Download - 12. Knowledge and Power in Plato's Political Thought

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Vol. 14(1), 51–77

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 0967–2559 print 1466–4542 online © 2006 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/09672550500445137

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Thom Brooks

Taylor and Francis LtdRIPH_A_144496.sgm10.1080/09672550500445137International Journal of Philosophical Studies0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online)Original Article2006Taylor & Francis1410000002005ThomBrooksDepartment of PoliticsSchool of Geography, Politics & Sociology, University of NewcastleNewcastle upon TyneNE1 [email protected]

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowedwith expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justificationtakes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the

Republic

as rule byphilosopher-kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Theirauthority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which theymake political judgements on behalf of their city-state. I call the second set ofarguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought,where absolute rule by philosopher-kings is undermined by the impurecharacter of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension ofjustice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise,partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power.Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governancefusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best

practical

city-state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his idealpolitical thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.

Keywords:

Plato; Socrates; Republic; idealism; constitution; democracy

I Introduction

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for personsendowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that thisjustification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first iswhat I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the

Republic

as rule by philosopher-kings. The philosopher-kings wield abso-lute authority over their subjects. This authority stems solely from theircomplete comprehension of justice, from which they make political judge-ments on behalf of their city-state. The second set of arguments is what Ishall call Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his laterthought, although hinted at in earlier dialogues. According to this view,absolute rule by philosopher-kings is undermined by the impure characterof all political knowledge.

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

52

Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolutepolitical power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justicedisallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical politicalphilosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutionsof monarchy with democracy into the best

practical

city-state. Thus, Platocomes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal politicalthought, reluctantly preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.Contrary to Straussian interpretations, I argue that the problem withphilosopher-kings relates to the nature of political expertise, rather thanspeculation beyond the text about whether or not philosophers would wantto rule.

1

II Plato’s Theory of Expertise

II A Crafts as Expertise

Plato believes that the opinions of some people are better than those ofothers (

Crito

47a; see also

Republic

494a).

2

As a result, some people areassumed to be able to make better judgements. This point is fairly uncontro-versial, unless Plato is attempting to argue that these persons have superiorjudgements about all matters – a view he rejects. The ability to make correctjudgements stems from one of two sources: either right opinion or trueknowledge. Acting from right opinion is akin to lucky guesswork, as theindividual chooses correctly, despite a less than full comprehension of thesubject-matter in question. On the other hand, when individuals makedecisions from true knowledge, their choice is deliberately well-thought-outand not given to chance.

For Plato, when we make judgements based on true knowledge ourchoice carries a certain authority that judgements based upon right or wrongopinion simply do not have. Thus, knowledge confers a special status on itsholder (see

Republic

583a, 584e–585a).

3

The authority that is conferred isnot

political

authority as such; instead, we might think of it as similar toassurance or certitude. For example, a medical doctor with true knowledgewill speak with greater assurance on how best to treat a variety of ailments,as she will most likely be correct. On the other hand, a medical doctor withless than perfect knowledge can only attribute his success to an arbitraryjudgement, a choice that will hardly win our confidence.

We each possess some degree of expertise in one type of craft (

techn

[emacr ]

).

4

It is supposed that if a person needs to have his shoes repaired, he would dobest to seek the advice of a cobbler. However, if this same person suffers illhealth, a medical doctor ought to be consulted instead. Thus, it follows forPlato that we may only perform well at one given craft (

Apology

22d–e).Plato believes that the crafts we choose are commensurable with our givennature, instead of the demands of the marketplace (see

Statesman

286d–e).

5

In addition, the crafts we choose complement the craft-related expertise of

e

KNOWLEDGE AND POWER IN PLATO’S POLITICAL THOUGHT

53

others in our community rather well, forming a natural division of labourfrom which all in a community benefit (

Republic

370c).When each citizen does what he or she ‘is naturally suited for’, the city

obtains a unity (

Republic

423d, 433a). A city is virtuous when each of itscitizens pursues his or her naturally suitable crafts (

Gorgias

506d–e;

Republic

433d).

6

This unity breaks down when persons who ought to beengaged in one variety of craft activity are able to pursue a differentcraft, or no craft at all (see

Republic

434a–b, 496a, 535c).

7

In such a city,the community is transformed from a united whole to a community ofindependent persons – a sign of poor social organization (

Charmides

161e–162a).

II B Expertise in Governance

For Plato, governance is one kind of craft. He calls this brand of expertise‘the expert knowledge of kingship’ (

Statesman

292e) and ‘the art of king-ship’ (

Statesman

308e, 311c; see

Euthydemus

291d).

8

Because it is a craft,only persons with a particular nature are suited to pursue expertise in gover-nance. The right to rule is not conferred via majority approval or materialwealth, but via expertise in statesmanship (see

Euthydemus

291c–292c;

Republic

426d, 477d–e;

Statesman

292c).

9

A person need not actually be aking to have this particular form of expertise (

Statesman

259c, 292e). If wecan only practise one craft well – and ruling is a craft – it will always beimpossible for all citizens to rule together, and a minority will always bepredisposed to rule (

Republic

494a;

Statesman

297b–c). Indeed, Platoassumes that only a few – or perhaps just one individual – will possess thisknowledge in any given city-state (

Statesman

297b–c, 300e; see also

Repub-lic

494a). Persons whose natures direct them best to pursue expertise inother crafts – such as slaves, retailers, or day-labourers – will forever be unfitto rule as a result (

Statesman

289e–290b).For Plato, it is a common fact of life that people properly seek counsel

solely from experts in a particular field.

10

As a consequence, whenever wediscern those who possess expert knowledge in

governance

, it is right thatthey should rule as this is the craft they naturally pursue best – just as thosewith expertise in trade skills ought to work as manual labourers (see

States-man

266e). The expert statesman alone transforms the naturally bestowedauthority from certitude which all naturally have of their given craft to anauthority that is

political

.

11

In addition, the city-state with expert rulers as its sole authority enjoysnatural unity to the fullest extent. Plato says:

this

is the constitution which alone we must say is correct. … All theothers that we generally say are constitutions we must say are notgenuine, and not really constitutions at all, but imitations of this one;


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those we say are ‘law-abiding’ have imitated it for the better, theothers for the worse

(

Statesman

293e; italics in the original)

The constitutions of different varieties of city-states imitate expert rule inso-far as they attempt to live by just laws (

Statesman

300c–e). These attemptswill fail because only persons naturally predisposed to governance canascertain and implement just laws, whereas those who are not so predis-posed may only ascertain just laws through lucky, but imperfect, guesswork(

Statesman

293c, 300c–e). An assessment of various types of governance canonly be based upon the ability a constitution has to imitate expert rule(

Statesman

300e–302e).

III The Philosopher-King’s Right to Govern

How does Plato’s theory of expertise in worldly affairs relate to politicalinstitutions? This is one of the more hotly contested debates in the litera-ture, particularly regarding Plato’s many criticisms of democracy. It mustfirst be said that what Plato meant by ‘democracy’ was quite different fromhow we may understand it today.

12

For Plato, a democracy is essentially alibertarian society in which each citizen can ‘arrange his own life in what-ever manner pleases him’ (

Republic

557b; see also 572d–e).

13

Every citizenhas a licence to do whatever he or she wants: ‘anarchy’ is called ‘freedom’(

Republic

557b, 560e). The share and scope of power held and exercised byeach citizen would appear to be much greater than that held by contempo-rary democratic citizens.

Nevertheless, both ancient and modern conceptions of democracy sufferfrom a similar problem in Plato’s view. In democracies, there is no prereq-uisite to rule, as one’s capability to govern is an irrelevant consideration(

Republic

557e). As a result, all members are treated equally despite the factthat some are more capable of good governance than others (

Republic

558c). All citizens share the task of governance in democracies. Therefore,the cobbler, the medical doctor, and the person with particular expertise inthe field all have an equal say regarding governance. One result is that polit-ical judgements will be based by and large upon mere guesswork as sole ruleby expert legislators is abandoned. Democracies are generally poorlygoverned as a consequence.

14

Furthermore, Plato argues that democratic citizens are slaves to theirpassions in rejecting the exclusive rule of experts over the city-state’saffairs (

Republic

561b–c).

15

Democratic leaders act little better than‘servants’ dedicated to the satisfaction of ‘the city’s appetites’ (

Gorgias

517b). In a memorable passage from the

Republic

, we are told that thecommon people


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always look down at the ground like cattle, and, with their heads bentover the dinner table, they feed, fatten, and fornicate … their desiresare insatiable … like a vessel full of holes.

(586a–b)

Persons ought to pursue their natural crafts only, which would result in aunified division of labour. Not all citizens should have a share in gover-nance, as not all citizens share a natural predisposition for expert rule. Infact, there would not be a division of labour at all if they did share such apredisposition. Citizens are seen as craftsmen in more than one trade indemocracies: one to make ends meet, the other, to obtain a share in power.In effect, such a share in power is illegitimate as non-experts have no givenright to rule.

16

Rather than ruling with an authority stemming from politicalexpertise, the majority of democratic citizens are like ‘people groping in thedark’ (

Phaedo

99b; see also

Republic

520c–d).

17

For Plato, monarchies are the best systems of governance, possessing‘good written rules, which we call laws’ (

Republic

576e;

Statesman

302e). Asis well known, Plato’s ideal monarchial city-state is to be ruled by philoso-pher-kings: men and women

18

who rule for the sake of neither honour norwealth, seeking only the advantage of the citizens they serve (

Republic

347c,347d, 412d–e).

19

In essence, philosopher-kings are persons who naturallypossess a disposition towards expertise in statecraft. Thus, only they shouldrule the city-state as only they have the necessary expertise, given that rulingis their exclusive craft. One obvious result is that the existence of philoso-pher-kings illegitimates governance by those predisposed towards othercrafts. A less obvious consequence is that the philosopher-kings are entitledto make various political judgements, but

not

judgements of an

economic

variety – the pursuit of wealth is not the philosopher-kings’ craft, and theyare barred from all but minimal economic activity

20

(see

Republic

416e).

21

Thus, the ideal city-state clearly divorces wealth and power.

22

Furthermore,Plato’s apparent dismissal of political economics as a craft is justified by abelief that virtue amongst the rulers alone will ensure the economic prosper-ity of the city-state: ‘Wealth does not bring about excellence, but excellencebrings about wealth and all other public and private blessings for men’(

Apology

30b).

23

In addition, an important reason why the city-state will beprosperous may be the unity of the state resulting from each personpursuing his or her natural craft (see

Republic

351d).The virtue of philosopher-kings appears to be a direct consequence of the

knowledge they possess (see

Meno

87c, 88d, 89a;

Phaedo 69b; Philebus 48c–49a; Republic 427e–428b, 491e–492a).24 This not to say that non-philosopher-kings lack virtue because of their lack of proper political expertise. On thecontrary, all craftsmen are virtuous to the extent that they have knowledge,rather than either true or false opinion, making the city-state virtuous as a


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result. If this is correct, it would appear that the philosopher-king’s licenceto spread ‘useful falsehoods’ is a right within certain boundaries, providedthat what is said is as commensurable as possible with the truth (see Republic382a–383c, 389b–c, 414b–c).25 We may still reject the use of lies of whateverbeneficial intent by those in power, but it is important to keep in mind thattheir subject-matter may only relate to the particular expertise possessed byphilosopher-kings.

An underlying assumption here may be that the members of most ancientGreek societies – and perhaps elsewhere – already pursued their propercrafts in the workplace. This might explain their relative absence fromdiscussions of social organization. On the other hand, the crucial differencebetween the virtuous and illegitimate city-states is whether or not the rulerspossess political expertise as their craft. If so, when Plato suggests that awhole city might be just by virtue of a small elite which is in power, a city-state is not virtuous solely on account of who rules (Republic 428e–429a,431c–d; see Laws 691c). Rather, a city’s virtue is a result of all pursuing theirproper craft, a situation where the difference between virtue and vice is asimple matter of installing proper rulers.

IV Is the Ideal Polis a Possibility?

Plato justifies the existence of philosopher-kings – the ideal monarchs – in arather peculiar manner. After suggesting that the entire discussion of theRepublic has been little more than a theoretical sketch, he tells us throughSocrates that ‘the nature of practice’ is to attain truth less well than theory(472e–473a):26

Then don’t compel me to show that what we’ve described in theorycan come into being exactly as we’ve described it. … Then next, itseems, we should try to discover … what’s the smallest change thatwould enable our city to reach our sort of constitution – one change, ifpossible, or if not one, two, and if not two, then the fewest in numberand the least extensive.

(Republic 473a–b)

Socrates says that only one change would be necessary to achieve this task:philosophers must rule as kings or kings rule as philosophers (Republic473c–d; see also 499a–d). The justification of philosopher-kings as expertsin statecraft is to be seen as an attempt to have ideal theory exist as a socialpractice.

Plato is quick to admit that ‘it is not impossible for this to happen’, but ‘itis difficult for it to happen’ (Republic 499d; see also 502b, c, 540d)27 (italicsin the original).28 Thus, from the very beginning Plato came to question the


57

possible existence of a virtuously pure city-state composed of philosophersexpertly trained in governance, invited to rule by a willing populace bowingto the philosophers’ special status as their rightful rulers:

Glaucon: You mean that [the philosopher-king] will be willing totake part in the politics of the city we were founding anddescribing, the one that exists in theory, for I don’t think itexists anywhere on earth.

Socrates: But perhaps, I said, there is a model of it in heaven, foranyone who wants to look at it and to make himself its citi-zen on the strength of what he sees. It makes no differencewhether it is or ever will be somewhere, for he would takepart in the practical affairs of that city and no other.

(Republic 592a–b)

Thus, the ideal city-state’s existence as an earthly, political practice may becompromised by its heavenly nature. The philosopher-king will only cometo rule the ideal model ‘in heaven’ proposed and in ‘no other’ city.29

However, Plato’s argument for this does not rest on a kind of Straussiansense of ironic talk; it stems from the inexact nature of political expertise.

The significance of these highlighted passages is the following. Platoseems surprisingly explicit about the utopian nature of the political philoso-phy spelled out in works such as the Republic. He acknowledges that prac-tice attains truth less well than theory (472e–473a). He notes that a kingdomof philosophers is all but impossible to realize (see 499d). Furthermore, theRepublic’s political philosophy is more in tune with ‘a model … in heaven’than a realistic model on earth.

Two things are particularly interesting here. First, Plato is not unaware ofthe utopianism of his political philosophy. Indeed, there are these hints andothers I shall discuss in this section that make this quite plain. Second, Platonevertheless takes the trouble to reveal and spell out this ideal politicalphilosophical vision almost despite this fact. This view, for Plato, is trulyhow things ought to be in some grand sense. The problem with the view isthat there are any number of barriers to its realization. I shall discuss thesebarriers in the next section.

IVA The Impurity of Expertise

Plato argues for a complicated dichotomy of soul and body, where the soulis loosely equated with ‘heaven’ and the body with ‘earth’ (see Theaetetus176a–b). The soul is the location of our intelligence (see Phaedo 76c). Thepursuit of ‘pure knowledge’ is impossible until we can ‘escape’ from ourbodies and observe things in themselves by the soul alone (Phaedo 66d–e).


58

However, the separation of the soul from the body – the soul’s ‘freedom’ –occurs only at death (Gorgias 524b; Phaedo 67d):30

Justice and self-control do not shine out through their images downhere, and neither do the other objects of the soul’s admiration; thesenses are so murky that only a few people are able to make out, withdifficulty, the original of the likenesses they encounter here.

(Phaedrus 250b)

If pure knowledge is ascertained by a soul only after the death of its body,it is impossible for corporeal beings to have pure knowledge of anything asa direct result. Thus, all varieties of human expertise possess impurity –including expertise in governing.

Initially, Plato fails to see the positive import of experience to our under-standing of the world. In the Theaetetus, he says:

knowledge is to be found not in the experiences but in the process ofreasoning about them; it is here, seemingly, not in the experiences,that it is possible to grasp being and truth. … We shall not now lookfor knowledge in sense-perception at all, but in whatever we call thatactivity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things which are.

(186d, 187a; see also Republic 409a)

A proper education is directed towards teaching students analytic skills, notfacts. Later, Plato changes his mind, acknowledging that some crucial crafts– such as agriculture, medicine, military strategy, and navigation – requirean expertise based upon deductive reasoning from experiences (Philebus56a–b).

Previously, such reasoning from facts was dismissed as impure and,hence, incapable of discovering truth. The purity and truth of somethingcorresponded to its purity as a piece of knowledge, a knowledge we accessvia other means. Now we realize that some activities which are undoubtedlycrafts – such as medicine or navigation – depend upon facts gleaned, at leastin part, through experience.31 Thus, not all crafts possess the same precisionas geometry or physics, while still being crafts in their own right (Philebus57b).32 There are some crafts which have greater precision, focussing uponeternal entities – such as the Form of justice (Philebus 58e–59b, 61d–e; seealso Phaedrus 247b–248b). On the other hand, there are other crafts whichhave less precision, focussing upon finite entities through empirical obser-vation, such as medicine and, I shall argue, governance.33

Tellingly, Plato says: ‘To me at least it seems that our discussion hasarrived at the design of what might be called an incorporeal order that rules


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harmoniously over a body possessed by a soul’ (Philebus 64b). Elsewherewe learn that the soul rules the body as its master when a soul and body areunited (Gorgias 465c–d; Phaedo 80a). But the body is not to be a total slaveto the soul. Instead, the soul relies on its body’s senses when it is ‘compelledto use them’ (Phaedo 83a). To borrow a well-known example from thePhaedrus, it is as if we are all charioteers steering two horses: one horserepresenting the good and the other horse its opposite (246a–b). Plato usesthe example to discuss the activity of the pure soul managing its rational andirrational parts. However, we are told that the example speaks also to thecombination of a soul and body as ‘a living thing’ that is bound by nature(see Phaedrus 246c–d; also Republic 439d–e).

The importance of these passages is that they strongly suggest a unitycomposed of a pure and an impure part: the living human being is the unityof a pure, rational soul with irrational desires stemming from our body’ssensuous appetites. This unity is ‘an incorporeal order’, as it harmoniouslyrules a soul and body (see Philebus 64b).34 The control of our body’s appe-tites is referred to as ‘moderation’ (Republic 442d). Thus, a person with aproper comprehension of the true nature of knowledge, such as Socrates, isnot an ascetic. Instead, the good soul directs a person to live a moderate life,refraining from indulging the whims of his or her passions (see Gorgias491e, 507a; Phaedo 108a–d).35 The good life is commensurable with ‘themixed life’ of moderation (Philebus 61b). As in individuals, the good city-state will practise moderation in its brand of mixed life, harmoniouslyunifying its rational and irrational parts within an earthly incorporation.

IVB How to Choose the Philosopher-Kings?

Even if we were to grant that philosopher-kings exist, Plato would still befaced with a number of grave difficulties. Chief amongst these is the abilityof anyone to distinguish someone who is a philosopher-king from someonewho is not. Previously, we saw that if governing is a craft, most people willhave a natural disposition to pursue different crafts. Indeed, very few peoplehave the necessary predisposition for expertise to be considered philoso-pher-kings (Republic 491a–b). If Socrates is an example, his advice to themembers of the jury in the Apology is instructive:

Indeed, gentlemen of the jury, I am far from making a defence now onmy own behalf, as might be thought, but on yours, to prevent you fromwrongdoing by mistreating the god’s gift to you by condemning me; forif you kill me you will not easily find another like me. I was attachedto this city by the god. … Another such man will not easily come to beamong you, gentlemen, and if you believe me you will spare me.

(30e–31a)


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The best scenario is a state of affairs in which the city-state’s previouslyestablished philosopher-kings know in advance a given population ofchildren who possess the potential to become future rulers. Each child isobserved throughout his or her life to determine whether or not s/he eagerlypursues ‘what is advantageous to the city’, unwilling to act otherwise (Repub-lic 412d–e, 413c–414b, 537a, 539a–c). Those who fail to live up to these stan-dards are to be rejected as rulers (Republic 414a, 538d–539a). Even if we wereto grant the possibility that philosopher-kings could devise sufficient peda-gogical methods for discovering their rightful heirs, an initial number ofphilosopher-kings must be known already. Thus, the selection and upbring-ing of potential philosopher-kings take place in a closed system, and we aregiven little advice as to how such a system might be established initially.

The education of ruling elites is at the very heart of any city-state that wishesto continue functioning properly. This should not be surprising, for the philos-opher-kings’ particular expertise is the raison d’être of their right to govern.This education is not for everyone, however, and the purity of those subjectedto it is to be maintained rigidly. The reasons are that such an education is ill-suited for persons who would do better at a different craft and that itsextension to all would produce political corruption of great magnitude:

Now, if cobblers become inferior and corrupt and claim to be whatthey are not, that won’t do much harm to the city … But if the guard-ians of our laws and city are merely believed to be guardians but arenot, you surely see that they’ll destroy the city utterly, just as theyalone have the opportunity to govern it well and make it happy.

(Republic 421a)

Thus, the education of those destined to be day-labourers does not necessi-tate the rigid supervision pertaining to the education of future rulers. Thelatter’s education is an important part of removing corruption from thephilosopher-kings, apart from their inability to pursue wealth.

In addition to a rigorous and selective education, another anti-corruptionmeasure imposed by Plato is the necessity for communal living amongst theruling elites.36 The general thought seems to be that if the ruling elites live aso-called ‘one for all and all for one’ lifestyle, then they will fail to see whatthey do on behalf of the city as anything but for the greater good. Contro-versially, Plato holds that women and children are to be held in common,itself ‘the cause of the greatest good for our city’ (Republic 464b). Thecommunal lifestyle is purported to disallow the formation of divisive factionsamongst the elites, which trickles down to an absence of division amongstthe ruled (Republic 464d–e, 465b). This maximizes the practice of their craft:the rule of all for the good of the city-state. That said, Plato admits that thisprogramme will ‘be hard to bring about in practice’ (Republic 502d).


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The good derived from the sharing of spouses is the greater production ofpersons with a predisposition towards governance. Plato does seem tobelieve that natural talents are greatest among persons from noble families,as Plato, Socrates, Alcibiades, Charmides, and Critias are all from suchfamilies (see Alcibiades 120d–121d; Charmides 154d).37 Thus, for Plato,familial communism is not some absurdity of the Republic which he did nottake seriously, as some claim.38 As formulated by Socrates, the problem isthat individuals like Alcibiades and Socrates are mere private citizens, ‘aswere our fathers’: this would never happen in Persia or Sparta, where morecare is taken to ensure the purity of noble blood (Alcibiades 121a–d). Purebreeding must be a characteristic of the ideal city-state to foster in the bestway the production of persons capable of expert governance (Republic460b–c).39 As few persons are born with such a disposition – the great major-ity have dispositions towards countless other crafts – only members of theruling elite are affected by this policy (Republic 457c–d; see also Statesman265e, 267d–e).

The production of children by parents sharing similar craft-relateddispositions is usually a common, natural affair.40 However, the importanceof ensuring that the rulers are true philosopher-kings born with the properdisposition necessitates interference by those in power to maintain bloodpurity. In fact, those in power select who has children with whom, not theindividuals themselves through personal choice (Republic 458c–d). Toensure commonality of breeding arrangements and prevent the develop-ment of private family units arising within the ruling elites, a ‘considerableuse of falsehood and deception’ becomes necessary (Republic 459c–d).Unfortunately for Plato, our inability to know a person’s true nature withabsolute certainty condemns each and every city-state to eventual dissolu-tion, mainly through inappropriate breeding between persons with differentdispositions (Republic 546a–b).41 As a result, centralized restriction ofsexual relationships is doomed to fail from the very start, aspiring to nothingmore than staving off the inevitable.

This is an additional way in which the Republic is fairly explicit aboutbeing a utopia, a utopia that could never fully succeed and take hold in theworld in any sustainable sense. To be clear, this claim is not somethingimplicit in the text, but spelled out at various points in it. There seems everyreason to believe that Plato did think that these views constitute politicalsociety as it ought to exist, but also every reason to believe that Plato knewthat such a society could never take root, certainly not in full.

IVC The Philosophical Pursuit of the Ideal Versus the Practical

Perhaps an even greater problem is that all true philosophers are too farremoved from the lived experiences of their fellow human beings.42 In theTheaetetus, we are told:


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Laws and decrees, published orally or in writing, are things [a philos-opher] never sees or hears. The scrambling of political cliques foroffice; social functions, dinners, parties with flute-girls – such doingsnever enter [the philosopher’s] head even in a dream … because it isin reality only his body that lives and sleeps in the city. His mind,having come to the conclusion that all these things are of little or noaccount, spurns them and pursues its winged way, as Pindar says … ‘inthe heights above the heaven’.

(173c–d; see Phaedrus 249b–e)43

Thus, the true philosopher is a completely non-political entity. Philosophersdo not live a life centred on creating specific public policies, but live instead‘a life of thought in the purest degree possible’ (Philebus 55a). As a result,a philosopher-king’s expertise stems from his full comprehension of justicein its purity alone, an impossibility given that the task is achievable by adisembodied soul alone. The expertise necessary for governing is a productnot of looking at individual legislative practices, but of drafting laws inkeeping with pure justice instead.

I would argue that the philosopher’s pursuit of the ideal – rather thanthe practical – is one source of difference between Socrates and Plato, aconception of philosophy that Plato comes to reject, as I have tried tohighlight.44 For example, Socrates says:

I believe that I’m one of a few Athenians – so as not to say I’m the onlyone, but the only one among our contemporaries – to take up the truepolitical craft and practice the true politics. This is because thespeeches I make on each occasion do not aim at gratification but atwhat’s best. They don’t aim at what’s most pleasant. And because I’mnot willing to do those clever things you recommend, I won’t knowwhat to say in court. … For I’ll be judged the way a doctor would bejudged by a jury of children if a pastry chef were to bring accusationsagainst him.

(Gorgias 521d–e)

By ‘true politics’, Socrates wishes to mark a distinction from the standardpractice of politics of his time.45 At this stage of Plato’s philosophical writings,politics is the exclusive craft of the soul (Gorgias 464b). However, Plato cameto argue that the philosopher ought to be engaged in the world politically.46

As we have seen already, a potential problem is that political expertise isgained in part through observation of events in the world, necessitatingreason’s appropriation of empirical data. Thus, it is an imprecise craft wedgedbetween the earth (i.e., the empirical) and the heavens (i.e., the rational).


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There is much reason to doubt the existence of philosopher-kings per se.A crucial difficulty I would like to focus on is Plato’s re-examination ofcrafts. All persons seek expertise in one particular sphere naturally suited tothem. The philosopher-kings’ expertise in statecraft is gained via the appre-hension of justice itself. The impossibility of success for earthly beings hasalready been discovered, but it is crucial to note that Plato came to adoptthis view as well. He says that it is possible ‘to discern what the nature ofjustice is’ from the heights of pure philosophy alone. However, the applica-tion of justice to the living constitutions of our earthly communities is onlypossible via a practical philosophy (see Seventh Letter 326a–b, 328c).Political power is knowledge of a particular kind, composed of both purelyrational and empirical parts (Protagoras 351a).

The consequences of this are that perfect justice may never exist on earthas it is impossible to discern as a sensual being and the world in which weapply justice is not itself eternal, but contingent and ever changing.47 Thus,the management of a city’s affairs is a particularly arduous task, for theknowledge of statecraft is not an exact science, after all (see Seventh Letter325c–d).48 In addition, it is often overlooked that when Plato ranks variousconstitutions of the soul from best to worst, the best constitution belongs tothe philosopher – but the second best belongs to the monarch (Phaedrus248d–e).49 The philosopher is at times equated with a ‘divine herdsman’, aperson ‘greater than that of a king’ (Statesman 275c).50

The upshot is that it seems clear well before we get to the Laws thatPlato’s ideal political philosophy – primarily spelled out in the Republic – isincapable of realization. Moreover, Plato is aware of the various barrierspreventing the realization of his ideal political philosophy. However, whatis interesting about this is that he will develop in the Laws another politicalphilosophy, a more practical political philosophy, that will address thesevery concerns. Instead of setting out a vision of what the best politicalcommunity looks like full stop, Plato directs his attention to laying out avision of the best practical and realizable political community. This does notmark a rejection of his ideal political philosophy as the ideal, but only as aworkable blueprint.

V Practically the Best City-State

VA Plato’s Rational Dictatorship

Like his use of ‘democracy’, Plato’s use of ‘monarchy’ may differ from howwe might understand the term today. A monarchy is not merely a collectionof one or more sovereigns ruling together, but persons ruling independentlyover a city-state in accordance with dictates of justice rather than theirsubjective whims (see Laws 856b). In fact, the ‘biggest enemy of the entirestate’ is persons who wish to oppose this state of affairs (Laws 856b). A


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monarch’s appropriation of justice in his judgements distinguishes his rulefrom those of democrats, oligarchs, or timocrats.

Plato’s apparent rejection of democracy and warm approval of monarchyshould not imply that he is, in fact, some kind of proto-totalitarian. On thecontrary, tyranny is the worst political system in his view, as tyrants act inconstant contravention of law and rational expertise (Republic 587b–c; seealso Statesman 276e, 302e). For Plato, tyranny is characterized by randomacts of terror (see Republic 579d–e).51 For example, a tyrant is described asa person who ‘always mutilates, kills and generally maltreats whichever ofus he wishes’ (Statesman 301d). Tyrants are also prone to stirring up conflict,whether it be domestic or international (Republic 567a).

Plato’s favouring of monarchy and aristocracy may be rooted in hisfamily’s background. The initial Athenian democratic movement saw theend of kingly rule in Athens: the city’s last king was a relative of Plato’sfather.52 Former members of the aristocracy were unsurprisingly critical ofthe new democratic institutions that negated their special social status.These former members, along with wealthy citizens, were probablyrelatively supportive of the overthrow of democracy by the Thirty at first.53

Plato provides a personal example: he tells us that when the Thirty came topower, he was invited ‘to join them at once in what seemed to be a properundertaking’ (Seventh Letter 324d). After all, members of the Thirty were‘relatives and acquaintances’ of his, such as the cousin – Critias – andbrother – Charmides – of Plato’s mother (Seventh Letter 324d).

How much of an influence were his family and friends on his politicalthought? Few cite an important letter from Plato to Perdiccas:54

If anyone hears this and says, ‘Plato apparently claims to know what isgood for democracy, but though he is at liberty to speak in theassembly and give it his best advice, he has never yet stood up and saida word’, you can answer him by saying, ‘Plato was born late in the lifeof his native city, and he found the demos advanced in years and habit-uated by former advisers to many practices incompatible with theadvice he would give. Nothing would be sweeter to him than to giveadvice to the demos as to a father, if he did not think he would berisking danger in vain and accomplish nothing. He would do the sameabout advising me, I know. If we seemed to him incurable, he wouldbid us a long farewell and refrain from advising about me or myaffairs’.

(Fifth Letter 322a–c)55

Plato’s disillusionment with Athenian democracy is heightened by its senseof self-certainty regarding the implementation of justice in its laws. At leastfrom this passage, it seems clear that Plato’s primary problem with democracy


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is with the absence of expertise in statecraft, a constant criticism in his politicalthought. Because it is an ‘incurable’ ailment, he searches elsewhere to bringabout a revolutionary new style of governance.

Plato turns to the empire of Syracuse to bring his model Republic to life,in a desperate bid to demonstrate its possibility (see Fourth Letter 320c–d):56

If in [Dionysius II’s] empire there had been brought about a real unionof philosophy and power, it would have been an illustrious example toboth Greeks and barbarians, and all mankind would have beenconvinced of the truth that no city nor individual can be happy exceptby living in company with wisdom under the guidance of justice, eitherfrom personal achievement of these virtues or from a right trainingand education received under God-fearing rulers.

(Seventh Letter 335d; see also Republic 473d–e)

First, it is important to note that what Plato desires is ‘a real union ofphilosophy and power’, when the community is administered within dictatesset by rational justice, a fact overlooked in revisionist interpretations.57

Second, one particularly great achievement of the fusion of philosophy andpower is its being an aid to convincing the majority of the practical successof a republic (Republic 498d). Furthermore, having a concrete example of acity ruled by philosophically enlightened rulers would benefit all humanity(Seventh Letter 336a–b).

Before turning to the importance of popular opinion in realizing the justcity-state, we should understand Plato’s method of unifying philosophyand power in the world. In Book IV of the Laws, he tells us that thequickest and easiest way to bring about a political transformation isthrough dictatorship, followed by constitutional kingship, then democracy,and, finally, oligarchy (710e). He then says: ‘Where the most influentialelement is both extremely powerful and numerically as small as it couldbe, as in a dictatorship, you usually get a rapid and trouble-free transition’(Laws 711a; see also 711b–d and Eleventh Letter 359b–c). This methodwas not idle talk, but, in fact, precisely what he was trying to accomplishaccording to the many letters written to Dionysius II, the tyrant ofSyracuse, attributed to Plato.58 In addition, Plato was aligned with Dionand was friendly with Hermias, the tyrant of Atarneus and Assos in theTroad (see Fourth Letter 322c–323d; Seventh Letter 323d–352a; EighthLetter 352b–357d).

If we believe that the Seventh Letter is authentic, Plato seemed to thinkthat Dion of Syracuse was the ideal candidate to bring the best possible stateinto existence.59 We are told that Dion ‘was in all things quick to learn …with a zeal and attentiveness I had never encountered in a young man’(Seventh Letter 327a–b). Plato says: ‘now, if ever, might we confidently hope


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to accomplish that union, in the same persons, of philosophers and rulers ofgreat cities’ (Seventh Letter 328a). He adds:

What tipped the scales eventually was the thought that if anyone everwas to attempt to realize these principles of law and government, nowwas the time to try, since it was only necessary to win over a single manand I should have accomplished all the good I dreamed of. This, then,was the ‘bold’ purpose I had in setting forth from home.

(Seventh Letter 328b–c; see also Republic 473c–d)

This would confirm Plato’s belief in the Republic (473c–d) that the easiestand quickest way to transform a city-state into a just political order is toeducate dictators so that they will possess expertise in statecraft.60 Ratherthan abandoning his Republic, Plato attempted to realize it by converting adictator to his side rather than via his ideal political philosophy’s elaboratesystem of breeding.

The transformation of dictators into statesman by education is alsoconsidered by Socrates in the dialogue Alcibiades. Socrates is very keen toinfluence the young Alcibiades to take up philosophical training prior toentering politics (Alcibiades 119b–120c, 132a):61

that is my greatest fear, that a love of the common people [rather thantruth] might corrupt you. … Get in training first, my dear friend, andlearn what you need to know before entering politics. That will giveyou an antidote against the terrible dangers.

(Alcibiades 132a–b; see also Republic 430a–b).62

The lesson for future rulers is that they should be properly prepared througha philosophical education prior to holding political power. A proper educa-tion will serve as an anti-corruptive antidote to the unpredictable practiceof managing state affairs.

The transformation of a dictatorship into a practical fusion of philosophywith political power is not to be achieved by violence: ‘let him not useviolence upon his fatherland to bring about a change of constitution’(Seventh Letter 331d).63 Indeed, the ‘art of statesmanship’ is the peaceful,social interconnection of courageous and moderate citizens (Statesman311b–c; see also Laws 628c–e). This disdain for violence has its precedent inSocrates’ well-known dictum in the Crito: ‘One should never do wrong inreturn, nor injure any man, whatever injury one has suffered at his hands’(49c–d; see also Gorgias 469b; Seventh Letter 335a).64

Instead of violence, Plato’s chosen tool was persuasion to convert themasses to accept expert rule, as he came to realize later in life the importance


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of popular approval and participation in governance.65 One of the earliestpieces of evidence is in the Crito:

Socrates: My good Crito, why should we care so much for what themajority think?…

Crito: You see, Socrates, that one must also pay attention to theopinion of the majority. Your present situation makes clearthat the majority can inflict not the least but pretty well thegreatest evils if one is slandered among them.66

Socrates: … They cannot make a man either wise or foolish, but theyinflict things haphazardly.

(44c–d)

Socrates’ utter rejection of public opinion67 stands opposed to Plato’s laterresignation at its importance in political affairs. Thus, while Plato wouldagree that public opinion is fickle, he would still join Crito in appreciatingthe significance of paying attention to the public mood. In the Second Letterwritten to Dionysius II and attributed to Plato, Plato tells us that hetravelled to Syracuse in part so that ‘philosophy might gain favour with themultitude’ (312; see also Seventh Letter 325d–e). This thought was notconfined to the various letters attributed to him, but was expressed also inthe Republic: one reason for making the transition to philosopher-king rulein any city is the need to convince the majority of people elsewhere that thisproject is a practical possibility (498d–499a).68

Finally, it is important to recognize Plato’s position on the rule of law. Aswith popular consent to expert rule, his position appears contradictory. Onthe one hand, Plato argues that all members of the city-state except itsruler(s) are subject to laws as ‘[i]t would be absurd for a guardian to need aguardian’ (see Republic 403e; Statesman 294a–b). Dangerously echoingsimilar, more sinister and contemporary, arguments, Plato says: ‘In somecases, the rulers will themselves be obeying our laws, and in others, namely,the ones we leave to their discretion, they’ll give directions that are in thespirit of our laws’ (Republic 458c). Thus, in essence, the rulers’ own judge-ments serve for what the law is: the law is the expression of their exclusivewill. Such a position is anathema to the rule of law as commonly understoodtoday.69

Nevertheless, while it does appear that Plato is authorizing expert rulersto be lawless, what distinguishes the monarch from the tyrant is themonarch’s embrace of laws. If we accept its authenticity, Plato comes toargue that ‘responsible kingship’ requires ‘laws punishing kings and citizensalike if they disobey’ in the Eighth Letter (355d–e). Indeed, what law is in itsfullest sense governs the actions of us all, lawlessness being the dominationof ‘men and tyrants’ over the law’s content (Eighth Letter 354c). In


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conclusion, if we accept that a justified, Platonic political order is a systemgoverned by the rule of law, we must accept equally Plato’s unsatisfactorymanner of dealing with legal revision by placing rulers outside the writtencodes they helped, in part, to fashion.70

VB The Mixed Wine of Freedom

If this account of Plato’s practical political philosophy is correct, he mustultimately endorse some mixture of expert rule with popular consent. Wefind just such an endorsement in Book III of the Laws:

Listen to me then. There are two-mother constitutions, so to speak,which you could fairly say have given birth to all the others. Monarchyis the proper name for the first, and democracy for the second. Theformer has been taken to extreme lengths by the Persians, the latter bymy country; virtually all the others, as I said, are varieties of these two.It is absolutely vital for a political system to combine them, if (and thisis of course the point of our advice, when we insist that no state formedwithout these two elements can be constituted properly) – if it is toenjoy freedom and friendship applied with good judgement.

(Laws 693d–e; see Eighth Letter 353d–e; my italics)71

Thus, Plato appears to abandon his earlier belief that harmony in the city-state will be produced simply by each person pursuing his or her naturalcraft.72 Instead, harmony and freedom are said to thrive best when the statefuses monarchy with democratic institutions. Any state that is of one varietyor the other will be disharmonious as a necessary result.73

Plato asks the question: how are these two different institutions to bereconstituted into one unified system? This new form of governancecomprises a legislator and guardians of the laws. The legislator is unelectedand properly educated for this office, responsible for making laws andpersuading the public about how the laws serve justice (see Laws 823a). Theguardians of the laws are common citizens who are democratically electedto enforce the laws of the city-state.74 In order to be candidates, individualsmust submit themselves to a process of lengthy scrutiny to ensure that theywill perform well if elected (see Laws 752d–754e, 755a–c).75

For Plato, the result is a compromise ‘between a monarchical and a demo-cratic constitution’ fusing a ‘moderate authoritarianism’ with ‘moderatefreedom’ (Laws 756e, 701e). There are a few things we can say about hismoderate authoritarianism. First of all, Plato says that this system will ‘enjoyfreedom and friendship applied with good judgement’ (Laws 693d–e). Inthe Republic, democracies are most characterized by freedom (557b, 562b–c). However, democratic freedom is something less than true freedom as it


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more closely resembles anarchical lawlessness (Republic 462c). The mainproblem with democratic governance is that the citizenry are completelyunscrupulous about who should make political judgements, allowing allcitizens to participate equally in a task at some people perform better thanothers (Republic 557e–558a, 560b).

Democracy requires responsible leadership to become a just politicalsystem:

I suppose that, when a democratic city, athirst for freedom, happens toget bad cupbearers for its leaders, so that it gets drunk by drinkingmore than it should of the unmixed wine of freedom, then, unless therulers are very pliable and provide plenty of that freedom, they arepunished by the city and accused of being accursed oligarchs

(Republic 562c–d; my italics)

Democracies pursue freedom for its own sake without regard for corre-sponding responsibilities. Keeping in mind the common ancient Greekpractice of always mixing wine with water prior to consumption, Platoopposes an ‘unmixed wine of freedom’ – a freedom to do whatever onepleases – perhaps for the reason that freedom is intoxicating: the citizens aremore liable to become drunk and irresponsible. Plato does not forbid theconsumption of wine – in this case synonymous with freedom – but he doesforbid excessive consumption. Freedom is a good to be cultivated in one’scity-state, so long as it is constrained by ‘good judgement’ (Laws 693d–e).With leaders capable of good judgement, a city-state is in possession of goodcupbearers and will be ruled with principled moderation, but enjoywidespread popular freedoms.

Plato appears to endorse a degree of political transparency, as the bestpossible city-state should openly consult with its citizenry on a regular basis:

whether [a city is] governed by one man or many, if its constitution isproperly ordered and rightly directed, it would be sensible to giveadvice to its citizens concerning what would be to the city’s advantage.

(Seventh Letter 330d–e)76

It would seem sensible to advise citizens on the best course of action, but notto decide in secret or force their compliance (see Laws 823a). A potentialdifficulty is that it is unclear how much accountability to non-experts Platodemands of rulers. He offers the following example: ‘Doctors provide theclearest parallel. We believe in them whether they cure us with our consentor without it’ (Statesman 293b; see also 296b–c). Expert rule justifies the impo-sition of the expert’s judgement on citizens irrespective of their consent.77


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Nevertheless, Plato did fully recognize the right of any member of societyto question the rule of law, so long as the law is obeyed (Statesman 299b–300c). Persuasion was his chosen instrument of agreement in the end, notcoercion (Republic 548b).78 In fact, the person with expertise in governanceought to persuade each member of an Assembly individually, rather thanforce their acceptance (Alcibiades 114b). The reason for this may be that thegovernance of any city ought to work towards the good of the citizens, notthe interests of those in power.79

VI Conclusion

How ought we interpret Plato’s arguments for philosopher-kings alongsidehis endorsement of moderate authoritarianism? Perhaps the best way ofunderstanding this dilemma is to say that Plato’s ideal political philosophycalls for the justified imposition of expert judgement in a way that his prac-tical political philosophy does not.80 In the former, philosopher-kings ruleover a city-state on account of their relatively perfect comprehension ofjustice and its demands. Their knowledge of justice confers an unequalledauthority of judgement on them in political affairs. In addition, their right torule is readily acknowledged by the ruled.

On the other hand, in his practical political philosophy, Plato came to seethe great difficulty of making such judgements, as statecraft is not the purescience he thought it was at first. Instead, the best possible ruler – ratherthan the ideal ruler – must receive a philosophical education, but such aneducation cannot hope simply to determine political decisions within theneat confines of ideal justice, but to judge within the contingent world ofearthly possibilities. The upshot is that the best possible rulers will stillpossess an expertise superior to their subjects, entitling the ruler to providepolitical judgements. However, this ruler will not command the absoluteauthority from absolute knowledge that a philosopher-king possesses. As aconsequence of this gap in expertise, the ruler’s authority is partly under-mined and the public earn a right to be involved in the political process.Moreover, Plato recognizes the importance of readily establishing his polit-ical objectives through a philosophically trained dictator. He believes thatthe citizenry will be more receptive to his objectives if they can be seen totake hold, rather than remaining mere theory alone.

Plato ultimately favours his practical political philosophy as the bestmanner of bringing about the best possible city-state, rather than the idylliccity-state. In addition, he is fairly clear that the ideal city-state is an idealthat cannot be realized and sustainable well before we reach later dialogues,principally the Laws. In fact, these barriers to the realization and sustain-ability of his ideal city-state are taken into account and addressed in what Ihave simply called Plato’s practical city-state, a political community that isfar more likely to take hold in the world in his own view. Plato never rejects


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his ideal political vision as the best picture of how a political communityought to exist. He does, however, reject his ideal vision as a viable option forpolitical reform.81

University of Newcastle, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

Notes

1 My critical views of Leo Strauss as a historian of ideas are similar to S. B. Drury’sviews. (See S. B. Drury, ‘The Esoteric Philosophy of Leo Strauss’, PoliticalTheory, 13 (1985), pp. 315–37.)

2 All references to Stephanus numbers in Plato’s works are to Plato, CompleteWorks, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).

3 ‘[R]eason is our king, both over heaven and earth’ (Philebus 28c).4 Justice is ‘doing one’s own work and not meddling with what isn’t one’s own’

(Republic 433a–b, 441e). On techné, see C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: TheArgument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

5 There are three primary varieties of crafts which people choose according totheir personality types: the philosophical choose philosophical crafts, the victory-loving choose victory-loving crafts, and the profit-loving choose profit-lovingcrafts (Republic 581c).

6 See Rachana Kamtekar, ‘Social Justice and Happiness in the Republic: Plato’sTwo Principles’, History of Political Thought, 22(2) (2001), pp. 189–220.

7 ‘[I]n a well-regulated city’ everyone ‘has his own work to do and no one has theleisure to be ill and under treatment all his life’ (Republic 496c). Elsewhere, Platosuggests that the day-labourer who does not work for the benefit of thecommunity loses a right to exist in it, as if he is unable to work because of illnesshe should ‘either recover his health or, if his body couldn’t withstand the illness,he’d die and escape his troubles’ (Republic 406d–e; see also 407c–e; GeorgeKlosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought (New York: Methuen,1986), p. 153). In addition, Plato calls ‘the greatest of all evils’ a city-state thatallows any one of its members to become ‘a poor person without means’ byselling all he owns (Republic 552a).

8 See George Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, Journal of Politics, 43(1981), p. 378.

9 I would agree with Klosko that ‘the central motif of the political theory of theRepublic [and elsewhere] is putting philosophical intelligence in control of thestate’ (Klosko, The Development of Plato’s Political Thought, p. 172).

10 For example, Socrates says: ‘In emergencies – if at no other time – you see thisbelief. When they are in distress, on the battlefield, or in sickness or in a stormat sea, all men turn to their leaders in each sphere as to God, and look to themfor salvation because they are superior in precisely this one thing – knowledge.And wherever human life and work goes on, you find everywhere men seekingteachers and masters, for themselves and for other living creatures and for thedirection of all human works. You find also men who believe that they are ableto teach and to take the lead. In all these cases, what else can we say but that mendo believe in the existence of both wisdom and ignorance among themselves?’(Theaetetus 170a–b).

11 See Gregory Vlastos, ‘The Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’,Political Theory, 11 (1983), p. 503, and Robin Waterfield, ‘Introduction’, inPlato, Republic, trans. R. Waterfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),


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p. xxv. This agrees with Reeve that, for Plato, ‘[p]roper political rule is properpsychic rule’ (Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, p. 262).

12 Democracy is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down; see my ‘A Defence ofSceptical Authoritarianism’, Politics 22 (2002), pp. 152–62; Robert A. Dahl, OnDemocracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Robert A. Dahl, Democ-racy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Gerardo Munckand Jay Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: EvaluatingAlternative Indices’, Comparative Political Studies, 35 (2002), pp. 5–34; andMichael Saward, ‘Reconstructing Democracy: Current Thinking and New Direc-tions’, Government and Opposition, 36 (2001), pp. 559–81.

13 Julia Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981),p. 300. See my ‘Plato, Hegel and Democracy’, Bulletin of the Hegel Society ofGreat Britain, forthcoming.

14 In a well-known, albeit brief, passage from the Statesman, Plato argues thatdemocracy is the most preferable form of governance, but only amongst unlaw-ful regimes (303a–b). As we shall see later, Plato continues to hold this view inhis later thought. Thus, Strauss is wrong to say that ‘every utterance of thePlatonic Socrates is ironical’. (See Leo Strauss, ‘The Liberalism of ClassicalPolitical Philosophy’, Review of Metaphysics, 12 (1959), p. 428.)

15 Cf. Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), p. 229.

16 While he disagrees with much else he has to say, Socrates appears to agree withCallicles that ‘the people who institute our laws are the weak and the many. Theydo this, and they assign praise and blame with themselves and their own advantagein mind. They’re afraid of the more powerful among men, the ones who are capa-ble of having a greater share, and so they say that getting more than one’s shareis “shameful” and “unjust”. … But I believe that nature itself reveals that it’s a justthing for the better man and the more capable man to have a greater share thanthe worse man and the less capable man’ (Gorgias 483b–d; see also 486d–487a).

17 Two further difficulties are (1) a great number of people falsely believe that theypossess this knowledge (Philebus 48c–49a) and (2) the masses are more keen towin than to pursue truth when engaged in a philosophical investigation with oneanother (see Gorgias 457c–d).

18 While Plato was not a feminist in any conventional sense, he did fully support theinclusion of women as guardians and kings in the ideal city-state alongside men(see Republic 455d–e, 456d–e; also see Ernest Barker, The Political Thought ofPlato and Aristotle (London: Dover, 1947), pp. 144–9, and Bruce Rosenstock,‘Athena’s Cloak: Plato’s Critique of the Democratic City in the Republic’, Polit-ical Theory, 22 (1994), pp. 363–90).

19 On the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers, see R. C. Crossand A. D. Woozley, Plato’s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London:Macmillan, 1964), pp. 134–65.

20 The guardians and philosopher-kings are paid solely through taxes (Republic416e–417b). It is assumed that this system will not be abused to benefit a materiallifestyle beyond basic needs, as the separation of wealth and power is meant toremove corruption from the ruling elites.

21 Plato does not want to suggest that the pursuit of wealth in the workplace shouldjustify great riches or poverty for any craftsman. Indeed, the more wealth oneacquires, the more difficult it is for anyone – including an ordinary labourer – topay attention to his or her craft (Republic 421d–422a). Similarly, if one is living inpoverty, attention to one’s craft is compromised in favour of mere survival (ibid.).

22 A. E. Taylor, Plato: The Man and his Work (London: Methuen, 1937), p. 277.


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23 This may be a difficulty, as some studies suggest that the durability of institutionsof governance is in large part determined by individual states’ economic perfor-mance (see Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom, and Christopher Reenock,‘Economic Performance, Institutional Intermediation, and DemocraticSurvival’, Journal of Politics, 63 (2001), p. 797). As a result, it may be economicperformance which grounds the stability of a system of governance, not viceversa as Plato suggests.

24 See my ‘Better Luck Next Time: A Comparative Analysis of Socrates andMah y na Buddhism on Reincarnation’, Journal of Indian Philosophy andReligion, 10 (2005), pp. 1–25 and Klosko, The Development of Plato’s PoliticalThought, p. 165.

25 Arguably, philosopher-kings would only tell useful falsehoods as an instrumentof last resort, given that ‘[t]hey must be without falsehood – they must refuse toaccept what is false, hate it, and have a love for the truth’ (Republic 485c; seeKateri Carmola, ‘Noble Lying: Justice and Intergenerational Tension in Plato’sRepublic’, Political Theory, 31 (2003), pp. 39–62, and Daniel Dombrowski,‘Plato’s Noble Lie’, History of Political Thought, 18 (1997), pp. 565–78).

26 Even later – in the Republic’s Book VIII – Socrates says: ‘for, after all, we’re onlysketching the shape of the constitution in theory, not giving an exact account ofit’ (548c).

27 See Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic, pp. 185–6.28 Even more difficult to implement on his count, Socrates commands that all chil-

dren over the age of 10 be sent out from the city to be re-educated, completelyseparated from their family (Republic 540–541a).

29 Plato offers various pieces of evidence for the suggestion that only someonedivine has the authority to rule, based upon his or her comprehension of justice.Three points worth noting are: (1) the ‘gods are our guardians’ (Phaedo 62b); (2)philosophers become ‘as divine and ordered as a human being can’ (Republic500c–d); and (3) the philosopher-king has ‘a divine ruler within himself’(Republic 590c).

30 If wisdom ‘is a kind of cleansing or purification’, it is at least a purification of thesoul in severing itself from a body in an important sense (Phaedo 69b–c).

31 See Richard Ketchum, ‘Plato on the Unknowability of the Sensible World’,History of Philosophy Quarterly, 4 (1987), pp. 291–305.

32 Plato offers a good example in a conversation between Socrates and Plutarchus:‘Suppose, then, there is a person who understands what justice itself is and cangive the appropriate definitions and possesses the same kind of comprehensionabout all the rest of what there is. – Let that be presupposed. – Will he be suffi-ciently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divinesphere itself but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, usingeven in housebuilding those other yardsticks and those circles? – We would findourselves in a rather ridiculous position if we were confined entirely to thosedivine kinds of knowledge, Socrates! – What are you saying? Ought we at thesame time to include the inexact and impure science of the false yardstick andcircle, and add it to the mixture? – Yes, necessarily so, if any one of us ever wantsto find his own way home’ (Philebus 62a–b).

33 It is also important to note that Plato uses Socrates to make all of thesestatements, perhaps causing another problem for the Straussian revisionistinterpretation.

34 Norman O. Dahl, ‘Plato’s Defence of Justice’, in Gail Fine (ed.) Plato 2:Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),p. 211.

a a


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35 The highest form of ignorance is ‘being overcome by pleasure’, not doing whatis pleasurable (see Protagoras 357e–358c; also Third Letter 317c–d). Pleasuresare likened to children ‘who don’t possess the least bit of reason’ (Philebus 65c).

36 Guardians of the city are forbidden to own property and to have private rooms,living together ‘like soldiers in a camp’ (Republic 416d–e). The philosopher-kings are chosen from the ranks of the guardians (Republic 525b).

37 Socrates says: ‘“And it is quite right, Charmides, that you should be superior tothe rest in all such things”, I replied, “because I don’t suppose that anyone elsehere could so readily point to two Athenian families whose union would be likelyto produce a more aristocratic lineage than that from which you are sprung …[one] side of the family is not a bit inferior to the other”’ (Charmides 157e–158a).There are early reservations about Critias’ ability to pursue truth at the expenseof reputation (Charmides 169c–d; see also 172d–e). We also have strongreservations about Charmides’ temperance at the conclusion of the dialoguewhich bears his name (Charmides 176c–d).

38 See Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964)and his student Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

39 See Taylor, Plato, p. 275.40 Plato says: ‘The moderate, I think, look out for people with the disposition they

themselves possess, and so far as they can they both marry from among these andmarry off the daughters they are giving away back to people of this sort’(Statesman 310c–d).

41 This is coupled with the fact that persons perfectly matched naturally produce agiven number of children having a lesser nature (Republic 546a–e; see RodJenks, ‘The Machinery of the Collapse: On Republic VIII’, History of PoliticalThought, 23 (2002), pp. 21–9).

42 Observed quite well by Callicles: ‘Philosophy is no doubt a delightful thing,Socrates, as long as one is exposed to it in moderation at the appropriate time oflife. But if one spends more time with it than he should, it’s the undoing ofmankind’ (Gorgias 484c; see 486a–b).

43 Socrates says further: ‘they say Thales was studying the stars, Theodorus, andgazing aloft, when he fell into a well; and a witty and amusing Thracian servant-girl made fun of him because, she said, he was wild to know about what was upin the sky but failed to see what was in front of him and under his feet. The samejoke applies to all who spend their lives in philosophy. It really is true that thephilosopher fails to see his next-door neighbour; he not only doesn’t notice whathe is doing; he scarcely knows whether he is a man or some other kind ofcreature?’ (Theaetetus 174a–b).

44 See Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, p. 374, and Mary P. Nichols, ‘TheRepublic’s Two Alternatives: Philosopher-Kings and Socrates’, Political Theory,12 (1984), p. 271.

45 Socrates says: ‘Polus, I’m not one of the politicians. Last year I was elected to the[Athenian] Council by lot, and when our tribe was presiding and I had to call fora vote, I came in for a laugh. I didn’t know how to do it. So please don’t tell meto call for a vote from the people present here’ (Gorgias 473e–474a).

46 Plato says of his own life: ‘Above all I was ashamed lest I appear to myself as apure theorist, unwilling to touch any practical task’ (Seventh Letter 328c).

47 See Paul Stern, ‘Tyranny and Self-Knowledge: Critias and Socrates in Plato’sCharmides’, American Political Science Review, 93 (1999), pp. 399–412.

48 A society may come into crisis through lack of resources, war, or plague, whichsuggests that there are factors beyond the rulers’ knowledge of justice at stake ina city-state’s survival (Laws 709a).


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49 Equated with the lawful king is the ‘warlike commander’ (Phaedrus 248d–e).50 This view is at great odds with the Straussian reading, stated well by Klosko:

‘According to Bloom and Strauss, however, this [the Republic] is an impossibleideal. Even if someone with the potential to be a philosopher-king should arise,he would not willingly leave his life of philosophical contemplation to rule. Toforce the philosopher to rule would be to commit an injustice against him, and sothe ideal state is impossible because its existence must rest upon an injustice tothe philosophers’ (George Klosko, ‘The “Straussian” Interpretation of Plato’sRepublic’, History of Political Thought, 7 (1988), p. 290. See also Bloom, TheRepublic of Plato, pp. 407–10, and Strauss, The City and Man, p. 124.).

51 See Hannah Arendt, The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (Harmond-sworth: Penguin, 2000), p. 119.

52 Plato’s mother Perictione ‘was connected with Solon’ (W. K. C. Guthrie, AHistory of Greek Philosophy, Vol. IV, Plato: The Man and his Dialogues, EarlierPeriod (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 10).

53 For example, wealthy citizens were expected to pay the full costs of state func-tions and celebrations, the number and cost of events decided upon by electedpolitical leaders.

54 Perdiccas was the king of Macedon from 364 to 359 BCE.55 Scholars have often wondered why Socrates chose to live almost exclusively

within Athens’ city walls associating himself with various members of the noto-rious Thirty. The decision to live and die by the laws of democratic Athens wasnot made arbitrarily. In the Crito, Plato says through Socrates that whenever wechoose to live in a city, we choose to obey its laws at one and the same time (51e;see also Apology 19a; Terence H. Irwin, ‘Socrates and Athenian Democracy’,Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18 (1989), pp. 184–205, and Vlastos, ‘The Histor-ical Socrates and Athenian Democracy’, p. 498). The law is crucial to improvingthe constitutions of the young men of Athens (Apology 24e).

This is not to say that Socrates was supposedly fully supportive of Atheniandemocracy: he often criticized its greatest hero, Pericles (Alcibiades 118c–119c;122b; Gorgias 516b–517c). According to Plato, Socrates even recounts beingelected once to the Athenian Council, although he was completely ignorant ofhow to participate as a member (see Gorgias 473e–474a). In the Republic, whenAdeimantus asks ‘which of our present constitutions do you think is suitable forphilosophers?’, Socrates answers: ‘None of them. That’s exactly my complaint’(497a–b). Why, then, did Socrates choose to stay in Athens? Perhaps the answerlies in the Gorgias: ‘[in Athens] there’s more freedom of speech than anywhereelse in Greece’ (461e). In short, there does not seem to be any clear answer tothe question, although the greater existence of freedom of speech in Athens mayhave made it most suitable for a social critic like Socrates.

56 Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, pp. 365, 371.57 See Strauss, The City and Man, p. 124; Bloom, The Republic of Plato, pp. 407–10;

and Allan Bloom, ‘Response to Hall’, Political Theory, 5 (1977), pp. 317–19 . Myview agrees with Klosko, ‘The “Straussian” Interpretation of Plato’s Republic’,p. 279: ‘[Strauss] seems not to realize how seriously the acceptance of Plato’sEpistles undermines his view of the Republic.’

58 Thus, it may be surprising to discover that, for Plato, idealism alone cannot bringabout a just order (Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, p. 160; seealso Nickolas Pappas, Plato and the Republic (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 200).

59 Perhaps unfortunately for Plato, Dion’s ascension to power never materialized(Seventh Letter 324b, 327a–328d, 351c–e).

60 Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, pp. 379–81.


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61 Socrates often proclaimed his love for Alcibiades, a love meant to improve the20-year-old Alcibiades as moral person rather than to satisfy Socrates’ physicaldesires (Alcibiades 103a–104a, 106e, 122b, 123d, 131c–132b; Symposium 213d–223d). In addition to Alcibiades, Socrates was highly attracted to Charmides (seeCharmides 154b–d; also Alcibiades 131c–d). Both Alcibiades and Charmideswere members of the Thirty.

62 This dialogue concludes with the foreshadowed words:

Alcibiades: I’ll start to cultivate justice in myself right now.Socrates: I should like to believe that you will persevere, but I’m afraid –

not because I distrust your nature, but because I know howpowerful the city is – I’m afraid it might get the better of both meand you.

(Alcibiades 135e)

63 See Klosko, ‘Implementing the Ideal State’, p. 384.64 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Vol. V, The Later Plato and

the Academy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 185.65 For a different viewpoint, see Irwin on ‘Platonic Love and Platonic Justice’, in

Terence H. Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995),pp. 311–13.

66 The ‘present situation’ is that Socrates has been condemned to die by the newlyinstalled Athenian democracy (see Apology 38c and Crito 43a–44d).

67 The best example of what was probably Socrates’ particular disdain for publicopinion may be the Cave analogy (see Republic 513e–519d). The analogy’simplication that philosophers have a duty to come back into the cave as thepeople’s rightful rulers in an attempt to spread truth may be more characteristicof Plato.

68 This view contrasts sharply with S. Sara Monoson, Plato’s Democratic Entangle-ments: Athenian Politics and the Practice of Philosophy (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2000). She says: ‘Neither Letter 7 nor Letter 8 lend support tothe view that Plato entered Syracusan politics in an effort to “realize” the planof the Republic. Both display Plato’s concerns to distance himself from amistaken interpretation of his interest in Syracusan affairs’ (p. 150).

69 Plato also suggests the impossibility of there being a rule of law: ‘That law couldnever accurately embrace what is best and most just for all at the same time, andso prescribe what is best … practically nothing in human affairs ever remainsstable, prevent any sort of expertise whatsoever from making any simple deci-sion in any sphere that covers all cases and will last for all time’ (Statesman 294b).The problem may simply be with his idea of law as something eternally true. Thefact that laws seem to require revision over time is not a reason not to have laws,but instead it reveals a need to have some mechanism for revising them whensuch revision becomes necessary. Plato does not seem to reject this position, buthe appears to believe that the rulers’ duty to revise the law of their city-statelicenses their freedom from constraint by the laws’ prescription.

70 Barry Weingast is quite right to point out: ‘Because laws and political limits canbe disobeyed or ignored, something beyond laws is necessary to prevent viola-tions. To survive, the rule of law requires that limits on political officials be self-enforcing’ (Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and theRule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 91 (1997), p. 262). Thus, wemust always entrust those in political authority with some degree of self-policing.


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Plato seems to assume that such officials would police themselves without anycountering influences.

71 If correct, this appears to contradict interpretations by Darrell Dobbs, ‘SocraticCommunism’, Journal of Politics, 62 (2000), pp. 491–510; Richard Holway,‘Achilles, Socrates, Democracy’, Political Theory, 22 (1994), pp. 561–90; KarlPopper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, The Spell of Plato (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945), pp. 86–119; Arlene W. Saxonhouse, ‘Democ-racy, Equality, and Eidê: A Radical View from Book 8 of Plato’s Republic’,American Political Science Review, 92 (1998), pp. 273–83; and C. C. W. Taylor,‘Plato’s Totalitarianism’, in Fine, Plato 2, esp. pp. 281–2.

72 See Catherine Pickstock, ‘Justice and Prudence: Principles of Order in thePlatonic City’, Telos, 119 (2001), pp. 3–16.

73 According to John Burnet, Plato’s fusion of legal kingship with legal democracyis a combination of Persian monarchy and Athenian democracy, ideally (JohnBurnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London: Macmillan, 1964), p. 239and n. 1; see Laws 699e and Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV,p. 301).

74 There are a number of other elected offices in addition, such as ‘generals’ and‘calvary-commanders’ (see Laws 755c–d, 756a–b).

75 In Plato’s view, ‘to put incompetent officials in charge of administering the codeis a waste of good laws … doing [the city-state] damage and injury on a giganticscale’ (Laws 751b).

76 Plato’s authoritarianism might be best characterized as an ‘accountable authori-tarianism’ or a ‘sceptical authoritarianism’. (See my ‘A Defence of ScepticalAuthoritarianism’, Politics, pp. 152–62 and my ‘Can We Justify Political Inequal-ity?’, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 89 (2003), pp. 426–38.)

77 Plato says shortly afterwards: ‘And whether they [the expert rulers] purge thecity for its benefit by putting some people to death or else by exiling them, orwhether again they make it smaller by sending out colonies somewhere likeswarms of bees, or build it up by introducing people from somewhere outsideand making them citizens – so long as they act to preserve it on the basis of expertknowledge and what is just, making it better than it was so far as they can’ (States-man 293d–e; see Gorgias 466b–c).

78 Moreover, persuasion is to be directed at ‘the soul’, not the body (Phaedrus270e–271a).

79 ‘Shouldn’t we then attempt to care for the city and its citizens with the aim ofmaking the citizens themselves as good as possible?’ (Gorgias 513e). Often heuses the analogy of the steersman, acting for benefit of ship and sailors (seeAlcibiades 117c–e, 135a–b; Republic 341c, 488a–489b; Seventh Letter 351d;Statesman 296e–297b, e, 299a–e; also see Laws 639b; Phaedrus 246a–247c). Inthese analogies the ‘ships resemble cities and their attitude to the true philoso-phers’ (Republic 489a). Here too we may be led to the belief that people oughtto follow the true philosopher’s judgement against their will.

80 I therefore disagree with Rosenstock’s belief that Plato’s dichotomy is betweenthe philosopher and the tyrant (Rosenstock, ‘Athena’s Cloak’, p. 383).

81 I have benefited greatly from the comments of Joy Chaudhuri, Jack Crittenden,Peter Jones, Graham Long, John Rose, Michael Shaw, and, most especially,Fabian Freyenhagen on previous drafts of this article. The article was presentedat the Society for the Contemporary Assessment of Platonism at the AmericanPhilosophical Association (Pacific Division) annual meeting and the NewcastlePolitical Philosophy Workshop.

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