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Geographical Metanarratives in Russiaand the European East: ContemporaryPan-SlavismMikhail Suslov a ba Russian Institute for Cultural Research, Moscowb Uppsala UniversityPublished online: 15 May 2013.

To cite this article: Mikhail Suslov (2012) Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the EuropeanEast: Contemporary Pan-Slavism, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 53:5, 575-595

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Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2012, 53, No. 5, pp. 575–595. http://dx.doi.org/10.2747/1539-7216.53.5.575Copyright © 2012 by Bellwether Publishing, Ltd. All rights reserved.

Geographical Metanarratives in Russia and the European East: Contemporary Pan-Slavism

Mikhail Suslov1

Abstract: A specialist on Russian geopolitical metanarratives investigates the re-emergence of Pan-Slavism in the ideological landscape of contemporary Russia. Arguing that it is a heterogeneous assemblage of both mutually antagonistic and complementary narratives about the unity of Slavic peoples, the author posits that Pan-Slavism’s durability lies not in its con-ceptual coherence but rather its emotional appeal to disparate Slavic peoples in the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern and Southeastern Europe. After briefly tracing the history of Pan-Slavism from its 17th-century roots through World War I into the Soviet period, he explores the metanarrative’s capacity to take modern Russia’s geopolitical thinking in new directions, including the potential to replace Russians’ center-periphery worldview with a that of a cosmopolitan network of kindred nations affording Russia greater access to the European community. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F020, F590, Z000. 152 references. Key words: Pan-Slavism, Russia, Serbia, Belarus, Ukraine, geopolitical metanar-rative, Slavophilism, neo-Slavism, Slavia, Orthodox Church, Holy Russia, Russian World, anti-colonialism, Eurasianism.

INTRODUCTION

In September 2012, Tomislav Nikolić, who had been inaugurated as the president of Serbia four months earlier, met with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders concluded

a number of economic agreements, including a $700 million loan from Russia to support the Serbian budget, concessions for the “Russian Railways” company in the Balkans, and deci-sions on the South Stream natural gas pipeline project (Ot zastoya, 2012, p. 2). The leader of the Serbian Radical Party is known for his pro-Russian sympathies and a sweeping statement to the effect that Serbia would rather become a Russian province than accept NATO’s patron-age (Sazonova, 2012). To be sure, Nicolic is an experienced political figure who understands the difference between rhetoric and politics, but nonetheless when two presidents shook hands in Putin’s residence of Bocharov Ruchey, the specter of Pan-Slavism waxed brightly.

The periodic re-emergence of pan-Slavism in Russian public discourse can be explained by its close connection with debates on identity formation in Russia, which last flared in the late 1990s–early 2000s. From that time forward, Russia’s steady economic growth has encouraged a flexing of its muscles in international relations and a stream of “new Cold War” rhetoric culminating in Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007.2 At the same time, on the

1Senior Fellow, Russian Institute for Cultural Research, Moscow, and currently at the Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University (Box 514, 751 20 Uppsala, Sweden; [email protected]). The author thanks the Swedish Institute and the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies for financial and institutional support.

2In which the Russian leader famously inveighed against U.S. “attempts to construct a unipolar world” (e.g., see Trenin, 2007).

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domestic front Putin’s widening crackdown on the democratic opposition has removed or at least weakened Westernizing voices from the political arena, and this (combined with a growing discrepancy between the amorphous character of Russian national identity and the radicalization of Russian nationalism) has opened a larger window of opportunity for the pan-Slavic cause. Concurrently, the reinterpretation of the collapse of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century” has heightened spatial anxiety (Pain, 2003, p. 29), prompting much mental re-mapping to enable Russia to continue to occupy a central place—be it in the center of the Eurasian landmass, the center of “Orthodox civiliza-tion,” or in the center of the “Slavic world.”

Pan-Slavism has never been a monolithic concept ideologically, and its fragmentation and ambiguity in today’s Russia partially reflect (and partially augment) uncertainties in processes of identity formation more broadly. Its multi-faceted character is manifest institutionally in a large number of loosely connected organizations that support the pan-Slavic cause.3 The most representative and inclusive pan-Slavic initiative has been a series of all-Slavic congresses, which were held in Prague (1998), Moscow (2001), Minsk (2005), and Kiev (2010), hosting a great variety of pan-Slavic groups united by a shared Euro-skepticism and anti-Westernism. In addition to formal organizational activities, Pan-Slavism is also relatively visible in the arts.4 And in the realm of scholarship, the center for academic Slavic studies in Russia (slavyano-vedeniye) is the Institute for Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Institute has an important role to play in Pan-Slavism despite (or perhaps due to) its academic respect-ability (Mitrofanova 2010, p. 228). Finally the International Slavic University finds a niche somewhere in between academic slavyanovedenye and the political organizations.

In addition to the institutional base briefly summarized above, pan-Slavic discourse fre-quently is evident in the utterances of Russian politicians. Political heavyweights such as the leader of the Communist Party (CPRF) Gennadiy Zyuganov, the leader of the Liberal- Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and the former mayor of Moscow Yuriy Luzhkov never missed an opportunity to avail themselves of the pan-Slavic theme (e.g., Luzhkov 1999, p. 2). Perhaps even more enthusiastic has been Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko, who has always positioned himself as a standard-bearer of Pan- Slavism via the political project of the Union State of Russia and Belarus (Karbalevich, 2010, pp. 498–513).

Finally, a sense of Pan-Slavism appears to be firmly embedded in Russian public opinion. Sociological surveys show that Russians privilege Belarus, Ukraine, and other Slavic coun-tries in the list of nations that are or should be important for Russian foreign policy. Thus, according to the survey done by FOM (Public Opinion Foundation) in 2001, 78 percent of Russians responded that Russia should have closer relations with the Slavic countries, whereas only 7 percent disagree with this statement. The same study shows that 61 percent are sympathetic toward the Poles, motivated mostly by ethnic and racial affinities (Petrova, 2001). Studies also indicate that rather high percentages of people would like Russia to

3These include the socialist-tinted AKIRN (Association for Comprehensive Study of the Russian People) in Moscow, headed by Yevgeniy Troitskiy; the International Foundation for Slavic Literature and Culture, affiliated with radical nationalist, monarchist, and Orthodox fundamentalist movements; the All-Slavic Assembly of repre-sentatives from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus; the Slavic Military and Patriotic Union; and the International Slavic Academy, which features an Eurasianist twist of pan-Slavic thought, as well as a preoccupation with the geopolitics and strategic security of Russia.

4I.e., the regular Golden Knight film festival, organized by the director and right-wing nationalist Nikolay Burly-ayev, and the Union of Writers of Russia (not to be confused with the Union of Russian Writers), which is known for its conservative stance and hosts such popular writers as Vasiliy Belov, Leonid Borodin, Sergey Lykoshin, Valentin Rasputin, and Eduard Volodin, who maintained close relations with patriotic Serbian political and cultural figures.

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reunite with the former Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine (O’Loughlin and Talbot, 2005, pp. 34–42).

The confessional, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, territorial, and socio-political heterogeneity of the Slavic nations makes pan-Slavism an umbrella term that must embrace many different configurations of “Slavic identities.” Although at first glance this may seem to be a weakness, at the same time it provides for unprecedented flexibility of the pan-Slavic rhetoric. As a kind of “weak force” in societal interactions, pan-Slavism can nonetheless be combined with and capitalize on stronger affinities of religion, nation, and territory. As a result, we can speak of many pan-Slavist projects, some of which can be mutually antagonistic whereas others are complementary or nest within one another like matryoshkas. The importance of the pan-Slavic imagination lies in its ability to prompt a comprehensive and multidimensional shift in the self-image of Russians and their perception of Russia’s place in the world. If Eurasianism strives to preserve Russia as it is now, admitting a possibility for territorial expansion in the future, pan-Slavic imagery transcends frontiers and borders, requires a substantial reshaping of the existing states, and destabilizes the territorial, ethnic, and confessional boundaries of Russian identity.

In this paper I not only map Pan-Slavism on the ideological landscape of contemporary Russia, but also explore directions in which it may extend beyond conservative geopolitics and anti-Western resentment, and offer an innovative reconfiguration of the spatial and tem-poral identities of the Russians. By destroying the center-periphery dichotomy, collapsing the imperial spatial hierarchy (with Moscow in the center), and establishing a networked territo-rial organization instead, Pan-Slavism could potentially shape a cosmopolitan porous commu-nity of kindred nations, and better integrate Russia into the European international community.

I approach Pan-Slavism as a metanarrative that gives sense, purpose, and coherence to discourses of history and geography. However, Pan-Slavism, as any other pan-nationalist movement, is conceptually amorphous and shallow. What lends Pan-Slavism durability and attractiveness, as well as an ability to re-emerge after long periods of dormancy, is not intel-lectual cogence but emotional appeal—people do not fight and die for a customs union, but as the Russian volunteer movement in the 19th and 20th centuries demonstrates (see below), they will die for their “brother Slavs.” The paradoxical cleavage between the intellectual debility and emotional powerfulness of Pan-Slavism should not obscure the fact that models of expressing emotions are also discursive; they are structured around such metaphors as blood, soil, kinship, love, and memory (e.g., Reddy, 2001; Davidson et al., 2007; Suny, 2012). So, in this paper I will work mostly with Pan-Slavism as a metanarrative, or an “army of meta-phors” and geopolitical imaginations (Dijkink, 1996; Agnew, 1998; O’Loughlin et al., 2006).

HISTORICAl BACkGROUND

Pan-Slavism first entered the Russian public consciousness with the work of the Croatian writer Juraj Križanić (1618–1683). His tract On Politics (1666) displays a concern with the imitative and non-authentic character of the Slavic cultures of the time and seeks to free the Slavs from Western influence (Krizhanic, 2003, p. 284). As a portent of the complicated future relations between Pan-Slavism and the Russian state, Križanić, who received univer-sity training in the West and traveled to Moscow to incite the tsar to form a Slavic union, was exiled to Siberia for 15 years. Russian society, largely disinterested in the Slavs throughout the entire 18th century, began to develop pan-Slavic ideas in the first third of the 19th century under the influence of German romanticism and the liberation movement in Europe. Such organizations as the Masonic lodge “Association of the United Slavs” (1818), the Decembrist

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secret society of the same name, and the Decembrist “Southern Society” interpreted the striv-ing for integration as a liberation process that would free Slavs from ancien régimes all over Europe and bring them together in a federation resembling the United States (e.g., Luciani, 1963). In 1848, the first pan-Slavic congress in Prague represented this left-wing tendency, with anarchist Mikhail Bakunin attending as a spokesman from Russia.

The Decembrist uprising of 1825 and the suppression of the Polish rebellion of 1830 by the Tsarist army crystallized the cleavage of Pan-Slavism into pro-Russian and anti-Russian branches, confirmed the state’s suspicion of any Slavic initiative, and prompted the move of pro-Russian Pan-Slavism to the right of the political spectrum, where it became comfortable in the company of Orthodox Messianism, Russian nationalism, and imperialism. At the same time, German scholars helped inaugurate Slavic studies in Russia, which by the end of the 19th century had achieved a position of academic respectability and political importance. Many a scholar became an influential public spokesman for the “Slavic cause.” These schol-ars facilitated intra-Slavic cultural cooperation, established the Slavic Benevolent Committee in Moscow (1858) and its branch in St. Petersburg (1868), hosted the all-Slavic Congress of 1867 in Moscow, and published The Slavic Herald through the last decades of the tsarist regime (Lapteva, 2005, 2012).

However, the contribution of “classic” Slavophilism to the pan-Slavic imagination was probably the most important. Not all of Slavophiles during the 1830s–1850s were equally inter-ested in the Slavic cause, but hardly any pan-Slavists of the time could ignore Slavophilism. Regarded by many as the main and perhaps even the only philosophical school that is origi-nally Russian, Slavophiles focused on the theme of authenticity, central to all debates in Russia (e.g., Scanlan, 1994). The Slavophiles Aleksey Khomyakov and Ivan Kireyevskiy, for example, argued that the borrowing of foreign culture, even if it is of higher quality, is harm-ful for both the “native soil” and the “implant”; cut from their roots, flowers wither, but also block the natural blossoming of the host culture (Kireyevskiy, 1861, pp. 27–33; Khomyakov, 1955, p. 99). Censuring Russian cultural hybridity, Slavophiles argued that colonialism had produced fragmented, disconnected, lifeless self-consciousness, so that Russians had become “foreign to themselves” and unable to “impartially question the general principles and fun-damentals of the [philosophical] systems [of the West]” (Khomyakov, 1955, pp. 106–107).

The themes of cultural authenticity and anti-colonialism triggered a series of paradoxes for Pan-Slavism, so the subsequent history of pan-Slavic ideas up to the present represents attempts to unfold and resolve them. One paradox involves the question of how Russia with her “soul captive of the West” (Zen’kovskiy, 1999) can deliver other Slavic peoples from captivity. For the lyrical poet Fyodor Tyutchev and the Russian literary giant Fyodor Dostoyevskiy and many of their followers, the answer lies in Orthodox Messianism. The concept of autonomous civilizations (“cultural and historical types”), developed by pain-staking theoretician Nikolay Danilevskiy, likely provides a more compelling explanation by representing the Slavic world as a more or less homogenous and unique civilization, sepa-rate from the “civilization” of Western Europe (Danilevskiy, 1871; MacMaster, 1967). V. Lamanskiy later reinforced this theorization in the 1890s with his concept of the “three worlds of Eurasia”: Western Europe, the East, and a Middle world comprised of the post-Byzantium space of Russia and the territories of the Ottoman Empire in Asia and in the Balkans—united by the shared Orthodox legacy and hostility to the West (Lamanskiy, 1892, p. 41).

The idea of the Slavic “civilization” was a real godsend for pro-Russian pan-Slavists, because it redirected attention from the slippery slope of the “liberation” theme to nega-tive identity-making processes by juxtaposing the Slavs against non-Slavic Western Europe. Germany and Austria-Hungary, as the epitome of Western Europe, emerged as the universal

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“Other” in the imagination of many influential Russian figures of the time (such as Ivan Aksakov and General Mikhail Chernyayev). “Tarrying with the negative” turned Pan-Slavism in the direction of state centralization and Russian nationalism—forces purportedly capable of checking the German Drang nach Osten (MacKenzie, 1974).

Pan-Slavism’s heyday came with the Bosnian rebellion of the 1875–1876 and the “vol-unteer movement” in Russia. General Chernyayev headed a corps of Russian volunteers in the Balkans, whereas Ivan Aksakov propagated Russia’s official involvement in the conflict through the work of the Slavic Benevolent Committee at home.5 Popular enthusiasm for the Slavic cause was soon manifest in a state decision; in April 1877 Russia declared war on Tur-key. The war’s victorious outcome brought Bulgaria’s independence, even though it did not secure Russian dominance in the Balkans.

By the end of the 19th century, Pan-Slavism was powerfully challenged by the tsar-ist regime’s international policy, which on the one hand suffered a series of setbacks in the Balkans, but on the other progressed spectacularly in the Far East. This progress prompted a reinterpretation of Russia’s self-identity and place in the world as the master and/or teacher of the Eastern peoples (Schimmelpennink van der Oye, 2001). Rampant anti- Westernism, state- sponsored imperialism, and Russian Messianism were the ingredients of this Orientals (vostoch-niki) movement, which in the 1920s prepared the way for the development of Eurasianism. The Eastern turn averted some intellectuals from the Slavic cause (Syromyatnikov, 1901) and prompted others to considerably revise their views toward a less Russia-centered and multilateral all-Slavic Union. Ideologues developed a vision of a federative body of Slavic nations with a strong “Eurasian” penchant for mediating between East and West. For them, Pan-Slavism was a geopolitical projection of their Slavophile ideal of Muscovite Russia with an all-Slavic tsar at its head, patriarchalism in social life, and Orthodox Messianism as the backbone of self-identification (e.g., Vasil’yev, 1908; Kireyev, 1912).

These developments in Russia were paralleled by those among Slavic populations to the west in Europe. The path toward “neo-Slavism” began in the Czech lands in the late 1890s, and featured political liberalism and sympathies for Russia, conditioned by a pronounced anti-Germanism. Financially supported by the Czech bourgeoisie looking toward the Russian market and intellectually supported by prominent Czech and Polish political figures, neo-Slavism received a mixed reception in Russia, demarcated by a right-left political division in that country on the eve and during the revolution of 1905–1907. Liberals argued that liberal-ization of the Russian regime after the October 17 Manifesto (1905) bridged the gap between authoritarian Russia and more Westernized and democratic Western Slavs (Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles). Similarly, after the debacle in the Far East,6 Russia would renounce her conde-scending attitude toward “younger brothers,” thereby creating a more friendly environment for inter-Slavic contacts.7

5Sergey Sharapov, the future Slavophile journalist, was one of the volunteers, even though at the time he still professed “nihilism” and revolutionary populism (narodnichestvo). Together with many of the Russian Populists who only a year previously had launched a campaign of “going to the people,” he soon thereafter turned to Russian nationalism and conservative Orthodoxy (Sharapov, 1900, pp. 23–24; Hepner, 1950; Perepiska, 2005, p. 161). His personal intellectual trajectory (e.g., see Suslov, 2011) illustrates well the ideologically versatile and politically amal-gamated phenomenon that was Pan-Slavism.

6The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, in which Russia lost two of its three naval fleets and perhaps 40,000–70,000 soldiers, represented a major setback for Russian prestige internationally.

7Sharapov, observing Russia’s diminishing might in the world, in a private letter wrote, “I think that here is the end of Russia as such. We have to offer our hands to the Poles and yell at the top of our voice ‘Long live the Slavs!’ Everything is rotten in Russia… Russia has fizzled out and became corrupt as a state and as a nation. We cannot revive by our own strength. Our rebirth lies in Slavdom” (Sharapov to Paskhalov, 1906, pp. 16–17).

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However, the possibilities of the emergence of a liberal Pan-Slavism were lost at the St. Petersburg conference of Slavic leaders in 1909, at which conservatives gained the upper hand and downplayed ideas of federative autonomy and political democratization (Vyšný, 1977, pp. 125–209; D’yakov, 1993, pp. 173–184). Too closely connected with the tsarist ancien régime, Russian Pan-Slavism did not outlive the collapse of the empire in 1917. After lying dormant for the next two decades, its resurrection began only after the German army swiftly thrust into Moscow during the autumn of 1941. By Stalin’s decision, an all-Slavic committee with a socialist bent was established in Moscow, and four Slavic meetings took place during the war, culminating in the Sixth all-Slavic congress in Belgrade in 1946. Soon afterwards, however, the conflict between Stalin and Josip Broz Tito again shelved Pan-Slav-ism for almost 50 years (Kohn, 1953, pp. 225–252).

All too often instrumentalized by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union alike, pan-Slavism was nevertheless a movement of its own, whose internal logic, purposes, and manifes-tations never fully coincided with the empire-building policies of St. Petersburg and Moscow and sometimes even collided with them. The history of neo-Slavism in early 20th-century Russia demonstrates the potential for democratization of the regime through the reconfigura-tion of Russian identity in a universalistic, non-hegemonic way. Even in the form of a “more royalist than the king” right-wing opposition, pan-Slavists were often considered by tsars and party first secretaries alike as vexing intransigents with no reluctance to confront great pow-ers in order to please the “Slavic brothers.” Still, in 1877 and partially in 1914, widespread pan-Slavic enthusiasm forced the state to reluctantly support the “Slavic cause.” Much later, the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (chiefly its constituent republic of Serbia) in 1999 by NATO became the finest hour of Pan-Slavism in the post-Soviet period, when on April 12 the Yugoslavian parliament voted to join the Union of Russia and Belarus, and the Russian State Duma decided on it positively four days afterwards (Postanovleniye, 1999). Although Russia’s President Boris Yel’tsin blocked the decision, it ushered in a new period of public discussion in which the rhetoric of Slavic fraternity and unity was widely aired.

SPATIAl ANXIETY AND CONTEMPORARY PAN-SlAvISM

In contemporary Russia, geographical imagination provides a more powerful source of self-identification than does history (Clowes, 2011, p. xi). The collapse of the Soviet Union is being increasingly interpreted as the loss of empire, and by extension, as the loss of self.8 The end of the communist grand narrative as well as the proclaimed “end of history” has added to the increasing spatial anxiety in Russian society. If history still divides more than unites in today’s Russia, geography seems to offer more stable rules for language games: for contemporary Russian intellectuals, Russian history “dissolves” in geography; the history of Russia’s territories and borders is represented as the guiding thread of history as such. For example, the number of university textbooks and postgraduate dissertations on geopolitics increased from 1 and 6, respectively, during the period 1993–1996 to 37 and 53, respectively, between 2005 and 2008.9

Most of these texts are “not about power politics; [they are] power politics” (Ó Tuathail, 1999, p. 108), because they have been written from the viewpoint of “classic” geopolitics, uncritically structuring reality according to certain “fundamental” principles or “laws,” such

8As if proving Geoffrey Hosking’s remark that unlike Western powers, Russia did not have an empire, it was an empire (Hosking, 1995, p. 27).

9Author’s calculations from the online catalogues of the Russian State Library (http://aleph.rsl.ru/F/?func=file&file_name=find-a and http://diss.rsl.ru/?lang=ru) as of October 1, 2012.

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as the clash of civilizations, the “eternal” conflict of land-based and maritime powers, the piv-otal position of the Eurasian landmass, and so on (Trenin, 2002, p. 4). University textbooks on geopolitics follow the principle of structuring the world into autonomous civilizations, each characterized by a peculiar “civilizational code” and “mentality” (Kubyshkin and Sergunin, 2010). These primordialist concepts and quasi-academic jargon (e.g., “geo-strategy,” effec-tive “geo-space”) have prompted the authors of these manuals to sketch a picture of the age-old striving of the West to disunite the Slavs, set them one against another, and master their “geo-space,” which is the pivot of the world landmass (Nartov, 1999; Gadzhiyev, 2000; Mukhayev, 2000, p. 590; Tikhonravov, 2000, pp. 230–255; Dergachev, 2004). Pan-Slavism is thus interpreted as a geopolitical “constant” in a formula of perpetual confrontation between the Whale (the maritime Atlantic civilization) and the Elephant (the continental Eurasian civilization); according to this “constant,” the Slavic question boils down to Russia’s eternal drive to control the Balkans, whereas the West does its utmost to prevent Russia from holding these territories (Petrov, 2003, 2009, p. 63; Narochnitskaya, 2004, p. 203).

In geopolitical debates, pan-Slavic discourses reshuffle the mental landscape of Europe and rescue the image of Russia’s centrality in the world from the emergent geographical sen-sibility of it being “on the edge,” in a twilight zone between the great civilizations of West and East. The imagery of a Slavic union pushes Russia back to the pivot of world history and geography. No matter how Russia’s centrality in the previous centuries is exaggerated in these discourses, today’s sympathizers of Pan-Slavism display heightened apprehension that “Russia is slowly moving into the grey zone of civilization” (Ivashov, 2000, p. 279) and is “becoming unimportant for the general historical progress of humankind” (Mialo 2003, p. 9; italics in the original). Likewise, Russia’s Messianic role in a future globalized world is conditioned upon its ability to rely upon the Slavic allies (Ivashov, 2005, p. 234; 2010, pp. 9–13).

Pan-Slavic imaginary geography privileges authenticity and differences, so it focuses on frontiers, peripheries, and borders. Trying to imagine Russia in the center, pan-Slavists never-theless put the center of gravity in Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, or even in the land of the Lusatian Sorbs in Saxony (Rodchenkova, 2008, pp. 215–217). By contrast, Moscow or the core lands of Russia represent the stagnant “rear,” and opposed to the “frontline” countries of the Slavic world. Historically, Serbia has played a key role in the Russian geopolitical imagination, being both culturally close and territorially distant, both the younger brother seeking protec-tion and assistance and a Slavic elder voicing patriarchal values such as valiant patriotism, religiosity, and traditionalism in family life.10

In geopolitical discourses, espoused among others by popular film director and right-wing politician Nikita Mikhalkov, Serbia, located in the center of the Balkans, is the key to Europe (Vukelich, 2006). With an air of impartiality, Slavic studies scholars in Russia cor-roborate this opinion, arguing that the Balkan crisis was the catalyst for many worldwide pro-cesses (e.g., Volkov, 2006, p. 39). The Balkan wars of the 1990s, in which the West sided with the opponents of Belgrade, reinforced rampant anti-Westernism in pan-Slavic circles as well as feelings of insecurity and fear of a Western invasion of Russia. In March 1999, a group of patriotic organizations composed an address to the U.S. Congress, which stated that “NATO’s military aggression in Serbia is being considered as a military challenge to Russia … We are

10This representation of Serbia is conspicuously persistent in today’s Russia. Writer and State Duma deputy Ana-toliy Greshnevikov professed that Serbia is spiritually much higher than any Western country and even higher than Russia, because “they have not had seventy years of Godless regime, they did not cut their roots and kept much of what we have lost … faith, national traditions, historical memory, continuity of generations. [They] never put down their memorials, nor re-wrote history, nor betrayed their forefathers” (Greshnevikov, 2005, pp. 354–355).

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going to help our brother Serbs by all available means” (Osipov, 2012, p. 425). Thus Serbia was understood as the last bulwark, the defensive line of the Slavic world, resisting the pres-sure of the West (Zhirinovskiy, 2002, p. 5; Dzhuretic, 2003, p. 555; Greshnevikov, 2006, p. 35). Right-wing politician Vladimir Zhirinovskiy voiced these concerns in the State Duma, when he called Serbia “our Brest Fortress,” evoking a powerful image of unprecedented resil-ience of the fortress defenders, who withstood the invading forces of the Nazi Wehrmacht from June 22 to 29, 1941 (Stenogramma, 1999).

Indeed memory and mythology of the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) is an important source of pan-Slavic enthusiasm. Another source is the resurgent Orthodox religiosity that inspires a Messianic reinterpretation of the Balkan conflict of the 1990s as leading Serbia to Golgotha prior to its crucifixion by NATO bombers in 1999 (Ryzhkov and Teterkin 2003, p. 6; Greshnevikov, 2005; Burlyayev, 2011, p. 67). The incontestable military preponderance of NATO forces vis-à-vis Serbia and its stubborn endurance echoes Polish romantic Messianism of the 1830s, according to which Poland was viewed as a Christ among the peoples, crucified by partitions (Walicki, 1982). Likewise, dismemberment of post-Soviet Yugoslavia redeems the whole world from the spells of Western “soft-power” policies. For many a conservative Slavic intellectual, the battle for Serbia was a battle for independence from the West and the entire “army” of accompanying concepts such as globalization or the “New World Order,” a euphemistism for the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy (Skobelev, 2003, p. 244; Nazarov, 2005, p. 913; Kalajić, 2006, p. 47, 111; Platonov, 2012, pp. 884–886;). Soviet and Christian Messianic themes often are used interchangeably when glorifying Serbia.11

Serbian “martyrdom” and “crucifixion” are powerfully juxtaposed with Russia’s irreso-lute policy in the Balkans, represented as a “betrayal” of Serbian brothers (e.g., Luk’yanovich, 2011, p. 242). The theme of Russia’s guilt before the Serbs, Belarusians, and even Trans- Carpathian Ruthenians (Mialo, 2003, p. 59) reinforces the impression that Russia is surren-dering her rights for spatial and historical centrality. Due to Aleksandr Lukashenko’s initiative in Slavic integration (e.g., Lukashenko, 1997, p. 5; Karbalevich, 2010, pp. 498–513), coupled with relative socio-economic stability, Minsk has an image of a pan-Slavic capital, which can teach Moscow a lesson (Zyuganov, 2006, p. 46; Kirillov, 2008, pp. 10–11). The antagonism of Belarus with the Western democracies, although less conspicuous than in Serbia’s case, has evoked similar Messianic comments.12

Ukraine’s desire to preserve its independence and to integrate with the European com-munity has caused much chagrin among Russian pan-Slavists. Yet in recent years Ukraine has made a spectacular reappearance in mental maps of a large segment of the Russian popula-tion associated with the Russian Orthodox Church. Enthroned on February 1, 2009, Patriarch Kirill (Gundyayev) has earned a reputation as a significant political leader on the post-Soviet space. He formulated the geopolitically loaded imagery of “Holy Russia,” with its center dis-persed in the Orthodox shrines of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, and partially Kazakh-stan. Ukraine, however, occupies the dominant position in his imagination. Nikolas Gvosdev, quoting the 19th-century historian A. N. Mouravieff, noted that the vast and often disunited territory of ancient Russia was kept together as one whole “chiefly by their [metropolitans’] travels and visitations” (Gvosdev, 2000, p. 220). A similar belief is evident in Kirill’s thinking:

11For example, Borislav Milošević, brother of the Serbian dictator, referred to Serbia as “the land of heroes and martyrs” in a speech to a Russian audience (Milošević, 2012).

12E.g., Zhirinovskiy (2007) has argued that Belarus “is sacrificing itself [in the name of] Slavic geopolitical interests.”

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his pastoral visits and pilgrimages re-weave the fabric of “Holy Russia” by “re-membering” its sacrosanct geographical contours.13

Although situated on the Russian border (the very name Ukraine is reminiscent of the Russian phrase u kraya, i.e., “on the edge”), Ukraine is nonetheless the center of “Holy Rus-sia,” its point of growth, and in Kirill’s view where its future is being shaped (Kirill, 2009, p. 214). This mapping of the contours of “Holy Russia” defines a space where “centers” are located on the periphery—Kiev, Crimea, Sviatohirsk, and Pochaev Lavra, as well as Novgorod, Karelia, Kolyma, and other “holy places” are on the southern, western, north-western, and eastern margins of the immense Russian hinterland, with only “holy” Moscow and Valaam in the middle. This kind of spatial structuring marks a shift from the Soviet-style hierarchical imperial space to a “post-modern” network of places, in which borderlands, “in-between” zones, and peripheries are privileged. The irony of this particular pan-Slavic geopolitical imagination lies in the fact that locating Russia in the center of the Slavic civili-zation makes her an “affirmative action empire” (Martin 2001), negligent of its own national core. Such a geographical disposition can have a cumulative anti-colonial, liberation effect, which in principle might lead us to imagine an alternative socio-political reality (Bhabha, 1995, p. 227; Chatterjee, 2010, p. 33).

OvERCOMING THE EAST-WEST DIvIDE

The hallmark of pan-Slavic discourses is a plea for cultural autonomy and originality (samobytnost’) of the Slavic peoples vis-à-vis the pressures of globalization.14 The emotional underpinning of this plea is the need to restore feelings of honor and dignity, badly injured by the subalternity of the Slavs in the Westernized world (e.g., Panarin 2001, p. 177). This anti-colonial sensibility capitalizes on Slavophilism, which again is coming into intellectual vogue in Russia (Narochnitskaya, 2005, p. 10).

On the other hand, Marxist anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist rhetoric from the Soviet period also strongly influences Pan-Slavism, and is often coupled with criticism of deindus-trialization and the semi-colonial status of the post-Soviet space in writings and speeches of pan-Slavic intellectuals (e.g., see Tulayev, 2001; Troitskiy, 2002, pp. 16–17; 2010, pp. 159; Kirvel’, 2005). For many of these intellectuals, Slavic unity is not a project for the distant future, but rather a memory of the past, the former block of socialist countries representing

13Kirill’s first pastoral visit to Ukraine occurred on July 27–August 5, 2009, when he made a series of key geo-political statements marking the anniversary of the baptism of St Vladimir. He began his visit in Kiev, which he called the southern capital of Holy Russia, “our Jerusalem and Constantinople,” the place where Russia was baptized (Kirill, 2009, p. 67; 2010b, pp. 109, 207, 343). On July 30, the Patriarch traveled to Sviatohirsk Lavra in eastern Ukraine’s Donetsk region. There he compared the history of this monastery with that of Russia in general—closed in 1787 by the decision of Catherine II and then again in 1918, Sviatohirst monastery was restored in 1992 as a “spiri-tual fortress” of “Holy Russia.” On the next day, in Gorlovka in the central Donbas, the backbone of the Ukrainian heavy industry, Kirill referred to this region as “the holy land of Donbas” (Kirill, 2009, p. 43; 2010b, p. 117). On August 1, already in Simferopol, the patriarch spoke of Crimea as “the ancient land of Tavria,” from whence St. Cyril started to teach the Orthodox faith in Russian lands and where St. Vladimir was baptized (Kirill 2010b, pp. 44–45). Kirill flew the next day to Koretsky monastery in the Volyn region in western Ukraine, before travelling to nearby Rovno. Kirill completed his journey at the Pochaev Lavra monastery, north of Rovno, which he assessed as “one of the greatest spiritual centers of Russian Orthodoxy” and “the great shrine of Holy Russia,” mystically sanctified by the prayers of many generations of monks (Kirill, 2009, p. 167; 2010b, p. 147).

14Globalization and other threats perceived as emanating from the West have also provided a context for the re-emergence of similar metanarratives that posit essential differences between the West and peoples of the former Russian empire (Eurasianism; see Laruelle, 2012, this issue) as well as between the West and the Hungarian and related eastern peoples with Turkic affinities (Neo-Turanism; see Akcali and Korkut, 2012, this issue).

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the long-awaited and now lost Slavic Union.15 According to this interpretation, Stalin is likely to emerge in the intellectual landscape as a Messianic demiurge of this union. Gennadiy Zyuganov, for example, has argued that Stalin managed to combine two traditionally Russian geopolitical projects: that of a strong imperial autarchic power, and that of Slavic reunifica-tion (Zyuganov, 1998, p. 124; 2004; 2007, pp. 177–178).16

Likewise World War II is being reinterpreted as a struggle between the Slavic world and the “Teutons,” the “armored fist” of Western civilization writ large (Tejkowski, 1998, p. 254; Mialo, 2004, pp. 219–220; Troitskiy 2009, p. 208). Similar to Germanophobic Pan-Slavism and neo-Slavism at the turn of the 20th century, today’s adherents of the Slavic cause fear the renewal of the Drang nach Osten and voice their concern that having lost their oversea colonies, Western powers are now trying to colonize their Slavic neighbors (Tejkowski, 1998, pp. 249–250; Troitskiy, 1999, p. 332; Zyuganov, 2011). In pan-Slavic discourses, NATO, the European Union, the United States, and other Western organizations are likely to be compared with fascism in order to strengthen the parallel between the current geopolitical context and World War II (Milošević, 2011) and to highlight the West’s aggressiveness.17

Although blind anti-Westernism seems to lie at the center of pan-Slavic discourses (e.g., Parshev 2005), its spatial imagery displays internal complexity and irony. Mechanisms of negative identity formation (Gudkov, 2004) work with much friction because juxtaposing the Slavic world with “the West” is not always tenable for the simple reason that Slavic coun-tries constitute a significant part of Europe. Thus, the pan-Slavic imagination destabilizes the “Self-Other” dichotomy by reinterpreting at least some parts of the “Other” as “Self.” Intel-lectuals close to the Kremlin in the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry embrace the idea of Slavic solidarity and seek to instrumentalize it on a par with other “soft-power” projects such as the “Russian World” and the Church-sponsored “Holy Russia,” both of which capitalize on the idea of a deterritorialized and decentralized network-like “affective community” of people loyal to Moscow.

Professor of the Diplomatic Academy Aleksandr Zadokhin has argued that political Pan-Slavism had lost resonance, but cultural Pan-Slavism remains important for both Russian self-identification and foreign policy, because through Russophile elites in the Slavic coun-tries of the European Union, Russia’s presence and weighty utterances on European issues are secured. He has argued that in the long run, “Slavic values should become part of European values” (Zadokhin, 2000). Elsewhere, he observed that Western European culture is forcing the Slavic culture of Eastern Europe out (Zadokhin, 2004); today this process is not that dra-matic because of the high economic expectations of the citizens of these countries, but in the future feelings of disappointment and resentment are likely to mount. Russia should seize this opportunity and offer full support for their cultural authenticity, in the process gaining politi-cal leverage in the dialogue with the West.18

15Other heirs of communist parties in the post-Soviet space, including the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, seem to embrace elements of Pan-Slavism as well (Zharakovskiy, 1999; Bobrakov-Timoshkin, 2011).

16On this point, both Troitskiy (2009, p. 190, 197) and Panarin (2006, p. 136) reverentially quote Stalin: “if the Slavs remain united and develop solidarity, nobody could even raise a finger [without the consent of the Slavs] in the future.”

17Even in respected academic circles, Slavo-phobia is believed to be a part of the Western identity, defined by its “craving for dominance in Eastern Europe, [by] insurmountable striving to baptize the baptized, to enlighten the enlightened, to teach the learned” (Nikiforov, 2000, p. 472; cf. Vyltsan, 2003).

18Zadokhin emphasizes that outright confrontation with the West is unwelcome, but argues that Russia and her Slavic allies should be accepted as an equal and respected part of Western civilization (Zadokhin 2004; see also Chernyy, 2004; Ol’khova, 2005, p. 167; and Petrova, 2008).

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The “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir) project entered Russian political discourse in the late 1990s, formulated by the influential “political technologist” Pyotr Shchedrovitskiy together with Efim Ostrovskiy (Baranova, 2009; Chepurin, 2009; de Tinguy, 2010). In 1999, Federal Law FZ 99-FЗ was adopted, which defined the state policy toward ethnic Russian compatriots living abroad. This law provides the legislative basis for the state’s support of the Russian diaspora in economic, cultural, academic, and other spheres, including the possibility to exert pressure on those countries considered to be discriminating against their Russian communi-ties (article 14.4). In 2007 the foundation Russkiy Mir was inaugurated by President Putin, with the ministries of Foreign Affairs as well as Education and Science as co-founders. It organizes yearly conventions, distributes grants, finances Russian communities abroad, main-tains the “Professorship of the Russian World” program, a student-exchange program, and a number of special events. The Russian World project also seeks to preserve and disseminate the Russian language, in cooperation with the External Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchate (e.g., Tsygankov, 2003; Mitrofanova, 2004; Sidorov, 2006).

With the creation of the Federal Agency Rossotrudnichestvo (“Russian collaboration”) by decree of then-President Medvedev in 2011, the entire system of coordinating and con-solidating the Russian diaspora took final shape, with a federal body at the top, supplemented by offices at the ministry level (Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education and Science, and Culture), together with the global state-sponsored foundations (Russkiy Mir, Yedinstvo vo Imya Rossii), local Russian centers (e.g., Russkiy Dom in Moscow), hundreds of “Russian centers” abroad, and thousands of Orthodox parishes outside of Russia. So the infrastruc-ture for projecting Russia’s influence abroad has been created and the network-like horizon-tal dimension of the Russian diaspora has acquired a vertical structure topped with bodies directly controlled by President Putin. The Russian political elite is now trying to align the Russian World project with imperial and isolationist “clash-of-civilizations” discourses, while downplaying its potential to reconfigure the geopolitical imagination into a non-hegemonic network-like imaginary space. However, the project has a “double edge”; it could provide leverage for the relatively rapid democratization of the regime, as it destabilizes the symbolic connection of “Russianness” with the territory, reconfiguring the metaphors of soil and land into metaphors of tradition and historical memory.

The same “danger” is embedded within another ideologically vibrant and state-sponsored pan-Slavic project, associated with the Russian Orthodox Church’s initiative to reanimate the concept of “Holy Russia.” The very choice of the “Holy Russian” imagery is signifi-cant because of its historically entrenched, anti-statist overtones. The first time the notion of “Holy Russia” is reported to appear, is in Prince Andrey Kurbskiy’s19 correspondence with the tsar Ivan the Terrible, when it acquired distinctive dissident connotations as an “opposite to the myth of the ruler,” and was further elaborated by the Slavophiles as an ideal to be followed (Cherniavsky, 1961, pp. 159–228; Duncan 2000, pp. 14–15). Patriarch Kirill has re-interpreted this metaphor somewhat, by concealing its anti-statist meaning. In his vision (elaborated above), “Holy Russia” has its distinctive territory and borders, encompassing Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and (on many occasions) Moldova and less often—Kazakhstan (Kirill, 2010b, p. 284, 308). Although the “Holy Russia” concept justifies a reintegration of the East Slavic states, Church leaders have attempted to distance themselves from the ethnic distinctions (Kirill, 2010a, p. 75; Kirill, 2011, p. 29). What holds “Holy Russia” together is a shared “cultural matrix” or the same “basic culture,” to use Kirill’s terminology.

19One of the conquerors of the khanate of Kazan’.

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“Basic culture” is the cultural fundament of a nation, from which various subcultures evolve over history, and on which they come to terms with one another. So, restoring “basic culture” is a mechanism for smoothing over conflicts among peoples belonging to differ-ent “civilizations.” Kirill and the head of the External Relations Department of the Moscow Patriarchy, Metropolitan Ilarion (Alfeyev), often highlight the fact that the Orthodox religion, the faith of the European continent for the first thousand years A.D., constitutes an impor-tant if not the bearing pillar of today’s Western civilization. Contrary to Huntington’s (1996) infamous geopolitical analysis, this means that the Orthodox countries are inseparable from the West; even more than this, the Orthodox countries and Russia are the vanguard of the world of Orthodoxy, and are thus responsible for what is occurring in the West (Ilarion, 2011, pp. 55, 82).

The concept of “basic culture” thus explains in which sense the Russian-Western concor-dat is thinkable: as the “inter-traditional.” As already noted above, neo-Slavism and related versions of liberal Pan-Slavism explored possibilities for enhancing Russia’s connections with the West, while retaining her cultural authenticity. However, when appropriated by the state, Pan-Slavism does not help to overcome the Slavophile–Westernizer cleavage; it rather evokes imagery of the conservative Holy Alliance of Russia, Austria, and Prussia of 1815 as a one-way channel of projecting Russia’s influence on the West.

vARIETIES OF PAN-SlAvISM

The amorphous character of pan-Slavic identity relativizes the idea of the autonomy of the “Slavic civilization,” which enters into multifaceted relations of branching and interpen-etration, so that the idea of a “Slavic world” nests within a number of broader narratives. A “hyphenated Slav” may encapsulate the identities of a Russian, an Orthodox believer, a European, a Eurasian dweller, and even a “white, Aryan, Nordic” man or woman.20

Eurasianism, a success story among the Russian geopolitical metanarratiaves, exerts great influence on the pan-Slavic imagination, with some commentators predicting the erosion of Pan-Slavism and its dissolution within Eurasianism (Mitrofanova, 2004, p. 131). However exaggerated this may seem (Romanenko, 2002, p. 527), some influential ideologists such as Boris Iskakov, President of the International Slavic Academy, and Kim Smirnov, rector of the International Slavic University, profess “Slavo-Eurasian union” as the most desirable integrationist project (Smirnov and Katayeva, 2000, p. 6; Iskakov, 2003; Troitskiy, 2011, p. 87).21 Nationalist politicians such as Sergey Baburin, known for his Slavophile initiatives and demonstrative excursions to the Republic of Serbian Krajina in the early 1990s, have by the early 2000s adopted Eurasianism as a more promising geopolitical project (Baburin, 2012, pp. 97, 483; see also Bondarenko, 2011, p. 75). And Aleksandr Dugin, the guru of today’s Russian Eurasianism, has acknowledged Pan-Slavism as a progenitor and a close relative to his geopolitical doctrine (Dugin, 2001; 2012, p. 74).

The focus on authenticity heightens attention to national (state) sovereignty. As Troitskiy has argued, reinforcement of national sovereignties should help repel the forces of global-ization (Troitskiy, 2002, pp. 16–17, 52, 64; 2010, p. 159). Thus a Slavic union paradoxi-cally should help Slavic nations preserve their sovereignty and cultural autonomy in today’s

20In the last case, Pan-Slavism is assembled with an idea of Slavic racial superiority and mythologies of a new paganism (Shnirel’man, 2012).

21In the popular imagination, the idea of Slavo-Eurasia has found its expression in a series of fantastic novels in the genre of alternative history, written by V. Rybakov and I. Alimov under a penname “Kholm van Zaichik” (e.g., Kholm van Zaichik, 2000).

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Europe (Volkov, 1998, pp. 9–10). In Messianic versions of Pan-Slavism, its proponents claim to rescue national autonomy for peoples all over the world and to assist them in the struggle against globalization and Americanization (Tejkowski, 1998, p. 247). However, at the same time pan-Slavists claim that Slavic nations should cede their national sovereignty to a broader pan-Slavic entity, “Slavia.”

Although today the concept of “Slavia” has shrunk to the “Eastern Slavs” only— Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians22—the assumption that the three peoples form a sin-gle nation is common in the pan-Slavic discourses (e.g. Troitskiy, 1998, pp. 214–223) that underlie both the “Russian World” and “Holy Russia” projects. This vision of “Slavia” can hardly be interpreted as an extension of Great Russian nationalism for the simple reason that periods of intensification of nationalism in Russia do not coincide with periods of Slavic enthusiasm. However, this symbolic reduction of cultural distance between Russia and other Slavic countries does not destroy the colonial situation as such; for example, refusal to rec-ognize Ukrainians as a separate nation, different from Russians, reinforces colonial neglect of authenticity and autonomy of national cultures (Ryabchuk, 2011). Some apprehension concerning this paradox can be found in the works of Mikhail Chvanov, a Slavophile writer who on many occasions expressed his doubts that political unification should be a necessary extension for fraternal ties: “Maybe we could better feel our brotherhood [with the Slavs], if we are separated” (Chvanov, 2003, p. 131).

Furthermore, Russian nationalists usually censure the “Slavia” imagery as well. Yegor Kholmogorov reverentially quoted pre-revolutionary conservative thinker Konstantin Leont’yev, who prophesied: “The establishment of a single Slavic state would usher into the world the end of Russia” (Leont’yev, 1996, p. 39; Kholmogorov, 2005, p. 298). To further distance Russia from the Slavs, Kholmogorov argues that, if Slavic by language, Russians belong to “Nordic civilization” by their culture, race, and “mentality” (Kholmogorov, 2006).23 The most intransigent anti-Slavic nationalists have compared the non-Russian Slavs with parasites who gain advantages from Russia without giving anything in return (e.g., Bushkov, 2010; see also Senderov, 2008). Similarly, liberal and pro-Western intellectuals, even if they appreciate Slavic cultural “reciprocity,” have warned against the temptation of political rein-tegration with the Slavic countries as unpractical and even harmful for the development of democracy in Russia (e.g., Makarenko, 2000, pp. 216–218; Chernomyrdin, 2003).

Orthodox conservatives are less skeptical about Pan-Slavism. Some developed the idea that Pan-Slavism is a temptation to which Russia succumbed as long ago as the 17th century, when the Raskol (the only major schism in the history of the Orthodox Church in Russia) took place.24 The finale of Russia’s sacrificial pan-Slavic policy came during the First World War, when Russia stood up for fraternal Serbia. Although suicidal for Russia, Pan-Slavism displays Russia’s readiness to “lay down [her] life for [her] friends” (John 15:13), which accords with Dostoyevskiy’s interpretation of Pan-Slavism as Russia’s service to humankind, and a mani-festation of her messianic universality (Yustin, 1998, p. 239).

22An exception is the exotic claim by Božidar Mitrović, Serbian lawyer and public figure living in Moscow, that Russians and Serbians are one and the same nation (http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=87).

23This line of thinking has some similarities with the Arctism metanarrative outlined by Laruelle (2012, in this issue).

24Film director and Orthodox monarchist Boris Leznev has argued that roots of Raskol lie in Russia’s attempt to draw herself closer to the Balkan co-believers at the expense of her own national uniqueness, with the dramatic split of the population into Nikonians and Old Believers (starovery) being the cost of this Pan-Slavism (e.g., see Riasanovsky, 1984, pp. 197–201).

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Still, the Slavic cause arouses suspicion among Orthodox intellectuals because of its emphasis on ethnicity at the expense of religiosity (Snychev, 2009, p. 350). The religious alternative is the image of “Slavia Orthodoxa,” the territory delineated by the superimposi-tion of Slavic ethnicity upon Orthodox religiosity (e.g., Ilarion, 2011, pp. 314–315; Krutov, 2011). In Church-related discourses, “Slavia Orthodoxa,” rooted in the Byzantine civilization and maintained through the common Church Slavonic language, represents part of Western Christian civilization. Such a vision is fraught with intransigence with regard to the non-Orthodox Slavs, so that if Serbia is represented as an outpost of “our” civilization in the West, then Poland is likely to emerge on mental maps as a mirror image of Serbia—an outpost of the West nested in the Slavic world (Yakovenko, 2007; Bondarenko, 2011, p. 74).

Thus the Orthodox component of Pan-Slavism shifts it dramatically to the right of the ideological spectrum (e.g., Osipov, 2012, p. 513) and creates tendencies toward Islamophobia. In the popular anti-utopian work The Mosque of Notre Dame de Paris (Chudinova, 2005), the West unwisely uses Muslims as its cat’s paw in order to destroy the Slavs, but then suddenly is confronted with Muslims’ dominance on the continent. Ksenya Mialo draws on the imag-ery in the Song of Rolland, with its representation of Muslims as noble knights and Slavs as beast-like creatures, to argue that if historically Islam is the part of the West, the real “Other” is the world of the Slavs (Mialo, 2003, pp. 69–70). Metropolitan Ilarion’s position is not that intransigent and anti-Western, but essentially reintroduces the moth-eaten metaphor of the Orthodox Slavs shielding Western civilization from barbarous Asians (Ilarion, 2010, p. 115).25

Orthodox Pan-Slavism is actively contested by socialist, nationalist, and ethnic pan- Slavists. Such influential leaders of Pan-Slavism as Yevgeniy Troitskiy and Nikola Kikeshev in Russia, Cheslav Kirvel in Belarus, and Boleslav Tejkowski in Poland argue that confes-sional differences in the Slavic world make religion-based unity untenable. Troitskiy refers to Western Europe as an example of a region in which political and cultural unity are possible despite religious diversity (Troitskiy, 2002, pp. 110–111; see also Volkov, 1998, p. 11 and Zakharov, 1999).

Thus, it is clear that Pan-Slavism is but one of several integrationist scenarios that are being staged on the present post-socialist space of Eurasia. It competes with Eurasianism, the European integration project, “Orthodox civilization” imagery, and a host of other metanarra-tives. As I have attempted to demonstrate throughout the paper, the strength of Pan-Slavism lies in its theoretical weakness, which allows it to be matched with a number of otherwise mutually exclusive projects.

CONClUDING COMMENT

Contrary to the Pan-Slavism of the pre-revolutionary period, which according to Hannah Arendt (1968) was powered by populist appeals rather than by business interests, today’s Pan-Slavism has a significant lobby among Russian elites as both a commercial project (opening outlets for Russian capital) and a political soft-power project that seeks to rebrand Russia’s image in Europe. However, Pan-Slavism’s real significance is being decided not at the level of Moscow’s international policies but at the more fundamental level of identity formation.

Due to the absence of any persuasive unifying factor among Europe’s Slavic peoples other than a common socialist past, Pan-Slavism remains a very elusive metanarrative, which proliferates and disseminates diverse ideologies ranging from socialism to church-related

25He also embraces anti-Muslim rhetoric in discussions of the Kosovo problem, advocating the staffing of aban-doned Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo by monks recruited from the Russian Orthodox Church (Ilarion, 2011).

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fundamentalism, nationalism, and racism. Likewise, it can be appropriated by liberal dis-courses and trigger a series of reinterpretations of the “negative” identity of contemporary Russians (i.e., identify formation in terms of “what we are not”). A liberal mapping of the Slavic world can shorten the cultural distance between Russia and the West, deterritorialize “Russianness” and lessen spatial anxiety, and decentralize spatial imagination. In this way, pan-Slavic imagery may prove useful in overcoming the post-colonial situation that presently exists in post-socialist space.

However, the internal logic of Pan-Slavism is paradoxical because it uncomfortably jux-taposes the ideological structures of anti-colonial “Eastern” nationalism with an imagination of a heterogeneous imperial space (be that Russiy Mir or “Holy Russia”). On the one hand, its claim for Slavic cultural authenticity reinforces the difference with Western Europe rather than collapses it, while on the other, its attempt to represent the Slavic world as a homogenous entity reproduces colonial tensions between Russia and her Slavic “brothers.”

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