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This article was downloaded by: [University of Liverpool]On: 09 October 2014, At: 11:36Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UKJournal of Intelligence HistoryPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjih20Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelationsof Peter and Martin Allen about the History of theSecond World WarErnst HaigerPublished online: 05 Oct 2012.To cite this article: Ernst Haiger (2006) Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelations of Peter and Martin Allen aboutthe History of the Second World War, Journal of Intelligence History, 6:1, 105-118To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2006.10555127PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLETaylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the Content) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjih20http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2006.10555127http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditionshttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions* I am very grateful to Prof. Reinhard R. Doerries for reading the manuscript withscrupulous care and suggesting improvements. Dr Catherine Atkinson of theRenaissance-Labor, Hanover, has polished up my English text.1 Lieber Herr Hitler... 1939/40: So wollte der Herzog von Windsor den Friedenretten (Inning: Druffel, 2001); Churchills Friedensfalle. Das Geheimnis des He-Fluges 1941 (Stegen: Druffel, 2003); Das Himmler-Komplott 1943-1945 (Stegen:Druffel, 2005).2 E.g. Daily Telegraph, 2 and 4 July 2005, 2; Sunday Times, 3 July 2005, 15;Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 2005, 29; Der Spiegel (4 July 2005): 131..The Journal of Intelligence History 6 (Summer 2006)Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelations of Peter and Martin Allen about the History of the Second World War*Ernst HaigerThe British author Martin Allen has written three books on the history of WorldWar II: Hidden Agenda: How the Duke of Windsor Betrayed the Allies(London: Macmillan, 2000); The Hitler/Hess Deception: British IntelligencesBest Kept Secret of the Second World War (London: Harper Collins, 2003); andHimmlers Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler(London: Chrysalis Books, 2005). In all three books M. Allen claims to revealsecrets that the British Establishment does not want revealed. The author andhis books are thus popular in revisionist circles in Britain and Germany(translations of his books have been published by a German right-wingpublisher). His works do not meet standards of academic historiography and1are teeming with wrong statements and with false, sometimes absurd interpreta-tions of sources.Last year historians, who had hitherto almost completely ignored MartinAllens work, were obliged to take note of it. In July 2005 the press reported onforged papers that had been planted among genuine documents in certain filesof the British National Archives. These were papers with which Allen wanted2to demonstrate in his book on Himmlers Secret War that the head of the SS didnot commit suicide in British custody, but was killed by British intelligenceagents with the knowledge of Winston Churchill to prevent him from talkingto the Americans when interrogated by them about contacts with Britain in theDownloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 106 Ernst HaigerWar. Forensic examination has well and truly shown that these papers areforgeries: letterheads on correspondence supposedly written in 1945 werecreated on a modern laser-printer; under the ink of the greeting and signatureof a letter a pencil guide was revealed in infrared-light; letters allegedly fromtwo different government departments were written with the same typewriter.The National Archives launched an official examination und gave the matter tothe police.Allen denied all previous knowledge that the papers were bogus, and ofcourse it is only fair to give him the benefit of the doubt. But the pressrecollected that he had once before come under suspicion of manipulatingevidence. In the book Hidden Agenda on the Duke of Windsor, a key sourceis a letter allegedly written by the Duke to Hitler (beginning: Lieber HerrDownloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 1073 M. Allen, Lieber Herr Hitler, 22-23, 182, 347.4 Peter Bower, Leslie Dick, Robert Radley, see Sunday Times, 3 July 2005, 15.5 R 58/572, fol. 80-81v, Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB).6 The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), 127ff.; cf. BerndMartin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1942(Dsseldorf: Droste, 1974), 277-279; Reinhard R. Doerries, Hitlers Last Chief ofForeign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg(London/Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003), 15-17.7 Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), ser. D vol. X (London: HMSO,1957)/ Akten zur deutschen auswrtigen Politik (ADAP), Ser. D Bd. X (Gttingen:Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), v. index of ADAP s.v. Windsor.8 Peter Allen, The Crown, 212 ff.: Victor was Rudolf Hess; there is no doubt [!]about his [Heydrichs] identity as C.9 Heydrich wrote a letter to foreign minister von Ribbentrop, dated Berlin, den 27.Juli 1940", DGFP/ADAP D X no. 247; Schellenberg asked the Foreign Ministry toinform Heydrich about his plans, which would have been nonsense if Heydrich hadbeen in Lisbon; see telegram sent by the Ambassador in Madrid Eberhard vonStohrer to the Auswrtiges Amt on 26 July 1940: Schellenberg requests that theHitler!). Commenting on the provenance of the letter Allen remarked that it3had been given to his late father, the author Peter Allen, by Albert Speer! Thispiece of writing, a facsimile of which is reproduced in the book, has beenexposed by three experts as a fake.4There is another story in this book based on false evidence which MartinAllen may have taken bona fide from his fathers book on the Duke of Windsor:The Crown and the Swastika. Hitler, Hess and the Duke of Windsor (London:Robert Hale, 1983). After the fall of France the Duke of Windsor, then servingas liaison officer with the French army, went to Spain. On the Spanishgovernments initiative the Germans tried to get in contact there with the Duke,who had voiced anti-Churchill and pro-peace sentiments. Walter Schellenbergof the German Secret Service was sent to the Iberian Peninsula to induce theDuke to settle down in a neutral country as a virtual ally of the Germangovernment. We are informed about this affair by short notes written bySchellenberg and his memoirs and by correspondence between the German5 6embassies in Spain and Portugal and the German Foreign Ministry. Peter Allen7claims to have read in these sources that Reinhard Heydrich and Rudolf Hessalso went to Portugal, thus supposedly revealing the identities of those actingunder the code names C. and Viktor in the sources. It is quite correct that8Heydrich was often called C in the SS-Sicherheitsdienst (SD), following theexample of the British Secret Service, they so admired, but the person calledC. in connection with the Windsor affair was not Heydrich (who stayed inBerlin) ; it was a Portuguese police or intelligence officer whom Schellenberg9Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 108 Ernst HaigerChief of the Security Police [Heydrich] be informed of the planning (ADAP/DGFPD X no. 235).10 Schellenbergs note, 26 July 1940: Sofort [on arrival in Lisbon] durch VermittlungW i n z e rs Verbindung mit C. aufgenommen. C. mit allem einverstanden, erklrt,die Sicherheit fr Willi [i.e. the Duke of Windsor] garantieren zu knnen (R 58/572, fol. 80, BAB). Schellenberg would not need a Vermittlung to contact hissuperior Heydrich.11 One of the reasons: Hess did not fly this Me 110 before November 1940, cf. RainerF. Schmidt, Rudolf He Botengang eines Toren? Der Flug nach Grobritan-nien vom 10. Mai 1941 (Dsseldorf: Econ, 1997), 157.12 See letter of Karl to Albrecht Haushofer of Jan. 31, 1935, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk (Boppard: Boldt, 1979), 2: 185, doc. 103.13 I am obliged to Dr Josef Henke of the Bundesarchiv for checking from which BAdocuments Peter Allen had obtained photocopies. Among these photocopies is nonewhich contains the information given by Peter Allen.contacted through the Police-Attach at the German embassy in Spain, PaulWinzer, on arriving in Lisbon. Nor can the person with the code name10Viktor, who interviewed the Duke of Windsor on 28 July 1940 in Lisbon, beidentified as Hess. Peter Allens first argument for identifying him as such readsas follows: The particular aircraft he [Hess] normally flew was a Messer-schmitt 110 [...], its number VJ-OQ, giving it the call sign V for Viktor, anobvious choice for a code name. Being aware that this was not a strongargument in fact a thoroughly unconvincing one he adds stronger11evidence. He quotes from an alleged telegram sent by Schellenberg on 28 July1940 which was adressed to A.H. and reads: Just a note to keep youinformed. Our friend Tomo met with C and Willi [code name for the Dukeof Windsor in the Schellenberg notes] this morning. Seven points plan wasdiscussed in detail. Allen identifies A.H. as Albrecht Haushofer, son ofHesss old friend, the geopolitician Karl Haushofer, and Tomo as Hess tomo(dachi), the Japanese word for friend, being the code name for Hessin the Haushofer familys correspondence and he comes to the conclusion12that the Viktor who called on the Duke of Windsor in Lisbon was the DeputyFhrer. For the general reader that might sound like a convincing story, butamong the German cables of which Peter Allen has obtained photocopiesfrom the Bundesarchiv there is no trace of this telegram which he quotes asBundesarchiv Document no. E 147120", nor can there be, since this sort ofreference number does not exist. The document is a pure invention of Peter13Allen. Viktor is in fact a Spanish emissary (V-Mann) of the SpanishMinister of the Interior sent to Lisbon to persuade the Duke and Duchess ofDownloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 10914 Cf. Schellenbergs notes, Sunday 28 July (R 58/572 fol. 80v, BAB): Viktor wirderwartet [...] Viktor war bei Willi [Windsor]. Dieser bittet um 48 StundenBedenkzeit. Ambassador von Stohrers tel. of 30 July (ADAP/DGFP D X no. 257):The Spanish Minister of the Interior just informed me that his confidential emissarytalked with the Duke on Sunday [July 28] [...]. The Duke [...] stated only that hemust think the matter over. He would give his answer after 48 hours.15 Schellenbergs notes, 31 July: In der Nacht zum 1.8.40 Ausarbeitung der 7 Punkte:Blumenstrauss [a bouquet was delivered at the house with a note which said: Beware of the machinations of the British Secret Service a Portuguese friend who has your interests at heart., Schellenberg Memoirs,139], Festnahme eines Verdchtigen auf dem Schiff, Liste ber mitfahrendeEmigranten wird Philipps [private secretary to the Duke] berreicht, Mitteilungdurch hchste Stellen ber in 4 Tagen beginnende Offensive; 1 August: [3 furthermeasures] Die 7 Punkte sind durchgefhrt. Cf. for these measures Schellenbergstel. from Lisbon of Aug. 2, 1940, ADAP/DGFP D X no. 277. Peter Allen refersto Blumenstrauss as a person: the German documents he has seen containindisputable references to both Hess and Heydrich as well as to Primo de Rivera,Winzer [..], Blumenstrauss and others [...]! Peter (and Martin) Allens commandof the German language appears inadequate, to put it politely.16 Daily Telegraph, 12 August 2005; I have only checked the authenticity of paperspresented as documents in this book in so far as they are of interest for my ownresearch work on Albrecht Haushofer (see my biographical essay in: Ernst Haiger,Amelie Ihering and Carl Friedrich von Weizscker, Albrecht Haushofer [Ebenhau-sen: Langewiesche-Brandt, 2002], 7-98). My arguments derive from comparingdubious papers with sources known to be authentic and identifying inconsistencies.17 www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news.Windsor to go to Spain. And the seven points plan, which according to14Peter Allens pseudo-document was discussed in detail by Hess and the Dukeof Windsor, was in fact Schellenbergs plan for measures to deter the Dukefrom sailing to the Bahamas, whither the British Government ordered him totake up his office of governor. We will find traces of this story in Martin15Allens book on Rudolf Hess.In the present article I wish to demonstrate that the book The Hitler/HessDeception, too, is partly based on forged documents. The National Archivesattention was drawn to these papers by me and the Archives staff and the16police have extended their investigations accordingly. These have not yet beenconcluded. On 22 February 2006 the National Archives informed the public inan update of the News on their website on document authenticity that seven17files have been found to contain forged documents and withdrawn from publicaccess and that a number of other files have also been withdrawn to use forcomparative purposes during the forensic testing. The National Archives haveconfirmed that the papers exposed as forgeries in this article are among thoseDownloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 110 Ernst Haiger18 Letter by Dr David Thomas, National Archives, Director Collections and Technol-ogy, of 10 July 2006.19 Allen, Deception, 110.20 CAB 127/206, National Archives Kew (NAK) (Allen cites the reference no. FO898/306, but it was impossible to locate it. On being approached for help, Allen saidthe reference number named above was correct). Facsimile in the German edition:which are believed by them and their scientific advisers to be forged. In May182006 the Archives changed the rules for users following the discovery offorged documents in the archives: only notebooks or pads that are bound byspiral wire, staples or stitching will be permitted (update of 4 May). Newreader tickets have been introduced that include a photograph taken as part ofthe ticket-issuing process; this change too is part of our ongoing improvementto our security practices (update of 15 May).What does the Hitler/Hess deception, as Martin Allen describes it, actuallymean? The British Government, knowing that Hitler desired peace with Britain,allegedly wanted to make him believe that there was a strong peace party inBritain which was willing and was able to bring down the Churchill govern-ment and to make peace with Hitler. Former supporters of appeasement ofwhom many people in Britain and in Germany thought that they still sympa-thized with the idea of a negotiated peace, were now in fact loyal supporters ofChurchill and thus party to the deception. The aim was to lure Hitler, whowas to believe that he would not run a real risk of a war on two fronts becauseof the activities of the British peace party, to go to war with Russia as theonly chance for Britain to win the war in the long run.The deception, Martin Allen asserts, was put into effect by an intelligenceoperation which was so very secret that it is doubtful if it was ever [MartinAllens italics] given an official title. But how do you refer to something withno name? Because by a strange quirk of fate the surnames of the mainprotagonists on both sides of the Channel began with the letter H Hitler,Hess, Haushofer, Hoare, Halifax the operational title Messrs HHHHoperation was adopted.19 Allen can only present two sources for the operation (For the author ofa conspiracy theory it is convenient that there are very few sources or indeedno sources at all, because that is an argument for the existence of a conspiracy).For the first source he only provides the reference number in the NationalArchives: FO 837/593. Unfortunately it is not possible to locate a documentcontaining the information cited by Allen in this file (which is about Portugesetinplate). Allens second document is a letter of the Minister of EconomicWarfare, Hugh Dalton, also in charge of the Special Operations Executive(SOE), to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of 28 February, 1941. Dalton20Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 111Friedensfalle, 412.21 Anthony Eden, Memoirs, vol. [III]: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1962), 190 ff.;the author quotes from his diary entry of 12 February 1941: Had difficulty ingetting away from this [a luncheon] and shedding Dalton in time to catch special[train].22 In 2004 Allens German cooperator and translator, the historian Dr Olaf Rose,revealed and published in a German version the recently released F.O. memo.Summary of principal German Peace Feelers, September 1939-March 1941": OlafRose, ...unsere Einstellung gegenber all diesen Angeboten ist in Zukunftabsolutes Schweigen! Ein sechzig Jahre gesperrtes Memorandum des ForeignOffice enthllt die britische Ablehnung 16 deutscher und neutraler Friedensangebo-te, Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart 52.4 (2004): 34-39, 34. Thisdocument is, however, well known to historians and was published by LotharKettenacker as early as 1977: Lothar Kettenacker, ed., Das Andere Deutschlandim Zweiten Weltkrieg. Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive/The Other Germany in the Second World War. Emigration and Resistance inInternational Perspective (= Verff. des Dt. Histor. Inst. London Bd. 2 / Publ. of theGerman Hist. Inst. London vol.2) (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1977), 164-87 (ibid. pp.187-200 the continuation: Summary of Principal Peace Feelers, April 1941 to June1942").states that he has been in deep contemplation ever since the matter wediscussed yesterday with the P.M. and feels he must express his concerns toEden before we take any further actions. He does not believe we can bemorally justified to use it [i.e. the Mssrs HHHH Operation] to cause thesuggested end result and he proposes to discuss the matter again with theForeign Secretary next Saturday. This document cannot be genuine. Daltoncould neither have discussed the HHHH operation with Eden and the PrimeMinister yesterday, i.e. on 27 February 1941, nor could he have proposed todiscuss it again with him next Saturday, for the simple reason that Eden hadleft London for a long diplomatic mission to Egypt, Turkey and Greece on 12February and he returned only on 10 April. To sum up: there is no documen-21tary evidence for the Messrs HHHH Operation.It is, of course, correct that Hitler urgently wished to make peace withBritain and that the Churchill Government refused to do so and that theirattitude was one of absolute silence also to the peace feelers on the part ofGerman opponents against the Nazi regime but that is well known and doesnot need to be revealed by Martin Allen and his right wing friends. 22But what Allen says about the alleged attempts of Hitler/Hess to contact oneof the leaders of the peace party is not based on sound source material. SirSamuel Hoare, a strong supporter of appeasement before the War and sinceMay 1940 British ambassador to Spain, was commonly seen (in Germany too)Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 112 Ernst Haiger23 SECRET. Papal Nuncio. Memorandum, 17 Nov. 1940, signed G.A.H., NAK, FO371/26991, NAK, facs. in Friedensfalle, 406-407 doc. b.24 David Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (London: Murray, 1997), 209; GrahamD. Macklin, Major Hugh Pollard, MI6, and the Spanish Civil War, The HistoricalJournal 49.1 (2006): 277-80, 280.not to be opposed to the idea of a negotiated peace. According to Allen his anti-Churchill statements were only mimicry, and he was an eager supporter of thePrime Ministers policy and entangled in the Messrs HHHH Operation.(Whether Hoare only wanted to deceive the Germans or whether he meant whathe said could be judged better, if the whole of his correspondence with the F.O.were made accessible to the public).Hitler launched his peace offers, according to Martin Allen, via his deputyRudolf Hess, Hesss old friend, the general and professor Karl Haushofer andthe latters son Albrecht. Both Haushofers are presented as Hitlers closeadvisers a gross overestimation of their influence in the Third Reich. AlbrechtHaushofer, says Martin Allen, called on Hoare in Madrid in July 1940, whenthe last round of peace offers were made. As evidence he cites a documentwhich he presents as a memorandum of 17 November 1940 by a certainG.A.H. on an encounter between Sir Samuel Hoare and the Papal Nuncio inSpain, who had communicated a peace offer transmitted to him by AlbrechtHaushofer on behalf of the German government. According to Allen,23G.A.H. is Captain Gareth Alan Hillgarth, naval attach at the British embassyin Madrid.This text is dubious on purely formal grounds. Would the naval attach bepresent at a meeting of his ambassador with the Papal Nuncio on a very delicatematter? And would he have written a memorandum on this conversation, if hehad not been present? For Allens argument, however, it is important thatCaptain Hillgarth was involved, because he worked for the Secret Service,organised the covert activities of the SOE in Spain and was an unofficialintelligence adviser to Winston Churchill.24The contents of the documents are equally dubious.1. G.A.H. states that the APA representative Haushofer had met Hoare.But Haushofer was not a representative of the APA, i.e. AuenpolitischesAmt of the NSDAP, headed by Alfred Rosenberg (he worked for anotheragency, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop). It might be argued that CaptainHillgarth did not know that but rather than APA would he not soonerwrite something like a Nazi Party agency for foreign affairs?2. I am quite sure that Haushofer did not stay for peace talks with Hoare inSpain in July 1940:Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 11325 Memo. by A. Haushofer: Gibt es noch Mglichkeiten eines deutsch-englischenFriedens?, Streng geheim, N 1122/937c, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), publ. byJacobsen, Karl Haushofer, 2: 458-61, doc. no. 246.26 Facs. Allen, Friedensfalle, 401-405 doc. a.27 See A. Haushofers memo. Gedanken zur Friedensordnung (Nov. 1941), UrsulaLaack-Michel, Albrecht Haushofer und der Nationalsozialismus: Ein Beitrag zurZeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Klett, 1974), 395 doc. no 100. In a note about an interview with Hess on 8 September 1940 Haushoferwrites that he had said to Hess that he did not know Hoare well (den ichpersnlich nicht gut kenne, zu dem ich mir aber jederzeit einen persnli-chen Weg erffnen knne); that argues against negotiations with Hoarein July 1940 on Hesss behalf. This note is undoubtedly genuine. It is25published in Allens book too, but the author does not try to clear up26the inconsistency. Haushofer never writes or indicates that he stayed in Spain duringWorld War II. To be sure, this is only an argumentum e silentio, butconsidering the rich evidence on Haushofers life it can be considered asubstantial one.3. Even given the fact that Hitler was eager to come to terms with Britain,the conditions of peace which Haushofer is said to have proposed via thePapal Nuncio on behalf of the German government before the beginningof negotiations are implausible, e.g. negotiations about a form ofreparation for damage inflicted during conquest of the occupied countriesin Western and Northern Europe. And it is unlikely that Haushofer shouldhave proposed that Germany request the restitution of the former Germancolonies, but that Southwest Africa might not be claimed: it was Hausho-fers opinion that in case of an Anglo-German colonial agreement discussed in the thirties (colonial appeasement) on no account wouldBritain cede the former German colony of East Africa (Tanganyika).27Martin Allen reports on a further German emissary to the Iberian peninsula inJuly without connecting the two missions: Rudolf Hess. Allen presents here adrastically abridged version of his fathers and his own tale about Hesss flightto Lisbon, reduced to one single sentence: The only clues to have surfaced [onalleged negotiations of the Duke of Windsor with representatives of the Germangovernment in Lisbon] allude to a seven-point plan, which was of sufficientimportance for Hess secretly to meet the Duke in the privacy of the Sacramentoa Lapa home of the German Ambassador to Portugal, [Oswald von] Hoyningen-Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 114 Ernst Haiger28 Allen, Deception, 76. In the German version (Friedensfalle, 104-105), at timesincorrect, the following sentences are added: Interessanterweise wurden AlbrechtHaushofer und Rudolf He an diesem Punkt in den Versuch hineingezogen, eineFriedensabmachung mit dem Herzog von Windsor auszuhandeln. Ihr Eingreifenzeigt, da Hitler gerade diesen Verhandlungsstrang als zu wichtig erachtete, um ihnin den wenig erfolgreichen Hnden seines Auenministers zu belassen. Es standzuviel auf dem Spiel, als da man sich htte noch weitere Fehler erlauben knnen.Das Eingreifen von He und Haushofer zu diesem Zeitpunkt ist ein Beweis dafr,wie ernst die deutsche Fhrung die Windsor-Friedensinitiative nahm. Cf. OlafRose, Warum Rudolf He 1941 nicht verhandeln durfte, Deutschland inGeschichte und Gegenwart 52. 1 (2004): 20-23: So flog er [Hess] mit seiner Me-110 (Kennung VJ-OQ) am 28. Juli 1940 von Augsburg nach Lissabon, um dort denberaus deutschfreundlichen britischen Ex-Monarchen Edward VIII. [...] zu treffen.Dieser wollte als Kontaktmann zu friedensbereiten Englndern wirken. [...] Einen7 Punkte-Friedensplan hatte man bereits mit dem Herzog von Windsor errtert[...] (p. 20).29 Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 26 March 1941, FO 794/19, NAK,facs. Allen, Friedensfalle, 413.30 Cf. supra on APA.31 That would have casted further suspicion on ethnic Germans abroad of being theFifth Column of Nazi Germany, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, NationalsozialistischeAuenpolitik 1933-1938 (Frankfurt am Main / Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1968), 107,110, 197 ff.Huene, on Sunday, 28 July 1940, for a series of secret meetings. Remarkably,28he gives no evidence whatsoever for this terse information, which must bebewildering to the reader. Maybe he had discovered in his fathers papers lettersaccusing him of having invented evidence in his Windsor book.Allen maintains he has unearthed a letter by Sir Samuel Hoare of 26 March1941 to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of the F.O., abouta further meeting with [Albrecht] Haushofer at the home of [the formerSpanish foreign minister Juan] Beigbeder in Madrid.29I repeat that I do not think that Haushofer ever had talks with Hoare inMadrid during World War II. One sentence is particularly dubious: H[ausho-fer] informed me that it has already been arranged for their Head of the AO tojourney anywhere, if it would resolve the impasse. Would Sir Alexander knowwhat AO was (Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP for party members livingabroad) and who the Head of the AO was (Gauleiter Ernst Bohle)? And30Haushofer would never have involved Bohle in any peace feelers; he had beenopposed to Bohle and his organisation since 1933 because Bohle wanted toorganise the Volksdeutsche too, i.e. the German-speaking subjects of otherstates something that would be detrimental to German Volkstumspolitik.31Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 11532 Allen, Deception, 191 ff.33 Ibid. p. 223. Allen often leaves himself a loop hole by modifying his statements inthe following manner: Despite the likelyhood that Hesss personal ambitions werethe primary factor behind his taking Bohles place on the mission to Scotland, thefact that Bohle himself was never told he was to fly to Britain[!] suggests Hitler andHess had always secretly planned for Hess to meet the close representative ofBritains head of state (p. 192).34 Ibid.35 This plane usually required a crew of two, but in Oct. 1940 Hess had asked forspecial radio equipment to be fitted. This was too large and cumbersome to fit intothe cockpit, and was instead installed in the navigators seat, according to the lateHelmut Kaden, chief Messerschmitt test pilot in 1940, see Lynn Picknett, ClivePrince and Stephan Prior, Double Standards: The Rudolf Hess Cover-up (London:Time Warner Books UK, 2002), 169 f. (first published by Little, Brown & Co,2001).36 FO 371/60508, NAK, not published by Allen. The text in question, a carbon copyon flimsy paper, is part of a file relating to press reports about the implication ofCarl Jacob Burckhardt as intermediary between German and British peace movesin 1941. 37 I am grateful to Paulette Thompson of the National Archives for sending me aphotocopy.Why is there mention of a journey by Bohle to resolve the impasse of the top-secret talks between Hitler-Hess-Haushofer and the British peace party?Allen makes the fantastic assertion, that it was Gauleiter Bohle who was to flyto Scotland as the representative of the German government and that Hessdecided only at the very last moment to fly in Bohles place, motivated bypersonal ambition. But that is entirely mistaken: Hess had spent months32meticulously planning his flight, as Allen correctly states himself, Bohle33according to Allen was never told he was to fly to Britain (!) and Bohle34would not have been able to pilot a Me 110 to Scotland.35Dubious and absurd interpretations of sources are Martin Allens speciality.I conclude with two examples. According to a document of in my opinionquestionable authenticity (the document may be genuine but Allens36interpretation is absurd) two agents of the British Secret Service called on KarlHaushofer at his farm Hartschimmelhof in Upper Bavaria on the very day of hisand his wifes suicide (Sunday 10 March 1946). According to the text a Mr.Hopkinson sent a cable from Bern to the Foreign Office: Attention Mr.Kirkpatrick. Further to your instruction of 8th March, K. Haushofer was visitedon 10th March. After interrogation it was apparent the gentleman knew nothingfurther on the subject in question. In response to our instructions the problemconcerning this man and the IMT has now been removed.37Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 116 Ernst Haiger38 Allen, Deception, xxvii.39 Stefan Scheil, 1940/41: Die Eskalation des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Munich: Olzog,2005), 15.40 Ich bin [...] damit einverstanden, da insbesondere mit Hinblick auf denGesundheitszustand des Zeugen Dr. Haushofer an diesen lediglich ein Fragebogen[English text: interrogatory] gerichtet wird. (Der Proze gegen die Hauptkriegs-verbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militrgerichtshof, vol. 8: Verhandlungs-niederschriften, 20. Febr. 1946 7. Mrz 1946, Nuremberg 1947, 691-693). KarlHaushofers son Heinz states in a memorandum about his parents suicide (seebelow fn. 45) that shortly before Karl Haushofer had been informed via a messagegiven on the radio that Hesss defence counsel did not want him to be called toNuremberg as a witness for the defence out of consideration for his state of health:that gave him the feeling of being freed of all obligations in this world.41 The Trial of Major German War Criminals: Proceedings (London: HMSO, 1947),8: 222.42 Allen, Deception, xxvi-xxvii.Allen asserts that these two men (why two?) were almost certainly thelast people to see the Haushofers alive, thus suggesting that they killed the38couple to prevent Karl Haushofer from revealing the Hitler/Hess peace offersin the witness-stand in Nuremberg. The historian Stefan Scheil who throughoutadopts Martin Allens theories adds ominously that 3 days before Karl Hausho-fers death Hesss defence counsel Dr Alfred Seidl requested to call him as awitness to Nuremberg, thus suggesting that the British had to fear his testimonyabout the Hitler/Hess peace overtures. That is not quite correct. Dr Seidl39requested the evidence, (a) restricted to the charge of the Fith Columnactivities of Auslandsorganisation, Deutsches Auslandsinstitut and Volkbundfr das Deutschtum im Ausland, by their respective former heads, Bohle, KarlStrlin and Karl Haushofer and (b) he did not insist on the presence of KarlHaushofer in Nuremberg: This procedure would not give Dr Seidl the chance40to examine Karl Haushofer in court about the Hitler/Hess peace feelers. SirDavid MaxwellFyfe, British member of the prosecution, had no objection tointerrogation (by interrogatory) of Karl Haushofer.41A man is said to have committed suicide, but in fact he was killed by Britishagents to silence him: this story reminds us of Martin Allens book on themurder of Heinrich Himmler. Allen spins out his fable, writing that KarlHaushoferss son Heinz two days later, on Tuesday, 12 March [...], puzzled byhis inability to contact his parents on the phone, went to Hartschimmelhof. Hefound the house deserted, although the lights within were burning. Withincreasing concern, Heinz [Haushofer] searched the substantial house, beforemoving on to the grounds and the surrounding forest. An hour later [...] HeinzHaushofer found his parents. This story is a pure invention, the real events42Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 11743 IRR Pers. Files, XE000655: Karl Haushofer, fol. 9-11, RG 319, NARA. Allenstates, ibid.: The local police, together with the American authorities, investigatedthe matter in some detail, but after all the horrors of the war, and with the desperatestate of Germany in the spring of 1946, resources and time were limited, and theHaushofers deaths were officially recorded as suicides. Allen does not seem to beaware of this police record.44 Cf. H. Haushofers statement (in the Haushofer Papers, N 1122/960, BAK)Erklrung ber die Grnde des Selbstmordes meiner Eltern Karl und MarthaHaushofer, drafted on 14 March 1946 for Father Edmund A. Walsh, S.J.,Georgetown University professor of geopolitics, who had interrogated KarlHaushofer as special consultant to IMT Justice Jackson. Cf. Jacobsen, KarlHaushofer, vol. 1, 443 ff. about the Haushofers suicide and the motives for it.45 Letter by K. to Albrecht Haushofer, 3 Sept. 1940, publ. by Jacobsen, Karl Haus-hofer, 2: 452-55, 454 doc. no. 243 (Allen quotes the Haushofer correspondenceonly from the microfilmed records at the US National Archives and not from thebooks by Jacobsen on Karl and by Laack-Michel on Albrecht Haushofer he haslisted in his bibliography); Allen, Deception, 89 ff.46 See J. Andreas Schmeller, Bayerisches Wrterbuch, 2. vermehrte Ausgabe bearbei-tet von G. Karl Frommann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1872) 1:, col. 317; cf. HermannFischer, Schwbisches Wrterbuch (Tbingen: Lauppsche Buchhandlung, 1904)1: col. 1571.were quite different. Karl Haushofer and his wife did not live alone on theirfarm, Heinz Haushofer and his family lived in another building on the estate,the nursemaid slept in the parents house, a cook lived there too. A recorddrafted by the local police of 11 March proves what had really happened:43when Heinz Haushofer wanted to call on his parents in the morning of 11March, he found farewell letters on their beds and a sketch by Karl Haushoferof the place where the son would find the corpses (these documents are in theHaushofer Papers) and where he did find them. The cook had been at home andshe had been ordered by Mrs Haushofer to fetch a clothes line, which wasinstrumental in the suicide. There is not a word about two British visitors in therecord. Heinz Haushofer testified that his father had been contemplating suicidefor a long time.44The most absurd and laughable misinterpretation of sources in Allens bookis the interpretation of the word Butzelware in a letter by Karl to AlbrechtHaushofer. The father refers to his sons comment that when summoned by45Ribbentrop to Vienna he had had a wonderful flight over the Salzkammergutand an unexpected reunion with the Butzelware in Vienna. This wordsignifies in the Bavarian dialect the Haushofers are Bavarians littlechildren, and in this letter it means Heinz Haushofers children, then living46in Vienna. But Allen knows better: This must be a code! PronouncedDownloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 118 Ernst Haiger47 Allen, Deception, 90-91. Incidentally, in this letter Karl Haushofer openly says thatHess had informed him about Hitlers wish to come to terms with Britain no codewas needed in transmitting this information to Albrecht Haushofer.48 Ibid., 12 ff., 27 ff.49 Allen, Deception, Acknowledgements, xiii-xiv.phonetically it becomes Botselwahr. In an old German dictionary publishedin Stuttgart in 1893" Allen found out, that Bote means messenger, and wahrmeans faithful or genuine. Thus Albrecht was being discreetly told to return[...] for an unexpected reunion with the genuine/faithful messenger someonewho could be trusted to deliver a truthful message. Karl Haushofer was in effecttelling his son that the Fhrer finally wanted a genuine peace with the British,and that he should go to a meeting near Berchtesgaden with Hess to give hisassistance. Martin Allen is clearly quite serious about this nonsense. But it47is difficult to understand why anyone else has taken this book seriously.Apart from the absurdities of interpretation and the presentation of not verysophisticated forgeries whoever may have fabricated them for whateverreasons the book teems with false statements on well known facts, e.g. aboutKarl and Albrecht Haushofer (It is evident that Allen has not read the books48and articles listed in his bibliography that are written in German, nor has hecontacted all the people connected either by family relationship to orexceptional knowledge of the main personalities or events of 1940-41, whoextended me their assistance). Perhaps Allen should have written a novel49The Butzelware Code. The books he has written are more fiction thanhistoriography but professing to tell true stories.Downloaded by [University of Liverpool] at 11:36 09 October 2014 Page 1Page 2Page 3Page 4Page 5Page 6Page 7Page 8Page 9Page 10Page 11Page 12Page 13Page 14