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Page 1: Isocrates in Platos Phaedrus

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A tincture of philosophy, a tincture of hope: Theportrayal of Isocrates in Plato's phaedrusMaureen Daly Goggin a & Elenore Long aa PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program , Carnegie Mellon University ,Published online: 21 May 2009.

To cite this article: Maureen Daly Goggin & Elenore Long (1993) A tincture of philosophy, a tincture of hope: The portrayal ofIsocrates in Plato's phaedrus , Rhetoric Review, 11:2, 301-324, DOI: 10.1080/07350199309389008

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Page 2: Isocrates in Platos Phaedrus

MAUREEN DALY GOGGIN AND ELENORE LONGCarnegie Mellon University

A Tincture of Philosophy, A Tincture of Hope:The Portrayal of Isocrates in Plato's Phaedrus1

Over the last century, a range of contradictory representations of Isocrateshave emerged through critical scholarship. At one end of the spectrum, he has beencontemptuously characterized as a naive and ineffectual politician (Bonner 194),as an intellectual wimp (DeVries, "Isocrates" 389), and as a conceited windbag(Howland 152; Thompson 182). At the other end, he has been regarded as the hoodornament on the newest model of rhetorical chic, as a strong proponent of democ-racy (Jaeger 3:66), as a pedagogical genius (Benoit 109; Forster 15), and as aprophetic visionary for rhetoric across time (Cahn 134-44). Of all the polarizeddebates pertaining to Isocrates, one of the longest standing concerns Plato'sdepiction of him in the Phaedrus. The debate generally hinges on the question:Does Isocrates represent the central cancer in a malignant rhetoric, or does hesymbolize the potential for a reformed rhetoric?

In addressing this Isocratean question, many scholars point to the followingpassage from the end of the Phaedrus:

It seems to me that his [Isocrates'] natural powers give him a supe-riority over anything Lysias has achieved in literature, and also that inpoint of character he is of a nobler composition; hence it would notsurprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary predeces-sors look like very small fry; that is, supposing him to persist in theactual type of writing in which he engages at present; still more so, ifhe should become dissatisfied with such work, and a sublimer impulselead him to do greater things. For that mind of his, Phaedrus, containsan innate tincture of philosophy. (279A)

A corpus of literary criticism interprets these lines as underhanded and sarcastic(Cope 31ff; Howland 159; Hudson-Williams; Robin 173). This pejorative inter-pretation is largely inherited from W. H. Thompson's 1868 critical edition of thePhaedrus, the first and indeed only English commentary on the dialogue until R.Hackforth published an edition nearly a century later in 1951 (cf. Hackforth ix).In his edition Thompson claims that Plato's prophecy for Isocrates is a backhandedcompliment "passed upon him [Isocrates] at the conclusion of the Phaedrus [sic]

Rhetoric Review, Vol. 11 ,No.2, Spring 1993 301

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. . . as but poor amends for the stinging sarcasm showered so profusely on his art. . . in other parts of the dialogue" (173).2

For many scholars an assessment of Plato's regard for Isocrates hinges on yetanother, and larger, concern: Plato's regard for a true art of rhetoric as posited inthe Phaedrus. Numerous critics argue that Plato is deeply skeptical of the possi-bility that a true art of rhetoric can ever be achieved.3 For instance, Everett LeeHunt contends that just as Plato's Republic can never be realized, neither can truerhetoric (46-47). Similarly, Oscar Brownstein suggests an ironic spin to Plato'streatment of the topic: "this ideal rhetoric is the Platonic counterpart of Aristo-phanes' Cloud-Cuckoo Land" (398). Peter Schakel (131), William Kelley (78), andThomas Conley (12) agree, contending that, according to the Platonic Socrates inthe Phaedrus, true rhetoric is clearly outside the reach of mortals; all that is withintheir grasp is a perversion of such rhetoric, equally corrupt as a lover who caresnothing for the well-being of his partner but only for his own physical pleasure.

We contend, however, that scholars who claim that Plato spumed rhetoric andwho, as result, view Isocrates as the target of the Phaedrus have done so largelybecause they have read the Phaedrus in terms of strict dichotomies: rational/irra-tional, philosophy/rhetoric, Truth/Falsehood. Such readings miss the nuances andcomplexities of Plato's dynamic view of rhetoric in this dialogue. By contrast, ourreading of the Phaedrus finds a spectrum along which both rhetors and rhetoriccan be located, a spectrum that recognizes the dynamism of discursive practices.This spectral vision opens up a space for locating Isocrates and his rhetoric.4

Both Plato and Isocrates were confronted with a moral/epistemic dilemma:Faced with the inaccessibility of certain knowledge, how is one to take moralaction? Our essay argues that it is at this point of tension between morality andepistemology that Plato's and Isocrates' views of a dynamic rhetoric converge. Webegin with a reading of the Phaedrus, focusing the explication on the Myth of theSoul. Then we turn to two other constructs from the dialogue that resonate withthe myth: the three mythical pairs of lovers and the three love speeches. Theseturns permit an extensive analysis of the moral/epistemic dilemma and the vitalrole of rhetoric in coping with it. Finally, we demonstrate a convergence of Plato'sand Isocrates' ideas on rhetoric to argue that this intersection permits a view ofIsocrates and Isocratean rhetoric as the tincture of hope for a reformed philosophi-cal rhetoric.

The Phaedrus is comprised of three speeches on love, one ostensiblycomposed by Lysias and the other two by Plato's Socrates. The first is adeceptive, dispassionate, and selfish discourse that argues for taking a nonloveras paramour. The second is also a deceptive discourse, but one that is passionateand well-intentioned, purporting to argue for taking a nonlover as paramour inan effort to protect the beloved. The third is a well-reasoned and passionateargument that demonstrates why lovers and beloveds should be paired. Takentogether, these three speeches reverberate on complex levels. This dynamism

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has provided material for rich debates concerning, for instance, the subjects andpurposes of the Phaedrus (Hackforth 8; Stewart 116-17). While it is not ourintention to score the notes and chords that play throughout the dialogue, we willfocus on that which resonates most clearly with Isocrates: the topic of rhetoric asconceptualized in the work. Because the Myth of the Soul most vividly portraysPlato's vision for a reformed philosophical rhetoric designed to grapple with themoral/epistemic dilemma, we begin with a close reading of this myth.5

The Myth of the Soul

The Myth of the Soul brings into focus three images that converge to intersectwith Isocrates' view of rhetoric, thus distinguishing him as a potential reformer ofrhetoric.6 First, the myth introduces the tripartite soul that illuminates the respon-sibility of reformed rhetoric to harness, not banish, emotional forces to comple-ment rational ones.7 Second, the portrayal of the variegated souls teaches that truerhetors need to leam how to control the dual reins of passion and rationality, notonly within themselves but also within the diverse personalities of their interlocu-tors. Third, in delineating various personality types on earth, the myth sketches adualistic controlling force, partly innate, partly self-governing. The latter forcemakes possible the reform of rhetoric. The myth clearly distinguishes betweenthose orators with a depraved nature who were flagrantly practicing rhetoric inPlato's day and those with a nature touched by philosophical inspiration. More thanmerely locating these orators along a hierarchy, some innately better than others,the notion of variegated personalities stresses that all orators have the ability andthe responsibility to move consciously toward higher Platonic goals.

Tripartite Soul

A central image in the Myth of the Soul is that of the charioteer and his twosteeds, a metaphor for the tripartite soul. Socrates likens the soul's nature to thephysical synthesis of the "powers in a team of winged steeds and their wingedcharioteer" (246A). The charioteer controls two horses: one "noble and good . . .a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty: one that consorts with genuinerenown, and needs no whip, being driven by the word of command alone" (246B,253D). The other is of "opposite character . . . hot-blooded, consorting withwantonness and vainglory; shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip andgoad" (246B, 253E). It is important to note here that the good horse, the onerepresenting the intellect or rationality, is controlled by "the word" whereas thebad horse, the one representing emotions or irrationality, is "shaggy of ear, [and]deaf." The seat of reason resides in the former, which thus responds to language,whereas the seat of passion resides in the latter, which, deaf to language, respondsonly to sensual stimulus.

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Plato's imagery here compels us to see the equestrian metaphor as repre-senting the differences between the ends of philosophy and sophistic rhetoric.8

Philosophy, like the noble steed, strives for absolute knowledge and aims at whatis best for man; conversely, sophistic rhetoric, like the ignoble steed, cares nothingfor truth but only strives for its appearance in order to fulfill what is pleasurableto man. The true rhetorician of Plato's Phaedrus, then, must be like the charioteerwho, understanding the light and dark powers of these two forces, maneuvers themtoward a high moral purpose. A superficial reading of this myth may lead one tosee a simple dichotomy between the two horses, between philosophy and rheto-ric—the former as noble, the latter as ignoble. However, such a reading would missthe richness and complexity of Plato's proposed reform. In the myth the goal ofthe charioteer is not simply to beat the bad horse into submission, letting the goodhorse take control; rather the goal is to orchestrate the vital forces in both horsesso that they work in concert with one another. Since every mortal is guided by boththe rational and the emotive, both horses are essential. What separates the reformedrhetor from the sophistic rhetor is this ability to do more than just harness theinfluencing forces. The reformed rhetor has the ability to maneuver the forces sothat they work with one another toward a more virtuous goal (260D).

Personalities of Variegated Souls

The task of balancing rational and emotional forces is arduous for the rhetor.Not only does he need to know his own soul, but in the paideiac race of life thecharioteer of rhetoric must know the nature of the other charioteers and theirsteeds. Not all souls are alike; there is a range of variegated souls on earth at anygiven time. Knowing the various natures allows the rhetor to make wise choicesin selecting and constructing the appropriate kind of speech to address "a vari-egated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and asimple soul in a simple style" (277C). Hence, the challenge for the ideal rhetor isto cultivate his innate skills for maneuvering his own reins and those of others.

The first principle in Plato's explanation of the variegated personalities is thatthe soul, eternal and indestructible, continually perpetuates its own motion (245C).The next principle is that all souls strive to discern absolute knowledge of theForms, or most generally, Being (248C). However, only the gods are able to takein the fullest views of Being because Being—absolute or perfect knowledge—canonly be apprehended by pure reason. Since the soul destined to become mortal isruled both by reason and emotion, it can attain only a partial vision of Being.

When "burdened with a load of forgetfulness and wrongdoing," souls losetheir wings, fall to earth, and take on bodily forms (248C). That which has seenthe least of Being is destined to land at the bottom of Plato's nine-runged ladderof humanity to become a tyrant, striving for power and pleasure instead of wisdom.Only one step above him is the sophist whom Plato conjoins with the demagogue.A full seven rungs higher, at the top of the hierarchy, sits the philosopher, "a seeker

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after wisdom and beauty, a follower of the muses and a lover" (248D). The amountof Being a soul manages to glimpse is the consequence of two interacting factors:which of the 12 gods it follows and how well it controls the reins of its steeds. Thefollowers of Zeus, for example, are "by nature disposed to the love of wisdom andthe leading of men" (252E) whereas followers of Hera, queen of heaven, have aroyal nature (253B). Since Zeus leads the parade of gods (246E), souls followingin his tracks have the greatest opportunity to gaze upon the most of Being. On earththese souls are more apt than others to become philosophers, perched on the toprung and lovers of wisdom.

Regenerative Cycles

According to the myth, once on earth, the eternal soul strives to regain itswings so once again it may follow in the train of its god. It takes several lifecyclesbefore the soul can rejoin its deity, each cycle testing the soul's propensity to striveafter goodness. Those who succeed in achieving the best within their mortal limitscontinue to pass through the lifecycles and are eventually rewarded with newwings. Those who fail "are taken to be punished in places of chastisement beneaththe earth" (249A). Socrates tells us that the diligent and successful philosopherneed pass through only three lifecycles while the lax and unsuccessful philosopheris destined to travel through ten such cycles with all the other mortals (248E,249A).

Plato's Socrates illustrates this ongoing moral process through his descriptionof three mythical pairs of lovers (253E-57A). The first pair illustrates the union oftwo philosophical souls striving for that which is best: each fostering the highestpotential in himself as well as in his beloved. Through their mastery at the reins,they are able to harness both passion and intellect in pursuit of this noble goal,thereby winning "self-mastery and inward peace" (256B). As a result, not only aretheir days on earth "blessed with happiness and concord," but "when life is over,with burden shed and wings recovered, they stand victorious in the first of the threerounds in that truly Olympic struggle" (256B). By contrast, the second philosophi-cal pair has the best of intentions, but they let their guard down and their reins goslack "in a careless hour, or when the wine is flowing" (256C). It is at this pointthat "the wanton horses . . . choosfe] that part which the multitude account blissful[and] achieve their full desire" (256C). On a continuum of kinds of lovers, this pairis neither so dear and celestial as the first nor as self-serving and earthly as thethird. The third and last pair "engenders] an ignoble quality extolled by themultitude as virtue" (256E, 257A). Thus, this last pair is condemned to float fornine lifecycles, "bereft of understanding" (257A) that they could have acquiredduring their lives had they chosen to work more closely with their steeds.

Socrates' descriptions of the three mythical pairs of lovers resonate with thethree speeches on love comprising the Phaedrus. Like the ignoble pair of lovers,Lysias's speech is calculating and self-serving, and designed to appeal to the

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multitude's sense of plausibility. By contrast, Socrates' first speech, reminiscent ofthe well-meaning pair of lovers, has honorable intentions insofar as it works toprotect a beloved. However, just as the well-meaning lovers are momentarilyinattentive to their wanton horses, the speech, for all its good intentions, rests ona misconception of true love. In its ignorance of the truth, the speech offends Eros.Socrates, therefore, refuses to leave until he has "made atonement for some offenceto heaven" (242C). His last speech, then, is a palinode, recanting the earliermisrepresentation of Eros. In it Socrates advocates a true and pure sense of lovewhich glorifies Eros and which, like the diligent pair of lovers, enhances the livesof both the lover and the beloved.9

Implications for Isocrates' Role in a Reformed Rhetoric

What implications do these resonating constructs—the Myth of the Soul, thethree mythical pairs of lovers, and the three love speeches—hold both for aphilosophical rhetoric and for Isocrates as the figure of hope of such rhetoric? TheMyth of the Soul makes apparent that not all gods are equal in their proximity toBeing; nor are all charioteers equally adept at maneuvering their reins, either whilein heaven so as to maximize what they can see of Being, or while on earth so asto realize their full innate potential. Plato's elaborate mythical scheme is a meta-phor that seeks to explain, on the one hand, a hierarchy of innate abilities—aconsequence of the god one follows—and, on the other, the development of thoseabilities—a consequence of how well the charioteer controls the reins. The com-plexity of the soul results from its attempt to orchestrate the myriad of impulseswithin itself. Plato's conception of rivaling forces of the soul makes room for areformed rhetoric. It demands a form of discourse that strives to orchestrate thepleasure-seeking part of the soul—that which finds delight in verbal fluency,crafted forcefulness, and graceful rums of phrases—with the disciplined part—thatwhich seeks restraint and truthfulness. In other words, philosophical rhetoricrequires eloquence and wisdom.

These three constructs converge as a bipartite metaphor for kinds of rhetorsand rhetorics. Socrates sets up polar ends of a rhetor/rhetorical continuum in hisprayer that Phaedrus will turn "towards the love of wisdom . . . [and] no longerhalt between two opinions," that is, between sophistic and philosophical rhetoric(257B). Rather than invoking a simple dichotomy, the constructs of the Myth ofthe Soul, the pairs of lovers, the three love speeches converge to let us see arhetor/rhetorical continuum along which we can locate Lysias/sophistic rhetoric,Isocrates/potentially philosophical rhetoric, and Plato/philosophical rhetoric.

The significance of the philosophical rhetor's special status ought not beoverlooked. Because the philosopher is born with a greater potential to strivetoward goodness, he should be diligent in assuming a greater moral responsibilityto do so. What is important to recognize is that, for Plato, an inequality exists

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among humans not merely because of differing inborn talents but also becauseindividuals make different uses of their talents. It follows from the myth thatrhetors are not merely bom; they must leam how to hone their talent to craftappropriate discourse, and they must persistently practice their craft. Thus themyth provides an explanation as to why Lysias's speech is criticized; it is bothpoorly crafted, or ineloquent, and impudent, that is, lacking in wisdom. Hence,unlike philosophical rhetoric, it can only pretend to harness the tripartite souls ofthose who hear it.

The sketch of the tripartite soul and the description of the three pairs ofmythical lovers, as well as the speeches they echo, further suggest that philosophi-cal rhetors have a moral responsibility not only to themselves but also to those whohear their discourses. Ultimately, these rhetors must be held responsible forcomposing as accurate an account of truth as their current stage of developmentpermits. Misconceptions of Truth arise from human limitations and human frail-ties. On the one hand, humans are limited in their ability to access Truth, but withpractice and time they can grow in their ability to approximate Truth. On the otherhand, like the lovers who turn their attention away from goodness momentarily,philosophical rhetors may occasionally go astray. The Myth makes clear, however,that these rhetors have the potential within themselves to return to a path of wisdomand imbue their discourses with their best approximation of truth. In either case,misconceptions, whether the result of youthful blindness or momentary weak-nesses, once recognized must be rectified, for it is one's moral obligation, saysPlato's Socrates, to represent as accurately as possible that which falls within theparameters of one's present vision.

Within Plato's view recantation, then, is not only possible but morally man-dated. Scholars such as Martha Nussbaum suggest that the Phaedrus may be readin its entirety as a palinode to Plato's earlier views on rhetoric (202). Socrates'playful jibe that he has heard "certain arguments advancing" the point that rhetoric"is no art, but a knack that has nothing to do with art" (260E) clearly echoes thevery words he used in the Gorgias to claim that rhetoric is not an art (462B, C).This notion of recantation makes the mythical pair of well-meaning lovers espe-cially worthy of our attention. Metaphorically, they represent the regenerativepotential for rhetors to redeem themselves and work toward the reform of rhetoric.

What is there so far in our consideration of the Phaedrus that would lead usto accept the notion that Isocrates, far from representing a corrupt rhetoric,represents hope—albeit perhaps a tincture, or trace, of hope—for the reform ofrhetoric? First, Isocrates is described as having natural powers superior to Lysias'sand a nobler character. In short, Isocrates has "an innate tincture of philosophy"(279A). In light of the vertical positioning of souls described in Socrates' myth,this touch of philosophy is a mark of distinctive talent that sets him apart from mostothers who engage in rhetorical activities. Second, Socrates argues that loversought to pair up with like souls—philosophers with philosophers, athletes with

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athletes, artisans with artisans (252C, D). Socrates, a follower of Zeus and a "loverof wisdom," calls Isocrates his "beloved" (279B) at the end of the dialogue. Thisnomenclature suggests that Plato—or at least the Platonic Socrates—saw in Iso-crates a like-minded soul, the highest kind of soul with a potential for the best kindof rhetoric.

Plato indicates that with this potential comes great responsibility for Isocrates.What the Platonic Socrates apparently hopes for Isocrates is a recantation of sorts.Just as a sublime impulse prompted Socrates to rectify his offense to Eros, so, too,Socrates prays that "a sublimer impulse" will prompt Isocrates to "become dissat-isfied with. . . the actual type of writing in which he engages in at present... [and]lead him to do greater things" (279A). Whether this portrayal of Isocrates indicateshis youthful blindness or a momentary moral lapse in his rhetoric, it points mostimportantly to the fact that Plato sees within Isocrates the potential to participatein the highest of philosophical discursive activity. As Socrates tells the youngPhaedrus, what marks the philosophical rhetor is that he "has done his work witha knowledge of the truth, can defend his statements when challenged, and candemonstrate the inferiority of his writing out of his own mouth" (278C). Apalinode, such as the one which Socrates delivers, is but one way to "demonstratethe inferiority of [one's] writing" (278C). The morally responsible rhetor is ableto recognize those occasions when a recantation is necessary. In this light, thewell-meaning lovers, in their pursuit to love one another purely while striving afterBeing, represent the dynamic tension for the rhetor between the desire for moralaction and the inaccessibility of certain knowledge.

Morality and Epistemology: Convergences between Plato and Isocrates

Thus far we have worked to pinpoint the tension between morality andepistemology as it emerges through the Myth of the Soul. This tension we willargue is one that pervades Isocrates' work as well. Both Isocrates and Plato soughtto reform rhetoric. Not only was such reform one of Plato's purposes of thePhaedrus (Hackforth 9), but the reform of rhetoric was also "an integral part ofthe great program of moral reform undertaken by Plato" throughout his life (North11). However, while Isocrates wanted to reform rhetoric for the very practical goalof the political and social revitalization of the Hellenic states, Plato wanted toreform rhetoric for spiritual and individual ends. Clearly, then, Plato and Isocratesdealt with the tension between moral action and epistemic limitations in differentways and consequently developed markedly different theories of rhetoric andpedagogy.10 However, the moral/epistemological tension running throughout theirworks permits us to locate intersections in their rhetorical theories. We argue thatit is at this point of convergence that Plato may have seen in Isocrates hope forrhetorical reform.

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Moral Development

The story line of the Phaedrus may be said to concern itself with the moraldevelopment of the young man for whom the dialogue is named. When we firstmeet Phaedrus, he is mesmerized by Lysias's speech and considers the deceptive,tedious discourse to be "extraordinarily fine" (234C), in fact, exemplary ofGreece's best rhetoric (234E). Warning against the oratorical practices of Lysias,the subsequent speeches and Socrates' commentary on them serve to instruct theyoung man regarding the proper purpose of public discourse. The overridingobjective of such oratory should not be to sway the multitudes according to whatis only probable or to serve as an eristic wrangling match; rather, its purpose shouldbe to instruct with clarity, completeness, and seriousness "those lessons on justiceand honour and goodness" (278A). Phaedrus marks his own conversion to philoso-phy when he states, "My own wishes and prayers are most certainly to that effect,"after Socrates prays that he and Phaedrus may follow the example of the philo-sophical rhetor (278B).

On the one hand, Socrates' moral concern for Phaedrus is on the level of thepersonal and spiritual. Against the backdrop of the Myth of the Soul, Socrates'prayer, for instance, that Phaedrus might "live for Love in singleness of purpose"(257B), functions as a blessing on the young man's own spiritual journey towardBeing. On the other hand, as Nussbaum points out in her description of fifth-cen-tury Athens, young Phaedrus was coming of age in a society where to be an adultcitizen meant devoting oneself "to the city's political and cultural life" (207). ForPlato at the time of writing the Phaedrus, a commitment to philosophy was notrestricted to a solitary life of contemplation. Quite the contrary: as stipulated in thedescription of the mythical pair of diligent lovers, to be "Zeus-like in soul" is tobe "disposed to the love of wisdom and the leading of men" (252E, emphasisadded). This contention of Plato's Socrates that philosophy intersects with theleading of men—that is, with civic activity—stipulates that rhetoric should have astrong moral dimension. In that rhetoric is used to guide men, Socrates' lesson forPhaedrus is that philosophical rhetoric is discourse that influences men rightly, thatis, along the paths that are just, honorable, and good (278A).

The moral realm of public discourse in Plato's theory of rhetoric is one vectorthat can be said to intersect with a similar line of argument in Isocrates' work.While Isocrates dismissed the contention that the Platonic philosophical enterprisewas some cure for social ills and rejected dialecticism as a pedantic method forsplitting hairs, he was "profoundly affected by the moral reformation initiated bySocrates" (Jaeger 3:50) and strove to transfer key philosophical tenets into therealm of politics. Indeed, Isocrates even referred to his own rhetorical system asphilosophical in its own right.11 Not unlike the mentoring stance that Socrates tooktoward Phaedrus, Isocrates assumed the stance of teacher and moral safeguard inseveral of his works. Yet, while Plato's Socrates aimed his sights on Phaedrus, a

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kind of Philosophical Everyman, Isocrates' apparent strategy was to step in andadvise especially rich and influential young men, namely Nicocles and Demoni-cus, shortly after they had lost their fathers. In To Nicocles, Nicocles or theCyprians, and To Demonicus, Isocrates explicitly articulates his version of apractical morality. As in the Phaedrus, in these horatorical texts we see a societyin which adulthood is equated with citizenship. Isocrates positions morality withinthe affairs of the city-state and portrays these affairs as a dynamic course of activitythat achieves its moral equilibrium through the careful discernment of its members,each according to his position.

Within the horatorical texts, the basis of Isocratean morality is made clear inthe arguments Isocrates develops to advocate the superiority of monarchical rule.12

What is important here is not the truth value of Isocrates' position, that is, whethermonarchical rule really was or is the best form of government. Rather, the point isthat he stood on moral grounds—albeit grounds that in some ways are out of syncwith current prevailing sociopolitical views—to argue in favor of the monarchy asthe superior form of government. This is not to say, however, that Isocrates arguedthat any monarchy was necessarily a moral one. Rather, he attested that themonarchy, by the nature of its design, had the greatest potential to serve the genuineinterests of the public, interests served when a government was involved indecisions "to relieve the state when it is in distress, to maintain it in prosperity, andto make it great when it is small" {To Nicocles 9). For reign to be a moral one, thereigning king must be a moral man, of superior intelligence and of nobler soul thanall those he rules (To Nicocles 10, 14). Thus it is to cultivate such virtue in theyoung prince as he succeeds his father to the throne that Isocrates writes ToNicocles.

There are multiple arguments, Isocrates wrote, that "prove" monarchical ruleto be the most fair and the least oppressive (Nicocles or §17). Among his argu-ments, two are central. Together they epitomize Isocratean morality. The first isthat only the position of monarch permits a government official to care genuinelyfor the needs of his people. As caretaker of his people and lover of his country (ToNicocles §16), the monarch "[d]eliver[s]... citizens from their many fears" andassures his citizens that no ill will come to those who do no wrong (To Nicocles§23). Contrariwise, the genuine interest of the public is not served in democraciesor oligarchies because there self-aggressive men skilled in haranguing the publicare those that succeed. In such cases, "[m]en . . . are led by their mutual rivalriesto injure the commonwealth" (Nicocles or § 18). They quarrel rather than deliberatewith one another, each working to secure what is most within his own privateinterest (Nicocles or §20). The king alone, "not having anyone to envy" and havinginherited the throne for life, can avoid rivalries and bickering, focusing instead ondiscerning the best course in daily decisions (Nicocles or §18).

The second key argument which Isocrates used to advocate monarchical ruleis that only within a monarchy is virtue encouraged and rewarded among the

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multitude (Nicocles or §15). According to Isocrates, that "the best among [themultitude] shall have the honours, while the rest shall suffer no impairment of theirrights" is a moral precept, one obvious to common sense yet violated in other formsof government (To Nicocles §16). In distributing their goods and services, oligar-chies and democracies do not discriminate among the more and less virtuous, "aprinciple," he explains, "which works in the interest of the worthless" (Nicoclesor §15). Since in such governments the virtuous get lost in the "hurly burly of themob" (Nicocles or §16), character that is noble and actions that are right areoverlooked. Neither rewarded nor nurtured, moral conduct disappears, and themoral conditions of the state gravitate toward mediocrity in the best cases and tocorruption in the worst.

In order for a monarch to care genuinely for the needs of its people and toreward consistently the most virtuous, the king must develop a keen sense ofdiscernment (To Nicocles §33). In some situations the king must be able to strikea balance been two good courses of action, between, for example, actions that arecourteous and those that preserve his dignity, between those that directly securehis own personal security and those that more immediately preserve the securityof the state (To Nicocles §34, 36). In each of these pairs, Isocrates explained, bothactions are necessary. What is required of an honorable king is to discern a balanceso that actions in favor of the one do not interfere with actions favoring the other.So it is with matters of legislation, management, finances, and religion (To Nico-cles §17, 19, 20). In striking a balance in such daily affairs, the king on a moregeneral level, maintains a state of equilibrium. His governance enhances thepeople's emotional well-being, financial prosperity and political stature while atthe same time it secures his own position as a respected leader, free from the fearsof popular unrest and insurrection (To Nicocles §9).

But the king must also be able to discern situations where the choice is notbetween two good actions but rather between what appears to be good and whattruly is. He must detect, for instance, true wisdom, or speaking "well on greatissues," from the appearance of wisdom, "disputing subtly about trilling matters"(To Nicocles §39). And he must seek council only from those whose wisdom isauthentic. Likewise, he must be able to discern true authority, that is, the respectsubjects grant a ruler whose judgments they believe to be better than their own,from the appearance of authority: harshness and severity in punishment (ToNicocles §24). And he must take that course of action that buttresses his trueauthority over the people. In pairs of alternatives such as these, in each case, onthe side of appearance is that which is base; on the side of the real stands thevirtuous. Baseness is linked with what is most horrid in governmental control:greed, corruption, danger, and oppression that lead the people to feel fear, dread,and hatred. In cases of such alternatives, it is through discerning the moral path aseach choice arises that the king is able to take steps to maintain a moral reign.

One may ask how Isocrates could have expected a king to possess such powers

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of moral discernment. In his words to Nicocles, Isocrates stressed that a king'sinnate ability is a class above other mortals. As he inherits a noble heritage and asuperior intelligence, a king also inherits the responsibility to cultivate the powersof his mind and the depth of his soul with education and discipline (To Nicocles§28, 10,11,50). For Isocrates it was only reasonable that less should be expectedof those under a king's rule. Isocrates' advice to Demonicus, a high-rankingCyprian citizen, for example, advocates wisdom, too (Demonicus §5), but a brandthat is more shrewd than sagacious. As a statement of practical ethics, To Demoni-cus concedes that the subjects of a monarchy must sometimes cultivate appear-ances that gain popular favor. He sets before Demonicus a set of "moral precepts,""practices" by which Demonicus "can make the most progress toward virtue andwin the highest repute in the eyes of all other men" (12). Consider, for instance,Isocrates' advice to the young man regarding his religious practices: "Do honourto the divine power at all times, but especially on occasions of public worship; forthus you will have the reputation both of sacrificing to the gods and of abiding bythe laws" (13).

For the multitude of Cyprians, Isocrates' goals are even less complicated,urging a morality that is equated with simple obedience and cooperation: "Do notbelittle nor despise . . . your assigned tasks," he writes, "but, knowing that thewhole depends on its success or failure on each of the parts, be careful ineverything" (Nicocles or §48). According to Isocrates' model of a moral city-state,the king's virtue is of tantamount importance. If all others cooperate, playing byrules that temper self-interest with well-rewarded virtue, the king can achieve amoral equilibrium to secure what is genuinely in the state's best interest (ToDemonicus §11; Nicocles or §49).13

For Isocrates, governing as one should included harnessing rhetoric for thebest ends of the state. Within Isocrates' texts runs an overriding concern for thewell-being of Athens, a concern which serves to underscore the need for acivic-minded rhetoric dedicated to the Greek city-states' best interest. During theera in which Isocrates taught and wrote, the Peloponnesian War threatened thedissolution of Greece. Endless battles between Athens and Sparta, for example, notonly proved economically devastating but also posed the very real threat ofunraveling the social fabric of Hellenic culture. Isocrates contended that the onlyway to stop Greece from destroying itself was to distribute power equally acrossall city-states, amove which would work to ensure Athens a position of leadershipin a unified nation. This pan-Hellenic ideal of a unified Greece, purged of its deeplyentrenched corruptions and bloody rivalries, became Isocrates' goal toward whichhe worked to spread throughout the entire Greek world. Crucial to our argumenthere is the fact that he considered public speaking to be a primary medium forrealizing this vision of political change.

As we have seen, Plato, too, demanded that the rhetor and his rhetoric servehigh moral ends. The dialogue makes clear that if Phaedrus had remained a devoted

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disciple to the clever but vapid Lysias, Phaedrus's soul would have become as dull.Just as Plato criticized the hollowness of both eristic wrangling (26ID, E) andsophistic discourse (262C), Isocrates also criticized empty orations. In Helen,Isocrates contends that "to praise bumble-bees and salt" is not appropriate (12) noris subtly arguing both sides of what Isocrates considered to be a purely theoreticalissue (1). Neither type of verbal display benefits the individual or society. ForIsocrates, as for Plato, the trouble with the sophists was that they did not striveafter wisdom. Isocrates counters this deficit by challenging the sophists to entertain"the highest kind of oratory that which deals with the greatest affairs" of the state(Panegyricus §4). For Isocrates, prescribing appropriate subject matter was aneffort to move rhetoric beyond the grasp of the sophists (John Poulakos).

With a moral commitment to wise and just reasoning, Isocrates made appealsfor rigorous rhetorical activity that addressed pertinent social issues with carefulattention to the facts at hand. For instance, Isocrates reprimands Polycrates formisrepresenting in a display the central character as a contemporary of Aeolus andOrpheus, who according to public knowledge lived far earlier. But what apparentlyconcerns Isocrates even more than this careless attention to factual details isPolycrates' failure to make his delivery relevant to current political or moral issuesfacing the state. Consequently, in Isocrates' revision of the text, he provides anextended discourse on the institution of Egypt. (See Busiris §11-29.) Likewise, heincorporates commentary concerning Theseus' reform efforts into Helen, a textsimilar in purpose and structure to Busiris. (See Helen §21-37.) Concerning Poly-crates' choice of subject matter, Isocrates urges: "you will preferably not deal in thefuture with such base subjects, but if that cannot be, you will seek to speak of suchthings as will neither injure your own reputation, nor corrupt your imitators, norbring the teaching of rhetoric into disrepute" (Busiris §49-50). Securing the reputa-tion of rhetoric from the critique of eristic wrangling is also Isocrates' apparentpurpose when in Helen he argues that improvements must surely be made to counterthe current sophistic practice of "wast[ing] their time in captious disputations thatare not only entirely useless, but are sure to make trouble for their disciples" as well(§1). In failing to employ their intellects, the sophistics' rhetoric was doomed to beinconsequential. In the face of impending social collapse, Isocrates consideredinconsequential oratory to be not merely fanciful but downright immoral.

The Nature of Knowledge

A fundamental epistemological tenet for Plato in the Phaedrus is that mortalsare limited in their access to knowledge. This limitation has significant implica-tions for rhetoric, an activity which should be grounded in knowledge of the Forms,such as Justice (247D), Temperance (247D), and Beauty (250C). This concessionto the inaccessibility of certitude is made clear in Socrates' opening words to theMyth of the Soul:

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As to soul's immortality then we have said enough, but as to its naturethere is this that must be said: what manner of thing it is would be along tale to tell, and most assuredly a god alone could tell it; but whatit resembles, that a man might tell in briefer compass: let this thereforebe our manner of discourse. (246A)

Similarly, a little later in the dialogue, Socrates admits that "whether I am right orwrong in doing so [using dialectic], God alone knows" (266B). In both instancesSocrates seems to be suggesting that although we may strive for absolute knowl-edge it is not within the boundaries of man's ability to reach it or to say what it is.Mortals—with their "dull.. . organs" (250B), their "inadequate reasoning powers"(Hackforth 95)—must settle on what something "resembles."

Isocrates also recognized the impossibility of accessing certain knowledge, aconcession which the sophists of his day were typically unwilling to make. InAgainst the Sophists, he criticizes those who promise to teach certitude. Specifi-cally, he rails against those sophists who "have gone so far in their lack of scruplethat they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under themthey will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happyand prosperous" (§3). Such promises are false and criminal. Absolute knowledge,for instance, knowledge of how to find true happiness, cannot be bought, taught,or sold. Indeed, Isocrates goes so far as to suggest that "those who follow theirjudgements are more consistent and more successful than those who profess tohave exact knowledge" (§8). In other words, even just following one's hunches isa better route than pretending one can achieve certitude.

Similarly, Isocrates takes to task those who "undertake to transmit the scienceof discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not havingtaken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge" (Against§9-10). According to Isocrates, the problem with this group of teachers is that theyconflate several kinds of knowledge. For Isocrates, the art of rhetoric depends ona rich constellation of technical or practical knowledge, contingent knowledge, andphronesis (understanding). Like the physical trainer who instructs athletes in thekinds of positions required for various athletic events, "the teachers of philosophyimpart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself (Antidosis§184). This technical knowledge can be taught; it forms a common method whichmarks those who have received such training (Antidosis §206). However, the otherkinds of knowledge—which Isocrates terms "'theories,' for no system of knowl-edge can possibly cover these occasions, since in all cases they elude our sci-ence"—depend on talent and experience (§184). That is, since the rhetoricalsituation is never the same on any two occasions for any two speakers or interlocu-tors, there is no way to systematize how the rhetor is to construct an appropriatespeech for every occasion. As Takis Poulakos points out, Isocrates distinguishedbetween the acquisition of knowledge and the application of knowledge. For

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Isocrates, "to bring doxa to krisis cannot be taught" ("Isocratean Rhetoric").Training can polish a talent for discerning the best course of action, but diligentpractice is also necessary.

For Isocrates, unlike Plato, doxa did not mean irresponsible opinion but "aworking theory based on practical experience—judgment or insight in dealing withthe uncertain contingencies of any human situation which presents itself (Noriin290-91). For example, Isocrates tells Polycrates that his own revision of Busiris issuperior not only in that it judiciously treats rudimentary facts but also because theargument has greater intrinsic probability. Arguing for the superiority of hisargument, Isocrates explains that it is only through the power of conjecture that acase can be decided: "[S]ince the question [of Busiris's guilt or innocence] is opento the judgment of a l l . . . one must resort to conjecture ... reasoning from whatis probable" (§35, emphasis added). Doing so is not merely effective; the seriousrhetor argues from the basis of well-considered opinions because knowledgeconcerning important political and moral issues is never known for certain. Iso-crates elaborated this position most fully in the Antidosis:

For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by thepossession of which we can know positively what we should do orwhat we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise whois able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the bestcourse, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himselfwith the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind ofinsight. (§271)

Although this work was written approximately sixteen years after the Phaedrus, itis clear from Isocrates' earlier works that his position on conjecture and inacces-sibility of certain knowledge had already been clearly articulated. Most relevantin the above passage are the echoes of Plato's Socrates in the Phaedrus. Specifi-cally, not only does this passage echo Plato's view on human epistemic limitations,but it also reverberates with Plato's concern that knowledge, however imperfect,requires a persistent and diligent effort, a strong theme in much of Isocrates' work.

Such dedication to practice and training is important for cultivating moralmen. As Isocrates explains in the Antidosis, "I consider that the kind of art whichcan implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed.. . . But Ido hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambitionto speak well" (§274-75). Isocrates, then, connects prudential conduct with sys-tematic training in rhetoric and with persistence in its application. Indeed, he goesso far as to blame the neglect of systematic training for the corrupt youth who wileaway the hours drinking and gallivanting (Antidosis §286-88).

Debates regarding the merits and shortcomings of Isocrates' own intellectualprowess are endless.14 What is clear, however, is that, regardless of any limitation

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in Isocrates' own mental ability, he stressed the importance of disciplined intelli-gence. In the Busiris, for example, Isocrates depicts early Egyptian society as anexemplary civilization. In the scenario young men devote themselves to trainingtheir intellects and to acquiring knowledge. Abstaining from all pleasures, theyoung men turn, instead, "to the study of the stars, to arithmetic, and to geometry"(§22). Over time, the studious young men in the Egyptian scenario become elderswho "have charge of the most important matters" of the state (22). For Isocrates,the trained intellect serves as a tool for influencing the state's affairs by providingthe basis for constructing and delivering wise discourse (To Nicocles §39). Iso-crates asserts that with properly schooled intelligence comes the ability to makewise judgments.

According to Isocrates, what distinguishes his rhetorical theory from thesophists' attempts at rhetorical practice is, in large part, this emphasis on mentaldiscipline. Isocrates repeatedly stresses that it is from mental toil that all benefitsspring, both for the individual and for society: "let a single man attain to wisdom,and all men will reap the benefit who are willing to share his insight" (Panegyricus§2). But what further distinguishes him from other Jeachers, and to some degreefrom Plato, was his richly complex notions about the various kinds of knowledgenecessary for effective oratory.,

Rhetorical Dynamism

In the Phaedrus, the road to knowledge is portrayed as a long and formidableone, filled with twists and turns and occasions for palinodes. While everyone islimited to feeding "upon the food of semblance" (248B), mortals, as we have seenfrom the Myth of the Soul, vary in their abilities to approximate the truth, somebecause of innate limitations and others because of failing to hone the talents theypossess.

Plato proposes the dialectic as a systematic way for negotiating the rhetor'sdilemma between moral obligations and epistemic limitations. The dialectic ispresented not as an exercise for discovering ultimate Truth but as a flexiblerhetorical tool for maximizing that which is discernable to mortals. As Curranexplains, the dialectical method provides a "safeguard" against avoidable errors inreasoning about the subject at hand (67). This technique is for Plato a matter ofdefining one's terms and setting them in a cogent order, a process that results fromCollection and Division. The former involves bringing "a dispersed plurality undera single form, seeing it all together" while the latter requires one "to divide intoforms" (265D and E). That is to say, the dialectic is a method for analyzing howthings resemble one another. In the Phaedrus, how one collects and divides thingsdepends on the relations one discovers in other parts of the known world, not onisolating absolute parameters of autonomous, self-confined Forms as some criticshave contended (e.g., Brownstein 394-95; Kinneavy 71).

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Plato introduces the dialectic as an artful tool of rhetoric. It is used to assessand clarify what one can know in relation to the particular rhetorical constraintsof the "occasions for speaking," "the type of speech appropriate to each nature,and order," and "what. . . can be relied on to create belief given the range of soulsin which one attempts "to implant conviction" (272A, 277C, 27IB, 271 A). Bysituating the dialectic within the rhetorical situation, Plato moves it beyond abarren mind-game, devoid of moral, spiritual, and social purpose. Instead, thedialectic, generating pertinent contextual knowledge, is a dynamic tool that worksto mediate the tension between the moral goal of influencing souls—the appropri-ate object of rhetoric —and barriers to certain knowledge (270E).

When Phaedrus complains that dialecticism "seem[s] a considerable busi-ness," Socrates makes it clear that there are no short cuts in mastering the art ofrhetoric (272B ff). The rhetor's task is an ongoing and taxing one. Perhaps it isbecause Plato conceived of knowledge in active terms that he found so ludicrousnot only the sophists' claims to hand over knowledge but also their notion thattechne contains wisdom. The absurdity of viewing the static pages of a book as alocus of knowledge is highlighted in Plato's Myth of the Invention of Writing.When the inventor of writing, Theuth, tells the king, Thamus, that the art of writing'"provides a recipe for memory and wisdom'" (274 E), Thamus rejects thisjudgment. On the second count, Thamus argues: '"[I]t is no true wisdom that youoffer your disciples, but only its semblance; for by telling them of many thingswithout teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the mostpart they know nothing'" (275A, B). What is important to note here is that Platois not rejecting the art of writing but rather the claim that writing can containwisdom. Plato's Socrates underscores the moral responsibility of those who engagein written or spoken discourse in saying: "there is nothing shameful in the mere

writing of speeches But in speaking and writing shamefully and badly, insteadof as one should" (258D). What is shameful is claiming more for writing than canbe rightly claimed. Wisdom, the synthesis of both moral commitment and disci-plined intellect was not, for Plato, a static commodity but an act of engagement.Because writing freezes the dynamism required of the search for knowledge, itshould not be regarded "as containing important truth of permanent validity"(277D). We might speculate that this is precisely the reason that Plato never wrotea techne. Serious rhetorical endeavors must remain open to revision, testing, andrefining in the face of changing contextual demands.15

Like Plato, Isocrates never penned a manual on rhetoric.16 We'd like tosuggest that this parallel is more than a coincidence and possibly further evidenceof the two men holding complementary views toward rhetoric, views that helddynamism to be a central consequence of mortals' pull toward moral action in theface of the inaccessibility of certitude. Consider that the sophists, trusting techneto stipulate static formulas for constructing and delivering discourse, reignedthroughout the rhetorical streets of Athens. The sense of rhetorical dynamism

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pulsing within Plato's Phaedrus and much of Isocrates' work was not commonlyheld. For this reason, Plato may have considered Isocrates a soulmate committedto a precious vision of a moral, intellectually rigorous rhetoric.

According to Isocrates, rhetoric's dynamism begins with the rhetor's power,of conjecture to determine the best course of action (Against §8). In extendingdiscourse, either oral or written, the rhetoric must advocate this course of actionin a manner that is original in treatment, fit for the occasion, propitious in style,and suited to the natures of those who hear him (Against §12; Nicocles or §16).Proper government, Isocrates suggests in Nicocles or The Cyprians, is best con-sidered rhetorical activity on a grand scale, for the superior government is thatwhich is best suited to fulfilling the demands of rhetoric, that is, to appraising andresponding to the natures and actions of men. For Isocrates, this power to orches-trate constraints so as to persuade one another is what has permitted civilizationitself: "Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each otherand to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped thelife of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made lawsand invented arts" (Nicocles or §5).

In the Phaedrus what makes rhetorical activity alive is the rhetor's obligationto write or to say that which is best, or the most moral, in the face of uncertainty.Even philosophical rhetors, who according to Plato's scheme have the most innateability to recognize the right course, are still bounded by their humanness, by theirinability to say what only a god can say for sure. Yet rhetors according to Platomust act, that is, they must write or speak when the appropriate occasion arises,and they must do so in ways that strive after goodness, justice, and honor (272A,278A). Plato makes clear that this activity is not only for the rhetor's own moraldevelopment but also for the development of those with whom he engages indiscourse (255E). Viewing rhetoric, morality, and knowledge from such a perspec-tive, Plato may have found Isocrates' work appealing on two different counts. First,Isocrates was committed to cultivating in his students of rhetoric their powers todetermine the most moral course of action when faced with several competingoptions. Second, Isocrates' treatises such as Panegyricus worked to bring aboutpan-Hellenism, thereby realizing in concrete terms Plato's demand that rhetoric beput to a rigorous moral test.

Conclusion

Those scholars who read the Phaedrus as Plato's rejection of rhetoric and whosubsequently view Isocrates as the target of this dialogue have tried to see thisdialogue in terms of a static extension of his earlier views on rhetoric (e.g.,Brownstein 397; Kelley 78; Robin 173; Schakel 131). The tendency here has beento misconstrue dialecticism as a formula for determining a stable truth. Suchreadings miss Plato's reconceptualization of the relationship between mortals and

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knowledge as an ever-changing, dynamic one that is pivotal for a serious art ofrhetoric. We are suggesting that with Plato's increasingly complex formulation ofa rhetoric comes his willingness to entertain the notion that rhetoric may bereformed and, consequently, be worthy of the status and title of a "true art," an arton which much of his hopes for moral reform hinge. To overlook this point is tomiss the vigorous interplay between moral obligations and epistemic limitationsthat gives rise to Plato's new vision of rhetoric. We have been arguing that it is atthis intersection of inaccessibility of knowledge and moral responsibility thatPlato's and Isocrates' theories of rhetoric converge, and Isocrates emerges as apotential ambassador of Plato's reformed rhetoric.

To see Isocrates as the target of the Phaedrus is to erroneously associate himwith the sophists and demagogues whom Plato condemns to the penultimate rungof the hierarchy of souls, just above the tyrant. These specious orators conjure updiscourse that is barren of inspiration that strives for truth. Such rhetoric—just asdemagoguery—is founded upon and exploits the emotions and prejudices of thepopulace. However, this reading mistakenly confuses Isocrates' practices withthose of orators who were insensitive to the dangerously manipulative potential ofrhetoric and who were ready to build arguments for argument's sake, oblivious towhether their speeches offend the divine or social order. As we have argued,Isocrates was acutely aware of the moral responsibilities of rhetors and teachersof rhetoric, devoting a good deal of space to this very issue in his treatises.

The explicit target of Socrates' criticisms against rhetoric in the Phaedrus isLysias's speech which demonstrates sophistic tendencies: a misplaced focus onarrangement and style, the absolute ignorance of the systematic principles behindrhetorical practices, and the utter disregard for the truth-value of what is said.Lysias's speech is formulaic, repetitive, lacking in substantial content, and mostimportantly, an affront to the god of love, Eros (shortcomings for which Isocratesmay well have criticized the speech). Hence, it is Lysias, as a sophist, who belongsnear the bottom on the hierarchy of souls and for whom Socrates prays in vain to"turn.. . towards the love of wisdom" (257B). In direct contrast, Isocrates alreadypossesses "an innate tincture of philosophy" (279A).

It is this notion of an "innate tincture of philosophy" that leads Plato's Socratesto prophesy "greater things" for Isocrates (279A). Even those critics who read theprophecy as a compliment to Isocrates typically suggest that Isocrates failed tofulfill the prediction (cf. Hackforth 12; Jebb 2:4). Perhaps these critics reach sucha conclusion because they leave Isocrates little alternative but to become anintellectual theorist to satisfy Plato. We would argue, however, that this conclusionis premature, if not misleading. The tendency in much scholarship has been toconflate the dramatic date with the date the dialogue was written and thus fail torecognize the significance of the prophecy as a literary tool. The dramatic date,410 BCE, corresponds to the period during which Isocrates wrote law speeches, aperiod so dark in Isocrates' life that he later denies it (Jebb 2:7). Yet the Socrates

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of the Phaedrus sees potential in this young logographer even if Isocrates should"persist in the actual type of writing in which he engages at present" (279A).17

However, when Plato was actually writing the dialogue—constructing the fictiveprophecy—Isocrates had long turned his back on writing for the law courts andhad become a most-respected teacher of rhetoric and a rhetorician. Certainly, wewould argue, Plato would have applauded this shift in Isocrates' career and wouldhave viewed the shift as evidence of "a sublimer impulse lead[ing] him to greaterthings" (279A). Consequently, we cannot agree with scholars who argue thatIsocrates failed to live up to Plato's expectations.18

But this is not to say that Plato commended Isocrates on all of his methodsand ideas, for Isocrates was not a dialectician and he rejected the notion ofuniversal truths—both fundamental principles of Plato's philosophy. Yet, as Hack-forth underscores, Isocrates' school had "stood over against the Academy" forseveral decades (11). Clearly, Plato's Academy with its interests in mathematicsand philosophy had proven unable either to extirpate all of rhetoric or to transformsophistic practices into the art of true rhetoric. Worse yet, Plato seems to havefeared the practice of sophistic rhetoric if left in the lands of the unenlightenedsophists would continue to corrupt the state and exploit the populace. OnlyIsocrates with his large following and political commitments could possiblyredeem rhetorical practices.

Isocrates held that with the trained power of conjecture one can "withoutclaiming absolute knowledge . . . still choose the right means to the right end"(Jaeger 3:64). For Isocrates, the rhetor's proper role was to work within thepolitical arena to provide the leadership necessary to unite the Greek city-states.Had Isocrates positioned his ideal in direct contrast to Plato and Socrates, he couldhave certainly led Plato to use the Phaedrus to spurn him. Rather, however,Isocrates strove to integrate Plato's primary criticisms against sophistic rhetoric—those aimed at moral indifference—with the particulars of active, timely politics.It is Isocrates' attempt to integrate moral responsibility into rhetorical practiceswhile conceding epistemic limitations that we are suggesting led the PlatonicSocrates to deem Isocrates touched with a tincture of philosophy—and that ledPlato to have hope, if only a trace of hope, in a rhetorical reformation.

Notes

1 We would like to acknowledge Richard L. Enos for his careful readings of initial drafts and for histhoughtful suggestions along the way. We would also like to thank James Murphy for his usefulcomments regarding our manuscript. Finally, we are especially grateful to Takis Poulakos not only forhis scholarship that works to open up a space for Isocrates but even more so for his insightful readingsand challenging comments that indicated a tincture of hope in earlier drafts of our paper.

2 Hackforth (9-12) and R. C. Jebb (2:4) are among the few scholars who have contended that passage279A is a vote of confidence in Isocrates.

3 By contrast, we follow scholars such as Glenn Morrow (237), Edwin Black (361), David Kaufer(63), and Jane Curran (67) who argue that Plato stipulates in the Phaedrus those practical principles

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through which it is possible for rhetoric to gain the "status of a bonafide and philosophically significantart" (Murray 279).

4 Regarding the Phaedrus, we are following the dramatic date and the date of composition whichHackforth recommends (8,7): the dramatic date of approximately 410 BCE establishes Isocrates as ayoung man; however, Phaedrus was actually written about 40 years later, in approximately 370 BCE,when Isocrates was close to 54 years old and nearing the apex of his immensely successful career as ateacher of rhetoric. (See G. J. DeVries, who provides a summary of various theories concerning the datingof the Phaedrus [Commmentary 7-11).] According to the approximate dates and organizational categoriesthat Jebb assigns to Isocrates' texts, the extant works which Isocrates would have written by 370 BCEare the three hortatory letters or essays titled To Nicocles (c. 374 BCE), Nicocles or the Cyprians (c. 372BCE), and To Demonicus (c. 372 BCE); the two displays titled Busiris (c. 390-1 BCE) and The Encomiumon Helen (c. 370 BCE); the essay on education titled Against the Sophists (c. 391 BCE); and the politicaltreatise entitled Panegyricus (c. 390 BCE) (2: 80-260). The above list does not include the six forensicspeeches that Isocrates wrote between 403 BCE and 393 BCE for, as Jebb states, "In his later writingsIsokrates nowhere recognizes this phase of his own activity" (2:7). Acknowledging, as Hackforth makesclear, the precarious business of dating texts such as these (3), it is important, nevertheless, to note thatPlato wrote his most damning dialogues concerning the practice of rhetoric, the Protagoras and theGorgias, before Isocrates had even begun his career as a theorist and teacher (Jaeger 3:112), and wecontend that Isocrates' general view of rhetoric would have been firmly established by the time Platowrote the Phaedrus (cf. Jebb 2:53).

5 The epistemological function of Platonic myth is well documented (Stewart 260ff; Zaslavsky 14-5),as is the epistemological function of the Myth of the Soul per se (Mueller 140-43). According to RobertStewart, myths provide Plato with ways of getting the listener "to begin thinking in much more complexways" (267). As Kelley underscores, that which is conceptual—philosophical or spiritual—is especiallydifficult to teach. Because the characteristics of myth, as a specific genre of discourse, require that itemploys physical images to describe that which is conceptual, the myth is a far better tool than literaldiscourse for Plato to use to teach philosophical ideas (69). Hence, a careful explication of Plato's Mythof the Soul is central to understanding the Phaedrus.

6 While the Myth of the Soul has been explicated according to themes of truth (Kelley 73-78), theconflicting forces comprising the soul (Kaufer 72-75), the audience's susceptibility to logical, pathetic,and ethical proofs (Golden 23), and as an allegory depicting the virtuous rhetor's soul (Weaver 61), toour knowledge the Myth of the Soul has not been previously treated, as it is here, as an allegory for theoverriding tension Plato identified between philosophy and sophistic rhetoric.

7 That Plato's view of the soul evolved over time must not be overlooked (cf. Dodds 212; Grube113; Welch 48). Particularly relevant to our discussion is the change occurring from the time when Platowrote the Gorgias, in which he damned all rhetorical practice, to the time he wrote the Phaedrus, inwhich he stipulates principles for a true art of rhetoric. At the time when Plato composed the Gorgias,he apparently conceived of a soul that was unified—comprised of a single life-giving, truth-seekingforce. Approximately 17 years later, however, when Plato wrote the Phaedrus, he had dismissed thenotion of the unified soul and held in its place what Kaufer terms a conflict model (65). Perhaps thefailure to recognize Plato's evolving conception of the soul coupled with a Victorian sensibility isresponsible for the privileging of rationality and temperance over irrationality and wantonness thatappears, for example, in Kelley (78) and Brownstein (393). However, as James Golden argues, by thetime he wrote the Phaedrus, Plato recognized that "not only is man a cognitive being concerned withrationality but also a person motivated by emotions or passions that sometimes cause irrationalbehavior" (24). We argue that it is Plato's conception of rivaling forces of the soul that, in part, makesroom for a true rhetoric.

8 See Edward Schiappa for a cogent discussion on the contemporary problems with using anddefining the slippery terms sophists and sophistic rhetoric. We are using sophistic rhetoric here andthroughout the rest of our argument in a sense consistent with how the term appears in translations of

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Plato's and Isocrates' works.9 Certainly, on another level, Socrates and Phaedrus represent a diligent pair, both of whom are

enriched by Socrates' palinode.10 For sketches of the fundamental differences between Plato's and Isocrates' educational theories,

see D. L. Clark (58), Hackforth (143-44), and James Kinneavy (73-75).11 For an extended discussion of how Plato and Isocrates each defined the term philosophy to suit what

each valued most, see Werner Jaeger (50, 89-91, 182-96), Jebb (2: 37, 49), and Kathleen Welch (119).12 One may ask whether the preference Isocrates voices for monarchical government in To Nicocles

and Nicocles or the Cyprians is genuine or merely assumed in order to write to and please the youngking. Takis Poulakos joins Jaeger in reading these horatorical texts as Isocrates' attempt "to legitimizethe constitution of tyranny by tempering its excesses" ("Narrative" 325). A survey of Isocrates' worksprovides corroborating evidence indicating that his position in these horatorical texts was more than arhetorical convenience. In his later writings, Isocrates repeatedly voiced disenchantment with democ-racy (Archidamus, Areopagiticus, On the Peace) and looked with moral indignation at the oppressivetyranny that emerged from Spartan barbarism (Panegyricus). Also, in idealizing the strengths of twodemocracies, Solon and Cleisthene, he portrays the governments in aristocratic terms better suited tomonarchical than democratic rule (Areopagiticus).

13 In his later writings, Isocrates continues to explore the potential for moral government. A few yearsafter Plato wrote the Phaedrus, Isocrates penned Evagoras in which he exhorts Nicocles to bridle his owndesires in order to serve best the needs of his subjects. (See Takis Poulakos, "Narrative" 325.) Isocratesemploys a similar principle in On the Peace to urge Athenians to evaluate the injustices of their aggressivepolitical policy that violates self-government, a principle which Isocrates refers to as an inalienable right.

14 Thompson outlines divided opinions concerning the assessment of Isocrates' intellect—opinionswhich fueled a debate that began in Greek and Roman antiquity, was sustained throughout the EuropeanRenaissance, and was very much alive in the Germany and England of his own day (170-71).

15 See Hackforth (163) who points out that Plato in the Epistle VII stipulates that the seriousphilosopher doesn't commit his most profound ideas to writing (344C). This reinforces that writingitself is not corrupt but the notion that it can contain wisdom is.

16 See Michael Cahn who highly commends Isocrates for never having written a techne (144).17 While some may argue that Plato would never have said a kind word about logographers, Plato

himself contends that any rhetor, including the poet, the political composer, and the logographer, whostrives in serious pursuit of truth and eloquence is a '"lover of wisdom,'" that is, is touched withphilosophy (278C, D).

18 It is interesting to note that Lysias, who we are contending is actually the target in the dialogue,followed a career path that was the mirror image of that followed by Isocrates. That is, Lysias abandonedhis career as a teacher of rhetoric to become a logographer. We can only wonder to what extent thesemirrored paths were on Plato's mind when he selected these figures for the Phaedrus. This is not todisparage logographers altogether, however. See Enos who calls attention to the important functionlogographers fulfilled in ancient Athenian society. Despite Isocrates' and Plato's written objections tologography, it apparently served to buttress democracy in Greece at this time (9).

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Maureen Daly Goggin is currently a PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program at Carnegie MellonUniversity. She has published on the role of history in studies of rhetoric and on disciplinary rhetoric.She has a chapter coauthored with Richard Young in Defining the New Rhetorics: Essays on Twentieth-Century Rhetoric (Sage, 1992). Currently, she is interested in disciplinary historiography and isresearching the emergence of the field of composition and rhetoric.

Elenore Long is currently a PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program at Carnegie Mellon University.She has published on community rhetoric, addressing sociopolitical and theological themes and has achapter forthcoming in Making Thinking Visible: A Collaborative Look at Collaborative Planning.Currently, she is exploring interdisciplinary issues in literacy and is researching the dynamic role ofrhetoric in community advocacy.

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