Download - South Sudan independence and the corrutpion challenges to overcome

Africa’s Newest Nation: Fresh Challenges to

Overcome

BT Costantinos, PhD Professor of Public Policy, School of Graduate Studies,

Department of Public Administration and Management, College of Management, Information and Economic Sciences, AAU

Lecture Notes Series IV, Addis Abeba, 2011

The Perils of and Trajectories for Resolving the Impact of Corruption on

South Sudan’s Independence PhD Lecture and Seminar

1 | overcoming corruption challenges to SS’s independence

1. Introduction

South Sudan became the 193rd member of the United Nations on 15 July 2011, six days after it became an independent state. After a tumultous half a century war, Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Negotiations held under thh suspices of IGAD, South Sudan is the newest state in the world. The story is long and trying. The January 2005 the CPA formally ended war between the Khartoum government and the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), Africa's longest civil conflict. Yet as the late SPLM Chairman John Garang was sworn in as 1st Vice-President on 9 July, implementation laged badly. The main obstacles were the ancien regime's lack of will to embrace genuine power sharing and elections, and ultimately allow a southern self-determination referendum after the six-year interim period and lack of capacity in the South to establish and empower basic structures of governance.

The members of the Security Council welcomed recognized that Sudan is in a critical pe-riod as it prepares for historic referenda in Abyei and Southern Sudan. Council members underlined their appreciation for the support that the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is providing to assist the parties, especially noting that fewer than four months remain. The members of the Security Council called for the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to take urgent action to facilitate peaceful and on-time referenda that re-flect the will of the Sudanese people, to respect their results, and to resolve key remaining post-referenda issues. The members of the Security Council look to the Secretary-General’s 24 September high-level meeting to focus international attention and support on Sudan dur-ing this time. They also welcomed the Secretary-General’s intent to create a referenda moni-toring panel, in response to a joint request by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peo-ple’s Liberation Movement, and requested that all parties provide full assistance to the panel once formed. UN Security Council, (2010)

It is no secret that one of the outstanding political changes in Africa which more than not is attributable to the post 9/11 US foreign policy shift is the coming of South Sudan into the central stage of the world politics. Nobody knew that the fate of this people who led one of Africa’s longest liberation struggles in the modern history would change so dramatically as it did soon as the US changed its' polices and alliances in the Arab and Islamic region. As a fact of history, the way to South Sudan’s independence wasn’t any easy. To put it mildly, it was in defiance of many old regional political traditions and negatively held views about se-cessionism in the African continent that the new Republic of South Sudan (RSS) deservedly made it to become the world’s newest state. But as we follow some of the stories as they un-fold, one is left with the impression that there is more to this new nation’s politics than that meets the eye.

In situations where public officials are seen to be using their positions to advance paro-chial interest and self-aggrandisement, a general loss of respect for authority and the law oc-curs and despondency in the general population develops. It is apparent that as the nation enters this new era of political pluralism, there is a need to overhaul the administrative ma-chinery and develop institutional alternatives to the hierarchical organisational structure. Nonetheless, the solutions, like the problems, can be seen in large part as elements, features and effects of political ideological leanings; taking shape and come into play as operation of a particular power doctrine.

The article presents the methodology and research questions, Challenges to South Sudan Independence, Brutal lessons from Eritrea, East Timor, Kosovo for South Sudan, Kiir vows to fight corruption in South Sudan government, corruption and its impact in SS’s develop-ment, Stemming threats of Corruption to good governance, Best practices in stemming the tide of Corruption and Conclusion


2. Statement of the problem

South Sudan ceases to appear young when it comes to how it creates multi-millionaires overnights. Still classified as one of the world’s poorest state though oil producing, the coun-try surprising against all odds has the highest rate of freedom fighters turn public fund loot-ers. One may ask how come that such things be allowed to go unabated in an age where good governance and accountability are not only the dominant slogans of the new world order, but are in fact being taught on regular basis by the countless Western NGOs and their local counterparts to all management levels in the developing countries who heavily depend on USAID and EU development funds and partnership.

In poverty ridden SS, a former soldier who is keenly diplomatic, cannot say if the gov-ernment is spending its money wisely. “I don’t know,” he replies. “We never see it. Their in-come doesn’t reach us.” Still, he has hopes for independence. “Maybe the government will see us now,” he says, “because we are suffering.” Back in Juba, the scourge of corruption in South Sudan is plainly visible for anyone who looks for it, and ultimately it will determine how quickly this nation, now among the world’s poorest, develops. The country’s secession from Sudan, against which it fought two civil wars over five decades, will do nothing to change this fact. “President Salva Kiir and his deputy forever Dr. Riek Machar both continue in their silence as the debate on ‘the 13 top corrupt South Sudanese’ boils. Sadly though, this worrisome silence comes against a background of a series of inter-communal killings dubbed as cattle rustling”. (Justin Ambago Ramba, 2011)

3. Methodology and research questions

3.1. Hypothesis While it is of fundamental importance that SS itself defines approaches to, and

processes of, participation, democracy and good economic governance, it is also nec-essary that such approaches be synthesised with universal principles, which assure both peaceful political contestation and policy participation. Without this, the process may well result in varying degrees of political and economic liberalisation, but not in a functioning market driven economy and democracy, which again raises some funda-mental questions.

3.2. The research questions focused on what brought about the current non-democratic dy-namics in SS’s recent history, viz. 3.2.1. Why is this poor nation promoting corruption? 3.2.2. Do market economies and democracy have indigenous SS roots? 3.2.3. What are the strategic options for fighting corruption that enhance sustainabil-

ity of the growth and human security? Hence, a series of literature review and interview instruments that reflect the range

of questions were developed and administered to collect a wide range of views from key informants and knowledgeable civic personalities of varying lifestyles and the interna-tional community. This think piece is a teaching material and dialogue starter article based on the various assessments undertaken in the recent past by the author princi-pally and by other scholars. While permission will be requested for the lengthy quota-tions, the conclusion remains that of the author

4. Challenges to South Sudan Independence A Troubled Divorce (NYT, 2011)

“Conflicts remain over how the two sides will share the south’s sizable reserves of crude oil and what to do about the Abyei region, which straddles the north-south border and is claimed by both. Less than six months after South Sudan broke away from Sudan, tensions between the neighbours have crystallized into fears of direct confrontation. While the two nations continue to discuss how to split lucrative oil revenues and the fate of the contested region of Abyei, a spreading rebellion inside Sudan prompted the Sudanese government to accuse the south of providing military support to the rebels. Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, rejected accusations by the Sudanese government that his country was arming


Sudanese rebels as “utterly baseless and malicious.” In November 2011, Mr. Kiir denounced the Sudanese government for threatening what he called a “military invasion” of South Su-dan. Mr. Kiir has accused the Sudanese government of bombing the South Sudanese area of Guffa, killing at least seven people and potentially moving insurgencies on both sides of the border closer to an international conflict. Many residents in the Sudanese provinces of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile fought alongside the south during its civil war with the north. But the 2005 peace treaty placed the two provinces in Sudan’s territory, leaving South Sudan to hold a referendum to decide its own fate. In January, the South Sudanese voted almost unanimously to secede from the rest of the country. Their fellow combatants in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile remained on the other side of the border, and an armed rebellion soon began.

In return, the Sudanese military has clamped down hard on the rebellion, filling the skies over Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile with Antonov bombers, some of which have flown over South Sudanese territory, too. A satellite imaging project organized by the Enough Pro-ject, an advocacy group, has published what it says is evidence of mass graves in the rebel-lious regions, and the United Nations has said the military activity could amount to war crimes. The United States, a close partner of South Sudan, had made strong overtures to the government in Sudan, saying that if it cooperated peacefully with South Sudan’s transition to independence, economic sanctions on the country could be lifted. But in early November, President Obama called for the sanctions to be extended over what he called “hostile” actions on the part of the Sudanese government that posed an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to American foreign policy. As the split approached, Mr. Bashir seemed to be steering his coun-try back toward war. The north occupied Abyei in May in overwhelming numbers, forcing nearly 100,000 southern Sudanese to flee. Heavy fighting also broke out soon after in Kadugli, the capital of Southern Kordofan — a northern Sudanese state where many of the people are aligned with the southern Sudanese.”

5. Brutal lessons from Eritrea, East Timor, Kosovo for South Sudan Eritrea emerged from its long war of independence and seceded from Ethiopia under a

referendum in 1993 only to plunge once again into military conflict, first with Yemen and Sudan and then, more devastatingly, with its old adversary, Ethiopia and recently with Dji-bouti. (Christopher Torchia, 2011)

“When East Timor voted for independence in 1999, militia loyal to the departing Indone-sian rulers went on a rampage that took more than 1,000 lives. War engulfed Kosovo in the late 1990s after it said it was splitting from Serbia, and some 10,000 people died. Then, as the grieving and the euphoria quieted, the hard and often divisive work of nation building began. The struggle continues, more than a decade later. If, as is widely expected, Southern Sudan has opted for independence in the weeklong referendum that ended Saturday, it will become the latest land to grasp statehood in the wake of violent upheaval. How well will it work? A half-century ago, the world had dozens of examples to study as countries around the globe won their independence from European colonial powers. Nevertheless, today the addi-tion of a new country to the world map is something unusual. Therefore, while comparisons can only be imprecise, the first steps of East Timor and Kosovo offer some guidance about the challenges facing the battered yet exultant people of Southern Sudan. "The expectations of independence are always very high," said Australian academic Damien Kingsbury, noting that the administrators of a new country inevitably lack skills and resources. "The first few years are almost always pretty shaky." (Ibid)

Since declaring independence in 2008 with Western support, it has been recognized by well under half the UN membership. Some have concerns about separatist movements on their own turf and worry about setting self-damaging precedents. Spain faces Basque and Catalan separatism. Russia has Chechnya, China has Tibet, India has Kashmir. For a country like Kosovo, "It leaves you in international limbo," said Tim Judah, author of two books about the new country of 1.8 million. "You're not a state among equals." In East Timor's case, Indonesia, emerging from a long dictatorship, agreed under pressure to a UN-backed


referendum in the former Portuguese colony that it had invaded and occupied in 1975. After East Timorese voted overwhelmingly to separate, the rampage condoned by Indonesia de-stroyed much of the territory's limited infrastructure.

5. Corruptions chokehold threatens new nation: Those in government, largely former bush commanders in the guerrilla Sudan People’s

Liberation Army and their friends and families, along with current SPLA higher-ups, enjoy a good life. This has been going on for years, since the 2005 peace deal gave South Sudan autonomy and paved the way for Saturday’s secession. One could argue leaders have seemingly done a lot in a short period, not least of which is create a government. Most of the wasted money comes from South Sudan’s oil wealth. It currently receives 50 per cent of the revenues — the other half goes to Sudan. It amounts to about $2 billion annually. South Sudan’s new president, Salva Kiir, talked about corruption in his inaugural speech, in front of delegations from around the world. “In order to develop our country and deliver on our development goals, it’s critical we fight corruption,” Kiir said. “As president I pledge to you to do all I can to remove this cancer.”

It is true that South Sudan by necessity is a nation whose people’s expectations see no limit; however it is the lack of the limit to greed for power and public money that has taken the lead under President Salva Kiir’s leadership. The new republic has much to leave every one’s mouth gapping in surprise. The Radio Miraya (South Sudan) a news portal of high in-tegrity, published in its local news column that came out on the 7th of September 2011 some of the most fascinating deliberations by the RSS National Legislative Assembly on the per-formance of the South Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission as it presented its claims of in-vestigations into some 60 cases of corruption and the recovery that was swindled through corruption in a report read out by the Commission’s Chairperson. The Commissioner’s re-port however made no any reference to the mushrooming South Sudanese millionaires who have accumulated wealth under very suspicious circumstances. (Ramba, 2011)

The MPs of the SPLM caucus also criticised the lack of consultations within the party in the process of nominations. They said the President instead informally consulted with unimportant individuals and not the SPLM as an institution. They also initially demanded that the President should first show them the list 13 ministers believed to be involved in corruption so that the par-liament could make sure that their appointment are not endorsed. However, the ruling party’s caucus finally compromised their position; he added and decided to approve all the appointed ministers and their deputies during the parliamentary sitting despite the concerns about their involvement in corruption. (Sudan Tribune 31, Aug. 2011).

The public and some of the lawmakers are trying to fight this battle with the govern-ment, for there is a strong believe that a credible international body has raised up the issues of the “the 13 top corrupted politicians” with the President, who is silent as the debate boils”.

6. Stemming threats of Corruption to good governance: In the following, one can consider to broaden the perspective further as tackling the prob-

lem requires a root and branch approach. Those at the receiving and giving ends are equally re-sponsible for the perpetuation of corrupt practices. The perpetrators need to be checked and deprived of the resources that they accumulated to buy off favours or exert influence on na-tional priorities or policy decisions. A rare consensus that is evolving is the need to make cor-ruption costlier to the perpetrator and the rewards much less significant. In so far as the likeli-hood exists that corrupters may be able to escape with their illicit proceeds, for so long, they would feel encouraged to carry on such destructive activities. Experience has shown that pre-venting the negative aspects of Counter Corruption Measures, CCM, requires a consistent, coherent, broad-based approach and a long-term perspective. 6.1. The evolution of a political culture: Legislation alone may not be effective in limiting corrup-

tion unless there is the evolution of a political culture.

6.2. Leadership: Democratic and governing institutions that stem the threats of corruption to good governance include legislatures, legal and judicial systems and electoral bodies. Legis-latures mediate differing interests, debate, and establish policies, laws, and resource priori-


ties that directly affect the political environment and encourage and support development and electoral processes ultimately ensure political legitimacy. In addition the effort must fo-cus on political leadership requires intimate knowledge of public policy analysis, formula-tion, and management and development of strategic plans and implementing them. An in-spiring ‘job description’ of leaders must be not only the power over discourse but also their ability to shape morality, to determine what is socially acceptable, culturally sound and po-litically uplifting.

6.3. Building rules and institutions: Political measures to fight corruption can be explained with reference to two institutional factors: political organisations and political rules. The relative strength of political organisations determines the rules of the political game that are in-stalled. Democratisation requires a plural set of political organisations, which promote and protect rules of peaceful political participation and competition. Together, democratic insti-tutions (ensure control of the state executive. In taking an institutional perspective, Africans assume that actors in the political system express preferences through organisations and that these organisations vary in strength according to their resource base. The relevant or-ganisations are found both in society, where they represent, and aggregate individual inter-ests, and in the state, where they check and balance executive authority. Democracy can be attained only if the rule of law is applied to ensure full accountability, transparency, and predictability of executive authority. Democratisation is a process of institutional learning, in which state and societal organisations develop a new and stable set of mechanisms to manage conflict peacefully. As democratic rule institutionalises uncertainty, it can only suc-ceed if and when all the political actors accept this uncertainty as preferable to the rigidities of dictatorship.

6.3.1. Founding an independent human quality development think tank would be the sin-gle most powerful tool - investment in human qualities and developing Knowledge Management systems, integration and mainstreaming: an essential approach for expanding multi-sectoral actions to engrain the tenets of CCM; constituting a range of practical strategies for scaling up activities within the civil service is integration and mainstreaming. Mainstreaming will engage governments, academia, NGOs, pri-vate sector, faith organisations, etc., that can both meet their needs as well as apply their comparative advantage to integrate specific aspects of civil service reform initia-tives; providing a mechanism through which multi-sectoral strategies can be ana-lysed and acted upon, within demarcation of responsibility, building up multi-echelon, yet coherent interventions. One possible modality is to utilise advanced technology to streamline and expedite corruption- prone business activities. Informa-tion technology may also be put to good use in monitoring fraudulent activities, keep-ing an updated database of people/ institutions involved in such actives.

6.3.2. Code of Conduct for political authorities and managers: that delimits the extent, causes, and impact of political intervention in the conduct of the CCM.

6.3.3. Oversight and Regulation: Political governance as the range of processes through which a society reaches consensus on and implements regulations, rights, laws, poli-cies and social structures, as well as justice, order and the welfare of the people is an-other set of support. Policies and laws are agreed up and carried out by institutions such as the legislature, judiciary, executive branch, elections, political parties, lobby-ists, the police, and a large variety of civil society organisations. Experience has shown that preventing corruption requires a consistent, coherent, broad-based ap-proach and a long-term perspective. Leadership, political will, and public support are essential to the success of any anti-corruption effort, and that the causes and not just the consequences of corruption have to be addressed. Without leadership and politi-cal will, anti-corruption strategies can breed a negative spin. Leadership is required to both set an example and to demonstrate that no one is above the law. Although high-level political support is not sufficient in and of itself, a high profile focus on specific action can be extremely useful in sending a strong signal that corruption will not be tolerated. The threats of corruption can be avoided if in law, citizens are able to sue the government for infringement of their civil rights that is subject to criminal proceedings.


6.3.4. The ability of courts to try defendants with constitutional principles, speedily and judiciously will also reduce the fears of civil servants needlessly being charged for corrupt practices. Rule of law is important to guarantee governmental predictability, create a climate conducive to domestic and foreign investment, and to enforce adher-ence to formal rules of behaviour. To be effective, the law has to be applied impar-tially with judicial independence assured. Indicators in this regard are in law, is there a national ombudsman and public protector covering the entire public sector.

6.3.5. Legislatures create the framework for addressing corruption, as well as promoting executive accountability. Mechanisms such as specific parliamentary oversight committees, open debates, parliamentary-mandated commissions of inquiry, and publication of parliamentary records can all help increase transparency and prevent corruption. While purely legal measures to reduce corruption are unlikely to be to-tally effective, they are an essential part of any anti-corruption strategy.

6.3.6. The Private Sector: Ultimately, the road to good governance can only be paved if economic means exist to support private sector-led social development. The contrary happens in Africa. The emergence of predatory states has meant that the business elite, private, and the informal sectors have been confronted with various legal and regulatory problems. The dominating ideological influences in the different historical periods have had in large measure negative impacts on its development, depending on the philosophical orientation of the regimes in power. Notwithstanding this infir-mity, it is agreed by many that promulgation of market policies and legislative meas-ures alone is not enough to encourage the development of the private sector.

7. Enhancing accountability:

While specific targeted CCM can be useful, they should be embedded in mutually sup-portive broader policy reforms. In general, reducing government involvement in the econ-omy, streamlining government functions, and limiting the discretionary decision-making au-thority of officials will reduce opportunity for corruption, while economic reforms can elimi-nate government monopolies and economic distortions, which facilitate it. The threats of cor-ruption to good governance can be avoided if in law, citizens are able to sue the government for infringement of their civil rights that is subject to criminal proceedings and there are regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch. In many developing countries, the state sector is large, politicians and civil servants have limited accountability, and there is little transparency in government. Raising the standards of governance is key to a country’s political development by abandoning state monopoly in favour of strategies that encourage private sector activity and increased investment, reward good organisational and individual performance, increase productivity and manage resources efficiently. 7.1. State corporate strategic and business plans: Government corporate plans, if well designed

can provide the basis for establishing the state’s ‘core activities’. An in depth re-evaluation of its core mission leading to recommendations for right-sizing the state; redeploying re-sources to high priority activities; and professional reassessment of its comparative advan-tage vis-à-vis other providers of services, in a way that advance and nurture business confi-dence is long overdue. This in turn influenced profoundly by the level of competence in eco-nomic management, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public service bureaucracy, the attitudes of leaders towards private enterprise, and the quality of infrastructure and ser-vices. Consistencies in credit policy and practice are indicators of how the framework of state-business relations develops or falls short of effective or strategic direction.

7.2. State capacity for policy and strategic harmonisation:

There are often profound constraints on business promotion and development even in highly developed societies. While the government has been amending policies in response to assessments of performance, there is simply no alternative to the establishment of sound in-stitutional capacity in government for real-time strategy development, sensitivity analysis, policy coordination, and attention to the details of implementation. Strategic objectives for markets must be clearly defined and made consistent with overall polices of a good national economic management. Measures which improve governmental accountability and trans-


parency, such as implementing rigorous, budgeting, expenditure and financial reporting mechanism, requiring all expenditures to be on-budget, enforcing audit provisions, and in-creasing public access to information, have also been found to reduce corruption. While purely legal measures to reduce corruption are unlikely to be totally effective, they are an es-sential part of any strategy.

It is advisable that a generational transition period for a meritorious civil service be devised with the development of a neutral civil service; where the leader of the civil service is a civil servant, and has complete administrative responsibility, making the civil service an active instrument in carrying out the policies of the government, including giving feed back advice on policies. In this sense, strategic entry points in building the capacity of the dis-tricts would not be simple and straightforward. New initiatives must complement the exist-ing capacity building work in progress that must be proactively supported. Creating a metric and meritorious civil service is a basic requirement for limiting corrupt practices and re-building public confidence in the bureaucracy. Remuneration is obviously a factor and civil service salaries and will undoubtedly have to be revised, but opportunities for career ad-vancement are important mechanisms to instil a sense of professional pride.

7.3. Anti-corruption agencies and watchdogs

Anti-corruption agencies and watchdogs bodies are significant components of any anti-corruption strategy. These include specialized anti-corruption agencies, offices of the inspec-tor general and ombudsman, independent human rights and electoral commissions and special committees of inquiry. To be truly effective, such bodies have to be independent and protected from political manipulation, and should report to parliament. They also need to have sufficient financial and professional resources, and to be afforded adequate powers to enforce ethical codes and standards. They need to enjoy the confidence of the public and their decisions have to be respected by the political elite. They obviously themselves have to maintain high standards of conduct, and be able to guarantee confidentiality and protection of those reporting corruptors.

Without the active involvement of civil society, it will not be possible to combat corrup-tion. Corruption cannot be seen in isolation. Its effects permeate societies, which in turn can either encourage or discourage corruption. Professional associations, civil society watchdog bodies, community organisations, consumer associations and religious leaders can build coalitions against corruption and demand greater governmental accountability. They can also play a crucial role in informing the public as to the extent and consequences of corrup-tion. The challenge facing them is to galvanize public opinion and persuade the citizens to actively combat corruption.

The media has a very important role to play in educating people, exposing corruption and building support for efforts to combat it. Corruption thrives on secrecy, which can be countered by a free press. An independent and free press also fulfils an important public information function and can help counteract public perceptions that corruptions is inevita-ble and important people are immune from investigative journalism as practiced by the me-dia, and that its practices impartiality. Such unsubstantiated accusations can serve to un-dermine anti- corruption efforts.

8. Conclusion At the climax of the drive for equitable and self-reliant development, Africa was set to become the source of hope and inspiration to the many. Indeed as the old order crumbled, the prospects for popular participation and corruption free governance were never brighter. It encouraged the hopes of many that the ‘hidden and dark’ nation would after all become the beacon of new hopes for the oppressed and dispossessed. Alas! Those high hopes soon were replaced with a general acknowledgement that the Dergue had lost the capacity to de-liver the identity that the community had held self-evident and instead bred a socio-entity that has wildly spun off its axis. It is now widely acknowledged that this bloated and corrupt military-bureaucratic machinery, which encouraged the encroachment of civil space in the name of development, thrived on graft and influence-peddling for the benefit of the powerful


elite, rendering the poor powerless, voiceless, and effectively disenfranchising people from participating in the decision-making processes.

The complexities good governance and the assumptions that are made based on per-ceived necessities or demand of societies and states are well beyond the scope of this paper. However, it would be necessary to deal briefly in trying to identify the modalities and sources of political transitions to good governance. Political transitions are initiated at three levels: state-led transitions, civil society initiated and led transitions and combinations of state led and society led transitions. (ALF/GCA, 1993, Bratton, Michael & Nicholas van de Walle, 1997. Widner,-Jennifer-A., ed., 1994). Obviously there would be a transition period to which the major actors to which these processes are often tied more or less closely and ideological constructs tend to be unsettled and, at times, unsettling. Particularly at the initial stages, these are more likely to be uncertain rather than stable structures of ideas and values. This has the ef-fect of opening up the reform process, of freeing the process from simple domination by any one organised stakeholder or coalition of them. Yet such elements and relations take shape and come into play within a hierarchy of global and local agencies and groups. A determinate order of institutions, powers, interests and activities operate through complexes of ideas and values, filling out, specifying, anchoring and often short-cutting their formal con-tent or meaning. Moreover, this may impose ideological as well as practical limits on the ex-tent to which and how CCM processes can be opened up or broadened.

Communes and political groups are vehicles through which good governance is prac-tised. This logic should have made the acceptance of the civil society a sine qua non. Unfor-tunately, the tendency to disregard civil society and its associations has disempowered the most important stakeholders to participate meaningfully in building national consensus on CCM. It is therefore neither unusual nor surprising that situation is one of acrimony rather than reconciliation. The great strength of pluralistic good governance over other political systems encourages the expression of different points of views, and all ideas and beliefs are constantly subjected to review and criticism.

Finally, stemming any the threats of corruption requires a disciplined, healthy, nour-ished, and motivated labour force that is required to produce and distribute the goods and services needed for sustained development. Leadership teams that are committed and will-ing with positive attitude to facilitate the process of opening up greater opportunities for every citizen are needed. The sector would require a proactive and innovative managerial and entrepreneurial team with capacities and will power. The crux of the challenge there-fore, being able to create, retains and put to productive use of people with such qualities throughout the economy. It is basically about having the ability and willingness to identify sequence and execute human-centred development priorities and programmes. It boils down to formulating and executing national and sectoral policies that would enhance aggre-gate commitment, determination and capacities to mobilise, develop, motivate, encourage and utilise all segments of society.

To meet the challenge of corruption is synonymous to meeting the development chal-lenge at large. Hence the need to develop independent human quality development think tanks: think thanks that contract professionals with focus on staff with strong academic cre-dentials, devoid of expressed ideology and objective, that can undertake non-partisan re-search (when required); financed primarily by government, non-state actors and donors agencies. In this context, highly qualified and independent think tanks that are able to tackle these issues in a solution-oriented way, can be of immense value in undertaking fundamen-tal research in the assembly and analysis of causes, trends and impact of corruption; and prospective demographic, strategic and economic trends, which are relevant for society in the fight against corruption.

The Constitutive Act of the African Union’s objective augur on promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent; promoting democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance. Notwithstanding the will to capture this un-common opportunity, its perspectives on political reform neglect to pose the problem of ar-


ticulation of democracy as a relatively autonomous mode of analysis, democratisation would consist of a set of activities in which universal, mainly Western, concepts and standards of governance are neatly “applied to”, as distinct from produced or re-produced in, African con-texts and conditions. Even at the level of application alone, it is largely overlooked that in-ternational models may enter states and societies in Africa through a proliferation of mechanisms that hinder the growth of open and effective democratic processes, that they may retard the development of indigenous democratic-system experience and capacity.

The objectives African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Cor-ruption Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, 11 July 2003 tally with this conclusion smartly: promote and strengthen the development in Africa by each State Party, of mechanisms required to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private sectors; promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the State Parties to ensure the effectiveness of measures and ac-tions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in Africa; co-ordinate and harmonize the policies and legislation between State Parties for the purposes of prevention, detection, punishment and eradication of corruption on the continent; promote socio-economic development by removing obstacles to the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and establish the necessary conditions to foster transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.

Within current projects of political reform, corruption is either conventionalised or ster-ilised on terrain of theory and often vacuously formalised on the ground of practice. It enters African politics and society in relatively abstract and plain form, yet is expected to land itself to immediate and vital African polity's socio-political experience. It suggests itself, and seems within reach, only to elude and appears readily practicable only to resist realisation.

References and endnotes

Africa Report N°179 17 Oct 2011 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/179%20South%20Sudan%20-%20Compounding%20Instability%20in%20Unity%20State.pdf, Accessed Oct 18, 2011

ALF/GCA, (1993). Trajectories of Political Transition - Research Design and Methodology, Arusha:GCA Bratton, Michael & Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative

Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Christopher Torchia (2011) East Timor and Kosovo give a hint of challenges for Southern Sudan, CP

http://www.google.com/hostednews/canadianpress/article/ALeqM5ju47_eZ_1fzhtW17y84fu1O4n3iA?docId=5659860, accessed Jan 18, 2011,

Corruption’s chokehold threatens new nation, (2011) http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/1022785--corruption-s-chokehold-threatens-new-nation, Accessed Nov 6, 2011

http://www.trust.org/trustlaw/news/oil-related-corruption-in-south-sudan-poses-high-laundering-risk-us-treasury-official-says/, Accessed Oct 18, 2011

Jeffrey Gettleman, (2011) Roots of Bitterness in a Region Threaten Sudan’s Future, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/africa/16sudan.html?ref=africa, accessed Jan 18, 2011

Jeffrey Gettleman, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/world/africa/17sudan.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print January 16, 2011, accessed Jan 18, 2011

Justin Ambago Ramba. The 13 Top Corrupt South Sudanese”. Who’re they? http://www.southsudannewsagency.com/opinion/editorials/the-13-top-corrupt-south-sudanese-whore-they. accessed Jan 18, 2011, Justin Ambago Ramba is Secretary General – United South Sudan Party (USSP).

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