Transcript

CRSSAnnualSecurityReport

2013 - 2018

Special Edition

Rule of Law - Security - Governance

CRSSAnnualSecurityReport

2013 - 2018

Special Edition

Author: Muhammad NafeesEditor: Zeeshan Salahuddin

Acronyms

Executive Summary

2018 - Violence in Pakistan

2013-2018 – Violence in Pakistan

Victims of Terror Attacks

Districts/agencies with highest fatalities

Affiliation of the victims of terror attacks 2013-18

Political party member fatalities

Religious party member fatalities

Religious person fatalities

Foreigner fatalities

Media personnel fatalities

Polio team fatalities

Security official fatalities

Claimants of Terror Attacks

Fatalities claimed by militant groups

Fatalities claimed by insurgent groups

Counterterror Operations

Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from security operations

Types of security operations

Outlaw Fatalities

Militant fatalities

Foreign militant fatalities

Insurgent fatalities

Criminal fatalities

Terror Attacks and Counterterror Operations Comparison

Victims of terror attacks and counterterror operations

Militant groups – claims and losses

Comparative data of insurgents' claims and their losses 2– 013-18

Drone Attacks

Sectarian violence

Fatalities from sectarian violence in Pakistan (2018)

Table of Contents

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Fatalities from sectarian violence by district/agency

Victims of sectarian violence

Sectarian fatalities by sect/religion

Claimants of sectarian violence

The Role of Counter Terrorism Departments in Countering

and Minimizing Terrorism by Dr. Farhan Zahid

Military Courts P– erformance , Review and Challenges by Imtiaz Gul

Judicial Delay ,Intervention ,and Legislature by Malik Altaf Javaid

FATA Merger - Developments and Challenges So Far

by Shagufta Khalique

National Counter Terrorism Authority - A Critical Review

by Saddam Hussein

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Acronyms

ACS AdditionalChiefSecretaryADP AnnualDevelopmentProgrammeADR AlternativeDisputeResolutionAI AnsarulIslamAJK AzadJammuKashmirANF Anti-NarcoticsForceANP AwamiNationalPartyAPC AllPartiesConferenceAPIS AdvancePassengerInformationSystemAPS ArmyPublicSchoolAQ AlQaidaAQIS AlQaidaIndianSubcontinentASF AirportsSecurityForceASP AnsarulShariaPakistanASWJ AhleSunnatWalJamaatBLA BalochistanLiberationArmyBLF BalochLiberationFrontBLT BalochistanLiberationTigersBMDA BalochistanMusallaDefaArmyBNP BalochistanNationalPartyBRA BalochRepublicanArmyBRP BalochRepublicanPartyBSNM BalochistanSub-NationalistMovementBSO BalochStudentsOrganizationCFT CounteringFinancingofTerrorismCID CriminalInvestigationsDepartmentCJS CriminalJusticeSystemCPC CivilProceduresCodeCPEC China-PakistanEconomicCorridorCrPC CriminalProceduresCodeCTD CounterTerrorismDepartmentsCTF CounterTerrorismForce

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DHQs DistrictHeadQuartersDRCs DisputeResolutionCouncilsFATA FederallyAdministeredTribalAreasFC FrontierConstabularyFCR FrontierCrimesRegulationFDMA FATADisasterManagementAuthorityFIA FederalInvestigationsAgencyFMU FinancialMonitoringUnitGB GilgitBaltistanGWOT GlobalWaronTerrorICT IslamabadCapitalTerritoryIED ImprovisedExplosiveDeviceIMU IndependentMonitoringUnitIS IslamicStateIS-K IslamicState-KhurassanITMP Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-MadarisPakistanJA JundullahJeM Jaish-e-MohammadJI Jamaat-e-IslamiJI JaishulIslamJID JointIntelligenceDirectorateJSMM JeaySindhMuttahidaMahazJST JeaySindhTehreekJUI-F JamiatUlema-eIslamJUI-S JamiatUlema-e-Islam-SamiKP KhyberPakhtunkhwaLEA LawEnforcementAgencyLeB Lashkar-e-BalochistanLeI Lashker-e-IslamiLeJ Lashkar-e-JhangviLeJ-AA Lashkar-e-JhangviAl-AlamiLeT Lashkar-e-TaibaLI Lashkhar-e-IslamiMMA MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal

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MQM MuttahidaQaumiMovementMQM-H MuttahidaQaumiMovement–HaqiqiMWM MajlisWahdat-e-MuslimeenNAB NationalAccountabilityBureauNACTA NationalCounterTerrorismAuthorityNAP NationalActionPlanNCEPG NationalCounterExtremismPolicyGuidelinesNFC NationalFinanceCommissionNISP NationalInternalSecurityPolicyNP NationalPartyNRA NationalRiskAssessmentPAF PakistanAirForcePCP PakistanCentreforPhilanthropyPHC PeshawarHighCourtPMLF PakistanMuslimLeagueFunctionalPMLN PakistanMuslimLeagueNawazPN PakistanNavyPPP PakistanPeople’sPartyPSP PakSarzameenPartyPTI PakistanTehrik-e-InsaafSCU SpecialCombatUnitSMM SindhMuttahidaMahazSPU SpecialProtectionUnitSSU SpecialSecurityUnitST SunniTehrikTNSM Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-MohammadiTTP Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistanUAE UnitedArabEmiratesUBA UnitedBalochArmyUBF UnitedBalochFrontUSA TheUnitedStatesofAmericaYBT YoungBalochTiger

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Executive Summary

AcrossPakistan,andacrossallmetrics,violence-relatedcasualtiescontinuedtodeclinein2018,registeringa45%dropfromthepreviousyear,and86%dropsince2013.Ifwelookpurelyatfatalitiesfromterrorattacksandincidents,thenumberdropped83% from4,643 in2013 to754 in2018.Thisanunprecedenteddropinviolenceacrossthecountry.Thebulkofthesuccessisowedtotheextensivekineticoperationsconductedacrossthecountry.However,whiletheprogressoneliminatingterrorismisexceptional,theprogressoneliminatingitsrootcauseofextremismremainswoefulatbest.

Twomajor incidents in 2014 precipitated this decline. The first was a brazenattack on Karachi airport inMay, 2014. This resulted inOperation Zarb-e-Azb,amilitaryresponsetoridthetribalregionofFATAofmilitants,theprovinceof

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Balochistanofinsurgents,andthecityofKarachiofurbancrime.Second,terroristattackedaschoolinDecember,inanincidentthatwouldleaveapermanentmarkonthecountry,killing135childrenandschoolstaffmembers. Inresponse,thePakistangovernmentenactedtheNationalActionPlan(NAP),designedtorootoutterrorismandextremismfromthecountry.Thisdocumentandsubsequentactions provided further impetus to the ongoing operation, and fueled policychangesaimedatimprovingsecurity.

Between 2013 and 2018, a total of 23,754 people died from violence-relatedincidents. Of these, 13, 428 perished in terror/insurgent attacks, 8,976 incounterterror/counterinsurgency operations, and 1,350 from robberies, droneattacks,andotherformsofcriminalactivities.Sindhsufferedthehighestnumberoffatalities,andBalochistanthehighestnumberofinjuries,despiteFATAbeingthe primary theater of militant activity and counterterror operations. SindhcasualtiesareconcentratedintheportcityofKarachibyaverylargemargin;infact,suicideattackandotherformsofterrorismcombinedisalowernumberthanthenumberoftargetkillingconductedbygangsandpoliticalmilitantsinthecity.Overalltherehasbeena97%reductioninterrorattackdeathsinSindh,86%inKP,82%inFATAand60%inBalochistan.

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Broadly speaking, victims can be classified into three categories: civilians,security/governmentofficialsandmilitants/insurgents/criminals.Allthreegroupshavewitnessedadeclineincasualties.However,whilethecivilianshaveseenadropfrom72.4%ofthetotalin2013to68.2%in2018,securityofficialshaveseena steady rise from14.9% in2013 to26.9% in2018, showcasing thecontinuedsacrificedbythelawenforcementagencies.Militantshaveseenasteadydeclineaskineticoperationshavetightenedthenoose,droppingfrom12.7%in2013to4.9%in2018.

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Purelyintermsofkinetics,Pakistanisonapositivetrajectorytoasecurefuture,provided the government takes somenecessary steps, including strengtheningthecivilianlawenforcementsector,dramaticallyimprovingthejusticesectorandjusticedelivery,aswellasenhancedgovernanceacrosstheboard.Pakistanhastremendousmomentumandanopportunitytocapitalizeonitsmanysuccesses,learn from its many mistakes, and plot a course for a peaceful, prosperous,positivefuture.

Thisreportisthusdividedintofivechaptersthatincludeterrorattacks,counter-terror operations, comparison of terror and counter-terror operations, droneattacks,andsectarianviolence.

Readers can approach CRSS for information related to this report. Alternately,youmay send your queries to [[email protected]], directly toMohammadNafees,SeniorResearchFellow,CRSS–theauthor[[email protected]],orZeeshanSalahuddin,SeniorResearchFellowandSyedaUrubaNisar,SocialMediaAssociate-theeditors.

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2018 - Violence in Pakistan

Upendingthetrendfromthelastseveralyears,Balochistan,notSindh,emergedasthemosttroubledprovinceintermsofcasualtiesfromviolence.BalochistanisfollowedbyKP,Sindh,FATAandPunjab(table01).

Table 01: Casualties from violence by province/region - 2018Province/Region Fatalities Injuries CasualtiesBalochistan 407 530 937KhyberPukhtunkhwa 161 247 408FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 208 194 402Punjab 148 140 288Sindh 192 86 278Islamabad 10 4 14AzadJammu&Kashmir 0 0 0GilgitBaltistan 7 1 8Total 1,133 1,202 2,335

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2013-2018 - Violence in Pakistan

Thecombinedhumanlossof lifebetween2013and2018,duetoviolenceandcounter-violence operations, is 23,754 persons. Of these 56.53% are a resultof terror attacks and 37.79% of law enforcement operations. The incidentsof robberies, drone attacks, and other minor crimes left 1,350 people dead,accountingfor5.68%(table02).

Table 02: Fatalities from all forms of violence in Pakistan - 2013-2018Category of violence FatalitiesTerrorattacks 13,428Counter-terrorsecurityoperations 8,976Robberies,droneattacksandothercrimes 1,350Total 23,754

Terror attacks include suicide bombings, armed attacks, target killings, andplantedexplosions.Between2013and2018,13,428peoplelosttheirlives,while14,793sufferedinjuries.Thehighestnumberoffatalitiesfromtheseattackswererecorded in the province of Sindh, followed by Balochistan, FATA, KP, Punjab,Islamabad,AJKandGB(table03).

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Table 03: Casualties from terror attacks by province/region - 2013-2018Province/Region Fatalities Injuries CasualtiesSindh 4,416 2,588 7,004Balochistan 2,991 4,273 7,264FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 2,657 2,676 5,333KhyberPukhtunkhwa 2,553 3,826 6,379Punjab 694 1,177 1,871IslamabadCapitalTerritory 85 221 306GilgitBaltistan 29 26 55AzadJammu&Kashmir 3 6 9Total 13,428 14,793 28,221

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Thehighestnumberofterrorfatalitieswerefromtargetkillings(6,479)followedby suicideattacks (2,148),otheractsof terrorism1 (1,946), andarmedattacks2 (1,895)(table04).

Table 04: Fatalities from terror attacks in Pakistan - 2013-2018Sources of attacks 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

Targetkillings 2,370 2,127 803 600 352 227 6,479

Suicideattacks 718 195 238 377 323 297 2,148

Otherterrorism 810 515 186 142 212 81 1,946

Armedattacks 460 790 304 121 136 84 1,895

Infighting 273 174 102 9 7 2 567Cross-borderattacks

0 29 29 16 88 37 199

Others 10 15 18 20 25 22 110Killed afterkidnapping 2 8 30 22 18 4 84

Total 4,643 3,853 1,710 1,307 1,161 75413,428Percentage drop in

fatalities since 2013: 17.01% 63.17% 71.85% 74.99% 83.76%

1Terrorism:bombexplosions,IEDexplosions,landminesexplosions,etc.2Armedattacks:Indiscriminatefirings,hurlingofhandgrenade,rocket/mortarattacks,etc.

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Thepercentagedrop inviolence-related fatalities tookadive in2014,andhasbeensteadilydecliningsince.ThehighestreductioninviolencewasobservedinSindh(97%),followedbyKP(86%),FATA(82%),Balochistan(60%),Punjab(36%),whileIslamabad-AJK-GBcombinedhave79%drop(table05).

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Table 05: Fatalities from terror attacks by year and province/region

Year Baloc. FATA KP Punjab Sindh I S B /AJK/GB Total

2013 840 809 921 83 1,934 42 4,6292014 522 834 788 187 1,467 50 3,8482015 390 346 303 109 560 10 1,7182016 540 175 283 108 196 0 1,3022017 361 346 131 154 194 6 1,1922018 338 147 127 53 65 9 739Total 2,991 2,657 2,553 694 4,416 117 13,428Percentage drop since 2013:

59.76% 81.83% 86.21% 36.14% 96.64% 78.57% 84.04%

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Victims of Terror Attacks

Nearly 70% of the victims of terror attacks were civilians. Irrespective of thesecurity operations, the percentage of civilian fatalities has fluctuated aroundthe 70%marker for the last six years. Security personnel witnessed a rise inpercentageof fatalities, but like all othermetrics, an overall drop. Conversely,militants, insurgents and criminals saw amarked decline in the percentage offatalities,asseeninthetableandgraphbelow.

Table 06: Fatalities from terror attacks by year and victims - 2013-2018

Year Civilians Sec./Gov. persons Militants/Criminals Total

2013 3,353 72.43% 690 14.91% 586 12.66% 4,6292014 2,590 67.27% 647 16.81% 613 15.92% 3,8502015 1,146 66.71% 344 20.02% 228 13.27% 1,7182016 895 68.74% 334 25.65% 73 5.61% 1,3022017 828 69.58% 275 23.11% 87 7.31% 1,190

2018 505 68.24% 198 26.76% 36 4.86% 740

Total 9,317 69.38% 2,489 18.53% 1,623 12.09% 13,428

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Districts/agencies with highest fatalities

TheprovincialcapitalofSindh,Karachi,topsthelistofdistrictsoragencieswiththemostfatalitiesbetween2013and2018,followedbytheprovincialcapitalsofBalochistanandKP.TheprovincialcapitalofPunjab,Lahore,is7thonthelist.

Table 07: Districts/agencies with highest fatalities - 2013-2018District/Agency FatalitiesKarachi 4,033Quetta 1,139Peshawar 1,065KhyberAgency 903NorthWaziristanAgency 537KurramAgency 419Lahore 334Mastung 288Kech 217MohmandAgency 201Total for top 10 9,136 (67%)Other districts 4,293Grand total 13,428

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Affiliation of the victims of terror attacks 2013-18

The victims of terror attacks are divided in three main categories: civilians,securitypersonnel,andoutlaws(militants/insurgents/criminals).Whilemilitants,insurgents,andcriminalstargetcivilianandsecuritypersonnel,thetargetsofthesecurityoperationsarealwaysoutlaws(militants,criminals,andinsurgents).

Thefollowinginformationdetailstheaffiliationsofthevictimsofterrorattacksinlastsixyearsincludingmembersofpoliticalparties,religiousparties,religiouspersons,polioteams,andothers.

Political party member fatalities

Mostpoliticalpartiesactiveinthecountryhavesufferedcasualtiesfromterrorattacksorviolence.MQMtopsthatlistbyalargemargin,followedbyANP,BNP,PPP,PMLNandPTI(table08).

Table 08: Fatalities of political party activists - 2013-2018 Affiliation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalMuttahidaQaumiMovement(MQM) 210 90 23 15 6 2 346

AwamiNationalParty(ANP) 96 17 7 6 2 24 152

BalochistanAwamiParty(BNP) 0 0 0 0 0 149 149

Other 62 25 24 12 11 14 148PakistanPeople’sParty(PPP) 34 21 12 4 2 0 73

PakistanMuslimLeague-Nawaz(PMLN) 15 11 20 0 1 3 50

PakistanTehrik-e-Insaaf(PTI) 19 5 9 4 2 6 45

Independent 30 1 11 0 0 0 42PakistanMuslimLeague-Functional(PMLF) 3 2 12 0 0 0 17

MuttahidaQaumiMovement-Haqiqi(MQMH)

7 1 2 0 1 1 12

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PakSarzameenParty(PSP) 0 0 0 1 3 3 7NationalParty(NP) 0 0 0 2 2 0 4SindhMuttahidaMahaz(SMM) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

JeaySindhTehreek(JST) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1Total 476 173 120 46 30 202 1,047

Religious party member fatalities

Among the religiousparties,ASWJappears tohavehad the largestnumberofvictimsofterrorattacks(135)inthelastsixyears,andthemajorityofthemweretargetedbetween2013and2015.ThisisfollowedbyJUIF,ST,andJI(table09).

Table 09: Fatalities of religious party activists - 2013-2018 Affiliation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalAhleSunnatWalJamaat(ASWJ) 55 56 15 6 0 3 135

JamiatUlema-e-Islam-Fazl(JUIF) 38 9 8 4 34 2 95

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SunniTehreek(ST) 39 10 1 1 0 0 51Other 14 27 6 0 0 1 48Jamaat-e-Islami(JI) 11 9 3 1 0 1 25MajlisWahdat-e-Muslimeen(MWM) 5 7 1 0 0 0 13

MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal(MMA) 0 0 0 0 0 5 5

JamiatUlema-e-Islam-Sami(JUI-S) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Total 162 118 34 12 34 13 373

Religious person fatalities

A total of 231 seemed to be targeted because of their faith, or for attendingreligiousgatherings.Theyaredetailedasfollows.

Table 10: Fatalities of religious persons from terror attacks - 2013-2018Identity TotalClerics/Moazzin/Qari/Preachers 58

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Pilgrims 56Worshippers 44Shrineattendants/Imambargahadmin 25Others 23Madrassastudents/teachers 14Shiascholars/Zakirs 6FaithHealers 5Total 231

Foreigner fatalities

Inthelastsixyears,60foreignerslosttheirlivestoterrorism,includingAfghans(43),Ukrainians,American,andNepalitourists(9),Chinese(3),anUzbekandanIranian.

Table 11: Fatalities of foreigners from terror attacks - 2013-2018Year - > 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalAfghan 21 9 3 4 5 1 43Others (American,Nepali,Ukrainian) 9 1 0 0 0 0 10

Chinese 0 0 0 0 2 1 3Iranian 0 1 1 0 0 0 2Uzbek 0 0 0 0 0 1 1Unknownforeigners 1 0 0 0 0 0 1Total 31 11 4 4 7 3 60

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Media personnel fatalities

Asmanyas40personsbelongingtomediacommunitylosttheirlivesinsixyearsandmostofthevictimsbelongedtomainstreamnewspapersorTVchannels.Themajorityofthemwerethevictimsoftargetkillingsorsuicideattacks(table12).Another55sufferedinjuriesduringthesameperiod,ostensiblyasanintimidationtactic.

Table 12 - Fatalities of media personnel by province/region - 2013-2018Province/Region FatalitiesKhyberPukhtunkhwa 14Sindh 11Balochistan 8Punjab 6FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 1Total 40

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Polio team fatalities

Atleast103personsassociatedwithpoliovaccinationcampaignwerethemartyrsofterrorattacksduringlastsixyears;17werefemales.Another73survivedtheattacks.NearlyathirdofthesevictimsweretargetedinFATAandnearlyanotherthirdinKP(table13)+.

Table 13: Polio teams members’ casualties - 2013-2018Province Fatality InjuryFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 30 20KhyberPukhtunkhwa 29 18Balochistan 27 8Sindh 15 11Punjab 2 16Total 103 73

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Polio teams comprise of vaccinators and police guards assigned for theirprotection.Bothweretargetedinattacks(table14).

Table 14: Polio team members’ fatalities by category and year - 2013 - 2018Category 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalPolioGuards 4 25 3 24 0 1 57PolioWorkers 9 14 11 7 1 4 46Total 13 39 14 31 1 5 103

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Security official fatalities

Asmanyas2,751securitypersonnelwerevictimsofterrorattacksinthereportingperiod.Thetable belowoffersyearlydataonthenumberoffatalitiessufferedbysecurity.Overall,therehasbeenariseinpercentageofthetotalvictimsofterrorattacks,butadeclineofalmost66%since2013,and68%since2014.

Table 15: Fatalities of security personnel - 2013-2018Year Fatalities2013 6952014 7432015 4132016 3592017 3032018 238Total 2,751

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Nearly 50%of thesewere police officials and followedby personnel from theArmy,FrontierCorps,Khassadars,Levies,Rangers,PakistanAirForce,andothers(table16).

Table 16 - Fatalities of security personnel by institution - 2013-2018Institution FatalitiesPolice 1,311Army 803FrontierConstabulary 349Levies 98Rangers 69Khassadar 65PakistanAirForce 29Others(ANF,ASF,CoastGuards,&PN) 27Total 2,751

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Claimants of Terror Attacks

Fatalities claimed by militant groups

Amongtheclaimantsof terrorattacks, theTTPand its splintergroupsclaimedresponsibilityfor1,759fatalitiesinthereportingperiod,followedbyIS(498).Foradditionaldetails,pleaseseethetableandgraphbelow.

Table 17: Fatalities claimed by militant groups - 2013-18Claimants 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalTehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)/TTPsplintergroups(andothers)

457 436 286 313 195 72 1,759

Daish/IslamicState(andothers) 0 0 0 130 148 220 498

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)/LeJ-AA 170 0 41 5 102 0 318

Others 26 32 31 10 26 1 126Lashkar-e-Islami(LI)(andothers) 2 30 40 16 5 0 93

AlQaida(andothers) 8 63 4 0 2 0 77Afghanmilitants 0 7 0 13 17 16 53AnsarulIslam 46 0 0 0 0 0 46JaishulIslam 6 2 0 8 0 0 16AnsarulShariaPakistan(ASP) 0 0 0 0 13 0 13

Pakistanimilitants 0 0 0 0 12 0 12Total 715 570 402 495 520 309 3,011

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Fatalities claimed by insurgent groups

TheinsurgentgroupsinBalochistanalsoclaimedresponsibilityforvariousterrorattacks.TheBLAclaimed59fatalities,buttheywerealsoactiveforallsixyearsofthereportingperiod.TheyarefollowedbyBLFwith45fatalitiesclaimed.

Table 18: Fatalities claimed by insurgent groups - 2013-2018Claimants 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalBalochistanLiberationArmy(BLA) 15 1 12 14 18 8 68

BalochLiberationFront(BLF) 18 3 20 4 0 0 45

BalochistanRepublicanArmy(BRA) 6 19 0 0 0 0 25

UnitedBalochArmy(UBA) 0 17 0 0 0 0 17YoungBalochTiger(YBT) 0 0 11 0 0 0 11BalochRepublicanParty(BRP)/BLA 0 0 0 6 0 0 6

UnitedBalochFront(UBF) 0 4 0 0 0 0 4

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BalochistanLiberationTigers(BLT) 3 0 0 0 0 0 3

Total 42 44 43 24 18 8 179

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Counterterror Operations

Thecounterterrorismoperationsbythesecurityagenciesleft8,976personsdeadand1,152injuredduringlastsixyears(2013-18).Morethan50%oftotalfatalitiesfromsecurityoperationswererecordedinFATA(4,759),followedbySindh(1,843),Balochistan(1,080),Punjab(835),KP(429),andotherregionsofthecountry.

Table 19 - Fatalities from security operations - 2013-2018Province Fatalities Injuries CasualtiesFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 4,759 558 5,317Sindh 1,843 159 2,002Balochistan 1,080 144 1,224Punjab 835 76 911KhyberPukhtunkhwa 429 108 537GilgitBaltistan 13 4 17IslamabadCapitalTerritory 12 92 104AzadJammu&Kashmir 5 11 16Total 8,976 1,152 10,128

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Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from security operations

The regions where counterterrorism/security operations resulted in the mostfatalitiesincludefouragenciesofFATA,fourdistrictsofBalochistan,andoneeachdistrictofSindhandPunjabeach(table20).

Table 20: Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from security operations - 2013-2018District/Agency FatalitiesNorthWaziristanAgency 2,350KhyberAgency 1,963Karachi 1,681OrakzaiAgency 171Kalat 163Quetta 133Lahore 117DeraBugti 113Awaran 105SouthWaziristanAgency 83Total 6,879 (80%)

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Types of security operations

Nearly 212 air raids during Zarb-e-Azb operations left 3,532 militants dead,roughly1,701encounterswithsecurityforcesleft3,599dead.Thecountrylost10BombDisposalUnitpersonnelinthelineofduty.Insomecases,encounterswithsecurityforcescameunderquestionafterthefamiliesofthevictimsofferedwildlydifferingaccountsof the incidents.Besides suspectedencounters, therewerealso80custodialdeathsofprisoners/detainees(table21).

Table 21: Fatalities through security operations by category - 2013 - 2018Category 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 FatalitiesEncounter with LEAs(orsuspected) 200 1,129 971 652 512 162 3,626

AirRaids 215 1,959 1,094 233 31 0 3,532Groundoperations 0 0 0 18 54 60 132Died(Incustody) 2 36 18 12 6 6 80

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Beatentodeath(custodial,hatecrime)

0 0 0 1 8 1 10

Bombdefused 2 0 0 0 6 0 8Bomb/LandmineDefuses 0 0 0 1 0 1 2

Total 419 3,124 2,083 917 617 230 7,390

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Outlaw Fatalities

Militant fatalities

Atotalof8,976militantslosttheirlivesforvariousreasonsduringthereportingperiod.Ofthem6,482wereeliminatedinsecurityoperationsandtheremaining2,494 were the victims of other incidents, including drone attacks, infightingbetween groups, and target killings, etc. The TTP and its splinter groupswerelostthehighestnumberofmilitants(1,699),followedbyLI(965),AQ,AQISandothers.

Table 22: Fatalities of militants from security operations - 2013-2018Affiliation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalTehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)/TTPsplintergroups(andothers)

359 646 329 185 171 9 1,699

Lashker-e-Islami(LI)(andothers) 159 351 402 48 5 0 965

Others 127 111 9 4 38 0 289AlQaida,al-QaedaintheIndianSubcontinent(AQIS)(andothers)

15 10 25 36 15 0 101

Lashker-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)(andothers) 7 0 16 28 15 6 72

Daish/IslamicState(IS)(andothers) 0 0 3 8 36 3 50

Pakistanimilitants 0 0 0 0 8 5 13AnsarulShariaPakistan(ASP) 0 0 0 0 10 0 10

Jundullah(JA) 0 0 0 0 4 0 4Total 667 1,118 784 309 302 24 3,203

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Foreign militant fatalities

Thebulkofforeignmilitantskilledbetween2013and2018includedAfghansandUzbeks.Thesearedetailedbelow.

Table 23: Fatalities of foreign militants from security operations - 2013-2018Affiliation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalAfghanMilitants(includingIS,Taliban,AQ,LIandcross-border)

1 17 16 10 17 8 69

Uzbek 0 54 0 0 0 0 54HaqqaniNetwork 9 7 0 5 17 4 42Arab 0 6 0 0 0 0 6Unknown 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 Total 10 84 16 17 34 12 173

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Insurgent fatalities

Asmanyas365insurgentslosttheirlivesinsecurityoperationsduring2013-18withBRA(87),BLA(80),BLF(63)andUBA(49)sufferingthehighestfatalities.

Table 24: Fatalities of insurgents from security operations - 2013-2018 Affiliation 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalBalochistanRepublicanArmy(BRA) 4 36 43 4 0 0 87

BalochistanLiberationArmy(BLA)/suspected 0 24 6 42 5 3 80

Other/unknown 0 0 27 29 7 0 63BalochLiberationFront(BLF) 0 0 40 5 3 1 49

UnitedBalochArmy(UBA) 0 0 0 34 2 0 36UBA/BLA 0 0 20 0 0 0 20Lashkar-e-Balochistan(LeB)(andothers) 0 10 4 0 0 0 14

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BLA/BalochistanMusallaDefaArmy(BMDA) 0 8 0 0 0 0 8

BalochistanSub-NationalistMovement(BSNM) 0 0 4 0 0 0 4

BRA/PeaceMilitia 0 2 0 0 0 0 2BalochStudentsOrganization(BSO) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

BalochRepublicanParty(BRP) 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

Total 4 80 145 115 17 4 365

Criminal fatalities

Thenumberofcriminalskilledinsecurityoperationsduring2013-18were1,537withrobberssufferingthehighestnumberoffatalities(693),followedbygangsters(452),unknowncriminals(169),dacoits(49),andothers.

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Table 25: Fatalities of criminals from security operations - 2013-2018Category 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalDacoits/Robbers 3 174 215 115 166 69 742Gangsters 61 202 165 60 21 19 528Othercriminals 3 12 9 80 73 9 186Kidnappers 0 12 10 17 10 0 49Militantfacilitators 0 0 1 3 1 8 13Politicalmilitants/gangsters 1 1 9 0 1 1 13

Foreigners 0 0 2 0 0 1 3Religiouspartymilitants 0 0 3 0 0 0 3Total 68 401 414 275 272 107 1,537

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Terror Attacks and Counterterror Operations Comparison

There isaconsistentdrop in terrorattacksafterthe launchofOperationZarb-e-Azb.However,thesameisnotthesamecaseforcounterterroroperations,asfatalities from security operations shot up 300% in 2014, beforewitnessing asimilardecline(table26).

Table 26: Fatalities from terror attacks vs. security operations - 2013 -2018Year -> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalTerrorattacks 4,629 3,850 1,718 1,302 1,190 739 13,428Securityoperations 833 3,391 2,635 1,154 689 274 8,976

Percentage drop interror fatalities since2013

-16.8% -62.9% -71.9% -74.3% -84.0%

Percentage drop insecurity operationfatalitiessince2013

307.1% 216.3% 38.5% -17.3% -67.1%

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There were 28,223 casualties (13,428 dead and 8,976 injured) from terrorattacks,and10,128casualties(8,976deadand1,152injured)fromcounterterroroperationsinthereportingperiod.

Table 27: Casualties from terror attacks vs. security operations - 2013-2018

Province/Region

Terror Attacks Security OperationsFatalities Injuries Total Fatalities Injuries Total

Balochistan 2,991 4,273 7264 1,080 144 1224Sindh 4,416 2,588 7004 1,843 159 2002KhyberPukhtunkhwa 2,553 3,826 6379 429 108 537

FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas

2,657 2,676 5333 4,759 558 5317

Punjab 694 1,177 1871 835 76 911IslamabadCapitalTerritory 85 221 306 12 92 104

GilgitBaltistan 29 26 55 13 4 17AzadJammu&Kashmir 3 6 9 5 11 16

Total 13,428 14,794 28,223 8,976 1,152 10,128

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Victims of terrorattacks and counterterror operations

Thetablebelowdepictsthenumberoffatalitiesbyvictimcategory.

Table 28: Fatalities from terror attacks and security operations by year - 2013-2018Category Year -> 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 Total

CiviliansAffectees 3,368 2,641 1,163 909 849 521

9,451Percentage drop -21.6% -56.0% -21.8% -6.6% -38.6%

Security Forces

Affectees 735 766 413 379 308 2392,840

Percentage drop 4.2% -46.1% -8.2% -18.7% -22.4%

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Militants/ Criminals

Affectees 1,359 3,834 2,777 1,168 722 25310,113

Percentage drop 182.1% -27.6% -57.9% -38.2% -65.0%Total Affectees 5,462 7,241 4,353 2,456 1,879 1,013

22,404Total Percentage drop -32.6% 39.9% 43.6% 23.5% 46.1%

Militant groups - claims and losses

IS and LeJwere the twomain outfitswhere lossesweremarginal against thenumberoffatalitiestheirterrorattacksafflicted.TTPclaimedthemostfatalities,andlostthemostmembers.

Table 29: Fatalities claimed/members lost by militant groups - 2013-2018Militant Group Claim LostTehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)/TTPsplintergroups(andothers) 1,759 1,699Daish/IslamicState(IS)(andothers) 498 50Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)/LeJ-AA 318 72Lashkar-e-Islami(LI)(andothers) 93 965

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Al-Qaeda(AQ)(andothers) 77 101Afghanmilitants 53 17AnsarulIslam(AI) 46 0JaishulIslam(JI) 16 0AnsarulShariaPakistan(ASP) 13 10Pakistanimilitants 12 13Total 2,885 2,927

Comparative data of insurgents’’ claims and their losses –- 2013-18

Similarly, the tablebelowshows the fatalities claimedby, and sufferedby, theinsurgentgroupsprimarilyoperatingintheBalochistanprovince.

Table 30: Fatalities claimed/members lost by insurgent groups - 2013-2018Insurgent Group Claimed LostBalochistanLiberationArmy(BLA)/suspected 59 88

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BalochLiberationFront(BLF) 45 49UnitedBalochArmy(UBA) 17 56BalochistanRepublicanArmy(BRA) 16 89YoungBalochTiger(YBT) 11 0BalochRepublicanParty(BRP)/BLA 6 1UnitedBalochFront(UBF) 4 0BalochistanLiberationTigers(BLT) 3 0Otherinsurgents/groups/unknown 0 82Total 161 365

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Drone Attacks

US forces in Afghanistan carried out 76 Drone attacks against themilitants inPakistanleaving473dead.ThemajorityofthesestrikeswerecarriedoutinFATAwithnineinKPandtwoinBalochistan.Percentagewise,therehasbeena92%dropinfatalitiesfrom2013(169),to2018(13).

Table 31: Fatalities from drone attacks by province/region - 2013-2018Province/Region 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 160 160 69 34 24 13 460

KhyberPukhtunkhwa 9 0 0 0 0 0 9Balochistan 0 0 0 2 2 0 4Total 169 160 69 36 26 13 473Total Attacks 27 24 11 3 7 4 76

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Likecounter-terrorsecurityoperations,thehighestvictimsofdroneattackswerethemilitants whose identities remained unavailable (199). Among the knownvictimsofdroneattacks,TTP(anditsmanysplintergroups)wasatthetop(176),followedbytheHaqqaniNetwork(47),andAQ(22).

Table 32: Fatalities from drone attacks by targeted group - 2013-2018Affiliation of victims 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalTehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)/TTPsplintergroups 84 24 30 29 7 2 176

HaqqaniNetwork(includingex-TTP) 16 7 0 5 17 9 54

Al-Qaeda 15 7 0 0 0 0 22Foreignmilitants 2 14 0 2 2 2 22Unknownmilitants 52 108 39 0 0 0 199 169 160 69 36 26 13 473

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Sectarian violence

Fatalities from sectarian violence in Pakistan (2018)

Asmanyas198personsweretargetedin2018becauseoftheirreligiousidentity,resulting in91fatalities,and107 injuries.FATAsufferedthehighestnumberoffatalitiesfromsectarianviolence(43),followedbyBalochistan(18),Punjab(11),Sindh(11),andKP(8).Between2013and2018,Pakistan lost2,099persons insectarianviolence,withanother3,274injured,asdetailedinthetableandgraphbelow.

Table 33: Fatalities from Sectarian violence by province/region - 2013-2018Province/Region 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalSindh 239 231 180 42 101 11 804Balochistan 213 86 33 73 51 18 474FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas 68 15 31 36 153 43 346

KhyberPukhtunkhwa 154 60 32 16 7 8 277Punjab 29 23 28 79 10 11 180IslamabadCapitalTerritory 5 6 5 0 2 0 18

AzadJammu&Kashmir 0 0 0 0 0 0 0GilgitBaltistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Total 708 421 309 246 324 91 2,099

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Fatalities from sectarian violence by district/agency

The tendistricts/agencies that sufferedmore than 80%of total fatalities fromsectarianviolence,theprovincialcapitalofSindh,Karachi,wasthemostaffectedwith594fatalities.Balochistan’sprovincialcapitalQuetta,wasthenexthighestaffected.

Table 34: Districts/agencies with the most fatalities from sectarian violence - 2013-2018District/Agency Fatalities Karachi 594

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Quetta 298KurramAgency 238Peshawar 178Lahore 109Sehwan 91Shikarpur 66Khuzdar 62OrakzaiAgency 52MohmandAgency 36Total 1,724

Victims of sectarian violence

Nearly 97% (2,049) of the victimsof sectarian violence are civilians.Of these,1,243 civilians were targeted for their religious identities, while several wereperformingtheirdutiesatareligiousplace(church,imambargah,mosque,etc.).

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Atotalof40securitypersonnelalsolosttheirlivesinsectarianviolence.

Table 35: Fatalities from sectarian violence by group - 2013-2018Group FatalitiesCivilians 2,049Securityandgovernmentofficials 40Militants/criminals/insurgents 10Total 2,099

Sectarian fatalities by sect/religion

TheShiaandShiaHazaracommunitiessufferednearly54%(815+289)ofthetotalfatalitiesduring2013-18,followedbySunnis(367),Sufis(198),Christians(171),andothers.

Table 36: Fatalities from sectarian violence by sect/religion - 2013-2018Sect/Religion FatalitiesShias 815

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Sunnis 367ShiaHazaras 289Sufis 198Christians 141Shias/Sunnis(indistinguishable) 59Christians/Muslims(indistinguishable) 59Ismailis 51Unknown/Others 46Hindus 30Ahmadis 24Bohras 7Zikris 7Sikhs 6Total 2099

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Claimants of sectarian violence

Nearly55%ofsectarianviolencewasclaimedtohavecommittedbythemilitantoutfitslikeTTPanditssplintergroups(467),LeJanditssplintergroups(399),andIS(271).WhileTTP’ssplintergroupshavebeenfoundactivethroughoutthelastsixyears,LeJanditssplintergroupsbecameinactivein2018.

Table 37: Claimants of sectarian violence by affiliation - 2013-2018Claimants 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 TotalDaish/IslamicState(IS)(andothers) 0 0 45 62 126 38 271

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ),LeJ-AA,LeJ-NB 236 22 40 5 96 0 399

Tehrik-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP)andsplintergroups 143 3 171 75 64 11 467

JaishulIslam(JI) 32 2 0 0 0 0 34Unclaimed 297 394 53 104 38 42 928Total 708 421 309 246 324 91 2,099

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The Role of Counter Terrorism Departments in Countering and Minimizing Terrorism

by Dr. Farhan Zahid*

Terrorismisaformofpoliticalviolenceandthecheapestoneasfarasfinancialaspects are concerned. On the other hand, it is always very expensive forgovernments to counter the threat of terrorism, whether engaging in anti-terrorism(defensivemode)orcounter-terrorism(offensivemode).Allovertheworld, governments suffering from terrorism raise counter terrorism forces,customizedtofightterroristgroups.Theyareimpartedwithspecializedtrainingsandcarrysophisticatedcounterterrorismequipment.Pakistan,acountryravagedby the scourge of terrorism is no different in adopting a similar set of policy,legislativeandtacticalmeasures.

The establishment of provincial Counter Terrorism Departments (CTD) wasproposedinthefirstNationalInternalSecurityPolicy(NISP)2014-18.Alongwithother counter terrorism measures the NISP demanded provinces to establishCTDsasdesperatemeasureswererequiredtodealwithrisingwaveofterroristattacks.OneofthecontoursoftheNISP2014-18wastoreorganizeallprovincialCTDs,byestablishingaFederalRapidResponseForceincollusionwithprovincialCTDs.3Agendaitemnumber8oftheNationalActionPlan(NAP)alsocalledforestablishment and deployment of counter terrorism forces across Pakistan inordertocombatterrorists’designsinanorganizedmanner.4Itisworthmentioningthatbeforethesepolicyinterventionsbythefederalgovernmenttheprovinceshadsomerudimentarycounterterrorismstructures.

Background

Pakistan has remained a hotbed of activities for a number of local, regionaland global Islamist and nationalist-separatist terrorist groups. Since the SovietInvasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent civil war (1979-89) a number ofjihadi groups took roots and flourished in Pakistan and Afghanistan. After thewithdrawal of Soviet forces and the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, ononehandAfghanistanplunged intoanotherbloody civilwarandon theother

* Dr.FarhanZahidearnedhisPhDinTerrorismStudiesfromtheUniversityofBrussels,Belgium.Dr.Zahidhasauthoredmorethan70researchpapersandarticles,andisapoliceofficerinPakistan,currentlysecondedtoNACTA.3TextofNationalInternalSecurityPolicy2014-18,availableat:https://nacta.gov.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/National-Internal-Security-Policy-2014.pdf 4NationalActionPlan

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PakistanfacedincreasingsectarianviolenceinitsurbancenterssuchasKarachi,Lahore,Jhang,Multan,Rawalpindiandothers.ThesurfacingofLashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ)waswatershedeventfortheraisingofEliteForceinPunjabprovinceinmid-1990s.AplethoraofsectarianandjihadigroupssuchasLeJ,Sipah-e-Mohammad,Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi(TNSM)andothersperpetratedactsofterrorismacrossPakistan in1990s.Sindhprovincewasalsoeffectedbyethno-politicalviolenceduring1990s.Hence,theprovincialgovernmentshadalreadysettoworkbyestablishingant-terroriststructurestocombattheprevailingsecuritythreats.The9/11attacksandsubsequentGlobalWaronTerror(GWOT)setthemodeforfurthermeasurestobetakenbythesuccessivegovernmentsinPakistan.Militaryintelligenceagencies,threewingsofarmedforces,provincialandfederallawenforcementforces,FederalInvestigationsAgency(FIA),IntelligenceBureau,Frontier Constabulary (FC) and Pakistan Rangers established their counterterrorismunitsandwingsinordertokeepabreastofchangingtimesandneeds.Sincethenprovincialpoliceforceshaveinvestedeffortsandresourcestobolstertheircounterterrorismcapacitiesandcapabilities.IntherecentpastIslamabadCapital Territory (ICT) Police has also fully functionalized its Counter TerrorismForce (CTF)whereasPunjabprovince raisedanotherCTFunitbesides theEliteForce.SindhprovinceraisedSpecialSecurityUnit(SSU)whichisconsideredthebestequippedCTforceinPakistanasfarasweaponsandtrainingareconcerned.

Theraisond’êtreofCTDsinPakistanistoconductoperations,collectandgatherintelligence,conductterrorisminvestigations,trainelitecounterterroristunits,forecast futureterrorism-relatedtrends,andfinally,monitor individualsonthefourthschedule,insectarianoutfits,andinreligiousseminaries.

Theyear2018remainedpivotalasCTDsfunctioninginprovincesmanagedtocurbtheactivitiesofterroristgroupsandscaleddownthelevelofviolencetovariousdegrees. In 2018, 105 terrorists were killed during encounters with CTDs andothersecurityforcesinPakistan;and431suspectedterroristswerearrestedinoperationslaunchedbyCTDs.Atleast10majorterroristplotsweredismantled.5

5“PakistanSecurityReport2018”,PakistanInstituteofPeaceStudies(Jan2019),Islamabad

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Punjab

CriminalInvestigationsDepartment(CID)ofPunjabpolicewasrechristenedintoCTDPunjab.TheCIDhadbeenthelynchpinofoperationsagainstsectarianandIslamistterroristgroupsinPunjabprovincesince1995.Itwasformallytransformed

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intoCTDin2010.6

AccordingtoaCTDofficialofPunjabpolice,anumberofterroristsleepercellsare still operating in the Punjab province. These are mostly Islamist militantgroupssuchasJamaatulAhrar,Tehreek-e-TalibanPakistan(TTP),Al-QaedaintheIndianSubcontinent(AQIS),IslamicState-Khurassan(IS-K)andsplintersofJaish-e-Mohammad(JeM)andLashkar-e-Taiba(LeT).Morethan500searchandseizeoperationswereconductedintheprovince.7

In its year-long major operations against militant operations the CTD Punjabengagedinscoresofactivities.TwoJuAmilitantsAmjadKhanandDawoodKhanwerearrestedfromHarbanspurainLahoreinJanuary15,2018.TheywereallsettoplanterroristattacksinLahore.8TheCTDfoiledabidofTTPterroriststolaunchstrikesagainstsensitiveinstallationsinKhanewaldistrictandarrestedfour.TheCTDalsorecoveredexplosivematerial,hand-grenades,andweaponsfromtheirpossession.9TheCTDPunjabalsogunneddownsixTTPterroristsinanoperationinGujratdistrict.ThesixwerelateridentifiedasproclaimedoffendersinvolvedinFerozpurRoadLahoreandBedianRoadbombblasts.TheywerealsolistedintheRedBookofCTDPunjab;acacheofarmswasalsorecovered.10InJuly2018,inoperationsagainst IS-KtheCTDarrestedanIS-KmilitantfromDaska,districtSialkot,andsimultaneouslyavertedamajorterroristplotbeinghatchedbyTTPagainstlocalpoliticiansinBahawalpurdistrictwhilearrestingfourTTPmilitants.11 TwomoreTTPterroristswerearrestedfromBhakkardistrictbytheCTDpersonnelinAugust.12InanothersuccessfuloperationagainstIS-KtheCTDfoiledabidtoperpetrateactsof terrorismon theeveofnationaldefenseday celebratedonSeptember6.TheCTDraidedaremoteareaBastiShorkotofMultandistrictandarrestedthreeplanningtolaunchattacks.13

InOctober,whileoperatingagainstTTPtheCTDarrestedthreemilitantsfromGojrabypassareaofTobaTekSinghdistrict.Acacheofarms,explosives,detonators,andothermaterialwererecoveredfromtheirpossession14;anotherTTPmilitant

6OfficialwebsiteofthePunjabpolice,https://punjabpolice.gov.pk/ctd 7DiscussionswithaCTDofficialofPunjabpolice8SouthAsiaTerrorismPortal,www.satp.com9“CTDarrestsfourmilitantsinKhaneal”,Frontier Post,May17,2018,https://thefrontierpost.com/ctd-arrests-four-militants-in-khanewal/ 10“SixTTPterroristskilledinGujratshootout”,News International,May28,2018,https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/322269-six-ttp-terrorists-killed-in-gujrat-shootout 11“CTDtrackdownfourTTPmilitants”,Dawn,July6,2018,https://www.dawn.com/news/1418268 12“CTDarreststwoterroristsinBhakkar”,Samaa News,August25,2018,https://www.samaa.tv/news/2018/08/ctd-arrests-two-terrorists-in-bhakkar/ 13“Plot to sabotagedefenceday foiled”,Nation, September3,2018,https://nation.com.pk/03-Sep-2018/plot-to-sabotage-defence-day-foiled 14 “Three terrorists held in TT Singh”, Daily Times, October 23, 2018, https://dailytimes.com.pk/313478/three-terrorists-held-in-tt-singh/

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wasarrestedfromRawalpindidistrictwithmapsofsensitiveareasandexplosivematerialsinthesamemonth.15

Overall the CTD Punjab had managed to contain the terrorist threat from arange of proscribed groups. A key reason was CTD-Intelligence Bureau (IB)cooperation in the province as a result of a Memorandum of Understanding(MoU)betweenthetwogovernmentorganizations.16Itispertinenttonoteherethat the successive governments in Punjab invested heavily in Punjab policekeepinginviewofchallengesofterrorism.Hithertothemeasurestakenbytheprovincialgovernmentsareeffectivebutnotentirelyadequateintheabsenceofimplementationofpolicymeasurestorootoutgrowingextremismfromsociety.

Sindh

ThefocusofCTDSindhremainedmultifacetedasitstruggledtocountermultiplethreats fromaplethoraofterroristorganizationsoperating intheprovince.Al-Qaeda in the IndianSubcontinent (AQIS)wasoneof the severe threats.AkeyleaderofAQISandEmirofSindhUmarJalalChandioaliasHajiSahabwasarrestedbyCTDinKarachiinNovember2018,amajorbreakthrough.17ChandiowasnotonlytheheadofAQISSindhChapterbutwasalsoconsideredveryclosetoAl-QaedaCentral’sEmirDr.Aymanal-Zawahiri.HisarrestcouldbeamajoradvanceincapturingZawahiri.

ApartfromworkingtocurbtheactivitiesofIslamistterroristgroupsoperatinginSindhprovincetheCTDalsoapprehendedJeaySindhMuttahidaMahaz(JSMM)andarrestedtwomilitantsinApril2018belongingtothisanti-stateorganization.18 The leaderof JSMMShafiBurfat isbased inahostileneighboringcountryandconducts terrorist operations in Sindh at the behest of hostile intelligenceagencies.TheseterroristswereinvolvedintargetingofChineseworkingforChinaPakistanEconomicCorridor (CPEC)andattackedChineseworkers inDecember2016inSukhardistrictandinGhotkidistrictin2017.

InadiscussionwithCTDSindhofficials,itwasrevealedthattheCTDincollaborationwith Special ProtectionUnit (SPU) of Sindh police is providing security to theChinesenationalsworkingfortheCPECprojectsinSindh.CTDisresponsiblefor

15“CTDfoilsterrorbid,arrestsTTPagentinRawalpindi”,Pakistan Today,October26,2018,https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/10/26/ctd-foils-terror-bid-arrests-ttp-agent-in-rawalpindi/ 16DiscussionswithaseniorofficialofCTDPunjab17“AQIShighprofilemilitantheldinKarachi”,Dawn,November20,2018,https://www.dawn.com/news/1446665 18“TwoJSMMmenheldfor2016attackonChineseengineers”.News International,April27,2018,https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/309584-two-jsmm-men-held-for-2016-attack-on-chinese-engineers

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providingcriticalsecurity input.19TheCTDSindhalsopublisheditsRedBookin2018providingdetailsoftopwantedterroristsinSindh.Thisisthesecondyearina rowthatHafeezPandraniofLashkar-e-Jhangvi remainedatop that list.HewasinvolvedintheplanningofmultipleterroristattackssuchasSehwansuicideattackandbombingofShia Imambargah inShikarpurdistrict.Other importantterroristleadersareMaqsoodBrohi(LeJ)andFarooqAhmadShah(LeJ).

Baluchistan

Baluchitsanpolice’sCTDalsoperformedwell.Baluchistanwitnessedasurgeof29%interroristincidents.AccordingtoaseniorofficialofCTDBaluchistan:

• A total of 227 intelligence-based operations were conducted in theprovinceduring2018

• 21terroristsfromTTPandIS-Kwerekilledinencounters(11TTP,10IS-K)

• 41terroristswerearrested

• Outof59casesofterrorismin2018theCTDresolved47

KeyleadersofTTPandIS-Kkilledin2018included:MuftiHidayatullah(provincialEmirofIS-KBaluchistan),SalmanBadini(IS-KEmirofQuetta),AsimMuhammadHasni (Emir of TTP Quetta), Waheed Bangulzai (IS-K), Saddam Hussain (IS-K),MahmoodKhan(TTP),andMuhammadSaleem(TTP).

Apart from eliminating these key leaders the CTD also arrested a number ofimportantTTPand IS-K leaders:Fazal-e-HaqKhaksar (TTP),MuhammadRahim(LeJ),HafizIsmael(LeJ),Khuda-e-Rahim(TTP),andMurtaza(IS-K).20

AccordingtoMohsinButt,theInspectorGeneralofPoliceBaluchistanprovince,15 police personnel lost their lives and 114 received injuries in combatingterroristsacrossBaluchistan.Intotal25terroristsofbothIslamistandnationalist-separatistterroristorganizationswerealsokilledinencounterswithCTDandlocalpolice.Moreoveratotalof55terroristswerearrestedin1,245intelligencebasedoperations conducted by the CTD Baluchistan. Overall 5,449 absconderswerearrestedbelongingto22differentmilitantorganizations.21

19DiscussionswithCTDSindhofficial20DiscussionswithCTDofficialofBaluchistanpolice21SaleemShahid,“119killed interror incidents inBaluchistan lastyear: IG”, Dawn, January12,2019,https://www.dawn.com/news/1457079

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Khyber Pakhtunkhawa (KP)

TheCTDofKPprovincepolicecouldrightlybeconsideredasthefrontlineforceagainst terrorism inPakistan.TheCTDwasestablished in2014and since thenithasperformedexceptionallywelldespiteall odds. TheCTD faces challengesofterrorism,extortionactivitiesbyanumberofterroristgroupsoperatinginKPprovince,targetedkillingsespeciallybyIS-KmilitantsinprovincialcapitalPeshawar,andkidnappingforransombybothterroristandcriminalnetworksoperatingintheprovince.WiththehelpofUSDepartmentofJustice’sInternationalCriminalInvestigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), the anti-terrorist trainingschoolwas established in the Nowshera district of the province in 2015. Twospecializedanti-terroristunits i.e. SpecialCombatUnit (SCU)andEliteWomenCommandosareadditionalfeaturesofCTDKPpolice.

UniqueonitspartisastudyconductedbyCTDKPofarrestedterroriststotraceoutthedriversofradicalizationandsubsequentactsofterrorism.Accordingtothis research,outof 1,650 incarcerated terrorists heldby theCTD1,182wereassociatedwithdifferentterroristgroups.Some36ofthemholdmaster’sdegreesindifferentdisciples,another36aregraduates,100areintermediates,and274passedmatriculation.Theyjoinedterroristorganizationswhilestudyingorsoonaftercompletingtheireducation.163ofthemattendedmadrasasbut94outofthosedroppedoutbecauseofdifferentreasonsrangingfromsocio-economictoterroristrecruitment.Majorityofthesamplearebetween20-30yearsofageand140of themarebetween14-19 years agebracket.Most of themhailed fromPeshawar(328)followedbySwabi,Bannu,D.I.Khan,andMardandistrictsofKPprovince.Asperthe interviews,adherencetoradical Islamist ideologywastheprimaryreasonoftheirjoiningofIslamistterroristgroups.22

22JavedAzizKhan,“72militantsarrestedinKPweregraduates,postgraduates”,News International,January 13, 2018, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/267985-72-militants-arrested-in-kp-were-graduates-postgraduates

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AtthefronttheCTDKPfaceschallengesfromIS-K,TTP,JamaatulAhar,LeJ,andaplethoraofsmallerfactionsofTTP,operatingindifferentpartsofKPprovinceandsomeoperatingfromeasternprovincesofneighboringAfghanistan.

NACTA’s’ Role

National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) was established in 2008 tocoordinate efforts of different law enforcement bodies, civil and militaryintelligence,andframecounterterrorismandcounterextremismstrategies.TheorganizationisplayingitsroleforgatheringCTDsandotherrelevantorganizationsat least onmonthly basis to discuss issues related to counter terrorism. JointIntelligenceDirectorate(JID)isresponsibleforcollatingandassessingintelligencegatheredatdifferentlevelsandtofurthermakeitactionable.AsfarasCTDsareconcernedNACTAhasbeenabletoprovidepolicyguidanceandactsasaplaceforcooperationandcoordination.Onconfrontingextremism,NACTAhasformulatedNational Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines (NCEPG) but unfortunately noprovincehasbeenabletoimplementinordertocurbextremisttendencies.

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Conclusion

For curbing decades long problem of terrorism successive governments haveadopted policy, legislative and tactical measures. Scores of military and lawenforcementoperations,anumberoflegislationsbytheparliament,andpoliciesadopted by cabinets have indeed yielded results. It is evident that terroristincidents have taken a nosedive in Pakistan during last three yearswhich is acommendableachievement.

Butallisnotwell.

The issueofgrowingextremismhasstillnotbeenaddressed.Anotherpendingmatter isneedfor furthercooperationbetweencivilandmilitaryorganizationsdealing with counter-terrorism, and inter-civilian agencies’ coordination forconcertedeffortsagainstproscribedorganizations.TheprovincialCTDsappeartoleadPakistan’sbattleagainstterrorism,butstillhavealotofkineticandtacticalworkaheadofthem.Itisexpectedthatwithimprovingconditions,trainingandpoliticalwill,theywilldeliver.

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Military Courts – Performance, Review and Challenges

by Imtiaz Gul*

MilitarycourtsinPakistanweresetupintheaftermathofaterroristattackontheArmyPublicSchool(APS)inPeshawaronDecember16,2014.Thebrazenattackhadleftatleast144dead,133ofthemchildren.

Early January in 2015, an All Parties Conference (APC) had greenlighted theproposed21stConstitutionalAmendment,whichcameintoeffectonJanuary6,2015.23ItallowedchangestothePakistanArmyActtoextenditsjurisdictionforspeedy trialof casesunder specifiedactsandprovide the constitutional coverwithasunsetclauseoftwoyearsfromthedateofenactment.OnJanuary9,2015Pakistanliftedthemoratoriumonthedeathpenaltytopavethewayfortrialsbythemilitarycourts.

Officialstatisticssuggestthat-asofDecember2018-eversincetheirinceptionoverthreeyearsago,theroughlyonedozenmilitarycourtshandled717casesand finalized 546 of them.24 The courts awarded death to as many as 310terroristswhile234wereawardedrigorous imprisonmentofvarieddurationsrangingfromlifeimprisonmentto5-yearimprisonment.Twoaccusedhadalsobeenacquitted.

Performance

Outofthe310convictsonly56-18percent-couldbesenttogallows.AndtheseexecutionswerecarriedoutfollowingcompletionoflegalprocesswhichincludedtheirappealsinsuperiorcourtsandrejectionofmercypetitionsbothbytheArmyChiefandthePresident.Theexecutionoftheremaining254terroristsispendingcompletionoflegalprocessinhighercourts.Thismeansthatevendespitefulfillingtheentirestringof legal formalities,a staggering82percentof the“jetblack”terroristscouldpotentiallyescapethecapitalpunishment.

*ImtiazGulisthefounderandExecutiveDirectoroftheCenterforResearchandSecurityStudiesinIslamabad.Heisanotedsecurityanalyst,isalsoservesastheEditorNationalSecurityforTheDailyTimes.23 Acts,Ordinances,President’sOrdersandRegulations.(2015).Retrievedfromhttp://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1420800195_264.pdf 24 StatisticsacquiredfromInter-Services’PublicRelations(ISPR)

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Legal Challenges

The establishment of themilitary courtswas notwithout controversy though.TheyfacedlegalchallengesbeforetheSupremeCourtbuttheapexcourt-ledbyJusticeSheikhAzmatSaeed-onAugust5,2015upheldthemovewithamajorityrulingonthegroundthatitwasatemporaryphenomenonwithatwo-yearsunsetclause. Ithad,however,cautioned itcouldstillreviewany judgmentpassedbythemilitarycourts.Later,in2016,evenaSClargerbenchalsoendorsedtrialofmilitantsconductedbythesecourts.

Butinanindirectchallengetotheapexcourt,thePeshawarHighCourt(PHC)setasideconvictionsof73personsconvictedonterrorismchargesincludingsuicideattacksandkillingofsecuritypersonnelandcivilians.

Inthe173-pagejudgmentauthoredbyPeshawarHighCourt’s(PHC)ChiefJusticeWaqarAhmadSeth,thehighcourtdirectedthegovernmentandlaw-enforcementagenciestosetfreealltheconvictsfrominternmentcentersifnotrequiredinanyothercase.ThesecondjudgeinthebenchwasJusticeLalJanKhattak.25

Are the Military Courts Essential?

In the aftermath of theAPS,military courts emerged as a speedy consensusrecipefordealingwithconvictedterrorists.Theyweretoutedasthe“needofthehour.”But, three yearson, onewonders if themilitary courts havebeeneffectiveatallasadeterrenttoterroristsor law-breakers? Ifofficialstatisticswereanyindicatortheanswerwouldprobablybeano,particularlyinviewofthemonumental anti-terroreffortbyall civilianandmilitary institutions,andthe ensuing encouraging results; a whopping nearly 86 percent reduction interrorism-related violence throughkinetic,non-kinetic and intelligence-basedoperations,inthelast4years.

It will indeed be unfair to attribute this marked decline in violence to themilitarycourts;muchmorethanthissmalldeterrent,ithasbeentherelentlessoperations – Zarb-e-Azb and Raddul Fassad – in tandem with the counter-terrorism departments’ continued preemptive work that has led to thecumulativedramaticdecreaseinincidenceofterrorism.

Itisindeedthesecurityparadigmshiftatthehighestcivilandmilitarylevelsthathasproducedresults–whicheventheUSSenatorLindseyGrahamacknowledged

25 Amin,A.(2018,November2).PHCreleases70convictssentencedtodeathbymilitarycourts.The News. Retrieved from https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/388558-phc-releases-70-convicts-sentenced-to-death-by-military-courts

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duringhisJanuaryIslamabadvisit.

Gradual efforts are underway to extricate the country from the baggage ofthepast fourdecades.This is theonlywaytomakeupfor the losteconomicdevelopmentopportunities.Wemustrecaptureoureconomicrelevancetotheworld.ThisiswhattheChinesehavebeenadvisingtoPakistanandtheadvice,itseems,isbeingwelltaken.

Now, particularly when the highest leadership is determined to “transformPakistanfromasecurity-centrictodevelopment-focusedstate,”thebestcoursewouldbe todiscardaltogether thedebateonwhether themilitarycourtsberevivedornot.Therealdeterrenceisthedoctrinalshiftthatisdistinctlyvisiblewithinvarioustiersofpoliticalgovernanceandthesecurityapparatus.

If discussions with key decision-makers were any indicator, a conscious bigcourse-correction, inspired apparently also by China, is underway with theobjectiveofcullingallthegodzillasthatthewaronterrorhadgivenbirthto.

In this encouraging context the military courts lose their sting as well asrelevance. There is no need at all if the intention of sternly dealingwith allrogueelementsissincere.Whyshouldthegovernmentandthearmyconcedeonothercriticalfrontstotheoppositionjustforthesakeofrevivingthemilitarycourts?Thebestanswertothemilitarycourtsisimmediaterevisionofthe170yearoldCriminalProceduresCode(CrPC)andtheCivilProceduresCode(CPC)toavoidlongdelaysandfacilitatequickerandinexpensivejusticedelivery.

Both themilitary and the government should better spend time and energyondevising strategies forde-radicalizing cadresofbannedoutfits. Long termsalvation and deterrence lies in long-term, indigenous reform programme toweanradicalsandpotentialalliesofexternally-driventerroristoutfitsawayfromtheviolentpath,notreallyinmilitarycourts,whichareinconflictwithprinciplesoffairness,dueprocessandjusticeitself.

Thefightagainstmilitancy,terrorismandviolentextremismwillofnecessitybelong.Butthecountrymustnotloseitsconstitutional,democraticandfundamental-rightsmoorings intheprocess.26Theanswertotheaforementionedchallengesliesinreformingthedatedcriminaljusticesystem,insteadofclutchingatstrawssuchasthemilitarycourts.PakistanmustreformtheCrPCforamoreeffectiveandspeedy litigationand indiscriminate law-enforcement.An improved justicesystemwillautomaticallymaketheaberrationssuchasmilitarycourtsirrelevant.

26 Extendingmilitary courts, again? (2019, January 10).DAWN. Retrieved from https://epaper.dawn.com/DetailImage.php?StoryImage=10_01_2019_008_001

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Judicial Delay, Intervention, and Legislature

by Malik Altaf Javaid*27

EversinceMarch2007,whenformerChiefJusticeIftikharChaudhryrefusedtobecomeapartytoformerPresidentPervezMusharraf’sdesireforasecondterm,Pakistanhasbeenabuzzwithjudicialintervention,activismandjudicialdelaythathasallledtounusualpendency.Avastmajorityofpeopleconsiderthisactivismand/or the judicial intervention as the real cause for some 1.9 Million casespendingacrossPakistan.SincesomepeoplebelievethatonlytheChiefJusticeofPakistanhasthepowertoexercisesuomotupowers;therefore,therestofthe3,999judgesworkingacrossPakistanareavailableforexpeditiousdisposalofthecases,whichisnotbeingdone.

Somemaintainthatit’sthepoorlegaleducationsystem,thenurseryofthelegalsystem,which is not producing the required quality. Hence, there is a judicialdelay. Some lament the outdated law, while others hold that judicial policiesmutilatethelawandthisapparentclashleadstojudicialdelay.Asmaintainedbyonefaction,thereisasheerdisparityinthegrowthofthejudicialsystemandthepopulationofPakistan,resultinginjudicialdelays.Theybelievethatin1973thepopulationofPakistanwasaround65millionwhichhasnowgrownto212millionwiththenumberofSupremeCourt Judgesremainingconstantat17.Onealsocannotdiscounttheapproachoftheexecutive:usingjudicialdelaysasatooltolambastthejudiciary.

Judicial delayshaveneverbeena serious concernof theexecutiveand/or thelegislature. However, in order to completely shift the burden on the judiciary,theexecutivemaintainsitisthejudicialinterventionwhichistherootcauseforthepending1.9millioncases,convenientlyignoringthefactthatthenumberofjudgesinthesuperiorjudiciaryistobeincreasedbythelegislature.Thejudicialorganistobefundedbytheexecutiveandlandsforestablishmentsofnewcourts.Assuchonecouldsafelymaintainthattherhetoricoftheexecutivecould,atbest,betermedaspoliticalpointscoringorpoliticaljugglery.

Almost daily, onefinds legislators complaining about the judicial interventionsaswellasmassivedelays,realizing littlethateventhePakistanMuslimLeagueNawaz(PLM-N)Government,havinga2/3rdmajority,neverdidanythingtofindlegal ways to stop,manage or curb the judicial intervention. There has neverbeenanymeaningfuldebateinordertocurethemenaceofjudicialintervention.The apparent helplessness of the legislature raises serious questions abouttheirwisdomand their seriousness tofindapanacea for judicial intervention,

*27MalikAltafJavaidisapracticingadvocateatSindhHighCourt,Karachi.

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whichperlegislatureisnotonlycausingjudicialdelaysbuthasalsocrippledthegovernment.

JudicialinterventionapparentlyflowsfromtheprincipleoftrichotomyofpowersandthepowersgivenbytheConstitution,adocumentframedbythelegislaturewithnointerventionofthejudicialorgan.Thenwhylamentthejudicialinterventionorapparentover-reach?IttookdaystoannulthepowersofthePresidentunderArticle58(2)(b)oftheConstitutionofPakistan1973,whileevenafterdecadesnothinghasbeendoneonotherissues.ThelegislaturehasneverseriouslymulledtointroducereformsintheCodeofCriminalProcedure(CrPC)1898ortochangetheCodeofCivilProcedure(CPC)1908,whichareallegedlyoutdatedlaws.Thelegislativehistoryisalsosilentabouttheincreaseinthenumberofjudges.Thecommittees of the legislature havenever devised to have a dialoguewith thejudiciarytocurbtheissueofchronicjudicialdelays.

Thelegislature,primafacie,doesnotconsiderexpeditiousjusticeafundamentalrightofthemasses.Thelegislatureholdsitselfhighandproudlymaintains“thejudiciaryisindependent”togetitselfabsolvedfromeverything.Inthisbackdrop,ifweexamine the eliminationofArticle 58(2) (b), introduced through the8thAmendment, one could safelymaintain it wasmeant to protect the personalinterestsandneverthedemocracy.Theunholyunanimityofthelegislatureisaself-explanatoryproofofthefact.Theprematuredissolutionoftheassemblieswas causing serious trouble for the legislators to present themselves for re-election; as such the best option was to delete the powers from the statutebook. Shockingly, the legislatorswhonever uttered aword in the sessions forthepopulacevotedinfavoroftheamendment.Needlesstosaythatallthiswasmotivatedbypoliticalinterests.

The procedural law, i.e. CrPC and CPC, are unchanged. The legislature, inparticular, without examining its contents, has relegated these as “outdatedlaws”.However,inreality,thesearethesamelawsunderwhichthecasesweredecidedexpeditiouslyandtherewerenocomplaintsofjudicialdelay.Eventodaytherearehardlyanycomplaintsontheefficacyofthesetwolaws,theonlyissueiswithregardtotheirdatesofbirth.Theefficacyoftheprocedurallawshasbeenunderminedbythejudicialpolicies,manifestofindividualwisdom.

Toquoteanexample, item10of theChapterExpeditiousDisposalof theCaseof National Judicial Policy 2009 provides that cases involving punishment ofsevenyearsormoreshallbetriedwithinoneyear.Whereasthelawprovidesthechallan(policereport)shallbesubmittedin14dayswithanallowanceof3days.Themagistrate,aftercollectingtheentirerecordifopinesthatthecaseismadeout,shallcommititfortrialandshallsupplycopiesoftherelevantdocumenttotheaccusedsevendaysprior to trial (Section265 (C )& (D)of theCRPC).The

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concernedcourtshallreexaminethesameandifdecidestotrytheaccused,thechargeshallbeframed,followedbytherecordingofstatementofwitnessesandthejudgment.Thejudicialpolicyhashowevercreatedroomtoprolongthetrialforoneyearwhichotherwisecouldhavebeendoneinamonth.TheefficacyofthelawcouldbeappreciatedfromthefactthatmilitarycourtsalsousetheCRPCfortrialandthereisnootherspeciallaw.

Toquoteanotherexample,whilestrikingout themilitarycourtsestablished in1997,theSupremeCourtobservedthatifsimilarfacilitiesofsubmissionofchallanandattendanceofwitnessesareprovidedtoordinarycourts,thecasescouldbedecidedjustasexpeditiously.Assuch,thereisnostrengthintheclaimthattheprocedurallawsi.e.theCRPCandtheCPC,areeitheroutdatedorineffective.ThelawsimplementedbyLordMichalayareaseffectiveastheyweresomehundredyearsago.Thechange;however,isinthesocialfabric.Thepoorlegaleducationsystem,apparentdisparitybetweenthegrowthofpopulationandjudicialsystem,control over the resources, political might, personal vendettas, bribery, andcorruptionareafewofthemanyelementswhichareprominentinthischange.

The issueofpopulation isperhapsthemotherofallother issues.Let’sexplainthejudicialdelayinthebackdropofagrowingpopulation.TheDistrict&SessionsCourtMalir,Karachi,wasestablishedinSeptember1994withfivecourts.After25years,itnowhas23courts.Duringthesetwoandahalfdecades,itspopulationhasgrowntentimes.Itwouldbeusefultopointoutherethattheapparentincreaseinthenumberofcourtsisduetotheadditionofciviljudges/magistrateswhichhavebeenincreasedfrom4to13,whereasitonlyhasfiveadditionaldistrictandsessionsjudgesandfourciviljudges.Thistookaperiodof25years.OnewouldbejustifiedtoquestiontheefficiencyofMinistriesofLaw,JusticeandParliamentaryAffairs.

Likewise,aCircuitBenchofSindhHighCourtisworkinginHyderabad.Itcaterstoanareaofaround77,029squarekilometers,servingapopulationof15,538,056.Onejudgeservesanareainexcessof15,000squarekilometersandapopulationofover31million.ItwouldbenecessarytomentionherethatasperArticle193oftheConstitutionofPakistan1973,thenumberofjudgeswouldbedeterminedbylaw,andthelaw-makingpowerssolelyvestsinthelegislature,andthejudiciaryhasnosay.Thenwhoistoblame?Nomatterhowefficientthejudgesmightbe,thebacklogof1.9millionistoomuchfor4,000judgesworkingacrossPakistan,aspointedoutbytheChiefJusticeofPakistan.

TheSupremeCourtofPakistanhasasanctionedstrengthof17judges,whoaretotakecareofthelegalissuesofapopulationofmorethan207million,aswellastheissuesofthegovernmentandotherlitigationsarisingfromsuomotuandthehumanrightsjurisdiction.Itisworthnotingthefactthatthesuperiorjudiciaryis

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workingwiththesamestrengthassanctionedin1973,whilethepopulationhasincreasedatamuchmoreacceleratedrate.Inmorethanthreedecades,thisissuehasneverbeenaddressedbytheParliament.Theexecutivehasnevertakenintoconsiderationtheimpactofthepopulationhikeandthenumberofjudges.Historyshowsthattheexecutivehasalwaysavoidedspendingonthejudicialorgan.

ThemegalopolisKarachi,withapopulationofaround22million,has249judgesworkinginthedistrictjudiciary.While217judgesareworkingindistrictjudiciaryatLahore,servingapopulationofaround12million.Thenumberofconstituenciesofthenationalassemblyandprovincialassemblieshasbeensubjectedtochangebasedonthepopulation.However,an increase in thenumberof judgesneverfound any attention of the legislature. Likewise, the budgetary allocation is inthehandsofthelegislature.Theforumiswiththelegislature.Thejudiciarycanadvise,notcompel.Theincreasednumberofjudgescan,definitely,enhancethehealthofthejudicialsystemandthekeytothissolutioniswiththeexecutiveandlegislature.

Onecouldsafelymaintainthatafterpopulation,unregulated legaleducation isresponsibleforthejudicialdelay.Lawyersarethelynchpinoftheentirejudicialsystem.Themeritforadmissiontolawschoolsanduniversitiesislowestamongstother faculties,whereas it is thehighest in thedevelopedworld.UnregulatedlawschoolswhichofferadegreewithoutattendanceareabundantinPakistan.Thelawschoolsaremassproducinglawyers,withoutanypracticalknowledgeorexperiencewhichultimatelyshowsintheirperformance.Thejudges,prosecutors,attorneys, NAB prosecutors, Advocate Generals, and Attorney Generals areappointed from these mass-produced lawyers. Saqib Nisar, Chief Justice ofPakistan,tookanactionagainsttheselawschools,whichwaswidelyapplaudedbythebarcouncils.However,itwasajudicialinterventionfortheexecutive.

Comingtojudicialintervention,apparently,itiscondemnedontwocounts,viz.,itcausesjudicialdelayssincethejudiciaryisnotabletofocusontheproceedingsof the case and rather focuses on proceedings with governmental functions.Secondly, itcausesadministrativedelays.Theexecutiveholdsthat it isnothingshort of misfortune to the state that at times the judiciary has been foundinvolvedinmakingeffortstorunPIA,steelmills,hospitals,andschools,insteadofproceedingwiththependingcases.

Thejudiciaryclaimstobeendeavoringfortheenforcementoffundamentalrightsthroughtheconstitutionaljurisdiction.ThelegislaturebelievesthatArticle184(3)’sexcessiveusehasrendereditasatoolforinterventioninjudicialfunctionsandacauseforjudicialdelays.Theoppositeargumentis,Article184(3)isapanaceatoadministrativelackofinterestinadministrativefunctionsandprovideswithacheckonthelegalityofadministrativefunctions.ThepeopleofPakistanshould

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not be at the mercy of the legislature, aware of its basic responsibilities. Bynow, thegeneralpublic showsa lukewarmresponse inchallenging the legalityofadministrativefunctions.Ifsomeonechallengesthelegalityofadministrativefunction,theyareoftentermeda“blackmailer”orapersonactingfortheirvestedinterest.Therefore,thegeneralpublic,unlesstheyhavesomecompellingreasonscoupled with their private interest, generally do not question the legality ofadministrativeaction.

TheConstitutionof Pakistan1973was framed in the leadershipofMr.Bhuttowhen therewere no other noticeable political parties. Therefore, the framersoftheConstitutionwouldhavebeenverymindfulatthetimeofframingArticle184(3) whereby they allowed the judicial organ to take certain actions.WhatpromptedMr.Bhuttotoconfersuch,apparentlydangerous,poweronthejudicialorgan?Wasitaresultoffarsightedness?Washetryingtostrikeoutabalance?Washelookingtopollutetheexecutiveauthority?Washeawarethathewouldbesucceededbytheinefficient?WeretheframersoftheConstitutionintendingtopermanentlycreateaparallelgovernment?Washeintendingtocreateasituationofjudicialandadministrativedelays?

Itmusthavebeentheresultoffarsightednessandtoprovideastrongcheckontheexecutiveactions.Onemustkeepinmindthatintheyesteryears,everyexecutivehasdemandedcompleteimmunitytohisactions,irrespectiveofitsresultsandimpactonthesociety.Therefore,onecouldsafelyleaninfavorofthefactthatthepowerwasgrantedtostrikeoutabalanceandwasnevermeantforjudicialandadministrativedelays.

Now,whatifthispower,whichwasmeanttocreateabalance,causesimbalance?Once again, it is with the legislature to consider. Eighteen amendments havebeenmadeintheconstitution,includingtheonewherebytheunbridledpowerofpresidenttodissolvethenationalassemblyhasbeentakenaway.Thenwhyisthelegislatureobservingsilence?Whyisthelegislaturenotmullingtoamendthispower?Perhaps,thelegislatureisawareofitsshortcomingsandpoorefficiency.

Whatprompted the legislature touniteagainstArticle58(2)(b)?Whyare theynot uniting on these issues which, according to them, are a bottleneck? Thelegislature,mostlikely,islackingthelegislativewisdomwhichtheframersoftheconstitutionhad.Whathasprecludedthelegislaturetodeterminetheextentofsuomotuaction?Again,theanswerwouldbethelackoflegislativewisdom.

One could argue that good performance could also render Article 184(3) uselessandperhaps,exceptamendment,itisthepanaceatoavoidthesoumotuactions.AtransparentandmeaningfulperformanceistheonlythingwhichwouldrenderArticle184(3)ineffective,despiteitsavailabilityintheConstitution.ThelegislaturehastheoptionofamendingArticle184(3),butthatwouldgivetheexecutiveabsolutepower.

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Onecouldalsoargueandmaintainthat3,999judgesdonotenjoythepowerofsoumotu.Therefore,theargumentofjudicialinterventioncausingjudicialdelays,bylarge,isanirrationalargument.Increaseinthenumberofjudges,improvedqualityof lawyers,meaningfuleducation,acollectiveapproach,precedenceofcollectivewisdomoverindividualwisdomandawiselegislativeapproachcouldimprove the health of the judicial system and the menace of judicial delaysplaguingthepubliccouldbeeliminated.

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FATA Merger - Developments and Challenges So Far

by Shagufta Khalique

Followingastringofquicklegislativemoves,PresidentMamnoonHussainsignedandsealedthe25thConstitutionalAmendmentonMay31,2018,puttinganendtotheBritishcoloniallegacycalledtheFederallyAdministeredTribalAreas(FATA).The Amendment finally put the region on theway tomainstream integrationthroughthemergerwiththenorth-westernKhyberPakhtunkhwa(KP)province.

Themergerofseven(ex-FATA)agenciesandsixfrontierregionsgeneratednewpolitical,territorialanddemographicdynamicsandrequirednewadministrativestructurestotakecareoftheadditionalpopulationfromtheex-FATAregions.Itnecessitatedseveraladministrative,andconstitutionalmeasuressuchas:

i) Replacement of the draconian Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), aspecialsetoflawsenforcedintheearly20thcentury,withthelawoftheland.

ii) Adjustments in the number of seats in the federal and provincialassemblies; 366 seats for KP in theNationalAssembly, 96 seats intheSenate–theupperhouse–whiletheKPAssemblymembersofparliamentrosefrom124to145aftertheadditionof21seats.Theseincluded16generalseatsandfourreserved.

iii) Creationofnewdistrictadministrativestructuresforapopulationofabout17,743,645.KP’spopulationhasswollento20,919,976spreadover101,741square-kilometers.

Inordertofacilitateandcloselymonitorthemergerprocess,PrimeMinister’sTaskForceformainstreamingthemergedtribaldistrictswasannouncedonSeptember04,2018withwell-definedtermsofreference(TORs).TheChiefMinisterofKPheadsthetaskforce,anadvisoryandmonitoringbodytolookintotheplanningandexecutionofproposedmeasuresforsmoothtransitionoftheprocessatalllevels. It comprises federal and provincial ministers, advisors and secretaries.Meanwhile,at theprovincial level,a seven-membercommitteeheadedbyMr.AtifKhan,TourismMinister,wasalsoconstituted.ItincludestheFinanceMinister,LawMinister,InformationMinisterandtheInspectorGeneralofPolice,KP.Aftersomereservationsandcriticism,AdditionalChiefSecretary,Mr.ShazadBangash,ChiefSecretary,Mr.KamranNaveed,andHomeSecretary,Mr.Ikram,werealsoincluded inthecommittee.However,thecommitteeneverofficially functionedandtheprovincialcabinetisnowlookingafterthepost-integrationscenario.

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Themajor decisions as per themeeting on January 1, 2019 of the task forcewith the PMand different stakeholders set a framework for the planning andimplementationof development activities for the tribal districts.However, thetaskforcehasbeendissolvedandthemattersarenowhandledbytheprovincialcabinet.Thekeyareastakenintoconsiderationwere:

1. Interim Governance Regulation

TheabolitionofFCRandpromulgationoftheInterimGovernanceRegulationfortheinterimperiodtoprovidelegalcovertothetransitionperiod.

2. Health

Extension of the IndependentMonitoring Unit (IMU) to themerged areas todemonstrate immediate provision of staff and removal of deficiencies from 7District Head Quarters (DHQs). Immediate recruitment will offer livelihood to2,200families.

3. Law and Order

Tofillthe2,200vacantpostsoflevies,trainingofleviestobeconductedaccordingto police standards and the police to move inside in a sequential manner.EstablishmentofcourtsforauniformjudicialsystemwiththeprovisionofDisputeResolutionCouncils (DRCs), amethodofAlternativeDisputeResolution (ADR),whichhasbeenbeneficialtothepeopledespitetheviolationsofhumanrights.

4. Finance

Punjab and KP, alongwith the Federal Government, to provide three percentof their share from the federal development budget. The provincial budgetshall include a budget for erstwhile FATA in FY 2019-2020making it the legalresponsibilityoftheProvincialAssemblyandtheCabinet.

5. Education

Toshowtheimmediatepresenceofthegovernment,checkingforabsentteachersandidentificationofmissingfacilities,extensionoftheIMUsystem,fulfillingtheneedsofallhighschools,vacantpoststobefilledandsanctioningofnewpostsneedstobecarriedout.

6. Political Participation

EnacttheLocalGovernmentActandholdlocalgovernmentelectionsatthesametimeasprovincialwhichwillensuregrass-rootlevelownership.Districtlevelelders

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nominatedbytribesforpeacekeepingandconflictresolutionincoordinationwithelectedlocalbodiesmembers.

7. Overall Governance

AbolitionofallpostsofAdditionalChiefSecretary(ACS)(FATA);mattersdealtbytheACStobetransferredtosecretaryhomeandtribalaffairs.Ministersandsecretarieswillstartvisitingmergeddistrictstoensurethevisibilityofthegovernment.TheCabinet istotakeanupdateoftheprogressthroughaspecialcabinetmeetingeverytwomonthsforbettercoordinationandbettersupervision.Vigilancebytheadministrationsothatcorruptandinefficientpracticesareshunned.

Theguidelinessetwerequitecomprehensiveandself-explanatory.Inpursuanceof integrationand toprovideabetter lineofmanagementadministration, thefollowing directorates working under FATA Secretariat were directed by theKhyberPakhtunkhwaEstablishmentDepartmentonNovember15,2018toreporttotherespectivesecretaryoftheKPGovernment:theDirectorateofAgriculture,Directorate of Livestock and Dairy, Directorate of Fisheries, Directorate ofForests,DirectorateofIrrigation,DirectorateofSports,DirectorateofIndustries,Directorate of Technical Education, Directorate of Skills, FIFA Small Dams,Directorate ofMineralsOil, Roads and Infrastructure.OnDecember 11, 2018,the Directorate of Agriculture and Research, Directorate of Local Governmentand Rural Development Works and Services and Public Health Engineeringweremerged.ThenotificationbytheEstablishmentDepartmentonJanuary16,2019 orders themerger of FATA DisasterManagement Authority (FDMA) andRehabilitationUnitwiththeKPGovernmentwhichwillreporttotheSecretaryofRelief,RehabilitationandSettlementDepartment.ThelatestpressconferencebytheProvincialMinisterofInformation,Mr.ShaukatYousufzai,onJanuary16,2019sharedthedevelopmentsinalignmentwiththetargetsandobjectivessetinthefirstmeeting.Hesharedthattheimmediaterecruitmentof15,000employeesoutof30,000vacantpostsinlinedepartmentsandofficesand6,000policeconstablesandofficerswillbeensuredinthefirstmeeting.

AnothermajordevelopmentwasthenotificationbytheHomeandTribalAffairsDepartmentKPonJanuary29,2019declaringtheseventribaldistrictsassessiondivisionsandsevenFrontierRegionsasthesubdivisionswhichwillpavethewayforsettingupregularcourtsintheregion.ArecentstepbyGovernorShahFarmanistheformulationofanadvisoryboardwithMr.UmerKhanasthechairmanandMr.RustamShah,Mr.LaiqandMr.Sangalasmembers;however,theboardhasbecomecontroversial.Firstly,thisisduetothepresenceofMr.RustamShahwhohasopenlyopposedthemerger,andsecondly,underthe1973ConstitutiontheGovernorcannotexercisesuchauthority.Toensureaccesstotheformaljusticesystem,ChiefMinisterMehmoodKhanissuedthedirectivesfortheappointment

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ofjudgesandsupportstaffinthemergedtribaldistricts.

Apparently, the overall scenario seems satisfactory after statements and newspouringindailyafterthevisitsofMr.AtifKhan,MinisterofTourism,Mr.ShaukatYousufzai,MinisterofHealthandInformation,Mr.AmjadAli,MinisterofMinerals,Mr.AbdulKarim,AdvisortoCMonIndustriesandMr.ZiaUllahBangash,AdvisortoCMonEducation.However,aholisticapproachseemstobethemissinglinkandeachdepartmentseemstobeoperatinginisolation.

Thetransitionperiodisthemostsensitiveperiodasfarasruleoflawanddisputeresolution is concerned. Currently, a constitutional and legal vacuum existsafter theabolitionof FCRand IGR. ThePA’sdesignationhasbeen renamedasDC,yetthereisconfusionandthedecisionisbeingtakenintheabsenceoflegaldirectivesfollowingthepastpracticesunderFCRorIGR.Extensionofthejudiciaryon emergency grounds must be handled on an urgent basis. KP GovernmentrequestedtheHighCourtforanextensioninthetimelinefortheextensionofthejudicialsystemandasix-monthextensionhasbeengrantedaswell.TheProvincialGovernmenthasdecidedtocarryonthetraditionalJirgawithmodificationsandtheintroductionofDRCs.ExperiencedJirgaeldershavebeeninvolvedinconflictresolutionfordecades;however,the inclusionofthememberswiththeclarityonADRHumanRightsandReconciliationwillhelpasthisinformalmechanismofjusticewouldnotrequireanyspecificinfrastructureandcanbecarriedoutinatraditionalmannerwithsomemodification.

Another mega challenge is law enforcement; the Levies and Khasadar Force.Around14,000LeviesandKhasadarpersonnelareworkinginerstwhileFATA.TheKhasadarsaremostlyilliterateandfrompoorfamilies.TheirselectionisbasedonnominationsbytheMaliks.Eachagencyhad itsownrulesandconventionsfortheKhasadarservice.Noinductionorin-servicetrainingwasimpartedandeverytribalagencyhastheKhasadarisystem,whereasLeviesareprovidedweaponsbythegovernment.Theyarerecruitedfromamongsttheindigenoustribes.UnlikeKhasadarForce,LevyForceisbettertrained.TheinductionofLeviesandKhasadarintoKPPolicewouldbeabigchallengefortheProvincialGovernment.Itneedstoberesolvedonanurgentbasissothatmistrustandmisunderstandingsarenotallowedtocreepin.

Peopleof thenewly integratedtribaldistrictsofKPareeagerlywaitingforthepolitical process to start. The most recent development is the completion ofdemarcation/delimitationprocessandElectionCommission’sdirectiveexpectedtoannouncethedateof localbodies’election.Onesegmentbelieves ithastostartofffrommacrotomicro.Toinitiatepoliticalparticipation,theelectionforthe Provincial Assembly should have been the first step due to two reasons.Firstly,theelectedMPwillbeinpositiontoreceivethefundsfromADPandNFC

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AwardinJune2019.Secondly,iftheelectionsfortheProvincialAssemblyareheldbeforethelocalbodies’,thevoterswilljusthavetovotefortheMPAwithasingleballotpaper.Ifthelocalbodieselectionsareconductedfirst,thepublicwillnotbeeducatedonthelocalbodiessystemastheKPgovernmenthadintroducedaseven-tiersystemoflocalbodies,andifthesamemodelistobeoptedfor,itisgoingtobequiteconfusingforthevoters.Alsoasafirststepitissuggestedthatthesimplestformoflocalbodiesbeintroduced.

Healthandeducationalrightsarethetopmostpriorityandstepsshouldbetakenonemergencybasisinthenewlyintegratedtribaldistricts.Almost1,000schoolsstanddemolishedduringmilitancyandahostofothereducationalinstituteshaveseveralmissingfacilities.AsperMr.ZiaUllahBangash,theprovincialeducationalpolicywillbeappliedtothesedistrictsaswell.Alltheschoolswillberenovatedandreconstructed.

Suggestions

After the merger of FATA line departments with the provincial government,newsispouringinondailybasis.However,coherenceandcoordinationamongdifferentgovernmentdepartmentsisneededtoachievethetargetsinminimumtimewithappropriateplanninganduseofresources.TribaldistrictshadinformalmechanismsunderthesupervisionofPA.Similarly,thecommunicationsysteminthetribaldistrictsneedupgrading,forexampleBajaurandWaziristandon’thaveinternetfacilitiesyet.TheTirahVally(Khyber,OrakzaiandKurrumdistricts)stilldon’thavemobileservice.

Newschoolswillbeestablishedonaneedbasis.ThereisnewsoftheestablishmentofArmyPublicSchoolinKhyberDistrictbutthemonthlyfeemayresultindropoutsdue to low incomes in the conflict stricken areas. The education departmentshouldinitiatesimpleandlow-costprogramsfortheenrollmentofstudents.

The capacity of both male and female teachers can be built to access thecommunitiesalongwithnewappointmentsbeing incentivized.Thehealthcardissuancehasbeenreassuredtotribalfamilies;however,itneedstobeaddressedonanemergencybasis.

Sensitization programs on human rights, equal citizenry, voting, local bodies’structures, administrative systems and procedures, and State’s formal justicesystemshouldbeinitiatedincollaborationwiththeeducationdepartmentandcivilsocietyorganizations.Thereare27civilsocietyorganizationscurrentlyactiveunder the umbrella of FATA youth Jirga. They can be engaged in sensitizationprogramsonelectoralprocessandadministrativeissues.

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Thefemalepopulationmustbeaccessedastheirinclusionpolitically,sociallyandeconomicallywillmakeadifference.Needbasedskilldevelopmentprogramscanbe introducedforthefemalepopulationwhichwillnotonlysupporttheirself-reliancebutalsohelpintheeconomicdevelopmentoftheregion.

Themaleandfemaleteachingresourcecanbeinvolvedinseveralprogramsduetotheirreachtothestudentsandcommunity.Teacherscanbetrainedtoaccessthefemalecommunityforraisingtheawarenesslevel.Inarecentdevelopment,womenhavebeendeployedinLeviesinBajaurandsimilarinitiativesinalldistrictscanencouragefemaleparticipation.Asakickstart,20womenwillberecruitedfortheLeviesForcetobeappointedinBajaurforthefirsttimeinthedistrict’shistory.

Presently,KurramandKhyberalreadyhavefemaleLeviespersonnel.Theprocessmustcontinueforallthetribaldistrictsasitwillbeanemploymentopportunityandtheinclusionofwomenwillensureruleoflawandpeacebuildingprocess.Inclusionoftribaleldersasadvisorsinthedevelopmentplanscanbeoneofthestepsintrustbuildingastheystillhaveinfluenceinthecommunities.

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National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) - A Critical Review

by Saddam Hussein*28

NACTA’’s Inception

PakistanhadremainedatthecentrestageofColdWarandexperiencedriseofextremismand terrorism - tracing back to the commencementofAfghanWarin December 1979. The contemporary evolution of extremism and terrorismcanbedistinguishedintwodistinctphasesbasedontheirpeculiarfeaturesandcharacteristics.Thefirstphasecanbereferredtotheeraofupheavalsstartingfrom1979-2001,pavingthewayforfanningmilitantextremism,andanumberof individuals sought violent means to promote extremist narratives for theirvested interests. Second phase started with the beginning of Global War onTerror(GWOT)afterthe9/11attacks.Thesecondandon-goingphaseinvolvesthechallengeofcounteringmilitantextremismspillingoverfromthepreviousera.Thesetwophaseshavecreatedlastingriftsandfaultlineswithinoursocietyanddevelopedextremistmind-setwhichwilltaketime,effortsandresourcesforthereversal.Inboththeseerassignificantdamageintermsofhumanandmateriallosseshasbeenwitnessedinthecountry.

In this backdrop, a need for an institutiondedicated to counter terrorismandextremism in Pakistan -which can act as a focal body, fully equipped to draftand implement national counter-terrorism and extremism strategies, and wasfelt. This resulted in the formationofNACTA in January 2008with amandateto “coordinate and unify” national counter-terrorismefforts and to drawup anationalstrategyinconsultationwithallstakeholders.Moreover,ideabehindtheestablishmentofNACTAcouldbetracedbackto3-Dcounterterrorismpolicyofthestate i.e.Dialogue, Development and Deterrence,aresolutionunanimouslypassedonOct22,2008byparliament.NACTAwas formallyoperationalized in2013afterthepassageof“NACTAAct2013”bythecabinet.

The administrative set-up of NACTA comprises different directorates/wingswhich includes:AdministrationandFinanceDirectorate,ResearchandAnalysisDirectorate, Information and Communication Technology Directorate (ICT),CounterViolentExtremism(CVE)Directorate,CounterTerrorism(CT)Directorate,CounteringFinancingofTerrorism(CFT)Directorate,LegalandSecurityDirectorateand Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID). Whereas, the financial allocation for

*28Saddam Hussein is a Research Fellow/Program Officer at Center for Research and SecurityStudies(CRSS),Islamabad.

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NACTAhasalsobeenincreasingeveryyear,surgingto1643.02millionPKRintheyear2017-18from95millionPKRin2013-14.

NACTA’’s Journey - A Bumpy Road

The brutal terrorist attack on Army Public School by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan(Fazlullahfaction)ledtotheformulationoftheNationalActionPlan(NAP),takingthe lead roleasapolicyguideline in counter-terrorismmeasures.NACTA,asacoordinatingbodyforcounter-terrorism,synchronizedalltheeffortsofsecurityandlawenforcementapparatusesacrossthecountryundertheNAP’sumbrella.Itsconcertedeffortsonmultilateralfrontsthroughsoftapproacheshaveyieldedsomepositiveresults.

InpursuanceofNAP,revampingtheCriminalJusticeSystem(CJS)wasproposed,resulting in an amendment - Criminal LawsAmendmentAct 2016 - passedbytheNationalAssembly.Later,itwasdecidedtoreviveallfourcomponentsofCJSi.e.police,prosecution,judiciaryandprisons.Therefore,NACTA,afterexhaustivedeliberationswithallstakeholders,developedaroadmapforre-vampingofCJS;detailed document, comprising of recommendations, implementation plan,responsibilities, timelines and cost has been sharedwithprovinces for furtheractions.

CounteringFinancingofTerrorism(CFT)wasanotherbigsteptakenbyNACTAinfightingterrorism.NACTAdraftedabillon“ModellawonFacilitationandRegulationofCharities”andsharedwith theprovincesand regions including ICT for theirinput andenactment from their respectiveassemblies.Once thebill ispassedbyrespectiveassemblies,thedraftmodellawwouldbecomeaneffectivepieceoflegislationforgoverningtheregistration,functionsandregulationofcharitiesand charity-seeking organizations. NACTA has also entered into an agreementwithPakistanCentreforPhilanthropy(PCP)tocreateawarenessamongpublicforgivingtheirdonationstotherightfulandlegallycertifiedentities.

NACTA, in collaborationwith relevant stakeholders i.e. FBR, SBP, ANF, FIA andintelligenceagencies,hasalsotakenaleadroleincoordinatingtheregulationofcross-bordermovementofcashthroughIBMSandAdvancePassengerInformationSystem (APIS) to effectively combatmoney laundering and terrorist financing.Similarly,effortsarebeingmadetoenablePakistanCustomstohaveanintegrateddatabaseforcurrencydeclarationsatallairportsforstrictenforcementofSBP’sprescribed currency limits. Then, issues attached to Branchless Banking (BB)precipitated,whichentailscertainrisksduetolowCustomerDueDiligence(CDD)bycertainfinancialinstitutions;NACTA,afterobtaininginputofvariousagencies,engagedwiththeSBPforfurtherimprovementsintheregulatorymechanism.In

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linewiththat,NACTAhasalsotakentheinitiativetosetupaTaskForceonCFTforeffectiveenforcementofAML/CFTregimeinPakistan,havingrepresentationof federal and provincial/regional stakeholders. The Task Force is still in itsformativephaseandisfacedwithproblemsofstructure,mandate,operationalandadministrativeSOPs,legalcoverandthepotentialissues,incaseitisvestedwiththepowersofinvestigation/prosecution.Though,NACTAwassuccessfulinestablishmentofCFTUnitsinallprovincialCTDssoastoenableinvestigatorstofocusonfinancialaspectsofeveryterrorism-relatedinvestigation.ItisworthytomentionthatNACTA,incollaborationwithFinancialMonitoringUnit(FMU),alsocarriedoutthreatassessmentsregardingterrorismandterroristfinancingwithallprovincialCTDsonboard;whichresultedinNationalRiskAssessment(NRA)reportsubmittedtoMinistryofFinance.

Moreover,NACTA’sinitiativesalsoresultedinrationalizationoflistsofproscribedpersonsbytheconcernedprovincialgovernments,alongwithimplementationofinternationalanddomesticlegalobligationsregardingfreezingofassetsofsuchproscribed organizations and persons. As per latest statistics, 65 organizationshavebeenproscribedand4areunderobservation,while8,374individualshavebeenplacedunderScheduleIV.Similarly,around5,089bankaccountshavebeenblockedthroughStateBankofPakistanandanamountofoverRs.157millionhasbeenfrozen.Over2,052individualsarefacingmovementrestrictions.Additionally,terroristorganizationswhichhaveattemptedtore-emergewithdifferentnamesaremarked and subsequently banned by the government. Correspondingly, ithas initiated the formulationofa robust terrorists’profiledatabasecontainingdetailedrecordsof individualsaccusedoforconvictedofactsofterrorismandviolentextremism.

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Besides,thereisacommonmisperceptionthatMadarisaredriversofextremismand centres of terrorist recruitment. In order to substantiate this very notion,NACTA devised a mechanism to seek support of Madaris in fighting against

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terrorismandextremism.NACTAdevelopedMadaris’dataandregistrationformsin consultation with Ittehad-e-Tanzeem-ul-Madaris Pakistan (ITMP), and otherfederal and provincial stakeholders. The raison d’etre of this exercise was tostandardizetheregistrationprocessandallowonlyregisteredMadaristooperateinthecountry.

Moderntimesalsobringswithitselfcontemporarychallenges;onebeingcyber-terrorism.Totacklethis,NACTAhassetupCyberSecurityandInformationandCommunicationTechnology(CS/ICT)Directorateonmodernlineswitharenewedapproach. In order to counter extremist ideologies, Tat’heer Drive has beeninitiated in the realmof cyberspace, aswell. Tat’heer is amultiprongedCyberCounter-Terrorism(CyberCT)strategywhichincludesmappingofradicalcontentsavailableoninternet/socialmedia.Additionally,thegovernmentbymovingaheadinitscounter-terrorismefforts,alsoauthorizedNACTAtocarryoutgeo-mappingof Karachi and Quetta for effective CTmeasures, while geo-mapping of othermajorcitiesisalsointhepipe-line.

Despite all these initiatives, one of the biggest challenges that Pakistan facedduringitsfightagainstterroristsandextremistswastocomeupwithacounter-narrativeatnationallevelagainsttheextremistone.NACTAtooktheinitiativeandpreparedaconceptpaperonNationalNarrativebasedoneightthemes(Religiousand Interfaith Harmony, Political and International Relations, Embodiment ofConstitution and Implementation of Laws, Strengthening National Security,Socio-CulturalValuesandCustoms,MediaEngagement,NationalDevelopment/Economy, National Reforms/Reconciliations). The document was submitted totheMinistryofInteriorforapproval.Unfortunately,thedocumentisstillindraftform;whereas,atthesametimePaigham-e-PakistanwasdevelopedbyIslamicInternational University (IIUI), Islamabad, with the same concept as that ofNationalNarrative,approvedbythePresidentofPakistan.

Furthermore,acutelyawareoftheimperativenessforconsolidationofthehard-earnedpeace,NACTAinlinewithitsmandate,initiatedamultidisciplinaryprocesstoformulateaNationalCounterExtremismPolicyGuidelinesforPakistan,after34roundsofdeliberationswith300plusdiversestakeholders.TheNationalCounterExtremism Policy Guidelines are citizen centric and reckon the essentiality of“Whole of Government and Society Approach” in eradication of ideology ofviolentextremismfromoursociety.TheparametersofthesaidPolicyGuidelinescomprise: rule of law and service delivery; people’s engagement; mediaengagement; education reforms; rehabilitation, reintegration and renunciationandpromotionofculture.

Likewise,NACTAhasadoptedvariousdynamicshortandlong-termapproachesforyouthengagement,withtheobjectivetopreventthemfromfallingintoviolent

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extremism.Inthefirstphase,NACTAhasidentified46educationalinstitutionsfrompublicandprivatesectorsacrossthecountryandstartedconductinginteractivesessionswithstudentsonyouthcentralityininculcatingpeaceandtolerance.Inthe secondphase,NACTAwill identifymajor religious seminarieswhereyouthengagementprogramswillbeexecutedonsimilarlines.Inthelong-term,NACTAwould endeavor to formulate a Youth Engagement Policy incorporating issuesraisedbystudentsduringthese interactivesessionsateducational institutions.Inadditiontothat,NACTAhasinitiatedaninternshipprogramforyoungscholars.Theobjectiveof thisprogram is toprovideanopportunity to students togainpracticalexperienceintheareasofCTandCVE.

Critical Analysis and the Future Road-Map

On a rocky rutted path, the NACTA has had mixed outcomes of success andpitfalls. Ithascomea longway;however, there is stillmuch lefttodo.Oneofthe achievements was the formulation of National Counter-Terrorism Policyguidelines,whichserveasthepathwaytowardsaninclusive,connected,peacefulandharmonioussociety.Theseguidelinesarethebed-rockforjoiningheartsandminds,andeffectivelyputsanendtothesupplylineofextremismbyengagingin the war of ideas. It, however, requires a whole-of-government and societyapproach to implement these guidelines. The other major accomplishmentwasthatNACTAstartedworkingonarobust‘NationalNarrative’onextremism,sectarianism,terrorismandmilitancywhichwouldserveasthecornerstoneofideologicalresponsetonon-traditionalthreats.Atpresent,theNationalNarrativedocumentisready;itisuptothecurrentgovernmenttoapproveandutilizeitandworktowardstheoperationalizationphaseofthisdocument.

It’sworthhighlighting thatCounter-TerrorismPoliceDepartmentshavedoneacommendable job in countering terrorism and extremism. Their performancecan be improved further if the federal and provincial governments introducesome accountability and transparency reforms accordingly. Moreover, it hasbeenobservedthatpolicedepartmentsarenotwellintertwinedintotheeffortstochokethefinancingofterrorism.Policedepartmentsarewell-suitedtoservethispurpose,becausetheyarethefirstresponders,investigators,andhavewide-spreadreach.So,thepoliceshouldmake‘chokingterrorfinancing’asanessentialpart of their training throughdifferent relevant organizations, such as FIA andthe SBP, formore robust response in this regard.Whereas, NACTA’s claim forupdatingofthelistsof4thschedulersundertheAnti-TerrorismAct,wasactuallytheachievementofpoliceandtheirCTDs.NACTA’srolewasjustlimitedtogettheinformationfromtheprovincesandsendtheliststotheSBPwiththerequesttofreezetheassetsofthelistedindividuals.Moreover,NACTAdoesnotevenhaveanylegalpowerstocompelCTDstocooperate.Intheabsenceofanyoperational

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andcoordinationroles,NACTAcanmerelyactasathinktank;tospendthatmuchresourcesonsuchanorganizationwouldbestrangethen.Also,NACTAisprimarilyapolicyformulatingbody;hencethedrivingseatshouldbegiventothosewhoarefrompolicymakingdomainandhavecomprehensiveexperienceinthefield,ratherthanassigningpositionstothosewhoaretrainedtoenforce/implement.Thisleadstowardsaninherentprobleminthewayofeffectivepolicymaking.

Themostsignificantaspectincounter-terrorismstrategythatNACTAhasgainedsometangibleresultsin,isaboutchokingthefinancingforterrorism.Numerousorganizationswereinvolvedinchokingterrorfinancing,buttherewasalackofcoordination among them. So, a National Task Force for choking financing forterrorism,comprisingof27relevantorganizationswasestablishedwithinNACTA;servingasacoordinatingbody.Nextstepwhichshouldhavebeentakenbeforeisnowuptothecurrentgovernment.Thisincludesmakingthistaskforcemoreinclusivebyaccommodatingotherrelevantstakeholders,andlettingitevolveintoanindependentauthority-whichwouldnotonlycoordinate,butalsotakepartinoperationalactivities.

NACTAalsoreached-outtodifferentuniversitiesand interactedwiththeyouthoncounterextremism.WhatislackingisthatNACTAhasnotyetdevisedaplanashowtoreachouttothesignificantportionofthepopulation-whichincludeslaborers, street-hawkers, shop-keepers - the commonmanetc.,whoaremorepronetoextremism.

Onthecontrary,NACTA’sperformancehasbeensignificantlyimpactedbylackofownershipbythePrimeMinisterHouse,theMinistryofInteriorwantingNACTAtoworkasitssubsidiaryandholdingbackorunevenflowoffinancesfromtheMinistryofFinance. In2014,arulingwaspassedbytheIslamabadHighCourt,placing the commandofNACTAdirectly under PrimeMinister but till the endof previous government, it was reporting to theMinister for interior. It is anupsettingfactthatnotevenasinglemeetingoftheBoardofGovernorsoftheNACTAcouldbeconvenedsinceitsinception;thispointsoutthattheneglectofthepastgovernmentresultedinthelackoffocusonimprovingthefunctioningofan importantorganization.Thesection6ofNACTAActsaysthat“theBoardmaymeetasandwhenrequiredbutitshallmeetatleastonceineachquarterof a year.” However, the last two primeministers including Nawaz Sharif andShahidKhaqanAbbasididnotholdanysinglemeetingof theBoard.Now, thecurrentgovernmentcanclearouttheambiguityinfunctions,responsibilitiesandresourcestoletNACTAfunctionoptimally.

Nevertheless, a stronger NACTA is needed to address trans-provincial issues,especiallyde-radicalizationandmadrasareformsinitiatives.ProgressonrevampingCJS is very slow.With regard to the effectiveness of police, the government’s

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emphasisisonenhancingthecounter-terrorismcapabilityofpoliceandonraisingspecializedunitswithbettermilitarycapabilities,whileimprovementinthequalityof investigationofterrorismcaseswhich isaprerequisite,anddemandsbettertraining, use of technology, forensic labs and an integrated national databaseseemsnottobeapriority.

In themostrecentdevelopmentregardingNACTA,PrimeMinister ImranKhan,on September 25, 2018, has decided to review the role and functions. ThePrimeMinister revealedthiswhilechairing thefirst-evermeetingof theBoardofGovernorsofNACTAatthePrimeMinister’sOffice,sincetheNACTAActwaspromulgated inMarch2013.PMKhanremarked that thenewground realitiescalledforrevisitingtheroleoftheorganisationinordertomakethisbodytrulyaproactiveandsophisticatedorganisationwithawell-definedmandate.Itwas,therefore,decidedduringthemeetingtoconstituteacommitteeforreviewingtheroleandfunctioningoftheorganisation. ItshowsthatthePTIgovernmenthasavision,butwhethertheycouldtranslateitintoactionistherealquestion;onlytimecantell.

Summing it up, NACTAwas a good idea that has been poorly developed andexecuted. It has been caught up in bureaucratic strife, lack of collaborationacross security apparatuses, scarcity of resources and, for vague direction orpurpose. Reportedly, Prime Minister Khan has decided to retain control overtheAuthority.Itisagooddecisionbecausecounteringterrorismrequiresmulti-disciplinaryapproachandInteriorMinistryalonecannothandleit.Itmayimbuetheorganizationwith freshvigor.A re-energizedandeffectiveNACTAwould inturngiveanewimpetustofadingNAP.OtherproblemisthatlawandorderisaprovincialsubjectandNACTAneitherhasitsprovincialextensionsnorhascontrolover provincial counter terrorism departments. Unless rules of business areamended,NACTAwould invariably come inconflictwith federalandprovincialinteriorministries.HavingprovincialextensionsofNACTAcanbeaviableoption,alongwithchalkingoutaprovisiontohavecounteringextremismandterrorismascommonresponsibilityoffederationandprovinces.

Whateverthepacemaybe,NACTAat-leastkick-startedthebasicmachinerytoscuffleterrorismandrelatedfactors,nonethelessitcouldhavedonealotmoreandmore could be done, but some internal and external impedimentsmadeNACTA’sjourneyratherabumpyone.Lastly,NACTAshouldbepreparedandoughttodoitshomeworkonthenewdriversofinsecurityinPakistanwhichincludes:youthalienationand frustration, exclusionary identitynarratives, lackof socialjusticeandtheruleoflaw,regionaldisparities,andlackofaccountabilityasthesignificantdriversofinsecurityinPakistan.

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About CRSS

CRSS Background

The Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS) is a think tank/advocacy center founded in September, 2007. Founded by noted security expert and media personality Im�az Gul, it is commi�ed to the cause of independent research and nonpar�san analysis, and informed advocacy, and help people outside Pakistan understand this na�on of 212 million people.

As an advocacy center, CRSS is dedicated to trigger cri�cal thinking through discourse anchored in global democra�c values such as socio-poli�cal diversity, rule of law, equal ci�zenry, and acceptance of diversity, fundamental human rights, all at the intersec�on of empirical research in security studies

CRSS Core Values

CRSS strives to embed the na�onal conversa�on in cons�tu�onalism, and ra�onalize it over extremism and sectarianism. CRSS believes the path to peace is through embodying fundamental human rights, specifically:– strict adherence to the rule of law, and stringent implementa�on– informing the public on civic educa�on, especially good governance and public accountability– promo�ng equal rights for all ci�zens of Pakistan– championing women empowerment– providing training and opportuni�es to youth to veer them away from radicaliza�on through cri�cal thinkingCRSS' programming reflects its core values, which CRSS believes can, along with �me-tested methodologies in strategic communica�ons, impac�ul message development, research and advocacy result in a more tolerant and cohesive Pakistan.

CRSS Publica�ons

CRSS produces several publica�ons annually. Our flagship publica�ons are the NAP Tracker, an annual audit of the counter-terrorism/counter-extremism Na�onal Ac�on Plan (NAP) of the Government of Pakistan; and the Annual Security Report, a measure of the state of security in Pakistan by gauging the number of violence-related casual�es across the country.

In addi�on, our most recent publica�on was the Role of Madrassas, which provided answers to why parents con�nue to send their children to madrassas. CRSS also regularly publishes papers, commentary and analysis by our research fellows from around the world. You can find all of our publica�ons freely online, or collect copies free of cost from our offices in Islamabad.

You can also visit the CRSS Blog, as well as the website of our sister organiza�on Afghan Studies Center.

Center For Research & Security Studies, Islamabad


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