Download - Putting upward influence strategies in context

Putting upward in¯uence strategiesin context

STEVEN M. FARMER

Department of Management, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY, U.S.A.

JOHN M. MASLYN AND DONALD B. FEDOR

School of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, U.S.A.

AND

JODI S. GOODMAN

Purdue University, Krannert Graduate School of Management, W. Lafayette, IN, U.S.A.

Summary Researchers have noted that upward in¯uence tactics are often used in varying patternsand combinations (e.g. Yukl and Falbe, 1990). This study investigated whether in¯uencestrategies representing hard, soft, or rational approaches to in¯uence behavior wouldemerge in relation to upward in¯uence tactics of assertiveness, rationality, coalition,upward appeal, ingratiation, and exchange. Hypotheses were o�ered concerning therelations of selected demographic, individual di�erence, relational, and opportunityfactors to these strategies. The 225 participants were full-time employees of a nationalnon-pro®t organization. Second-order factor analysis provided some support for thedimensionalization of upward in¯uence tactics as representing hard, soft, and rationalstrategies. Each strategy was related to a unique set of predictors. The results suggest ahigher level of complexity for in¯uence strategies than previously expected. Theimplications of this study, as well as fruitful areas for future research, are discussed.*c 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Introduction

Interpersonal in¯uence, in its many forms, is ubiquitous in organizational life. As researchershave continued to pursue an understanding of how organizations function, the topic of in¯uencehas received an ever-increasing amount of scienti®c and popular press attention (Cohen andBradford, 1990; Pfe�er, 1992). In light of the recognition that organizational members mustoften work through others to accomplish their tasks, researchers have been trying to ®ll in manyof the gaps in our current knowledge regarding how, when, and why in¯uence is used inorganizations. Speci®cally, in what ways do individuals at work in¯uence their colleagues,

We would like to thank Bruce Barry, Robert Bontempo, Michael Buckley, Carolyn Nicholson, and three anonymousreviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Addressee for correspondence: Steven M. Farmer,Department of Management, Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY, U.S.A., 13699-5790.

CCC 0894±3796/97/010017±26 Received 14 October 1994# 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Accepted 30 October 1995

JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, VOL. 18, 17±42 (1997)

subordinates, and superiors to achieve valued outcomes or obtain important resources (Kipnis,1976; Tedeschi, Schlenker and Bonoma, 1973)?

The focus of this study is on upward in¯uenceÐin¯uence that is directed by subordinatestoward their immediate superiors. According to Porter, Allen and Angle (1981), upwardin¯uence has received less conceptual and empirical attention across the various behavioralliteratures than have downward in¯uence (e.g. management and leadership) and lateral in¯uence(e.g. group dynamics and socialization). Since their observation, however, interest in upwardin¯uence in organizations has increased (e.g. Ansari and Kapoor, 1987; Deluga, 1991; Duttonand Ashford, 1993).

Part of the reason for this increased interest mirrors shifts in power distributions in manyorganizations. As organizations have downsized and ¯attened to meet the demands of com-petitive environments, employees in some ®rms have been `empowered', with more decision-making authority vested in lower level employees (Cotton, 1993). Indeed, employee involvementin decision-making is one criterion for the prestigious Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award. Forlower-level employees, involvement in decision-making almost certainly involves more upwardrequests for information, for resources, or even for more authority. Increasingly, competitivepressures are resulting in increases in employee empowerment to meet the need for moreinnovation as well as more productivity (Gustavsen, 1986). In the future, it seem likely that lowerlevel employees will have more reasons and more opportunities to in¯uence their superiors.Thus, a better understanding of upward in¯uence will ultimately bene®t many organizations.

Researchers have begun to specify the components of the complex array of in¯uence formsand antecedent forces that a�ect a person's decision to in¯uence another (e.g. Ansari andKapoor, 1987; Deluga, 1991; Schriesheim and Hinkin, 1990). This study represents an additionto this e�ort and is designed to extend the upward in¯uence literature in two ways. First, it hasbeen noted that tactics will often be used in combination (Falbe and Yukl, 1992; Yukl and Falbe,1990). Yet until recently, most in¯uence research has focused on a tactic-by-tactic examinationof in¯uence use. However, researchers in several literatures have suggested that certain meta-categories of in¯uence tactics may re¯ect their strategic use by individuals (e.g. Berger, 1985;Kipnis, 1984; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1988, 1985, 1983; Miller, 1983; Miller, Boster, Rolo� andSeibold, 1987).

To date, the in¯uence tactic typology o�ered by Kipnis, Schmidt and Wilkinson (1980) hasreceived the most attention, and has been the only typology that has prompted a serious attemptto develop and validate scales (Schriesheim and Hinkin, 1990; Yukl and Falbe, 1990). It has beenproposed that groupings of in¯uence tactics in this typology may re¯ect several overarching,higher-order strategies (Barry and Shapiro, 1992; Kipnis, 1984; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1985;Deluga, 1991). These meta-categories of in¯uence tactics have been characterized as re¯ectinghard strategies, soft strategies, and rational strategies. There has been no direct empiricalevidence to date concerning this categorization, although it is beginning to be commonly used inthe management literature (e.g. Barry and Shapiro, 1992; Deluga, 1991). Therefore, the ®rstresearch question asked in this study is `Can individuals' use of in¯uence tactics be dimensional-ized as meta-categories re¯ecting hard, soft, and rational strategies?'

Second, independently dimensionalized in¯uence tactics do appear to be used ininterdependent ways (Falbe and Yukl, 1992; Pfe�er, 1992; Yukl and Falbe, 1990; Yukl, Falbeand Youn, 1993), suggesting some sort of strategic use of in¯uence behavior. However, pastresearch has tended to investigate small sets of predictors in relation to speci®c tactics and totest their relationships with these tactics individually. Understanding more about in¯uencestrategies requires us to examine the conditions under which we expect particular strategies tobe manifested. Framed in operational terms, we should concurrently account for multiple

18 S. M. FARMER ET AL.

causes of individual tactics and multiple e�ects of individual predictors of in¯uence. One suchapproach is to simultaneously examine multiple in¯uence behaviors in relation to a relativelycomplete set of known or hypothesized predictors. This assertion follows the logic set forth byBacharach (1983) that in¯uence strategy encompasses `a way of thinking that involves consider-ation of one's power, one's objectives, and how one can most e�ectively be used to secure theother' (pp. 371±372).

This study draws from four general sets of predictors (relational, individual di�erences,demographic, and opportunity) to more fully examine the role that these play in subordinates'choice of upward in¯uence strategies. Therefore, the second research question asked is `What arethe patterns of in¯uence antecedents that are associated with particular meta-categories ofin¯uence strategies?'

In the following sections, we ®rst present a conceptual basis for the hypothesized in¯uencestrategies. We then examine how di�erent combinations of predictors may be related to use ofeach proposed strategy. Finally, we present research which assessed whether in¯uence tacticsform hypothesized in¯uence strategies, and also investigated hypotheses concerning theantecedents of these in¯uence strategies.

In¯uence Tactics and In¯uence Strategies

Identifying in¯uence tactics

In¯uence behaviors have generally been identi®ed in terms of the tactics used to obtain a desiredgoal from a target individual. As noted, the typology o�ered by Kipnis et al. (1980) has receivedthe most attention (e.g. Schriesheim and Hinkin, 1990; Yukl and Falbe, 1990). Recently,Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990) conducted four studies to improve the Kipnis et al. scales.Through an iterative process, they derived an 18-item instrument (six dimensions with threeitems each) with better reliability and validity than other instruments derived from the Kipnis etal. (1980) typology (e.g. the POIS; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1982). The resulting tactics were labeledassertive (e.g. expressed my anger verbally), rational (e.g. explained the reasons for my request),upward appeal (e.g. obtained the informal support of higher-ups), coalition (e.g. obtained thesupport of co-workers to back up my request), ingratiation (e.g. acted in a friendly manner priorto asking for what I wanted), and exchange (e.g. reminded him/her of past favors that I did forhim/her).

Identifying in¯uence strategies

Based on the Kipnis et al. (1980) typology, Kipnis (1984) suggested that in¯uence tactics can begrouped into three meta-categoriesÐstrong, weak, and rationalÐthat re¯ect particularmindsets on the parts of in¯uences. In a later piece directed at a non-academic audience, thesestrategies were renamed as hard, soft, and rational (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1985). The particulartactics used to represent each strategy have di�ered across di�erent studies. Kipnis and Schmidt(1985) proposed that a hard strategy consisted of tactics of assertiveness, that a soft strategyconsisted of tactics of friendliness or ingratiation, and that a rational strategy consisted of tacticsof rationality and bargaining or exchange. Barry and Shapiro (1992) used this categorization toexamine how di�erent combinations of these in¯uence strategies a�ected compliance. In an

UPWARD INFLUENCE STRATEGIES 19

investigation linking upward in¯uence behavior with subordinate impression managementcharacteristics, Deluga (1991) created scales based on a somewhat di�erent combination of thesix tactics. He viewed tactics of assertiveness, upward appeal, and coalition as re¯ecting a hardapproach or strategy, tactics of ingratiation and ¯attery as re¯ecting a soft approach, and tacticsof rationality and bargaining as re¯ecting a rational approach. However, neither Barry andShapiro (1992) nor Deluga (1991) empirically validated the meta-categorization scheme, nor hasany consistent theory base been used to support these categorizations.

The following sections develop a conceptual basis for a categorization of upward in¯uencetactics as representative of hard, soft, and rational strategies. These strategies can be seen tostem, in a broad sense, from such social in¯uence processes as power dependence and socialexchange (Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1961), and in a more particular way, from those ofcompliance, identi®cation, and internalization proposed by Kelman (1961), which Miller (1983)has noted are grounded in di�ering sources of the in¯uence agent's power1.

Hard strategiesHard strategies may be described as those where the in¯uence agent perceives that he or shecontrols meaningful reinforcements for the target (Tedeschi et al., 1973); this is the mechanismthrough which the agent expects compliance to be gained (Miller, 1983; Kelman, 1961). This maybe done either through direct control of rewards and punishments in return for complianceor non-compliance, or may be mediated through manipulative threats. The former means isgenerally associated with legitimate or coercive power, of which subordinates usually possesslittle. The use of an implied threat, however, is a hard in¯uence tactic that is often available tosubordinates, given that interdependent tasks may often provide a power base for subordinates(Crozier, 1964). Within the Kipnis et al. (1980) typology, the verbal aggressiveness that de®nes asubordinate's use of assertiveness with a superior may be meant to convey or presage the threatof a poorer working relationship, a lack of e�ort, or some other subtle obstructiveness on thepart of the subordinate if compliance is not gained.

Likewise, the Kipnis et al. (1980) tactic of upward appeal, or taking matters over thesupervisor's head, clearly involves a direct threat to the supervisor's legitimate authority. Themanipulative use of exchange may also be part of a hard strategy (Falbe and Yukl, 1992),especially when viewed from a power-dependence perspective (Emerson, 1962; Bacharach andLawler, 1977). When used in this fashion, exchange may be seen as a distributive bargaining toolbased on some facet of the supervisor's dependence upon the subordinate, and is analogous to amarket transaction where bargaining power of the parties is unequal (Pfe�er, 1992). Forexample, the subordinate may remind the superior of past e�orts that were clearly beyond thecall of duty to obtain compliance, especially when coworkers or other superiors are aware ofthose e�orts.

Soft strategiesA soft strategy of upward in¯uence involves less aggressive, more psychologically manipulatingmeans (Neale and Northcraft, 1991). This strategy is based in part on Kelman's (1961) notion ofidenti®cation, focusing on reinforcing the target's role relationship with the in¯uence agent(Miller, 1983). A soft strategy re¯ects agents' perceptions that they do not control target


1 We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.

compliance. So, rather than involving some implicit threat, a soft strategy is designed to secure asupervisor's volitional compliance to an in¯uence request by either making the subordinate moreattractive in some way (the tactic of ingratiation), or by o�ering some presumably attractivefuture payback in return for compliance (the tactic of exchange).

It is important to point out that individuals may use similar tactics in di�erent ways. Therefore,it is possible that the same tactic may be re¯ected in di�erent in¯uence strategies. Although somerecent evidence has found that a soft strategy is more e�ective in the absence of an o�eredexchange than in its presence (Barry and Shapiro, 1992), a broad stream of social psychologicalresearch has suggested that ingratiation tactics will not increase liking of the agent by the targetunless the target perceives that the in¯uence agent actually intends to help him/her, and that helpis freely o�ered (Broll, Gross and Piliavin, 1974; Greenberg and Frisch, 1972; Nemeth, 1970).Thus we propose that both ingratiatory behaviors (e.g. acting friendly prior to making a request)and some forms of exchange may represent a soft strategy in compliance-gaining.

Rational strategiesWith a rational strategy, subordinates appeal to or try to invoke instrumental reasoning on thepart of the supervisor. The object is to o�er the supervisor a course of action (complying with thein¯uence request) that would presumably maximize the expected value of some outcomeimportant to the supervisor. As such, this type of strategy may be conceptualized within utility orexpectancy frameworks to gain what is desired (Tedeschi et al., 1973). Consistent with Kelman's(1961) notion of internalization, this strategy frames presentation of the self as knowledgeableand credible (Miller, 1983) in order to evoke a positive response. Often, subordinates attempt touse a rational strategy through the tactical use of reason or logic. Exchange can also be part of arational strategy when used in an integrative sense, as bargaining in the absence of strong powerdependence in either direction. In general this last strategy uses rational tactics and exchange (asbargaining) and represents the presentation of logical arguments and `objective' rationales forwhat is desired.Although garnering support from subordinates, peers, or superiors is a common in¯uence

tactic in organizations (Pfe�er, 1992), it is unclear whether coalition tactics would be part of ahard or soft strategy (Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983; Yukl et al., 1993; Yukl and Tracey, 1992).Coalitions can conceivably be used either as a way to directly force another to do something(as part of a hard strategy, such as when subordinates gang up to force an appointment to aposition), or as an indirect (i.e. soft) method of garnering additional support for a project or aposition. Given the speculative nature of the evidence, however, the role of coalition use inupward in¯uence strategies is uncertain, and will be explored empirically in this study.

Empirical tests of in¯uence strategy categorizations

Greene (1990) has argued that a single in¯uence act (e.g. friendliness or ingratiation) may be theresult of any number of cognitive representations. This position is echoed by Bacharach (1983)concerning bargaining within organizations, in that the same tactics may be used in di�erentbargaining settings, for completely di�erent reasons. A particular strategy or plan may itselfresult in the use of di�erent behavioral tactics by di�erent people, or even by the same individualat di�erent points in time (Berger, 1985). Because of this, the behavioral strategies proposed hereare o�ered as archetypes, not absolutes. As such, they are proposed as a starting point for thisresearch. The meaning of these strategies may depend to some extent on the vantage point of the


observer, as studies ®nding attributional di�erences between in¯uence agent and in¯uence targetseem to suggest (Erez, Rim and Keider, 1986; Yukl and Falbe, 1990). Research in this area is at arelatively early stage, and since there has been little empirical work in this area it is possible thatour results may not map exactly onto these archetypes. In order to assess this possibility, thehypothesized model of in¯uence tactic±in¯uence strategy relationships will be compared toseveral alternative models of tactic±strategy relationships. This will also allow the examinationof the role of coalition tactics in upward in¯uence strategies. The following propositions werethus formulated for testing:

A hard strategy will be represented by tactics of assertiveness, upward appeal, and exchange(1a). A soft strategy will be represented by tactics of ingratiation and exchange (1b).A rational strategy will be represented by tactics of rationality and exchange (1c).

Factors A�ecting Upward In¯uenceStrategies

Under what conditions might individuals use hard, soft, or rational strategies? Why do somepersons use tactics that emphasize the rationality and reasonableness of their needs, while othersutilize hard tactics of upward appeal and assertiveness or the softer tactic of ingratiation? In thelast two decades, a number of organizational scholars have theorized about this process(e.g. Cobb, 1984; Cody, Greene, Marston, O'Hair, Baaske and Schneider, 1986; Cody andMcLaughlin, 1985; Kipnis, 1976; McCall, 1978; Porter et al., 1981) and have empiricallyexamined the antecedents of in¯uence use (e.g. Cody and McLaughlin, 1985; Kipnis andSchmidt, 1983; Michener and Schwertfeger, 1972). These researchers have identi®ed several setsof variables that seem to be related to particular types of in¯uence. These include dispositionalin¯uences or individual di�erences, relational in¯uences involving perceptions of target power,the quality of the relationship between in¯uence agent and target, demographic factors, andopportunities to exercise in¯uence. In the section below, we identify those expected to beparticularly important as predictors of in¯uence strategies. These relationships are summarizedin Table 1.

Conditions associated with use of a hard strategy

Of the three strategies presented here, a hard strategy is perhaps the least frequently used withinthe organization. Tactics such as verbal aggressiveness (arguing, threats, etc), taking mattersover the boss' head, and hardball forms of exchange are not considered appropriate behavior inmost organizations. Because of this, we did not expect that situational factors would play amajor role in predicting this form of in¯uence. In the absence of situational variance, it is morelikely that global personal characteristics may predict use of these hard forms of in¯uence.Several of these that should be particularly salient (Machiavellianism, locus of control, self-monitoring, and subordinate tenure) are discussed in the sections below. Another usefulconceptual perspective to hard in¯uence involves a power-dependency approach, which suggeststhat the successful use of power requires accounting for the characteristics of the person towardwhom it is directed. In particular, we focus on in¯uence agents' perceptions of power di�erentials


and on their perceptions of the quality of the relationships between themselves and theirimmediate superiors.

Previous research has suggested several conditions that may be related to both the willingnessand the ability of subordinates to use a hard strategy to gain compliance from their supervisors.First, it has been noted (Kipnis, 1976; Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983, 1985) that coercive forms ofin¯uence tend to be used when the in¯uencer holds a power advantage. As such, we would expectthat when subordinates perceive little power di�erential between themselves and their super-visors, the likelihood of subordinates' use of a hard strategy would increase.

The quality of the exchange relationship between subordinate and supervisor should alsoa�ect the use of a hard strategy. The leader±member exchange (LMX) perspective assumes thatdyadic role development will result in di�erentiated role de®nitions, and therefore in variedleader±member exchanges (Graen & Cashman, 1975; Dienesch and Liden, 1986). Those dyadsthat exhibit a high degree of exchange (high in LMX or `in-groupness') consist of a leader±follower relationship characterized by mutual liking, trust, respect, and reciprocal in¯uence. LowLMX relationships are characterized by more traditional supervisor±subordinate relationshipsbased on hierarchical di�erentiation and the formal roles of the employment contract(Dansereau, Graen and Haga, 1975). In a recent study, Deluga and Perry (1991) found LMXto be negatively related to assertiveness tactics. In general, the in¯uence literature does show thatharsh means of in¯uence are often invoked to in¯uence a disliked or distrusted person (Kipnis,1976; Michener and Schwertfeger, 1972). We would expect that subordinates with good personaland working relationships would be less likely to put this relationship, and the resulting bene®ts,


Table 1. Proposed framework of upward in¯uence strategies, associated tactic components, and conditionsassociated with strategy use

Strategy Description Tactic Conditions associatedcomponents with use

Hard strategy Subordinate uses negative Assertiveness Perceived powerreinforcements and punishments di�erentials betweento gain compliance from the Upward appeals subordinate andsupervisor supervisor are lowBased on interdependence of Exchange based on Poor LMX relationshipworking relationships dependence of target Subordinate is high-Mach

Coalition? Subordinate has externalorientation

Soft strategy Subordinate secures supervisor's Ingratiation Subordinate is highvolitional compliance by self-monitorpsychological manupulation of Exchange based on Increasing levels ofsupervisor a�ect toward self or invoking norm of educationtoward subordinate reciprocityBased on reinforcement of Subordinate is high-Machtarget's role relationship with Coalition? Subordinate has externalsupervisor (identi®cation) orientation

Rational Subordinate gains compliance Rationality Increasing levels ofstrategy by appealing to supervisor's education

instrumental reasoning Exchange asBased on subjective expected bargaining Subordinate works atutility, expectancy, and di�erent physical locationinternalization perspectives to supervisor

at risk by using hard forms of in¯uence. On the other hand, subordinates with lower qualityrelations with their supervisors have less to protect, and the costs of using harsh or threateningtactics may not be prohibitive.

It is also possible that some individuals are more prone to use a hard strategy, simply as afunction of individual characteristics. Of the many individual di�erences that may be examined,Machiavellianism, re¯ecting about whether other people can be manipulated to achieve one'sgoals and one's inclinations to do so, seems to be naturally linked to power use. Although highMachs may be more e�ective in face-to-face situations (Christie and Geis, 1970), an enduringcharacteristic of Machiavellian behavior is that it can be described as being quite adaptiveconcerning the use of in¯uence (Grams and Rogers, 1990). High Machs can be expected to usewhatever method is necessary to achieve their goals, whereas low Machs may be more con-strained by personal, moral standards. As such, we might expect that subordinates that are highMachs would be more likely to use a hard strategy to obtain compliance from a supervisor.

Another individual di�erence that has been linked to hard or coercive power is locus of control(Rotter, 1966), which di�erentiates individuals by the extent to which they believe they have asense of personal control over their environment (Internals) or the belief that their lives arecontrolled by external forces such as luck or powerful others (Externals). Externals may begenerally more aggressive in the workplace (Perlow and Latham, 1993), and are more likely to usecoercive tactics in upward in¯uence than are internals (Lamude, Daniels and White, 1987).Goodstadt andHjelle (1973) showed that individuals perceiving themselves as powerless whoweregiven access to a range of in¯uence methods used coercive and punishing means of in¯uence farmore often than individuals with an internal locus of control. Also, Kapoor, Ansari and Shukla(1986) found that external orientations were related to tactics of upward appeal and blocking(preventing others from obtaining positive outcomes). Since externals may assume that morerational forms of in¯uence will not be e�ective (Kipnis, 1976), a higher external orientation shouldbe associated with a hard strategy to coerce compliance. Interestingly, Kapoor et al. (1986) alsofound that a high external orientation was also related to ingratiation tactics, suggesting thatexternals may also prefer a soft or covert strategy, a point discussed in the next section.

Hypothesis la: Perceived power di�erentials between subordinate and supervisor will benegatively related to use of a hard strategy.Hypothesis 1b: Leader±member exchange (LMX) will be negatively related to use of a hardstrategy.Hypothesis 1c: Machiavellianism will be positively related to use of a hard strategy.Hypothesis 1d: External locus of control will be positively related to use of a hard strategy.

Conditions associated with use of a soft strategy

Rather than involving coercion, a soft strategy relies on some form of psychologicalmanipulation to entice a form of compliance that the target perceives as volitional. As with ahard strategy, a number of antecedent conditions are likely to be associated with soft forms ofin¯uence. These include individual and demographic characteristics of self-monitoring, locus ofcontrol, Machiavellianism, and education. It is notable that these proposed antecedents allre¯ect some personal characteristic, although they may di�er in their stability over time. Of allthree forms or strategies of in¯uence discussed in this paper, soft strategies may be those thatrequire the most `political' skill. The predictors of a soft strategy that we forward here share thisin common: they all re¯ect, in various ways, the ability of individuals to directly in¯uence thetarget in an emotional or a�ective way. This includes the ability to create a sense of obligation on


the part of the target to reciprocate for something the in¯uence agent has done or will do. Thissense of obligation or reciprocity may be best described as one that is often based in a�ect: we feelobligated because returning favors is the `right thing to do'. The particulars of this argument arepresented below for each hypothesized predictor of soft in¯uence strategies.

The skill and ability with which subordinates present their social selves to superiors cana�ect a number of salient outcomes for employees (e.g. supervisor attraction and performanceappraisals; cf. Leary and Kowalski, 1990; Wortman and Linsensmeier, 1977). An importantfactor in this process is self-monitoring, or the extent to which individuals actively attend to theimage they are creating within social situations (Snyder, 1974). Essentially, individuals high inthis characteristic are sensitive to their social environment and how they appear in it. Notsurprisingly, both empirical studies and reviews of the relationship between self-monitoring andimpression management behaviors, such as self-enhancing communications, have suggested apositive relationship between the two (Caldwell and O'Reilly, 1982; Fandt and Ferris, 1990;Liden and Mitchell, 1989). This suggests that self-monitoring should be positively related toingratiating in¯uence behaviors (Liden and Mitchell, 1989) and, therefore, to the use of a softin¯uence strategy.

An achieved characteristic that may enhance self-presentation ability is the level of educationalattainment of the subordinate (Ralston, 1985). This may occur through what Perkins (1986) hastermed `thinking frames', or the tactics and strategies people use to organize thinking and givemeaning to events. It is reasonable to assume that higher educational levels may re¯ect increasinglevels of political skill, particularly those skills which involve subtle diagnosis of the impacts ofone's own behavior on an in¯uence target, which Pfe�er (1992) has noted as important to thee�ectiveness of the individual in in¯uence situations. If so, we would also expect to ®ndeducational attainment positively associated with softer, more subtle forms of in¯uence.

As was the case with a hard strategy, previous research suggests that Machiavellianism is alsorelated to the ingratiation component of a soft strategy. Machiavellians may be characterized asseeking to control or manipulate others. Ralston (1985) proposed that high Machs tend to useingratiatory tactics more than do low Machs, a ®nding supported by several empirical studies(Falbo, 1977; Grams and Rogers, 1990; Pandey and Rastogi, 1979). Here, the expectation isstraightforward: Machiavellianism will be positively related to a soft strategy.

Another condition conducive to soft in¯uence involves subordinate perceptions of a lack ofpower or control (Schmidt and Kipnis, 1984). Research on powerless actors has focused on theconstruct of locus of control (Rotter, 1966) which, as noted previously, may not only beassociated with a hard strategy, but also a soft strategy (Kapoor et al., 1986). Ralston (1985)proposed that since internals believe they can control their environment, they should be morelikely to use ingratiatory tactics than would externals. However, Canary, Cody and Marston(1986) concluded that powerless actors tend to prefer compliance-gaining situations in whichthey are dependent on the target and can exploit that dependence by manipulating the target'semotions (positively or negatively), or by manipulating relational or exchange obligations(i.e. invoking norms of reciprocity and feelings of obligation; Pfe�er, 1992). Based on this, it wasexpected that individuals with an external orientation would be more likely to use a soft strategythan are internals.

In summary, we propose the following:

Hypothesis 2a: Self-monitoring will be positively related to use of a soft strategy.Hypothesis 2b: Level of education will be positively related to use of a soft strategy.Hypothesis 2c: Machiavellianism will be positively related to use of a soft strategy.Hypothesis 2d: External locus of control will be positively related to use of a soft strategy.


Conditions associated with use of a rational strategy

Rational in¯uence seems to be ubiquitous in organizations. This is, at least partly, a function ofbroad societal and organizational norms that provide legitimacy to this means of persuasion.Whereas the political norm structure may vary between organizations or even withinorganizations concerning what type of upward in¯uence attempts are considered `acceptable'(Allen, Madison, Porter, Renwick andMayes, 1979; Porter et al., 1981), reason and logic seem tobe almost universally accepted as appropriate means of pursuing in¯uence goals. When in¯uenceis directed upward, rational forms of in¯uence are especially likely to occur, because they havefewer costs than, say, using an assertive strategy (Kipnis et al., 1980; Yukl et al., 1993; Yukl andFalbe, 1990). Also, since subordinates tend to possess less control over valued resources than dosuperiors, the ability to provide rewards and punishments or to o�er exchanges may be lowcompared to the ability of supervisors to in¯uence subordinates by reward, punishment, orexchange. As a result, individuals attempting to in¯uence superiors are more likely to be in asituation where image maintenance is important, and are therefore motivated to attempt toappear rational and competent (Cody and McLaughlin, 1985; Godfrey, Jones and Lord, 1986).

Regarding upward in¯uence, the implications of these ®ndings pose an interesting dilemma forresearchers. In¯uence research has found that rational forms of in¯uence are used far more oftenthan any others, and are in fact used almost universally in organizations, in all directions and atall levels (e.g. Yukl et al., 1993; Yukl and Tracey, 1992). Given this apparently limited variabilityin the use of rational in¯uence, is it possible to identify antecedent con®gurations that arepeculiar to its use? Here, the focus is on factors thought to a�ect the propensity and opportunityfor subordinates to in¯uence the supervisor by rational means: level of education, leader±member relations, and opportunities for face-to-face contacts.

The ability to reason and use logic requires development to use e�ectively. Such cognitivedevelopment involves the ability to take multiple perspectives and to develop increasinglycomplicated and di�erentiated schema regarding these perspectives (Perkins, 1986). Develop-ment of this skill has been one of the primary goals of education at all levels. Since individualscannot use in¯uence-related skills which they do not have (Bisanz and Rule, 1990), it follows thatwe would expect to ®nd educational attainment positively associated with reason and logic inupward in¯uence attempts.

The opportunity that an individual has to engage in upward in¯uence should impact theselection of in¯uence tactics (Perreault and Miles, 1978; Porter et al., 1981). Concerning rationalin¯uence, opportunities for in¯uence may exist within the context of the leader±memberrelationship (Liden and Mitchell, 1989), especially concerning the frequency and quality ofcontact between the dyadic members. Subordinates in high LMX dyads have been shown to havegreater participation in decision making (Dansereau et al., 1975; Scandura, Graen and Novak,1986), thus o�ering more direct opportunities for arguing a particular point of view, makingrequests, bargaining, etc. Ansari and Kapoor (1987) used a scenario approach to representauthoritarian, participative, and nurturant-task type managers and assessed the tactics used toachieve various goals. They reported that in¯uence methods used by subordinates weresigni®cantly a�ected by the leadership style of the superior. For participative managers, rationalpersuasion was adopted signi®cantly more often than for authoritarian managers.

The opportunity for subordinates to engage in face-to-face versus non face-to-face contactswith their supervisors should also signi®cantly a�ect in¯uence strategy selection (Barry andBateman, 1992; Perreault and Miles, 1978). Communication through non face-to-face channels(e.g. telephone, e-mail) can inhibit the transfer of social cues, such as facial expressions, that maybe integral to some tactics, such as ingratiation or assertiveness, that are associated with soft and


hard strategies (Sproull and Kiesler, 1986; Williams, 1977). Under these conditions, interactionsbetween individuals often have by necessity a more rational, task-oriented focus than face-to-face interactions (McGrath, 1984; McLeod, 1992). Therefore, it was expected that individualswho are not located in the same o�ce as their supervisors would tend toward greater use ofrational strategies, since the transfer of complex social cues is most e�ective in face-to-facesituations (Kiesler and Sproull, 1992; McGrath and Hollingshead, 1993). To examine thiscontention, whether subordinates and their supervisors are located at the same o�ce (co-located)was used as a measure of the opportunity of subordinates to interact on an ongoing basis withtheir superiors. This provides an indirect test of how medium (face-to-face versus other methods)a�ects in¯uence strategies.

On the basis of the previous discussion, the following hypotheses are o�ered:

Hypothesis 3a: Level of education will be positively related to use of rational strategy.Hypothesis 3b: Being located at a di�erent workplace than one's supervisor will bepositively related to use of a rational strategy.

Methods

Participants and procedure

Employees from approximately 53 branch locations of the southeast region of a national non-pro®t organization served as participants. Data were collected through a questionnairedistributed to 285 employees across all hierarchical levels in the organization. Responses weremailed directly to the researchers. Of the 226 questionnaires returned, one individual declined toparticipate and as such was not included in the ®nal sample. The resulting sample size ofN� 225re¯ects a response rate of 87 per cent. The sample was 89 per cent female. Almost all of theparticipants (95.4 per cent) completed at least some college and 59.5 per cent earned a collegedegree. The mean age of the participants was 38.8 years (S.D.� 10.6). Sixty-®ve per cent of theparticipants worked at the same location as their managers, and the mean organizational tenureof the participants was 4.48 years (S.D.� 5.58).

Measures

DemographicsParticipants' education level (coded ordinally, with anchors of 1� less than high school and5� graduate degree) and whether they were co-located with their supervisors (1� at di�erentlocations; 2� located at same location) were included in the analyses.

Leader±member exchangeSeven items from Scandura and Graen (1984) were used to construct a unidimensional measureof LMX (alpha� 0.91). This scale has shown criterion-related validity across a number of recentstudies (e.g. Kozlowski and Doherty, 1989; Liden and Maslyn, 1993; Scandura et al., 1986).

MachiavellianismThe MACH IV scale (Christie and Geis, 1970) was used to assess participant levels ofMachiavellianism (alpha� 0.68). This scale consists of 20 items scored on a 7-point Likert scale


from agree strongly to disagree strongly. The scale has shown good reliabilities and strongevidence of discriminant and convergent validity (Robinson, Shaver and Wrightsman, 1991). Asmall modi®cation was made on three items where the word `people' was substituted for the word`men' (e.g. `Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless they're forced to do so') toeliminate gender-speci®c language.

Locus of controlAlthough originally proposed to be a unidimensional construct (Rotter 1966), more recentevidence suggests that locus of control may be a multidimensional construct (e.g. Du�y, Shi¯ettand Downey, 1977; Levenson, 1981; Stanley, Hyman and Sharp, 1984). Recent conceptualiza-tions have focused on the dimensions of internal attributions, chance attributions, andattributions to powerful others. As we were interested speci®cally in upward in¯uence situationswhere the in¯uence target is generally more powerful than the in¯uence agent, we used a scaledesigned to speci®cally measure this dimension, rather than the more commonly used Rotter(1966) measure. The powerful others subscale from Levenson and Miller's (1976) multi-dimensional locus of control scale, which assesses the extent to which powerful others are seen asthwarting attempts at mastery or control (Levenson, 1981), was used to assess externalorientation (alpha-0.75). The original six-point scale was adapted to a ®ve-point Likert scale,with anchors of strongly disagree and strongly agree. Previous research has indicated that thisscale possesses adequate levels of construct validity and internal consistency (Levenson, 1981;Lindbloom and Faw, 1982; Sherman and Ryckman, 1980; Kapoor and Ansari, 1988; Kapooret al., 1986).

Self monitoringThis scale assesses individuals' levels of self-observation and self-control of expressive behavior,as guided by situational cues to social appropriateness. Twenty-®ve true-false items from Snyder(1974) were used to assess the degree of participants' self-monitoring of their own behaviors(alpha� 0.75).

Perceptions of supervisor powerSubordinate perceptions of supervisor power were assessed by using the reward and coercivepower subscales developed by Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989). These subscales are part of abroader set of ®ve subscales corresponding to French and Raven's (1959) ®ve bases of power(reward, coercive, legitimate, expert, and referent). These scales were chosen because theydirectly re¯ect subordinates' perceptions of supervisors' power to provide positive and/ornegative reinforcements, which should be related to the willingness of subordinates to use hard orcoercive in¯uence on those supervisors. The reward and coercive subscales consist of four itemseach (respectively, alpha� 0.67; alpha� 0.85).

In¯uence tacticsThe 18-item scale from Schriesheim and Hinkin's (1990) re®nement of Kipnis et al. (1980) wasused to assess in¯uence tactics. This scale consists of six subscales each measured by threeitems. Participants were asked how often they used each of the six tactics during the past 6months to in¯uence their boss or supervisor. The tactics used in subsequent analyses


represented assertiveness (alpha� 0.64), rationality (alpha� 0.75), coalition (alpha� 0.83),upward appeal (alpha� 0.61), ingratiation (alpha� 0.67), and exchange (alpha� 0.72). Thesereliabilities are comparable to those found for these tactics in previous research (e.g. Erez et al.,1986; Kipnis et al., 1980; Schmidt and Kipnis, 1984), although somewhat lower than thosefound by Schriesheim and Hinkin (1990). A con®rmatory factor analysis was performed usingLISREL VII to assess the ®t of the proposed six-factor structure (�2 � 192.22, df� 120,p50.000, GFI� 0.91, AGFI� 0.87, RMSR� 0.05), with the six factors left free to correlate.Although the ®t of this model was somewhat worse than that found by Schriesheim and Hinkin(1990), t-values for all hypothesized factor loadings were signi®cant. Eleven of the 15 possiblebivariate correlations between the six factors were signi®cant, supporting the possibility thatthese ®rst-order factors may represent a higher-order factor structure. The Tucker±Lewis Index(TLI; Tucker and Lewis, 1973) was used to assess the incremental ®t of the ®rst-ordermodel versus the null model (�2 � 1217.15, df� 153, p50.000, GFI� 0.52, AGFI� 0.46,RMSR� 0.19). The TLI for this comparison was 0.91, indicating that the ®t of the model isadequate (Marsh, Balla and McDonald, 1988).

Results

Zero-order correlations

Correlations, means, and standard deviations may be found in Table 2. As expected for upwardin¯uence, rational tactics were used far more often than any other means of in¯uence. All of thezero-order correlations among the in¯uence tactics were positive, and below 0.30 except betweenupward appeal and assertiveness (r� 0.33), upward appeal and exchange (r� 0.33), upwardappeal and coalition (r� 0.43) and ingratiation and exchange (r� 0.40). Intercorrelationsbetween the in¯uence tactics indicated that coalition, upward appeal, ingratiation, and exchangeall appear to be related; rational tactics appear to have relatively small intercorrelations with theother in¯uence tactics; and assertiveness is most highly related to upward appeal, coalition, andexchange tactics.

The zero-order correlations between the predictors also tended to be moderate (0.30 or below).The four exceptions were between LMX and coercive power (r�70.41), Machiavellianism andself-monitoring (r� 0.38), Machiavellianism and locus of control/powerful others (r� 0.38), andcoercive power and reward power (r� 0.37). Correlations between the predictors and thein¯uence tactics were mostly below the 0.30 level, and were generally as expected. To assessmethod variance between these variables, Harman's single-factor test (Podsako� and Organ,1986) was used. The factor analysis did not ®nd a single-overriding factor, instead ®nding ®vesigni®cant factors. Given these results, and considering the moderate intercorrelations of thepredictors, it was concluded that multicollinearity was not a problem within either variable set.

In¯uence strategies

It was proposed that the in¯uence strategies are composed of particular sets of tactics. Since thesein¯uence tactics are themselves composed of separate items, this proposition was tested by usingsecond-order factor analysis (Marsh and Hocevar, 1988, 1985) in LISREL VII. Second-orderfactor analysis involves simultaneous estimation of speci®ed ®rst- and second-order factors



Table

2.Means,standard

deviations,andcorrelationsamongvariables*

Variables

Mean

S.D

.1

23

45

67

89

10

11

12

13

14

1.Assertiveness

1.63

0.71

1.00

2.Rational

4.38

0.71

0.16{

1.00

3.Coalition

1.87

0.94

0.22{

0.17{

1.00

4.Upward

appeal

1.26

0.47

0.33{

0.03

0.43{

1.00

5.Ingratiation

2.54

0.99

0.02

0.17{

0.21{

0.29{

1.00

6.Exchange

1.38

0.56

0.19{

0.11

0.27{

0.40{

0.33{

1.00

7.LOC/powerful

2.51

0.53

0.06

0.11

0.15{

0.11

0.25{

0.26{

1.00

others

8.Machiavellianism

85.00

13.17

0.17{70.14{

0.16{

0.14{

0.20{

0.16{

0.38{

1.00

9.Self-monitoring

11.11

4.26

0.02

0.04

0.17{

0.16{

0.27{

0.21{

0.28{

0.38{

1.00

10.Education

3.74

0.91

0.04

0.20{

0.24{

0.17{

0.29{

0.22{

0.10

70.03

0.07

1.00

11.Rew

ard

power

3.59

0.75

0.01

0.09

70.01

0.04

0.19{

0.08

0.10

0.17{

0.15{

0.01

1.00

12.Coercivepower

3.67

0.93

0.17{

0.09

0.13{

0.08

0.21{70.02

0.08

0.23{

0.22{

0.12{

0.37{

1.00

13.LMX

19.21

5.23

70.38{

0.01

70.11

70.15{70.10

0.13

70.1

70.17{70.03

0.05

70.05

70.41{

1.00

14.Co-location

1.70

0.45

70.05

70.17{70.09

0.00

70.06

0.13

70.01

70.12

70.03

70.04

70.04

0.14{

0.02

1.00

*n�185after

listwisedeletion.

{p50.05;{p50.01.

based on a correlation matrix between the measured variables (Marsh and Hocevar, 1988). The18 items of the in¯uence tactic scales served as measured indicators and the six in¯uence tacticsserved as ®rst-order factors. The model proposed speci®ed that tactics of assertiveness, upwardappeal, and exchange would form a second-order hard strategy, that tactics or ingratiation andexchange would form a second-order soft strategy, and that tactics of rationality and exchangewould form a second-order rational strategy. As noted earlier, coalition tactics may be part ofeither hard or soft strategies, or perhaps both. Higher-order models with coalition loading on thesoft strategy (model 1), on the hard strategy (model 2), and on both strategies (model 3), wereassessed. These models were compared to that proposed by Deluga (1991) in which assertiveness,coalition, and upward appeal loaded together on a higher-order hard factor, ingratiation alonerepresented a soft higher-order latent factor, and tactics of rationality and exchange loadedtogether to represent a higher-order rational factor (model 4)2.

LISREL results for these models can be found in Table 3. Following the suggestions of severalauthors (JoreskoÈ g, 1993; Marsh and Hocevar, 1985; Tanaka, 1993), the ®t of these models was


2 In models where second-order latent constructs were represented by a single ®rst-order indicator, the variance for thatloading was set to 1.0, which parameterizes the model to indicate that the indicators and the latent constructs areidentical (Hayduk, 1987). The matrix between the ®rst-order factors was speci®ed as a diagonal matrix (i.e., not allowedto correlate) since covariation between ®rst-order factors is presumed to be explained by higher-order constructs. Inorder to assess discriminant validity between second-order factors, the covariance matrix of second-order factors wasallowed to be correlated. Maximum likelihood estimation was used in all models.

Table 3. Goodness-of-®t indices for second-order models of in¯uence strategies

Second-order models �2 df p �2/df GFI* AGFI RMSR TLI{ T

Null model 1372.18 123 0.000 11.16 0.51 0.31 0.13First-order model 192.22 120 0.000 1.60 0.91 0.87 0.05 0.91 {

Model 1 222.89 127 0.000 1.76 0.90 0.86 0.07 0.26 0.86Hypothesizedmodel, coalitionas a soft tactic

Model 2 216.09 127 0.000 1.70 0.90 0.86 0.06 0.16 0.89Hypothesizedmodel, coalitionas a hard tactic

Model 3 215.82 126 0.000 1.71 0.90 0.86 0.06 0.18 0.89Hypothesizedmodel, coalitionas both a soft anda hard tactic

Model 4 248.88 129 0.000 1.92 0.88 0.84 0.08 0.53 0.77Based on Deluga(1991)

* GFI, goodness of ®t index; AGFI, adjusted goodness of ®t index; RMSR, root mean square residual; TLI, Tucker±Lewis index; T, target coe�cient.{ The Tucker±Lewis index assesses the ®t of successively nested models. The TLI for the ®rst-order model, reportedearlier, re¯ects improvement in ®t of that model versus the null model. Due to the formula used to compute thiscoe�cient, higher numbers indicate better ®t versus the null model for this comparison. TLI coe�cients for the second-order models re¯ect the decrement in ®t of those models as compared to the ®rst-order model. For these comparisons,lower numbers indicate a smaller incremental di�erence between the ®t of the second- and the ®rst-order models.{ Since the target coe�cient assesses the incremental ®t of a second-order factor model, it cannot be reported for the®rst-order model.

assessed in several ways. Chi-square values, the ratio of chi-square to the degrees of freedom, thegoodness-of-®t index (GFI) and adjusted GFI, the root mean square residual (RMSR, which is ameasure of the average deviation between the observed and derived covariance matrix), theTucker±Lewis Index (TLI), and Marsh and Hocevar's target coe�cient (T) were assessed.Inspection of standardized residuals supplemented these measures.

For all three versions of the proposed model, chi-square values were signi®cant. However,chi-square values vary for reasons not related to ®t, such as having a large number of variablesor having a large or small sample size (Marsh and Hocevar, 1985). Marsh and Hocevar (1985)have suggested that the ratio of chi-square to the model degrees of freedom may be a moreuseful measure. Values were well below 2 for all three models, connoting reasonable ®t. Formodels 1±3, the GFI and AGFI values were similar, with RMSR being slightly higher formodel 1. Inspection of t-values indicated that all speci®ed covariances between the manifestmeasures and the ®rst-order factors were signi®cant. All expected loadings from ®rst-order tosecond-order factors were signi®cant, except for the following. In none of these three models didexchange tactics load signi®cantly on any of the three hypothesized strategies. For models 1 and2, coalition tactics did not load signi®cantly on the second-order soft factor; however, coalitiondid load signi®cantly on the hard factor in models 2 and 3. Model 4, based on Deluga (1991),had ®t indices that were somewhat lower than models 1±3. All speci®ed loadings in this modelwere signi®cant.

Incremental ®t was assessed by the TLI. In this case, the TLI assesses the reduction in ®t thatnecessarily results from the second-order model being nested within the ®rst-order model (Marshand Hocevar, 1988). Model 2 showed the least reduction in ®t (16 per cent) from the ®rst-ordermodel. Incremental model ®t was also assessed by the target coe�cient (T) proposed by Marshand Hocevar (1985). This coe�cient is the ratio of the chi-square of the ®rst-order model to themore restrictive second-order model. Although absolute standards do not exist, a T coe�cient of0.90 is considered acceptable (Marsh and Hocevar, 1985), suggesting that models 2 and 3 ®t thedata best.

In model 1, several of the item-level components of coalition had positive standardizedresiduals greater than 2 with various item components of assertiveness and upward appealtactics, indicating that the relationship between coalition and these `hard' tactics was under-estimated (JoÈ reskog, 1993). Although several standardized residuals in models 2 and 3 weregreater than 2, no particular pattern was discernible. In no case for these three models was thenumber of positive or negative standardized residuals greater than 8. Model 4, however, showeda large number of negative standardized residuals (over 20), indicating overestimation of thecovariance between these variables. Of the nine possible covariances between the three manifestindicators of exchange and the three manifest indicators of rationality, four had negativestandardized residuals greater than 3, suggesting possible misspeci®cation for the loading ofexchange tactics on the higher-order rational factor.

These above indices provide measures of absolute ®t of the models, but they do not provideany direct comparison between the models (Tanaka, 1993). The relative ®t of the models wascompared by chi-square di�erence tests, which is appropriate for nested models. A nestedmodel is created by imposing additional parameter constraints on a model (Hayduk, 1987).Strictly speaking, chi-square di�erence comparisons can only be made between nested models(Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Hayduk, 1987). Models 1, 2, and 4 were nested within model 3, whilemodel 4 was also nested within model 2. Using a signi®cance cuto� of 0.05, chi-square di�er-ence tests showed that both models 1 and 4 ®t the data signi®cantly worse than did model 3(models 1 and 3: �2 � 7.07, df� 1, p50.05; models 4 and 3: �2 � 33.06, df� 3, p50.001) whilethere was no di�erence between model 3 and model 2 (�2 � 0.27, df� 1, p40.05). Since model 2


is more parsimonious than model 3 (i.e. requires fewer parameters), it provides a better ®ttingmodel.

Overall, the pattern of results shows partial support for propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c. With theexception of exchange tactics, the proposed pattern of tactic±strategy relationships was asexpected. Based on both theory and these results, a best-®t model (Rodgers and Maranto, 1989)was estimated. Assertiveness, coalition, and upward appeal were speci®ed to load together on ahigher-order hard factor, ingratiation and exchange represented a soft higher-order latent factor,and tactics of rationality represented a free-standing rational strategy. Although exchange didnot load signi®cantly on the soft factor in the ®rst three models, it was included here as a `soft'tactic for both empirical and conceptual reasons. First, partitioning the variance of the exchangescale across three strategies may have masked its loading on any one strategy. When exchangeloaded only on the rational strategy (in model 4), the path was signi®cant, although as notedabove it may have been misspeci®ed. Second, in upward in¯uence, exchange may often re¯ect apromise of future obligation of the in¯uencer to perform a positive act for her or hissupervisorÐan intrinsically soft appeal. For the best-®t model, all speci®ed covariances betweenmanifest indicators and ®rst-order constructs and between ®rst-order and second-orderconstructs were signi®cant, indicating convergent validity (�2 � 216.61, df� 129, p50.000,GFI� 0.90, AGFI� 0.86, RMSR� 0.06).

Using chi-square di�erence tests, this model ®ts the data signi®cantly better than did models 2and 3, within which it was nested (model 2 and best-®t model: �2 � 0.52, df� 2, p40.05; model 3and best-®t model: �2 � 0.79, df� 3, p40.05). Since the best-®t model is more parsimoniousthan either model 2 or model 3, it provides a better ®tting model. Using the TLI, a reduction in®t from the ®rst-order model of 11 per cent was indicated, suggesting that the second-ordermodel provides a reasonable explanation of the data. The T coe�cient for this comparisonwas 0.89.

Finally, discriminant validity for the best-®t model was tested by assessing whether inter-correlations between higher-order hard, soft, and rational factors were signi®cantly less thanunity (Bagozzi and Yi, 1991; Phillips, 1981; Sujan, Weitz and Kumar, 1994). For this model, thecorrelations are noted as follows, with standard errors in parentheses: hard/soft, 0.75, (0.09);hard/rational, 0.19 (0.14); soft/rational, 0.34 (0.15). Discriminant validity is achieved in all casesbecause the con®dence interval of plus or minus twice the standard error does not include 1. AsBreckler (1990) has noted, the ®t of a particular model may be nearly identical for a potentiallylarge number of equivalent models. The high correlation between soft and hard strategies, alongwith the relatively small, if signi®cant, di�erences between several of the models suggests cautionin overgeneralizing these results. More research on the higher-order factor structure of in¯uencetactics is clearly warranted.

Predictors of in¯uence strategies

Hypotheses 1±3, concerning the predictors of in¯uence strategies, were tested using LISRELVII. Based on the best-®t in¯uence strategy model generated by the second-order factor analyses,composite scales were formed to represent hard and soft strategies (coe�cient alphas of 0.76 and0.70 respectively; alpha for the rational scale was 0.75). Parameters were set free to be estimatedaccording to the predictions of the hypotheses. Because retaining each manifest item as anindicator of its constructs would result in an inordinately large number of items (over 100)leading to identi®cation problems (Sujan et al., 1994), items measuring each construct werecombined into a single indicator for the construct. To account for measurement error, error


for each construct was set at one minus the composite reliability (Kenny, 1979), while factorloadings for the individual indicators on their respective constructs were set equal to the squareroot of the reliabilities (Anderson and Williams, 1992). For education and co-location, a smallamount of error variance was assigned to account for data transcription errors (Hayduk, 1987).Since ordinal and interval variables were used together, the analysis was based on a polychoriccorrelation matrix (MutheÂ n, 1993). Maximum likelihood estimation was used.

Fit indices for the model indicate a mixed ®t (�2 � 38.33, df� 19, p� 0.005, GFI� 0.97,AGFI� 0.86, RMSR� 0.05). The RSMR and GFI indicate a good ®t, although the AGFI issomewhat low. T-values indicated that none of the predictors of the hard strategy wasstatistically signi®cant (hypotheses 1a±1d, regarding power di�erentials, LMX, Machiavellian-ism, and external locus of control), although the directions of the relationships were consistentwith predictions. Three of the four predictions concerning the soft strategy were supported(Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2d, concerning self-monitoring, education, and external locus ofcontrol), while hypothesis 2c (Machiavellianism) was not supported. Of the two proposedpredictors for the rational strategy, both were signi®cant (hypothesis 3a, concerning education,and hypothesis 3b, concerning co-location). Overall, the model explained 16.3 per cent of thevariance of the hard strategy, 28.8 per cent for the soft strategy, and 9.1 per cent for the rationalstrategy.

Inspection of modi®cation indices indicated only one parameter with a value greater than 3.This occurred for the path between the hard strategy and education (MI� 11.05). Thisparameter was freed, and the resulting model showed signi®cantly improved ®t (�2 � 27.42,df� 18, p� 0.07, GFI� 0.98, AGFI� 0.89, RMSR� 0.04). In this revised model, the pathbetween the hard strategy and education was signi®cant, as was the path betweenMachiavellianism and the hard strategy (hypothesis 1c). This model increased the varianceexplained for the hard strategy to 22.1 per cent.

Discussion

This study examined whether upward in¯uence tactics of assertiveness, rationality, coalition,upward appeal, ingratiation, and exchange could be categorized as re¯ecting hard, soft, orrational strategies, and investigated several sets of antecedents of those strategies. Reasonablecongruence between predicted and expected patterns of tactic±strategy relationships was found,indicating quali®ed support for the strategy archetypes posited by Kipnis and Schmidt (1985)and Kipnis (1984). A hard strategy was re¯ected by in¯uence tactics of assertiveness, upwardappeal, and coalition use, soft strategy was formed from tactics of ingratiation and exchange,and logic, reason, and rationality formed a rational strategy.

Conceptually, the results provide support for the idea that processes of social in¯uence such ascompliance, identi®cation, and internalization (Kelman, 1961) can be linked to overt behavioraltactics. In the recent past, in¯uence research has tended to favor an inductive, atheoreticalapproach, which was itself a response to problems with prior deductive approaches to under-standing in¯uence behavior (Raven, 1975). Examination of higher-order in¯uence strategies suchas was done in this study may provide a means to link much of the rich theory generated over thelast 30 years with equally-important behavioral examinations of in¯uence.

Results indicated mixed support for hypotheses concerning the predictors of these threestrategies. Using relatively conservative ®t criteria within LISREL, only higher levels of


education and Machiavellianism signi®cantly predicted a hard strategy. A soft strategy wasassociated with higher levels of education, self-monitoring, and having an external locus ofcontrol. Individuals who were more highly educated and who were not located at the same o�ceas their supervisors reported using higher levels of a rational strategy.

It was expected that power di�erentials, LMX, Machiavellianism, and external locus ofcontrol would be related to the hard strategy. Only the hypothesis concerning Machiavellianismreceived any direct support (following an adjustment to the model), although the direction ofrelationships of power di�erentials, LMX, and external locus of control were all consistent withpredictions. While not predicted, higher levels of education were signi®cantly related to greateruse of a hard strategy. This suggests at least two possibilities. First, both high-Machs and better-educated individuals may be more adept at picking spots to selectively use hard or coercive formsof in¯uence, and thus may be likely to wield it more often than others. Second, high-Machs andwell-educated people may simply be more self-con®dent in `pushing' for things that they wantfrom their supervisors.

It was anticipated that high levels of subordinate education, Machiavellianism, and self-monitoring, as well as a subordinate external orientation would be associated with a softin¯uence strategy. The results are partially supportive of these expectations. The signi®cantpredictors related to a soft strategy (education, self-monitoring, locus of control) give a picture ofindividuals who are particularly sensitive to how they appear in their work environment, andmay believe that signi®cant aspects of that environment are controlled by individuals otherthan themselves. As such, a soft strategy could involve a desire to di�use any possible negativereaction from the target of in¯uence, either through ingratiation, the support of others, oro�ering something in exchange for what one wants or needs (Tedeschi et al., 1973).

Initially it was expected that a rational in¯uence strategy would be related to subordinatesbeing more highly educated and to being located at di�erent o�ce locations than theirsupervisors. These expectations received support. Therefore, although subordinates use rationalin¯uence more than any other form (see means in Table 2), this strategy is particularly likely to beused when opportunities for face-to-face interaction are limited and other in¯uence tactics maybe particularly di�cult to use. The results also support the notion that educational developmentmay encourage the use of a rational strategy by enhancing individuals' ability to make use oflogic and reason in generating arguments to obtain something desired from a supervisor.

The power of education to predict the in¯uence strategies that individuals use in upwardin¯uence provides support for Sears' (1986) contention that education may strongly a�ectattitudinal, and perhaps behavioural, processes. If higher levels of education re¯ect greaterpolitical skill and thus a stronger propensity to use di�erent forms of in¯uence, this may explainwhy education was found to be a predictor of more than one strategy. It is also possible thatmore educated people may simply be more honest in reporting the in¯uence tactics they are likelyto use3. Considering the predictive range of this variable, future research on in¯uence strategiesshould not ignore its e�ects.

Strengths and limitations

Like all survey research, this study was subject to a number of limitations. First, any study relyingon a single questionnaire administration can be subject to interpretational problems from



unwanted method variance. In this study, however, the intercorrelations of the predictors tendedto be moderate, except for the individual di�erence scales (which we might expect to be somewhatrelated), and the Harman single-factor test did not reveal one general factor. Also, it is unlikelythat educational attainment, which was a signi®cant predictor, was subject to common-methodbias. Although this evidence is indirect, it does tend to partially mitigate the concern that methodvariance signi®cantly contaminated the results.

A second potential limitation involves the low reliabilities of several of the variables used in thestudy. Considering their values, the results need to be interpreted with caution. However, oneadvantage of using structural equations modelling in this study is that the e�ects of thesereliabilities on intervariable relationships could be explicitly accounted for, increasing con®dencein the results. A related limitation involved the use of cross-sectional data in this study,precluding any demonstration of causality in the relationship examined.

This study used a survey instrument that measured self-reported behaviors across situations(the past 6 months). This raises several issues which parallel current arguments about method-ology in in¯uence research. Recall measures may result in selective retrieval and reporting biasesthat distort the recall of actual tactics used (Dillard and Burgoon, 1985). Self-reports mayconceivably more closely re¯ect implicit theories about in¯uence behaviors than the actualin¯uence behaviors themselves4. Also, given that in¯uence scale scores in this case representaggregates of past behavior, presumably across a number of incidents, it is impossible to identifyhow tactics are used within speci®c in¯uence attempts. This precluded examination of some ofthe contextual factors thought to be important predictors of upward in¯uence tactics. Forexample, previous research has shown that the goals of an in¯uence attempt may be a powerfuldeterminant of in¯uence tactics chosen (Kipnis et al., 1980; Yukl and Falbe, 1990). Otherimportant situational predictors may include the importance of the resources one is attemptingto acquire, and the expectations for success or anticipated resistance in the in¯uence attempt(Kipnis and Schmidt, 1983). As such, the current study sheds some light on what kinds ofstrategies individuals use, and what the personal, demographic, and relational antecedents ofthese strategies may be, but cannot indicate the circumstances in which di�erent strategies areused, or how ¯exible or in¯exible individuals may be in using these strategies.

Issues for future research

The ®ndings from this study suggest that in¯uence behaviors are not merely a series of dis-connected actions, but instead may re¯ect more abstract strategies that provide general guide-lines for action (Berger, 1985). The operationalization of in¯uence strategies in this study wasbased on the expectation that they consist of speci®c groupings, or meta-categories, of in¯uencetactics that re¯ect some consistent meaning. However, the term `strategy' also may be used torefer to actors' `general choices in transforming plans into practice so as to accomplish particulargoals' (Seibold, Cantrill and Meyers, 1985, p. 556). Clearly, future in¯uence research ought togive greater attention to the linkages between the behaviors people use to obtain compliance inorganizations with the sorts of plans or cognitive strategies that drive these behaviors. As such,tactics refer to what individuals do (Bacharach, 1983); they are short- duration, low-levelbehavioral routines that are used to actualize strategies (Berger, 1985). Accordingly, strategiesmay refer to the aspects of planning how to use in¯uence tactics to gain compliance (Bacharach,1983; Schenck-Hamlin, Wiseman and Georgacarakos, 1982). They are abstract, and provide



general guidelines for action (Berger, 1985). The manner in which we conceptualized in¯uencestrategies is based on in¯uence behaviors, but the meaning of the strategies is drawn frompresumed cognitions associated with those behavioral sets.A related issue concerning the links between in¯uence cognition and in¯uence behavior is

re¯ected by the problem of model equivalence. To assess our hypotheses, we examined fourpossible models of how upward in¯uence tactics may form upward in¯uence strategies. A best-®tmodel was then generated which was used to test hypotheses concerning predictors of thesestrategies. While this procedure resulted in an improved model, we hasten to add that thedi�erences between several of the models were not great. It is rarely noted that the ®t of a favoredmodel may be similar to a large number of equivalent or nearly-equivalent models (Breckler,1990). Compelling alternative models can usually be easily formulated by researchers, but rarelyare (Breckler, 1990).

While equivalence of ®t in this study may be to some extent a methodological artifact, it mayalso re¯ect the possibility that particular in¯uence behaviors may not always coalesce into thesame basic strategies. Although other research in compliance-gaining has shown evidence ofstrategies similar to those found in this study (e.g. Falbo, 1977; Wiseman and Schenck-Hamlin,1981), one basic problem with in¯uence categorization schemes is that a single in¯uence act(e.g. friendliness or ingratiation) may be the result of any number of cognitive representationsor strategies (Greene, 1990). This position is echoed by Bacharach (1983) concerning bargainingwithin organizations, in that the same tactics may be used in di�erent bargaining settings, forcompletely di�erent reasons. Also, a particular strategy or plan may itself result in use of di�erentbehavioral tactics by di�erent people, or even by the same individual at di�erent points in time(Berger, 1985). As such, the in¯uence strategies investigated in this study probably do notrepresent the only ones that are possible. Considering the variable relationships that may existbetween in¯uence behaviors and in¯uence strategies, it should not be assumed that these strategiesre¯ect the entire population of in¯uence strategies that individuals may use in organizations, norcan any assumption be made about the hierarchical relations between strategies. Rather, theyrepresent several that may commonly be used in organizations, but there are undoubtedly othersthat may re¯ect di�erent antecedent conditions. As is often the case, the reality that is hinted at byresearch results can be more complicated and dynamic than originally expected.

Overall, an important goal of future research in this area should be to begin to map thesestrategies while placing more emphasis on the underlying processes by which individualsorganize and generate in¯uence-related cognitions, and less emphasis on generating `inclusive'typologies that do not fully account for the complexities of in¯uence decisions. To do this,organizational in¯uence researchers will need to draw on cognition-related streams of researchsuch as models of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1985), research on con¯ict and negotiationprocesses (Neale and Northcraft, 1991; Thomas, 1991), work on attitude formation andsubsequent relationships to behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Azjen, 1991), and recent workon decision-making, such as image theory (Beach, 1990).

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