1

Who are you? The Effects of Social Network Sites on the Construct of Personal Identity:

The Meta-Patterns View

by

Zachary Shaw

submitted to the

Department of Philosophy

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Bachelor of Arts

March 28, 2016

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... 4

Dedication ....................................................................................................................................... 5

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 6

Informational Background .............................................................................................................. 7

Social Network Sites ..................................................................................................................... 12

Theories of Personal Identity ........................................................................................................ 16

Effects of SNSs on Identity Construction from the Meta-Patterns View ..................................... 33

Turkle’s Long-Term Analysis of SNSs and Personal Identity ..................................................... 40

Conclusion: The Futility of Turkle’s Call for Arms and the Nature of Self-Identity ................... 45

Works Cited .................................................................................................................................. 50

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Acknowledgements

Thank you to everyone who has directly or indirectly affected my life. You are the

reason that I was able to complete this work. Thank you to my advisor Professor Harman for

guiding me through my independent work and telling me stories about the Princeton of old.

Thank you to all of my professors and teachers throughout my entire education for teaching me

with enthusiasm and patience. You have taught me your subjects, how to learn, and how to live.

Specifically, thank you to Mr. D. for your inspiration and continued support. Thank you to all of

my coaches throughout the years – in baseball, basketball, soccer, and primarily volleyball.

Without your mentorship and expertise I would not have been able to attend Princeton, and I

would not have been able to focus and manage my time effectively enough to complete this

work. Specifically, thank you to Coach Shweisky. I have learned more because of you than

anyone else in these four years. Thank you to all of the cadre members in the Army ROTC

program. What little common sense and discipline I have is due to your training and mentorship.

You are the reason why I have so much time to write this acknowledgments section and am

turning my thesis in on time. Thank you to my friends from high school, Princeton, and

anywhere else along the way. Only with your continuous support through the good and the bad

have I been able to get to this point in my life and accomplish this task. Finally and most

importantly, thank you to my family. You have taught me right and wrong and the gray area

inbetween and embedded in me the motivation and positive, growth mindset that I value most

about myself. And you have loved me unconditionally. Without this sense, mindset, and love, I

would not have been able to get close to the point of accomplishing this task.

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to my mom, who has taught me the value of face-to-face

communication and human relationships.

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Abstract

The development of [Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)] has

not only brought enormous benefits and opportunities but also greatly outpaced our

understanding of its conceptual nature and implications, while raising problems whose

complexity and global dimensions are rapidly expanding, evolving and becoming

increasingly serious. Our technological tree has been growing its far-reaching branches

much more widely, rapidly and chaotically than its conceptual, ethical and cultural roots.

The lack of balance is obvious and a matter of daily experience in the life of millions of

citizens dealing with information-related issues. The risk is that, like a tree with weak

roots, further and healthier growth at the top might be impaired by a fragile foundation at

the bottom. As a consequence, any advanced information society faces the pressing task

of equipping itself with a viable philosophy and ethics of information. It is high time we

start digging deeper, top-down, in order to expand and reinforce our conceptual

understanding of our information age, of its nature, its less visible implications and its

impact on human and environmental welfare, and thus give ourselves a chance to

anticipate difficulties, identify opportunities and resolve problems, conflicts and

dilemmas. (Floridi 5)

In this paper, I will show how the use of social network sites (SNSs) has affected and will

continue to affect our personal identities, and how only one modern theory of personal identity,

what I will call the meta-patterns view, can adequately account for these effects. From those

investigations, I will argue against the futility of Turkle’s normative argument against social

network site use and conclude that our personal identities are nothing more than attempts to

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recognize patterns of ever-changing information. In order to reach a point where we can

understand how our personal identities have changed, we need to understand the most prevalent

philosophical theories of personal identity, and the development of SNSs – what they are, how

we use them, and what role they play in our lives. But even before that, we must understand that

SNSs are a broader symptom of a larger technological phenomenon – mainly what Luciano

Floridi calls the “re-ontologizing of the nature of the infosphere” (Floridi 6) – in common

English, the onset of the information age. Only with this background can we effectively

understand how SNSs fit into our lives, and only with this understanding can we determine how

these SNSs have affected our concept of personal identity according to the meta-patterns view.

Informational Background

Since the dawn of history, we have had ways to record information.1 With each

compounding technological development, we have found ways to more concisely and more

quickly represent more and more of our histories. For much of human existence, information

systems served only as ways to remember our history – recording systems. From hieroglyphs to

Linear B, writing was a large step forward for mankind. As that writing moved from cave walls

to papyrus and paper, our records became mobile. Letters were written not to record our

histories, but to communicate with others. In these first two stages, information occurred, was

written down, was managed (by physically taking that information somewhere else) and then

was used. The next development for information systems was the ability to process information

with purely mechanical machines like Charles Babbage’s difference machine. With some given

information, we could now deduce other information (without human computation) and then use

that new information. Around the same time as Babbage’s invention came ways to communicate

1 By definition, pre-history is the time before we had records of human development.

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over space – the telegraph, Morse code, the telephone, and the radio. Now information would

occur, and could be processed, managed, and transported relatively efficiently to anywhere in the

world. Next, with the development of computers starting in 1940, we could process information

relatively efficiently – a single machine could perform many operations on our information by

processing the information in bits. Alan Turing developed the ability to constantly input

computable data and output processed information (Barker-Plummer). This further shortened the

gap between processing and managing, as the limiting factor became the throughput of a given

machine. Next came the increasing speed of computation with Moore’s Law – that computers

will double processing capacity2 every 18-24 months. With these developments, what Floridi

calls the “information life cycle” – information occurring, being processed and managed, and

then being used – was becoming shorter and shorter (Floridi 3).

More recently, the Internet has been developed. It synchronizes the processing and

managing capabilities of information systems into one easy-to-use system. As a result, there is

an unprecedented ability to create and use information. Instead of using a computer to make a

computation and then calling a friend to tell them about it, you can make that computation on

your computer and immediately post the results and the proof of the solution on a webpage

which everyone with a computer in the world can more or less permanently see, including your

friend. The abilities to process and manage information are becoming increasingly intertwined.

From the Internet, we can see that the time necessary for a person to receive information and

then act upon that information – the information life cycle – is continuing to shrink.

I will call this space of time between a person’s reception of an informational input from

the world and their reaction to that input with some informational output into the world the

Turing time gap. This gap is the time necessary for you to use the available technology to

2 Measured by the maximum number of transistors that can fit on a specified computer chip.

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complete the information life cycle. This gap is suitably described as the “Turing” time gap

because the Turing machine which Alan Turing created is the model still used to describe the

information life cycle as related to computation in computer science (Barker-Plummer). With

the technologies currently available, the Turing time gap has been reduced to negligible as

compared with the time it takes us as people to process information and act upon it. For

example, early in a relationship, possible partners may strategically wait to text their partner in

order to spur their significant other to ‘chase’ them (“Boy Talk”). In this case, the Turing time

gap of sending a picture message is negligible; however, because of the communication

medium’s social norms, information is inputted and outputted more slowly than if a phone call

were made to describe the object of the picture.

The Turing time gap is one measure of a larger phenomenon which Floridi calls

ontological friction: “the forces that oppose the flow of information… and hence (as a

coefficient) to the amount of work and effort required to generate, obtain, process and transmit

information in a given environment” (Floridi 7). Like the Turing time gap, ontological friction is

shrinking. All of the technological developments previously mentioned improve our ability to

process and manage our information, which, in turn, allows us to have more useful and, simply,

more information – thus lessening ontological friction.

As a result of these friction-reducing, time-saving, communication-enabling capabilities,

modern information communication technologies are very popular. They are becoming so

popular that our everyday world is becoming digitized. People are using their phones to text

their significant others at the lunch table instead of interacting face-to-face with their friends, or

they are texting their friends instead of interacting face-to-face with their significant other. They

are reading the news and posting articles to their blog instead of saying, “Hello,” on the subway.

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According to a 2011 study by the Pew Research Center, 13% of cell phone users, about 10.7% of

the total population, “has pretended to be using their phone in order to avoid interacting with the

people around them,” and this number has likely risen since then with increasing rates of cell

phone usage (Smith, Street). This statistic demonstrates the popularity of modern ICTs and their

digitization of the world.

As the digital and analogue3 worlds become increasingly intertwined and the threshold

between them increasingly becomes blurred, it becomes difficult to understand certain concepts,

like personal identity, whose older theories did not take into account this digitization (Stokes

364, Floridi 8). In order to understand these concepts given recent technological developments,

it is necessary to view the world through a framework which is centered around information – a

universal theme of both the digital and analogue worlds. Thus, Floridi introduces the infosphere:

“the whole informational environment constituted by all informational entities (thus including

informational agents as well4), their properties, interactions, processes and mutual relations”

(Floridi 6). The infosphere includes both information which is recorded online and offline – it

may be stored in our individual memories, on a terabyte hard drive, or written in hieroglyphics.

The infosphere is growing larger and larger,5 and that exponential growth is only possible

because of new information storage technologies6 which store more than previously thought

possible, and new information lifecycle technologies7 that are turning every interaction into data.

3 Analogue in the sense that includes all processable information which is not digital: “The digital is spilling over

into the analogue and merging with it.” (Floridi 8) 4 Important distinction because the infosphere treats interaction from informational agents the same as from ‘real’

agents. 5 Until the commodification of computers, there was only 12 exabytes of data in all of world history. In 2013, there

were 4,400 exabytes, and in 2020 it is predicted that there will by 44,000 exabytes of data (Gantz). 6 Example: Cheap hard drives which store ten or twenty times the amount of memory as was commercially possible

a couple of years ago. 7 Example: ‘Big data’ ad technology software which tracks the hundreds of data points available on Internet users,

and which sells access to that information in the form of online advertisements to the advertising marketplace.

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Given this nature, Floridi has deemed the increasing digitization of the world the “re-

ontologizing of the infosphere” (Floridi 12). According to Floridi, when this re-ontologization

has finished we will always be digitally connected, “it will be difficult to understand what life

was like in predigital times, and the very distinction between online and offline will become

blurred and disappear” (Floridi 8).

In this re-ontologized world, Floridi predicts that information will become our way of

“Being” (Floridi 9). We will no longer conceive of reality as a material world, but rather as an

informational world where objects and processes that we now classify as digital will play an

equal role to their physical, analogue counterparts. This change has great implications for

personal identity: “the criterion for existence is no longer being immutable or being potentially

subject to perception but being interactable” (Floridi 10). Differentiating ourselves only through

analogue means does not differentiate ourselves sufficiently for a solid sense of self if interacting

in the digital world is the social norm. Unless our way of differentiating ourselves is to reject the

digital norm and that aligns with our deeper sense of self, then we must somehow use the digital

forms available to us in order to create our personal identity.

For example, say we devote ourselves to a life of deep sea fishing. It would seem at first

glance that one could deep sea fish and learn all one needs to know about deep sea fishing with

minimal interaction in the digital world. However, if we assume the infosphere to be re-

ontologized, that is not the case. In this newly re-ontologized world of deep sea fishing, it is

socially accepted that one should post a picture and a video of every big fish one catches. If one

does not post pictures of at least three fish per day, one is socially stigmatized by one’s peers.

They say, “You are not a real fisherman! We have no proof that you caught anything good.” As

Then, companies looking to pinpoint their ads to specific users will buy those ads which are most likely to result in

revenue for their product.

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this social pressure grows, one is left with three options in the maintenance of their identity: (1)

Give in and begin to use one’s digital resources to develop their identity. (2) Look to find one’s

sense of identity elsewhere. (3) Or, incorporate one’s old-school style of not using social media

into one’s personal identity as a deep sea fisherman. In this re-ontologized world, even the deep

sea fisherman must somehow use (or not use) his or her SNS presence in order to maintain his or

her personal identity.

Broadly, our personal identity is a consequence of our personal narrative. The way we

view our selves, who we think we are, is a result of how we perceive the actions we have taken

throughout our lives. Those perceptions and the consequent personal narrative are told through

the given information systems of the current age. Thus, those perceptions and our personal

identities depend upon the mediums through which they are transmitted, i.e. information

communication technologies including SNSs.

Social Network Sites

Social network sites (SNSs) play a large role in the increasingly digitized infosphere.

They are an information and communication technology that inforgs,8 or actors in the infosphere,

commonly use to distinguish themselves as individuals. Within the infosphere, situations like

that of the deep-sea fisherman – where an individual must use their digital presence to maintain

their identity among their peers and create their personal narrative – are becoming more and

more prevalent.9 Thus, SNSs are instrumental in the development of inforgs’ personal identities.

SNSs consist of websites where users create “visible profiles that display an articulated list of

Friends who are also users of the system” (Boyd 212). SNSs are online platforms which enable

8 “Informationally embodied organisms… mutually connected and embedded in an informational environment, the

infosphere, which [they] share with both natural and artificial agents similar to us in many respects” (Floridi 11). 9 84% of American adults (age 18-64) are online and 74% of online American adults use social media (“Social

Networking”). Thus, 62% of American adults use SNSs.

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users to “construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of

other users with whom they share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections

and those made by others within the system” (Boyd 211). The most prevalently used SNSs are

currently Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, Pinterest, and Instagram (“Top”). With SNSs,

individuals can “type oneself into being” (Boyd 212) through both narrative and multimedia

components (Stokes 365).

Because SNS use is a large part of the way we brand ourselves online to distinguish

ourselves from the virtual masses of inforgs in the infosphere, these social networks are used to

promote the individual, with profiles at the center of their interface. Because of this

individualized focus, “construction and maintenance of relations on SNSs is akin to ‘social

grooming’” (Boyd 224). You, as a user, want your profile to be popular because you want social

approval. Thus, you consciously construct an online representation of yourself – to manage your

networks’ impressions of you in a way that face-to-face communication does not allow for (Boyd

219). Every interaction one makes using SNSs can be a conscious, calculated choice whereas in

the real world one’s body language and real-time reactions cannot be controlled in such a

manner. In line with this calculated thinking, “online profiles are essentially performative, with

users trying to give a particular impression of themselves… all profiles are necessarily less than

authentic”10 (Stokes 365). SNS profiles often represent the aspirational identities that users

would like to embody in the real world, but have not yet been able to accomplish (Stokes 365).11

10 However, “if ‘authentic’ here simply means ‘free’ from attempts to give a particular impression of oneself then

it’s doubtful that any identity-presenting social behavior, online or offline, could count as authentic” (Stokes 365).

Authentic is a term that draws a line between what one’s identity really consists in and what is outside of that

identity but related to one’s personal identity. Depending upon the theory of personal identity assumed, this line is

drawn in different places. 11 Again, this is typical for both your virtual and non-virtual identities. You want to make a good impression on

others you interact with.

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There are several older stigmas associated with SNSs – both related to the performative

nature of profile creation. These stigmas are networking and misrepresentation. Both of these

stigmas are a result of SNSs’ histories. SNSs stemmed from MUDs (Multi-User Dungeon) and

MOOs (MUD, Objection-Oriented). MUDs and MOOs are early virtual environments in which,

as a user, you are a character. They were first created in the mid-70’s, and were most popular in

the late-80’s and throughout the 90’s. In these virtual environments, you can move and interact

with other characters – other users – by “typing directions or using the mouse to point in the

direction desired” (Sawyer). One’s interactions consist of a variety of human actions including

but not limited to “exploration, friendship, conversation, debate, and romance” (Sawyer). In

MOOs, more advanced forms of MUDs, users can also create objects (thus, ‘object-oriented’

MUDs) such as rooms, furniture, talking pets, and even talking furniture (Sawyer). The key

aspect of MUDs and MOOs as related to personal identity is that users play as characters

anonymously. Thus, users construct new selves through their characters in these virtual

dungeons. These selves may be of a different gender, sexual orientation, personality, or any

other attribute which is commonly thought to make up one’s personal identity.

Because SNSs have developed from the foundations of MUDs and MOOs, many assume

these SNSs to serve similar functions to their predecessors; thus, many call SNSs Social

Networking Sites not Social Network Sites. However, Social Network Sites are primarily not

used to develop new connections or do networking online with strangers (Boyd 211). Instead,

these sites are used to “maintain offline relationships or solidify offline connections” – to

communicate with people who are already a part of one’s social network (Boyd 221, 211). The

bi-directional confirmation requirement for friendship reinforces this norm of SNSs (Boyd 213).

It is not socially acceptable to accept a random friend request from someone not already in your

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social network: “the nature of SNSs contradicts popular concerns about the lonely adolescent

who connects online with strangers” (Peter 83). Furthermore, “SNS users use the search

capabilities of Facebook to ‘search’ for connections which they have already made in the real

world as opposed to ‘browsing’ for new strangers to connect with” (Boyd 221).

Understanding this stigma of networking vs. extending one’s network leads us to the

second stigma of misrepresentation. With the ability to “articulate and make visible” one’s

social networks and choose what others see on those networks, there is the ability to misrepresent

one’s real life online. Users can represent a different identity on SNSs than the one they live in

real life. However, because SNSs are used to extend one’s already-existent social network, there

is a strong incentive to not misrepresent oneself using SNSs: “SNSs mostly extend existing

offline relationships, making such fictional presentations considerably harder” (Stokes 364).

Posting a status which does not fit with one’s personal identity in the real world will

result in social stigmatization by one’s peers. For example, Dom Mazzetti, an upper-middle

class college student, is a brother in a fraternity which obeys a strict social code of drinking a lot

of beer and lifting a lot of weights. However, Dom has recently become obsessed with rapping

and rap music. He has begun to post rap songs and lyrics, both recorded by other artists and by

himself, to his Facebook account. Many of his peers have pulled away as friends because they

do not want to be associated with someone who does not fit their strict social mold. I personally

have seen a situation similar to this example occur on Princeton’s campus. Although Dom is not

misrepresenting himself through his actions on Facebook, this example shows why a SNS user

would not want to misrepresent oneself: One would be socially stigmatized. Thus, typically

“people don’t have digital alter egos” (Floridi 12).

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However, the argument for complete misrepresentation is valid in rare, but well-known,

stereotypical cases. For example, a sexual predator assumes a new identity to take advantage of

a young, innocent teenager. In extreme cases like these the perpetrator does assume a

completely different identity. However, in this case the profile is being used as a tool to

accomplish a different goal, not as a way to diversify its owner’s identity: The sexual predator

likely does not feel that their fake profile is a part of their true self. Yet, if misrepresentation is

limited only to these extreme cases, then why, today on Facebook for example, are 5.5% –

11.2% of all accounts fake (Protalinski)? The answer is that almost all of these fake accounts are

created by programs and bots in order to boost the number ‘likes,’ and thus the popularity of

one’s profile – not to create a fake personal identity to make an alter ego as in a MUD or a MOO

(Parsons).

Today’s social networks are primarily used as accurate representations of one’s offline

self. SNSs are so strongly associated with misrepresentation and networking because of their

history. Because MUDs and MOOs were not used to accurately portray one’s real world

personal identity, SNSs have been stigmatized (Sawyer). However, SNSs are not exact copies of

one’s personal identity as expressed in certain real life situations. One’s personal identity

changes depending on the medium of ICT used for its expression; in the case of SNSs, that

medium pushes one’s personal identity to be performative and aspirational.

Theories of Personal Identity

All of these technological changes, from writing to Turing machines to SNSs, have had at

least a marginal effect on our personal identities. If these technological changes had not existed,

we would have expressed ourselves through different mediums and have spent our time on

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different activities.12 In short, our lives would be different, and thus our individual concepts of

personal identity would likely be different. Given the assumption that SNSs have affected our

personal identities in some way, a coherent theory of personal identity must be able to account

for their effects. If not, for the purposes of this paper I will dismiss that theory of personal

identity as inadequate.

Despite these constant effects from ICTs – not to mention the many other socioeconomic,

political, and cultural forces throughout time – the concept of personal identity has continued to

exist. Thus, there must be some foundation of the concept that has remained. This foundation

tries to answer prototypically ‘deep’ questions like “Who am I?” Philosophers have sought to

discover what exactly is fundamental to a person’s identity, through reason. Like other

philosophical issues, there is no conclusive answer. However, to come to terms with what we

commonly believe to be a person’s identity, it is useful to understand the philosophical basis for

our common conceptions. At the philosophical level – where we have a more concrete grasping

of what makes up a person’s identity – it will be easier to determine how SNSs have affected that

conception. From that philosophical understanding of SNSs’ effects on personal identity, we can

return to see how those changes have influenced our everyday conceptions of personal identity.

In prior discussions of social networks and personal identity, one broad theory or another

of personal identity is assumed. However, it is useful to develop a more nuanced understanding

of the various theories of personal identity in order to make explicit the assumptions and

rationale for the given theory under which we are interpreting personal identity. In order to

understand more deeply how SNSs have affected our concept of personal identity, we will start

by exploring the different philosophical questions of personal identity.

12 Specifically, without these technological advances, we would be spending a lot more of our time accomplishing

different parts of the information life cycle – which are automated or shortened by these ICTs.

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Broadly, one’s personal identity consists in “those features which define her as a person

or make her the person she is” (Olson 2). This general statement gives way to several more

concrete questions. We must answer the fundamental nature question: What are we (Blatti)?

What are our fundamental properties (Olson 6)? We must know what characteristics are

necessary for a being to be counted as a person, and what are sufficient. Also, we must answer

the persistence question: What does it take for a person to continue existing, to persist, from one

time to another. How can I tell that I am the person I was yesterday and the person that I will be

tomorrow? Additionally there is the evidence question: “What evidence bears on the question of

whether the person here now is the one that was here yesterday” (Olson 4)? When we are

looking to answer the persistence question, what evidence can we and must we use in our

arguments?

There are many different theories that attempt to formulate a cohesive definition of

personal identity which answers these questions of fundamental nature, persistence, and

evidence. None of the theories are perfect, but some are currently more widely accepted than

others. An explanation of these various theories and their answers to the three questions of

personal identity will help to ground our understanding of how SNSs have affected personal

identity. After presenting each theory, I will endeavor to understand if SNSs could possibly have

affected our personal identities assuming that current theory.

Broadly, there are two types of theories of personal identity – reductionist and non-

reductionist. Reductionism, as expressed by Derek Parfit, states that “psychological and/or

physical continuity and connectedness are adequate to the facts of personal identity without any

notion of strict identity being posited” (Kapstein 292). We can define a person by using only

facts about their physical and mental states. On the other hand, non-reductionists believe the

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opposite claim: We cannot resolve the problems of personal identity without incorporating some

immutable essence into our definition. There either cannot be evidence or there is not sufficient

evidence available (to us as human beings) to identify people as being human in light of that

information. Thus, these theories incorporate some immutable essence of humanity into their

definition of personal identity.

We will start by examining the reductionist theories. First, let’s take the view called

animalism. This view claims that we, as people, are merely organisms of the animal kingdom:

“We are animals.” If we are of the species Homo sapiens, then we are human (Blatti). From this

fundamental claim, animalism answers the persistence problem by positing that the conditions

for persistence of a human person are identical to those of any other animal that exists (Blatti).

Because we are members of this species and we are animals, we do not have bodies that are

animals. Animalism opposes that we are anything but animals: “material bodies, souls, bundles

of mental states, thinking organisms, persons materially constituted by but nonidentical with

animals, nothing at all” (Blatti).

However, exactly what the conditions are for animals to exist is a matter of debate

between animalists. On one hand, organic animalists set the necessary conditions for animal

persistence to be that “one’s purely animal functions – metabolism, the capacity to breathe and

circulate one’s blood, and the like – continue” (Blatti). On the other, somatic animalists claim

that animals are “functionally organized physical objects whose membership in a particular

species is attributed to its origin and structure” (Blatti). Only if this structure is lost will an

animal, and thus a human, cease to exist. Although the concept of an animal is up for debate,

animalists agree that one’s personal identity is the same as the identity of any other animal.

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Could we, as animals, be affected by SNSs? I do not believe that a change in our

information life cycle could cause us to leave the animal kingdom. Take the following thought

experiment to understand why. A specific species of inchworm has created a new technology,

Inch Worm SNS (IWSNS), which matches all capabilities of human SNSs for inch worms.

Because of IWSNS, are inch worms fundamentally changed as animals to the extent that we no

longer call them animals? Do their autonomic functions change? Does the structure of an

inchworm as a functionally organized physical object change? Perhaps, these autonomic

functions and structure will be affected in several thousand years as inchworms evolve to

maximize their resources given their IWSNS-expanded constraints of survivability. However, it

is unlikely that within several millennia we would go so far as to describe inchworms as

something other than animals. Certainly the animalism of an inchworm will not be changed in a

couple decades. Given that modern SNSs have only existed for that short time, our personal

identities have not been affected by SNSs – from the perspective of animalists. Thus, the

animalist theory of personal identity is inadequate in explaining the effects of SNSs on our

personal identities.

A different view, the functional brains view, posits that we are physical parts of

organisms, specifically functioning brains. This view attempts to resolve two common

arguments regarding personal identity – the too-many-subjects problem and the not-enough-

bodies problem (Campbell 5, 11). The too-many-subjects problem is an argument animalists use

to defend their view that one’s identity and one’s self are one and the same with an organism.

For, if I were not my organism – whether that be my physical organism or the structure of my

organism – then I must be two separate entities – my self and my body. Because “it is absurd to

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suppose that there are really two subjects of each individual thought or experience occurring in

your head,” animalists claim that we must be the same as our organism (Campbell 5).13

On the other hand, the not-enough-bodies problem is an argument against animalists.

The problem is the inability to explain the medical case of dicephalus. In a dicephalus, like the

case of Abigail and Brittany Hensel, twins are fused together at some point below the neck

(Extraordinary). They live separate lives with separate minds, and there are two distinct people.

However, there is one physical organism. It is clearly not the case that one of the people

coincides with the organism while the other does not because each person controls their

respective side of the physical body. In the case of dicephalus, animalists are forced to either

bite the bullet and reject that there are two separate humans or create an exception case to their

theory – perhaps proposing a dicephalus as a different kind of human being. Both the too-many-

subjects problem and the not-enough-bodies problem present serious doubts as to the validity of

certain theories of personal identity.

In response to these two problems, the functional brains view “den[ies] that we are

spatially coincident with organisms” (Campbell 8). Instead, “a person is identical to those

functional areas of her brain that are necessary and jointly sufficient for her capacity for

consciousness… we are nonderivative subjects of consciousness” (Campbell 9). Specifically,

we assume that ‘functional’ parts of our brain are essential for the generation of consciousness.

Thus, the too-many-subjects problem is avoided because we coincide with the functional parts of

our physical brains14 – thus, we do not have the dilemma of the self and physical body as

13 However, as Campbell points out, this argument can be turned against animalists after a person’s death: We do not

survive death, but our organism and its matter do not change when someone dies. But if we are our organism and its

matter remains the same during death, does the organism live on? 14 Some may dispute the viability of this claim because it equates our personal identity with a mass of matter that

weighs, on average, 3 lbs, or about 2% of our total body weight. From this point of view, it seems far-fetched to

limit the essence of a being so complex to only 2% of that body.

22

separate entities. Furthermore, the not-enough-bodies problem is avoided because, in the case of

dicephalus, there are two physical brains to coincide with two separate personal identities.

So, have the functional parts of our brain been affected by SNSs? To know the exact

answer to this question, we must be able to identify which areas of the brain are responsible for

our consciousness and which areas of the brain are affected by SNSs if any. To start, let’s

explore the research on the functional areas of the brain – the areas responsible for

consciousness. Before 2014, there had been no conclusive studies connecting any specific area

of the brain to consciousness (Thomson). Then, in 2014, one study found a link between the

claustrum and consciousness (Thomson). In that study, one subject’s claustrum was stimulated

with electricity; while stimulated, the subject was unconscious. Once the stimulation was

stopped, the subject immediately regained consciousness (Thomson). Additionally, further

research regarding the claustrum has been done which supports this scientific evidence (Stiefel).

However, besides this one experiment, there has been no

additional evidence linking the claustrum or any other

functional area of the brain to consciousness.

On the other hand, let’s take a look at the effects

of SNSs on specific areas of the brain. Research has

shown that SNSs “can lower your self-esteem and alter

your appetite” (“5 Weird”). When someone sends you a

message, likes one of your posts, or comments on one of

your status updates, using a SNS will activate the same

areas of the brain as when using heroin or cocaine – the

reward centers of the brain (Bautista). As we use SNSs

Source:

Thomson

23

more and more, we become conditioned to seek praise and approval through their mechanisms.

Additionally, food porn, pictures or videos of appetizing food shared on social media,

“provokes a real emotional and physical hunger response that can be tough to control”

(O’Rourke). Because of a phenomenon called “supernormal stimuli,” looking at food porn

magnifies our desire for foods which we are already preprogrammed to love (O’Rourke). Part of

the brain’s reward center is activated, the hunger hormone ghreline is released, and the brain’s

area responsible for self-control fails to activate as it would in a situation where someone is

looking at real food (O’Rourke).

Both of these effects of SNSs may not equate to a visible effect on the brain after one

session of SNS use. However, because 62% of American adults are SNS users (“Social

Networking”),15 and on average spend 1.7 hours per day using SNSs (“Social Media”), there is

likely a systemic effect on the brain’s reward center. As we are constantly conditioned to exhibit

these responses because of our SNS use, the brain slowly changes. This change likely manifests

itself physically in some of the functional parts of the brain. However, the only area which has

been shown to directly alter consciousness is the claustrum. Besides this sole study, very little is

known about the claustrum – specifically regarding connections between it and the reward

centers of the brain. Thus, there is not significant scientific evidence to show that SNSs affect

our personal identity from the functional brains view. In the future we may find other links

between certain functional areas of the brain and consciousness, and these links may prove that

personal identity is affected by SNSs – according to the functional brains view. However, with

our current scientific research, the functional brains view cannot adequately explain the effects of

SNSs on our personal identities and is therefore inadequate for our investigations.

15 84% of American adults (age 18-64) are online and 74% of online American adults use social media (“Social

Networking”). Thus, 62% of American adults use SNSs. Also, the statistic for adolescents (age 12-17) is much

higher – 95% of teens are online, and 81% use SNSs. Thus, 77% of teens use SNSs (“Teens”).

24

A different view posits that there cannot be such a thing as personal identity:

“If I wrote a book ‘The world as I found it’, I should also have therein to report on my

body and say which members obey my will and which do not, etc. This then would be a

method of isolating the subject or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no

subject: that is to say, of it alone in this book mention could not be made” (Wittgenstein).

Because any subject is made up of its members – we define something by its parts – there is no

holistic identity of a subject. Because any description of people must be formulated using a

collection of the parts of what ‘makes’ a person, there is no unique personal identity. Because

this view denies the existence of personal identity, there is no concept for SNSs to affect. Thus,

this view is unchanged by the advent of SNSs and inadequate for the investigations of this paper.

Another view, called the constitutional view and proposed by Lynne Rudder Baker,

argues that we, as people, are “material things ‘constituted by’ organisms: a person is made of

the same matter as a certain animal, but they are different things because what it takes for them

to persist is different” (Olson 6). This view claims that we are constituted by our physical

bodies, but we are not identical to them – unlike organic animalists. To understand the

distinction between constitution and identity, take the following example: A bronze statue is

constituted by bronze, but there is something more about the statue than its bronzeness that

makes it a statue, and not just a piece of bronze (Baker 592). In both the case of a bronze statue

and the case of a person it is difficult to put a finger on exactly what makes the piece of bronze a

statue16 or what makes the human body a person.

In the case of a person, proponents of this constitutional view posit that one is a “person

in virtue of having a narrowly-defined capacity for a first-person perspective, and is human in

16 In the case of the statue, perhaps it is the artist’s intent that the piece of bronze be known as a statue, combined

with the statue’s audience’s awareness of that artist’s intent.

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virtue of being constituted by a human body (or human animal)” (Baker 592). This view

attempts to toe the line between accepting our animalistic natures and recognizing that we are

ontologically different beings from the rest of the animal kingdom. People are human by virtue

of their human bodies, but they are people because they have first-person perspectives: the

ability and desire to ask, “What am I?” (Baker 592).

As to whether the constitutional view of personal identity could be affected by SNSs, the

answer follows that of the animalist theories. Just as it is unlikely that our autonomic physical

functions or our structural integrity as animals will be changed by our ability to further cut the

Turing time gap and reduce ontological friction, it is unlikely that our first-person perspectives as

people will be significantly affected by SNSs. Even if we were to measure the effects of SNSs

over several millennia, SNSs will likely not significantly affect personal identity assuming the

constitution view. Thus, this view is inadequate for the purposes of this paper.

The last major reductionist view is what I will call the meta-patterns view. Analytic

philosopher David Lewis argued for a version of this view: We, as people, are “best regarded as

suitably related aggregates of person-stages” (Lewis 1). Just as a volleyball match can be

divided into multiple sets, people can be divided into different person-stages (Olson 6). No two

person-stages are the same. Thus, the persistence question of personal identity arises. If we are

constantly changing psychologically, physiologically, and mentally, what, that is within the

physiological, psychological, or mental realm, can maintain our identity as the same persons over

different person-stages?

In order to answer this question, we must understand the intrinsically changing nature of

persons – drawing upon Buddhist philosophy which also supports a version of the meta-patterns

view. In Buddhism, this view expresses personal identity as the “anatman, a person who

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passes,” who is constantly unfolding (Flanagan 95). An anatman is known by a proper name –

as I go by the name ‘Zach’ and my friend goes by the name ‘Devin’ – but he or she is physically

and mentally changing at every moment. The anatman is the opposite of the atman, or the view

of personal identity as a “strict identity and self-same soul” (Flanagan 97).

This dichotomy seems backwards from the reductionist and non-reductionist point of

view. The most basic theory of personal identity is the irreducible, soul-proponing, atman

theory, whereas in Western philosophy the most basic theory is the reductionist theory, and all

non-reductionist theories are exactly that – non-reductionist. The anatman, or non-atman, theory

seems to presuppose an immutable soul. Some who misinterpret Buddhist philosophy see this as

a contradiction because, if the Buddhist view is known as a negation of a certain view, it would

make sense if that original view were widely accepted. True to form, the atman theory is widely

accepted.

We need concepts in order to understand the world around us, so many of us blindly

assume those concepts to be true – like many of those who assume atman theory. Buddhism

does not deny that there are persons – concepts like those signified by the names ‘Zach’ and

‘Devin’ that we use by convention to describe certain physical, physiological, and mental

patterns. However, it does deny that these persons ultimately refer to anything “really real”

(Flanagan 95): “it is a brilliant work of art, a product of the intellect, which says, ‘Let’s give all

this a name. Let’s call it ‘I’’” (Trungpa 6). In our everyday lives, we need to be able to

characterize concepts which are not simple and absolute in order to live meaningful lives. Thus,

we create concepts which are comprised of collections of patterns of states and events. Two of

these concepts are the immutable soul and real people. These concepts themselves make an

27

impact on our decisions and therefore the events of the world; nevertheless, these concepts do

not actually refer to anything more than recurring patterns of states and events.

We know what the anatman identity is not, but what is it? How can a patterning of events

make up something as complex as personal identity? In order to understand this problem, take

the following Buddhist, metaphorical explanation:

You cannot step into the same river twice. Both you and the river will have changed

between t1 and t2, whatever the interval. Does this mean there is no river and no you?

Of course not. I have stepped into the Eno River numerous times. The water in the Eno,

the cells on the surface of my skin, my age, and my state of mind were different each and

every time I stepped into the river, which was also different in numerous hard-to-notice

ways. But it is [the person] who has stepped into the river each time. (Flanagan 96)

The world and the people in it are constantly unfolding and changing. Thus, there is no

immutable, rigid essence to personal identity. On the reductionist hand, the consistent patterning

of certain events and states allows us to recognize patterns of patterns. These meta-patterns

make up our individual concepts of personal identity.17 Specifically, our conscious awareness is

one of the recurring meta-patterns. The anatman theory posits that our personal identities consist

in18 the meta-patterned ability to think intelligently, reason, reflect, and “consider itself as itself,

the same thinking thing, in different times and places” (Flanagan 96). Consequently, personal

identity “links together a series of mental [and physical] processes in one connected and

conscious experience” (Kapstein 294).

17 Taken a step further, the general concept of personal identity that we use to encompass all individuals’ personal

identities is a meta-meta-pattern because it is the pattern of individuals’ meta-patterned personal identities abstracted

into a concept for the purposes of our understanding. 18 This is where the anatman theory draws the line between what is included in someone’s personal identity and

what is merely a pattern of states or events related to one’s personal identity.

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Returning to Lewis’s view, personal identity is “the relation between temporally extended

continuant persons with stages at different times” (Lewis 1). As mentioned earlier, this view’s

rationale begins by answering a version of the persistence question. How can we, as persons,

persist over time if we are constantly changing time-slices of persons? What causes us to persist

between each time-sliced experience? In the meta-patterns view, the connectedness and

continuity of individual patterns resolves this issue. Individual, present, time-sliced patterns

have “direct relations of similarity and causal dependence between… each of [their] successors”

(Lewis 2). This connectedness between patterns allow for a cohesive experience over time. In

addition to this connectedness, meta-patterns between individual time-sliced patterns seem to

develop: “The existence of [these] step-by-step paths from here to there, with extremely strong

local connectedness from each step to the next” gives us one continuous experience from which

we can determine recurring causes and effects as meta-patterns (Lewis 2). Through these

patterns of the relation between our different selves throughout time, we, or at least the concept

of our personal identities as individuals, can survive throughout time and resolve the persistence

problem.

In Patrick Stokes’s article “Ghosts in the Machine: Do the Dead Live on in Facebook?”

he make a distinction between selves and persons which clarifies the persistence question even

further. In this view, selves are the individual, present-time states of our bodies – physical,

physiological, and psychological. They are the “the present locus of experience,” the water in

the Eno River at time t1 (Stokes 376). Similarly, the self-identity is the “the identity that

guarantees the continuation of one’s immediately available arena of presence over time” (Stokes

377). Also, this identity is fundamentally the most important to us as individuals because

without it, we would no longer exist. On the other hand, persons are diachronically extended

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patterns of selves. The person is the collection of meta-patterns that one comes to call “Zach” or

“Devin.” Extending this definition to what I will call person-identity19 to avoid confusion,

person-identity is “the identity over time of the public person who happens now to be at the

centre of one’s arena of presence” (Stokes 377). At any given time, one’s time-sliced self

includes a formulation of one’s narrative person-identity. Applying these new concepts to the

river metaphor of personal identity explored earlier, our person is the diachronic collection of

meta-patterned states and events that we come to call a river, and our self is the time-sliced

physical material – mostly water – that the river consists in at any given moment.20

Stokes comes to realize this distinction between persons and selves by pondering a

common rebuttal of most theories of personal identity – one’s personal identity after death. Even

after an individual’s physical death, some part of his or her identity lives on. Why do we care so

much about the treatment of human corpses? Why are we so respectful of the social media

profiles of the dead?

Not making the effort to remember the dead dishonours not the memory of the dead

person, but the dead person themselves, for the dead are not reducible to our memories of

them… For us if not for the dead themselves, their moral identity extends beyond the

boundaries of their biological lives. That we struggle to ground that sense metaphysically

does nothing to disenchant our sense of the dead persisting in this way. (Stokes 368-369)

Using the distinction between self-identity and person-identity, we can understand this

phenomenon. Our present-tense, time-sliced selves die when we physically die. We no longer

constantly have thoughts in our head. We no longer are physically living or physiologically

19 Stokes simply calls it personal identity. 20 For the remainder of this paper, I will use the terms self, person, self-identity, and person-identity as explained in

this paragraph.

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developing. Thus, there is no self-identity. However, our person-identity lives on in the lives of

others through their individual, meta-patterned concepts of my diachronic person.

To better understand how SNSs would affect the meta-patterns view of personal identity,

it would be helpful to have a concept which coheres meta-patterning with Floridi’s view of

individuals as inforgs in the re-ontologized infosphere. Floridi’s concept of Shannon

information fills this gap perfectly. One’s patterning of Shannon information is the “complex

organization or form of a person” which “persist[s] through changes in matter-energy” (Floridi

25). Only if that pattern of Shannon information is maintained will personal identity be

maintained. The metaphor which Floridi uses to describe our personal identities is very similar

to the Buddhist metaphor for anatman identity: “We are but whirlpools in a river of ever flowing

water. We are not stuff that abides, but patterns [of Shannon information] that perpetuate

themselves.” (Floridi 25). In this way, personal identity is not tied to any specific physical part

of the body like the brain. Instead, the constant form of Shannon information in our ever-

changing bodies of matter-energy answers the questions of continuity and connectedness through

the same reasoning as employed by Lewis. Additionally, patterning and meta-patterning of

Shannon-information can be applied to Stokes’s distinction of the self-identity and the person-

identity. In the infosphere, self-identity is the time-sliced patterning of Shannon information

which makes up one’s self concept, and person-identity is the diachronic collection of meta-

patterned Shannon information which makes up one’s self concept from connected and

continuous patterns of self-identity.

In short, according to the meta-pattern view of personal identity, our person-identities can

be affected by SNSs. To go further, they must be affected. Our person-identities are the ever-

changing collection of meta-patterns created as a result of the different patterns exhibited by our

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time-sliced self. At any given time, our time-sliced self includes our current meta-patterned

concept of our person. Although this person extends temporally, it also is constantly changing.

These time-slices of our person are influenced by the mediums through which our selves are

expressed. SNSs are one of those mediums; thus, our personal identities have been affected by

SNSs. But to what extent? The answer to this question, unlike most of the other theories, can be

better understood with further philosophical reflection. Because this theory does not identify our

personal identity with our physical body or parts of it, or any concrete concept of our person for

that matter, this view cannot be proven or disproven through scientific study. Thus, after the

non-reductionist theories of personal identity have been explored, we will endeavor to

understand how SNSs have affected our meta-patterned personal identities.

These reductionist views all rely on the assumption that a person is a conglomerate whole

of physical or psychological parts. However, another approach, the non-reductionist view,

rejects these claims that a person can exist as a combination solely of physical or psychological

parts. The non-reductionist view posits that all other competing views fail to account for some

specific case of the continuity of personal identity. Thus, there must be some “further fact which

does not consist in physical and/or psychological continuity” that makes us, as people, stable

over time (Kapstein 291). There are competing non-reductionist views as to what, in addition to

this further fact, one’s personal identity consists in. Some believe that one’s personal identity is

only this further fact like Thomas Reid and Joseph Butler (Shoemaker). They posit that an

‘immutable soul’ alone could account for the continuity of a person over time: “Each person is

an individual who has an unchanging essence that makes him or her who they are” (Flanagan

97). Conversely, others believe the dualist view, which proposes that we are “compound things

made up of an immaterial soul and a material body” (Olson 6). We are us in virtue of our

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material body and some immaterial soul which cannot be associated with any physical or

psychological aspect of our being, but which is ontologically part of us.

In order to understand the rationale for non-reductionist views, let’s look at the following

problems of personal identity, and how their lack of resolution leads non-reductionists,

specifically dualists, to conclude that personal identity must be a further fact. For example, take

the case of a brain hemisphere transplant:

“It might be possible one day to remove a whole hemisphere, without killing the person.

There are no logical difficulties in supposing that we could transplant one of [the

person’s] hemispheres into one skull from which a brain had been removed, and the other

hemisphere into another such skull.” (Swinburne 14-15)

If we allow this thought experiment,21 then the one person would exist as two people. However,

non-reductionists assume it to be impossible for one person to be two. Consequently, sameness

of body and psychology cannot constitute personal identity. There must be something more

which makes a person a person. Additionally, take the case of amnesia in which people continue

to exist despite the loss of all memories. Because these amnesiacs are still themselves,22 people

cannot be only their memories and psychological states. Thus, personal identity does not have

psychological or physical continuity. But there must be something which is constant for

continuity to occur: “For some kind of thing to continue to exist is for the stuff out of which it is

made to continue to exist, and for it to maintain the form characteristic of that kind” (Swinburne

27). Thus, dualists conclude that there must be an immaterial soul which complements a

person’s psychological states and provides the continuity of a person’s identity over time (Olson

21 Comparing the prior functional brains view, this dualist argument assumes that there are not certain necessary

areas of the brain for consciousness (or at least that if there are certain necessary areas of the brain, they can be split

in two and remain functional). Otherwise, it would not be possible to entertain the thought experiment of two

consciousness-producing brains – both halves of an original brain. 22 Those in favor of a view of personal identity purely as mental states will argue against this claim.

33

6). These non-reductionist views go against the previous theories which posit that personal

identity is some combination of physical characteristics.

Based on our previous conclusions, we can understand the possible effects of SNSs on a

non-reductionist personal identity. For those who believe that our personal identity is only an

immutable soul, the question of SNSs’ effects is pointless. Because, by definition, we have no

way of measuring what this non-physical, non-psychological, immutable soul is, there is no way

to conclude that it has been affected or not by SNSs. Thus, this view is inadequate for

proponents of the dualist view – again – because there is no way to measure SNSs’ effects on the

immutable soul aspect of personal identity. However, it may be possible for us to draw

conclusions about the effects of SNSs on the other half of the view depending on what non-

reductionist theory it is comprised of. The conclusions of the dualist view will match those of

the respective reductionist theory which makes up the reductionist half of that dualist theory.

Thus, our explorations into the reductionist views will also show how the dualist view will be

affected by SNSs.

In summary, only the meta-patterns view of personal identity adequately accounts for

SNSs’ effects on our personal identities. Thus, in the examination of those effects we will

assume the meta-patterns view of personal identity.

Effects of SNSs on Identity Construction from the Meta-Patterns View

Given this analysis of personal identity theories and our knowledge of SNSs as platforms

used to differentiate oneself in the infosphere, let’s explore how SNSs affect our meta-patterned

person-identities. First, let us define identity construction as “the development of stable and

fulfilling friendships and the ability to disclose private information in appropriate ways and

settings” (Peter 83). Our relationships give us the support we need to create a concrete concept

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of person-identity in the present moment. In turn, these meta-patterns of selves enable us to

interact with those around us in socially acceptable ways which continue to develop our person-

identity narratives. SNSs affect these meta-patterns in several ways.

The extension view proposes that SNSs extend our person-identities. SNSs are part of

the virtual space which is used to extend one’s person-identity in ways which one cannot do in

real life. By its nature, this extension is made within the structural limitations of SNSs’

infrastructures. Through the medium of SNSs and within this structure, there are many ways to

extend one’s self. You can change your profile picture on Facebook, like a post on Twitter, write

a LinkedIn post and share it with a select number of your connections, post pictures of you and

your cat on Instagram, etc. All of these activities affect the Shannon information of your current

time-sliced self – based on your responses to these actions and your responses to others’

interactions.23

Let’s return to Floridi’s metaphor of the whirlpool as personal identity in order to

understand this theory of SNSs as extensions to your personal identity. In this metaphor, your

person-identity is the collection of meta-patterns of Shannon information that we call a

whirlpool. Imagine a world where the whirlpool is exactly the same, but there is no Shannon

information which represents color. There is only black and white and shades of gray. This

world mirrors your person-identity before SNSs. With SNSs, you are a more complex person.

There is more Shannon information which must be incorporated into your identity – more

interactions. This world reflects the world of the whirlpool in color. Before color in the

23 On a SNS, because the information is open and interacted with by so many users, the information from one

interaction expands exponentially. For example, User C may ‘like’ an interaction between User A and User B. This

interaction between User A and User B now is an informational input for User C. Thus, as a consequence of the

closing Turing time gap, Floridi states that, “the digital deals effortlessly and seamlessly with the digital” (Floridi 7).

Interactions flow instantaneously to and from digital interactions.

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whirlpool world and before SNSs in our world, nothing was missing. However, now that SNSs

do exist and they are a part of your meta-patterned person, your person-identity is more complex.

Furthermore, SNSs extend the self by “enable[ing] communication with other people

from [one’s] extended social network” which, without SNSs, one would not be able to

communicate with (Peter 83). SNSs’ “profiles extend our practical, psychological and even

corporeal identity in ways that give them considerable phenomenal presence in the lives of

spatially distant people” (Stokes 363). For example, I met a French girl on a plane to San

Francisco. She did not have an American phone and was leaving the country in three days. I

could not stay in touch with her if I were not able to look her up on Facebook and send her a

Friend Request. With Facebook, I can interact with her, albeit within Facebook’s structural

limitations, and I can facilitate other types of interaction with her – perhaps meeting in real life,

interacting on other SNSs, or talking on the phone. Without Facebook, the Shannon information

making up her self presently would not be as connected or affected by the Shannon information

making up my self. In this way, SNSs enable connections which would otherwise not have been

possible, thus extending our person-identities.

The extension view, like the stereotype of fake SNS profiles, is an effect of their

evolution from MUDs and MOOs. Because in MUDs and MOOs one anonymously creates a

new identity, the real life (abbreviated RL by MUD and MOO users) identity and the likely

multiple identities in virtual MUDs and MOOs transform one’s identity into “the sum of one’s

distributed presence” across these multiple platforms (Tavani 352). This parallelism between

online and offline identities allows users who are less socially adept in RL to develop stronger

identities in these virtual worlds. MUD and MOO users would develop online connections they

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otherwise would not have made; thus, they would construct their Shannon information-patterned

person-identities in new ways.

In modern-day SNSs, users do not create new, drastically different identities as in MUDs

or MOOs. However, that does not mean that their identities are not distributed across the

different platforms of SNSs and RL. SNS users do have a distributed person-identity presence

across these different mediums. As Stokes argued, SNSs play a role in our person-identity

diachronic narratives, even after our physical deaths. Just as we have different meta-patterns of

our personal identity in different contexts, we have different meta-patterns of our personal

identity on individual SNSs. For example, in RL our meta-patterns of our self when around our

college friends are likely very different from those meta-patterns of our self when we are

interacting with our boss at work. These meta-patterns may be used to describe two different

people.

This idea of different meta-patterns of person-identity being expressed in different

contexts is best conveyed in Harry Potter when Barty Crouch Sr. exclaims to his son “You are no

son of mine!” (Harry). The meta-patterned, diachronic person which Barty Sr. knew does not

match the meta-patterned, diachronic person who is currently being exhibited by the Shannon

information-patterned, current self of Barty Jr. Just as Barty Jr. was exhibiting different patterns

of Shannon information than his father knew, and you are a different person with your college

buddies than while talking to your boss, you are also a different person on all different SNSs.

The specific meta-patterns expressed in all these different contexts and on all these different

SNSs24 through your time-sliced self make up a part of the diachronic narrative of your

24 You might say that you are closer to your LinkedIn person when talking with your boss, and closer to your

Facebook person when talking with your college buddies. This shows that SNSs are equally viable platforms to

different RL situations to express one’s person.

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collective meta-patterned person. Thus, you may be different on these different occasions

without being literally a different person.

This phenomenon can be extended to the metaphor of the person as a whirlpool.

Depending on the weather conditions of the area, the ice melt of recent years, the erosion of

sediment in the river, etc. the whirlpool in the river will consist of a slightly different aligning (or

meta-patterning) of Shannon information during different years and different seasons. This

change is not merely the different particles of time-sliced water flowing through the whirlpool

and river at any given instant (these flowing particles represent the changing Shannon

information of the self). Rather, it is the changing meta-patterns of that water, the currents of the

whirlpool, which depend upon the different environmental conditions of the area. These

changing meta-patterns represent the different person-identities of an individual in different

contexts.

Conversely, SNSs limit one’s personal identity because of increased overlap between

different contexts of one’s person – over space. Because SNSs significantly lower the

ontological friction of your personal Shannon information, it is more difficult to keep clear

boundaries between person-identity narratives of different contexts. For example, what happens

if you are Facebook Friends with your college buddies and your boss? SNSs do offer tools to

manage what sub-networks can see a given post, but for most users the struggle to learn those

tools and remember which posts should be displayed to which sub-networks is not worth the

hassle (Valor 18). Even with these tools there is the risk that you may accidentally include your

boss on the list of people who can see your posts directed to your college buddies. Instead, most

users opt to “come to terms with the collision – allowing each network member to get a glimpse

of who [you are] to others (and in other situations), while at the same time asking [your]self

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whether these expanded presentations project a person that is more multidimensional and

interesting, or one that is manifestly insincere” (Vallor 18). In this way, SNS users’ personal

identities are limited to what aligns, to a certain extent, with the social norms of all of that users’

different overlapping networks and their contexts.

Similarly, SNS users must align their person-identities over time. Just as over one’s

different networks one must act according to an all-encompassing social standard because of

SNSs lessening of ontological friction (if one opts to accept the collision of multiple person-

identities), one’s interactions in the past must adhere to the current social standards because of

another effect of SNSs on Shannon information – permanence. Because after posting something

to one’s profile it is almost permanently25 available to one’s network, SNS users must align their

past interactions and Shannon information to their current meta-patterned person. There are SNS

tools like Facebook’s “‘Timeline’ feature (which displays my entire online personal history for

all my friends to see) [that] can prompt me to ‘edit’ my past;” however, “it can also prompt me to

face up to and assimilate into my self-conception thoughts and actions that might otherwise be

conveniently forgotten” (Vallor 18). Before SNSs we could reconcile our different, past meta-

patterned versions of our persons by changing our perspectives on those memories. We could

remember the aspects of our past persons in a way which more easily aligned them with our

current person. Now we cannot as effectively bend those memories to align with our current

meta-patterned person. Because of the permanent nature25 of most SNSs, a post cannot be

forgotten or as easily morphed to fit one’s current diachronic person narrative. Thus, one’s

current, complex person-identity must “take into account the multiple pasts and presents that the

25 There are ways to edit and delete SNS posts. However, other users of these networks can easily save or

screenshot any post before it is deleted or edited. Consequently, the post becomes permanent. Also, for more

sophisticated hackers, there are ways to access time-archived profiles which would include original or deleted posts

(Cooper, Wolpe).

39

user has occupied/is occupying” (Stokes 365). Consequently, one must more coherently align

one’s current person-identity to one’s past person-identities. In this way, one’s person-identity is

constricted by SNSs.

Also, SNSs are likely to make one’s personal identity increasingly polarized because of

“the unique temptations of ‘narrowcast’ social networking communities” (Vallor 16). SNSs

allow us to connect and relate with those who otherwise would not be in our network. This is the

effect of decreased ontological friction. However, we are most likely to only connect with those

people who we already share traits, interests, or groups with because we can relate through these

connections. So what we see on SNSs – for example the Timeline on Facebook – is already

geared towards people with which we share something.

“[Combined with] the absence of the full range of personal identifiers evident through

face-to-face contact, SNS[s] may also promote the deindividuation of personal identity by

exaggerating and reinforcing the significance of singular shared traits that lead us to see

ourselves and our SNS contacts more as representatives of a group than as unique

persons.” (Vallor 16)

The architecture of SNSs, specifically the algorithms of features like the Facebook ‘Timeline,’ is

geared to show us what we want to see for financial reasons. If we like what we see, we will

visit the site more often which earns the SNS company more advertising revenue. Consequently,

on SNSs there is “a tendency to constrict our identities to a closed set of communal norms that

perpetuate increased polarization, prejudice and insularity” (Vallor 16). Despite there being less

ontological friction of Shannon information because of SNSs, due to the structure of SNSs the

information which uses these almost frictionless pathways is limited by how it is tailored to our

interests. However, there will always be a flow of information on SNSs which does not perfectly

40

fit our individual social norms and perfectly align with our current person-identity, and this flow

“has the potential to offer at least some measure of protection against the extreme insularity and

fragmentation of discourse” perpetuated by SNSs (Vallor 24). Still, as SNSs’ algorithms become

more refined, and the Shannon information which individuals are exposed to through SNSs on a

daily basis becomes more polarized, our Shannon information meta-patterned persons will

become increasingly polarized.

SNSs act to extend, constrain, and narrow our personal identities in a variety of ways.

With new technological developments like SNSs, it seems that we are becoming more and more

complex beings. Our person-identity narratives now must incorporate more Shannon

information than ever before into their histories.

Turkle’s Long-Term Analysis of SNSs and Personal Identity

Although we may initially use SNSs in order to extend our identities and connect with

those with whom we would not be able to otherwise, SNSs have other long-term effects. One

investigation of personal identity, popularized by Sherry Turkle in several books – most recently

Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age – posits that the abstraction from

analogue interactions to digital interactions in SNSs is destroying our ability to relate to one

another, and thus negatively impacting the construction of our personal identities. This view

originates from the Heideggerian view of technology as “a monolithic force with a distinctive

vector of influence, one that tends to constrain or impoverish the human experience of reality in

specific ways” (Vallor 5). All technology which abstracts from our natural26 experience of the

world creates a hyperreality (Vallor 6). From this view, SNSs serve to “subvert or displace

organic social realities by allowing people to ‘offer one another stylized versions of

26 In the sense of meaning without any ICT.

41

themselves… rather than allowing the fullness and complexity of their real27 identities to be

engaged’” (Vallor 6).

As noted before, SNSs are designed to be user-friendly, and give us complete control of

our interactions. This control limits the risk of interactions on SNSs (Vallor 8). Because of

these characteristics of SNSs, they, like other hyperrealities, have a “tendency to leave us

‘resentful and defeated’ when we are forced to return” to RL (Vallor 6). We start using SNSs as

ways to extend our person-identity narratives. Then, when combined with recent developments

in mobile technology which allow us to always be connected, we end up using SNSs in place of

other ‘more natural’ mediums of relating because of the short-term benefits of SNSs: “We begin

by arguing that the replacements are ‘better than nothing’ but end up considering them ‘better

than anything’ – cleaner, less risky, less demanding” (Franzen). Thus, we are “quick to settle for

the feeling of being cared for and, similarly, to prefer the sense of community that social media

delivers, because it comes without the hazards and commitments of a real-world community”

(Franzen).

Turkle argues that SNSs are negatively affecting our identity by creating a vicious cycle

of deficient conversations and lack of alone time which influences our meta-patterned person-

identities. Instead of spending time with those around us physically, we are spending time using

SNSs. There is a “growing cultural tolerance for being ‘alone together’” (Vallor 21). Even

when we are together with people physically, we are still alone because we are not paying

enough attention to them to relate on a level deeper than we do on SNSs: “With people, things go

best if you pay close attention and know how to put yourself in someone else’s shoes. Real

people demand responses to what they are feeling” (Turkle 11). However, when we are

constantly looking at SNSs on our smartphones while interacting with others, we cannot meet

27 This theory presupposes that we have a concrete, real personal identity.

42

those demands. With this growing cultural tolerance for a lack of empathy, conversation is

becoming a lost art.

According to this view, “conversation is on the path toward the experience of intimacy,

community, and communion” (Turkle 11). With fewer intimate conversations, we will have less

intimate relationships and little motivation to explore the issues that make up our person-

identities. Connecting with others on a deep level is much easier when face-to-face with that

person because RL forces us to work through the difficult parts of interactions. In a RL

conversation, there is awkwardness and there are “Ah-ha!” moments where we finally

understand the other person’s perspective on an issue. On a SNS, the predetermined structure of

the interaction avoids as much awkwardness as possible, and in that structure it sacrifices its

users’ opportunities to develop and grow. Instead of needing to wrestle with deep issues to form

an identity, SNS users do not need to think about these issues. Instead, they are differentiating

themselves on SNSs through competition and the level of adherence to social norms. These

norms are based upon SNSs’ structures which put ease of use and control first, and they may not

align with our current and aspiring person-identities. Thus, to a certain extent person-identity

has transformed from a pursuit to find out who one really is and to develop meaningful

relationships into a competition to perform “a better version of [oneself] – one that will play well

to [one’s] followers” (Turkle 23).

These norms create competition for popularity. The competitive nature of personal

identity construction through SNSs is a result of the relational nature of SNSs:

Identity construction takes place along a continuum of implicit and explicit identity

claims… Implicit claims are mainly visible and portray the self as a social actor, notably

in its connection with peers, for example by posting party pictures (‘relational self’)…

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[while] explicit identity claims are largely narrative descriptions and portray the self as an

individual actor (‘individual self’), for example when adolescents describe on SNSs who

they are. (Peter 86)

On SNSs, the relational self dominates profiles and thus identity construction (Peter 87):

“Whether they wish their identities to be formed and used in this manner or not, the online selves

of SNS users are constituted by the categories established by SNS developers, and ranked and

evaluated according to the currency which primarily drives the narrow ‘moral economy’ of SNS

communities: popularity” (Vallor 17). Thus, SNS profiles often serve as place-markers within a

network as opposed to accurate depictions of one’s personal identity (Peter 87).

As a consequence of this relational dominance of SNSs’ identity construction, “while

identity construction entails to some extent the presentation of idealized parts of the self, the

positive feedback of others endows this self-presentation with social legitimacy” (Peter 87). In

other words, one’s personal narrative needs to be popular for one to have a strong sense of

personal identity. Because of our constant comparisons, there is a salary cap on the amount of

self-esteem in the total population. Only those with the most popular profiles are likely to feel

good about themselves and their personal identities.28 This competition leads SNS users to a

cycle of more adamantly performing to the norms of SNSs in order to become more popular

instead of trying to explore their selves and develop a person-identity which adheres to their true

aspirational person-identities. Our profiles are already aligned to the performance- and

28 You are likely to see the most popular posts and statuses of your friends because SNSs use algorithms to

determine what Twitter tweets, Instagram posts, etc. you see first on each respective SNS, and these algorithms are

partially based upon the popularity of the posts of those you follow, your friends, or your connections. For example,

you may go on Facebook every day for twenty minutes and post one picture per day. If people like what you post,

perhaps one day per week one of your posts has a lot of likes and comments and makes you feel good about

yourself. For the other six days, you are comparing the popularity of your own posts to largely the most popular

posts of all of your 200 friends, and because six of every seven days your posts are not nearly as popular as the most

popular posts of your friends, you feel dissatisfied (“Is Facebook”). Thus, “frequent use of social media leads to

feelings of depression and social anxiety” (Turkle 26).

44

competition-centered structure of SNSs, so there is no need to create our own coherent and

aligned personal identity. We only need to compete within the predetermined structure of SNS

profiles for the most well-aligned, popular profile. Thus, in SNS users’ competition to develop

the most popular profile, they fail to develop coherent, concrete person-identity narratives.29

The other half of the Turkle’s vicious cycle is related to solitude. When we are truly

alone, we work to interpret what has happened to us, specifically those perspective-widening

conversations, in a way which fits our personal narrative. In self-reflection, we align our meta-

patterned person-identities to the recent self-identity patterns we have experienced. However,

with SNSs we rarely spend time alone because if we are not on SNSs, then we feel the short-term

pain of loneliness. Thus, we choose to go on SNSs during time we might otherwise have spent

alone. Additionally, even when we are alone, much of that time is unproductive and spent

thinking about using SNSs or fearing missing out.30 However, when we are alone without access

to SNSs or other distractions, we develop a stronger person-identity in the long run. With SNSs,

we always can entertain ourselves in the short-term and “get a neurochemical high from

connecting,” but in the long-term we become lonelier because our meta-patterned person-

identities are learning to resonate online instead of learning to develop meaningful relationships

(Turkle 19).

We improve at what we practice. When we spend time using SNSs, we improve our

ability to become popular on a SNS and communicate through the medium of a given SNS.

When we spend time in conversation, we improve our ability to relate to others face-to-face.

And when we spend time alone, we improve our ability to be content alone and to incorporate

29 “Torn between our desire to express an authentic self and the pressure to show our best selves online, it is not

surprising that frequent use of social media leads to feelings of depression and social anxiety” (Turkle 26). 30 Fear of missing out or FOMO is “FoMO is experienced as a clearly fearful attitude towards the possibility of

failing to exhaust available opportunities and missing the expected joy associated with succeeding in doing so”

(Herman).

45

our experiences into a cohesive narrative – “engaging in more productive solitude” (Turkle 13).

As a result of our spending our time on SNSs instead of conversing face-to-face or reflecting in

solitude, empathy markers in college students have declined at an unprecedented rate in the last

10 years (Turkle 311).

SNSs and their increasing use are a topic of heated debate as related to personal identity

formation. They enable connections which otherwise would not have been made and allow us to

be more connected with those physically away from us – thus extending our personal identities.

However, they also affect the meta-patterns of Shannon information which make up our person-

identities. As a result, our person-identities are more polarized, less solidified, less empathic, and

with lower self-esteem on average. Are technological progress and the closing of the Turing

time gap worth these sacrifices?

Conclusion: The Futility of Turkle’s Call for Arms and the Nature of Self-Identity

When paper letters and the telephone were invented, people were probably making

arguments similar to Turkle’s against these technologies. Both of these ICTs lessened

ontological friction and the Turing time gap, but, like SNSs, they likely “compromised the

important function of passive modes of embodied self-presentation beyond our conscious control

[of their respective time periods], such as body language, facial expression, and spontaneous

displays of emotion”31 (Vallor 18). Despite this concession of what Turkle calls the

‘authenticity’ of the interaction, we have managed to maintain our personal identities. Yet,

Turkle cries for us to put down our phones, return to face-to-face conversation, solitude, and

reflection, and asks SNS companies to design technology that “encourages us to disengage”

(Turkle 43).

31 Vallor describes the effects of SNSs using this quote

46

However, I believe that this call is a lost cause because of technological determinism and

market forces. Technological determinism is the view of “technology as an independent driver

of social and cultural change, shaping human institutions, practices and values in a manner

largely beyond our control” (Vallor 7). Ontological friction will continue to decrease, and, if you

agree with Turkle, empathy and self-esteem will continue to decrease in the population also.

Floridi, for example, has already concluded that the infosphere will become completely re-

ontologized in his prediction that the distinction between online and offline will disappear

(Floridi 8). Turkle suggests that SNS companies could work to get us off of SNSs and back to

having conversations and reflecting in solitude. However, this action would go in direct

opposition to these company’s business models. They make money from people using their

websites and using them frequently, so they are not going to urge people to stop using SNSs or

develop infrastructures that limit SNS use. Additionally, users play fundamentally passive

roles… [and] have little or no direct bargaining power,” so the common man is not going to be

able to motivate SNS companies to change (Vallor 27). Thus, because of technological

determinism and the business models of SNSs, the future of personal identity is going to be a

combination of resonating online through SNSs and interacting in RL.

Turkle posits that the relative distance from our person-identity determines the level of

‘authenticity’ of one’s personal identity expressed in a given interaction. Conversely, I believe

that when we use ICTs our interactions do not become less ‘authentic.’ Regardless of the meta-

patterning of Shannon information, we are interacting with another human being. Drawing an

arbitrary line to determine what is ‘authentic’ and what is not ‘authentic’ will primarily serve to

exclude those who are less apt at RL interaction. Take the example of Jill the blind woman. In

Jill’s physical community, she is stigmatized and discriminated against because of her blindness.

47

In this community, she feels uncomfortable expressing herself. However, she works as a suicide

hotline responder. In this role, she feels that she can express herself and be appreciated without

judgment. Are her interactions for her job on the phone more or less ‘authentic’ than those in her

physical community with face-to-face interaction? “Physical reality does not always enable or

facilitate connection nor does it do so equally for all persons” (Vallor 8).

We arbitrarily choose to define ‘real’ and ‘authentic’ interactions as those which best

enable and fit our expression of our personal identity. For some this may mean face-to-face

interactions. For others this may mean using a SNS. Many assume that face-to-face interactions

are authentic because they are the way of the past, and SNSs have been statistically associated

with depression, anxiety, and a lack of empathy. However, stigmatizing the use of SNSs as

unreal lowers the self-esteem of those whose personal identities are best expressed through that

medium. Despite this critique of Turkle, SNSs are and will continue taking over personal

interaction and identity construction because of technological determinism and market forces. In

the future, the problems which Turkle highlights will plague human interaction and personal

identity, and it is useful to identify them. However, it is not worth alienating those people who

cannot best express themselves face-to-face, in order to futilely fight against technological

determinism.

In this analysis of SNSs’ effects on personal identity, thus far we have focused on how

SNSs affect the person-identity of individuals. We have avoided concretely positing how SNSs

affect the self-identity of individuals – how they affect our present-time patterns of Shannon

information. The reason that we have avoided this topic is because it is a very difficult one. The

complex nature of the Shannon information that we label our self is only becoming more

complex. In a world where one’s personal identity is clearly connected to one’s physical body, it

48

is much easier to distinguish what is and is not a part of oneself. Metaphorically, it is much

easier to determine what currents (person-identity) are currently a part of the whirlpool than what

water particles (self-identity) are currently a part of the whirlpool. Let’s assume for example that

our selves encompass all Shannon information which physically, physiologically, and mentally is

connected to a person at the current time-slice. Although this definition in itself would be

controversial, it is possible to conceptualize. But when there is Shannon information connected

to a person online on a SNS profile too, it is even harder to know where to draw the line. When

our personal identity begins being affected by how we resonate on SNSs in addition to our ‘more

natural’ mediums of communication, it is difficult to rationalize drawing the line in the same

place. This increased confusion only goes to show the nature of our personal identities.

We arbitrarily circle patterns of Shannon information in order to form our self-identities.

We need these patterns to create persons and person-identities in order to comprehend the world

and live coherent lives, but these patterns are only man-made impositions on the world. At its

heart, personal identity is merely a construct we have created in order to understand the world,

and it will change fluidly as the Shannon information it consists in changes and thus our

patterned interpretations of that Shannon information, our self-identities, change. It has been

proposed that our “smeared-out selves are constituted by a shifting web of embodied and

informational relations… and may lose coherence as the relations that constitute us are

increasingly multiplied and scattered among a vast and expanding web of networked channels”

(Vallor 19). However, this statement assumes that we have ‘real’ selves to begin with. Contrary

to that, SNSs show that selves are only a construct we create to coherently live our lives – just

patterns of Shannon information. We try to string together all of the different parts, but with the

49

complexity brought by SNSs, it is becoming increasingly evident that we are just creating a

concept from identifiable patterns in order to understand our lives.

50

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This paper represents my own work in accordance with University regulations.

3/28/2016

X Zachary Shaw

Zachary Shaw

Signed by: dshaw