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Advancing Soft Kill CapabilityAdvancing Soft Kill Capability Through Improved Payload

PositioningPositioning

Steve KercheySteve KercheySenior Business Manager - Naval

© 2011 Chemring Countermeasures Ltd

The information in this document is the property of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd and may not be copied or communicated to a third party or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd.

This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Chemring Countermeasures Ltd, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Chemring Countermeasures Ltd or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.

Topics

Soft Kill Background

Current IR decoy capabilities

Advanced IR threats

Future IR decoy capability

Optimisation of capability through Trainable LaunchersOptimisation of capability through Trainable Launchers

ConclusionsConclusions

Questions

08 September 2011 Chemring Countermeasures

Requirements of a Passive Countermeasure S tSystem

1. To provide advice to the Command (launch time, Shipparameters) in order to maximise P (Probability Escaping Hit)parameters) in order to maximise PEH (Probability Escaping Hit).

2. To provide a payload, which individually, or in combinationi h h l d i l d d d hwith other payloads, gives relevant and adequate, and enough

representation of the target from the missile’s perspective andsufficient life to cover typical engagement duration.

3. To deploy payloads to a position/pattern such that the allthe payloads are in the Seeker gate, replicate or improve targetrepresentation OR obscure own ship OR confuse the operatorAND result in the missile missing the intended target.

5. Minimise the Need for Ship Manoeuvre

4. To minimise contribution to ship signature.

08 September 2011

Chemring Countermeasures

Improvement in EW Capability

Improved

Improved Launcher

Rounds Improved EW C2, SI and Launcher

System ,

Algorithms

08 September 2011


Ship Layered Defence – The ProblemyASM Threats:

Sea Skimming Mach 1 Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecReaction Time:

. Sea Skimming Mach 1

. Sea Skimming Mach 1-3+

. High diving

Mach 1 threat: Ship will have 90 SecMach 2 threat: Ship will have 45 SecMach 3 threat: Ship will have 30 Sec

Threat Improvements:Threat Improvements:Higher Frequencies

FasterStealthierStealthier

Increased ManoeuvrabilityMore Processing Power

. Target Detection . Manoeuvre for weapon arcsThreat Response:

. Target Detection

. Classification

. ROE AssessmentWeapon Assignment

. Manoeuvre for weapon arcs

. Fire

. Kill assessmentRe-engage/Reseed if needed

08 September 2011


. Weapon Assignment . Re-engage/Reseed if needed

Ship Layered Defence S d ti

ConfusionChaff

Jammers

DistractionChaff

Active Decoys

SeductionChaff

Active DecoysJammers

Siren ADR

JammersyJammersIR Materials

Sea ViperSea Viper

Seawolf

Range

08 September 2011

Goalkeeper


From a Soft Kill Perspective Mk 41 VLS Primarily designed for Cold War hard kill AAW using Standard SM Series missiles. Adapted for anti surface and anti land. Now has 4 pack for ESSM and Soft kill Active

$Nulka Round (in the order $500,000)

HMS Daring fires Sea Viper - May 11. The first T45 firing was completed 3 years after the ship commissioned, but this is not unusual with such complex weapon systems.C t ti t £2 5bCost estimate - £2.5bn

CENTURION Trainable Launcher System has been designed primarily for EW Soft Kill with 130mm countermeasures. Advanced ASMD Passive countermeasure response. Concept to initial firing 15 months. Concept to production 4 years!!

08 September 2011


Augmenting Hard Kill - Pec, Peh, Pes Curves PPe

Prob

Pec = 1 - ((1-Peh).(1-Pes ) )

bability off Escaping hit

Rather than further improve hard kill, hi h ill f l f

Target Difficulty

which will reap from law of diminishing returns, work on

improving soft kill which has had less impro ement o er the last 10 earsTarget Difficultyimprovement over the last 10 years.

Match Threat Diversity with Defensive Diversity


CCM 216 Distraction Deploymentp y

RF Seduction – Changing from Large Single Burst Payload to

Missile DirectionWind

Burst Payload to….

Missile DirectionWind Direction

Chaff Bloom

Chaff Payload

and Drift

Chaff Payload Deployment

Payload FlightControllable Firing Parameters

Payload Flight

Launcher Azimuth Angle

Launcher Firing Time


….to 5+ Variable Range Payloads

Missile Direction

Wind Direction DirectionDirection

Ships

Chaff Bloom and Drift

pTrack

Chaff Payload Deployment

Controllable Firing Parameters

Launcher Azimuth Angles

Sub-munition Flight Flight Time – Electronic

Launcher Firing Time

08 September 2011


Current Naval IR Decoy CapabilityCurrent naval IR decoys consist of 5 mortar launched sub-munitions containing bursting charge and

y y

sub munitions containing bursting charge and phosphorous leaves.

Fixed firing interval

Sub-munitions generally use a pre-determined fuze.

TALOS

08 September 2011


Current Naval Decoy LaunchersRounds deployed from fixed angle launchers.

y

angle launchers.

Multiple launchers orientated at different azimuth angles gare required to give coverage around a ship.

All launchers tubes at one fixed elevation angle –typically 45 degrees.yp y g

To achieve a given azimuth firing angle the ship may

d t b dneed to be manoeuvred.

08 September 2011


Decoy Against Reticle Type Seeker

08 September 2011


Advanced IR Threats- Imaging infrared seekers are becoming an increasing threat t l l tfto naval platforms.

- Advanced image processing capabilities with the ability to discriminate between target ship and decoys.

- Gated tracking with the use of a guard gate

- Aspect ratio analysis of objects identified by the seeker.

I i i ti fi ld f h- Image processing is a very active field of research.

- Many varied techniques available.

- Further advances are being made all the time.

08 September 2011


Example Of A Decoy Against an IIR Seeker

08 September 2011


Future IR Decoy Capability- Future IR naval decoys will need to be placed so that IR seekers see patterns that

y y

make it hard to reject with simple techniques.

- IR decoy rounds fired from fixed angle tubes have very limited ability to form a specific pattern.

- Chemring Countermeasures is developing a variable range round and a fully trainable launcher to maximise payload placementlauncher to maximise payload placement accuracy.

The aim is to form decoy patterns that areThe aim is to form decoy patterns that are more ship signature representative against sophisticated threats.

08 September 2011


CENTURION® CoverageCENTURION Coverage

800 600800 600

100

Ship

00

Elevation determined by launcher design

Range determined by countermeasure

Range determined by countermeasure

Azimuth coverage limited by ship’s structure

Elevation Azimuth


Algorithm OptimisationNeed to consider ship speed and heading, wind speed and bearing, threat bearing and closing speed and many other g g g p yparameters to calculate solution.

Launch parameters need to be calculated very quicklyLaunch parameters need to be calculated very quickly.

A human operator will not be able to calculate all the parameters quickly enoughparameters quickly enough.

Complexity of the problem and timing requirements dictate that a fast computer algorithm will be needed.

This is essentially a multi-dimensional optimisation problem y p pthat the algorithm controlling the deployment of the decoys will have to solve.


Desired PatternThe pattern should walk the seeker off the ship without triggering the guard gate

Th tt i ti d h th t th l t d i b i t f llThe pattern is timed such that the last decoy is burning out or falls into the sea (which ever occurs first) when the missile is arriving at the ship’s position.

Use decoy as early as possible without allowing the seeker a chance to reacquire.

Ed f S k FOVEdge of Seeker FOV

08 September 2011


CENTURION Against IIR Seeker

08 September 2011


08 September 2011


CENTURION® - Key Design Features• 12 Rounds – vertically stored to minimise firing and training forces• Target unloaded weight <1000Kg• Deck Footprint <2.2m diameter• Reaction time <3 sec - worst case

B k d tibilit ith i ti d• Backward compatibility with existing rounds• Stabilised in ship’s heading, pitch and roll• Low RCS Signature• Low RCS Signature• High Through Life Capability Management upgrades• WLC and Supportability addressed in design• WLC and Supportability addressed in design

• COTS Components• AR&MAR&M• Safety• Training (Maintainers and Operators)


Operational Advantages of CENTURION®

• Area coverage minimises the need for ship manoeuvre

• Optimal solution to high weight of attack

• Maximises soft kill effectiveness

• 3 axis placement accuracy with variable range rounds• 3 axis placement accuracy with variable range rounds

• All soft-kill munitions available for all engagements

• Increases payload placement accuracy by compensating for ship movement thereby maximising ship signature replication

• Low angle firings to achieve ballistic trajectory and therefore significantly reduced flight times for Distraction

• High angle firings for steep attack threats

Maximises Contribution to Platform Protection08 September

2011Chemring Countermeasures

Maximises Contribution to Platform Protection

Prototype Bravo Launcher

08 September 2011


Prototype Bravo Launcher


Conclusions- IIR missiles are becoming an increasingly sophisticated threat.- Variable range rounds fired from a trainable launcher offerVariable range rounds fired from a trainable launcher offer potential to be able to place decoys in such a way that they are much harder to distinguish from the ship.- To place the decoys in an effective pattern requires an algorithm that needs to solve a complex multi dimensional

ti i tioptimisation.- Modelling has shown that a trainable launcher with variable range rounds offers a significant improvement in capabilityrange rounds offers a significant improvement in capability.

08 September 2011


Thank you for your attentiony yFor further details and briefing

please visit Stand 27please visit Stand 27

© 2011 Chemring Countermeasures Ltd

The information in this document is the property of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd and may not be copied or communicated to a third party or used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied without the express written consent of Chemring Countermeasures Ltd.

This information is given in good faith based upon the latest information available to Chemring Countermeasures Ltd, no warranty or representation is given concerning such information, which must not be taken as establishing any contractual or other commitment binding upon Chemring Countermeasures Ltd or any of its subsidiary or associated companies.

Download - Advancing Soft Kill Capability Advancing Soft Kill Capability

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