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  • This article was downloaded by: [University of Liverpool]On: 09 October 2014, At: 11:36Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

    Journal of Intelligence HistoryPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjih20

    Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelationsof Peter and Martin Allen about the History of theSecond World WarErnst HaigerPublished online: 05 Oct 2012.

    To cite this article: Ernst Haiger (2006) Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelations of Peter and Martin Allen aboutthe History of the Second World War, Journal of Intelligence History, 6:1, 105-118

    To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2006.10555127

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  • * I am very grateful to Prof. Reinhard R. Doerries for reading the manuscript with

    scrupulous care and suggesting improvements. Dr Catherine Atkinson of the

    Renaissance-Labor, Hanover, has polished up my English text.

    1 Lieber Herr Hitler... 1939/40: So wollte der Herzog von Windsor den Frieden

    retten (Inning: Druffel, 2001); Churchills Friedensfalle. Das Geheimnis des He-

    Fluges 1941 (Stegen: Druffel, 2003); Das Himmler-Komplott 1943-1945 (Stegen:

    Druffel, 2005).

    2 E.g. Daily Telegraph, 2 and 4 July 2005, 2; Sunday Times, 3 July 2005, 15;

    Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 2005, 29; Der Spiegel (4 July 2005): 131..

    The Journal of Intelligence History 6 (Summer 2006)

    Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries: The Revelations of Peter and Martin Allen about the History of the Second World War*

    Ernst Haiger

    The British author Martin Allen has written three books on the history of World

    War II: Hidden Agenda: How the Duke of Windsor Betrayed the Allies

    (London: Macmillan, 2000); The Hitler/Hess Deception: British Intelligences

    Best Kept Secret of the Second World War (London: Harper Collins, 2003); and

    Himmlers Secret War: The Covert Peace Negotiations of Heinrich Himmler

    (London: Chrysalis Books, 2005). In all three books M. Allen claims to reveal

    secrets that the British Establishment does not want revealed. The author and

    his books are thus popular in revisionist circles in Britain and Germany

    (translations of his books have been published by a German right-wing

    publisher). His works do not meet standards of academic historiography and1

    are teeming with wrong statements and with false, sometimes absurd interpreta-

    tions of sources.

    Last year historians, who had hitherto almost completely ignored Martin

    Allens work, were obliged to take note of it. In July 2005 the press reported on

    forged papers that had been planted among genuine documents in certain files

    of the British National Archives. These were papers with which Allen wanted2

    to demonstrate in his book on Himmlers Secret War that the head of the SS did

    not commit suicide in British custody, but was killed by British intelligence

    agents with the knowledge of Winston Churchill to prevent him from talking

    to the Americans when interrogated by them about contacts with Britain in the

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  • 106 Ernst Haiger

    War. Forensic examination has well and truly shown that these papers are

    forgeries: letterheads on correspondence supposedly written in 1945 were

    created on a modern laser-printer; under the ink of the greeting and signature

    of a letter a pencil guide was revealed in infrared-light; letters allegedly from

    two different government departments were written with the same typewriter.

    The National Archives launched an official examination und gave the matter to

    the police.

    Allen denied all previous knowledge that the papers were bogus, and of

    course it is only fair to give him the benefit of the doubt. But the press

    recollected that he had once before come under suspicion of manipulating

    evidence. In the book Hidden Agenda on the Duke of Windsor, a key source

    is a letter allegedly written by the Duke to Hitler (beginning: Lieber Herr

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 107

    3 M. Allen, Lieber Herr Hitler, 22-23, 182, 347.

    4 Peter Bower, Leslie Dick, Robert Radley, see Sunday Times, 3 July 2005, 15.

    5 R 58/572, fol. 80-81v, Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB).

    6 The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), 127ff.; cf. Bernd

    Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939-1942

    (Dsseldorf: Droste, 1974), 277-279; Reinhard R. Doerries, Hitlers Last Chief of

    Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg

    (London/Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2003), 15-17.

    7 Documents on German Foreign Policy (DGFP), ser. D vol. X (London: HMSO,

    1957)/ Akten zur deutschen auswrtigen Politik (ADAP), Ser. D Bd. X (Gttingen:

    Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1963), v. index of ADAP s.v. Windsor.

    8 Peter Allen, The Crown, 212 ff.: Victor was Rudolf Hess; there is no doubt [!]

    about his [Heydrichs] identity as C.

    9 Heydrich wrote a letter to foreign minister von Ribbentrop, dated Berlin, den 27.

    Juli 1940", DGFP/ADAP D X no. 247; Schellenberg asked the Foreign Ministry to

    inform Heydrich about his plans, which would have been nonsense if Heydrich had

    been in Lisbon; see telegram sent by the Ambassador in Madrid Eberhard von

    Stohrer to the Auswrtiges Amt on 26 July 1940: Schellenberg requests that the

    Hitler!). Commenting on the provenance of the letter Allen remarked that it3

    had been given to his late father, the author Peter Allen, by Albert Speer! This

    piece of writing, a facsimile of which is reproduced in the book, has been

    exposed by three experts as a fake.4

    There is another story in this book based on false evidence which Martin

    Allen may have taken bona fide from his fathers book on the Duke of Windsor:

    The Crown and the Swastika. Hitler, Hess and the Duke of Windsor (London:

    Robert Hale, 1983). After the fall of France the Duke of Windsor, then serving

    as liaison officer with the French army, went to Spain. On the Spanish

    governments initiative the Germans tried to get in contact there with the Duke,

    who had voiced anti-Churchill and pro-peace sentiments. Walter Schellenberg

    of the German Secret Service was sent to the Iberian Peninsula to induce the

    Duke to settle down in a neutral country as a virtual ally of the German

    government. We are informed about this affair by short notes written by

    Schellenberg and his memoirs and by correspondence between the German5 6

    embassies in Spain and Portugal and the German Foreign Ministry. Peter Allen7

    claims to have read in these sources that Reinhard Heydrich and Rudolf Hess

    also went to Portugal, thus supposedly revealing the identities of those acting

    under the code names C. and Viktor in the sources. It is quite correct that8

    Heydrich was often called C in the SS-Sicherheitsdienst (SD), following the

    example of the British Secret Service, they so admired, but the person called

    C. in connection with the Windsor affair was not Heydrich (who stayed in

    Berlin) ; it was a Portuguese police or intelligence officer whom Schellenberg9

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  • 108 Ernst Haiger

    Chief of the Security Police [Heydrich] be informed of the planning (ADAP/DGFP

    D X no. 235).

    10 Schellenbergs note, 26 July 1940: Sofort [on arrival in Lisbon] durch Vermittlung

    W i n z e rs Verbindung mit C. aufgenommen. C. mit allem einverstanden, erklrt,

    die Sicherheit fr Willi [i.e. the Duke of Windsor] garantieren zu knnen (R 58/

    572, fol. 80, BAB). Schellenberg would not need a Vermittlung to contact his

    superior Heydrich.

    11 One of the reasons: Hess did not fly this Me 110 before November 1940, cf. Rainer

    F. Schmidt, Rudolf He Botengang eines Toren? Der Flug nach Grobritan-

    nien vom 10. Mai 1941 (Dsseldorf: Econ, 1997), 157.

    12 See letter of Karl to Albrecht Haushofer of Jan. 31, 1935, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,

    Karl Haushofer: Leben und Werk (Boppard: Boldt, 1979), 2: 185, doc. 103.

    13 I am obliged to Dr Josef Henke of the Bundesarchiv for checking from which BA

    documents Peter Allen had obtained photocopies. Among these photocopies is none

    which contains the information given by Peter Allen.

    contacted through the Police-Attach at the German embassy in Spain, Paul

    Winzer, on arriving in Lisbon. Nor can the person with the code name10

    Viktor, who interviewed the Duke of Windsor on 28 July 1940 in Lisbon, be

    identified as Hess. Peter Allens first argument for identifying him as such reads

    as follows: The particular aircraft he [Hess] normally flew was a Messer-

    schmitt 110 [...], its number VJ-OQ, giving it the call sign V for Viktor, an

    obvious choice for a code name. Being aware that this was not a strong

    argument in fact a thoroughly unconvincing one he adds stronger11

    evidence. He quotes from an alleged telegram sent by Schellenberg on 28 July

    1940 which was adressed to A.H. and reads: Just a note to keep you

    informed. Our friend Tomo met with C and Willi [code name for the Duke

    of Windsor in the Schellenberg notes] this morning. Seven points plan was

    discussed in detail. Allen identifies A.H. as Albrecht Haushofer, son of

    Hesss old friend, the geopolitician Karl Haushofer, and Tomo as Hess

    tomo(dachi), the Japanese word for friend, being the code name for Hess

    in the Haushofer familys correspondence and he comes to the conclusion12

    that the Viktor who called on the Duke of Windsor in Lisbon was the Deputy

    Fhrer. For the general reader that might sound like a convincing story, but

    among the German cables of which Peter Allen has obtained photocopies

    from the Bundesarchiv there is no trace of this telegram which he quotes as

    Bundesarchiv Document no. E 147120", nor can there be, since this sort of

    reference number does not exist. The document is a pure invention of Peter13

    Allen. Viktor is in fact a Spanish emissary (V-Mann) of the Spanish

    Minister of the Interior sent to Lisbon to persuade the Duke and Duchess of

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 109

    14 Cf. Schellenbergs notes, Sunday 28 July (R 58/572 fol. 80v, BAB): Viktor wird

    erwartet [...] Viktor war bei Willi [Windsor]. Dieser bittet um 48 Stunden

    Bedenkzeit. Ambassador von Stohrers tel. of 30 July (ADAP/DGFP D X no. 257):

    The Spanish Minister of the Interior just informed me that his confidential emissary

    talked with the Duke on Sunday [July 28] [...]. The Duke [...] stated only that he

    must think the matter over. He would give his answer after 48 hours.

    15 Schellenbergs notes, 31 July: In der Nacht zum 1.8.40 Ausarbeitung der 7 Punkte:

    Blumenstrauss [a bouquet was delivered at the house

    with a note which said: Beware of the machinations of the British Secret Service

    a Portuguese friend who has your interests at heart., Schellenberg Memoirs,

    139], Festnahme eines Verdchtigen auf dem Schiff, Liste ber mitfahrende

    Emigranten wird Philipps [private secretary to the Duke] berreicht, Mitteilung

    durch hchste Stellen ber in 4 Tagen beginnende Offensive; 1 August: [3 further

    measures] Die 7 Punkte sind durchgefhrt. Cf. for these measures Schellenbergs

    tel. from Lisbon of Aug. 2, 1940, ADAP/DGFP D X no. 277. Peter Allen refers

    to Blumenstrauss as a person: the German documents he has seen contain

    indisputable references to both Hess and Heydrich as well as to Primo de Rivera,

    Winzer [..], Blumenstrauss and others [...]! Peter (and Martin) Allens command

    of the German language appears inadequate, to put it politely.

    16 Daily Telegraph, 12 August 2005; I have only checked the authenticity of papers

    presented as documents in this book in so far as they are of interest for my own

    research work on Albrecht Haushofer (see my biographical essay in: Ernst Haiger,

    Amelie Ihering and Carl Friedrich von Weizscker, Albrecht Haushofer [Ebenhau-

    sen: Langewiesche-Brandt, 2002], 7-98). My arguments derive from comparing

    dubious papers with sources known to be authentic and identifying inconsistencies.

    17 www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news.

    Windsor to go to Spain. And the seven points plan, which according to14

    Peter Allens pseudo-document was discussed in detail by Hess and the Duke

    of Windsor, was in fact Schellenbergs plan for measures to deter the Duke

    from sailing to the Bahamas, whither the British Government ordered him to

    take up his office of governor. We will find traces of this story in Martin15

    Allens book on Rudolf Hess.

    In the present article I wish to demonstrate that the book The Hitler/Hess

    Deception, too, is partly based on forged documents. The National Archives

    attention was drawn to these papers by me and the Archives staff and the16

    police have extended their investigations accordingly. These have not yet been

    concluded. On 22 February 2006 the National Archives informed the public in

    an update of the News on their website on document authenticity that seven17

    files have been found to contain forged documents and withdrawn from public

    access and that a number of other files have also been withdrawn to use for

    comparative purposes during the forensic testing. The National Archives have

    confirmed that the papers exposed as forgeries in this article are among those

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  • 110 Ernst Haiger

    18 Letter by Dr David Thomas, National Archives, Director Collections and Technol-

    ogy, of 10 July 2006.

    19 Allen, Deception, 110.

    20 CAB 127/206, National Archives Kew (NAK) (Allen cites the reference no. FO

    898/306, but it was impossible to locate it. On being approached for help, Allen said

    the reference number named above was correct). Facsimile in the German edition:

    which are believed by them and their scientific advisers to be forged. In May18

    2006 the Archives changed the rules for users following the discovery of

    forged documents in the archives: only notebooks or pads that are bound by

    spiral wire, staples or stitching will be permitted (update of 4 May). New

    reader tickets have been introduced that include a photograph taken as part of

    the ticket-issuing process; this change too is part of our ongoing improvement

    to our security practices (update of 15 May).

    What does the Hitler/Hess deception, as Martin Allen describes it, actually

    mean? The British Government, knowing that Hitler desired peace with Britain,

    allegedly wanted to make him believe that there was a strong peace party in

    Britain which was willing and was able to bring down the Churchill govern-

    ment and to make peace with Hitler. Former supporters of appeasement of

    whom many people in Britain and in Germany thought that they still sympa-

    thized with the idea of a negotiated peace, were now in fact loyal supporters of

    Churchill and thus party to the deception. The aim was to lure Hitler, who

    was to believe that he would not run a real risk of a war on two fronts because

    of the activities of the British peace party, to go to war with Russia as the

    only chance for Britain to win the war in the long run.

    The deception, Martin Allen asserts, was put into effect by an intelligence

    operation which was so very secret that it is doubtful if it was ever [Martin

    Allens italics] given an official title. But how do you refer to something with

    no name? Because by a strange quirk of fate the surnames of the main

    protagonists on both sides of the Channel began with the letter H Hitler,

    Hess, Haushofer, Hoare, Halifax the operational title Messrs HHHH

    operation was adopted.19

    Allen can only present two sources for the operation (For the author of

    a conspiracy theory it is convenient that there are very few sources or indeed

    no sources at all, because that is an argument for the existence of a conspiracy).

    For the first source he only provides the reference number in the National

    Archives: FO 837/593. Unfortunately it is not possible to locate a document

    containing the information cited by Allen in this file (which is about Portugese

    tinplate). Allens second document is a letter of the Minister of Economic

    Warfare, Hugh Dalton, also in charge of the Special Operations Executive

    (SOE), to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden of 28 February, 1941. Dalton20

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 111

    Friedensfalle, 412.

    21 Anthony Eden, Memoirs, vol. [III]: The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1962), 190 ff.;

    the author quotes from his diary entry of 12 February 1941: Had difficulty in

    getting away from this [a luncheon] and shedding Dalton in time to catch special

    [train].

    22 In 2004 Allens German cooperator and translator, the historian Dr Olaf Rose,

    revealed and published in a German version the recently released F.O. memo.

    Summary of principal German Peace Feelers, September 1939-March 1941": Olaf

    Rose, ...unsere Einstellung gegenber all diesen Angeboten ist in Zukunft

    absolutes Schweigen! Ein sechzig Jahre gesperrtes Memorandum des Foreign

    Office enthllt die britische Ablehnung 16 deutscher und neutraler Friedensangebo-

    te, Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart 52.4 (2004): 34-39, 34. This

    document is, however, well known to historians and was published by Lothar

    Kettenacker as early as 1977: Lothar Kettenacker, ed., Das Andere Deutschland

    im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Emigration und Widerstand in internationaler Perspektive/

    The Other Germany in the Second World War. Emigration and Resistance in

    International Perspective (= Verff. des Dt. Histor. Inst. London Bd. 2 / Publ. of the

    German Hist. Inst. London vol.2) (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1977), 164-87 (ibid. pp.

    187-200 the continuation: Summary of Principal Peace Feelers, April 1941 to June

    1942").

    states that he has been in deep contemplation ever since the matter we

    discussed yesterday with the P.M. and feels he must express his concerns to

    Eden before we take any further actions. He does not believe we can be

    morally justified to use it [i.e. the Mssrs HHHH Operation] to cause the

    suggested end result and he proposes to discuss the matter again with the

    Foreign Secretary next Saturday. This document cannot be genuine. Dalton

    could neither have discussed the HHHH operation with Eden and the Prime

    Minister yesterday, i.e. on 27 February 1941, nor could he have proposed to

    discuss it again with him next Saturday, for the simple reason that Eden had

    left London for a long diplomatic mission to Egypt, Turkey and Greece on 12

    February and he returned only on 10 April. To sum up: there is no documen-21

    tary evidence for the Messrs HHHH Operation.

    It is, of course, correct that Hitler urgently wished to make peace with

    Britain and that the Churchill Government refused to do so and that their

    attitude was one of absolute silence also to the peace feelers on the part of

    German opponents against the Nazi regime but that is well known and does

    not need to be revealed by Martin Allen and his right wing friends. 22

    But what Allen says about the alleged attempts of Hitler/Hess to contact one

    of the leaders of the peace party is not based on sound source material. Sir

    Samuel Hoare, a strong supporter of appeasement before the War and since

    May 1940 British ambassador to Spain, was commonly seen (in Germany too)

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  • 112 Ernst Haiger

    23 SECRET. Papal Nuncio. Memorandum, 17 Nov. 1940, signed G.A.H., NAK, FO

    371/26991, NAK, facs. in Friedensfalle, 406-407 doc. b.

    24 David Stafford, Churchill and Secret Service (London: Murray, 1997), 209; Graham

    D. Macklin, Major Hugh Pollard, MI6, and the Spanish Civil War, The Historical

    Journal 49.1 (2006): 277-80, 280.

    not to be opposed to the idea of a negotiated peace. According to Allen his anti-

    Churchill statements were only mimicry, and he was an eager supporter of the

    Prime Ministers policy and entangled in the Messrs HHHH Operation.

    (Whether Hoare only wanted to deceive the Germans or whether he meant what

    he said could be judged better, if the whole of his correspondence with the F.O.

    were made accessible to the public).

    Hitler launched his peace offers, according to Martin Allen, via his deputy

    Rudolf Hess, Hesss old friend, the general and professor Karl Haushofer and

    the latters son Albrecht. Both Haushofers are presented as Hitlers close

    advisers a gross overestimation of their influence in the Third Reich. Albrecht

    Haushofer, says Martin Allen, called on Hoare in Madrid in July 1940, when

    the last round of peace offers were made. As evidence he cites a document

    which he presents as a memorandum of 17 November 1940 by a certain

    G.A.H. on an encounter between Sir Samuel Hoare and the Papal Nuncio in

    Spain, who had communicated a peace offer transmitted to him by Albrecht

    Haushofer on behalf of the German government. According to Allen,23

    G.A.H. is Captain Gareth Alan Hillgarth, naval attach at the British embassy

    in Madrid.

    This text is dubious on purely formal grounds. Would the naval attach be

    present at a meeting of his ambassador with the Papal Nuncio on a very delicate

    matter? And would he have written a memorandum on this conversation, if he

    had not been present? For Allens argument, however, it is important that

    Captain Hillgarth was involved, because he worked for the Secret Service,

    organised the covert activities of the SOE in Spain and was an unofficial

    intelligence adviser to Winston Churchill.24

    The contents of the documents are equally dubious.

    1. G.A.H. states that the APA representative Haushofer had met Hoare.

    But Haushofer was not a representative of the APA, i.e. Auenpolitisches

    Amt of the NSDAP, headed by Alfred Rosenberg (he worked for another

    agency, the Dienststelle Ribbentrop). It might be argued that Captain

    Hillgarth did not know that but rather than APA would he not sooner

    write something like a Nazi Party agency for foreign affairs?

    2. I am quite sure that Haushofer did not stay for peace talks with Hoare in

    Spain in July 1940:

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 113

    25 Memo. by A. Haushofer: Gibt es noch Mglichkeiten eines deutsch-englischen

    Friedens?, Streng geheim, N 1122/937c, Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), publ. by

    Jacobsen, Karl Haushofer, 2: 458-61, doc. no. 246.

    26 Facs. Allen, Friedensfalle, 401-405 doc. a.

    27 See A. Haushofers memo. Gedanken zur Friedensordnung (Nov. 1941), Ursula

    Laack-Michel, Albrecht Haushofer und der Nationalsozialismus: Ein Beitrag zur

    Zeitgeschichte (Stuttgart: Klett, 1974), 395 doc. no 100.

    In a note about an interview with Hess on 8 September 1940 Haushofer

    writes that he had said to Hess that he did not know Hoare well (den ich

    persnlich nicht gut kenne, zu dem ich mir aber jederzeit einen persnli-

    chen Weg erffnen knne); that argues against negotiations with Hoare

    in July 1940 on Hesss behalf. This note is undoubtedly genuine. It is25

    published in Allens book too, but the author does not try to clear up26

    the inconsistency.

    Haushofer never writes or indicates that he stayed in Spain during

    World War II. To be sure, this is only an argumentum e silentio, but

    considering the rich evidence on Haushofers life it can be considered a

    substantial one.

    3. Even given the fact that Hitler was eager to come to terms with Britain,

    the conditions of peace which Haushofer is said to have proposed via the

    Papal Nuncio on behalf of the German government before the beginning

    of negotiations are implausible, e.g. negotiations about a form of

    reparation for damage inflicted during conquest of the occupied countries

    in Western and Northern Europe. And it is unlikely that Haushofer should

    have proposed that Germany request the restitution of the former German

    colonies, but that Southwest Africa might not be claimed: it was Hausho-

    fers opinion that in case of an Anglo-German colonial agreement

    discussed in the thirties (colonial appeasement) on no account would

    Britain cede the former German colony of East Africa (Tanganyika).27

    Martin Allen reports on a further German emissary to the Iberian peninsula in

    July without connecting the two missions: Rudolf Hess. Allen presents here a

    drastically abridged version of his fathers and his own tale about Hesss flight

    to Lisbon, reduced to one single sentence: The only clues to have surfaced [on

    alleged negotiations of the Duke of Windsor with representatives of the German

    government in Lisbon] allude to a seven-point plan, which was of sufficient

    importance for Hess secretly to meet the Duke in the privacy of the Sacramento

    a Lapa home of the German Ambassador to Portugal, [Oswald von] Hoyningen-

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  • 114 Ernst Haiger

    28 Allen, Deception, 76. In the German version (Friedensfalle, 104-105), at times

    incorrect, the following sentences are added: Interessanterweise wurden Albrecht

    Haushofer und Rudolf He an diesem Punkt in den Versuch hineingezogen, eine

    Friedensabmachung mit dem Herzog von Windsor auszuhandeln. Ihr Eingreifen

    zeigt, da Hitler gerade diesen Verhandlungsstrang als zu wichtig erachtete, um ihn

    in den wenig erfolgreichen Hnden seines Auenministers zu belassen. Es stand

    zuviel auf dem Spiel, als da man sich htte noch weitere Fehler erlauben knnen.

    Das Eingreifen von He und Haushofer zu diesem Zeitpunkt ist ein Beweis dafr,

    wie ernst die deutsche Fhrung die Windsor-Friedensinitiative nahm. Cf. Olaf

    Rose, Warum Rudolf He 1941 nicht verhandeln durfte, Deutschland in

    Geschichte und Gegenwart 52. 1 (2004): 20-23: So flog er [Hess] mit seiner Me-

    110 (Kennung VJ-OQ) am 28. Juli 1940 von Augsburg nach Lissabon, um dort den

    beraus deutschfreundlichen britischen Ex-Monarchen Edward VIII. [...] zu treffen.

    Dieser wollte als Kontaktmann zu friedensbereiten Englndern wirken. [...] Einen

    7 Punkte-Friedensplan hatte man bereits mit dem Herzog von Windsor errtert

    [...] (p. 20).

    29 Sir Samuel Hoare to Sir Alexander Cadogan, 26 March 1941, FO 794/19, NAK,

    facs. Allen, Friedensfalle, 413.

    30 Cf. supra on APA.

    31 That would have casted further suspicion on ethnic Germans abroad of being the

    Fifth Column of Nazi Germany, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Nationalsozialistische

    Auenpolitik 1933-1938 (Frankfurt am Main / Berlin: Alfred Metzner, 1968), 107,

    110, 197 ff.

    Huene, on Sunday, 28 July 1940, for a series of secret meetings. Remarkably,28

    he gives no evidence whatsoever for this terse information, which must be

    bewildering to the reader. Maybe he had discovered in his fathers papers letters

    accusing him of having invented evidence in his Windsor book.

    Allen maintains he has unearthed a letter by Sir Samuel Hoare of 26 March

    1941 to Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of the F.O., about

    a further meeting with [Albrecht] Haushofer at the home of [the former

    Spanish foreign minister Juan] Beigbeder in Madrid.29

    I repeat that I do not think that Haushofer ever had talks with Hoare in

    Madrid during World War II. One sentence is particularly dubious: H[ausho-

    fer] informed me that it has already been arranged for their Head of the AO to

    journey anywhere, if it would resolve the impasse. Would Sir Alexander know

    what AO was (Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP for party members living

    abroad) and who the Head of the AO was (Gauleiter Ernst Bohle)? And30

    Haushofer would never have involved Bohle in any peace feelers; he had been

    opposed to Bohle and his organisation since 1933 because Bohle wanted to

    organise the Volksdeutsche too, i.e. the German-speaking subjects of other

    states something that would be detrimental to German Volkstumspolitik.31

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 115

    32 Allen, Deception, 191 ff.

    33 Ibid. p. 223. Allen often leaves himself a loop hole by modifying his statements in

    the following manner: Despite the likelyhood that Hesss personal ambitions were

    the primary factor behind his taking Bohles place on the mission to Scotland, the

    fact that Bohle himself was never told he was to fly to Britain[!] suggests Hitler and

    Hess had always secretly planned for Hess to meet the close representative of

    Britains head of state (p. 192).

    34 Ibid.

    35 This plane usually required a crew of two, but in Oct. 1940 Hess had asked for

    special radio equipment to be fitted. This was too large and cumbersome to fit into

    the cockpit, and was instead installed in the navigators seat, according to the late

    Helmut Kaden, chief Messerschmitt test pilot in 1940, see Lynn Picknett, Clive

    Prince and Stephan Prior, Double Standards: The Rudolf Hess Cover-up (London:

    Time Warner Books UK, 2002), 169 f. (first published by Little, Brown & Co,

    2001).

    36 FO 371/60508, NAK, not published by Allen. The text in question, a carbon copy

    on flimsy paper, is part of a file relating to press reports about the implication of

    Carl Jacob Burckhardt as intermediary between German and British peace moves

    in 1941.

    37 I am grateful to Paulette Thompson of the National Archives for sending me a

    photocopy.

    Why is there mention of a journey by Bohle to resolve the impasse of the top-

    secret talks between Hitler-Hess-Haushofer and the British peace party?

    Allen makes the fantastic assertion, that it was Gauleiter Bohle who was to fly

    to Scotland as the representative of the German government and that Hess

    decided only at the very last moment to fly in Bohles place, motivated by

    personal ambition. But that is entirely mistaken: Hess had spent months32

    meticulously planning his flight, as Allen correctly states himself, Bohle33

    according to Allen was never told he was to fly to Britain (!) and Bohle34

    would not have been able to pilot a Me 110 to Scotland.35

    Dubious and absurd interpretations of sources are Martin Allens speciality.

    I conclude with two examples. According to a document of in my opinion

    questionable authenticity (the document may be genuine but Allens36

    interpretation is absurd) two agents of the British Secret Service called on Karl

    Haushofer at his farm Hartschimmelhof in Upper Bavaria on the very day of his

    and his wifes suicide (Sunday 10 March 1946). According to the text a Mr.

    Hopkinson sent a cable from Bern to the Foreign Office: Attention Mr.

    Kirkpatrick. Further to your instruction of 8th March, K. Haushofer was visited

    on 10th March. After interrogation it was apparent the gentleman knew nothing

    further on the subject in question. In response to our instructions the problem

    concerning this man and the IMT has now been removed.37

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  • 116 Ernst Haiger

    38 Allen, Deception, xxvii.

    39 Stefan Scheil, 1940/41: Die Eskalation des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Munich: Olzog,

    2005), 15.

    40 Ich bin [...] damit einverstanden, da insbesondere mit Hinblick auf den

    Gesundheitszustand des Zeugen Dr. Haushofer an diesen lediglich ein Fragebogen

    [English text: interrogatory] gerichtet wird. (Der Proze gegen die Hauptkriegs-

    verbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militrgerichtshof, vol. 8: Verhandlungs-

    niederschriften, 20. Febr. 1946 7. Mrz 1946, Nuremberg 1947, 691-693). Karl

    Haushofers son Heinz states in a memorandum about his parents suicide (see

    below fn. 45) that shortly before Karl Haushofer had been informed via a message

    given on the radio that Hesss defence counsel did not want him to be called to

    Nuremberg as a witness for the defence out of consideration for his state of health:

    that gave him the feeling of being freed of all obligations in this world.

    41 The Trial of Major German War Criminals: Proceedings (London: HMSO, 1947),

    8: 222.

    42 Allen, Deception, xxvi-xxvii.

    Allen asserts that these two men (why two?) were almost certainly the

    last people to see the Haushofers alive, thus suggesting that they killed the38

    couple to prevent Karl Haushofer from revealing the Hitler/Hess peace offers

    in the witness-stand in Nuremberg. The historian Stefan Scheil who throughout

    adopts Martin Allens theories adds ominously that 3 days before Karl Hausho-

    fers death Hesss defence counsel Dr Alfred Seidl requested to call him as a

    witness to Nuremberg, thus suggesting that the British had to fear his testimony

    about the Hitler/Hess peace overtures. That is not quite correct. Dr Seidl39

    requested the evidence, (a) restricted to the charge of the Fith Column

    activities of Auslandsorganisation, Deutsches Auslandsinstitut and Volkbund

    fr das Deutschtum im Ausland, by their respective former heads, Bohle, Karl

    Strlin and Karl Haushofer and (b) he did not insist on the presence of Karl

    Haushofer in Nuremberg: This procedure would not give Dr Seidl the chance40

    to examine Karl Haushofer in court about the Hitler/Hess peace feelers. Sir

    David MaxwellFyfe, British member of the prosecution, had no objection to

    interrogation (by interrogatory) of Karl Haushofer.41

    A man is said to have committed suicide, but in fact he was killed by British

    agents to silence him: this story reminds us of Martin Allens book on the

    murder of Heinrich Himmler. Allen spins out his fable, writing that Karl

    Haushoferss son Heinz two days later, on Tuesday, 12 March [...], puzzled by

    his inability to contact his parents on the phone, went to Hartschimmelhof. He

    found the house deserted, although the lights within were burning. With

    increasing concern, Heinz [Haushofer] searched the substantial house, before

    moving on to the grounds and the surrounding forest. An hour later [...] Heinz

    Haushofer found his parents. This story is a pure invention, the real events42

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  • Fiction, Facts, and Forgeries 117

    43 IRR Pers. Files, XE000655: Karl Haushofer, fol. 9-11, RG 319, NARA. Allen

    states, ibid.: The local police, together with the American authorities, investigated

    the matter in some detail, but after all the horrors of the war, and with the desperate

    state of Germany in the spring of 1946, resources and time were limited, and the

    Haushofers deaths were officially recorded as suicides. Allen does not seem to be

    aware of this police record.

    44 Cf. H. Haushofers statement (in the Haushofer Papers, N 1122/960, BAK)

    Erklrung ber die Grnde des Selbstmordes meiner Eltern Karl und Martha

    Haushofer, drafted on 14 March 1946 for Father Edmund A. Walsh, S.J.,

    Georgetown University professor of geopolitics, who had interrogated Karl

    Haushofer as special consultant to IMT Justice Jackson. Cf. Jacobsen, Karl

    Haushofer, vol. 1, 443 ff. about the Haushofers suicide and the motives for it.

    45 Letter by K. to Albrecht Haushofer, 3 Sept. 1940, publ. by Jacobsen, Karl Haus-

    hofer, 2: 452-55, 454 doc. no. 243 (Allen quotes the Haushofer correspondence

    only from the microfilmed records at the US National Archives and not from the

    books by Jacobsen on Karl and by Laack-Michel on Albrecht Haushofer he has

    listed in his bibliography); Allen, Deception, 89 ff.

    46 See J. Andreas Schmeller, Bayerisches Wrterbuch, 2. vermehrte Ausgabe bearbei-

    tet von G. Karl Frommann (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1872) 1:, col. 317; cf. Hermann

    Fischer, Schwbisches Wrterbuch (Tbingen: Lauppsche Buchhandlung, 1904)

    1: col. 1571.

    were quite different. Karl Haushofer and his wife did not live alone on their

    farm, Heinz Haushofer and his family lived in another building on the estate,

    the nursemaid slept in the parents house, a cook lived there too. A record

    drafted by the local police of 11 March proves what had really happened:43

    when Heinz Haushofer wanted to call on his parents in the morning of 11

    March, he found farewell letters on their beds and a sketch by Karl Haushofer

    of the place where the son would find the corpses (these documents are in the

    Haushofer Papers) and where he did find them. The cook had been at home and

    she had been ordered by Mrs Haushofer to fetch a clothes line, which was

    instrumental in the suicide. There is not a word about two British visitors in the

    record. Heinz Haushofer testified that his father had been contemplating suicide

    for a long time.44

    The most absurd and laughable misinterpretation of sources in Allens book

    is the interpretation of the word Butzelware in a letter by Karl to Albrecht

    Haushofer. The father refers to his sons comment that when summoned by45

    Ribbentrop to Vienna he had had a wonderful flight over the Salzkammergut

    and an unexpected reunion with the Butzelware in Vienna. This word

    signifies in the Bavarian dialect the Haushofers are Bavarians little

    children, and in this letter it means Heinz Haushofers children, then living46

    in Vienna. But Allen knows better: This must be a code! Pronounced

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  • 118 Ernst Haiger

    47 Allen, Deception, 90-91. Incidentally, in this letter Karl Haushofer openly says that

    Hess had informed him about Hitlers wish to come to terms with Britain no code

    was needed in transmitting this information to Albrecht Haushofer.

    48 Ibid., 12 ff., 27 ff.

    49 Allen, Deception, Acknowledgements, xiii-xiv.

    phonetically it becomes Botselwahr. In an old German dictionary published

    in Stuttgart in 1893" Allen found out, that Bote means messenger, and wahr

    means faithful or genuine. Thus Albrecht was being discreetly told to return

    [...] for an unexpected reunion with the genuine/faithful messenger someone

    who could be trusted to deliver a truthful message. Karl Haushofer was in effect

    telling his son that the Fhrer finally wanted a genuine peace with the British,

    and that he should go to a meeting near Berchtesgaden with Hess to give his

    assistance. Martin Allen is clearly quite serious about this nonsense. But it47

    is difficult to understand why anyone else has taken this book seriously.

    Apart from the absurdities of interpretation and the presentation of not very

    sophisticated forgeries whoever may have fabricated them for whatever

    reasons the book teems with false statements on well known facts, e.g. about

    Karl and Albrecht Haushofer (It is evident that Allen has not read the books48

    and articles listed in his bibliography that are written in German, nor has he

    contacted all the people connected either by family relationship to or

    exceptional knowledge of the main personalities or events of 1940-41, who

    extended me their assistance). Perhaps Allen should have written a novel49

    The Butzelware Code. The books he has written are more fiction than

    historiography but professing to tell true stories.

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