7AAN2018 Syllabus – Academic year 2015/16 Basic information

Credits: 20 Module Tutor: Mark Textor Office: Consultation time: Semester: 1 Lecture time and venue: Seminar time and venue (if different):

Module description (plus aims and objectives)

Assessment methods and deadlines

Phenomenology is an influential philosophical tradition that tries to provide a non-reductive understanding of consciousness (understood broadly). The ‘grandfather’ of phenomenology is Franz Brentano (1838-1917) who proposed an Aristotelian approach to the mind. The work of later phenomenologist (Husserl, Sartre) is, in large part, a response to Brentano’s arguments. In this course we will therefore begin at the beginning, namely with Brentano’s main work Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874). We will begin with Brentano’s view that intentionality is the mark of the mental and then turn to his view of consciousness.

• Formative assessment: One x 2,500 word essay Deadline(s):

• Summative assessment: One x 4,000-word essay. Deadline:

NB Please note that for semester I-only Study Abroad students, assessment requirements may vary. In particular, May exams will be replaced by summative essays to be submitted by the end of term (date TBC)

Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings)

Outline of lecture topics (plus suggested readings) – continued if necessary

Week One Marks of the Mental Suggested reading: Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book II, chapt. 1 Week Two: Brentano’s Theses: Intentional Inexistence/Relationality/Directedness Suggested reading: Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book II, chapt. 1, sect. 5. - Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Appendix I Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the mental. Current Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, ed. A. O'Hear,

Cambridge 1998. Week Three: Intentional Inexistence Suggested reading: Chisholm, R. 1955/6. Sentences about Believing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 125-48. Dennett, D. 1993. Content and Consciousness. London: Routledge. Reprint of the 1967 edition. Chapt. II Week Four Intentionality and Correctness Conditions Suggested reading: Mulligan, K. 2007. Intentionality, knowledge and formal objects. Disputatio 23, 205-228 Week Five: Physical Intentionality Suggested reading: Molnar, G. 2004. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, chapt. 4 READING WEEK Week Six Brentano on Consciousness I Suggested reading: Aristotle: De Anima, Book 3.2 Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book II, chapt. 2 Caston, V. 2002. Aristotle on Consciousness, Mind 111, 751-815. 2004. More on Aristotle on Consciousness: Reply to Sisko. Mind 113, 523-33. Week Seven: Brentano on Consciousness II Suggested reading: Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book II, chapt. 2, sect 8-10 Week Eight Husserl’s criticism of Brentano Suggested reading: Husserl, E. 1913. Logical Investigations II/2. Appendix: Outer and Inner Perception. Zahavi, D. 2004. Back to Brentano? Journal for Consciousness Studies 2004, 66-87. Week Nine The Unity of Consciousness Suggested reading: Brentano: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Book II, chapt. 4 Week Ten Husserl and Brentano on Emotions Brentano: Loving and Hating. In The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, London 1967. Husserl, E. 1913. Logical Investigations II/I. Logical Investigation V, sect. 15. S d di

Suggested essay questions

Suggested additional readings

Is there a plausible explanation of intentionality? Are all mental phenomena intentional? Are only mental phenomena intentional? What is Brentano’s argument for the same-order theory of consciousness? Is it convincing? What does the unity of consciousness consist in? Does Brentano make the unity of consciousness plausible? What are Husserl’s points of criticism

Can one explain intentionality? Are all mental phenomena intentional? Are only mental phenomena intentional? What is Brentano’s view of consciousness? Is it justified by a convincing argument? What is Husserl’s criticism of Brentano’s view of consciousness? Is it convincing? What is Brentano’s view of the unity of consciousness? Is it justified by a convincing argument?

Jacquette, D. (ed) 2005. Brentano. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 168-238.

Smith, B. 1995. Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano. Chicago: Open Court Publishing.