Planner’s Notebook

HOW TO STRETCH A TATAMI

Wallace f . Smith

Using accepted space standards, tatanzi per person for lapan and persons per room for the United States, a comparison i s drawn betureen the homing markets of Tokyo and of Los Angeles. Decision rilles are developed to indicate the new constrnction reqnired t o redzice overcrowding to meet house- hold space standards in the tu’o locationJ. In the process the imtitntional effects of the homing markets are analyzed.

A “tatami” is a straw mat, 90 centimeters wide, 180 centimeters long (approximately three feet by six), and four centimeters thick.l It is the standard flooring material in Japanese dwellings, even in modern concrete apartment buildings; and it is the main reason why Japanese people take off their shoes before entering a house. The mat is resilient, insulating, and smooth to the touch. Its cloth binding can be quite decorative. The mats are replaced periodically; and when they are installed, they are stitched together.

The tatami of Japan has some interesting statistical properties. It is a module of dwelling unit design. Its shape limits the variation in room dimensions, even in rooms that are floored with some other material. A three-tatami room is almost always six feet by nine (to use a convenient conversion factor). Except for half- tatami (which might be considered the more basic module), the gross area of a dwelling must be an even multiple of the module. Hence, the number of tatami in a dwelling unit is a numeraire for the amount of space; and housing data in Japan are compiled largely in terms of tatami, though this is sometimes a deceptive indicator of actual floor space.? This gives the statistics on housing space in Japan somewhat greater meaning- fulness than, say, square-meter data that is available for some European nations, for a “square meter” does not have any necessary shape. The tatami is much more use- ful as a measure of housing space than room counts in United States data, which are absurd by comparison.

The most interesting statistical property of the tatami today is that the extent and nature of the housing prob- lem in Japanese cities can be reduced, almost entirely, to counts of tatami. The shortage of sheer housing space is so severe that questions of structural quality and equipment are unimportant by comparison. To the Japanese, housing is “semai,” which translates as

l l d a r e F . Smith is Associate Pfofessoi. of BUsiiwJJ AdtiriniJtwztiotz: UniiJerJity of California, Bei.Leley.

PLANNER’S NOTEBOOK : SMITH

“narrow,” and housing lies at or near the top of problems in the minds of Japanese citizens. That makes the humble tatami highly useful as a unit of reckoning for planners and economists. It is probably as nearly homogeneous a measure of welfare as urban disciplines will ever encounter.

What follows is an exercise in the interpretation of housing data for Tokyo (the Prefecture, with a current population of just over eleven million), expressed in terms of tatami per dwelling unit and persons per household. Data are from Japan’s Housing Smwey of 1963 and are based, in this case, on a sample. The reader will surmise that the point of the exercise is philosophical rather than hortatory and is aimed at goings on in the United States, as much as it betrays a fascination with the Orient. After an examination of the space problem in Tokyo, the paper turns to similar issues in an American metropolis. The comparative application of an optimization algorithm to two very disparate situations is designed to show that institutions may be at least as important as analytical procedures in revealing our urban options.

The Shortage at Three Tatami per Person With that inscrutable aside, let us plunge into the handy set of numbers displayed in Table 1. The body of the table is taken directly from the source document. (Totals that did not add in the original have been forced very slightly because our present purpose re- quires arithmetic balancing. ) Tokyo’s 2.4 million “principal households” are arrayed by number of house- hold members and by number of tatami in the dwelling. Differences in tenure, location, price, and the like are suppressed. Lines drawn through the table divide it into three segments : combinations representing less than three tatami per person; combinations that com- pletely exceed three tatami per person; and combinations that, given the frequency classes along the top of the table, just conform to a three-tatami-perperson norm. The assumption is made that the size distribution of households with ten or more members corresponds to the distribution of dwellings with 30 or more tatami.

The three-tatami norm is arbitrary. I chose it partly because it fits the form of the data so conveniently and partly because it sometimes does appear as a benchmark

389

TABLE 1 Households in Tokyo, 1963, br Size of Household and Size of Dwellinn in Relation to Three-TatamilPerson Norm

Number of Number of tatami in dwelling Above Belorn8 Total norm Within norm persons in

household -3 3-1.9 6-8.9 9-11.9 12-14.9 IS-17.9 18-20.9 21-23.9 24-26.9 27-29.9 30-31.9 36-47.9 48-S9.9 60+

I 2.0001 166,oOO1 52,600 18.700 9.300 5.700 3,600 2,100 1,400 850 860 650 110 220 264,090 2 440 152.0001 117.0001 68.400 39.900 29.400 17.100 10.200 7.800 5.000 6.300 4.200 1.200 620 459.560 3 130 64,500 100,000I 98,400 I 62.900 54.000 31,700 18.500 14,200 9.300 10,800 7,800 2,200 1,400 475,830 4 SO 24.100 62.000103.000 81.400176.300 51.000 31,700 23.900 15,800 20,600 15,100 4.100 2,100 511.150 5 350.330 6 1,800 9,000 23.000 27,200 29.200 I 23.300 I 19,100 15,900 11,500 16,3M1 13,400 4,500 2,700 196.900 7 10 490 3.100 8.300 10,600 11.800 11.600 I 9,800 1 8.700 6,500 9,700 7.700 2.800 1.600 92.700 8 110 890 2.600 3.600 4,200 4,600 4,000 I 4.500 1 3,000 5.300 4,400 1,600 990 39,790 9 40 350 830 1.100 1,600 1,800 1,700 1 , 9 0 0 1 1.300 1 2 . 3 0 0 2,100 590 460 16,070

10 10 80 330 540 680 1.100 1.100 l.W 1.200 1 1.900 2 . W 930 760 I 12.230

30 6.400 24.900 55,300 I 52.8001 53.333 1 41.303 Z 8 , W 23.600 16.700 21.400 18.000 5,600 2.700

96,090 190.120 212,800 240,600 157.600

83,400 37.000 15,290 5 I 450

166,000 117.000

81.400 53,300 23,300 9.800 4,500 1.300 5.890

9a.400

2,000 152.440 164,630 189,150 139,430 90.200 45.900 20,030 9,320 6.340

I I

TotaL 2,660 415,450 369,920 378,860 289.340 266.180 187.100 126,500 103.200 71,150 95,460 75,650 23.630 13,550 2,418,650 . . Above . . . . 52.600 87.100 112,100 165.400 144.700 109,900 95,503 68,650 93.560 73.350 22.700 12,790 .. 1,038,350 ..

Below 2,660 249.450 200,320 193,360 95,840 47,480 19,100 6,800 3,200 1.200 . . . . 819,410 within .. 166,000117,000 98.400 81,400 53.300 23.300 9,800 4.500 1,300 1,900 2,300 930 760 . . . . 560,890 . .

Source: Japan, Rcporr of Tbc Housing Swucy ofl963, Vol. 111, Part 13, Table 9.

minimum in Japanese discussions of housing. The linearity of this norm is arbitrary and runs against Japanese planning concepts, but this is a convenient simplification and does not affect the argument.

The columns and rows added to the table summarize the numbers of households and units lying above the norm, those within it, and those lying below. By the three-tatami standard, 819,410 households, or 33.9 percent of all Tokyo households, have too little housing space. On the other hand, more than a million house- holds have an amount of space that exceeds the norm.

Suppose that a policy were adopted of assuring every household at least three tatami per member. There are at least three ways in which such a policy might be carried out, each differing substantially from the others in the physical volume of construction that would be required and each resting on its own set of political, social, and economic institutions.

First, we could set to work to supply each under- housed family with a new dwelling of “normal” size. This would mean building 819,410 units with a total of 10,272,900 tatami. (The assumption is made throughout that enlarging of existing units is unfeasible; the author is not aware of studies that might estimate the opportunity for such enlargement. ) In principle, no additional land would be required and no changes in residential density patterns need occur, for the new and

larger dwelling could be placed on the land now oc- cupied by the dwelling that is too small. (This assumes away the question of multiunit structures in which only some of the units are too small for their occupant house- holds.) The essential element in this approach is that those households with adequate dwellings are not to be involved directly or indirectly, except as taxpayers, in the task of achieving the minimum space standard.

A second approach might reallocate existing dwell- ings, taking advantage of the fact that the number of households with “excess” space is greater than the number with too little space. Such reallocation is shown by the entries in Table 2. This reduces the number of households below the norm to 221,060. (The algorithm minimizes the aggregate tatami deficit.) Below-normal conditions are restricted to households with three or fewer members and to dwellings with less than nine tatami. Having achieved this heroic rationali- zation in the use of existing housing space (and over- looking location and other factors, it will be recalled), we might suppose that the building task had been reduced to its minimum dimensions. Constructing new and larger dwellings for each of the 221,060 house- holds below the line in Table 2 would mean producing 1,511,520 tatami of new space, only about 15 percent of the number required by the first method. Taking construction costs to be a linear function of the number

TABLE 2

Number of Number of tatami in dwelling Above Below persons in Total norm Within norm household -3 3-1.9 6-8.9 9-11.9 12-14.9 15-17.9 18-10.9 21-23.9 14-26.9 27-29.9 30-31.9 36-47.9 4GS9.9 60+

Allocation and Constraction Program for Three-TatamilPerson Norm, Tokyo 1963 (Households)

I 2,6601 261,430 I 2

About . . . . 32.540 254,400 187.100 126.500 103,200 71,ljO 95,460 75.650 23,630 1,320 971 ,000 Within . . 261.430 305.540 378.860 256.750 11.780 . . _ _ 12,230 1.226.590

Bdow 2,660 154,020 64.380 . . 221,060 Build 89,640 64,380 154,020 Scrap 2.660 151.360 154,020

Source: See Table 1.

390 AIP JOURNAL NOVEMBER 1968

of tatami (not an unreasonable assumption, in fact), this reallocation of the housing stock would save about 85 percent of the resource cost of meeting the three- tatami goal.

Inasmuch as Japan is a nation that explains its housing difficulties in terms of resource scarcity but does, at the same time, have minimum housing space goals, it seems a likely place to explore the problem of housing reallocation. The immobility implied by the first method described above is very costly in capital resources, though Japan husbands its capital resources most diligently. It is very important to under- stand why some kind of reallocation of existing space does not occur spontaneously and may not be a realistic part of the housing program.

Before we look into the circumstances that seem to limit the opportunity for this kind of housing space reallocation, we may note that Table 2’s totals do not really minimize the construction task in meeting the three-tatami standard. If 64,380 units of nine tatami and 89,640 units of six tatami were added to the supply, all households could have at least the minimum space. This is 154,020 units rather than 221,060 units, the number formerly designated as necessary. The new construction is finally reduced to 1,117,260 tatami, which is 10.9 percent of the initial deficit.

The difference between this third solution of the problem and the second approach is philosophical and political. Starting with the data in Table 1, we have a choice of two algorithms for deciding how many new units must be built for each household size cate- gory. The political expedient might be to solve the problems of the smallest households first. These mainly consist of the very young or the very old, whose needs are most modest, so the cost to the public seems well offset by the social benefit.

If this decision rule is adopted, we note that there are more existing units of 3-5.9 tatami ( 4 1 5,450) than there are one-person households (264,090) . If reallo- cation is possible, no resources need be expended to provide these households with minimum space. Such an algorithm ultimately produces a need for construct- ing 502,370 units, however; and, while no household would then have space below the standard, there would also be no households above the standard. This “smallest first” decision rule would produce results unambiguously inferior to those that have already been shown to be possible.

in satisfying housing needs, either from the existing stock or from new construction, actually underlies Table 2 and the third method of meeting the three tatami standard. The arithmetic is as important as the social mechanics, for a great deal of the effort of moving households to rationalize the use of space could be wasted if the residual needs for additional construction-the num- bers and sizes of units to be built-were calculated by

PLANNER’S NOTEBOOK : SMITH

The algorithm “largest first”

an inappropriate but appealing method, such as “smallest first.”

The Organization of Tokyo’s Hozlsing Market The distribution of housing space that is reflected by Table 1 might, in fact, be more “rational” than any- thing that social innovators could do with it. The dis- parities might be accounted for by differences in loca- tion and Iocational preference plus differences in price and income-related qualities, and differences in type of structure and in tenure. What evidence, if any, is there for believing that the existing allocation of space is not already “ideal” in the laissez-faire sense?

For one thing, there is virtually no residential mortgage market in Japan4 Though single-family, owner-occupied dwellings are both the mode and the norm in Japan, the household that aspires to ownership must accumulate cash or credit on a security other than real estate by a process that involves long delays. A recent survey found that only one Tokyo home purchaser in twenty financed his purchase through a financial in~titution.~ The largest number simply used their own savings, whereas others received the cash as gifts or loans from relatives. A sizeable fraction borrowed from their corporate employers, usually after many years of service. There are many Tokyo families who need to acquire larger dwellings. They have the income to amortize the purchase price. Suitable dwellings exist, but these families are denied the opportunity to purchase a more suitable dwelling because Japan lacks the appro- priate credit institutions.

Inasmuch as the basic need is for exchanges of dwellings, many would-be buyers are also would-be sellers. Sellers are frustrated by the inability of poten- tial purchasers to finance the transaction. Lack of mortgage credit also limits the development of new housing, so the obvious competitive response to sub- stantial dissatisfaction with housing is greatly weakened.

Renter households should, in principle, be more mobile and better able to rationalize their collective use of the housing stock. In Japan, however, laws that were greatly strengthened during the Pacific War give tenants a financial interest in their dwellings that tends to keep them from moving.G It is nearly impossible for a land- lord to evict his tenants except by paying an amount of compensation that will enable the tenant to find sub- stitute housing. The amount is virtually a market- determined price. In the face of a severe housing shortage this payment in Tokyo now represents half or more of the market value of the entire property. A tenant who voluntarily secures other housing, no matter how desperately it might be needed by his overcrowded family, surrenders this enormously valuable right.

Rational allocation of resources in a market econ- omy requires effective dissemination of information. Buyers should have a means of learning what is avail- able, and sellers should know what people are willing to pay. Urban real estate markets rely very much upon

391

brokers to perform this informational function; but in Tokyo it is performed very badly. There are more than 25,000 brokerage offices in Tokyo, a large proportion of which handle both rental and sales housing. Yet, their effectiveness is open to serious question, for they have so grossly and steadily abused their clients that buyers and sellers alike are reluctant to become involved with brokers.’ Part of this is attributable to weaknesses in the infrastructure of the business; there is neither title insurance nor an escrow system, and brokers take commissions from both parties to a transaction. In part, it is also the result of the serious housing shortage, which attracts unscrupulous and poorly trained agents.

For these reasons we may conclude that market pro- cesses in Tokyo probably do not allocate housing to the most effective user. Mutually beneficial exchanges of dwellings by households, which the market should facilitate, are undoubtedly discouraged in a significant number of cases by the peculiar housing market institu- tions of Tokyo. There are some other factors that argue that a more even distribution of housing space would indeed be “rational” in a narrow business sense. The housing stock is not highly differentiated in any respect other than space. Construction methods are relatively standardized-and have been for a long time. The same is true of the architecture. Land users are so interspersed that residential “neighborhoods,” in the American sense of socioeconomic islands, are difficult or impossible to identify. Location relative to place of work could be a rationalizing factor, for the transporta- tion system of Tokyo is deficient-causing great dis- comfort and loss of time; yet there is no available information that would suggest residential patterns ap- proximate a minimization of journey-to-work distances.

Large investment programs are indeed required to relieve Tokyo’s housing space complaint, but the scale of this investment could be reduced considerably if it were coupled with certain structural reforms-broaden- ing the availability of mortgage credit, tempering some effects of tenant protection laws, and improving the per- formance of real estate brokers, most particularly. The result would be a better utilization of existing resources

10

consistent with basic household preference patterns. This is not to say that such things must be done

or even that they represent a “better” solution to the larger housing problem than one that relies primarily upon massive new construction. Structural changes might founder on the harder political and administra- tive truths. We can simply say that structural changes would diminish the burden of new investment. It is also relevant to speculate that such structural changes will occur in any case in the reasonably close future.

12,230 12.230 . . 12,230 . .

More Is Better Three tatami per person is not a large amount of space. What would happen to the dimensions of the problem if we made a more ambitious-and equally arbitrary- assumption that the standard should be six tatami? The basic data lend themselves (with some simplifying assumptions) to this larger definition. The lines run- ning through Table 3 break up the matrix as nearly as possible on a six-tatami standard (though the inter- vals used required some arbitrary assignments so that data categories would not be split). Of 2,418,650 households, 283,300 were above this standard in 1763; 188,520 were within it; and the great majority, 1,946,- 830, were below it, as would be seen if the lines from Table 3 were superimposed on Table 1.

Direct achievement of the six-tatami standard would thus require replacing 80.5 percent of the dwelling units in Tokyo. Paradoxically, a “rationalization” of the use of space, as shown in Table 3, would increase the number of households below the higher standard to 2,396,200-almost 100 percent. Whether this is really a more rational pattern of use than that which exists in the data may well be disputed. The algorithm “largest households first” does not offset the surpluses enjoyed by one family-size group against the deficit confronted by another family-size group.

Further application of the procedure previously described identifies the size distribution of the 778,760 dwellings that would have to be constructed to meet the six-tatami standard with the assumption of “opti- mal” reallocation of all space, existing and new. Thus,

TABLE 3 Allocation m d Construction Program for Six-TatamilPcrson Norm, Tokyo, 1963 (Households)

Number of Number of tatami in dwelling Above w o w persons in Total norm Within norm household -3 3-5.9 6-8.9 9-11.9 12-14.9 IS-17.9 18-20.9 21-23.9 24-26.9 27-29.9 30-35.9 36-47.9 48-19.9 60+

1 2.660 261.410 1 I 264.090 .. 264.090 .

2 3 4 S 6 7 6 9

. 154.020 305.540

64.380 378,860 32.590 256.750 254.400

11.780 187,100 126,500 24,950 78.250 71,150 ‘47,5001 I

47.960 44,740 I I

459, 560 475.830 511,150 350,330 196.900 92.700

30.910 1 8.880 I 1.320, 39.790 . . 14.750 16.070 . .

. .

459,560 475.830 511.150 350 I 330 196.900 92 I 700

8,880 30,910 1.320 14.750

Source: Scc Table 1.

392 AIP JOURNAL NOVEMBER 1968

TABLE 4 Owner Houreholds in Lor Angelcs-Long Beach SMSA, 1960, by Size of Household and Nambcr of RoomJ in Relation t o One-PcrsonlRoom Norm

Number pf Number of rooms Above Below persons in Total norm Within norm household 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 +

6+ 12 153 714 8,699 41,992 I 43,596 16,326 13.037 124.529 . .

1,838 5 236 4.726

25,867 61,231 72.959

171,857

~~

561 933

2 I 726 13,561 51 I 570

69,351

Source: U.S., Bureau of the Census, Ccnsus of Housing: 1966, “Metropolitan Housing,” HC(2>104, T.A-5.

a doubling of the space standard would more than sextuple the minimum number of units that would have to be constructed. At three tatami per person (Table 2). only 154,020 new units would be needed.

The size distribution of new construction is quite different when the larger space standard is employed. New units smaller than eighteen tatami would not be needed, and most construction would be of larger dwellings.

This raises the knottiest problem of all. If prospects of real economic growth make it likely that space standards will soon rise, would it be better to follow through on the construction requirements for the more modest standard now-say three tatami-or to embark at once on a program aligned to a more ambitious standard? Because there is so much more to this question than the skeletal condition of this paper can suggest, no answer will be attempted. One point is worth noting: the building program for the six-tatami standard would involve scrapping units equivalent to all those constructed for the three-tatami standard if the two programs were carried out sequentially, that is, when the larger standard was achieved, 1,152,780 dwellings would have been built, whereas only 998,760 would be needed to achieve that standard at once.

Meanwhile, Back in L.A. All of this is really an insidious way of making a point just a little closer to home-Los Angeles. After all,

it is up to the Tokyoites to solve the Tokyo housing problem; and they may have a very different way of looking at things. The point is that the structure of the housing market is a variable that enters into the definition of housing goals. Tokyo simply provides an extreme and, if you like, exotic illustration, but the fact is essentially universal.

Of course, housing data in the United States express unit size in terms of rooms rather than tatami. This is a substantial weakness of our data systems, if not of our housing tastes, for “room” is an extraordinarily loose concept. We are stuck with it though, and we are also stuck with a derivative measure of crowding in terms of “persons per room.”

A common, though obsolescent, standard of space in American housing is one person per room. Without intending to suggest an equivalence between this norm and either of those used in connection with Tokyo data, we can examine the implications of the previous dis- cussion for an American city. Los Angeles will do.

Tables 4 through 7 show operations on distribu- tions of housing unit size by owner-occupied house- holds and renter households in the Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA in 1960. Tables 4 and 6 show actual distributions, plus column and row totals of entries above, within, and below the one-room-per-person standard. Because of the form of the data the problem has been assumed away for units of six or more rooms.

Only 5.6 percent of the owner households fall below

TABLE 5 Allocation Propma for One-PcrsonlRoom Norm, Los Anneks-Lonn Beach SMSA Homeowners, 1960

Number of Number of rooms Above Below norm Within norm persons in Total

household 1 2 3 4 s 6 7 8 f

1 I 2,555 I 13,738 48,810 46,932 112,035 109,480 2,555 . . 2 142,860 213,422 356 I 282 356 I 282 . . . . 3 237,053 237,053 237,053 . . . .

1 I 1

4 1 26.958 227,280 254,238 254 I 238 . . . . I 1 118,583 41,302 159,885 159,885 . . . . 1

6+ 64.917 59,612 124.529 . . 124 I 529 I Total 2.555 13,738 48,810 189,792 477.433 345,863 106,219 59,612 1,244,022 Above .. 13,738 48,810 189,792 477,433 345,863 41,302 . . 1 , $16,938

Within 2.555 .. . . . . . . . . 64 I 917 59 612 Below . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .

127.084

Source: See Table 4.

PLANNER’S NOTEBOOK : SMITH 393

TABLE 6 Renter Households in Los Angcles-Long &acb SMSA, 1960, by Size of Household and Number of Rooms in Relation t o One-Person/Room Norm

Number of Number of rooms Above Below persons in Total norm Within norm household 1 2 3 4 S 6 7 8 t

1 1 54,796 I 94.866 111,156 35,953 10,262 1,955 568 313 309,869 255.073 54,796 . . 2 4.537 I 30,9911 133,037 83,544 33,390 7.259 1,761 800 295,319 259.791 30,991 4 1537 3 633 5,1101 42,377 I 61,288 29,818 8,014 1,878 809 149,927 101,807 42,377 5,743 4 178 1.932 15,652 I 46,370 I 27.368 9,794 2.551 1,041 104,886 40,754 46,370 17.762 I 88 759 6,491 21,577 I 18,257 1 7,858 2,006 853 57,889 10,717 18,257 28,915

6+ 43 552 4,248 15,281 18,581 [ 10,406 2,888 1,684 1 53,683 14,978 38.705

Total 60,275 134,210 312,961 264,013 137,676 45,286 11,652 5,500 971,573 Above . . 94,866 244,193 180,785 100,838 34,880 8,764 3,816 668,142

Below 5,479 8,353 26,391 36,858 18,581 . . . . . . 95,662 Within 54,796 30,991 42,377 46,370 18,257 10,406 2,888 1.684 207,769

Source: See Table 4.

this arbitrary line, and the vast majority are above it. More significantly, when the “largest first” algorithm is applied in Table 5 , we find that the number of households below the standard is eliminated; and the number above the standard is increased. Overcrowd- ing could be eliminated (on this definition) without any additional construction.

Tables 6 and 7 relate to renter households in the Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA, and similar comments apply. We find 9.8 percent below the arbitrary line, but a reallocation of units could reduce this to zero while increasing the number of households above the standard. Again, no additional construction is required.

We know that ( 1) the Los Angeles area has a resi- dential mortgage market that, if anything, is hyperac- tive; ( 2 ) it has a complement of housing market communication methods that compare favorably with Tokyo’s; and ( 3 ) it doesn’t have tenant protection laws -at least not the kind we find in Japan. At the same time, we are entitled to wonder if the housing market functions quite as smoothly as it might to serve the choices of ideally informed buyers and sellers of residential space. We also know that qualitative differ- entiation in the housing stock is a significant element in household decision-making. Neighborhood and indi- vidual location factors may tend to minimize apparent deviation from “equitable” allocations of space.

Could we then recommend that Los Angeles, or its federal protectors, undertake structural reforms of the

housing market in order to reduce overcrowding? Prob- ably not. With a space problem that seems much less acute than Tokyo’s, Los Angeles has fewer options for solving it. Indeed, because its particular space deficits are buried in a tangle of location, housing type, and other variables, it may be impossible to conceive of a program that would eliminate overcrowding in Los Angeles. The institutional structure is probably not so imperfect that it inhibits a significant number of mutu- ally beneficial exchanges of existing dwellings. Present overcrowding can probably be attributed to lags in the adjustment of inventory characteristics to changes in the composition of demand. Though the problem is “small,” there is little realistic hope for eliminating it.

Of more relevance to the American situation is the dynamic aspect of Tokyo’s housing space problem- whether programs should be shaped in terms of today’s norm or an expected future norm. Housing issues in the United States are largely matters of quality rather than space. Qualitative improvement can depend on the rate of housing replacement activity as well as upon the form of that replacement. Should we stimulate the construction of minimum standard dwellings as direct replacements for presently substandard dwellings, or should we encourage replacement indirectly by focus- ing construction at upper quality ranges?

This is the problem that sounds most familiar to American housing observers, yet it is only a minor transformation of the sheer space problem in Tokyo.

TABLE 7 Allocation Program for One-Ptrson/Room Norm, Lor AngclcJ-Long Bcncb SMSA RcnterJ, 1960

Number pf Number of rooms Above Below persons in Total norm Within norm household I 2 3 4 S 6 7 8+

I I 60,275 I 134,210 115,384 309,869 249,594 60.275 . . 2 I 197,577 97,742 295,319 295 ~ 319 . . . . I 3 1 149.927 149,927 149,927 . . . . I 4 1 16,3441 88.542 104,886 88,542 16,344 . . 5 I 49,134 I 8,755 57,889 8,755 49,134 . .

6+ I 36.531 11,652 5.500 I 53.683 . . 53.683 ..

Total 60,275 134,210 312,961 264,013 137,676 45,286 11,652 5,500 971,573 Above . . 134,210 312.961 247,669 88,542 8,755 . . . . 792.137

Below . . . . . . . . .. Within 60,275 . . . . 16,344 49,134 36,531 11,652 5,500 179,436

. . . . . .

Source: See Table 4. AIP JOURNAL NOVEMBER 1968 394

The choice is between direct efforts related to an iden- tifiably underhoused population and efforts aimed at structural reform in the housing market. We could make a case that structural imperfections with respect, not to the distribution of space per se, but to the bargain- ing positions of different socioeconomic groups abound in American housing markets. Perhaps few would bother to question that this is so. What this situation implies, however, is that we have options concerning the character of housing efforts. Some of these options are markedly inferior to others in terms of what is coming to be called “cost effectiveness.” It is time to approach the design of American housing programs in an analytical framework that is broad enough to involve systems of indirect solutions, for these may prove to be our best options.

Summary Quantification of the housing space problem in Tokyo requires some assumptions about the malleability of housing market institutions in that city. Structural reforms in the direction of a more fluid housing market could reduce substantially the amount of new invest- ment needed to meet minimum space standards. Our simple algorithm reduced the amount of new construc- tion needed to meet a three-tatami per person standard by a maximum of nearly ninety percent when we as- sumed that larger units could be reallocated to larger households.

Improvement of the housing space norm over time raises the question of basing today’s programs on cur- rent or future norms. The algorithm contributes a concept of social cost resulting from this changing of standards, without implying that it is a net cost.

In the United States, or in the example of Los Angeles to be more exact, overcrowding is not a domi- nant housing issue, but it may be more intractable than in Tokyo. It is unlikely to yield to efforts at structural reforms in the housing market. Structural reforms can serve other housing goals in American cities, how- ever, such as the improvement of effective demand for better housing quality. Such structural changes could prove more useful than direct assistance to families “underhoused” by American definitions.

Author’s Note: This paper is based 012 information acquired during a sabbatical year in Japan. The author gratefully acknowledges financial assistance during that stay from Resources for the Future, Inc., and from T h e Institute for International Studies, University of California.

NOTES 1 An excellent source on present-day housing problems in Japan

is Masahiko Honjo, et al., National Report of Japan, a report pre- sented to the 28th World Congress of the International Federation for Housing and Planning, Tokyo, 1966. The nature of the tatami is described on p. 26 ff. See also hh i s t ry of Construction, Housing Loan Corporation, and Japan Housing Corporation, Housing in Japan ’66 (Tokyo, l966), especially p. 13.

=Traditionally, only about one-half of the floor area of a Japanese dwelling is covered with tatami. Entrance areas, hallways, kitchens, closet spaces, and toilet and bath areas are left without mats. Consequently, as a rule of thumb, doubling the number of tatami approximates the total floor area. In reality, however, there is wide variation in this ratio. Recent studies seem to indicate that the multiplier is substantially less than two for many smaller units and often more than two for larger dwellings. See W. Miwa, “Classifying Housing Sizes,” Collected Essays of the Japanese Con- struction Association (June and September 1965; January, Febru- ary, and June 1966). (In Japanese)

3The algorithm can be expressed by the following rule: In the matrix in Figure 1, in which a generally diagonal line separates households above the space standard from those below it, make all interchanges for which X is above the line and Y is below the line, X being a smaller household than Y and Y initially occupying a smaller unit than X.

Unit sizes \ A /

I I I 1

Household sizes

FIGURE 1 Optimization Algorithm ’

4 Since World War 11, a government agency, The Housing Loan Corporation, has endeavored to prime the pump of private mortgage lending but has had very little success. This corporation’s main activity has turned out to be direct lending for purchase of newly constructed homes. The Housing Loan Corporation’s lending re- sources are quite limited, however.

5The survey was made by the Housing Loan Corporation. It showed that 53.2 percent of the buyers used only their own savings, 20.4 percent borrowed from their employers, 11.7 percent borrowed from relatives or friends, 3.7 percent received funds as gifts from datives, and 5.7 percent acquired monies from other sources.

6 See Yoshimi Seiko, “On the Protection of Tenants in Japan,” Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics, I (April 1960), 5 6 6 8 ; Yoshio Hanao, “Basic Differences in Appraisal Concepts Between Japanese and American Systems,” Fourth Pan Pacific Real Estate Appraisal Conference, (Special Ed.; Tokyo: Japanese Association of Real Estate Appraisal, 1966) pp. 28-37.

7 To illustrate: On October 23, 1966, The Japan Times carried a story about a police raid on seventy Tokyo real estate offices to gather evidence for prosecution. One of those arrested was reported to have used fourteen dummy firms to accept deposits from pur- chasers so that the stolen funds could not be traced.

PLANNER’S NOTEBOOK : SMITH 395