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A plan for co‐operation intransport between South andNorth KoreaMyong‐Sop Pak a & Tae‐Yong Kim a
a National Sussan University , Nam‐ku, Pusan, Korea ,608–737Published online: 13 Mar 2007.
To cite this article: Myong‐Sop Pak & Tae‐Yong Kim (1996) A plan for co‐operationin transport between South and North Korea, Transport Reviews: A TransnationalTransdisciplinary Journal, 16:3, 225-241, DOI: 10.1080/01441649608716949
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TRANSPORT REVIEWS, 1996, VOL. 16, No. 3, 225-241
A plan for co-operation in transport between South andNorth Korea
By MYONG-SOP PAK and TAE-YONG KIM
National Sussan University, Nam-ku, Pusan, Korea 608-737
This paper investigates the setting up and co-ordination of an adequatetransport network between South and North Korea in anticipation of the ultimateunification of the Korean peninsula which occupies an important geopoliticalposition in the transport network of northeast Asia. Such a transport network isanalysed in all modes of transport by sea, land and air.
1. IntroductionWith the rapid growth of South Korea's economy in recent years, a considerable
amount of capital and technology has been accumulated, which should become abasis for strengthening economic co-operation with the North, preparing the way torestore the people's homogeneity and achieving peaceful unification. On the otherhand, there is North Korea's shortage of foreign currency and technological back-wardness because of its self-reliant economic policy which is now being changed to apolicy of opening the country.
Due to the long military and political confrontation between the North andSouth, a communication network between the two nations, whether roads, railways,air or maritime services, does not exist. These would be essential for an activeeconomic exchange. The more economic co-operation between the South and theNorth improves, the higher will be the quantity of goods that have to be transported.Hence the necessity for a connecting transport network is to increase.
Even if North Korea adopts a policy of promoting the expansion of imports andexports to satisfy the domestic demand, it will be very difficult to solve the question ofinternational transport with the existing infrastructure. A solution could be the useof South Korean transport facilities, but then it would not only be necessary to buildsuitable roads but also to set up an adequate transport network between North andSouth Korea in anticipation of the ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula. Suchan inter-Korean transport system would enable North and South Korea, whichoccupy an important geopolitical position in the transport network of northeast Asia,to become a strategic region that links northeast Asia to Europe and North Americain the transport of people, cargoes and information.
2. Korean transport policy for economic co-operation in northeast AsiaAs the end of the Cold War era leads to the reshaping of the international order,
northeast Asia is also seeking out a new inter-relationship. The trend of regionaliza-tion, transformation of the former Soviet Union, China's continued efforts towardsopenness and reform, and North Korea's attempt to expand its external economicrelationship, are basic conditions for the realization of the great developmentpotential.
The northeast Asia region has become an area which has received a lot ofattention, and is closely watched by the rest of the world community for various
0144-1647/96 $12.00 © 1996 Taylor & Francis Ltd.
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reasons. This area consists of South Korea, North Korea, Japan, Mongolia, China(specifically the provinces of Heilong-Jang, Jilin and Liaoning), Inner Mongolia andthe Russian Far East with a total area of about 10 million square kilometres.According to United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates of1990, the total population of this area is about 320 million people, with a GNP ofabout US $3 500 billion. However, if we include China as a whole, then we will have atotal population of about 1-425 billion or 27% of the total population of the world.
In the northeast Asia region, we have countries with different levels of develop-ment which could compliment and help each other. They range from an under-developed country like Mongolia to a highly industrialized country like Japan. Thisregion is also endowed with the largest concentration of natural resources in theworld. To develop and utilize these resources, Japan possesses large amounts ofcapital and advanced technology, South Korea has experience in successfullyachieving economic development with quite a high standard of technology andcapital (Noland, 1990). China has a vast labour force which also provides a hugeconsuming power.
China is the most distinctive case in the region. Since the opening of the country in1978, China has shown a really impressive growth performance. Its annual averagegrowth rate was 10-1% during 1980-1985 and 7-9% during 1985-1990. The growthrate of China's GDP is 8-2% for 1991, 13-4% for 1992 and 1993, and 11-6% for thefirst half of 1994 (Ling, 1994). With a population of 1-2 billion and its economic andnon-economic potential, it seems that China will play a very important role in thecoming century in this region as well as in the world. Some economists predict thatChina will surpass Japan in GNP after 2020 if she keeps her high growth rate in thefuture. With the establishment of a socialist market economy, the total amount ofeconomic income will grow rapidly and the people's standard of living will get closerto that of affluent societies. Transport as the infrastructure of the national economyand social development will then face new situations and new patterns and assume anincreasingly important role.
On the other hand, Japan and South Korea, both densely populated countries, arepoor in natural resources and depend largely on foreign trade. North Korea hasample mineral resources, and is attempting to liberalize its closed economic structuregradually; it looks likely that North Korea will adopt a Chinese style of market-oriented economy step by step. For example, North Korea is also adopting a limitedopening in the TREDA (Tumen River Economic Development Area) by allowing itto develop as a special export-oriented free economic trade zone along the Chinesemodel. TREDA is an area bordering China, Russia and North Korea (Seol, 1993).
The Tumen River Economic Development Area (TREDA) project is co-ordinatedand supported by the UNDP on behalf of the five countries signatory to the October1991 Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) agreement: SouthKorea, North Korea, China, Russia and Mongolia. The long-term goal of thisproject is twofold: to develop the region as the hub of transport and as the centre ofprocessing and manufacturing industry. The achievement of these two goals is verylikely to turn Tumen River area into an epicentre, like Hong Kong.
The Tumen river flows mostly along the Korea-China border, but also along theKorea-Russia border over a distance of 15 kilometres between Fangchuan in Chinaand the East sea (sea of Japan). TREDA basically consists of that terrain locatedwithin conceptual boundary lines drawn from Chongjin in North Korea, throughYanji in China to Nakhodka in Russia. TREDA specifically incorporates the Najin/
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 227
Sonbong Special Economic Zone in North Korea, the Yanbin Autonomous Pre-fecture in China which includes the Special Economic Zones of Yanji and Hunchu,and Vladivostok and the Free Economic Zone of Nakhodka including Vostochnyand Primorsky Krai towns and ports south of those cities in Russia.
According to the TRADP Infrastructure Sub-Group UNDP (1995), the currentTREDA population of 3 million is expected to exceed 10 million by 2020 while thereal average annual GDP per capita of this population is expected to rise by a factorof more than five from approximately US $1 200 in 1990 to some US $6 500 in 2020, inconstant 1990 dollars.
The potential for a transport hub lies in its possible role as a bridgeheadconnecting such areas as Japan and South Korea, since TREDA, in addition to itsproximity to those two countries, can be connected to either the Trans-SiberianRailway or the Trans-China Railway (figure 1). The rail network within TREDA canbe considered the most efficient and best developed transport mode for supporting theeconomic development of the area, since although it is not yet completed, it is muchfurther advanced than the highway network. The missing railway links betweenHunchun and Zarubino and between Hunchun and Najin would give the ports ofZarubino and Najin the critical transport connection with the rest of TREDA. Ifthese connections are completed, it will curtail transport distance and diversifytransport mode from the east coast of Korea and the west coast of Japan toEurope. In addition, it will provide China with access to the East sea throughTREDA, which in turn will facilitate external trade with northeast China. Also, aconnection could be made to the Trans-Siberian Railway through northeasternMongolia upon completion of links within TREDA: this would pass through
RUSSIA
WIDE GAUGE
STANDARD GAUGE
COMPOSITE CAUCE
- UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Figure 1. Railway transport network of TREDA.
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228 Myong-Sop Pak and Tae-Yong Kim
Table 1. Feasibility of economic cooperation among northeast Asian countries.
Southern countriesJapanSouth Korea
Northern countriesRussia (Siberia)China (3 provinces)North Korea
OthersChina (mainland)
Resource
AA
OO
•O
Labour
AA
AOO
O
Capital
O
•AAA
A
Technology
O
•AAA
A
Social overheadcapital (SOC)
O
•AAA
A
Note: Symbols indicate rich (O), moderate (O) and poor (A).
Changchun to Arxan on the Mongolian border and to Choybalsan to connect withthe Trans-Siberian Railway at Borzya. This will make it easier to develop easternparts of Mongolia. However, because the would-be partners are proposing planswhich are based on their own national interests and circumstances, the task ofco-ordination and integration is expected to require a considerable period of time.
The combination and complimentariness of various forces, capacities andopportunities will undoubtedly help foster the development and growth of thisregion (table 1). For efficient economic co-operation here a transport network inthe northeast Asia region appropriate for the 21st century must be established.
Transport is a crucial link in the world economy, both as a servant and as a creatorof trade. Cheap and efficient transport services are a prerequisite to an expandingworld trade. As Stubbs et al. (1980) put it:
Transport is a keystone of civilisation. The spread of production, trade and ideasand the economic ascendancy of mankind all depend upon movement. Personalmobility is one of democracy's most valued freedoms, and a surprisingly highproportion of our income is devoted to our movement and to the movement of thegoods that we buy.
The transport network development strategy for the Korean peninsula is thedevelopment of contiguous routes between South and North Korea. Transport routesthat are the most rational for the entire economy of northeast Asia should beconsidered.
The Korean peninsula is situated between the Yellow sea where it faces China andthe East sea (sea of Japan) where it faces Japan and Russia. Thus it is the centre of thenortheast Asia region. The East sea maritime transport network should link the portsof Pusan, Sokcho (South Korea), Najin (North Korea), Niigata (Japan) and Vladivo-stock (Russia). Express highway and express rail routes are to be constructed betweenPusan and Vladivostock. All of these express highway and rail routes are to beconnected to Japan through an undersea tunnel constructed under the strait betweenKorea and Japan. The Yellow sea transport networks for both sea and air should linkcities on the Korean peninsula with Kyusha (Japan), Dalian (China), Beijing andShanghai.
In the past, the intermodal transport network linking northeast Asia with Europefocused on the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), the alternative to the all-water servicevia the Suez canal. Today, however, the world's interest is in potential landbridges
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 229
that link China (Trans-China Railway, TCR) with the Korean peninsula (Trans-Korean Railway; TKR) as well. Exploitation of a trans-continental railway isregarded as the most important development in the supra-regional transportsystem as it has remarkable impacts on transport cost and time savings. Accordingto Containerisation International Yearbook (1992), an examination of the competi-tive distance, time and cost from Kobe and Yokohama in Japan to Rotterdam andMunich in Europe shows that the Trans-Far East/Europe railway is superior to all-water service. In the transport from northeast Asia to Europe, TSR at present takesthe shortest running time of 25 days and is the most economic route, but TCR is morecompetitive than TSR in terms of distance and running time. As the Korea MaritimeInstitute (1992) analysed, in the case of Korea, if the disconnected railway isreconstructed between Seoul and Wonsan (North Korea) and linked to the TSR ofthe former Soviet Union, or if the TKR is connected to the TSR passing throughPyongyang, then the TKR will be more competitive than either the TSR or the TCRin terms of running time and the cost (table 2).
3. The present North Korean transport systemAt the time of writing in South Korea, the relative balance by traffic volume in the
operation of transport systems is 34% by rail, 23% by road and sea, and 43% by air.The figures for North Korea, on the other hand, are 86% by rail, 12% by road andsea, and only 2% by air (Kim, K. S., 1994).
The following reasons account for the predominant use of rail for transportinggoods in North Korea: First, North Korea maintains its domestic policy with theintention of establishing an independent national economy. Second, North Korea hasbeen giving priority to trade with China and Russia, countries connected to NorthKorea by rail. Third, since North Korea's coasts are only in the east and west,transport by sea is almost non-existent. This is opposite to the general tendencytowards the establishment and expansion of the shipping industry since the secondworld war (Pak, 1991).
For a transport system to operate normally, it should be developed to match thegrowth of the economy and industrial development. In the case of North Korea,however, although the country has emphasized the importance of transport, it haslacked consistency in its development, resulting in frustration with the transport
Table 2. Comparison of grand land bridge (distance, freight, sailing time) to Rotterdam.
Distance(km)
Freight(US$)
Sailingtime(days)
TKRTCRTSRSea route
TKRTCRTSRSea route
TKRTCRTSRSea route
From Pusan
13023103701223019790
1388146416501876
25-3524-3225-3526-30
From Inchon
12 608102461293720109
1338144916501876
26-3524-3226-3526-30
From Kobe
13 607110001282020200
1859154117641629
25-3525-3225-3525-30
Source: Korean Maritime Institute, 1992, Proceedings of the 4th KMl International Symposium.
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230 Myong-Sop Pak and Tae-Yong Kim
system. In other words development of the transport system has not kept up withindustrial development, and too much emphasis has been put on the rail transportnetwork.
3.1. RailwaysThe railway, as the main axis of North Korea's transport system, takes 90% of all
cargo and 60% of all passenger travel. Due to the topography of North Korea, therail network is divided into two parts, the eastern network and the western network(figure 2). In the southern area of North Korea, a connection between Pyongyang andWonsan has been constructed. Since 1970, the railtrack has been changed to broad-gauge and electrified; it was created to bring products directly from the productionsite to the consumer. The national rail network spans the length and breadth of the
C " , ' • ' ««t , - v,^-. ^ ; p -j-^,:
Figure 2. North Korea.
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 231
country. There is the Kyongui line, the Wonna basic line (from Wonsan to Najin), thePyongwon line, and the Chongchon-Ichon line. Recently, including a section in thenorth, six lines were newly established or expanded, bringing the total length ofrailway to 5059 km. Since beginning electrification of the Pyongwon line in 1958,North Korea has electrified 65% (3280 km) of its railways (Kim, Y. Y., 1994). This isa considerable achievement compared with South Korea.
There are three reasons for North Korea concentrating on electrifying therailways. First, as there are many extreme curves the rail tracks were of low quality.Second, many locomotives had to be exchanged anyway, because of their age. Andthird, to use electric locomotives that run on domestically generated power instead ofusing diesel-locomotives which run on imported oil. For these reasons, North Koreais continuing to electrify her railways.
However, North Korea's railway cannot fulfil all its given tasks. First, 98% oftheir railways are only single track. The higher the reliance is on rail for cargotransport, the less effective it is with single tracks over long distances. However muchthe transport effectiveness is raised by electrifying single tracks, it cannot increase theeffectiveness of cargo transport over long distances. The higher the reliance on rail forcargo transport is (the reliance on rail for cargo transport in North Korea was 88% in1988, and 90% in 1992) the higher the operational frequency. But the higher theoperational frequency, the more stations are necessary, which in turn increases delays.If North Korea relies on single track railways for cargo transport, the distributionsystem of goods will itself have much less value.
North Korea, bordering directly on China and Russia, has six railway lines goinginto China and one into Russia, but at present only three are in service. These havestations at Sinuiju, Namyang, and Dumankang (Tumen River) on the North Koreanside, and stations at Dandong and Tumen in China and at Khasan in Russia.
3.2. RoadsAs cargo transported by rail has to be picked up from the stations and transported
to the consumers, the amount of the cargo transported on the roads has increasedabruptly. Modification of the roads soon became necessary, because other light, shortdistance cargo was also being transported by road.
The North Korean government planned, therefore, to increase road capacity forcargo transport as follows: capacity expansion of 2-9 times during the first seven-yearplan (1961-67), 1-8 times expansion during a six-year plan (1971-76), a four-timesexpansion during the second seven-year plan (1978-84), and a 2-6 times expansionduring the third seven-year plan (1987-93). Those goals were never achieved becauseof the topography of the country with its steep slopes, and the extremely small andnarrow roads, mostly unpaved, which shortened the life of trucks and the transportability of the network.
Since 1970, North Korea has put a lot of effort into paving the main roads andhas been continuously building highways after the construction of the first one in1978 between Pyongyang and Wonsan. However, the North has invested relativelylittle in highway construction due to the preponderance of the railway as a means oftransport. Only 7-6% of the 23000 km of road is paved, only 1 717 km of the roadsare without hills, and there is just 530 km of highway defined as roads suitablefor vehicles travelling at 80-100 km per hour, 20-23 metres wide includingroad surface, median strip and shoulder and four lanes (Korea Transport Institute1991).
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China
^
H i c h o n tahung.^
Figure 3. Express highway network in North Korea.
North Korea's 530 kms of highways consist of the following (figure 3):Pyongyang-Nampo (53 km), Pyongyang-Wonsan (172 km), Pyongyang-Sunan(15km), and Wonson-Keumgangsan (114km), Pyongyang-Kaeseong (170km),and Pyongyang-Hicheon (120 km) are under construction. We can see here thatthe highways from Pyongyang to Nampo and Wonsan connect the west with the east,and the others to Hicheon and Kaeseong connect the north with the south.
Thus the industrial belt, with Pyongyang as its centre, is connected to theports, while a middle axis provides a road link between the port of Nampo onthe west coast and the port of Wonsan on the east coast. This connects to theindustrial belt (chemical and metal industries) at Hamhung and Hungnam, andalso to the northern city of Hicheon at the centre of the biggest precisioninstrument and car-producing region in North Korea. The most recently completedhighway section, from Pyongyang to Kaeseong, will, as the route to Pyongyang fromthe south, be playing an important role in connections between North and SouthKorea. North Korea's highways are necessary as links between the industrial regions,and are also building bridges to those regions that require preferential constructionwork.
Faster development for North Korean roads is not in sight for the near future, asNorth Korea maintains the policy of using roads only for short distances (within arange of 30 km). While South Korea's transport system operates according to the'first road, second rail' policy, North Korea applies a 'first rail, second road' policy,which explains the fact that North Korea's road cargo transport is only one-tenth thatof South Korea.
We can see a similar contrast in the possession of cars. Entrance into modernsociety means entrance into a car society. The higher the economic growth is, thegreater the importance of road transport for goods and passengers. Road transporthas the advantage that any item can be brought right to the desired place. Using therailway for moving small amounts of goods over short distances can be far moreinconvenient, because trains need a lot of time to stop for loading and unloading, andneed considerable manpower, as well as requiring other means for transport to a finaldestination. It is much less efficient.
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 233
3.3. Shipping and portsIn 1975 North Korea had a fleet of 17 ships comprising a total of 82000 gross
register tons compared with South Korea's 476 ships of 1 484 000 gross register tons.By 1992, North Korea's fleet had increased to 540000 gross register tons: not even10% of that of South Korea which was 7410411 gross register tons. North Koreapossesses only 20% of the ships it actually needs for transporting cargo to and fromother countries. At present the nation relies on the service of vessels from its tradingpartner countries (Chung, 1992).
There are two sea routes in the home waters of the east coast. One in the northernregion connects the cities of Najin, Chongjin and Hungnam, relieving the over-burdened Wonna main railway line. The other is the southern sea route, which, inconnecting Wonsan, Kojeo and Jangjeon, is the main transport route in the regionalong the coast to the south of the East sea. Three important routes in the homewaters of the west coast are used for the transport of iron and silica. These sea routes,which connect the iron mines in Dokhyon (Pyongyang province) with theHwanghea steel mills at Songrim, are the Yongampo-Dasado-Songrim route,the Mongkeumpo-Nampo route, and the Soheri-Songrim route.
North Korea is operating Nampo as the overseas port for the west sea route whichleads to Shanghai in China. On the east side is a route from Chongjin and Najin to theports of Vladivostock and Nakhodka in Russia, and a southern route connectsHungnam, Chongjin, Wonsan, Nampo and Haeju with Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe,Osaka, Moji and Niigata in Japan.
The ports on the east and west coasts of North Korea serve different functions.Eight of the ports, Nampo, Songrim, Haeju, Rajin, Wonsan, Hungnam, Chongjin,and Sonbong are trading ports. By contrast, the five ports of Kimchek, Chongjin,Sinpo, Yanghwa and Wonsan are ocean maritime ports, and with Sinuiju there areanother three fishing ports. Although transport by sea did not play a big role, NorthKorea has built up her ports over the years. However, they are still unable to unloadvessels over 20000 gross register tons and have no special piers for container ships.Until the seventies, the loading and unloading capability in North Korean ports wasvery limited as there was a lack of basic equipment. Things have improved, however,and with the beginning of the eighties when plans were made to increase overseastrade, ports were expanded. As a result, in 1990, ports like Chongjin could unload8 800 000 tons, Nampo 7 000 000 tons, and Najin 4 000 000 tons, with a nationwidetotal of 34-9 million tons (Hyundai Shipping Company, 1992).
North Korea is moving carefully to open the country to foreign markets, even ifonly partially, by assigning Sonbong as a trading port and by participating inplanning for developing the Tumen River area. According to the plans, Sonbongshould mainly become a container port. The first step is to bring Sonbong's loadingand unloading capacity to 20 million tons a year, then to 59-99 million tons as asecond step. As the third step, the port should expand to the extent that it can handle100 million tons of cargo annually.
At the end of 1991 North Korea announced its plan to designate Najin-Sonbongand Chongjin port as a free economic trade zone and free trade port, respectively.This zone is the so-called sub-triangle area in the Tumen River area, and the northernpart of Sonbong borders both China and Russia. The Najin-Sonbong zone is witnessinga gradual process of infrastructure development and improvement. Most of theseactivities are funded and undertaken by the central government. According toHla (UNDP Resident Representive in Seoul, 1995), state investment totals about
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US $50 million (excluding labour cost) and this amount will be doubled to over US $100million in 1995. This includes major improvement of highways upgrading and elec-trification of railways from the Chinese border to Najin and Chongjin, the doubling ofrailway capacity from Najin to the Russia border (Tumen River), the upgrading of theSonbong airport and run-way facilities to operate commercial services by 1996 and thecompletion of two more berths at Chongjin port to handle transit cargo to China. At theNajin port, the installation of the aluminium terminal for handling containers is due tobe completed during 1995.
3.4. Air servicesNorth Korea does not have civil airlines. The only airline of North Korea, called
Korea Airline (renamed from Chosun Civil Air in 1992) is run by the Bureau of AirTransport, whose president is Kim Yong-Woong, general director of the Civil AirTransport Bureau. Korea Airline has currently five international routes to six citiesin five countries. The five routes are as follows: Pyongyang-Moscow-Berlin,Pyongyang-Moscow-Sofia, Pyongyang-Khabarovsk, Pyongyang-Beijing, andPyongyang-Bangkok. In addition, Aeroflot, the Russian airline, has a weeklyflight between Khabarovsk and Pyongyang. A Chinese civil airline also serves theBeijing-Pyongyang route (Kim, I. K., 1992). Aeroflot also has the right to make aweekly flight between Moscow and Pyongyang but it is not in service at the time ofwriting.
Korea Airline's Pyongyang-Bangkok route, which was initially approved by thepertinent governments in March 1993, is known to have discontinued its service afterits first flight in April of the same year because of very few passengers. North Korea'sairline also operates irregular flights between Pyongyang and east Europe, the MiddleEast and Africa.
North Korea also had an agreement with Japan, after talks in Beijing in January1992, to open air routes between Pyongyang and Nagoya, and Pyongyang andNiigata, with 80 flights per year. The agreement has not come into effect, however, asthe talks on the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countriesended in a stalemate. Korea Airline owns 29 principal aircraft and 35 supplementarycarriers, a total of 64 civil aircraft. For its international airport, North Korea hasSunan International Airport, which was constructed in the 1950s at the outskirts ofPyongyang and was partly expanded in 1989 before an international student festivalin Pyongyang. Few North Koreans have the opportunity to use this airport.
On domestic flights within North Korea there are no civilian passengers to beseen. However, an air service operates between Pyongyang, Hamhung and Chongjinfor government personnel almost every day. In addition, other planes are operated onan irregular basis for crop dusting, fish-finding, and patrolling the coast. SunanInternational Airport has continuously expanded since it was opened in 1955. Atother places, such as Sunan, Wonsan, Seondeog, Chongjin, Haesan etc., domesticairports are located for the use of military and government personnel.
4. Transport co-operation between South and North KoreaThe most urgent requirement for smooth economic exchange and co-operation
between South and North Korea is the construction of a transport network betweenthem. Through the construction of such a transport network, mutual economicreliance between the South and the North would be strengthened. If South Koreancompanies go into North Korea and North Korea is unable to solve her problem of
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 235
narrow roads many of the benefits will not be realised. Co-operation in transportbetween both Koreas is therefore necessary. Such a transport network needs to beconstructed for all modes of transport (sea, rail, roads, and air service in that order).This involves considering economic elements and national security.
4.1. Maritime co-operationThe maritime service has disadvantages with regard to speed and convenience, but
it has strong advantages in its high capability in cargo loading. As for ports for inter-Korean trade, Nampo and Haeju on the west coast and Chongjin, Najin andHungnam on the east coast of North Korea could be mentioned, while SouthKorea has ports in Incheon, Mokpo, Pusan and Pohang.
At present cargo, unable to be shipped directly between North and South Korea,has to either be shipped through Chinese ports or via very circuitous routes thatextend many kilometres from the Korean coast. The direct route between Incheonand Nampo which is projected to open a service by the Samsun Shipping Company is137 km long, a distance roughly half the 250 km via a Chinese port (Weihai). Thedirect voyage takes only one day compared with the roundabout route which requirestwo or three days. The cargo shipping on this ocean route would cost 60-6% less. TheSamsun Shipping Company has also announced plans to open a direct Pusan-Chongjin route by way of Japan. This Pusan-Chongjin (Wonsan) route would beprofitable both to the shipowner and the consignor. The cargo transport bound forthree northeastern provinces of China is currently conducted on the Pusan-Dalian-Changchun route, but a direct inter-Korean sea route such as the Pusan-Chongjin-Changchun route would reduce the shipping charges to a great degree. The shippingdistance of the Pusan-Chongjin-Changchun route is 1482 km, which is much shorterthan the 2028 km of the Pusan-Dalian-Changchun route (Kukje Sinmun, 1994).
In consideration of these facts, the marine transport of a unified Korea is expectedto prosper on the one hand along the East sea axis linking Pusan-Chongjin(Wonsan)-Najin-Sonbong, and, on the other hand, along the West sea axis linkingKwangyang-Incheon-Nampo-Sinuiju.
To ensure mutual benefit, both sides have to abide by the principle of using thesame number of vessels with the same loading capacity (Chung, 1992). However, sincethe number of North Korean cargo ships is too small, South Korean vessels shouldcarry out the transport of cargo for the time being while North Korea build up herfleet and catches up gradually. In the very early stage it could even also be desirablethat ships from a third country transport the cargo between South and North Korea,but before a foreign fleet could carry such cargo, it would have to be agreed that thiskind of shipping service is not international transport. Also, a plan should beconsidered for co-operation in expanding social overhead capital for the incompleteport facilities in North Korea. In order to exchange technical know-how andinformation, academic exchange, specialist training, and mutual port inspectionsshould be held. This would lead to a supplementing of facilities that are lacking, andto an improvement in the efficiency of operations. For example, there is serious lack ofequipment and experience in handling containers (Korea Maritime Affairs Institute,1994).
4.2. Land transport co-operationIt is important to work out a way to transport goods between South and North
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Korea by using the North Korean railway, but, considering the isolation of NorthKorea at the time of writing, it seems to be a very difficult task. The following reasonssuggest why it is none the less possible: first, the Kyongeui line is at present inactive inall the provinces with the exception of the area near Pyongyang: it could, therefore, beused for cargo transport without additional investment (Im, 1991). Second, by usingthe idle rail facilities, foreign currency, of which there is a great shortage, could beobtained. It is not clear, however, whether the Hamkyong line (now Pyongna line)from Kowon to Chongjin has reserve potential for transporting cargo, and the linealso appears too short to be profitable.
The Kyongui line linking Seoul and Sinuiju along the west coast would come intooperation again if the 12 km between Munsan and Changan are restored, and theKyongwon line linking Seoul and Wonsan would be able to run again with thereconstruction of the 16 km between Sintanri and Woljongsa. When these two railwaylines are completely restored, then Korea will be able to construct a trans-continentalrailway starting from Pusan, linking it to Europe and the Middle East.
Travelling from Seoul to Pusan in a super train in less than two hours (it now takesfour hours) may sound like a dream but it will become a reality by 2002 when an inter-city high-speed railway will be put into operation (Korea Times, 1995). The Seoul-Pusan high-speed rail system was first proposed in 1981 as part of the nation's fifthFive-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan. The project, expected to cost over 13billion dollars and the biggest in Korea's history, is expected not only to revolutio-nalize domestic transport but substantially affect other fields as well. It is projectedto extend to Sinuiju, at the northwestern tip of the Korean peninsula, in the event ofunification, while lines linking Seoul to the southwestern part of Korea and across tothe southeast are also envisioned in a government plan for the complete networkingby the high-speed rail system.
Korea is also looking beyond its boundaries with a view to making the country aninitiating point of a possible trans-Siberian high-speed rail, linking Korea to Europe.Thus the project promises to become a cornerstone of the Korean globalizationprocess, helping unify the Korean peninsula, while strengthening its internationalcompetitiveness through high tech rail transport.
In preparation for re-unification, the South Korean government plans over thelong-term to construct a road network in the form of a lattice with seven north-southroutes and nine east-west routes (figure 4). This main road network will be financedby private capital. The vice-minister for construction in South Korea explained in aspecial report before the National Assembly on 31 August 1994, that it is important toconstruct a main road network in the form of a lattice, in order to achieve balanceddevelopment for the nation and to prepare for a unified Korea. The shortage offinancial resources for such a road construction project will be made up by privatecapital finance. The seven north-south routes will include Mokpo-Seoul-Sinuiju,Masan-Wonju-Haesan, Kwangju-Seoul-Manpo, and Pusan-Kangneung-Sonbong, while the nine east-west axes will be expansions of already-existinghighways and national roads. A precondition for constructing a new road networkand expanding existing roads is, more than anything else, a resolute policy of openingthe country. If this plan is going to be applied successfully, North Korea's economywill receive a boost for the following reasons:
First, the construction of these roads could provide North Korea with jobs andstimulate related industries. Second, income could come from road taxes and highwaytolls. Third, foreign investment is essential to building up North Korea's economy.
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 237
'Wando'
Figure 4. Main road network plan.
Through an efficient and systematic transport network, foreign investors can beattracted.
The principal contributors to the taxes and tolls would be South Korean andforeign companies using North Korean roads to move cargoes to and from China,Mongolia, Russia and Europe. The income would be paid to the North Koreangovernment or to a joint venture between, say, a highway construction company andNorth Korea.
4.3. Air transport co-operationAlthough there have been an increased number of flights between Japan and
China and between Korea and China, direct air routes by way of North Korea areessential in order for Korea to make connections for northeastern China, Far EasternRussia and Mongolia. Air routes in northeast Asia consume a great amount of timeand fuel because of 'political detours'. For example the direct route between Seouland Beijing is 900 km in distance, which is less than half the flight distance of 1 940 kmalong the current air route. Direct air routes would greatly contribute to the furthergrowth of air transport.
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North Korea announced on 22 December 1994 that it will allow all civil airplanesof the world to have access to its territorial airspace and to land and take off at itsairports. In addition, North Korea has indicated its intention to enter the ICAOagreement on international aviation business and transit, which stipulates that themember countries of the agreement are required to provide safe transit and landingfor purposes other than transport by civil aviation of the other member countries.Entry into this agreement, however, does not guarantee these privileges; the transit ofterritorial airspace requires further permission from the authorities concerned. TheSouth Korean Ministry of Construction and Transport has not received any formalnotice as yet from the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) concerningthe opening of North Korea's airspace. It seems impossible for the time being, forSouth Korean civil aircraft to be able to pass through North Korean territorialairspace.
Some civil airlines think that opening North Korea's airspace would be of minorhelp in travelling to Siberian areas (for example, the Seoul-Khabrovsk route) becausethe narrow airspace of North Korea is of little use or significance. Furthermore,aviation authorities estimate that foreign airlines would prefer the Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo route to the Beijing-Pyongyang-Tokyo route even though the latter is to beopened, because of the less efficient North Korean air traffic control (Chosun Ilbo,1994).
5. ConclusionAccording to the above analysis, Korea should set up in the near future a well co-
ordinated and completely modern comprehensive transport system, equipped withadvanced transport technology. This system will have rail, highway, sea and air routesas the backbone and will be compensated by other kinds of multimodal transportlines to link up different parts of the country with main routes and subordinate routes,combining water, land and air transport into a whole network. South and NorthKorea should talk about an investment plan for the expansion of social overheadcapital investments such as the construction of a transport network that connects allparts of the peninsula. If possible, the plan should be tendered as a 'national plan forcomprehensive development', as preparation for the tie-up after unification.
In both halves of Korea, large ports should be constructed where the major roadsend in coastal cities. These ports should be connected through seaways, and withfurther planning for developing the relationship between roads and seaways, coastaltransport should be initiated. The plan should not stop there. By constructing a north-south highway through the two Koreas, the transport network of the Korean peninsulacan connect the transport network of the Pacific ocean with China and Russia, whichwould make Korea the central point of cargo distribution in northeast Asia.
To realize this plan, North Korea should build distribution facilities, like truckterminals, delivery centres, industrial distribution centres, and store houses, at theeight biggest industrial regions, which should in the future be connected to the(already planned) compound cargo terminals in the main cities of South Korea. Thecargoes between these terminals could be transported by train or truck. Suchcompound cargo terminals would deal with national as well as overseas transport.It should be also considered that through co-operation in maritime transport betweenSouth and North Korea, a coastal maritime service between the south and the northwould effectively support the land cargo transport, alleviating the already serioustraffic congestion.
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Co-operation in transport between South and North Korea 239
Finally, if a financial arrangement is made for North Korea's portion, the otherprojects (in South Korea) will not be difficult to finance. In fact, the means ofacquiring these funds is the most important theme of these projects. In August 1994,the South Korean government announced the Private Capital Inducement Act for theExpansion of Social Infrastructure, and an enforcement decree the followingNovember, in order to encourage private investment in infrastructural projects andestablish a legal framework for incentives for private investors in those projects.Private companies investing in primary and secondary infrastructural facilities will bepermitted to obtain commercial loans as permitted by the Foreign Capital Induce-ment Act. Private companies planning infrastructural projects will be entitled to taxincentives such as a 50% reduction of capital gains tax and capital gains surcharge, a15% deduction for investment reserve, and a full deduction for interest on loansassociated with infrastructural projects. A fund will be established to guarantee thedebt obligations of private enterprises which take out loans for infrastructuralprojects. This will serve to ensure the entire infrastructural investment programmeover the long-term.
Possible risks and dangers arising from such investment can be divided anddispersed through the International Financial Corporation (IFC), the Asian Devel-opment Bank (ADB), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), andthe World Bank. Various financing methods are being developed using secureddebentures to finance the huge projects as low-risk private investments. The banksmay show interest in participating in the projects, which might lead to an excessiveissuing of bank stocks, because the issue of debentures will help increase their funds,and bankers' participation will help expand their access to such construction projectsin the Korean peninsula as harbours, airports, highways and physical distributioncentres.
These projects have social and economic utility, but are not always profitable forprivate investment. However, they will generate enormous social and economicbenefits to South Korea. The benefits will be distributed dynamically throughoutevery industrial sector in South Korea, and the transport network can enable SouthKorea to achieve industrial reorganization and capital accumulation. Through thesedevelopments, South Korea's two seaports (Pusan and Kwangyang) and the inter-national airport to be built in Youngjong island will become the node of sea and airtransport and a main distribution centre that will develop northeast Asian transportinto a hub-and-spoke system. It will also be helpful for South Korea to reduceunification costs, because it stimulates the North Korea's economic growth.
In short, the transport system, which has so far been planned and constructed onthe basis of South Korea, should be designed and established, from now on, from thestandpoint of the transport network of the entire Korean peninsula in preparation fora unified Korea and the globalization of the territory.
AcknowledgmentThe authors wish to thank the Non-directed Research Fund, National Sussan
University Research Foundation, Pusan, for its active support, and reviewers for theirvaluable comments on this and earlier drafts.
Foreign summariesLa péninsule coréenne occupe une position géopolitique importante dans le réseau de
transport du nord-ouest de l'Asie. C'est dans la perspective d'une unification des deux Corées
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240 Myong-Sop Pak and Tae-Yong Kim
que se placent les auteurs pour étudier les possibilités de coordination du développement desréseaux de transport des deux Républiques. L'article couvre les réseaux des divers modes:maritime, terrestre et aérien.
Korea hat eine wichtige geopolitische Position in den Verkehrsnetzen Nordost-Asiens.Dieser Beitrag untersucht wie im Vorgriff auf eine letzlich erwartete Wiedervereinigung eingemeinsames Verkehrssystem für Nord-und Südkorea geschaffen und koordiniert werdenkönnte. Dieses Verkehrssystem wird für alle Verkehrsmittel (Land, Meer, Luft) untersucht.
Este trabajo investiga la instalación y posterior coordinación de una red de transporteadecuada entre Corea del Norte y del Sur, en anticipación a la inevitable unificación de lapenínsula de Corea que ocupa una importante posición geopolítica en términos de la red detransporte del nordeste asiático. Dicha red se analiza respecto a todos los modos de transporteque la utilizan por aire, mar y tierra.
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Editorial suggestions for further readingThere are no editorial suggestions for further reading.
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