Download - Pests and Donors in Mali, 1985–90

Pests and

A.R. KREMER

Donors in Mali, 1985 - 90

Between 1985 and 1988 large-scale spray campaigns were carried out against migratory crop pests in the Sahel. The Malian government and its donors subsequently adopted this emergency response to a natural disaster as a long-term strategy for crop protection in Sahelian Mali. This is financially unsustainable, probably economically wasteful and stunts the development of other plant protection strategies. A similar process has occurred in Burkina Faso, Niger and Sinigal. Donors should therefore exercise critical, collective control over the release of pesticide aid and should subject it to economic evaluation.

Development donors intend that the projects they finance should be ‘financially sustainable’; their benefit should endure after the withdrawal of their subsidy. Projects are, moreover, intended to be ’economically viable’; their value to the beneficiaries should exceed their cost to the donor by a margin representing the oppor- tunity cost of capital. If rapid intervention is required to alleviate a natural or man- made disaster, however, the criteria of financial sustainabililty and economic viability are suspended. This is an emergency, by definition short-term, so the calculus of financial sustainability is irrelevant. Neither can the human suffering be contained by economic cost-benefit analysis.

Pests are counted among the principal constraints upon agricultural production in the western Sahel (Deuson and Day, 1990). Between 1985 and 1990 the response to a pest emergency was extended to chronic pest problems. In this article I describe how it happened in Mali and refer to similar developments in Burkina Faso, Niger and

SCnbgal. It is of interest as a study in institutional behaviour and as a criticism of the exclusion of economics (TAMS, 1989) from the planning of pest control projects in the Sahel.

CONTRASTING PEST PROBLEMS IN THE WESTERN SAHEL: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PESTS

It is useful to divide pest attacks into two categories: private and public. Whether a pest is defined as private or public depends solely upon whether villagers could, in principle, control it or not. In brief, the distinguishing feature of private pests is that they are difficult to control away from the crop; once a public pest is in the crop it is too late for control.

The desert locust (Schistocercu greguriu) and the migratory locust (Locusfu migrutoriu) are prime examples of a public pest. The recommended control strategy is to locate and spray their breeding zones in deserts and marshes respectively; by the time adult swarms are attacking crops, control is much

DISASTERS VOLUME 16 NUMBER 3

208 A . R . Kremer

more difficult (Popov, 1988; Rowley, 1989; Skaf, 1988). The grasshopper Oedaleus senegalensis can sometimes be equally evasive, forming swarms which move north and south across the Sahel with the inter- tropical convergence zone (ITCZ), and breed as they go (Popov, 1988, Cheke, 1990). Farmers can kill hatchlings with pesticide dust, but control of winged adults has been based on national campaigns with vehicle- and aircraft-mounted sprayers. It has also been suggested that control should be planned by means of satellite images and computer models of pest populations (Launois and Lecoq, 1990). The weaver bird (Quelea quelea) and the glossy starling (Passer luteus) are greatly feared by rice-farmers, sorghum-growers and communities near the river Niger. These constitute a public pest attack, because control by the destruction of nesting colonies takes place many kilometres from feeding grounds.

Because the coordination of many donors against many swarms in several countries is the key to campaigns against all these public pests, a special role in them is reserved for the FA0 (Brader, 1988). Wrathall (1988) makes the telling observa- tion that the sudden and spectacular appearance of locust and 0. senegalensis swarms is more attractive to news reporters than the lingering, slow, dull destruction wrought by other pests. As the FA0 high command coordinates an international campaign against a visible enemy, the press draws instinctively upon the language of the war correspondent (see for example Walsh, 1988; Lorelle, 1989a and Lorelle, 1989b).

Other grasshopper species, however, are private pests, amenable to treatment by farmers. Hieroglyphus duganensis, Kraussaria angulifera, Kraussella aniabile, Cataloipus cymbiferus and Diabolocatantops axillaris tend to move short distances into arable fields when the surrounding bush begins to dry out. The millet head-miner (Heliocheilus albipunctella, previously known as Raghuva

albipunctella) and stem-borer (Coniesta ignefusalis, previously known as Acigona ignefusulis) caterpillars can similarly only be controlled in the field itself (Nwanze, 1985 and Hughes and Rhind, 1988). A third category of major private pests of millet contains the beetles: Pachnoda interrupta, Psdydolytta spp. and Rhinyptia infuscata. No formal research on their movements has been undertaken, but farmers report that ’they eat where they are born’. Weeds and plant diseases such as mildew and smut are clearly suited to in-field control.

Particular species are labelled above as private or public pests, but these labels could switch, just as Oedaleus senegalensis takes wing upon reaching adulthood and normally sedentary grasshoppers have been observed moving up to 500km downwind per night (Reynolds and Riley, 1988). It is furthermore possible that collective action at village level may increase the effectiveness of private pest control. Gahukar’s (1984) recommendation that farmers should destroy stem-borer pupae by burning stalks after the harvest would have to be followed by a whole village for each farmer to receive the benefit.

DONORS’ RESPONSE TO THE PESTS

Between 1985 and 1987 the public pests Schistocerca gregariu and Oeduleus senegalensis dominated the scene. In 1985 CIRAD’s (Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Dbvelop- pement) biomodel of Oedaleus senegalensis was predicting heavy swarms for 1986. The FA0 responded by coordinating the preparation of a massive campaign using aircraft- and vehicle-mounted insecticide sprayers. The campaign’s total cost was US$40 million, of which US$8.5 million went to Mali (FAO, 1986b). In total, 1.1 million litres of insecticide were applied. The campaign was deemed a success (Walsh, 1986b), and preparations began for 1987, when 1.3 million hectares were


Pests and Donors in Mali, 1985-90 209

treated, of which 76 per cent were sprayed from the air. TAMS (1989) described the spraying of 1987 to be an ‘overabundant‘ and uncoordinated response to a false alarm, and that its economic or ecological implications had not been considered.

The desert locust made an appearance in 1986 (FAO, 1986a). There was a small trans-Saharan treatment campaign in 1987, but weather conditions were unfavourable to the locust (Walsh, 1988). In response to dire warnings (Walsh, 1986a and Pedgley, 1987) of impending locust swarms, the FA0 prepared a major spray campaign for 1988 and 1989. This regional operation was to cost US$240 million, of which US$120 million was spent on pesticides (Hanley, 1989). It turned out, however, that a combination of east winds, low tempera- tures and drought had reduced locust populations to unimportance. Only 20 per cent of the reduction was estimated to have resulted from human intervention (Launois, 1989). Mali had requested and received aid from the African Development Bank (AfDB) and other donors for a 1988 anti-locust campaign. When it was discovered that the locust problem was insignificant, the national plant protection service turned the pesticides against other field pests and placed the AfDB’s financial aid in reserve. The FAO, noting that the aid had been disbursed despite the absence of locusts, declared the Malian campaign ’crowned with success’ (FAO, 1989).

The Government of Mali, with funding from a major multilateral donor, created a national plant protection service, the Service de Protection des VCgetaux (SPV) in 1987. The project document, drawn up by entomologists and plant protection experts, declared that the SPV should be responsible for ‘plant protection in all its aspects‘. Apart from a reference to the USW,OOO per annum to be paid by the Malian government as salaries and the US$7,000 per annum to be paid for office costs and building maintenance, however,

the project document said nothing on the funding of recurrent costs. It recommended that third-party donors provide US$2 million for experts, consultants, training and research and it envisaged the training of 200,000 villagers in 1,000 villages in ’the use of pest control products and equip- ment’, but did not s p e c 9 how this material would be financed.

The training of villagers in insecticide use followed a pattern already established in Niger. Ten young men from a village would be grouped into a plant protection brigade (brigade phytosanitaire) and receive training in the handling and application of insecticide dust and ultra-low volume (ULV) liquid insecticides. With bilateral and multilateral funding, 37 such brigades were formed in 1988,246 in 1989 and over 400 in 1990. Meanwhile, SPV field agents were under pressure to provide free pesticides to villagers without brigades. Many therefore created ’unofficial’ or ‘temporary’ brigades. A study of one SPV base in north western Mali found that official brigades received 45 per cent of the insecticide dust and 58 per cent of the ULV formulation delivered free to farmers. Malian brigades, official and unofficial, treated 200,000-250,000 ha in 1990, an area roughly equal to that covered by vehicle- and aircraft-mounted sprayers.

By 1988, the threat from the public pests, the desert locust and Oedaleus senegalensis had receded; nobody can tell for how long. The SPV and the brigades, however, still remain. They pose an important question: when the emergency aid has stopped, what is the role of a plant protection service without a campaign budget and a plant protection brigade trained to use free insecticides?

The answer was to adopt the emergency procedures (an alert, an appeal for pesticide donations, a spray campaign) as a long-term strategy for crop protection in the Sahelian zone of Mali. This solution has advantages for all the institutions con- cerned: SPV officers receive per diem pay-


210 A.R. Kremer

ments and are welcomed as the bringers of aid, a coordinating role remains for the F A 0 and its consultants and commodity aid is relatively simple for bilateral donors to disburse. Those responsible for plant protection funding and project administration in the F A 0 and all bilateral projects are entomologists or plant protection specialists by training; their professional upbringing has not stressed the importance of financial sustainability or economic viability.

BURKINA FASO, NIGER AND SENEGAL

This situation is not particular to Mali. The migratory pest threats of 1985-7 also affected Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal so plant protection brigades and donor subsidies assumed a similar importance. In 1990, Burkina Faso boasted 45,000 brigade- members. Niger reports 30,000 in 1991, but the training had been conducted so rapidly that no definite figure is available. Aid covered 96 per cent of its plant protection service in 1988. Around two-thirds of pesticides used by Niger brigades in 1991 were funded by a single bilateral donor. Repetto (1985) reported that free pesticides in Senegal were equivalent to an 89 per cent pesticide subsidy, 75 per cent of the cost of Senegal’s plant protection service was financed by donors in 1988-89.

FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF DONOR INTERVENTION

The Malian government is unable to finance the recurrent costs of plant protection. Civil service salaries have been frozen since 1987 and are often paid two or three months in arrears. A head of section in the SPV with 4 years’ agricultural training would typically receive a salary of US$140 per month. Foreign aid in 1986 was over two-thirds of Malian government expenditure (World Bank, 1988). For lack of funds, the government’s present rural development strategy is based upon Opbrations de DkveZoppement

Rural (ODRs), areas of the country adopted by bilateral donors.

Neither will the peasant of the Malian Sahel purchase insecticides. ULV insecticide applications cost at least FCFA (Franc de la Communaute Franqaire Africaine) 2,500 (US$8.75) per hectare, which rose to U S 1 3 per hectare in 1986 when they had to be air- freighted to Mali for the Oeduleus senegalensis campaign (TAMS, 1989). By contrast, ODA’s Mali Millet Pest Project’s survey of 105 farming families in north western Mali in 1990 found the median cash expenditure upon agriculture to be around FCFA 500 (US$1.75) per hectare per annum. Of the sample‘s cash investment, 53 per cent was spent on labour hire, and 47 per cent on cultivation implements, ploughs and hoes. Little cash is available for agriculture because the main worry of families is obtaining food for the growing season. What is available is directed towards labour hire, because a high ratio of land to labour produces financial returns to labour hire for first weeding in excess of 100 per cent (Kremer and Sidibe, 1991).

It is no surprise, then, that the SPV and its brigades depend upon donor subsidy. Figure 1 shows how the costs of Mali’s 1990 campaign were shared between the Malian government and donors. Two-thirds of the pesticide donations were provided by two donors, one bilateral and one regional.

The Malian government paid approx- imately US$246,000 for the SPV‘s salaries and other remunerations in 1990. Donors supplemented this by 30 per cent with per diem payments to SPV officers on missions. One major bilateral donor’s per diem payments were worth around five times an officer’s daily salary, and tended to be concentrated among the heads of section and heads of department in the SPV’s head office.

The fact that the SPV and its brigades continued to receive recurrent cost subsidy after the migratory pests receded would not necessarily constitute a problem in itself. It



Source: Kremer and Sidibe (1991)

FIGURE 1 Percentage of SPV campaign expenses met by donors and government in the twelve months to 31 October 1990

is conceivable that donor subsidy could provide the foundations for a long-term, nationwide and economically-productive plant protection strategy. In practice, however, this will not occur, because the annual cost of nationwide coverage would be many times higher than present levels of funding.

Tables 1 and 2 derive a rough estimate of this cost. Estimated areas of millet and sorghum (including intercropped fields) were obtained for each year between 1985 and 1989 and averaged. These are multi- plied by an arbitrary estimate, a ‘plant protection (PP) factor‘, which represents the frequency of insecticide application. A PP factor of 1.00 signifies that these millet and sorghum fields would receive a course of treatments every year. A PP factor of 0.1 signifies a course of treatment for 10 per cent of millet and sorghum fields every year, or for all fields one year in ten, etc. Assuming (optimistically) one brigade per 250 hectares and defining a course of

treatment as one powder and one ULV application, we arrive at the cost estimates of Table 2.

The recurrent cost budget of a nationwide brigades scheme would be in the order of FCFA 7 billion (US$25 million) per annum. That is 3 times the cost of the 1986 Oedaleus senegalensis campaign, 12 times the cost of the 1990 campaign and 1.5 per cent of Mali’s 1986 GDP. It is therefore clearly out of the question for insecticide aid to provide a long-term nationwide solution.

ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF DONOR INTERVENTION

Although an abundance of research on the effects of pesticides on pest populations has been performed, data on yield gains, and hence economic returns, is conspicuously scant. What there is does not justify a long- term plant protection strategy based upon subsidised insecticides.

The Action Pilote de Guidamaka (1985-6),


212 A. R. Kremer

TABLE 1 A rough estimate of the area to be treated each year under a long-term, nationwide strategy

of plant protection

Ha millet Ha sor hum Ha to bz Rqyioti Sub- region mean 85-9 mean By5-9 PP factor t reatrd

Kayes Kayes Kayes Kayes Kayes Kayes Kayes Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Koulikoro Sikasso Sikasso Sikasso Sikasso Sikasso Sikasso segou segou segou segou segou segou segou segou Mopti Mopti Mopti Mopti Mopti Mopti Mopti Mopti T'tou T' tou T' tou T'tou T'tou Gao Gao Gao Gao Gao

KAYES BAFOULABE DIEMA KENIEBA KITA NIORO YELIMANE KOULIKORO BANAMBA DIOILA KANGABA KATI KOLOKANI NARA BAMAKO SIKASSO BOUGOUNI KADIOLO KOLONDIEBA KOUTIALA YANFOLILA YOROSSO SEGOU BARAOUELI BLA MACINA NIONO SAN TOMINI AN MOPTI BANDIAGARA BANKASS DIENNE DOUENTZA KORO TENENKOU YOUVAROU TOMBOUCTOU DIRE GOUNDAM GOURMA-RHA NIAFUNKE GAO ANSONGO BOUREM KIDAL MENAKA

2,914 1,011 7,268 2,193 7,556 8,682 1,770

13,019 37,855 26,531 2,396

21,573 18,974 32,742

0 31,078 21,444 21,798 9,382

50,783 2,799

30,084 155,703

14,225 48,466

117,465 36,382 65,720 33,012 50,074 41,682 49,538 21,013 37,297 45,233 14,645 25,274

1,049 4,505 5,143 2,806

20,774 169 814

0 0

1,220

12,240 11,798 17,683 8,491

21,037 22,323 3,842

16,137 6,855

60,553 11,542 30,805 22,697 34,860

0 56,629 38,707 15,301 14,522 58,315 14,543 29,906 19,471 16,058 23,385 7,477 2,861

30,135 16,580 5,100 4,679 6,667

10,486 2,935

738 285

1,009 250 897

7,720 497

1,358 1,963 1,423

771 0

262

1.00 0.50 1 .oo 0.50 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 0.10 0.10 0.25 0.75 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.75 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 .oo 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

15,154 6,405

24,951 5,342 7,148

31,004 5,612 7,289

33,533 8,708 1,394

13,095 31,254 67,601

0 8,771 6,015 3,710 2,390

10,910 1,734 5,999

87,587 15,142 35,926 93,706 29,432 47,928 24,796 55,173 46,362 56,205 31,500 40,232 45,971 14,929 26,283

1,299 5,402

12,863 3,303

22,132 2,131 2,237

77 1 0

1,482

TOTAL 1,144,062 671,795 0.55 1,000,811

Source of Cropped Area Estimates: Mali: Direction Nationale dr I'Agricultrrre. EnquCte National de Conjuncture, Bamako.



TABLE 2 Hypothetical cost* of training and supplying a nationwide plant

protection brigades system

Hectares treated Hectares per brigade Brigades

1,000,811 250

4,003

Sprayers per brigade 4 Cost per sprayer 10,000 Sprayer life in years 2

Powder per hectare per year (kg)

Sprayer costs per year 80,060,000

8 500 Cost of powder per kg

Cost of ULV per hectare

Cost of powder per year

Cost of ULV per year 3,002,434,465

Training costs per year 124,093,000

4,003,245,953

3,000

Total cost per year 7,209,833,418

*All costs expressed in FCFM (Franc de la Communaute Francaire Africaine)

funded by USAID via the Prujet Lutte Zntkgrke, estimated the yield effects of insecticide dusts in millet fields in an area of Mauritania suffering from blister-beetles (Psalydolytta spp.). The method and results are described by Dembele (1989). Insecticide dust was applied to demonstration plots two or three times at a dose of 20 kg to 25 kg per hectare. The cost of the full treatment calendar at 1990 Malian prices would have been around US$lOO per hectare (Table 3). The treatment calendar produced millet yield gains of 558 kg per hectare in 1985 and 367 kg per hectare in 1986. Valuing them at FCFA 75 per kg (US$0.26 per kg), we can hypothesise that the average farmer invest- ing in the calendar would have made a profit in 1985 and a loss in 1986.

ODA’s Mali Millet Pest Project measured the yield effects of a single application of Ripcord (Cypermethrin) ULV applied to millet during male flowering.

Although ULV could produce an acceptable economic return where Heliocheilus albipunctella was the principal pest, the short active life of the pesticide, yield reduction by drought and re-invasion by winged pests combined to produce poor benefit-cost ratios (Lock, Mahmoud and Sidibe, 1988; Lock and Mahmoud, 1989; Lock, 1990 and

TABLE 3 Hypothetical cost of Guidimaka treatment

calendar at 1990 Malian prices

Item Cost per hectare (US$)

Seed dressing 1.75 c. 56 kg* insecticide dust 98.70

Total 100.45

*Dembele (1989) does not give the exact doses.


214 A.R. Kremer

Kremer and Sidibe, 1991). Hughes and Rhind (1988) had arrived at a similarly gloomy conclusion, without translating their Sudan trial results into benefit-cost ratios.

Moving from in-field treatments to pest population reduction operations such as the 1985-7 operations against locusts and Oedaleus senegalensis, economic analysis necessarily turns into informed guesswork (Musuna, 1988). The official view of the 1986 Oedaleus senegalensis campaign was that it saved 90 per cent of the crops threatened, or 200,000 tonnes of food (Anon, 1987), but this seems far too high (Cheke, 1990). Given the cost of the campaign and assuming a grain price of US$265 per tonne, the campaign needed to save 136,000 tonnes just to break even.

In brief, the economic returns of pesticide use in the Sahel will never be fully known; there are too many pesticidelpestl croplpricelweather permutations for this to be possible. What information there is does not justify pesticide subsidies. The burden of proof lies, therefore, with the proponents of such subsidies.

ORGANISATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF DONOR INTERVENTION

Lipton (1986) has described a common effect of a budget dominated by foreign aid. The recipient institution shifts ‘from development management to aid management’. Mali’s SPV was built, with donor funds, as an institution whose every action would require donor support. It then adopted policies and procedures which require indefinite external funding.

(a) In response to the availability of per diem payments, heads of department and section prefer management by supervisory mission to delegation of procedures.

(b) Disagreement over the allocation of aid for pest control research between the

SPV and the national agricultural research service has hindered the creation of links between research stations and the SPV. The SPV’s function has come to be seen as the distribution of free insecticides. Where donors have funded pilot programmes to test alternatives to insecticides, the pilot programmes have resorted to free pesticide distribution (Kremer and Sidibe, 1991). Neither the SPV’s head office nor donors can accept reports of pest attack at face value, owing to the existence of incentives to exaggerate. By the time the pest attack has been confirmed, and emergency pesticide aid has been requested, approved, disbursed and delivered, much damage may already have been effected. If an aid project is less generous in supporting recurrent costs, for example by paying lower indemnities, showing an interest in cost-recovery from farmers or failing to provide fuel and pesticides, it is less likely to be acceptable.

It should be noted, however, that many SPV field officers are keen to reduce farmers’ dependence upon free insecticides, since they become the focus of farmers’ resentment when pesticide gifts are insufficient or unequally distributed.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

After the emergency campaigns of 1985-8 in the Sahel, donors and recipient govern- ments adopted the emergency response as a long-term strategy for plant protection in the western Sahel. This is financially unsustainable, stunts recipient institutions and is probably economically wasteful. But with a per capita GDP of around US$200 per annum, Mali is one of the poorest countries in the poorest continent of the world. It



seems churlish to criticise donors for being over-generous towards the Sahel, the region of Mali where poverty is most keenly felt.

The fact is that donors will continue to support the distribution of free pesticides in Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Their interest will continue to wax and wane as the locust threat advances and recedes (Rowley, 1989). In such a situation, a few practical recommendations may be of value.

(a) Donors should create an in-country reserve fund for local insecticide pur- chases. This would reduce admini- strative delay in the event of pest emergencies.

(b) A condition of this fund is that pesticides should only be released to defined areas on the declaration of an ’emergency’ by a donors’ committee. The committee would be advised by the plant protection service, but the decision whether disbursement should be made would be taken in its absence. Disbursements would not be made in most years.

(c) An economist should be included in evaluations of plant protection projects where funds permit.

(d) Research into in-field control should feature benefit-cost analysis.

(e) The indemnities paid by different donor organisations should be rationalised.

These actions could reshape the relationship between pests, plant protection services and donors to the point where a change of crop protection strategy becomes conceivable.

Note

This article is based upon research carried out by the Mali Millet Pest Project, funded by Britain‘s Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and executed in conjunction with Mali’s plant protection service, the Service de Protection des Vkgktaux (SPV) and the ODA’s Natural

Resources Institute (NRI). ODA has financed the preparation of this paper out of concern that the requirements of economic viability and financial sustainability should enter into the planning of crop protection projects in the Sahel. The views expressed are those of the author, however, and are not necessarily shared by the SPV, NRI or ODA.

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A.R. Kremer 4 Dorset Place Faversham Kent ME13 8PP UK


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