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DoMuslimsandChristiansbelieveinthesameGod?

RezaShah‐Kazemi,TheInstituteofIsmailiStudies

‘Somegoddirectmyjudgment!’

ThePrinceofMoroccoinMerchantofVenice,ActII,SceneVII

ThisisthesupplicationmadebythePrinceasheisabouttotakethetestwhichhasbeen

setforwinningthefairPortia’shand:torightlyguesswhichofthethreechestscontains

herportrait.Shakespearemaywellhavebeenengaginginaplayfulironybyhavingthe

MuslimPrincemakethissupplication.Forhemusthaveknownthatacentraltenetofthe

Islamicmandatewas,precisely,toputanendtopolytheism.ThePrince’ssupplication,

though,helpsustoseequitestarklythecontrast,orratherincommensurability,between

polytheismandmonotheism:withinthefirstsystemofbelief,therearemanygodsfrom

whichtochoose,whilethesecondassertsthatthereisbutoneGodfromwhomtoseekhelp

andguidance.Weshouldseeinthelightofthiscontrastthatitisillogicalifnotabsurdto

giveanythingotherthananaffirmativeanswertothequestionputtous:‘DoMuslimsand

ChristiansbelieveinthesameGod?’If,instead,weweretoaskChristiansandMuslimsthe

question:doyoubelieveinoneGod—inaunique,ultimateRealityfromwhichallthings

emerge,towhichallthingsreturn,andbywhichallthingsaregoverned?,theanswer

wouldbe:ofcourse!IfbothpartiesagreethatthereisonlyoneGod,andnotmanyfrom

whichtochoosetobelieveornotbelieve;andifbothpartiesaffirmthattheybelieveinGod,

thentheconclusionfollowsinescapably:ChristiansandMuslimsdobelieveinthesame—

theone‐and‐only—God.‘Afalsegodhasnoexistenceintherealworld’,StPaultellsus,and

goesontoaffirm:‘ThereisnoGodbutone’(Cor.8:4).TheQur’ānstatesthesamesimple

principleinthefollowingverse,oneofmanywhichrestatethefirstpartofthebasiccreed

ofIslam,lāilāhailla’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’:‘ThereisnoGodbuttheoneGod’(5:73;

emphasisadded).TheQur’ānthenmakesexplicitthelogicalconcomitantofthisoneness,

asregardsfellowbelieversinthisoneGod,bytellingtheMuslimstosaytotheChristians

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andJews:‘OurGod(ilāhunā)andyourGod(ilāhukum)isone’(29:46).Fellowmonotheists,

howevermuchtheymaydisagreeaboutothermatters,areasonewithregardtotheOne:

theyallbelieveinGodassuch,asopposedtobelievinginsuchandsuchagod.

However,oncewemovefromthisstraightforwardmonotheisticpostulateandenterinto

theologicaldiscussionofthenatureofthisGodinwhomallmonotheistsbelieve,we

encountermajorproblems.Themostinsurmountableofthesearegeneratedbythe

ChristiandoctrinesoftheIncarnationandtheTrinity:isJesusGodincarnate,andifso,to

whatextentdoesthisincarnationenterintothedefinitionoftheessentialnatureofGod?Is

beliefintheTrinityanessentialconditionforauthenticbeliefinGod?OnekindofChristian

position,basedonorthodoxdogma,canbeconceivedasfollows:

1) WeaffirmoneGod,butthisaffirmationisarticulatedintermsofabeliefinaTrinity

ofthreePersons:Father,SonandSpirit;

2) thisbeliefconstitutesanessentialelementofChristianbeliefinGod;

3) anyonewhodoesnotsharethisbeliefcannotbesaidtobelieveinthesameGod.1

Suchapositionnotonlyanswersnegativelytothequestionposed—Muslimsand

ChristianscertainlydonotbelieveinthesameGod—itwillalsoelicitfromtheMuslimside

acorrespondinglynegativeanswer:weagreewithyou,theywillsaytotheChristians,we

donotrecogniseourGod,Allāh,inthedivinityyoudescribe,sowecannotbelieveinthe

sameGod.

ItwouldseemthatouranswertothequestionwhetherMuslimsandChristiansbelievein

thesameGodmustthereforecomprisebothpositiveandnegativeelements,ithastobe

bothyesandno:‘yes’,objectivelyandmetaphysically;and‘no’,subjectivelyand

theologically.Buttheobjective,metaphysical‘yes’outweighsthesubjective,theological

‘no’.Inotherwords,MuslimsandChristiansdoindeedbelieveinthesameGod,insofaras

theultimatereferentoftheirbeliefisThattowhichtheword‘God’metaphysicallyrefers:

                                                            1 This view, together with a stress on the centrality of the Incarnation to the Christian conception of God, has characterised the response of many leading Evangelicals to the Common Word interfaith initiative, an initiative to which reference will be made at the end of this essay. 

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thetranscendentAbsolute,ultimateReality,theuniquesourceofBeing.However,when

thissameRealityisconceivedbyhumanthought,andthisconceptionisframedin

theologicaldiscourse,withreferencetotheattributesandactsofthisReality—suchas

Creator,Revealer,Saviour,andJudge—thenfundamentaldifferencesbetweenthetwo

systemsofbeliefwillbeapparent.Thesedifferenceswillremaininplaceforaslongas—

andinsofaras—weremainconceptuallyboundbythelimitsoftheology;buttheycanbe

resolvedonthehigherplaneofmetaphysicsandthedeeperplaneofmysticism—planes

whicharenotconstrained,doctrinallyasregardsmetaphysicsorexperientiallyasregards

mysticism,bythelimitationsoftheology.2

Wewillaimtosubstantiatethisargumentwithreferencetotwochiefsources:therevealed

dataoftheQur’ān,andtheinspireddataofthemetaphysiciansandmysticsofboth

ChristianityandIslam.TheQur’ān—andtheSunnaorConductoftheProphet,whichisan

eloquentcommentarythereon—providesuswithcompellingevidencethatthesupreme

ObjectofbeliefandworshipisGodforbothMuslimsandChristians,eveniftheconceptions

ofGodheldbyMuslimsandChristiansdivergeand,atpoints,contradicteachother.The

perspectivesofsuchmysticsasIbnal‐‘ArabīinIslam,andMeisterEckhartinChristianity

helptorevealthemannerinwhichthesedivergentsubjectiveconceptionsofGodfailto

infringeupontheobjectiveone‐and‐onlinessoftheAbsolutebelievedinbyMuslimsand

Christians.TheAbsolutereferentoftheword‘God’/‘Allāh’,then,isoneandthesamewhen

ourfocusisonthetranscendentObjectofbelief,ratherthanthehumansubjectadheringto

thebelief:iftheword‘belief’bedefinedprincipallyintermsofthedivineObjectrather

thanthehumansubject,thenouranswertothequestionposedmustbeintheaffirmative.

Wecannotofcourseignorethesubjectivesideofthequestion,for‘belief’impliesboth

things,anobjectandasubject;butevenhere,wecanansweraffirmatively,ifthebeliefof

thehumansubjectbedefinedmoreintermsofspiritualorientationthanmental

                                                            2 If it be asked what is the difference between theology and metaphysics we would reply as follows, basing ourselves on the writings of René Guénon and Frithjof Schuon: theology is rational thought focused upon the data of revelation, while metaphysics is the rational expression of intellection, intuition, or inspiration, which is proportioned both to the substance of revelation and its source, that is, the Revealer, or the divine reality per se. The two are by no means mutually exclusive; indeed, as  Palamite ‘mystical theology’, in particular, demonstrates, theology can be enriched by the intellectual insights of metaphysics and by the experiential certitudes of the mystics. 

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conception,focusingmoreontheinneressenceoffaiththanonitsouterform.This

determinationtofocusontheessentialelementsoffaithwithinthesubject,ratherthanthe

relativelyaccidentalfeaturesofconceptualbelief,reflectsourconcernwithwhatismost

essentialinthedivineObjectoffaith—namely,ultimateReality—ratherthanderivative,

dogmaticallyexpressedaspectsofthatReality.Muslimswillnotbeabletoaffirmbeliefin

‘theTrinity’anymorethanChristians,ontheplaneoftheology,canunequivocallyaffirm

beliefinwhatMuslimscall‘Allāh’;forthistermhascometoimplycomplextheological

beliefsarticulatedintermsofawholemyriadofpremises,assumptions,andfoundations,

theacceptanceofall,ormost,ofwhichisnecessaryforthetheologicalaffirmationofbelief

inAllāh.If,however,attentionisdirectedawayfromthetheologicaldefinitionofAllāh,and

toitssupra‐theologicalormetaphysicalreferent—thatultimateEssence(al‐Dhāt)whichis

absolutelyineffableandthusun‐nameable;andif,likewise,welookbeyondthetheological

definitionoftheTrinitarianconceptionofGod,andfocusinsteadonitssupra‐theologicalor

metaphysicalreferent—the‘superessentialOne’,toquoteStDinoysius,towhomwewill

turnlater—thenweshallbeinapositiontoaffirmthat,despitethedifferentnamesby

whichtheultimateRealityisdenotedinthetwotraditions,theRealitythusalludedtois

indeedoneandthesame.AndwearejustifiedinreferringtothisRealityas‘God’,‘Deus’,

‘Theos’or‘Allāh’,orwhatevertermstandsforthisRealityinanylanguage,aslongasitbe

madeclearthatwearenotimplyingtherebyallthetheologicalramificationsofthese

differentterms.Rather,weareusingthesetermstodenotetheirultimatetranscendent

referent.

Thisessayiscomposedofthreeparts:thefirstbeginswithadiscussionoftheQur’ān,and

proceedstoaddressthedebatesandpolemicsgeneratedbytheTrinitarianconceptionof

GodinChristianity.Hereitwillbeseenthattheverynatureoftheologicaldebaterendersit

allbutinevitablethatfundamentaldisagreementsaboutthenatureofGodwillprevail,

overshadowingorevenunderminingtheelementsofcommonalityinbeliefsheldby

MuslimsandChristians.Thesecondpartthenshiftstotheplaneofmetaphysics,beginning

withdiscussionofanactoftheProphet,anactofgreatsymbolicsignificance,which

resolvestheapparentcontradictionbetween,ontheonehand,theQur’ānicaffirmation

thattheGodoftheMuslimsandtheChristians(andtheJews)isoneandthesame;and,on

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theother,theMuslimrepudiationoftheTrinity.Themysticsofthetwotraditionshelpus

toarriveatapositionofdivine‘objectivity’,aconceptualpointofreferencederivedfroma

spiritualperspectivesubspecieaeternitatis,apointofviewfromwhichtheunique

metaphysicalObjectofbelieftakespriorityoverthetheologicallydivergent,subjectively

variegated,conceptionsofthatObject.Finally,inpartthree,wereturntotheplaneof

theologyinthecontextofcontemporaryinterfaithdialogue,andevaluatetheextentto

whichthewell‐intentionedeffortsofMuslimsandChristianstoaffirmthatwedobelievein

thesameGodmightbenefitfromtheinsightsofthemystics,bymaintainingaclear

distinctionbetweenthelevelofspiritualessence,onwhichtherecanbeagreement,and

thatoftheologicalform,onwhichthereis—andshouldbe—respectfuldisagreement.3

1. Qur’ānicRevelationandMuslim‐ChristianTheologicalDisputation

Thekeytheologicalcontroversytobeaddressedhereis,quiteevidently,thatsurrounding

theTrinitarianconceptionofGod:doestheChristianbeliefinaTrinitarianGodnecessarily

implyforbothChristiansandforMuslimsthatChristiansbelieveinaGodquiteotherthan

thatbelievedinbyMuslims?TheTrinity,expressingthebeliefthatGodisoneandHeis

three;togetherwiththeIncarnation,expressingthebeliefthatGodbecameman,was

crucified,androsefromthedead,therebyliberatinghumanityfromsin—thesebeliefsflyin

thefaceofthecentraltenetsofMuslimfaith.ThemostfundamentalaspectoftheMuslim

creediscentredonanaffirmationofdivineoneness(Tawhīd),oneofthemostimportant

Qur’ānicformulationsofwhichexplicitlyrejectsthatwhichliesatthecoreofChristian

belief,theideathatGodcouldhavea‘son’.Chapter112oftheQur’ān,entitled‘Purity’or

‘Sincerity’(Sūratal‐Ikhlās)readsasfollows:

Say:He,God,isOne,

God,theEternallySelf‐Subsistent

                                                            3 This is an application of the principle finely articulated by James Cutsinger, ‘Disagreeing to Agree: A Christian Response to A Common Word ’ (unpublished, but see the online version at www.cutsinger.net/scholarship/articles.shtml). Cutsinger argues that Christians and Muslims can disagree on the level of theology in order to agree on that of metaphysics. This argument is based upon the teachings of Frithjof Schuon, whose perspective on this question is summed up in the formula: conform to holy separation at the base in order to realize holy union at the summit. See Frithjof Schuon, Logic and Transcendence—A New Translation with Selected Letters, ed. James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2009), p.195. 

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Hebegettethnot,norisHebegotten

AndthereisnonelikeuntoHim.

Thereisevidentlyatheologicalimpassehere,afundamentalincompatibilitybetweenthe

respectiveconceptualformstakenbybeliefinthesameGod.EvenifChristiansretorttothe

aboveversesbydenyinganykindofcarnalrelationinthe‘sonship’ofJesus,insistingthat

thesonshipinquestiondoesnotoccurintimeandspace,butisaneternalprinciple,of

whichthehistoricalIncarnationisbutanexpression,4itisnonethelessclearthatthe

Qur’ānemphaticallyrejectstheideathat‘sonship’—whetherphysical,metaphoricalor

metaphysical—shouldformpartofanycreedalstatementregardingGod.Inotherwords,it

rejectsthevalidityofascribingtoJesusthestatusof‘sonofGod’,andinsodoingrejectsa

beliefwhichconstitutesacardinaltenetofChristianfaith.Likewise,inrelationtothe

Trinity:theChristiansareinstructedbytheQur’āntodesistfromalltalkofthree‐nessin

relationtoGod:‘Saynot“three”;desist,itwouldbebetterforyou.Godisbutonedivinity

(innamāAllāhilāhwāhid)’(4:171).

OneGod:Qur’ānicaffirmations

AlongsidethiscritiqueofcertainaspectsofChristianbelief,theQur’ānalsocontainsalarge

numberofaffirmations,implicitandexplicit,thattheGodworshippedbytheChristians

(andJews)isnoneotherthantheGodworshippedbyMuslims;theRevealeroftheQur’ān

istheRevealerofallthescripturescontainedinboththeOldandNewTestaments;this

RevealerisnoneotherthantheoneGod,Creatoroftheheavensandtheearth.Itispartofa

Muslim’sbeliefthatGod,asthesourceoflifeandlove,wisdomandcompassion,has

revealedmessagesconcerningHimselftoallhumancommunities,indifferentways,andat

differenttimes;5andthattheserevelations,from‘above’,aresomanymeansbywhichour

innatecertaintyofGodfrom‘within’isaroused,awakened,andperfected.Thisbeliefis

clearlyarticulatedbynumerousversesoftheQur’ān.TheMuslimisenjoinedbytheQur’ān

                                                            4 They also point out that the idea that Jesus ‘became’ the son of God when he was born, or when he was baptised, or at some other point in his life—all such ideas are strictly heretical, being so many forms assumed by the heresy known as ‘Adoptionism’. See Geoffrey Parrinder, Jesus in the Qur’ān (London: Sheldon Press, 1965), p.127. 5 ‘For every community there is a Messenger’ (10:47). 

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tobelievein‘GodandHisAngels,andHisBooks,andHisProphets’andtoaffirm:‘wedonot

distinguishbetweenHisMessengers’(2:285).Moreexplicitly,theMuslimisinstructed:

‘Say:WebelieveinGod,andthatwhichwasrevealeduntoAbraham,andIshmael,and

Isaac,andJacob,andthetribes,andthatwhichwasgivenuntoMosesandJesusandthe

prophetsfromtheirLord.Wemakenodistinctionbetweenanyofthem,anduntoHimwe

havesubmitted’(2:136).GiventhefactthatitistheoneandonlyGodwhohasrevealed

HimselftotheBiblicalProphets,toJesusandtoMuhammad,itisthisoneandonlyGodthat,

accordingtothelogicoftheQur’ān,isobjectively‘believedin’byMuslims,Christiansand

Jewsinthemeasureoftheirfidelitytotheirrespectiverevelations.TheAbsolute—however

itbereferredtoindifferentlanguages,whetherproto‐Semitic,Hebrew,Syriac,Aramaic,

Arabicoranyotherlanguage—isThatinwhichbeliefisinvested;itisThatwhich

transcendsnotonlythenamesandconceptsbywhichitisapproximatelydesignated,but

alsothetheologieswhichunfoldfromit,andbywhichitbecomesenvelopedandalltoo

oftenobscured.6

Thefollowingversesareofparticularrelevancetoourtheme:

‘HehathordainedforyouofthereligionthatwhichHecommendeduntoNoah,andthat

whichWerevealtothee[Muhammad],andthatwhichWecommendeduntoAbrahamand

MosesandJesus,saying:Establishthereligion,andbenotdividedtherein...’(42:13).A

singleJudeo‐Christian‐Muslimtraditionisherebeingaffirmed,onewhichisinwardly

differentiated,eachoftheProphetscomingtoaffirmandrenewwhatwasrevealedbyhis

predecessor.Thekeycharacteristicdefiningtherelationshipbetweenthedifferent

Prophetsisconfirmation:

AndWecausedJesus,sonofMary,tofollowintheirfootsteps[thefootstepsofthe

JewishProphets],confirmingthatwhichwas[revealed]beforehimintheTorah,

andWebestoweduponhimtheGospelwhereinisguidanceandlight,confirming                                                            6 Al‐Ghazzālī, despite being a master‐theologian himself, was essentially a Sufi mystic, and says that theology can be a ‘veil’ over God; only spiritual effort (mujāhada) can disclose the true nature of God, His essence and attributes. See  his Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al‐dīn (Beirut: Dār al‐Jīl, 1992), p.34; English translation by Nabih Amin Faris, The Book of Knowledge (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1970), p.55. Eric Ormsby sums up well al‐Ghazzālī’s calibrated approach to theology: ‘It was a weapon, essential for defending the truths of the faith, but not an instrument by which truth itself could be found ... it demolishes but it does not build.’ Eric Ormsby, Ghazali—The Revival of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld, 2008), p.64. 

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thatwhichwas[revealed]beforeitintheTorah—aguidanceandanadmonition

untothosewhoarepious.LetthePeopleoftheGospeljudgebythatwhichGodhath

revealedtherein(5:46‐47).

Theverynextverse,5:48,beginswiththefollowingwords,reinforcingthiscrucialroleof

reciprocalconfirmation.‘Anduntothee[Muhammad]WehaverevealedtheScripturewith

thetruth,confirmingwhateverScripturewasbeforeit,andasaguardianoverit’.

Thelogicalconsequenceoftheassertionsoftheuniquesourceofrevelationforallthree

traditionsistheQur’ān’scategoricalaffirmationthattheGodworshippedbytheChristians

andtheJews(‘thePeopleoftheBook’)istheselfsameGodworshippedbyMuslims:

‘AndarguenotwiththePeopleoftheBookexceptinamannermostfine—butnotwith

thosewhoareoppressors,andsay:Webelieveinthatwhichhathbeenrevealeduntous

andthatwhichhathbeenrevealeduntoyou;ourGod(ilāhunā)andyourGod(ilāhukum)is

One,anduntoHimwesubmit’(29:46).

Thisversegivesusthemostdefinitiveanswertothequestionwehavebeenasked,theilāh

or‘divinity’believedinbytheMuslimsandthe‘PeopleoftheBook’—Jews,Christiansand

Sabians—isoneandthesame.Theword‘Allāh’,itshouldbenoted,isderivedfromthe

wordilāhtogetherwiththedefinitearticle,al‐;theconstructal‐ilāh,‘thedivinity’,was

transformedintothepropername,‘Allāh’.Thisname,therefore,refersintrinsicallyand

metaphysicallyto‘thedivinity’,toThatwhichisworshipped,totheAbsolute.Itisalso

etymologicallyequivalenttotheHebrewElôh,andtheSyriacAlāh.AllthreeSemiticforms

ofthisnamefortheAbsoluteareinturnderivedfromtheroot‘lh,meaning‘toworship’.7

Similarly,inregardtotheEnglishword‘God’,weshouldnotethatanidenticalmeaningis

conveyedbyitsetymologicalroot:foritisthepastparticipleconstructionoftheproto‐

Indo‐Europeanrootgheu,meaning‘toinvoke/supplicate’.Theliteralmeaningof‘God’is

thus‘theOnewhoisinvoked(orsupplicated).’Onthissemanticplane,then,weshouldsee

                                                            7 Umar F. Abd‐Allāh, ‘One God, Many Names’, in Seasons—Semiannual Journal of Zaytuna Institute, vol.2, no.1, 2004, p.47. 

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nodiscrepancybetween‘Allāh’and‘God’—botharesimplysemanticformsofdesignating

thedivinitytowhichworshipandprayeraredirected.8

Theargumentderivingfromtheaboveversecanbereinforcedbyseveralotherverses,

amongstwhichthefollowingisoneofthemostimportant.Accordingtomost

commentators,thiswasthefirstverserevealedgrantingpermissiontotheMuslimstofight

inself‐defenceagainstaggressors.Itisofparticularpertinencetoourtheme,underliningas

itdoesthedutyofMuslimstoprotectfellow‐believersintheChristianandJewish

communities—thusinducingaspiritofsolidarityamongallthosewhobelieveintheone

andonlyGod:

Permission[tofight]isgiventothosewhoarebeingfought,fortheyhavebeen

wronged,andsurelyGodisabletogivethemvictory;thosewhohavebeenexpelled

fromtheirhomesunjustly,onlybecausetheysaid:OurLordisGod.HadGodnot

drivenbacksomebymeansofothers,monasteries,churches,synagoguesand

mosques—whereinthenameofGodisoft‐invoked(yudhkarufīhāismAllāh

kathīran)—wouldassuredlyhavebeendestroyed(22:39‐40).

‘The name of God’ (ism Allāh)—the one and only, selfsame God—is ‘invoked’ in

monasteries,churchesandsynagogues,andnotjustinmosques.JustasinIslamictheology,

theoneGodhasninety‐nine ‘Names’,withouttherebybecominganythingotherthanone,

so thedifferent ‘names’ given toGod in thedifferent revelationsdonotmake theobject

namedanythingbutone.ThenamesofGodrevealedbyGodintheserevelationsarethusto

be seen in stark contrast to those ‘names’manufactured by the polytheists as labels for

their idols. These false gods are described as follows: ‘They are but names that ye have

named, ye and your fathers, for which God hath revealed no authority’ (53:23). One is

remindedhereofStPaul’sdictum,citedattheoutset: ‘Afalsegodhasnoexistenceinthe

realworld’.

ThevariousnamesbywhichGodisnamedintheJudeo‐Christian‐Islamictradition,onthe

contrary,dohave‘authority’.TheyrefertooneandthesameRealityinamanneratonce

                                                            8 Ibid, p.51. 

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authoritativeandauthentic,preciselyonaccountofhavingbeenrevealedbythatReality.

Thesenames,therefore,resonatenotonlywiththatsupremeRealitytranscendingall

thoughtandlanguage,butalsowiththeinnateknowledgeofGodwhicharticulatesthe

inmostrealityofthehumansoul,thefitra.9ThepointhereisthatitisthesameGodwho

createseachsoulwithinnateknowledgeofHim,thesameGodwhorevealsHimselftoall

soulsindiverseways,andthesameGodwhoisworshippedbythecommunitiesdefinedby

theserevelations.Itisforthisreason,amongothers,thattheQur’ānholdsoutthepromise

ofsalvationnotjusttoMuslimsbutto‘Jews,ChristiansandSabeans’,bringingthesethree

specificallymentionedreligiouscommunitiesintothegenericcategoryofbelieverswho

combinefaithwithvirtue,thesetwobeingthekeyconditions—necessarybutnot

sufficient10—forsalvation:

‘Trulythosewhobelieve[inthisRevelation],andtheJewsandtheChristiansandthe

Sabeans—whoeverbelievethinGodandtheLastDayandperformethvirtuousdeeds—

theirrewardiswiththeirLord,neitherfearnorgriefshallbefallthem’(2:62;repeated

almostverbatimat5:69).

Forourpurposes,thekeypartofthisverseisthecategory:‘whoeverbelievethinGod’.The

categoryisnotrestrictedjustMuslims,Jews,ChristiansandSabians,butencompassesall

thosewhobelievein‘God’assuch—whateverbethespecificnamebywhichGodis

referredto.Thisisrepeatedattheendoftheverse:therewardtothosewhobelieveand

actvirtuouslyisgivenfrom‘theirLord’,Rabbihim,whateverbethemeansbywhichthe

Lordassuchisdesignatedlinguistically.

ThePeopleoftheBookarenottoldtofirstensurethattheirconceptionofGodcorresponds

exactlytotheIslamicconception,andthentobelieveintheLastDay,andtoactvirtuously;

                                                            9 This primordial nature is the inalienable infrastructure not just of the soul, but also of the ‘right religion’. There can be no revelation from on high without innate receptivity to that revelation being present within: ‘So set thy purpose for religion with unswerving devotion—the nature [framed] of God (fitrat Allāh), according to which He hath created man. There is no altering God’s creation. That is the right religion (al‐dīn al‐qayyim), but most men know not’ (30:30). 10 For, according to a well‐known saying of the Prophet, nobody is saved on account of his deeds: only the mercy of God affords access to Paradise. 

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rather,itistakenforgrantedthatThatwhichisreferredtoasAllāhistheGodinwhom

theyalreadybelieve,theGodwhocreatedthemandrevealedtothemthescripturesby

whichtheyareguided.Similarly,intheverysameverseinwhichtheProphetistoldnotto

followthe‘whims’(ahwā’)ofthePeopleoftheBook,heisalsotoldnotonlytoaffirmbelief

intheirscripture,butalsotoaffirmthatAllāhis‘ourLordandyourLord’:

Andbethouuprightasthouartcommandedandfollownottheirwhims.Instead

say:IbelieveinwhateverscriptureGodhathrevealed,andIamcommandedtobe

justamongyou.GodisourLordandyourLord.Untous,ourworks,anduntoyou,

yours:lettherebenoargumentbetweenus.Godwillbringustogether,andunto

Himisthejourneying(42:15).

If,asweshallseebelow,thereisindeedan‘argument’betweentheMuslimsandthe

Christians,overtheTrinity,forexample,thisargumentdoesnotpertaintothequestionof

whetherMuslimsandChristiansbelieveinthesameGod,orhavethesameLord;rather,

theargumentisoversomethingmorecontingent:thehumanconceptualisationofthat

Lord,togetherwithHisattributesandacts.ThatHeis‘ourLord’isnotdisputed—weall

believeinHim;how‘ourLord’isconceivedbyus—thatisthesubjectofthedispute.Unity

onthelevelofthedivineObjectgoeshandinhandwithdiversity—andeven

contradiction—onthelevelofthehumansubject.

Theverseswhichwehaveciteddemonstratethatthereisanessentialanddefinitiveaspect

tofaithin‘God’whichtakesprecedenceovertheconceptualanddogmaticformsassumed

bythatfaith.Thisessentialfaithisnotnecessarilyannulledbyanimperfectconceptionof

Thatinwhichonehasfaith.Thepositingoftwounequaldegreesoffaith,theoneessential

anddefinitive,theotherformalandderivative,isprincipallybasedontheQur’ānicverses

expressingthesetwoattitudestotheChristian‘faith’,ontheonehandaffirmativeandon

theothercritical;itisalsoderived,asweshallseelater,fromanactoftheProphetwhich

servesasanimplicitcommentary,atoncedramaticandeloquent,onthesetwoaspectsof

theQur’ānicdiscourse.

TheTrinity:Muslimcritique

12  

BeforelookingatthiscrucialactoftheProphet,letusconsiderthecritiqueoftheTrinity

foundintheQur’ān,andthenelaboratedinMuslimtheology.Althoughtheideaof

‘threeness’iscensuredinageneralwayintheQur’ān,theonlyspecific‘trinity’mentioned

intheQur’ānisnottheTrinityaffirmedinChristiandogma.Ontheonehand,boththe

specificbeliefinJesusasthesonofGod,andthegeneralideaofthree‐nessisrejected:

OPeopleoftheBook,donotexaggerateinyourreligionnorutteraboutGodaught

savethetruth.TheMessiah,JesussonofMary,wasbutaMessengerofGodandHis

WordwhichHecastintoMaryandaSpiritfromHim.SobelieveinGodandHis

Messengers,andsaynot:“Three”!Desist:itwillbebetterforyou.ForGodisOne

divinity(Allāhilāhwāhid)—FarremovedfromHisMajestythatHeshouldhavea

son...(4:171).

Ontheotherhand,aspecificconfigurationofthe‘trinity’11isgiveninthisverse:

‘Andbehold!Godwillsay:“OJesus,sonofMary!Didstthousayuntomen,‘Takemeandmy

motherfortwogodsbesideGod?’”Hewillsay:“GlorybetoThee!NevercouldIsaythatto

whichIhadnoright”’(5:116).

This‘trinity’isevidentlyonewhichallorthodoxChristianswouldsimilarlyreject.Asfor

4:171,letuslookathowitisinterpretedbyoneofthemostinfluentialcommentatorsin

thespecificallytheologicaltraditionofexegesis,Fakhral‐Dīnal‐Rāzī:

Thefirstissue:themeaningis,‘DonotsaythatGod,glorifiedbeHe,isoneSubstance

(jawhar)andthreehypostases(aqānīm).KnowthatthedoctrineoftheChristiansis

veryobscure.Whatcanbegleanedfromitisthattheyaffirmoneessence(dhāt)that

isqualifiedbythreeattributes(sifāt),exceptthateventhoughtheycallthem

attributes,theyareinrealityessences(dhawāt)...Thoughtheycallthem‘attributes’,

theyareactuallyaffirmingtheexistenceofseveralself‐subsistingessences(dhawāt

qā'imabi‐anfusihā),andthisispureunbelief(kufr)...If,however,wewereto                                                            11 Another form of the ‘trinity’ is given at 5:72: ‘They indeed disbelieve who say that God is the third of three ...’ This, similarly, refers not to the orthodox Christian Trinity, but to a heretical form therof. 

13  

understandfromthese‘Threeasmeaningthattheyaffirmthreeattributes,then

therecanbenodenying[thetruthof]this.Howcouldwe[asMuslims]say

otherwise,whenwe[aretheoneswho]say,‘HeisGodotherthanwhomthereisno

god,theKing,theHoly,thePeace,theKnower,theLiving,theOmnipotent,theWiller

etc.’,andunderstand[aswedo]eachoneoftheseexpressionsasbeingdistinct

fromalltheothers.Therecanbenoothermeaningfortherebeingseveral

attributes.Wereitunbelieftoaffirmtheexistenceofseveraldivineattributes,the

Qur’āninitsentiretywouldberefuted;andtheintellectwouldalsobeinvalidated

sincewenecessarilyknowthattheconcept12ofGodbeingKnower(‘āliman)isother

thantheconceptofHimbeingOmnipotent(qādiran)orLiving(hayyan).’13

Evenifthe‘trinity’beingrefutedhereisconceivedasconsistingoftheFather,Jesusand

Mary,theMuslimcritique,basedonsuchversesasthosecitedabove,isfocusedonthe

ChristianideaofthreePersonsbeingidenticaltotheoneEssence,eachPersonbeing

absolutelyidenticaltotheEssenceatthesametimeasbeingdistinctfromtheothertwo

Persons.Thisappearstopositthreedistinctessencesratherthanthreeattributesofone

Essence,andthuscontrastssharplywiththeMuslimtheologian’sdefinitionofthe

attributes‐Essencerelationship.Al‐Ghazzālī,forexample,givesthestandardSunni‐Ash‘ari

positionontheattributes,towhichRāzīalsosubscribed,14asfollows:theessential

attributesofGod—living,knowing,powerful,willing,hearing,seeing,speaking15—are

‘superadded’(zā’ida)totheEssence;theseattributesareuncreatedandeternal(qadīma),

butarenotself‐subsistent,ratherthey‘subsistthroughtheEssence’(qā’imabi’l‐dhāt);they

                                                            12 Literally: ‘that which is understood from’, mafhūm. 13 Fakhr al‐Dīn al‐Rāzī, Al‐Tafsīr al‐kabīr (Beirut: Dar Ehia Al‐Tourath Al‐Arabi, 2000), vol.4, pp. 271‐272. I am grateful to Dr Feras Hamza for pointing out to me the importance of this passage. 14 See, for a helpful introduction to this theme, Nader al‐Bizri, ‘God’s Essence and Attributes’, in Tim Winter (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), especially pp.129‐131.  15 These are the ‘essential attributes’ (sifāt al‐dhāt) as opposed to attributes of actions (sifāt al‐fi‘l); the essential attributes are most often deemed to be these seven, but sometimes there are just two (life and knowledge) sometimes eight, at other times 15, etc.  There was considerable variation as regards what constituted an essential attribute.  

14  

arenotidenticaltotheEssencebutneitheraretheyotherthanit.16WhereastheseMuslim

theologiansmaintainthattheattributessubsistnotthroughthemselves,butthroughthe

Essence,withwhichtheyareco‐eternal,theyunderstandtheChristianviewoftheTrinity

tobe,incontrast,aformofshirk,‘association’orpolytheism,insofarasitpositsthree

PersonswhoarealldeemedtobeGodwhilealsobeingeternallydistinctfromeachother;

eachPersonbeingeternallydistinguishedfromtheothertwowhilesharingacommon

substanceornature(homoousia).Rāzīsays,however,thatiftheChristiansconfined

themselvestoaffirmingonlythatGodhadthreeattributes,attributeswhichwereclearly

subordinatetotheEssencewhichtheyqualify—thuspositingauniqueEssencewhich

unambiguouslytranscendedthePersons—thentheycouldnotbeaccusedofkufrorof

shirk.

ThekindofreconciliationofthetwotheologiesbeingproposedbyRāzīisonewherebythe

ChristiansupholdthetranscendenceoftheuniqueEssencevis‐á‐visthethreePersons,or

affirmthetranscendenceofthe‘Father’understoodastheEssence,whothenmanifests

Himselfthroughtwoattributes;thisismeanttoreplacetheconceptionoftheEssence

being,asitwere,‘shared’equallybythethreePersonswhoaresimultaneouslyidenticalto

theEssenceanddistinguishableasPersonswithintheEssence.Rāzīwouldcontendthatthe

distinctivenessofthePersonscannotbesituatedatthesamelevelofabsolutenessasthe

Essence:ifthePersonsaretobeviewedasattributes,thentheycannotbedistinctfrom

eachotheronthesameplaneonwhichtheiridentitywiththeEssenceisaffirmed.

Variouseffortswereinfactmadetonarrowthegapbetweenthetwotheologiesalongjust

theselines.ThesewereformulatedforthemostpartbyChristianapologistslivingin

Muslimlands,whoattemptedtodomoreorlesswhatRāzīproposed:presenttheTrinityin

termswhichresembletherelationshipestablishedwithinIslamictheologybetweenthe

attributesandtheEssence.17Forexample,theJacobite18ChristianArab,Yahyāb.‘Adī(d.

                                                            16 Al‐iqtisād fi’l‐i‘tiqād (eds. H. Atay and I. Cubkcu) (Ankara: Nur Matbaasi,1962), pp.4‐5. 

17 Sidney Griffith effectively refutes Harry Wolfson’s claim that the Muslim theologians derived their view of the attributes from the Christian Trinity, showing that it was the other way round: Christians in 

15  

974),writinginArabicandmakingfulluseofArabictermsdrawnfromthevocabularyof

Muslimkalām,referstoGodasbeingone‘substance’(jawhar)andthree‘attributes’(sifāt),

eachofwhichisdescribedasbeingdistinctfromtheothertwoasregards‘meaning’

(ma‘nā).19Hewassensitivetothechargeofpolytheism,andreferstothe‘ignorant’(al‐

juhhāl)amongtheChristianswhoassertthatthethreehypostaseseachconstitutea

distinctsubstance.TheproperconceptionoftheTrinity,accordingtoYahyā,isbasedupon

thedoctrinesoftheChurchFathers,anditisthisconceptionthatisheldby‘thethreesects

oftheChristians’,bywhichhemeanstheMelkites,theNestoriansandtheJacobites.The

onesubstanceorousiaisdefinedintermsoftheArabicconceptsjawhar(substance),dhāt

(essence),andmāhiyya(quiddity)—allofwhichwereappliedbyMuslimtheologiansto

God.Withinthisuniquesubstance,however,onecandistinguishbetweenthreePersons

whoaredefinedbyunique‘personal’properties:paternity(ubūwa)fortheFather,filiation

(bunūwa)fortheSon,andprocession(inbi‘āth)fortheSpirit.20

Inthepreviouscentury,anotherArabChristian,theNestorian‘Ammāral‐Basrī(d.ca.850)

hadrebuttedthechargeoftritheismlevelledagainsttheChristiansbytheMuslims,and

articulatedinhisKitābal‐Burhān(‘TheBookofProof’)apositionveryclosetothat

proposedbyRāzī:

BeforeGod,weareblamelessofallegingthreegods.Rather,byoursayingFather,

SonandHolySpirit,wewantnomorethantosubstantiatethestatementthatGodis

                                                                                                                                                                                                Muslim lands came to frame their Trinitarian theology in terms already established within Muslim kalām, as will be evident in what follows. 18 The Jacobites, Melkites and Nestorians were the main Christian sects in the territories conquered by the Muslims in the eastern part of the Byzantine empire, principally Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, in the first wave of the expansion of Islam. They were distinguished principally by different Christologies. As Sidney Griffith shows clearly, these Christian sects were not only granted tolerance by the Muslims, their identity was in large part forged by the culture of Islam which ‘fostered the articulation of a new cultural expression of Christian doctrine, this time in Arabic, and it provided the cultural framework within which the several Christian denominations of the Orient ultimately came to define their mature ecclesial identities.’ Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque—Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p.4.   19 See Sidney Griffith, The Beginnings of Christian Theology in Arabic—Muslim‐Christian Encounters in the Early Islamic Period (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), p.177.  20 See Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp.335‐336. 

16  

living(hayy),speaking(nātiq).AndtheFatheristheonewhomweconsidertohave

life(hayāt)andword(kalima).ThelifeistheHolySpiritandthewordistheSon.21

ThispresentationechoesthatofStIrenaeus,oneoftheearliestChurchFathers(d.ca.202),

whoreferredtotheSonandtheSpiritasbeingakintothe‘twohands’ofGodtheFather,by

whichHecreatesallthings,suchthattheFathercomestocreationthroughtheSonandin

theSpirit,andcreaturesgototheFatherintheSpiritandthroughtheSon.StIrenaeus

referstotheSonastheWordofGod,andtheSpirittotheWisdomofGod;thesetwowere

eternallypresentinGodandwithGod,withoutdividingHimintothree:‘sincetoHimis

everpresentHisWordandWisdom,theSonandtheSpirit,bywhomandinwhomHemade

allthings.’22

Here,thederivativeaspectofthedivinityofthesecondandthirdPersonsoftheTrinity,in

relationtothefirst,iscombinedwiththeunityoftheGodhead—thetwo‘hands’being

inseparablefromthe‘body’ofthepersontowhomtheybelong.TotheobjectionthatGodis

notcomposedofparts,andcannotbecomparedtoabodywithtwohands,StIrenaeus

wouldnodoubtrespondbysayingthatonehastoapplytothisanalogyastrongmutatis

mutandisclause:God’s‘body’—thedivineReality—isabsolutesimplicity,thusnon‐

composite;His‘hands’—thatisHisWordandHisWisdom—areakintothehandsofabody

onlyinonerespect.Justasitisthroughthehandsthatthebodyacts,soitisthroughthe

divineWordandWisdomthatGodcreates.Inanotherrespect,however,thereisno

commonmeasurebetweenthetwothingscompared,fortheWordandWisdomare

inseparablefromtheverysimplicityofGod’sReality,whereasthetwohandsofabodycan

beseparatedfromthebodyofwhichtheyarerelativelyaccidentalparts,boththebodyand

itshandsbeingcompositesubstances.

AnotherChristianArab,theJacobiteAbūRā’ita(d.ca.850)pursuedasimilarlineofthought

tothatof‘Ammāral‐Basrī,makinguseoftheMuslimattributesofknowledgeandlife.Just

                                                            21 Cited in Sidney Griffith, Beginnings, p.170. 22 St Irenaeus, Five Books of S. Irenaeus Against Heresies, tr. John Keble (Oxford & London: James Parker & co, 1872), Book 4, ch.20.1, pp.364‐365.  

17  

asMuslimtheologiansacceptthatGodis‘theKnowing’(al‐‘Alīm)and‘theLiving’(al‐Hayy),

withouttheseattributesbeingconsideredas‘partners’(shurakā’,sing.sharīk)alongside

God,so,fortheChristians,thesetwoattributesaregiventhenames‘Son’and‘Spirit’:

‘Furthermore,asperfectentities,God’slifeandknowledgemustbeconsiderednotonlyas

distinguishable,butalsoassimultaneouslyinunion(ittisāl)withoneanother,andwithHis

perfectbeing.’23God’slifeandknowledgearethushypostases(aqānīm),24whichare

distinguishedonefromtheotherwithoutthisdistinctionrupturingtheunityofthe

substanceofGod’sbeing.

Whilesuchformulationsmayappeartobridgethegapbetweenthetwotheologiesinsome

respects,therapprochementonthislevelisafragileone.Fortheveryinsistenceofthe

ChristianapologistsupontheeternaldistinctionbetweenthePersonsoftheTrinityatthe

leveloftheGodhead,alongsidetheaffirmationthateachofthePersonsisidenticaltothat

Godhead,ensuredthatmostMuslimtheologianswouldnotacceptthedoctrine.Typicalof

thekindofargumentmadeagainsttheChristianTrinityisthatofthephilosopheral‐Kindī

(d.873).Hearguedthatif,ontheonehand,thereisasolesubstancewithineachofthe

hypostases,andontheother,eachofthehypostaseshasaproperty,whichiseternalinit,

andwhichdifferentiatesonehypostasisfromtheother,itfollowsthat:

...eachofthehypostasesiscomposedofasubstance,whichiscommontoallofthem,and

aproperty,whichisuniquetoeachofthem.Buteverythingcomposedistheeffectofa

cause,andeffectofacausecannotbeeternal,whenceitfollowsthatneitheristheFather

eternalnoristheSoneternalnoristheHolySpiriteternal.Thus,thingswhichhavebeen

assumedtobeeternalarenoteternal.25

Yahyāb.‘AdīcitesKindī’scritiqueandretorts:thisargumentholdsonlyforcreated

substances;thecompositenatureofcreatedthingsisaconcomitantoftheirtemporality,

causeandeffectonlytakingplaceintime.InthecaseofthePersonsoftheTrinity,however,

                                                            23 Griffith, Beginnings, p.183. 24 This is the plural of uqnūm, the Arabic transliteration of the Syriac qnoma, which translates the Greek hypostasis. Griffith, Beginnings, p.180. 25 Cited in Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, p.322. 

18  

thetemporalconditionistranscended:theyhavenevernotexisted,thustheycannothave

beenbroughtintoacompositeformcomprisingsubstanceandproperty.Onthecontrary,

‘thesubstanceisdescribedbyeveryoneoftheseattributes(al‐sifāt)and...theseattributes

areeternal,withouttheirhavingbeenproducedinitaftertheyhadnotbeen.’26

Kindīwouldprobablyhaverespondedthatthecompositenatureofacompoundisnot

contingentupontemporalityalone;rather,itisapropertyofthesubstanceofthething

itself:anysubstancecomposedofmorethanoneelementcannotbutberegardedas

composite,itcannotbesimple.Itisthefactoftheexistenceoftwoormoreelementsthat

makesasubstancecompound,thequestionoftimedoesnotenterintotheessential

definitionofsubstance.

Inanycase,Yahyāb.‘AdīistryingheretoanswerMuslimobjectionstotheTrinity,while

bringingthefocusbacktosomethinghethinksiscommonbetweentheMuslimand

ChristianconceptionsofunityandpluralityinrelationtoGod.Hearguesthat,likethe

Muslimattributes,theChristianTrinityisaneternallysubsistentmodeofpluralitywithin

unity,itisathree‐nesspertainingtotheuniquesubstanceofdivinity,withthereal

distinctivenessofeachPersonbeingmaintainedwithinthatonesubstance.Butthe

problemsremain,asiswelldemonstratedbythefollowingpolemicalexchange—among

themostprotractedinallsuchexchangesthathavebeenrecordedinthehistoryofMuslim‐

Christianpolemics.Thecorrespondencebeganwithaletterwritteninthe13thcenturyby

PaulofAntioch,theMelkiteBishopofSidon,to‘aMuslimfriend’.Thisapologyforthe

Christianfaithwentthroughvariouseditions,oneofwhichwassentby‘thepeopleof

Cyprus’totwoMuslimtheologiansinDamascus,IbnTaymiyyain1316andIbnAbīTālibal‐

Dimashqīinthefollowingyear.AsregardstheTrinity,theletterechoestheargumentof

‘Ammāral‐Basrī,notedabove.Itasserts:‘Thethreenames[Father,SonandSpirit]areone

eternalandeverlastingGod:athinglivingandarticulate(shay’hayynātiq),theEssence,

speech,life.Asweseeit,theEssenceistheFather,thespeechistheSon,andthelifeisthe

HolySpirit.’Theresponsefromal‐Dimashqīconcentratesonthedistinctionbetweenthe

                                                            26 Ibid. 

19  

namedentities,arguingthateachnamedbeingisutterlydifferentfromtheothertwo,‘the

FatherisdifferentfromtheSon,andutterlydistinctfromhim,andsimilarlytheSpiritis

differentfrombothofthem.’Giventheaffirmationofthesethreeapparentlydiscrete

entities,theresultcanonlybekufr(unbelief)andshirk(polytheism).

InthiswayyoudeclareunbeliefandpolytheismbydeclaringthattheFatherexists

byhisessence,thatis,Heiseternal,andthatheislivingbytheSpirit,and

articulatingbytheSon;thattheSpiritislivingbyitsessence,thatis,itiseternal,and

thatitexistsbytheFather,andisarticulatingbytheSon;andthattheSonis

articulatingbyhisessence,thatis,heiseternal,andheexistsbytheFatherand

livingbytheSpirit.Thusyougivetheclearestindicationofpolytheism.27

Inotherwords,wereturntotheobjectionmadebyRāzī:thePersonsarenotattributes

(sifāt),butareinrealityessences(dhawāt),eachessencebeingdefinedbyaproperty

particulartoit:existenceistheeternallysubsistentdefiningproperty—hencetheeternal

‘essence’—oftheFather;lifeistheeternallysubsistentdefiningproperty—hencethe

eternal‘essence’—oftheSpirit;andarticulationistheeternallysubsistentdefining

property—hencetheeternal‘essence’—oftheSon.Weshouldmakeitclearherethat

Dimashqī’sresponseisbasedontheclassicalAsh‘ariteformula,mentionedabovebyal‐

Ghazzālī:theattributesmustbedescribedasbeingneitherGodnorotherthanGod.This

ambivalentformula,alone,isdeemedtosatisfytherequirementofsimultaneously

safeguardingthedivineunitywhilstaffirmingtherealityoftheattributesintheir

distinctiveness.Letuslookatthisformulamoreclosely:

1)‘notGod’:theattributesaretrulydistinctintheirplurality,buttheycannotbesaidto

constitutedifferentessencesalongsideGod,andthisiswhy,intheirdistinctiveplurality,

theymustnotbeidentifiedpurelyandsimplywiththeAbsolute:theattributes,inthis

respect,arethus‘otherthanGod’.AndthisiswhattheChristianformulationsofthe

Essence‐Person(orEssence‐attribute)relationshipfailtoassert;theymaintain,onthe

contrary,thateachPersonoftheTrinity—evenifthisPersonbedescribedasaMuslim‐

                                                            27 Cited in Rifaat Ebied & David Thomas (eds.), Muslim‐Christian Polemic during the Crusades—The Letter from the People of Cyprus and Ibn Abi Tālib’s Response (Leiden: Brill, 2005), p.333 (translation modified). 

20  

sounding‘attribute’—isidentifiedwithGod,atthesametimeashavingitsown

distinctivenessasaPerson.

2)‘nototherthanGod’:theAsh‘aritesaddtotheprecedingdenialthecomplementary

affirmationthattheattributesare‘nototherthanGod’,fortheattributeshavenoself‐

subsistentessencesoftheirown,andsubsistonlythroughtheuniquedivineEssence.But

thisaffirmation‘nototherthanGod’canonlybeacceptedifitbeconditionedbythe

negation:theattributesare‘notGod’.Theresultingsynthesisofthetwocomplementary

statementsaffirmstherealityoftheattributeswithoutunderminingtheunityofGod,while

upholdingtheunityofGodwithoutdenyingtherealityoftheattributes.FortheAsh‘arites,

then,alltheattributesareco‐eternalwiththeEssence,notbeingabsolutely‘other’thanIt,

norbeingabsolutelyidentifiedwithIt;thustheyarerealandnotsimplymetaphorsor

merenames,buttheirrealitydoesnotintroducedivisionwithintheoneEssence.

AtthispointoneshouldnotethatitisnotjusttheChristianswhofallshortoftheAsh‘arite

criteriaoftawhīdonthisissue,forboththe‘attributionists’or‘assimilationists’(al‐

mushabbiha,literally:thosewhocreatealikenessorsimilarity),referredtoasal‐

Hashwiyya,andthe‘anti‐attributionists’,theMu‘tazilites,areregardedasholding

erroneousandevenhereticalbeliefsaboutGod.Thefirstgroup,basingthemselvesona

literalreadingofcertainQur’ānicverses,ascribedtoGodquasi‐corporealattributes(a

body,hands,aface,andsoon),thusfallingfoulofassimilationism(tashbīh),ormakingGod

comparabletocreatures,andanthropomorphism(tajsīm),leadingtothe‘sin’ofassociation

orpolytheism(shirk);whiletheiropponents,theMu‘tazilites,aredeemedtostraytoofarin

theoppositedirection,strippingGod(ta‘tīl)ofallattributesinavainefforttosafeguardHis

transcendentunicity.Forthem,Godcanbedescribedas‘knowing’,butnotthroughan

attributecalled‘knowledge’;Heisindeedomnipotent,butnotthroughanattributecalled

‘power’.28Itispertinenttonoteherethattheaccusationofbeinga‘Christian’ismadeinthe

disputesovertheattributes:theAsh‘aritetheologianal‐ShahrastānīaccusestheMu‘tazilite,

Abūal‐Hudhaylal‐‘Allāf(d.841)ofimitatingtheChristiansintheirviewoftherelationship

                                                            28 Cited by Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, trs. A.Hamori & R.Hamori (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), p.95. 

21  

betweentheEssenceandthePersons,saying,‘AbūHudhayl’saffirmationofthese

attributesasaspectsoftheEssenceisthesameasthehypostasesoftheChristians.’29

TheMu‘tazilitepositionistypicallybasedonthiskindofreasoning:

1. Thatwhichiseternalisdivine.

2. Thedivinityisabsoluteunity,uttersimplicity.

3. TheunityandsimplicityofGodthusstrictlyexcludesthepluralityofeternal

attributes.

Godcannotthereforehaveattributesthatarebotheternalandmultiple:toassertthe

contraryistofallintopolytheism.30Inhisargumentagainstthose‘philosophers’whodeny

thateternalattributescanbeascribedtoGod,al‐Ghazzālīwrites:‘Whyshoulditbe

impossibletosaythat,justastheessenceofHimwhoisnecessaryofexistence[wājibal‐

wujūd,‘thenecessaryexistent’]iseternalandhasnoefficientcause,soalsoHisattribute

existswithHimfrometernityandthushasnoefficientcause?’AsWolfsonnotes,this

argumentisnotsodissimilarfromtheChristiandefenceoftheTrinity31—aswesawabove,

inYahyāb.‘Adī’sresponsetoKindī.

ItisthusnotsurprisingtofindtheSpanishscholaroftheZāhirīschoolofthought,Ibnal‐

Hazm(d.1064),sarcasticallyaskinganAsh‘arite:‘Sinceyousaythatco‐existentwithGod

arefifteenattributes,allofthemotherthanHeandallofthemeternal,whydoyoufind

faultwiththeChristianswhentheysaythatGodisthe“thirdofthree”?’32TheAsh‘arite,

accordingtoIbnHazm,lamelyrepliesthattheonlymistakemadebytheChristiansis

restrictingtotwothenumberofthingsco‐existingwithGod.Inlikefashion,the

contemporaryIranianShi‘itescholar,AyatollahJavādi‐Āmulī,takestheAsh‘aritestotask

                                                            29 Cited in Sidney Griffith, Beginnings of Christian Theology, p.178. 30 See Wolfson, Philosophy of the Kalam, pp.132‐143.    31 Ibid, p.139 and p.323. As regards Wolfson’s claim that ‘Muslims [were led] to adopt a Christian doctrine which is explicitly rejected in the Koran, and transform it into a Muslim doctrine… [They were] led to the substitution in Muslim theology of divine attributes for the Christian Trinity’ (ibid, p.128), it is clear that the differences between the two doctrines greatly outweigh their similarities. 32 Ibid, p.314. 

22  

forbelievinginseven,eightornine‘gods’ratherthanjustthethreeoftheChristians.Itis

theAsh‘ariteaffirmationoftheattributesasbeingbotheternal,ontheonehand,and

‘super‐added’totheEssence(zā’ida‘alā’l‐dhāt),ontheother,thatleadsJavādī‐Āmulīto

accusetheAsh‘aritesofbelievinginmorethanoneGod:‘Ifweacceptthatthereareeight

attributesoftheEssence,inadditiontotheEssenceitself,thenwewillhavenineeternal

existententities.’33HemountsastrongargumentinfavouroftheShi’itepositionwhichis

neitherthatofsimplystrippingGod’sEssenceofallattributes(ta‘tīl),asdidthe

Mu‘tazilites,noraffirmingthemasbeingsuper‐addedtotheEssence,asdidtheAsh‘arites.

Rather,fortheShi‘is,alloftheattributesareviewedasbeingreal,ontheonehand,this

realitybeingabsolutelyidenticalwiththeEssence;and,ontheotherhand,eachofthe

attributesaredistinctfromtheEssence,andthusfromeachother,onlyinrespectof

conceptualmeaning(mafhūm).34

Furthermore,thestricttraditionalists—amongthem,Hanbaliteliteralists—pourscornon

allthosewhoengageintheology(kalām),sayingthattheliteralmeaningoftheQurʾānand

thepropheticSunnasuffice;theuseofreason,argument,anddisputationonlyleadsastray.

Thegreatjuristal‐Shāfiʿī,founderofoneofthefourschoolsofSunnijurisprudencesaid:

‘Myverdictonthepeopleofkalāmisthattheyshouldbebeatenwithwhipsandthesolesof

sandals,andthenparadedthroughalltribesandencampments,whileitisproclaimedof

them,“SuchistherewardofthosewhoforsaketheQurʾānandtheSunna,andgive

themselvesuptothekalām”.’35

                                                            33 ‘Abd Allāh Javādī‐Āmulī, Tawhīd dar Qur’ān [Tawhīd in the Qur’ān], vol.2 of Tafsīr‐i mawdūʿī‐i Qur’ān‐i Karīm (Qum: Isrā’ Research Centre, 1386 Sh./1998), p.301. 34 Javādī‐Āmulī, Tawhīd, pp.305‐311. This perspective is based on such texts as the sermon no. 1 of the Nahj al‐balāgha of Imam ‘Alī b. Abī Tālib. See our translation of and comment upon this seminal text, Justice and Remembrance—Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ‘Alī (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), Appendix 1, pp.208‐218. On the one hand, one’s conception of the Essence must be shorn of all attributes, insofar as these latter are susceptible to distinctive conception apart from the Essence, and on the other hand, the ontological reality of the attributes is affirmed, each attribute having no ‘binding limitation’, insofar as its substance is identified absolutely with the divine Essence. 35 Cited by Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, op.cit., pp.110‐111. 

23  

Itwouldappearnecessary,inthelightoftheseintra‐Muslimpolemics,toaskthequestion:

doallMuslimsinfactbelieveinthesameGod?36ThesamecanbesaidoftheChristians,

whosemutualanathematizationsandexcommunicationsaretoomanyandcomplexto

begintomentionhere.Sufficetosaythat,onthetheologicalplanewhichwearepresently

considering,wecertainlyneedtoaskthequestionwhetherandtowhatextentCatholics

andOrthodoxbelieveinthesameGod,ifthesetwogreatbranchesoftheChurchcouldsplit

sodefinitivelyandacrimoniouslyoverthecorrectunderstandingoftheTrinity:doesthe

SpiritproceedfromtheFatheralone,astheOrthodoxmaintain,orfromtheFatherandthe

Son(filioque),astheCatholicsmaintain?Ifthisquestion,goingtotheveryheartofthe

TrinitarianconceptionofGod,isdisputed,then,inthemeasurethatone’sbeliefinGodis

predicateduponaproperunderstandingoftheTrinity,itisnotirrelevantorirreverentto

askthequestion:doCatholicsandOrthodoxbelieveinthesameGod?Thequestionisbyno

meansmerelyacademic,norofmerelyhistoricalinterest,pertainingonlytothe‘great

schism’whichwasformalizedin1054.Asrecentlyas1848,whenPopePiusIXissuedan

invitationtotheEasternchurchesonthesubjectofunity(intheapostolicletterInSuprema

PetriApostoliSede)hemetwithablisteringresponsefromtheEasternPatriarchs:how

couldtheyunitewiththeCatholicswhoprofessedthefilioque,‘condemnedbymanyHoly

Councils...subjectedtoanathemabytheeighthEcumenicalCouncil’;thefilioquewhich

introducedunequalrelationsintheTrinityand,mostseriouslyofall,‘destroyedthe

onenessfromtheonecause’,i.e.theFather:

                                                            36 As we shall see in the next section, Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s metaphysics allows us to answer in the affirmative: yes, Muslims do believe in the same God, as regards the divine essence of belief, even if the human form assumed by belief contradicts other such forms. It might also be noted here that he offers a strictly metaphysical view of the divine attributes, arguing that they are certainly real, but only as the Essence (this being identical to the Shi’i position); but as regards their diversity, he argues that this is not only due to the diverse modes of perfection indistinguishably comprised within the Essence, the diversity is a concomitant also of the plurality of created being, with which the one Essence enters into so many relationships; the attributes are thus so many modes of relationship with the cosmos, they become outwardly diversified according to the multiplicity of the cosmos. The metaphysical ‘oneness of being’, and not just the oneness of God, is established by Ibn al‐‘Arabī through his assertion that the multiplicity of the cosmos is rooted in the ‘fixed archetypes’ (al‐a‘yān al‐thābita), and these, in turn, have no real existence—no ontological substance. They ‘exist’ only in the consciousness of God, in a manner analogous to the subsistence of ideas within the mind of man. He thus can assert that there is nothing in being but God, and since God is one, being cannot but be one. See William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge—Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989), pp.31‐58, et passim. 

24  

ThenoveldoctrineoftheHolyGhostproceedingfromtheFatherandtheSonis

essentiallyheresy,anditsmaintainers,whoevertheybe,areheretics,accordingto

thesentenceofPopeStDamasus(‘IfanyonerightlyholdsconcerningtheFatherand

theSon,yetholdsnotrightlyoftheHolyGhost,heisaheretic’),andthatthe

congregationsofsucharealsoheretical,andthatallspiritualcommunionin

worshipoftheorthodoxsonsoftheCatholicChurchwithsuchisunlawful.37

ItistheCatholicadditionofthefilioquethat,sotheOrthodoxarguetothisday,undermined

the‘monarchy’oftheFatherassolecauseoftheGodhead,andtherebyruinedthebalance

betweentheunityofGod—determinedbytheFather—andthethreenessofGod

establishedbythePersons.IftheSpirit‘proceeded’notfromtheFatheralone,butalso

fromtheSon,thentherearetwosourcesorcausesoftheGodhead,insteadofone.Thisis

whatisimpliedintheaccusationthattheveryonenessofthecauseoftheGodhead,the

Father,is‘destroyed’bytheadditionofthewordfilioquetotheCreed.38

Canonesay,then,thattheOrthodoxconceptionoftheTrinity,withitssolesourceofunity

locatedintheFather,ismorelikelytomeetMuslimtheologicalcriteriaofTawhīd?Not

necessarily.FortheTrinityremainscentraltoOrthodoxtheology,andanyefforttoelevate

theunityofGodabovetheTrinityisfraughtwithproblems.EveniftheFatherisdescribed

astheuncausedcauseoftheSonandtheSpirit,onecannotcalltheFather‘superior’to

them,foranykindofelevationoftheFatherimpliesasubordinationoftheothertwo

Persons.Orthodoxtheologiansfirmlyresistedanysuch‘subordinationism’,asisclearfrom

thefollowingstatementbyStGregoryofNazianzen:

IshouldliketocalltheFatherthegreater,becausefromHimflowboththeequality

andthebeingoftheequals[i.e.,theothertwoPersons]...ButIamafraidtousethe                                                            37 The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy, Edward Siecienski (Oxford: Oxford University press, 

2010), pp.188‐189. 

38 See Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972 [reprint]),  pp. 218‐223 for a 

concise explanation of the doctrinal implications of the filioque; and for a more extended theological 

exposition, Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church  (Cambridge: James Clarke, 

2005 [reprint]), pp.51‐66, et passim. 

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wordOrigin,lestIshouldmakeHimtheOriginofinferiors,andthusinsultHimby

precedenciesofhonour.FortheloweringofthosewhoarefromHimisnoglorytothe

Source...Godheadneitherincreasednordiminishedbysuperioritiesorinferiorities;

ineveryrespectequal,ineveryrespectthesame,justasthebeautyandthe

greatnessoftheheavensisone;theinfiniteconnaturalityofThreeInfiniteOnes,

eachGodwhenconsideredinHimself;astheFather,sotheSon,astheSonsothe

HolyGhost;theThree,oneGod,whencontemplatedtogether;eachGodbecause

consubstantial;theThree,oneGodbecauseofthemonarchy(emphasisadded).39

FortheMuslimtheologiantheprincipleofunity—‘oneGodbecauseofthemonarchy’—is

fatallycompromisedbytheassertionoftrinity:‘eachGodbecauseconsubstantial’.The

logicalconsequenceofthisconsubstantialityisthatallattributesoftheGodheadpertainto

eachofthethreePersonsoftheTrinityinaquasi‐absolutemanner:eachPersonisfully

Godbydintofsharingthesamesubstance(homoousia)ofGodhead;theyareofthesame

nature,whilebeingdistinctfromtheothersonlyonaccountofaparticular‘personal’

quality:‘begetting’inthecaseoftheFather,‘beingbegotten’inthecaseoftheSon,and

‘proceedingfrom’inthecaseoftheSpirit,aswehaveseenabove.InthewordsofStJohnof

Damascus:

Forintheirhypostaticorpersonalpropertiesalone—thepropertiesofbeing

unbegotten,offiliation,andofprocession—dothethreedivinehypostasesdiffer

fromeachother,beingindivisiblydivided,notbyessencebutbythedistinguishing

markoftheirproperandpeculiarhypostasis...TheFather,theSon,andtheHoly

Ghostareoneinallrespectssavethoseofbeingunbegotten,offiliationandof

procession.40

Thisstatementhelpsustoperceivethereasonwhy,onthetheologicalplane,itisso

difficulttoformulatetheTrinityintermswhichfitwithintheframeofanIslamic

                                                            39 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology, op. cit., p.63. To introduce any kind of inequality within the Godhead is to fall into a kind of Arianism, against which St Gregory of Nazienzen railed: ‘We believe that to subordinate anything of the Three is to destroy the whole’ (from his attack on Arius in the treatise ‘On St Basil’). 40 Cited in ibid, p.54. 

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conceptionofattributes.ForaccordingtothedogmaoftheTrinity—whetherOrthodoxor

Catholic41—everythingpossessedbytheFatherisequallypossessedbytheSonandthe

Spirit;inotherwords,allthedivineattributessuchasknowledge,power,will,etc.are

ascribedequallytoallthreePersons,whoaredistinguishedonefromtheotherexclusively

accordingtotheirPersonalproperties.ThisviewdivergesradicallyfromtheIslamic

conceptionoftheattributes,allofwhicharepossessedbyonesoleEssence,andeachof

whichisdistinguishedfromalltheothersbyvirtueofitsparticularpropertyorquality;the

attributeofknowledge,forexample,cannotbeequatedwiththatofpower,exceptbyvirtue

oftheircommonrootandsourceintheEssence.AccordingtotheTrinity,however,both

attributesareequallypredicatedofeachofthethreePersons,whoaredistinguishedfrom

eachother,notasoneattributeisdistinctfromanother,butsolelybyapersonalproperty

definedinrelationtoorigin:‘thepropertiesofbeingunbegotten,offiliation,andof

procession’,asStJohnputit,describing,respectively,theFather,SonandSpirit.

Accordingtothisstrictapplicationofthedogma,itisdifficulttoseehowthethreePersons

constitutedifferentattributesofGod,if‘attributes’bedefinedaccordingtoMuslim

theology.ForeachofthePersonsequallypossessesalloftheattributesoftheothertwo,

withthesoleexceptionofthequalitydeterminedbytheirrespective‘personal’properties.

Apartfromthissoledistinction,eachPersonoftheTrinityisdeemedtobeequaltothe

othersinsofarasallthedivineattributesareconcerned;sotheSonandtheSpiritareas

omniscientandomnipotentastheFather,andthesameappliestoalltheattributes.St

ThomasAquinas,forexample,afterdefiningtheSonastheWordorthe‘understanding’of

God,writesthatinGod‘tobeandtounderstandareidentical.Therefore,thedivineWord

thatisinGod,whoseWordHeisaccordingtointellectualexistence,hasthesameexistence

asGod,whoseWordHeis.Consequently,theWordmustbeofthesameessenceandnature

asGodHimself,andallattributeswhatsoeverthatarepredicatedofGod,mustpertainalso

                                                            41 St Augustine, for example, in his treatise on the Trinity, maintains that ‘there is so great an equality in that Trinity that ... the Father is not greater than the Son in respect to divinity.’ Cited by Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, vol. 1, ‘Faith, Trinity and Incarnation’, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p.357. The Father, the Son and the Spirit are equally ‘divine’; so every attribute of divinity is to be equally attributed to all three Persons. 

27  

totheWordofGod’.42ThesamelogicisappliedtotheSpirit,identifiedbyAquinasasthe

loveofGodforHimself.43ThusitistoallthreePersonsequallythatalltheattributesof

divinitypertain,foreachisnothingotherthantheonesubstance.Itispreciselythis

‘sharing’ofalldivineattributesthatisdeemedbyMuslimtheologianstobeaviolationof

Tawhīd,foritappearstopositthreedifferentiatedrealitieswhichareatoncefullydivine

andyeteternallydistinctfromeachother.ItisthisthatmakestheologianslikeRāzīclaim

that,eveniftheChristianscallthethreePersons‘attributes’ofoneEssence,theyinfact

believeinthreedistinctessences.

TheChristianmightrespondasfollows:whenitisassertedthattheSonorWordpossesses

alltheattributesoftheFather,ortheEssence,whatismeantisthatinsofarasthedivine

natureissimple,ontheonehand,andinsofarastheSonisidentifiedwiththisnature,on

theother,theSonmustpossessalltheattributespossessedbytheFather.TheSondoesnot

possessalltheseattributesbyvirtueofthatwhichdefineshimas‘Son’—hisbeing

begotten—butbyvirtueofhissubstance,whichisidenticaltothatoftheEssence.The

argumentmightbeextendedthus:youMuslimsmustregardeachoftheessentialdivine

attributesasequallypossessingalltheotherattributes—failingwhichthesimplicityofthe

divinenatureisviolated.Eachattributemustpossessalltheotherattributes,notinrespect

ofwhatdistinguishesitasaspecificattribute—wisdom,forexample,asopposedtopower;

rather,itcanonlypossessalltheotherattributesinsofarasitisnototherthantheobjectof

attribution,thus,insofarasitistheoneEssence,towhichalltheessentialattributesare

ascribed.Fromthispointofview,theChristianmightconclude,Muslimbeliefinaplurality

ofessentialattributesisnotsodifferentfromtheTrinitarianconceptionofGod.

TheAsh‘aritemightreplyasfollows,beginningwithareminderofthedefinitiveformula:

‘theattributesarenotGodandnototherthanGod’;whatismissingfromtheTrinitarian

conceptionispreciselytheapophaticelementoftheformula.TheChristianonlysaysthat

                                                            42 Aquinas’s Shorter Summa—Saint Thomas’s own concise version of his Summa Theologica, trans. Cyril Vollert (Manchester, New Hampshire: Sophia Institute, 2002), ch.41, p.38. 43 See ibid, chs. 45‐48. At the end of this essay we shall see the way in which Aquinas helps to build a bridge between the two theologies—a bridge constructed out of a philosophical conception of the absolute simplicity of the divine Essence. 

28  

eachPersonisnottheothertwo,butasregardsthedivineidentityofeachPerson,thereis

onlyaffirmationandnonegation.Thatis,theChristianonlyaffirmsthedivinityofallthree

Persons,withoutmakingthenegationwhichwouldregistertherelativityofthe‘Persons’in

relationtothepureabsolutenessanduntrammelledunicityoftheEssence.Thenegation—

‘notGod’—isrequiredasthepremiseuponwhichthecomplementaryaffirmation—‘not

otherthanGod’—isvalid.TheShi‘itheologianwouldalsorejecttheTrinitarianconception,

butforadifferentreason:theessentialattributesareindeednothingbuttheEssence,and

arethusallequally‘God’,giventhedivinesimplicity;butwhatismissingfromthe

Trinitarianconception,fromthispointofview,isthecorrectdefinitionofwhat

distinguishestheattributesfromeachother:theyaredistinguishednotbypersonal

propertiesofbegetting,beingbegottenandproceeding,astheChristianswouldsay,rather,

theyaredistinguishedonlyasregardstheirmeaning,thatmeaningwhichisconceivable

fromthehumanpointofview.44Thatwhichdistinguishesoneattributefromanotheris

thereforeeminentlycontingent.TheTrinitarian,bycontrast,notonlyconceivesofthe

distinctionswithintheGodheadasbeingdefinedaccordingtopersonalproperties,butalso

conceivesofthesedistinctionsasbeingeternal:thedistinctionsbywhichthethreePersons

aredistinguishedareeternaldistinctions.ForbothShi‘isandSunnis,thePersonsofthe

Trinitycannotbeatonceeternallydistinctandequallydivine.ForallMuslimtheologians,

distinctionimpliesrelativity,whiledivinityimpliesabsoluteunity.

Allsuchtheologicaldisagreementnotwithstanding,theargumentmadeearlier,basedon

Qur’ānicverses,thattheChristiansdoindeedbelieveinandworshiptheselfsameGodas

theMuslims,isnotnecessarilyinvalidated.Thequestionhere,fortheMuslims,isthis:

whichaspecttakesprioritywithintheQur’ānicdiscourse,rejectionofChristiandogmaor

affirmationofChristianbeliefintheoneGod?Bothaspects,ofcourse,havetobeaccepted

bytheMuslimwhowishestobefaithfultotheQur’ān,butthechallengeistodetermine

whichistobegivenpriorityintheprocessofsynthesisingthetwoaspectsintoone

                                                            44 This does not mean that the attributes are merely figments of human imagination, devoid of objective ontological substance; it means, on the contrary, that the one Essence constitutes the ontological reality of the attributes, and that what the human intellect conceives as distinct attributes is but a reflection of the infinite perfections of the Essence, perfections which cannot in any way be distinguished from the absolute infinitude of the Essence, that is: an absolute oneness which is infinitely perfect. 

29  

fundamental,definitiveattitudetoChristianbelief.Wewouldarguethattheaspectof

affirmationmusttakepriority,insofarastheobjectivegroundsuponwhichonecanaffirm

thatChristiansandMuslimsbelieveinthesameGodprevailoverthesubjectivedifferences

ofconceptionofthatGod.Thedifferentconceptionshavebecomeembodiedintheological

dogmas,butwe(Muslims)needtoaskthequestion:dothesedogmasdefinetheessenceof

ChristianbeliefinGod?Orisitthecase,rather,thattheessenceofChristianbeliefinGod

transcendsthedogmaswhichattempttodefinebothGodandorthodoxbeliefinGod?We

alsoneedtobringintotheargumentthecrucialprincipleofintention:insofarasweregard

theprincipleofspiritualintention,governedbythedivineObject,astakingprecedence

overtherationalconception,fashionedbythehumansubject,wecanassertthatwhat

unitesMuslimsandChristians—beliefinoneGodandnotseveralgods—isinfinitelymore

significantthatwhatdividesthem,namely,theirrespectiveconceptionsoftheprecise

nature,theattributesandtheactionsofthatGod.TheQur’ānicassertionthattheGodofthe

ChristiansandMuslimsisoneandthesameisanassertionrelatingmoretoobjective

realityandtoultimateprinciplethantosubjectiveperceptionsanddogmaticdefinitions:

howevertheChristianssubjectivelydefinetheirGod,theobjectoftheirdefinitionsandthe

ultimategoaloftheirdevotionistheoneandonlyGod.Thiskindofreasoningcanhelp

MuslimstoarriveattheconclusionthattheonenessofthedivinityinwhomtheChristians

affirmbelieftakespriorityoverthefactthattheirdescriptionofthisGodentailsaTrinity

withintheUnity.However,inthemeasurethatone’sreasoningfollowsatheologicaltrain

ofthought,thetendencywillbeintheoppositedirectionsothat,formostMuslim

theologians,Trinitariandogmawillberegardedasovershadowingifnoteclipsingtheunity

ofGod.

2.BeyondTheology

Theargumentbeingproposedheremightbenefitfrominsightsderivedfromadifferent

approachtotheissue,symbolicandmetaphysicalratherthanratiocinativeandtheological.

Anappealhastobemadetospiritualintuition.Thereisanincidentwhichtookplaceinthe

lifeoftheProphetwhichcallsouttobedecipheredbypreciselythiskindofspiritual

30  

intuition.ItdemonstratesgraphicallythatChristiansbelieveinandworshipnothingbut

theonetrueGod.Italsoshowstheimportanceofaffirmingsolidaritywith‘fellow‐

believers’,andhowthisspiritualsolidaritymustultimatelyprevailoveralltheological

differencesbetweenthem.

Inthe9thyearaftertheHijra(631)45aChristiandelegationfromNajran(inYemen)came

toMedinatoengageintheologicaldiscussionandpoliticalnegotiation.Forourpurposes,

themostsignificantaspectofthiseventisthefactthatwhentheChristiansrequestedto

leavethecitytoperformtheirliturgy,theProphetinvitedthemtoaccomplishtheirritesin

hisownmosque.AccordingtothehistorianIbnIshāq,whogivesthestandardaccountof

thisremarkableevent,theChristiansinquestionwere‘Malikī’thatis,Melchite,meaning

thattheyfollowedtheByzantineChristianrites.Theseritesembodiedallthefundamental

dogmasoftheChurchCouncils,sowearespeakinghereaboutanenactmentofthevery

doctrines—Trinity,Sonship,Incarnation—thatarecriticisedintheQur’ān.Thoughwedo

notknowexactlywhatformofliturgywasenactedintheProphet’smosque,whatisknown

isthatChristianswerepermittedtoperformtheirprayersinthemostsacredspotinthe

Prophet’scity—anactwhichwouldbeunthinkableweretheseChristiansprayingto

somethingotherthanAllāh.

Clearly,inthis‘existential’commentaryontheQur’ānicdiscourserelatingtotheChristian

faith,itisthesupra‐theologicalormetaphysicalperspectiveofidentityorunitywhichtakes

priorityovertheologicaldivergence.Therealityofthisdivergenceisnotdeniedbythe

propheticact;46rather,theinvalidityofdrawingcertainconclusionsfromthisdivergenceis

revealed:onecannotusethedivergenceasgroundsforassertingthatChristiansbelievein

andworshipsomethingotherthanGod.TheactoftheProphetshows,onthecontrary,that

disagreementontheplaneofdogmacan—andshould—coexistwithspiritualaffirmation

                                                            45 There is some discrepancy in the sources about the precise date of this event. See A. Guillaume (Tr.) The Life of Muhammad—A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah (Oxford, 1968), pp.270‐277; see also Martin Lings, Muhammad: His Life Based on the Earliest Sources (Cambridge, 1984), pp.324‐325. 46 Indeed, the dispute over the nature of Jesus was cut short by a revelation to the Prophet instructing him to challenge the Christians to a mutual imprecation (mubāhala): the curse of God was to be invoked on ‘those who lie’; see Q 3:61. The challenge was in fact not taken up by the Christians. 

31  

onthesuperiorplaneofultimateReality,thatRealityofwhichdogmaisaninescapably

limited,conceptualexpression.Exotericortheologicaldistinctionremainsonitsownlevel,

andthisdistinctionisnecessaryforupholdingtheuniquenessandintegrityofeachpath:‘

...foreachofyou[communities]WehaveestablishedaLawandaPath(5:48;emphasis

added)’;whilemetaphysicalidentityisimpliedbyspiritualintention:thesummitisOne,

andthebelievermovestowardsthatonenesspreciselybyobeyingtherevealedLawand

traversingthespiritualPaththatleadstothatsummit:‘UntoyourLordisyourreturn,allof

you,andHewillinformyouaboutthosethingsconcerningwhichyediffered’(5:48,endof

theverse).

TheProphet’sactionthusreinforcestheprimarythrustoftheQur’ānicmessageregarding

theGodoftheChristians:itisthesameGodthatisworshipped,butthatdivinityis

conceiveddifferently—erroneously,aseachwouldsayabouttheother.Theonenessofthe

divineObjecttakesprecedence—infinitely,onemightadd—overanydiversitywroughtby

thehumansubjects;forthatwhichisspirituallyintendedbysincerefaithtakespriority

overtheverbalandconceptualformsassumedbytheintention:theseformsareaccidental,

whiletheobjectintendedisessential.Thisspiritualintentionmanifestsanintrinsic

‘tendency’towardstheTranscendent,andthisharmoniseswithan‘in‐tending’,ora

‘tendinginwards’,aspirituallyinteriorizingmovement,engagingthedeepestpointofthe

heartofthebelieverinthequestforGod.Whatissharedincommonisthefundamental

aspirationtoworshiptheoneandonlyGod—theobjective,transcendent,unique,and

ineffableReality;thatwhichisnotsharedincommonisthemannerinwhichthatRealityis

conceived,andthemodebywhichthatRealityisworshipped:wehavehereafusionatthe

leveloftheEssence,withoutanyconfusionatthelevelofforms.Thedogmasandritualsof

eachfaithremaindistinctandthusirreducible,whilethesummitofthepathdelineatedby

dogmaandritualisunderstoodtobeoneandthesame.Itmightbearguedthatthedegree

ofambiguityattachingtoChristianworship—worshippingGod‘throughJesus’—opens

suchworshipuptothechargeofpolytheism.Butonecanretortthatconceptualambiguity

intermsofreferenceistrumpedbyspiritualintentionalityinsincereworship;conversely,

thatwhichissincerelyintendedcannotbeinvalidatedbythatwhichisambiguously

defined.Giventhatdivinerealitycanneverbeexhaustivelydefined,themostonecanaim

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atinthisdomainislessinadequateconceptions,accompaniedbyaspiritofhumble

acknowledgementthatthedivinerealityforevereludeshumanattemptsatcomprehension.

‘ThatthereisaGodisclear;butwhatHeisbyessenceandnature,thisisaltogetherbeyond

ourcomprehensionandknowledge’,asStJohnofDamascusputit.47

Onecanandmustacceptthatthereisanirreducibletheologicalincompatibilitybetween

IslamicandChristianconceptionsofGod,butoneneednotgofurtherandclaimthatthis

incompatibilitypermitstheMuslimtheologiantosaythatChristiansworshipsomething

otherthanGod,thattheirworshipisaformofpolytheism.Thiswouldbejustifiedneither

bytheQur’ānicdiscoursepertainingtoChristianitytakenasawhole,norbytheProphet’s

sayings,again,takenasawhole,andparticularlyinrelationtohisallowanceofChristian

worshipinthemosqueofMedina.Suchanactonhispartwouldbeunthinkablewerethis

worshiptobequalifiableas‘polytheistic’inanysense.OnecanindeedimaginetheProphet

receivingArabpolytheistleadersintohismosque,foritistruethattheProphet’smosque

atthattimewasnotonlyaplaceofworship,italsoservedasakindofdīwānorcourt;but

onecannotimaginetheProphetinvitinganypolytheisttopraytohisgodsinthemosque.

Nonetheless,someMuslimtheologiansmightarguethattheProphetwasonlybeing

‘diplomatic’and‘courteous’inallowingtheChristianstoprayinhismosque,andthatone

mustnotdrawanytheologicalimplicationsfromthisact.Theargumenthoweverbackfires,

foriftheProphetwerewillingtogosofar,forthesakeofdiplomacyandcourtesy,asto

permit‘polytheistic’worshiptobeenactedinhismosque,howmuchmoreincumbentis

this‘diplomacy’and‘courtesy’uponhisfollowers,whomust,accordingtothelogicofthis

argument,refrainfromcharacterisingChristianworshipas‘polytheistic’,ifonlyoutofa

diplomacyandcourtesyinemulationofthepropheticexample?ForMuslimstoaccuse

Christiansofengaginginpolytheismis,therefore,notonlytogomuchfurtherthanthe

ProphetortheQur’āneverwent;italsoconstitutesanimplicitcriticismoftheProphetfor

compromisinganessentialtheologicalprinciple—distinguishingclearlybetweenTawhīd

andshirk—forthesakeofsomethingsoeminentlycontingentas‘diplomacy’or‘courtesy’.

                                                            47 On the Orthodox Faith, 1:4; cited by Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church, op.cit., p.217. 

33  

ThemetaphysicalprincipleexpressedbytheProphet’sactcanalsobediscernedinan

eschatologicaleventdescribedbytheProphet.Thefollowingsaying—whichexistsin

slightlydifferentvariants,inthemostcanonicalofhadīthcollections—concernsthe

possibilityofseeingGodintheHereafter.TheMuslimsareconfrontedbyatheophanyof

theirLord,whomtheydonotrecognize:‘IamyourLord’,Hesaystothem.‘Weseekrefuge

inGodfromyou,’theyreply,‘wedonotassociateanythingwithourLord’.ThenGodasks

them:‘Isthereanysign(āya)betweenyouandHimbymeansofwhichyoumight

recognizeHim?’Theyreplyintheaffirmative,andthen‘allisrevealed’,andtheyalltryto

prostratetoHim.Finally,asregardsthispartofthescene,‘HetransformsHimselfintothe

forminwhichtheysawHimthefirsttime,48andHesays:“IamyourLord”,andtheyreply:

“YouareourLord!”.’49

Ibnal‐‘Arabīandthe‘godcreatedinbelief’

Theconsequencesofthisremarkablesayingarefar‐reaching.Godcanappearinforms

quiteunrecognisableintermsofthebeliefsheldbyMuslims;andifthisbetrueontheDay

ofJudgmentitisequallysointhisworld.IntheSufitradition,Ibnal‐‘Arabīprovides

arguablythemostcompellingcommentaryonthecognitiveimplicationsofthisprinciple.

Insodoinghealsofurnishesuswithstronggroundsforansweringintheaffirmativethe

questionposedtousinthisconsultation.Theessenceofhiscommentaryisthatoneand

thesameRealitycantakeamultitudeofforms,henceItmustnotbeconfinedwithinthe

formsofone’sownbelief.Thedivinityconceivedbythemindisnot,andcannotbe,the

pureAbsolute,butis,rather,the‘godcreatedinbeliefs’(al‐ilāhal‐makhlūqfi’l‐i‘tiqādāt).

This‘created’god,however,farfrombeingasourceofmisguidanceforthecreatures,is

itselftheconsequenceofthemercifulradiationoftheGodwholovestobeknown,in

accordancewiththewell‐knownsaying,citedmorebytheSufisthanthetheologians:‘Iwas

ahiddentreasure,andIlovedtobeknown’.Ibnal‐‘Arabīcommentsonthisinmanyplaces,

                                                            48 The wording here is extremely important: wa‐qad tahawwala fī sūratihi allatī ra’ūhu fīhā awwal marra. 49 This version of the saying comes in the Sahīh Muslim (Cairo: Īsā al‐Bābī al‐Halabī, n.d), chapter entitled Ma‘rifa tarīq al‐ru’yā (‘knowledge of the way of vision’), vol. 1, p.94. 

34  

buthere,themostimportantaspectofthesayingconcernsthemercyinherentinthelove

tobeknown:‘AftertheMercyItself,“thegodcreatedinbelief”isthefirstrecipientof

Mercy.’50Godissaidtohave‘writtenmercy’uponHisownsoul,accordingtotheQur’ān

(6:12,and6:54).BeingHimselftheessenceofMercy,thefirst‘form’receivingthatmercyis

thequalityofmercyitself,thefountofradiantcreativity.Thereafter,the‘godcreatedin

belief’receivesmercifulexistentiation,andthisrefersnotjusttothediversemodesof

theophanicrevelationtohumankind,butalsotothecapacityofeachhumansoulto

conceiveofGod,thus,inasense,thepowerto‘create’Godinone’sbelief.‘SinceGodisthe

rootofeverydiversityinbeliefs...everyonewillendupwithmercy.ForitisHewho

createdthem[thediversebeliefs]...’51

Accordingtothisperspective,thevariousrevelations,alongwithdiversebeliefsfashioned

thereby,constitutesomanywaysbywhichGodinvitesHiscreaturestoparticipateinHis

infinitelymercifulnature.Recognitionofsuchrealitiesmeansthatitis‘improper’todeny

GodsuchasHeisconceivedinthebeliefsofothers:

Generallyspeaking,eachmannecessarilystickstoaparticularcreedconcerninghis

Lord.HealwaysgoesbacktohisLordthroughhisparticularcreedandseeksGod

therein.SuchamanpositivelyrecognizesGodonlywhenHemanifestsHimselfto

himintheformrecognizedbyhiscreed.ButwhenHemanifestsHimselfinother

formshedeniesHimandseeksrefugefromHim.Insodoinghebehavesinan

improperwaytowardsHiminfact,evenwhilebelievingthatheisactingpolitely

towardsHim.Thusabelieverwhostickstohisparticularcreedbelievesonlyina

godthathehassubjectivelypositedinhisownmind.Godinallparticularcreedsis

dependentuponthesubjectiveactofpositingonthepartofthebelievers.52

                                                            50 Fusūs al‐hikam, translated as Bezels of Wisdom, by R. Austin (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), pp. 224‐225. See our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn al‐Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), the chapter on Ibn al‐‘Arabī (pp.69‐129) for a discussion of this theme of universality in the context of his metaphysical teachings. 51 Cited by William C. Chittick, The Sufi Path of Knowledge—Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s Metaphysics of  Imagination 

(Albany, NY: SUNY, 1989), p.388. 

52 Cited by Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.254 (translation modified). 

35  

Inotherwords,GodmercifullyandlovinglyrevealsHimselftoHiscreationintheophanies

whichcannotbutconformthemselvestothesubjectivelimitationsofthecreature;but

thereisadynamicinteractionbetweenthehumansubjectandthedivineObject,between

theaccidentalcontainerandthesubstantialcontent:thehumanisdrawnintothedivine,to

theextentthattheconceptuallycircumscribedformofbeliefgiveswaytothespiritual

realizationofthecontentofbelief.Ifthisspiritualmovementortendencyfromtheformto

theessence,fromthesubjecttotheobject,fromthecontainertothecontent,doesnottake

place,thenoneenvisagestheopposite:thehumansubjectivisationofthedivine,the

relativisationoftheAbsolute,theindividualbecomingblindedbythecontingentformof

hisbelieffromitsessentialcontent.

Asmentionedabove,thedifferentbeliefsareapriorideterminedbythe‘heart’,butthe

capacityoftheheartitselfisinturnfashionedbyaninitialcosmogoniceffusionofgrace

fromthemercifulLord.Sohumansubjectivityisitselftheresultofdivinecreativity,and

cannotthereforeintrinsicallyrelativisetheAbsolute,evenwhileappearingtodoso.God

notonlycreatesman,butinasenseallowsmantocreateHim,whichhedoesbyconceiving

ofHimandbelievinginHimandworshippingHimaccordingtothemodesdeterminedby

theformassumedbyhisbelief.God,however,istrulypresentandactivewithinthat

belief—oratleastonedimensionofdivinityis.ForIbnal‐‘Arabīdistinguishesbetweenthe

absoluteEssenceofGod—sometimesreferredtoasal‐Ahad,theall‐exclusiveOne—andthe

Lord(al‐Rabb),alsocalledthe‘divinity’(al‐ulūhiyya),orsimplythe‘level’(al‐martaba),or

al‐Wāhid,theall‐inclusiveOne.Thesetwodimensionsoftheoneandonlydivinityhelpus

toseethatthedistinctivenessofthedivinequalitiesisconceivableonlyatthefirstdegree

ofSelf‐manifestation.Itisonlyatthisleveloftheophanythattheperfectionshiddenwithin

thesupra‐manifest‘treasure’ofthedivineOnenessaredistinctivelyaffirmedasaplurality;

itisonlyatthislevelthatthereisaforeshadowingofthemanifestationoftheinfinite

perfectionsoftheall‐exclusiveOne,thisanticipationofmultiplicitynotdetractingoneiota

fromitsoneness.Forthepluralityofitsperfectionsisstilllocatedattheprincipial,supra‐

manifestlevel,thatofaonenesswhichis‘all‐inclusive’,al‐wāhidiyya.Thedistinction

betweenthesetwodimensionsofoneness,al‐wāhidiyyaandal‐ahadiyya(ortheonenessof

themany,ahadiyyatal‐kathra,andtheonenessoftheone,ahadiyyatal‐ahad)iscrucialin

36  

themetaphysicsofIbnal‐‘Arabī;andwhatmustbestressedaboutthisdistinctionisthatit

pertainstothedivinenatureandnothingelse;itreferstotwodimensionsofoneness

withintheabsolutelyindivisibledivinenature,onedimensionpertainingtotheAbsoluteas

such,andtheothertotheAbsolutewithits‘face’turnedtowardscreation.Asweshallsee

below,thisdistinctioncanhelpustodemonstratethecompatibilitybetweentheTrinity,

metaphysicallyorsupra‐theologicallyconceived,andtheprincipleofTawhīd.

Wecanonlyknow,andrelateto,thenamesandqualitiesoftheLord,orthe‘divinity’,orthe

‘level’;buttherecanbenodirect,unmediatedrelationshipbetweenusandtheEssence.

ThisisbecausetheEssencehasnothingtodowithcreation;theonlypossiblekindof

relationshipbetweenthedivineRealityandcreationismediatedbyanintermediary

principle,whichistheLord,the‘divinity’orthe‘level’:aprincipleatoncedivineand

relative.Itisthisdegreeofrelativitywithindivinitywhichcanbeconceived,andthus

believedinandworshipped.ThisisthefirstdegreeoftheophanicSelf‐determination

propertotheEssencewhichremains,nonetheless,forevertranscendentinrelationtoall

thatflowsforthfromthisSelf‐determination,andafortiori,allthattakesplacewithin

creation:‘ItisnotcorrectfortheRealandcreationtocometogetherinanymode

whatsoeverinrespectoftheEssence’;theRealandcreationcanonlybebroughtinto

relationship‘inrespectofthefactthattheEssenceisdescribedbydivinity.’53

TheEssencebecoming‘described’bydivinitymeansthatItistranscribedwithinrelativity

by this theophany,without in anyway sacrificing its immutable transcendence. It is this

divinityorLordthat,alone,canbeconceivedandworshipped.Ibnal‐‘Arabīexpressesthis

principle in various ways, amongst which themost striking is the following exegesis of

18:119: ‘Let him not associate (any) one with his Lord’s worship’. The immediately

apparentmeaningoftheverserelatestotheprohibitionofshirk,orassociatingfalsegods

withthetruedivinityorwiththeworshipofthatdivinity,butIbnal‐‘Arabīmakesthe‘one’

inquestionrefertotheEssence,andinterpretstheversethus:

HeisnotworshippedinrespectofHisUnity,sinceUnitycontradictstheexistenceof

theworshipper. It is as ifHe is saying, ‘What isworshipped is only the “Lord” in                                                            53 Ibid, p.59. 

37  

respect of His Lordship, since the Lord brought you into existence. So connect

yourself to Him andmake yourself lowly before Him, and do not associate Unity

withLordshipinworship...ForUnitydoesnotknowyouandwillnotacceptyou...54

Thedegreeofdivinitythatcanbeconceivedof,believedin,andworshippedcannotbethe

pureuntrammelledunityoftheEssence.Thereisnoroom,inthismetaphysicalunity,for

themultiplicitypresupposedbycreation.TospeakoftheCreatoristospeakofthe

creature,tospeakoftheLordistospeakofthevassal:buttheOnehasno‘other’towhichit

relates,ifitdid,itwouldceasetobetheAbsolute,itwouldberelativizedbyitsrelationship

totherelative.Wemustnot,therefore,‘associate’UnitywithLordship:intermsofUnity,

thecreatureisapurenon‐entity,itisonlyinrelationtotheLordthatthecreaturehasany

existence,andtheraisond’êtreofthecreatureistoworshiptheLordwhomitcanconceive.

TheOne,however,foreverevadestheconceptualisationwhichisthebasisforforming

belief.Wecanconceivethatitis,butnotwhatitis.ItisforthisreasonthattheProphet

asserted,invarioussayings:meditateonthequalitiesofGod,butnotonHisEssence.55

AsweshallseewithbothStDionysiusandEckhart,thisapophaticapproachtothesupreme

Realityopensupapathwhichtranscendsalldivergencesasregardstheological

descriptionsofGod.TocontinuewiththisbriefexpositionofIbnal‐‘Arabī’sperspective,let

usnotethatdespitethetranscendenceoftheOneaboveallbeliefsconcerningit,Godis

nonetheless‘witheveryobjectofbelief.’Thisstatementevokesthedivineutterance:‘Iam

withtheopinionMyslavehasofMe.’56Theword‘with’translates‘inda,whichmightalso

betranslatedas‘presentwithin/as/to’57:Godthusdeclaresthat,inasense,Heconformsto

                                                            54 Ibid, p.244 55 Al‐Rāghib al‐Isfahānī, a major lexicographer of the Qur’ān, writes in his explanation of the Qur’ānic concept of fikr, ‘meditative thought’: ‘Meditation is only possible in regard to that which can assume a conceptual form (sūra) in one’s heart. Thus we have the following saying [of the Prophet]: Meditate upon the bounties of God but not on God [Himself, His Essence] for God is above and beyond all possibility of being described in terms of any form (sūra).’ Mu‘jam mufradāt alfāz al‐Qur’ān (Beirut: Dār al‐Fikr, n.d.),  p.398. 56 This is a strongly authenticated hadīth qudsī, or divine utterance, transmitted by the Prophet. It is found in Bukhārī, al‐Tirmidhī and Ibn Mājah. See Forty Hadith Qudsi, selected and translated by E. Ibrahim and D. Johnson‐Davies (Beirut: Dar al‐Koran al‐Kareem, 1980), p.78. 57 The translators of the above‐mentioned work render the saying as follows: ‘I am as My servant thinks I am.’ 

38  

whateverformofbeliefHisslavehasofhim.Ibnal‐‘Arabīcontinues:‘His[i.e.God’s]

existenceintheconception(tasawwur)ofhimwhoconceivesHimdoesnotdisappear

whenthatperson’sconceptionchangesintoanotherconception.No,Hehasanexistencein

thissecondconception.Inthesameway,ontheDayofResurrection,hewilltransmute

Himselfinself‐disclosurefromformtoform...’58

Ibnal‐‘Arabīisherereferringbacktotheprincipleofthedivinecapacitytoundergo

tahawwul,accordingtothepropheticsayingcitedearlier.WhatistrueofGodontheDayof

Resurrectionistruehereandnow.Whetheritbeacaseofdifferentindividuals,different

schoolsofthoughtwithinIslam,ordifferentreligions:Godistrulypresentwithinallthese

diverseconceptionsandbeliefsconcerningHim,withoutthisresultinginanyfundamental

contradiction,giventheunlimitedformsbywhichGodcanrevealHimself.Whatweare

givenhereisapictureofradicalrelativism,butonewhich,paradoxically,‘proves’theone

andonlyAbsolute.FortheAbsoluteisthatwhichtranscendsallpossiblepowersof

conception,andyetimmanentlyandmercifullypervadesallthoseconceptionsofHim

whichstemfromauthenticdivinetheophanies.Oneofthemostusefulimagesemployedby

Ibnal‐‘Arabītoreconcilethetwotermsofthisparadoxisthis:watertakesonthecolourof

thecup.Thecupsymbolisestheformofbelief,whilethewatercontainedthereinstandsfor

theObjectofbelief.

Hewhoseesthewateronlyinthecupjudgesitbythepropertyofthecup.Buthe

whoseesitsimpleandnoncompoundknowsthattheshapesandcolorsinwhichit

becomes manifest are the effect of the containers. Water remains in its own

definitionandreality,whetherinthecuporoutsideit.Henceitneverlosesthename

‘water’.59

Inthisimage,thecupsymbolizestheformofthe‘preparedness’or‘receptivity’(isti‘dād)of

aparticularbelief;thewaterinthecupsymbolisesthetheophanywhichhasadapteditself

to the form and shape of the belief. The substance and colour of water as such is

undifferentiated and unique, but it appears to undergo changes of form and colour on

accountof theaccidental formsof the receptacles inwhich it ispoured.This recognition

                                                            58 Sufi Path, p.337. 59 Ibid., pp.341‐342.  

39  

enables one to realize that the ‘water’ (or theophanies) in ‘cups’ (or beliefs) other than

one’sownisjustasmuch‘water’asisthewaterinone’sowncup.Onecanthusaffirmthe

veracityofallbeliefsorrather:allthosebeliefswhose‘cups’containthewaterofauthentic

Revelation, even if these beliefs are also forged by the unavoidable relativity of the

creaturelyfacultyofconception.

Thisprincipleisexplicitlyreaffirmedinthefollowingimportantpassage:

Hewho counsels his own soul should investigate during his life in thisworld, all

doctrines concerning God. He should learn from whence each possessor of a

doctrineaffirmsthevalidityofhisdoctrine.Onceitsvalidityhasbeenaffirmedfor

himinthespecificmodeinwhichitiscorrectforhimwhoupholdsit,thenheshould

supportitinthecaseofhimwhobelievesinit.Heshouldnotdenyitorrejectit,for

hewillgatheritsfruitontheDayofVisitation....Soturnyourattentiontowhatwe

havementionedandputitintopractice!ThenyouwillgivetheDivinityitsdue... .

ForGodisexaltedhighaboveenteringunderdelimitation.Hecannotbetieddown

by one form rather than another. From here you will come to know the all‐

inclusivenessoffelicityforGod’screaturesandtheall‐embracingnessofthemercy

whichcoverseverything.60

Inanswertothequestion,howdoesoneascertainthe‘validity’ofadoctrineorbelief,Ibn

al‐‘Arabīwouldanswerintermsofrevelation:thosedoctrineswhichclearlyderivefromor

are rooted in a revelation of God are to be accepted. This answer emerges from the

following sentence, dealing with the legitimacy of prostration to something ‘other than

God’—as did the angels to Adam, or the family of Joseph to Joseph: ‘Hewho prostrates

himself tootherthanGodseekingnearnesstoGodandobeyingGodwillbefelicitousand

attaindeliverance,buthewhoprostrateshimselftootherthanGodwithoutGod’scommand

seekingnearnesswillbewretched’(emphasisadded).61

Doctrinesandbeliefswhichareman‐madeare thusclearlyrejected—weare far froman

‘anything goes’ attitudewhich accepts all doctrines as true in an indiscriminatemanner.                                                            60 Ibid., pp.355‐356. 61 Ibid., p.365. 

40  

Rather,we are being urged by Ibn al‐‘Arabī to be open to all receptacleswhich contain

beliefs rooted in divine revelation, and to judge them according to their content, rather

than be misled into judging the content according to the accidental properties of the

container.Whatis‘accidental’hereincludeseventhedogmasofthedifferentfaiths,noneof

whichcanclaimtoexhaustthemysteryofthatSubstancetowhichtheyallude.

Toaffirmonlythe‘God’createdwithinone’sbeliefisthustantamounttodenyingHiminall

otherbeliefs:‘HewhodelimitsHimdeniesHiminotherthanhisowndelimitation....But

he who frees Him from every delimitation never denies Him. On the contrary, he

acknowledges Him in every form within which He undergoes self‐transmutation.’62 The

consequencesof thisdenialwill be adiminution inone’s receptivity to the lovingmercy

containedwithinthebeliefsofothers.However,attachingoneselfonlytothe‘water’within

one’s own cup still results in mercy, given that the theophanic form is still a true

theophany,itisGodandnothingbutGod,eveniftheformassumedbyGodbeextrinsically

limitedby the formof one’s belief: there is an absoluteness of content, combinedwith a

relativityofthecontainer,butthatabsolutenessisnotrelativizedbythecontainer.Rather,

whatisexcludedbythecontaineristheinfiniteformsoftheophanyfillingthecontainersof

otherbeliefs. Inotherwords, it isnotthecasethatGodisrelativizedbythespecificityof

one’sbelief,bythelimitedcontainer;rather,therelativityofthehumanbeliefisdisplaced

bytheabsolutenessofitsowncontent,inthemeasurethatthiscontentisrealizedthrough

spiritualassimilation,andnotjustconceivedbyrationalthought.Forthenoneperceives—

ordrinks—waterassuch,thesubstanceofwhichisidenticaltothatcontainedinallother

containers. So the very absoluteness of the content of one’s realized belief leads to an

assimilationoftheinfinitudepropertothatabsoluteness.‘Drinking’thewaterwithinone’s

own cupmeans drinkingwater as such, and thus, in principle, one has drunk the same

substance as thatwhich is contained in all the other cups.Aswe said at the outset, one

believesinGodassuchandnotsuchandsuchagod.

                                                            62 Ibid., pp.339‐340. See our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006), for further discussion of these themes in the context of the quest for transcendent realization, according to these three mystics. 

41  

Evenifthistotalrealizationisnotattained,thebelieverwillnonethelessbenefitfromhis

capacitytorecognizeGodinbeliefsotherthanhisown,forhehasaglimpseofthefelicity

whichflowsfromtheunrestrictedbeatificvisionofGodinallHisforms.Thebeatificvision

experiencedbythebeliever intheHereafterwillconformtothenatureofhisconception

andattitudetowardsGodinthehere‐below.ThisisclearlyassertedbyIbnal‐‘Arabīinthe

courseofdescribingthe‘share’accordedtothehighestsaint:heenjoysthefelicitywhichis

the fruit of all forms of belief held by the faithful of the different religions, because he

recognizes their correspondence to real aspects of the divine nature.63 This direct and

plenaryparticipationinthefelicitythatiscontainedwithintheformsofbeliefsconcerning

Godisthusseentobearealityalreadyinthis life—aprefigurationofthehighercelestial

states.

Thus,Ibnal‐‘Arabīurgesthebelievertomakehimselfreceptivetoallformsofreligious

beliefbothforthesakeofobjectiveveracity—thatis,‘thetrueknowledgeofthereality’

thatGodisimmanentwithinallformsofHisSelf‐revelation—andintheinterestsofone’s

posthumousstate—the‘greatbenefit’thataccruestothesoulintheHereafterin

proportiontotheuniversalityoftheknowledgeofGodwhichithasattainedonearth.The

visionthatresultsfromthisopennesstothediversityoftheophanieswithintheformsof

differentbeliefsisbeautifullyexpressedinthemostfamouslinesfromIbnal‐‘Arabī’spoetic

masterpiece,Tarjumānal‐ashwāq:

Myhearthasbecomecapableofeveryform:

itisapastureforgazellesandaconventforChristianmonks,

Andatempleforidolsandthepilgrim’sKa‘ba,

andthetablesoftheTorahandthebookoftheKoran.

IfollowthereligionofLove:whateverwayLove’scamelstake,

thatismyreligionandmyfaith.64

                                                            63 See M. Chodkiewicz, Le Sceau des Saints (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), p.73. 64 The Tarjuman Al‐Ashwaq, R.A. Nicholson, (trans.) (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1978), p.52. 

42  

ItisclearthatintheselinesIbnal‐‘Arabīisnotaffirmingthattheformsmentionedareall

equallylegitimatereligiousforms;onlythattheyareall,quaforms,equallymanifestations

ofthedivinereality.Heismakinganontologicalandnotspecificallyreligiousaffirmation.

EverythingmanifestedinbeingisamanifestationofGod,sinceGodisbeing;onthisbasis,

heinterpretstheverse:‘ThyLordhasdecreedthatyoushallnotworshipanybutHim(17:

23)asadescriptivestatementratherthanasanormativeinjunction,forGodis‘identical

witheverythingtowardwhichthereispovertyandwhichisworshipped’.65Everythingthat

isworshippedisthereforedivine,butasregardsthespecificallyreligiouscriterionfor

authenticworship,this,asseenabove,isderivedupontheprincipleofGod’sscriptural

revelations,whichareconcreteandspecific,notonthedivineself‐disclosureswithinthe

domainofmanifestation,whichareuniversalandinescapable.

Finally,letuslookattheremarkableinterpretationgivenbyIbnal‐‘Arabītoonehisown

linesofpoetryinthiswork.Thisgivesusonepossiblewayofunderstandingthemeaning

oftheChristianTrinityfromamysticalMuslimperspective.Thelineinthepoemisas

follows:

‘MyBelovedisthreealthoughHeisOne,evenasthePersonsaremadeonePersonin

essence.’Theinterpretationgivenbythepoethimself:‘Numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicity

intheDivineSubstance,astheChristiansdeclarethattheThreePersonsoftheTrinityare

OneGod,andastheQur’āndeclares:“CalluponGodorcallontheMerciful;howeverye

invokeHim,itiswell,fortoHimbelongthemostbeautifulNames”(17:110).’66

ThemostbeautifulNamesofGod,al‐asmā’al‐husnā,canbeseenasthearchetypesofall

possiblemodesoftheophany,andthereby,ofthediverse—evencontradictory—beliefsof

Godfashionedbythosetheophanicmodesofself‐revelation.Thenamesarediverse,

referringtothedifferentaspectsoftheNamed;beliefsfashionedbytherevelationofthose

namesarethuslikewiseinescapablydiverse,butallthebeliefsarenonethelessatonein

thesupremeObjectoffaith.Ibnal‐‘ArabīunreservedlyidentifiesthethreePersonsofthe

                                                            65 Cited by W.Chittick,  ‘Towards Sainthood: States and Stations’, in M. Chodkiewicz (ed.), Les Illuminations de La Mecque (Paris: Sindbad, 1988), p.319. 66 Ibid., p.70. 

43  

Trinityasthreeaspectsor‘names’oftheoneEssence,thusresolvingmultiplicitywithin

unityinamannerwhichisanalogoustothatbymeansofwhichtheninety‐nine‘names’

refertobutoneEssenceinIslam.For‘numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicityinthedivine

Substance’.Asweshallseebelow,thisisamirror‐imageofwhatEckhartsaysaboutthe

Trinity,aboutnumberwithinthedivinity,andabout‘ahundred’Personswithintheone

God.BothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabīsituatepluralitywithinthedivinenatureonaplane

whichisbelowthatoftheEssence,aplanewhichpertainstotherelationshipbetweenthe

Essenceandthedomainofmanifestation.Tospeakof‘relationship’isthusineluctablyto

speakofrelativity,anditisonthisplaneofrelativity—stillwithinthedivinenatureitself,

butrelativitynonetheless—thatonecanascribepluralitytoGod.TheEssence,however,

transcendsthisrelativityandis‘one’notinanynumericalsenseofunitywhichcanbe

distinguished,onthesameplaneofnumber,fromplurality;forthenwewouldstillbeon

theplaneofrelativity,assertingone‘unit’orthingasopposedtoothersimilarlylocated

unitsorthings.Rather,theEssenceisoneinaproperlymetaphysicalsense,asensewhich

goesbeyondphysisornature,understandingbynatureallthatwhichpertainstothe

createdorder,andnumberevidentlypertainstothisorder.NumberasappliedtoGodmust

thenbeappliedinaconsciouslymetaphysicalmanner:ifoneistospeakofGodintermsof

thecontingentcategoryofnumber,thenoneshouldassertthatGodisindeed‘one’,for,on

theplaneofnumber,‘one’isthemostadequatesymbolbywhichtheAbsolutecanbe

described.67

SpiritualreceptivitytotherealizationoftheEssenceisdeepenedbythecapacityto

conceiveoftheinescapablylimitednatureofallconceptions:theintrinsicallyinconceivable

natureofultimateRealitycanberealized,toonedegreeoranother,inspiritualvision,that

visionwhicharisesinproportiontotheeffacementoftheindividual(fanā’).Thisshiftfrom

conceptuallimitationtospiritualvisioniswellexpressedbyIbnal‐‘Arabīinrelationto

                                                            67 As Frithjof Schuon writes, in his irrefutable critique—and also inspiring interpretation—of the dogma of the Trinity: ‘Only Unity as such can be a definition of the Absolute; in the realm of number, unity alone represents an element of absoluteness, as does the point or the centre in space, and the instant or the present in time...’. This is from the essay entitled ‘Evidence and Mystery’ in his Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.91. For another compelling interpretation of the Trinity, see Schuon’s Understanding Islam (Bloomingon, IN: World Wisdom, 1994), p.53. 

44  

Moses’squesttoseeGod.Ibnal‐‘ArabīrecordsthefollowingdialoguehehadwithMosesin

thecourseofhisspiritualascentthroughtheheavens:

[Isaidtohim]...yourequestedthevision[ofGod],whiletheMessengerofGod

[Muhammad]saidthat‘notoneofyouwillseehisLorduntilhedies’?

Sohesaid:‘Anditwasjustlikethat:whenIaskedHimforthevision,Heanswered

me,sothat“Ifelldownstunned”(Q7,143).ThenIsawHiminmy[stateof]being

stunned.’Isaid:‘While(youwere)dead?’Hereplied:‘While(Iwas)dead....Idid

notseeGoduntilIhaddied’.68

Thisistheconsummationoftheapophaticpath:‘extinctionwithincontemplation’(al‐fanā’

fi’l‐mushāhada),thisbeingpreciselythetitleofoneofIbnal‐‘Arabī’smostexplicittreatises

onthethemeoffanā’.69Asweshallseeinamoment,thesimilaritiesbetweenthis

perspectiveandthoseofbothStDionysiusandMeisterEckhartarestriking.

Christianapophaticismandsuperessentialidentity

TheperspectiveofIbnal‐‘Arabī,wewouldargue,ismirroredintheapophatictraditionof

mysticaltheologywithinChristianity.Itisinthistraditionthatalldogmaticformulationsof

theultimateRealityareseenasfallingshortofadequatelyexplainingordescribingIt.As

withIbnal‐‘Arabī’s‘godcreatedinbeliefs’,mysticsofthistraditioninsistontheneedto

transcendallconceptualexpressions,andtheverysourceofthoseconcepts,theminditself,

inordertoglimpsewiththeeyeoftheheart,andfinallytorealizeinthedepthsofone’s

spirit,theineffablemysteryofGod.Wewouldarguethatitisthroughunderstandingthis

processofradicaldeconstructionattheconceptuallevel,graspedasthepreludetoan

‘unthinkable’spiritual‘reconstruction’atthetranscendentlevel,thattheonenessofthe

GodbelievedinbyChristiansandMuslimsstandsoutmostclearly.Forifthemindandall

                                                            68 Cited by James W. Morris, ‘The Spiritual Ascension: Ibn ‘Arabī and the Mi‘rāj,’ Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol.108, 1988, p.375. 69 See Michel Valsan’s translation, Le Livre de l’Extinction dans la Contemplation (Paris: Les Éditions de 

l’Oeuvre, Paris, 1984). 

45  

thatitcanconceiveistranscendedbythespiritualrealizationofThatwhichis

inconceivable,thenafortiorialldesignationsoftheIneffablearelikewisetranscended,

eventhosedesignationswhichformthecoreoftheTrinitariandogma.

LetusnotefirstofalltheimportanceofthefollowingpointmadebyVladimirLosskyabout

thistraditionof‘thought’ingeneral:itisoneinwhichthoughtitselfissubordinatedto

‘being’,toanexistentialtransformationofthesoul:

Apophaticismisnotnecessarilyatheologyofecstasy.Itis,aboveall,anattitudeof

mindwhichrefusestoformconceptsaboutGod.Suchanattitudeutterlyexcludesall

abstractandpurelyintellectualtheologywhichwouldadaptthemysteriesofthe

wisdomofGodtohumanwaysofthoughts.Itisanexistentialattitudewhich

involvesthewholeman:thereisnotheologyapartfromexperience;itisnecessary

tochange,tobecomeanewman.ToknowGodonemustdrawneartoHim.Noone

whodoesnotfollowthepathofunionwithGodcanbeatheologian.Thewayofthe

knowledgeofGodisnecessarilythewayofdeification.…Apophaticismis,therefore,

acriterion:thesuresignofanattitudeofmindconformedtotruth.Inthissenseall

truetheologyisfundamentallyapophatic.70

Furtheroninthisseminaltext,Losskyreferstotheultimatefunctionofthedogmaofthe

Trinity:‘ThedogmaoftheTrinityisacrossforhumanwaysofthought.’71Weunderstand

thistomeanthatthedogmaoftheTrinityisnotintendedtofunctionasan‘explanation’or

‘description’ofGod;rather,itisameansofthinkingtheunthinkableinordertoeffaceall

thoughtwithinthemysterythatisintrinsicallyincommunicable.Thisprincipleisbrought

homeclearlybyStDionysiusinhisprayertotheDeity‘aboveallessence,knowledgeand

goodness’attheverybeginningofhistreatiseTheMysticalTheology:‘...directourpathto

theultimatesummitofThymysticalLore,mostincomprehensible,mostluminousand

mostexalted,wherethepure,absoluteandimmutablemysteriesoftheologyareveiledin

                                                            70 Vladimir Lossky, Mystical Theology, op.cit., p.39. 71 Ibid, p.66. 

46  

thedazzlingobscurityofthesecretSilence,outshiningallbrilliancewiththeintensityof

theirDarkness...’72

Thepurposeofdefiningtheultimaterealityintermsofdarkness,andasthatwhichiseven

‘beyondbeing’,isnotsimplytoshroudthatrealityinutter,impenetrableobscurity,but

rathertoprecipitatereceptivitytothatrealitybyshowingtheinabilityofthehumanmind

inandofitselftoattaincomprehensionof,orunionwith,thatreality.Itisthecontrast

betweenultimatereality—asutterDarkness—andmentalabstraction—apparentlight—

thatisinquestion.Hecontinues,addressinghisdisciple:

Dothou,dearTimothy,inthediligentexerciseofmysticalcontemplation,leave

behindthesensesandtheoperationsoftheintellect,andallthingssensibleand

intellectual,andallthingsintheworldofbeingandnon‐being,thatthoumayest

arisebyunknowingtowardstheunion,asfarasisattainable,withHimwho

transcendsallbeingandallknowledge.Forbytheunceasingandabsolute

renunciationofthyselfandofallthings,thoumayestbeborneonhigh,throughpure

andentireself‐abnegation,intothesuperessentialRadianceoftheDivineDarkness.

Hethenreferstothe‘transcendentalFirstCause’,andcriticizesthosewhoidentifyGod

with‘theimageswhichtheyfashionaftervariousdesigns’.ThisresonatesdeeplywithIbn

al‐‘Arabī’simageofthecupandthewater.Thesimilaritybetweenthetwoperspectivesis

deepenedwhenwereadthatthistranscendentReality‘revealsHimselfinHisnakedTruth

tothosealonewhopassbeyondallthatispureandimpure,andascendabovethesummit

ofholythings,andwho,leavingbehindthemalldivinelightandsoundandheavenly

utterances,plungeintotheDarknesswheretrulydwells,astheScripturesdeclare,thatOne

Whoisbeyondall.’73

                                                            72 Dionysius the Areopagite, Mystical Theology and the Celestial Hierarchies (Fintry: The Shrine of Wisdom Press, 1965), p.19. 73 Ibid, p.21 

47  

ThisOneisevidentlybeyondanyconceivablenotionofthreeness—butitisalso,aswe

shallsee,equallybeyondanyconceivablenotionofoneness.First,letusnotethat,likeIbn

al‐‘Arabī,DionysiususesMoses’squestforthevisionofGodtobringhomethepointthat

Godcannotbeseen,butHecanberealized.Godcannotbeseenbecause‘thedivinestand

highestthingsseenbytheeyesorcontemplatedbythemindarebutthesymbolical

expressionsofthosethatareimmediatelybeneathHimWhoisaboveall.’Itisonlythrough

beingplungedintotheDarkness,andafter‘allhisreasoningpowers’havebeensilenced,

thatthesoulcanbe‘unitedbyhishighestfacultytoHimwhoiswhollyunknowable;thus

byknowingnothing,heknowsThatwhichisbeyondhisknowledge.’74

WeareremindedhereofwhatIbnal‐‘ArabīsaidinrelationtotheLord/divinity/level:itis

thataspectofRealitywhich,incontrasttotheEssence,canbeconceived;itisthatdegreeof

being,beneaththeEssence,towhichbeliefandworshiparedirectedandproportioned.

LikewiseforStDionysius,vision,conceptionandcontemplationpertainonlytothe

penultimateontologicaldegree,nottoultimateReality:‘thedivinestandhighestthings

seenbytheeyesorcontemplatedbythemindarebutthesymbolicalexpressionsofthose

thatareimmediatelybeneathHimWhoisaboveall.’Alldoctrinesanddogmas,eventhose

reachinguptothe‘divinestandhighest’cannotevenberegardedassymbolsofultimate

Realityitself,theycanonlysymbolizewhatis‘immediatelybeneathHim.’Thefunctionof

thesymbols,then,istoinducereceptivitytoThatwhichcannotevenbeadequately

symbolizedletaloneexplainedordescribedbyconcepts.Wewouldpropose,onthebasis

ofthisapophaticunderstandingofsymbols,thattheTrinityconstitutesjustsuchasymbol

ofpenultimateReality;itcannotbeappliedtotheultimateReality,forthislattercannotin

anywaybesymbolized.

Ifallvisibleandintelligibleformsarealike‘symbolicalexpressions’ofthepenultimate

Reality,theymustthereforebe‘seenthrough’,justasonemustseethroughthe‘cup’of

one’sbelieftothewaterit‘contains’.Thiscapacitytoappreciatethesymbolicnatureof

one’sbeliefs,andindeedofone’sentireconceptualapparatus,isthepre‐requisitefor

                                                            74 Ibid, pp.21‐22. 

48  

takingtheplungeintothatOnenesswhichisinconceivable,beingbeyondeventhenotion

ofoneness.Inthislight,theessentialnatureofthedivinityaffirmedbyChristiansand

MuslimscanbeintuitedasoneandthesameReality,thatRealitywhichcanonly

extrinsicallybeconceivedoforsymbolized.Themostfaithfulorleastinadequatemeansof

alludingtothisReality,however,isnotthroughaffirmation,butthroughradicaldenial.The

TranscendentOneisdescribedasnotbeing‘oneoroneness…norsonshipnor

fatherhood’.75

BoththeChristiandogmaoftheTrinityandtheMuslimdoctrineofTawhīdareherebeing

challenged—asconcepts.TheultimateRealitycannotbedescribedintermsofnumber,nor

afortiori,intermsofanydualisticrelationshipsuchasisimpliedby‘fatherhood’and

‘sonship’.Boththeideaofonenessandthatoftrinityarealiketobegraspedassymbolicof

thethresholdofReality,andarenottobetakenliterallyasdefinitionsofthatthreshold,or,

stillless,asdefinitionsoftheEssenceofthatReality.ThefirsttestimonyofIslam,lāilāha

illa’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’canbemetaphysicallyunderstoodtorefertotheapophatic

principlebeingdescribedhere:noconceivabledivinity,onlytheinconceivableAbsolute.

OnecanconceivethattheAbsoluteis,butonecannotconceiveexactlywhatitis.Itcanbe

intuitedasabsoluteReality,thesourceofallbeingandexistents,orasabsoluteGoodness,

thesourceofallfelicityandlove,orasabsoluteConsciousness,sourceofallwisdomand

knowledge,butwhattheabsolutenessofthesequalitiesreallymeanscannotbeputinto

words.76ThereisthereforesomethingcommunicableaboutthenatureoftheAbsolute,as

                                                            75 Ibid, p.29. 76 We have elaborated upon this theme in our Paths to Transcendence—According to Shankara, Ibn 

‘Arabi and Meister Eckhart (Bloomington: World Wisdom, 2006). The three mystics studied in that work 

are at one in affirming that while the Absolute is indeed ineffable and incommunicable in its essence, it 

reveals something of its nature in the ultimate spiritual realization, and that ‘something’ is described by 

each of these mystics in strikingly similar terms. In this, we believe, there lies an answer to the questions 

posed in Denys Turner’s excellent paper in this volume, ‘The “same” God: Is there an “Apophatic” 

solution, or, Who’s to Know?’ The crux of his position is summed up in this sentence: ‘For the absolute 

unknowableness of  “ultimate reality” eliminates all content on which any criteria of sameness and 

difference can get a grip.’ On this basis, Turner argues that there is no ‘apophatic solution’ to the 

question of whether or not Muslims and Christians worship the same God. We would argue, however, 

that for the mystics we studied the impossibility of acquiring full cognitive knowledge of ultimate Reality 

49  

wellassomethingincommunicable;itisineffableinitsessenceandyetrevealssomething

ofthatessencetotheprophets,saints,sagesandmystics.Itmightbespirituallyglimpsed

bythe‘eyeoftheheart’ofthespiritualseeker,an‘eye’whoseopeningispredicatedupon

somedegreeofself‐effacement,initially,and‘extinction’,ultimately.Inthewakeofthis

vision,however,itisstillimpossibletoadequatelydescribeinwordstheRealityglimpsed.

Asal‐Ghazaliputit:‘Hewhohasattainedthemysticstateneeddonomorethansay:“Ofthe

thingsIdonotremember,whatwas,was;thinkitgood;donotaskanaccountofit”.’77

EckhartianTrinityandMetaphysicalTawhīd

LetusnowturntoMeisterEckhart,andlookinparticularatthedaringmannerinwhich

theTrinityisarticulatedinthewakeoftherealizationoftheAbsolute.Hisexpositionofthe

Trinityhasthemeritofrenderingexplicitsomeofthekeypremiseswhichmaybeimplicit

intheassertionbyChristiansthattheMuslimsdobelieveinthesameGodasthemselves,

evenifthey,theMuslims,denytheTrinity:theybelieveintheEssenceofthatDivinity

whichcan‘assume’dogmatically,andatalowerontologicaldegree,theaspectofthree‐

ness.ItalsohastheconsiderablemeritofshowingMuslimsthatthereisapresentationof

theTrinitywhichnotonlyharmoniseswithTawhīd,butindeedbringstolightdimensions

ofTawhīdinamannercomparabletothegreatestofthemysticalsagesofIslamwhohave

asserted,quiteparadoxically,thattheconceptof‘monotheism’canbeaveilovertheOne,

justasmuchaspolytheismis.Thatis,ithelpstheMuslimtotransformadogmaticand

                                                                                                                                                                                                paradoxically goes hand in hand with spiritual realization of that reality. This realization produces a 

certain degree of knowledge of Reality, such knowledge being the trace or, to use Shankara’s term, 

reflection (abhasa), of Reality left within the consciousness of the mystic after his return to ‘normal’ 

modes of awareness. One who only sees the sun as it is reflected in a mirror will know something of the 

nature of the sun, but nothing of its true dimensions in space. Likewise, the mystic, upon the return to 

normal awareness, will be able to speak of the reflected image of the reality attained in the moment or 

state of enlightenment, but cannot convey anything of the ‘dimensions’—absolute,  infinite, perfect—of 

that reality as it truly is. As Ibn al‐‘Arabī writes: ‘Gnostics cannot impart their spiritual states to other 

men; they can only indicate them symbolically to those who have begun to experience the like.’ Quoted 

by R.A. Nicholson in The Mystics of Islam (London: G. Bell, 1914), p.103 (translation modified). 

77 Al‐Ghazzālī is citing a saying from Ibn al‐Mu‘tazz in his autobiographical work al‐Munqidh min al‐dalāl 

(‘Deliverance from error’), translated by Montgomery Watt, p.61. 

50  

formalconceptionofonenessintoanexistential,spiritualandtransformativeawarenessof

thatwhichisbeyondbeingandthus,afortiori,infinitelybeyondtherealmofnumber.

This,indeed,istheontologicalshiftofconsciousnesswhichtheSufisinsiston:Godisone,

notjustinthesenseofbeing‘nottwo’or‘notmultiple’,butinthesenseofexcludingall

otherness.ThetheologicalaffirmationofoneGodistransformedintoaspiritualrealization

thatthereisbutauniquereality,whichisoutwardlydifferentiatedbyvirtueofitsown

infiniteradiance.Tothinkotherwise,fortheSufis,istofallintoa‘hidden’polytheismor

shirk.

BeforeaddressingdirectlytheTrinity,itisworthnotingthatEckhart’sapproachtothought

generallycoincidespreciselywiththatofDionysiusandIbnal‐‘Arabī.Allmentally

articulatedattributesfallshortof‘describing’thedivinereality:‘Itisitsnaturetobe

withoutnature.Tothinkofgoodnessorwisdomorpowerdissemblestheessenceanddims

itinthought.Themerethoughtobscuresessence...Forgoodnessandwisdomand

whatevermaybeattributedtoGodarealladmixturestoGod’snakedessence:forall

admixturecausesalienationfromessence.’78

Itsnatureis‘withoutnature’,thatis,itisdevoidofanyspecificnature,orattributesthat

canbeadequatelyexpressedinhumanlanguage;onemustnotrelativizethedivinereality

byequatingitwithanyattributeswhicharesusceptibletomentalarticulation.Itdoes

possesstheseattributes,intrinsically,butItalsotranscendsthem,andthisisthekeypoint:

itisthistranscendenceofeveryconceivableattributethatmakesittheAbsolute.The

Absolutepossessesallpositiveattributes,butalsotranscendsthem:oneisremindedhere

oftheAsh‘ariteformula:‘theattributesarenotGod’,fortheAbsolutetranscendsall

attributes;but‘theattributesarenototherthanGod’,fortheAbsolutepossessesall

attributes,andthatwhichispossessedbytheAbsolutemustbeonewithit,onpainof

violatingthedivinesimplicity,andattributingdivisiblepartstotheAbsolute.

                                                            78 Meister Eckhart: Sermons & Treatises, tr. M.O’C Walshe (Dorset: Element Books, 1979), vol.2, pp.32 & 

39. 

51  

Eckhart’sinsistencethatourconceptionofGodbeshornofany‘nature’orattributeis

echoedinthefollowingwordsof‘Alīb.AbīTālib,thecousinandson‐in‐lawoftheProphet,

fourthcaliphofIslam,andfirstImamoftheShi’aMuslims.79Thisishowhecommentson

themeaningofikhlās,literally‘makingpure’,referringtothepurificationofone’s

conceptionofGod:

Theperfectionofpurification(ikhlās)istodivestHimofallattributes—becauseof

thetestimonyofeveryattributethatitisotherthantheobjectofattribution,and

becauseofthetestimonyofeverysuchobjectthatitisotherthantheattribute.So

whoeverascribesanattributetoGod—glorifiedbeHe!—hasconjoinedHim[with

somethingelse]andwhoeversoconjoinsHimhasmadeHimtwo‐fold,andwhoever

makesHimtwo‐foldhasfragmentedHim,andwhoeverthusfragmentsHimis

ignorantofHim.80

Godofcoursepossessesattributes—theninety‐nine‘names’ofGodbeingthenamesof

theseattributes.Imam‘Alīclearlyisnotdenyingtherealityoftheseattributesassuch,for

earlierinthesermoncitedabove,heaffirmsthatGod’sattributeshave‘nodefinedlimit’.

TheycanhavenolimitbecausetheattributesareontologicallyidenticaltotheEssenceas

such,andhavenoself‐subsistingrealityapartfromthatEssence.Onecanidentifythe

attributeswiththeEssence,butnotviceversa:itisanactofshirktoidentifytheEssence

eitherwithItsownattributesor,stillworse,withourunderstandingoftheseattributes.

Thus,Eckhart’sviewoftheAbsoluteastranscendingallmentalconceptions,specific

nature,andeven(asweshallseeinamoment)theTrinity,caneasilybereadbyaMuslim

asrootedintheavoidanceofsubtleshirk,andasacommentaryonthemeaningofthefirst

testimonyofIslam,nodivinitybutGod.

ThisisparticularlyclearwhenwelookatthewayinwhichEckhartdealswiththequestion

ofGod’s‘being’.ForhestressesinmanyplacesthatGodis‘beyondBeing’,andthus                                                            79 He is aptly described by Frithjof Schuon as the ‘esoteric representative of Islam par excellence’. See his The Transcendent Unity of Religions (tr. Peter Townsend) (London: Faber & Faber, 1953), p.59. See our Justice and Remembrance—Introducing the Spirituality of Imam ‘Alī (London: IB Tauris, 2006) for discussion of some of the major themes articulated by this seminal figure of nascent Islam. 80 Cited in ibid, p.208. 

52  

transcendsallpossibilityofbeingdescribedbytheattributespropertoBeing.God,hesays,

isashighabovebeingasthehighestangelisabovethelowestant?81‘WhenIhavesaidGod

isnotabeingandisabovebeing,IhavenottherebydeniedHimbeing:ratherIhave

exalteditinHim.IfIgetcopperingold,itisthere...inanoblermodethanitisinitself.’82

Thedenial,then,ofthespecific,conceivableattributesofGod—includingeventhatmost

indeterminateanduniversalattribute,Beingitself—meansanexaltationofallofthese

attributesintheirundifferentiatedessence.ThisappearstobeidenticaltowhatImam‘Alī

meanswhenhenegatesthedivineattributes,ontheonehand,andsublimatesthemonthe

other.Theattributesaremorefullyandreallythemselvesinthedivineonenessthanthey

areintheirownspecificity,andafortioriinthementalconceptionswehaveofthem.Sothe

denialoftheattributesisadenialonthepurelymentalplane,itisnotadenialoftheir

intrinsicsubstance:conceptualapophasispavesthewayforaneminentlypositiveopening

tothetranscendentsubstanceoftheattributes.83Thissubstanceisone,butitisoutwardly

articulatedinconformitywiththedifferentiatedplanesuponwhichitsinnerinfinitude

outwardlyunfolds.Thisleadstothefollowingimportantpointpertainingtothenon‐

numericalnatureoftheTrinity:

Foranyonewhocouldgraspdistinctionswithoutnumberandquantity,ahundred

wouldbeasone.EveniftherewereahundredPersonsintheGodhead,amanwho

coulddistinguishwithoutnumberandquantitywouldperceivethemonlyasone

God...(he)knowsthatthreePersonsareoneGod.84

ThisechoesthepointmadeearlierbyIbnal‐‘Arabī:‘numberdoesnotbegetmultiplicityin

thedivineSubstance’.Godcanrelatetomultiplicityinavarietyofways,butthisdoesnot

introducemultiplicityintothedivinenature;themultiplicitycomesfromthecreatedor

manifestedrealm:fromtheworld,notfromGod.ButforbothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,the

levelofdivinitywhichcanassumemultiplerelationswiththerealmofrelativityisitself                                                            81 Meister Eckhart, op.cit., vol. 2, pp.150‐151. 

82 Ibid. 83 One is reminded here of a cognitive principle within the school of Advaita Vedanta: ‘That which cannot be expressed is expressed through false attribution and subsequent denial (adhyaropa‐apavada).’ It should be noted that the Sanskrit apavada is cognate with the Greek apophasis. See our Paths to Transcendence, op.cit., pp.2‐8.  84 Ibid, vol.1, p.217. 

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perforcerelative;itisalevelordegreeofdivinitywhichistranscendedbytheEssenceof

divinity.Thus,thisEssence—Eckhart’s‘Godhead’—transcendsallconceivabledistinctions.

Allthatcanbesaidofit,provisionally,isthatitisabsolutelyone.Mentalconception—and

thusalldogmapredicatedthereupon—isincapableofexpressingtherealityofGod,and

yetonehastomakeanefforttoconceiveofthedivineEssenceaspureanduntrammelled

unity.However,eventheconceptionofonenessistaintedbyitsveryformasaconception:

‘themerethoughtdimstheessence’.OneisthusleftwiththetaskofconceivingoftheOne

whileatthesametimeknowingthatthisconceptionisinescapablyflawed:onehasto

conceiveonenessbyspirituallypiercingtheveilofthatveryconception.Asmentioned

earlier:onehastoconceiveofThatwhichisinconceivable;foritispossibletoconceivethat

itis,butimpossibletoconceivewhatitis.Itisa‘something’ashesaysinthepassage

below,‘whichisneitherthisnorthat’.

Sotrulyoneandsimpleisthiscitadel,somodeandpowertranscendingisthis

solitaryOne,thatneitherpowernormodecangazeintoit,norevenGodHimself!...

Godneverlooksinthereforoneinstant,insofarasHeexistsinmodesandinthe

propertiesofHisPersons...thisOnealonelacksallmodeandproperty...forGodto

seeinsideitwouldcostHimallHisdivinenamesandpersonalproperties:allthese

Hemustleaveoutside...ButonlyinsofarasHeisoneandindivisible(canHedo

this):inthissenseHeisneitherFather,SonnorHolyGhostandyetisasomething

whichisneitherthisnorthat.85

Thismetaphysicalperspective,clearlyindicatingtherelativityoftheontologicalplane

uponwhichtheTrinityisconceivable,canhelpMuslimstoseethatbeliefintheTrinity

doesnotnecessarilyimplyanycompromiseasregardstheabsoluteonenessofGod;

indeed,thesensitiveMuslimmightcometoseetheTrinityisalegitimatedoctrine

accountingforthemysteryofGod’sself‐revelation,becomingtherebyanalogoustothe

doctrineofthedivinenamesandattributesinIslam.ThePersons,likethedivineattributes

                                                            85 Ibid, vol.1, p.76. One might note here that Nicholas of Cusa says something very similar. He writes that 

in His ineffable infinitude, God cannot be described as ‘one or three or good or wise or Father or Son or 

Holy Spirit’. Rather, God ‘infinitely excels and precedes all such names.’ This is from his Cribratio 

Alkorani, p.88, as cited by Miroslav Volf in his forthcoming book, Same God ... 

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inIslam,areidenticaltotheEssence,whichisabsolutesimplicity;buttheconverseisnot

true:theEssenceisnotexhaustivelyidentifiablewithanyofthePersons.Justasthe

Personsaredistinguishedfromeachotherintermsoforigin,otherwisebeingequalinall

respectsquanatureorsubstance,sotheattributesaredistinguishedfromeachotherin

termsoftheirspecificproperties,butareequaltoeachotherquaEssence:eachattributeis

identicaltotheAbsolute,theobjectofattribution.Inbothcases,thereisanoutward

differentiationwhichdoesnotinfringeuponaninwardidentity,orunicityofsubstance.

The‘names’aredistinguishedintermsofthespecific,henceexclusive,propertiesthey

denote,buttheyarealsoindistinguishablebyvirtueoftheircommonroot,theEssence.

EachnameisthusidenticaltotheEssence,inonerespect,anddistincttherefromin

another;asbeingidenticaltotheEssence,eachnameisthusidenticaltoeveryothername.

ThisviewoftherelationshipbetweenthenamesandtheEssenceinIslamicmetaphysics

canbeseentocorrespondtotherelationshipbetweenthePersonsandtheGodheadin

Eckhartianmetaphysics.AccordingtoEckhart,thethreePersonsareidenticaltoeachother

onlyatthetranscendentlevelofBeyond‐Being,thelevelwhichtranscendsthelevelof

BeingordivinityuponwhichthePersonsaredistinctasPersons.

OneoftheclearestexpressionsofthedistinctionbetweentheleveloftheTrinityandthe

levelofthepureAbsoluteisgivenbyEckhartwhenhespeaksofthesoulbeingborneupin

thePersons,accordingtothepoweroftheFather,thewisdomoftheSonandthegoodness

oftheHolyGhost—thesethreebeingthemodesof‘work’propertothePersons.86Hegoes

ontosaythatitisonlyaboveallthis‘work’that‘thepureabsolutenessoffreebeing’isto

befound;thePersons,assuch,are‘suspendedinbeing’.Here,wehaveadoublelesson:not

onlyistheTrinityrelativizedinthefaceofthepureAbsolute,itisalsorendered

conceivableasthedeploymentofthedivinegracesbywhichthesoulattainsspiritual

realization.Itismadesubordinatetopureorabsolutebeing,ontheonehand;and,onthe                                                            86 Ibid, vol.2, pp.174‐175. In terms of strict Trinitarian dogma this interpretation might be regarded as depriving the Persons of their full divinity, by ascribing to them only one particular ‘work’ or divine quality. All three Persons, so it might be argued, do all kinds of ‘work’, as each of them is as much God as the other two Persons are, distinguishable one from the other only as regards the single characteristic defining their Personhood: ‘begetting’ for the Father, ‘being begotten’ for the Son and ‘proceeding’ for the Spirit.  

55  

other,itisgraspedasthedeploymentofdivinepower,wisdomandgoodnesswhich,alone,

carrythesoultowardsitsgoalanditssource,tothat‘placewherethesoulgraspsthe

Personsintheveryindwellingofbeingfromwhichtheyneveremerged’.

ThePersons‘neveremerged’fromthe‘indwellingofbeing’,becausethat‘indwellingof

being’isnothingotherthanBeyond‐Being,ortheGodhead,andtheessentialrealityofthe

Persons‘resides’inthatEssence;nowtheiressentialrealityistheirtruereality—their

apparent‘emergence’therefrom,quadistinctPersons,isjustthat:anappearance.Weare

remindedhereofwhatIbnal‐‘ArabīsaysaboutthedivineNameshavingtwoconnotations:

‘thefirstconnotationisGodHimselfWhoiswhatisnamed,thesecondthatbywhichone

Nameisdistinguishedfromanother’;so,ontheonehand,‘theNameistheReality’,while

ontheotherhand,‘itistheimaginedReality’.87Moreexplicitly,asregardstheapparent

realityoftheNames:‘TheNamesintheirmultiplicityarebutrelationswhichareofanon‐

existentnature.’88

So,forbothEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,thepureAbsoluteisidentifiedintermsofan

essentialonenesswhichprecedes—notsomuchtemporallyasontologically—thedegreeof

beingatwhichanydistinctionsbecomediscernible.WhenEckhartsaysthatthePersonsas

suchare‘suspended’atthelevelofbeing,thisisanotherwayofsayingthatthePersons

                                                            87 Cited by Ralph Austin, The Bezels of Wisdom (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), p.125. 88 Cited by Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p.161. In referring to the Names as ‘relations’ one thinks of St Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of the Persons: they, too, are called by St Thomas ‘relations’—but he would most likely have problems defining these relations as being ‘non‐existent’. He may accept, however, the argument that they are not ‘existential’, in the sense of ‘standing apart’ from God’s Esse (Being): they are ‘non‐existent’ because absolutely identical with God’s Esse, subsisting above all contingent things, all ‘existents’, and are thus ‘supra‐existent’. This is similar to Ibn al‐‘Arabī’s view in one respect, but quite different in another: for Ibn al‐‘Arabī, the Names are non‐existent (‘adam) only in their aspect of specificity, hence exclusivity—the fact that in one respect each Name is distinct from and thus excludes all others—because non‐existence is the defining feature of this exclusivity proper to multiplicity. In another respect, however, the Names are real: they are real insofar as they are identical to the Named, the Essence, pure wujūd (Being), which is absolutely one, and absolutely universal: absolutely unspecifiable, or non‐delimited, and yet also, not delimited by this non‐delimitation. ‘Do not declare Him nondelimited and thus delimited by being distinguished from delimitation!’ he warns us: ‘For if He is distinguished then He is delimited by His nondelimitation. And if He is delimited by His nondelimitation, then He is not He.’ Cited by Chittick, Sufi Path, op.cit., p.112. Cf. Denys Turner’s illuminating discussion of the meaning of God as esse indistinctum (indistinct Being) in Eckhart’s perspective, The Darkness of God—Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), pp. 162‐167. See also the following note, 91. 

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‘boilover’(bullitio)fromBeyond‐Beingintobeing,fromtheuniqueGodheadintoandas

theTrinitarianGod.89However,theTrinitarianGodisnotsomethingotherthanthe

Godhead:itis,toparaphraseIbnal‐‘Arabī,theEssence‘described’bydivinity.Itisthe

onenessoftheone(ahadiyyatal‐ahad)becomingdiscernibleastheonenessofthemany

(ahadiyyatal‐kathra):90thatwhichisdistinctanddiscernibleasapluralityinthelatteris

nothingbuttheinitial,metaphysicalprefigurationoftheperfectionswhicharehiddenand

undifferentiatedintheformer.BothIbnal‐‘ArabīandEckhart,then,revealtheinadequacy

ofallmentalconceptionsofdivineunityinthefaceoftheoverflowinginfinitudeoftheOne.

ForthepurelyconceptualaffirmationofGod’sonenesssmacksofshirkinthemeasurethat

itimpliesthatGod’sonenessisa‘countable’ornumericalone,thatGodissimplyoneunit

amongothersimilarunits.Imam‘Alīexpressesthisprincipleinthefollowingsaying.Heis

askedaboutthemeaningofGod’soneness,andrefersfirsttotheerroroftheperson‘who

says“one”andhasinmindthecategoryofnumbers.Nowthisisnotpermissible,forthat

whichhasnoseconddoesnotenterintothecategoryofnumbers.’91

ThisstatementresonatesdeeplywiththefollowingwordsofEckhart:

Oneisthenegationofthenegationandadenialofthedenial.Allcreatureshavea

negationinthemselves:onenegatesbynotbeingtheother...butGodnegatesthe

negation:Heisoneandnegatesallelse,foroutsideofGodnothingis.Allcreatures

areinGod,andareHisveryGodhead,whichmeansplenitude…Godalonehas

oneness.Whateverisnumberdependsonone,andonedependsonnothing.God’s

                                                            89 One of Eckhart’s boldest claims is to be identified with the undifferentiated Godhead in his uncreated essence. To quote Turner’s summary of Eckhart’s claims: ‘ .... not merely does the Father give birth to me in the Son, before all that I was in the Godhead in its absolute, primitive oneness, a oneness which “precedes” all the differentiations of the Trinity of Persons, that “seething and boiling” or bullitio ... my existence in the Godhead is beyond all distinctions, in the undifferentiated oneness of the Godhead, it cannot be distinct from the Godhead as such. Therefore I existed in the Godhead before God, in God’s very “own ground”. If I was there in that ground at the birth of the Trinity, a fortiori I was there before my own creation.’ The Darkness of God, op.cit., p.145. 90 ‘In respect of His Self, God possesses the Unity of the One, but in respect of His Names, He possesses the Unity of the many.’ Cited by Chittick, Sufi Path, op.cit., p.337. 91 Justice and Remembrance, op.cit., p. 

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richesandwisdomandtruthareallabsolutelyoneinGod:itisnotone,itis

oneness.92

Referringtothenon‐numericalonenessofGodasbeing‘thatwhichhasnosecond’isImam

‘Alī’swayofreferringtotheuniquerealityofGod,outsideofwhom‘nothingis’,as

Eckhart’sformulationhasit.Similarly,Imam‘Ali’snegationoftheattributes,andhis

identificationofthemallwiththesimplicityofthedivineEssence,isexpressedbyEckhart’s

insistencethatGod’s‘richesandwisdomandtruthareallabsolutelyoneinGod’;and

Eckhart’scorrectionofhimself‘itisnotone,itisoneness’canbereadasadeliberate

encouragementtohislistenerstoshifttheirconsciousnessfromastaticnumerical

conceptionofunity,standingopposedtoanequallystaticconceptionofmultiplicity,toa

dynamicspiritualconceptionoftheeternalintegrationofmultiplicitywithinunityandthe

overflowingoftheinnerrichesofthatunitywithinmultiplicity.Thisreciprocalintegration

isoneaspectofmetaphysicalTawhīd,andisreferredtobytheSufisintermsof‘the

multipleOne’(al‐wāhidal‐kathīr)andthe‘uniquemultiplicity’(al‐kathīral‐wāḥid).93

GodaloneisabsoluteReality,forbothofthesemysticalauthorities,andthissolerealityis

atonceall‐exclusive,byvirtueofitsineffabletranscendence,andall‐inclusive,byvirtueof

itsinescapableimmanence.The‘negationofnegation’istantamounttopureaffirmation,

butaffirmationnotofacountableoneness,rather,ofanall‐inclusiveoneness,withinwhich

allconceivablemultiplicityiseternallycomprised.Imam‘Alī’swayofexpressingEckhart’s

‘negationofnegation’isasfollows.‘Being,butnotbywayofanybecoming;existing,butnot

fromhavingbeennon‐existent;witheverything,butnotthroughassociation;andother

thaneverything,butnotthroughseparation;acting,butnotthroughmovementsand

instruments;seeing,evenwhennothingofHiscreationwastobeseen;solitary,evenwhen

therewasnonewhoseintimacymightbesoughtorwhoseabsencemightbemissed.’94

                                                            92 Meister Eckhart, op.cit., vol. 2, pp.339 & 341. 93 See the discussion of this principle, in the context of al‐Kāshānī’s Sufi commentary on the Qur’ān, in R. Shah‐Kazemi, The Other in the Light of the One—The Universality of the Qur’an and Interfaith Dialogue (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2006), ch.2, section 1, entitled ‘The One in the Many, the Many in the One’, pp.76‐97. 94 Cited in Justice and Remembrance, op.cit., pp.208‐209.  

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Godis‘witheverything,butnotthroughassociation’:Heisnotsomeseparateentity

conjoinedtothecreature,forthiswouldentailaduality—GodandthethingsHeis‘with’;

and‘otherthaneverything,butnotthroughseparation’:Hisinaccessibletranscendence

doesnotimplythatHeisseparatefromwhatHetranscends,forthiswouldagainentaila

duality—GodandthethingsHetranscends.Multiplicityisthusintegratedwithinan

ontologicalunityaccordingtoImam‘Alī’sperspective,andthis,webelieve,iswhatEckhart

meanswhenhesaysthat‘outsideGodnothingis’:theapparentmultiplicityofexistenceis

integratedwithinthetrueunityoftheOne—Beyond‐Being—inamannerwhichreflectsthe

wayinwhichtheapparentmultiplicityoftheTrinityisrenderedtransparenttotheunityof

itsownEssence.Torepeat:weshouldbeable‘tograspdistinctionswithoutnumberand

quantity’,andtherebycometoseethatPersonsorattributescanexistwithintheGodhead

which,nonetheless,remainsuniqueandindivisible.

Thisuniqueness,however,mustbeconceivedastranscendingnumber.Neitherthree‐ness

norone‐nesscanadequatelydescribethisone‐and‐onliness.Eckhartthereforesaysthat

everythingutteredabouttheTrinity‘isinnowayreallysoortrue…becauseeverynameor

ingeneraleverythingthatdenotesanumber,ormakesanumbercometomind,orbe

conceived,isfarfromGod.’HethenquotesasayingfromBoethius:‘Thatistrulyonein

whichthereisnonumber’.95

ItisimportanttorepeatherethecrucialprincipleenunciatedbyFrithjofSchuon,referred

toearlier:‘OnlyUnityassuchcanbeadefinitionoftheAbsolute;intherealmofnumber,

unityalonerepresentsanelementofabsoluteness,asdoesthepointorthecentreinspace,

andtheinstantorthepresentintime...’.

ThemetaphysicalperspectivesofEckhartandIbnal‐‘Arabī,StDionysiusandImam‘Alī,

helpustoperceivethegroundsuponwhichwecanaffirmunequivocallythatMuslimsand

ChristiansdobelieveinthesameGod.ThisGodcanbeconceivedasThatwhichtranscends

thedomainwithinwhichallexistentialcategoriessubsist,includingnotjustthecategories

time,space,form,matter,andnumber,butalsoalldistinctdivineattributes.Itisthusa

Realitywhichcannotbeadequatelydescribed,whetherbyattributesorPersons,forboth

                                                            95 Meister Eckhart—Teacher and Preacher (ed. B. McGinn), (New York/Mahwah/Toronto: Paulist Press, 1986), pp.210‐211. 

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attributesandPersonsarerelativitiesbydintoftheirverysusceptibilitytoconceptionin

distinctterms,thisdistinctivenessbeinganinescapablecocomitantoftheir‘ex‐istence’,

takingthiswordaccordingtoitsetymologicalroots,ex‐stare:their‘standingapartfrom’

thatall‐embracingRealitywhichcannotbeconceived,thisinconceivabilitybeingthe

extrinsic,apophaticconcomitantofitsintrinsic,‘super‐essential’mystery.

3. ContemporaryWitnessandPhilosophicalTheology

ACommonWord

OnOctober13,2007,aground‐breakinginterfaithinitiativewaslaunchedbytheRoyalAal

al‐BaytInstituteinAmman,Jordan.96Anopenletterentitled‘ACommonWordBetweenUs

andYou’,signedby138Muslimleadersandscholarsrepresentingeverymajorschoolof

thoughtinIslam,wassent‘toleadersofChristianchurcheseverywhere.’Thiswasan

invitationtoengageindialogueonthebasisofloveofGodandloveoftheneighbour,these

beingrecognisedasthetwo‘greatcommandments’enjoinedbybothtraditions.The

overwhelminglypositiveChristianresponsesfromtheleadersofallthemajorChurches

impliedthatthebasic,albeitunspoken,premiseofthetext—beliefinthesameGod—was

accepted.Someresponsesmadethismoreexplicitthanothers.Forexample,inthe

responseoftheYaleDivinitySchool,weread:‘WeapplaudthatACommonWordBetween

UsandYoustressessoinsistentlytheuniquedevotiontooneGod,indeedtheloveofGod,

astheprimarydutyofeverybeliever.’97

Inhisresponse,theArchbishopofCanterbury,DrRowanWilliams,notonlyaffirmsthat

ChristiansandMuslimsbelieveinthesameGod,butalsogoestogreatpainstopointout

thattheTrinitarianGodisinessencenototherthantheOneGodbelievedinand

                                                            96 See www.acommonword.com for the text itself, and the responses thereto.  97 See, for the full text, ‘A Christian Response to A Common Word Between Us and You’, New York 

Times, Nov.18, 2007. 

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worshippedbyMuslims,evengoingsofarastoapply—whetherconsciouslyornot—two

Muslim‘names’ofAllāhtotheTrinitarianGod,thatis,al‐Hayy(theLiving)andal‐Qayyūm

(theSelf‐subsistent).Themeaningoftheword‘God’accordingtotheArchbishop,is‘a

natureoressence–eternalandself‐sufficientlife....wespeakof“Father,SonandHoly

Spirit”,butwedonotmeanoneGodwithtwobeingsalongsidehim,orthreegodsoflimited

power.SothereisindeedoneGod,theLivingandSelf‐subsistent,associatedwithno

other.’98

Suchexplicitaffirmationoftheidentity—thesameness—oftheChristianandIslamicGodis

bynomeansrestrictedtoourtimes.Thefollowingaresomeofthenoteworthyprecedents

inthehistoryofChristian‐Muslimdialogue:

1.TimothyI(d.823),CatholicosandPatriarchoftheChurchoftheEast,wholivedmostof

hislifeinBaghdad,centreoftheAbbasidempire,wassummonedtothecourtoftheCaliph

al‐Mahdī(r.775‐785)torespondtovariousquestions.Heassertedclearlyhisbeliefthatthe

ProphetMuhammadcalledpeopletotheonetrueGod:

Muhammaddeservesthepraiseofallreasonablemenbecausehiswalkwasonthe

wayoftheProphetsandoftheloversofGod.WhereastherestoftheProphets

taughtabouttheonenessofGod,Muhammadalsotaughtaboutit.So,hetoowalked

onthewayoftheProphets.Then,justasalltheProphetsmovedpeopleawayfrom

evilandsin,anddrewthemtowhatisrightandvirtuous,soalsodidMuhammad

movethesonsofhiscommunityawayfromevilanddrawthemtowhatisrightand

virtuous.Therefore,hetoowalkedonthewayoftheProphets.99

2.PopeGregorywrotetotheMuslimKingAnzirofMauritaniain1076,expressing

gratitudeforacharitableactperformedbythelatter:‘WebelieveandconfessoneGod,

althoughindifferentways,andpraiseandworshipHimdailyastheCreatorofallagesand                                                            98 See the full text of the Archbishop’s response on www.acommonword.com.  99 Sidney Griffith, The Church in the Shadow of the Mosque—Christians and Muslims in the World of Islam (New Jersey & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp.104‐105. Timothy’s statement is all the more remarkable given his refusal to explicitly acknowledge that the Qur’ān was indeed a divine revelation. He believed nonetheless in the sincerity of the Prophet’s summons to believe in the one true God and to lead a life of virtue in consequence thereof. 

61  

therulerofthisworld.Forastheapostlesays:“Heisourpeacewhohasmadeusbothone”

(Eph.2.14).’100

3.PopePiusXIsaid,whendispatchinghisApostolicDelegatetoLibyain1934:‘Donot

thinkyouaregoingamonginfidels.Muslimsattaintosalvation.ThewaysofProvidenceare

infinite.’101IfMuslimsarenot‘infidels’theymustbeincludedinthecategoryof

‘believers’—thosewhobelieveintheoneandonlyGod.

4.Similarly,sometwodecadeslater,PopePiusXII(d.1959)declared:‘Howconsolingitis

formetoknowthat,allovertheworld,millionsofpeople,fivetimesaday,bowdown

beforeGod.’102Muslims,then,worshiptheoneandonlyGod,theGodworshippedby

Christians.

Letusnowreturntothequestionposedatthebeginningofthisessayaboutthedegreeto

whichtheTrinityiscentralandindispensabletoChristianbelief,andask:whatdosuch

affirmationsbyChristianauthoritiesimplyforthestatusofthedoctrineoftheTrinityin

Christianbelief?Threeimplicationsmightbepositedhere:

1) ThedoctrineoftheTrinityisnotanessentialelementintheChristianbeliefinone

God.ThatiswhywecanembraceMuslimsasfellow‐believersintheoneGodevenif

theydonotbelievein—andindeed,repudiate—theTrinity.

2) ThedoctrineoftheTrinityisessentialtoChristianbeliefinGod,anditaccurately

definesthetrue,objectivenatureofthatoneGod;soMuslimswhotrulybelievein

theonetrueGodcannotbutbelieveintheTrinity,objectivelyandinreality,evenif

                                                            100 See J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church 

(London: Collins Liturgical Publications, 1983), pp.276‐277 

101 L’Ultima (Florence), Anno VIII, 1934; cited in William Stoddart, What do the Religions say about Each Other?—Christian Attitudes to Islam, Islamic Attitudes to Christianity (San Rafael, CA: Sophia Perennis, 2008), p.12. 102 Cited in ibid, p.12. Abundant material of a similar nature can be found in this valuable compilation of William Stoddart. One should also note here such statements as the following; Pope John‐Paul II said to a group of Moroccan Muslims (August 19, 1985): ‘We believe in the same God, the one God, the living God, the God who created the world and brings his creatures to their perfection.’ For this and other similar statements by modern Popes, see http://www.usccb.org/seia/textsislam.shtml 

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theyareunawareofthefactsubjectively,andfailtoregisteritdogmatically.The

taskfortheChristianhereistosaytotheMuslimswhatStPaulsaidtothe

Athenians:‘Whomthereforeyeignorantlyworship,HimdeclareIuntoyou’(Acts,

17:23).103

3) TheTrinityisessentialtoChristianbelief,butitispossibletoconceptuallyabstract

thisaspectofbelief,andstillretainanadequateconceptionoftheEssenceofGod,

theEssenceofthatdivinitybelievedinandworshippedbyMuslims.SoMuslims

maynotbelieveintheTrinity,butinsofarastheybelieveinGod’sunicityand

simplicity,transcendenceandperfection—togetherwithmostifnotalloftheother

attributesascribedtothedivineEssencebyChristians—theybelieveintheselfsame

EssenceornatureofGodaspositedandarticulatedinChristianfaith.

WehaveseenintheprevioussectionhowEckhartprovidesuswithgroundsuponwhich

thislatterposition,3),mightbemetaphysicallyarticulated.TheOne,theGround,the

Godheadis‘beyondBeing’,whilethePersonsoftheTrinityare‘suspended’atthelevelof

Being,therewhereGodisdefinableasGodinrelationtocreatures.Itwasalsoseenthat

thiscorrespondscloselywithIbnal‐ʿArabī’sdistinctionbetweentwodegreesofoneness

withinthedivinity:theonenessoftheOne,andtheonenessofthemany.Inbothcases,

pluralitywithindivinityisaffirmedwithoutdetrimenttotheunity,simplicityor

transcendenceofGod,suchpluralitybeingsituateduponanontologicalleveltranscended

bytheOne,thepureEssence.However,onemightask:isthereawayofarticulatingthis

perspectiveintheologicalterms,doingsobyreferencetoauthoritieswithintheChristian

traditionwhoarelesscontroversialthanEckhart?Webelievethatitis,andthisessaywill

                                                            103 A variation on this position is given by such figures as Abelard and Bonaventure. Abelard affirmed that no Jew or Gentile—nor any person with ‘common sense’—could doubt that ‘God is Power, Wisdom and Goodness’. Trinity in Aquinas, p.8. Similarly, Bonaventure gave a host of ‘natural reasons’ which proved that God was a Trinity. See ibid, pp.19‐20. As we shall see shortly, Aquinas strongly rejects this position: belief in the Trinity requires a leap of faith, and is by no means a logical or natural concomitant of belief in the oneness of God. 

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beconcludedwithanecessarilybriefattempttosketchoutsuchaperspective,doingsoin

relationtothewritingsofStThomasAquinas.104

StThomasAquinasandtheCommonGroundofTranscendence

Afteraddressingthequestionofsacreddoctrineingeneral,AquinasbeginshisSumma

TheologicawithatreatiseontheunityofthedivineEssence.Thereislittle,ifanything,in

thistreatisewithwhichaMuslimcoulddisagree.OnereadsaboutGod’sunity,simplicity,

indivisibility,togetherwithsuchfundamentalattributesasthedivineperfection,wisdom,

andgoodness;aboutdivineexistencebeingidenticaltodivineessence,togetherwithahost

ofexplanationspertainingtoGod’snecessaryexistence—nearlyallofwhichcouldeasily

havecomefromthepenofaphilosophically‐mindedMuslimtheologianinhisdescription

ofGod.105Asregardsthemeaningoftheword‘God’,itisimportanttonotethatAquinas

assumesthatallofthosewhospeakof‘God’haveinmindanidenticalsignification,the

wordorconceptalwaysindicatinganidenticalreferent:‘ThenameGodsignifiesthedivine

nature,forthisnamewasimposedtosignifysomethingexistingaboveallthings,the

principleofallthings,andremovedfromallthings;forthosewhonameGodintendto

signifyallthis.’106Theword‘God’thussignifiesthatsupremerealitywhichtranscendsall

thingsatthesametimeasbeingthesourceofallthings.

AsregardstheunityofGod,AquinasgoestogreatpainstoassertthattheoneGodisnot

composedofparts,eventhoughitcomprisesinfiniteperfections.Althoughthedivine

natureorEssenceisabsolutelyoneandnon‐composite,itisconceivedbytheintellectin

inescapablymultipleways.Thus,intheefforttounderstandsomethingmeaningfulabout                                                            104 One might also choose such figures as St Gregory Palamas and St Maximus the Confessor, within the Orthodox tradition, whose articulation of the concept of the divine Essence would also provide us with strong grounds for asserting commonality, if not identity, with the Muslim conception of the divine Essence. 105 Indeed, the influence of such philosophers as Ibn Sīnā and al‐Fārābī (and such mystical theologians as al‐Ghazzālī) on fundamental themes of Aquinas’s ontology, philosophy and theology has been amply demonstrated by contemporary scholarship. See, for example, A.M. Goichon, The Philosophy of Avicenna and its Influence on Medieval Europe (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1969). 106  The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, trs. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981), vol.I, p.68, I.13.8, reply to objection 2. 

64  

thenatureofGod,thehumanintellectformsconceptions‘proportionaltotheperfections

flowingfromGodtocreatures’;theseperfectionspre‐existinGod‘unitedlyandsimply’,

whereasincreatures‘theyarereceived,dividedandmultiplied’.Tothesevariegated

conceptionsofdifferentperfections,however,‘therecorrespondsonealtogethersimple

principle’,aprinciple‘imperfectlyunderstood’bythedifferentconceptions.107

Hecontinuesthus,inhisreplytoobjection3inthisarticle:‘TheperfectunityofGod

requiresthatwhataremanifoldanddividedinothersshouldexistinHimsimplyand

unitedly.ThusitcomesaboutthatHeisoneinreality,andyetmultipleinidea,becauseour

intellectapprehendsHiminamanifoldmanner,asthingsrepresentHim.’Again,noneof

thiswouldbeobjectionabletotheMuslimtheologian.Indeed,thelattermightregardsuch

statementsasthesetobestrongevidenceforthesubjectivenatureofthedoctrineofthe

Trinity:itisbutamodeof‘plurality’subsistinginthemindofthecreature,notinthe

objectiverealityoftheCreator,whois‘oneinreality’andonly‘multipleinidea’.

Inhisso‐called‘shorter’Summa(entitledCompendiumofTheology)Aquinasmakeseven

clearerthewayinwhichtheunicityofthenature/Essenceisrenderedmentallycompound

onlybyandwithinthehumanintellect;andhestressestheneedtoseethroughourown

creaturelycategoriesinordertograspGod’sutterunityandsimplicity:‘IfwesawHis

essenceasitisinitself,amultiplicityofnameswouldnotberequired;ourideaofitwould

besimple,justasHisessenceissimple.Thisvisionwehopeforinthedayofourglory;for,

accordingtoZechariah14:9,“InthatdaythereshallbeoneLord;andHisnameshallbe

one”.’108

Again,thissoundsverymuchlikeIslamicTawhīd.Indeed,Aquinassumsupthispartofthe

discussiondealingwiththenatureofGodbywriting:‘ThetruthsaboutGodthusfar

proposedhavebeensubtlydiscussedbyanumberofpaganphilosophers’,bywhomhe

meansbothGreeksandMuslims.However,whendiscussionturnstotheTrinity,thereisan

abruptchangeoftone:

                                                            107 Ibid, vol.I, p.63 I.13, 4. 108 Aquinas’s Shorter Summa, ch.24, p.26 

65  

ButthereareothertruthsaboutGodrevealedtousintheteachingoftheChristian

religion,whichwerebeyondthereachofthephilosophers.Thesearetruthsabout

whichweareinstructed,inaccordwiththenormofChristianfaith,inawaythat

transcendshumanperception.TheteachingisthatalthoughGodisoneandsimple,

ashasbeenexplainedabove,GodisFather,GodisSon,andGodisHolySpirit.And

thesearenotthreegods,butareoneGod.109

While‘paganphilosophers’mightwellunderstandsuch‘essentialattributes’asdivine

goodnessandwisdom,theycannotgraspthepersonalpropertiesoftheessence,suchas

paternityandfiliation110—norcantheChristianprovetheexistenceofsuchpropertiesby

meansoftheintellect.AquinasquotesHilary’sstatement,fromthetreatiseontheTrinity:

‘Letnomanthinktoreachthesacredmysteryofgenerationbyhisownmind’;and

Ambrose:‘Itisimpossibletoknowthesecretofgeneration.Themindfails,thevoiceis

silent.’Hethenadds:‘Since,therefore,mancannotknow,andwithhisunderstandinggrasp

thatforwhichnonecessaryreasoncanbegiven,itfollowsthatthetrinityofpersons

cannotbeknownbyreason’.

HegoessofarastosaythatanyattempttoprovetheTrinitybymeansofreason‘derogates

fromfaith’,andthisintwoways.‘Firstlyasregardsthedignityofthefaithitself,which

consistsinitsbeingconcernedwithinvisiblethingsthatexceedhumanreason’.Inother

words,beliefintheTrinitydoesnotderivefromanythingthatreasoncandeducefromits

conceptionofthedivineEssence;rather,itcomesexclusivelyfromfaithinthespecifically

Christianrevelation,transmittedbyauthority,andreceivedinaspiritofhumbleobedience

bythefaithfulsouloftheChristianbeliever.Thosethingswhich‘exceedhumanreason’

cannotbeprovenbyhumanreason.Faithistheonlymeansbywhichthesethingscanbe

understood:credoutintelligam—‘Ibelieveinordertounderstand’,asStAnselm’sfamous

dictumhasit.

ThesecondwayinwhichtheattempttorationallyprovetheTrinityderogatesfromfaith

concernsthequestionof‘drawingotherstothefaith’.Hewrites:

                                                            109 Ibid, ch.36, p.35. 110 Summa Theologica, vol.IV, p.2040, III.3, 3.   

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Forwhenanyoneintheendeavourtoprovethefaithbringsforwardreasonswhich

arenotcogent,hefallsundertheridiculeoftheunbelievers:sincetheysupposethat

westanduponsuchreasons,andthatwebelieveonsuchgrounds.Thereforewe

mustnotattempttoprovewhatisoffaithexceptbyauthorityalone,tothosewho

receivetheauthority;whileasregardsothers,itsufficestoprovethatwhatfaith

teachesisnotimpossible.111

ThenecessityoftheTrinity,then,cannotbedemonstratedbyreason,thereareno

argumentswhichcarrysufficientweighttoprovetheTrinity;butthedoctrinemightbe

shownbyreasontobe‘notimpossible’.Intermsofintellectualexposition,then,thisisa

modestclaim:theChristiancannotprovethelogicalnecessityoftheTrinity,inthewayhe

canprovethenecessityofthedivineEssence.HecanatmostdemonstratethattheTrinity

is‘notimpossible’.Thismeansthatwhilenon‐Christianscanneverbetaughtbyreasonto

believeintheTrinity,theymightcometoseethatitis‘notimpossible’thattheessential

attributeswhichtheycanlogicallydeducefromtheexistenceoftheEssencemightbe

broughtintosomekindofcorrespondencewith,orapproximationto,thepropertiesofthe

Persons.Hence:

ThephilosophersdidnotknowthemysteryoftheTrinityofthedivinePersonsby

itsproperattributes,suchaspaternity,filiationandprocession,accordingtothe

Apostle’swords,‘WespeakthewisdomofGodwhichnoneoftheprincesofthe

world’—i.e.,thephilosophers—‘knew’(ICor.ii.6).Nevertheless,theyknewsomeof

theessentialattributesappropriatedtothePersons,aspowertotheFather,wisdom

totheSon,goodnesstotheHolyGhost.112

Hereonecanseeatheologicalbridgeconnectingthetwotraditions.Aquinasacceptsthat

‘philosophers’,i.e.,MuslimsandGreeks,canattainknowledgeofsuchessentialattributesas

power,wisdomandgoodness,attributeswhichareundifferentiatedinthesimplicityofthe

divineEssence,inonerespect,whilealsopertaining,inanotherrespect,totheFather,Son

andSpirit,respectively.Itisthuspossiblefortheologiansofbothtraditionstocome

togetheronthistranscendentcommongroundconstitutedbytheunicityandsimplicityof

                                                            111 Summa Theologica, vol. I, p.169, I.32.1. 112 Ibid, reply to objection 1.  

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theEssence,withinwhichcertain‘essentialattributes’arepresentbutundifferentiated.On

thebasisofthiscommonconceptionofthetranscendentEssencetheycanaffirm:weas

ChristiansandMuslimsdobelieveinthesameGod,thesameGodconceivedessentially.But

asregardstheappropriationoftheessentialattributesbythePersons,ortheascriptionto

eachofthethreePersonsofalloftheessentialattributes,therewillbetheological

disagreement.Nonetheless,theagreementontheplaneoftheEssencecanprevailover

disagreementontheplaneofthePersons:thismaybeputforwardasthetheological

premiseimplicitintheaffirmationbyChristiantheologians—includingtheArchbishopof

Canterbury,andvariousPopes,pastandpresent—thattheyandMuslimsdobelieveinthe

sameGod.

ThisargumentisreinforcedwhenweaskStThomasabouttheformalstatusofabeliefin

GodwhichisdevoidofanyconceptionoftheChristianTrinity.Fortheanswergivenbyhim

isasfollows:

Ifwementallyexcludethepersonalpropertiestherewillstillremaininourthought

thedivineNatureassubsistingandasaPerson…Evenifthepersonalpropertiesof

thethreePersonsareabstractedbyourmind,neverthelesstherewillremaininour

thoughtstheonePersonalityofGod,astheJewsconsider.113

Soevenif,liketheJews,MuslimsdonotbelieveintheTrinity,whattheydobelievein—the

‘divineNature’,theunique‘Person’the‘OnePersonality’—isidenticaltowhatChristians

believeinatthatsamelevelofdivinity—thetranscendentunicityofthedivineEssence.

ThisoneGodistheGodofAbrahamandMoses,neitherofwhommadeanymention

whatsoeveroftheTrinity,andyetitisaffirmedinChristiandogmathatitwas‘theTrinity’

whobestowedrevelationuponthemboth,anduponallprophetsofGod.Inthewordsof

thetextoftheFourthLateranCouncil(1215):‘ThisholyTrinity,whichisundivided

accordingtoitscommonessencebutdistinctaccordingtothepropertiesofitspersons,

                                                            113 Summa Theologica, vol.IV, p.2040, III.3, a.3, reply to objections 1 and 2. 

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gavetheteachingofsalvationtothehumanracethroughMosesandtheholyprophetsand

hisotherservants,accordingtothemostappropriatedispositionofthetimes.’114

TheTrinity,being‘undividedaccordingtoitscommonessence’,isthusnothingotherthan

theOneGodofAbrahamandMoses—andofMuhammad,oneshouldadd.However,neither

AbrahamnorMosesnorMuhammadwouldrecognisethatthisOneGodis‘distinct

accordingtothepropertiesofitspersons’;theywouldnotaffirmanyTrinitywithinthe

Unity.Sowereturntothepointjustmade:ChristiansdobelieveinthesameGodasthe

JewsandtheMuslims—thesameGodconceivedessentially;butinadditiontothisessential

belief,ChristiansalsoaffirmbeliefinatriuneaspectofGod,anaspectvehementlydenied

byJewsandMuslims.Onenoticeshereadifferencebetweenimplicationandpredication:

forChristians,beliefinGodmaywelltheologicallyimplybeliefintheTrinity,butisnot

essentiallypredicateduponit,failingwhichtheycouldnotaffirmthatJewsandMuslims

believeinandworshiptheonetrueGod.ItwouldappearthattheChristiancanbelievein

God,therefore,withoutthisbeliefbeingpredicatedontheTrinity;buttheChristiancannot

believeintheTrinitywithoutbelievinginGod.ThisshowsthatbeliefinoneGod—thebasic

postulateofmonotheism—musthaveprimacyoverbeliefintheTrinity.Tociteoneofthe

keyprinciplesofThomistictheology:whatiscommontakespriorityoverwhatisproper:

‘Whatisessentialisprioraccordingtoourunderstandingtowhatisnotional,justaswhat

iscommontowhatisproper.’115WhatiscommontothePersons—thedivinenature,

substanceoressence—precedes,ortakespriorityover,whatispropertothePersons—

theirspecific,personalproperties;likewise,whatisessentialoruniversalinourknowledge

takespriorityoverwhatisnotionalorspecific.Thisprinciplecanbeappliedtothequestion

atissuehere:whatiscommontothetwotheologiesofIslamandChristianity—beliefinthe

onedivineEssence—takespriorityoverwhatdifferentiatesthem—thedistinctive

                                                            114 We have taken this translation from the compendium of Catholic documents made available at http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1215‐1215,_Concilium_Lateranum_IIII,_Documenta_Omnia,_EN.pdf. See also J. Neuner & J. Dupuis, The Christian Faith, op. cit., for this and many of the most important doctrinal texts of the Catholic Church. 115 This is cited from St Thomas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences (I, Sent., d.29, q.1, a.2) in Gilles Emory, Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, Michigan: Sapientia Press, 2003), p.179. 

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‘properties’(whetherattributesorPersons)ascribedtothatEssencewithinthetwo

theologies.

ItisthecommongroundofaffirmationofbeliefinGodassuch—GodquaEssence,

SubstanceorNature—that,evenintheabsenceofanyreferencetotheTrinity,allows

ChristianstoaffirmthatMuslimsbelieveintheonetrueGod,theGodofAbrahamand

Moses.ThisappearstouslogicallyimpliedinthestatementofStThomas:IfthePersonal

propertiesareabstractedfromourminds,‘therewillstillremaininourthoughtthedivine

Nature...theonePersonalityofGod,astheJewsconsider’.TheChristianconceptionofGod,

then,isnotunderminedbythementalabstractionoftheTrinitytherefrom:itmaybe

devoidoftheplenituderenderedspirituallyaccessiblebyexplicitrecognitionofthe

TrinitariandimensionsoftheoneGod,butitremainsnonethelessanadequatedoctrinal

expressionoftheonetrueGodpostulatedbyallmonotheistictraditions.TheChristian

theologianmightregardtherelationshipbetweenthiskindofunitaryconceptionofGod

andthefull‐bloodedTrinitarianconceptionofGodasbeinganalogoustotherelationship

between,ontheonehand,anabstract,purelymentalconceptionofacircle,which,being

onlyaconceptioninthemind,isdevoidofanyobjectivedimensionsinspace;and,onthe

other,aconcreteperceptionofanactualsphereexistinginspace.TheChristiancanthen

argueboththattheMuslim/JewishconceptionofGodisidenticaltotheChristian

conceptionofGod—bothpositthesameconceptual‘circle’;andthattheChristiangoesone

stepfurther,bygraspingthedimensionswhicharemissingfromthatconception—the

concretemanifestationoftheabstractcircleasanactualsphere.Theshiftfromtheoneto

theothermightbeseenassymbolizingtheshiftfromtranscendencetoimmanence,or

simply:theactbywhichGodbecomesincarnateinJesus—thefocalpointoftheological

incompatibilitybetweenthetwotraditions.TheTrinitybothanticipatesandresultsfrom

themysteryoftheincarnation,andforthisreasonoughttoremainbracketedoutofany

efforttoestablishcommontheologicalgroundbetweenthetwotraditions,thiscommon

groundbeingconstitutedbytheaffirmationoftheabsolutetranscendenceoftheoneand

onlydivinity.

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Aquinas—andwithhim,theentirescholastictradition,itseems—regardstheshiftfromthe

onenessofGodtotheTrinityasbeingashiftfromgeneral‘metaphysics’116tospecific

‘theology’.117ThethreenessofGodisagreatermystery—greaterinthesenseofmorefully

transcendentvis‐à‐visthecreaturelycategoriesofthoughtandbeing—thanisthemerely

metaphysicalorphilosophicalonenessofGod.Thisonenessissomethingthatboththe

JewsandtheGreeksunderstood;thethreenessofGod,however,spirituallytrumpsthis

abstractconception,itmoreadequatelyrevealstheintrinsicincapacityofhumanthought

toattainknowledgeofthemysteryofGod:‘thefoolishnessofGodiswiserthanmen’(1

Corinthians,1:25);italsoeffectivelyforeshadowsthedoctrineofsalvationthroughthe

Cross,whichis‘untotheJewsastumblingblock,anduntotheGreeksfoolishness’(1

Corinthians,1:23).118Allthreemysteries—Trinity,IncarnationandtheRedemption

wroughtthroughtheCrucifixion—aresummedupinthechallengingenunciationbyby

VladimirLossky,citedearlier:‘ThedogmaoftheTrinityisacrossforhumanwaysof

thought.’

SotheChristiantheologiancanplaceMuslimsinthesamecategoryastheJews:asSt

Irenaeussaid,insofarastheJewsbelieveinGod,loveHimandpractisevirtue,they‘reveal

oneandthesameGod’.119Throughhisdetailedelaborationofthedoctrinepertainingtothe

uniquenature/EssenceofGod,then,Aquinashelpstorenderexplicitwhatisimpliedin

suchstatementsbyIrenaeusabouttheJews,andthosemadebytheauthoritiescitedabove

aboutMuslims:thisuniqueEssenceisthecommongrounduponwhichallmonotheistscan

cometogetherandassertwithunanimitythattheybelieveinthesameGod.Letusalsonote                                                            116 Which we would prefer to call ontology or philosophy, reserving metaphysics for such perspectives as those of Eckhart and Ibn al‐‘Arabī, perspectives which reveal the limitations of theology; see footnote 2. 117 See for example St Bonaventure’s treatise, ‘The Soul’s Journey into God’, where the final three chapters address, in clearly ascending hierarchical order, the unity of God, the Trinity, and then the flight into ‘spiritual and mystical ecstasy’. Bonaventure—The Soul’s Journey into God, The Tree of Life, The Life of St Francis, tr. and ed. Ewert Cousins, (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1978), pp.94‐116. 118 St Gregory of Nyssa writes that the Christian faith is distinct both from the monotheism of the Jews and the polytheism of the Greeks, a point of view which is summed up by St John of Damascus who writes in his De Fide Orthodoxa (I, 7): ‘On the one hand, of the Jewish idea we have the unity of God’s nature and, on the other, of the Greek, we have the distinction of hypostases—and that only.’ Cited by Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, op.cit., p.363. 119 Even if he also asserts that only through the Son can the Jews be liberated from slavery to God and become friends of God. See Five Books of S. Irenaeus Against Heresies, op.cit., book 4, ch.13. 4. 

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thatAquinas’sstatementthatitispossibletoabstracttheTrinityfromone’sconceptionof

God,withoutruiningone’sconceptionofthisEssence,isimpliedinthefollowing

declarationoftheFourthLateranCouncil.AfterstatingthepositionofJoachim,who

rejectedthatofPeterLombard,thefollowingstatementismade:

We,however,withtheapprovalofthissacredanduniversalcouncil,believeand

confesswithPeterLombardthatthereexistsacertainsupremereality,

incomprehensibleandineffable…eachofthethreePersonsisthatreality—thatis

tosaysubstance,essenceordivinenature—whichaloneistheprincipleofallthings,

besideswhichnootherprinciplecanbefound.Thisrealityneitherbegetsnoris

begottennorproceeds;theFatherbegets,theSonisbegottenandtheholySpirit

proceeds.120

AlongsidethedogmaticaffirmationoftheidentityofeachofthethreePersonswiththe

Essence,thereisareferencetothatEssenceintermswhichclearlyindicatethepossibility

ofdistinguishingItfromthePersons,andthus,inversely,thepossibilityofabstractingthe

PersonsfromtheEssencewithoutdetrimenttoone’sconceptionoftheintrinsicnatureof

theEssence;thisessentialnaturebeingdefinedinthisconciliartextbythefactthatit

‘neitherbegetsnorisbegottennorproceeds’.WeareremindedhereofEckhart’s

statement,citedabove:forGodtoseeinsidetheOne‘wouldcostHimallHisdivinenames

andpersonalproperties’;onlyinsofarasGodisoneandindivisible,‘neitherFather,Sonnor

HolyGhost’,canHeseeorenterintotheOnenessthatEckharthasdiscovered.Ashesaid,

whendefendinghimselfagainsttheaccusationsofheresy:‘AlthoughinGodtheFather

essenceandpaternityarethesame,Hedoesnotgenerate[theSon]insofarasheisessence,

butinsofarasHeisFather,eventhoughtheessenceistherootofthegeneration.’121

ItisdebatablewhetherAquinaswouldhaveacceptedtheimplicationthatEckhartdraws

fromthefactthattheEssenceisthe‘rootofthe‘generation’,namely,thattheEssence

transcendstheTrinity,accordingtothesameprinciplebywhichGodheadtranscendsGod,

                                                            120 From the website cited above: http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/1215‐1215,_Concilium_Lateranum_IIII,_Documenta_Omnia,_EN.pdf.  121 Cited by Denys Turner, The Darkness of God, op.cit., p.154. 

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Beyond‐BeingtranscendsBeing,everycauseontologicallyprecedesitseffect,orastheroot

haspriorityoverthetree.ButonecanarguenonethelessthatforAquinastheunityofthe

divineEssenceisthephilosophical‘infrastructure’ofthedogmaoftheTrinity:onehasto

understandfirstwhattheessenceornatureofGodis,andonthisbasisproceedto

discussionofGodquaTrinity.AndthisindeediswhytheSummastartswithatreatiseon

theunityofGodandthenproceedstotheTrinity.122This,togetherwiththefactthathe

acceptsthattheunitarianconceptionofGodremainsvalidonitsownlevel,evenifthe

Trinitarianconceptionbeabstractedfromit,meansthatitisentirelylegitimatefor

ChristianstoinvokeAquinas’sperspectivesoutlinedhereasjustificationforpositingthe

uniqueEssenceofGodasthatinwhichChristians,MuslimsandJewsbelieve,irrespective

ofthefactthatbothMuslimsandJewsdisbelieveintheTrinity.

FromtheMuslimpointofview,theChristianconceptionofatranscendentEssencewhich

‘neitherbegetsnorisbegotten123norproceeds’inthewordsoftheFourthLateranCouncil,

canformthebasisuponwhichtheaffirmationcanbemadethatChristiansandMuslimsdo

indeedbelieveinthesameGod;but,addedtothisaffirmationwillcomearejectionofthe

verydoctrines—theTrinityandtheIncarnation—whichtheChristiansdeemtobethe

ultimatefulfilmentofmonotheism.Andhereinliesthecoreofthemutualtheological

irreducibilitybetweenthetwotraditions;however,thisincompatibilitycanbeacceptedon

onelevel,withoutcompromisingthecompatibilityachievedatanother:eachcanrecognise

theotherasafellow‐believerintheonetrueGod.Inotherwords,therecanbeagreement

asregardsthefactthatGodisoneandtranscendsallthings,anddisagreementoverthe

claimthatGodisalsothreeandisuniquelyimmanentinJesusChrist.Buttheagreement

cantakepriorityoverthedisagreement,fortheagreementissituatedontheuniversal

groundofmonotheism,andinrelationtothetranscendentEssenceoftheoneGodwhich                                                            122 This is the basic argument of Rudi Te Velde: ‘The treatment of the Trinity presupposes therefore a 

prior clarification of God’s activity, which in turn presupposes a clarification of the divine essence (or 

substance), since the activity follows upon the being of the subject of activity (agere sequitur esse).’ 

Aquinas on God—The ‘Divine Science’ of the Summa Theologiae (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p.69. 

123 One is reminded here of the fundamental verses of the chapter of sincerity/purity (112): ‘Say: God is One; God, the Eternally subsistent. He begetteth not, nor is begotten, and there is nothing comparable to Him.’ 

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definestheverytermsofthatmonotheism;whereasthedisagreementissituatedonthe

particulargroundofChristiantheology,andinrelationtothePersonsofaTrinitywhich

canbeabstractedfrombeliefinGod,withoutthisabstractionnegatingorunderminingthe

essentialpostulateofmonotheism:beliefinoneGod.

AffirmingthiscommongroundoftranscendenceispreciselywhatFrithjofSchuoncallsfor:

hestressestheneedfor‘spiritualsolidarity’betweenallthose‘whotraditionallytake

cognizanceoftranscendenceandimmortality’.124Asregardsthequestionposedhere,

MuslimsandChristianscertainlybelievein‘transcendence’;theywillagreethatGodis

absolutelytranscendent,butwilldisagreeabouthowthistranscendentdivinityrelatesto

andispresentwithin,thecreatedworld;thatistosay,theywilldisagreeaboutthe

modalitiesofdivineimmanence,ashasbeenstressedrepeatedlyinthisessay.Itisthus

significantthatSchuondoesnottalkaboutimmanenceinthiscontextof‘spiritual

solidarity’betweenbelieversofdifferenttraditions.Forthestressontranscendence,by

contrast,allowsonetobuildabridgeofunanimity,notjustbetweenthetheologiesofIslam

andChristianity,butalsobetweenallthegreatreligioustraditionsoftheworld.Asregards

immanence,itisonlyontheesotericplanethatthetwotraditionsmightbeseentobein

harmony,butevenonthisplanetherearesignificantdifferencesasregardsspiritual

accentuation.125

But,returningtotranscendence,bothtraditionsareatoneasregardsallthekeyfeaturesof

theessentialnatureofGod,definedabovebyStThomasas‘somethingexistingaboveall

things,theprincipleofallthings,andremovedfromallthings’.Wehaveseenthat,

metaphysically,thiscommonbeliefisrenderedirrefutablyself‐evident,whereas

theologicallyithasalltoooftenbeenobscuredbehindimpenetrableveilsofconflicting

                                                            124 Schuon makes it clear that he does not believe it possible or desirable to establish ‘a generalized metaphysical or quintessential understanding’, a project which he regards as ‘self‐defeating in practice’; rather, what he has in view is simply the possibility of ‘an adequate understanding’ for the sake of upholding the quintessence of the spiritual heritage of mankind, summed up in the principles of the transcendence of the Absolute, and the immortality of the soul. F. Schuon, Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.5. 125 See our forthcoming essay, ‘Light upon Light? The Qur’ān and the Gospel of St John’.  

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linguisticformulations.WiththehelpofStThomas,though,wecanframethiscommon

beliefintermsofphilosophicaltheology—something,thatistosay,half‐waybetween

theologyandmetaphysics—focusingonthetranscendentcommonground,theunique

EssenceofGod,andlegitimatelybracketoutthedoctrineoftheTrinityforthepurposesof

affirmingbeliefinthatuniqueEssence.

ThisabstractionoftheTrinityfromtheChristianconceptionofGod,forthepurposesof

affirmingsolidaritywithfellow‐monotheists,bynomeansimpliesanyderogationofthe

TrinitybyChristians.Onthecontrary,itservestodeepenthemysteryoftheTrinityby

denyingthatitcaninwaybebroughtwithinthepurviewof‘ordinary’monotheism:the

Trinityisanextraordinaryinstanceofmonotheism,onewhichspurnsallpurelynatural

reasoning,andcallsouttobegraspedbythesupernaturalmeanspropertospecifically

Christianfaith.Aswehaveseenabove,thisiswhatStThomasinsistsupon;anythingshort

ofthis—anyattempttodemonstrateorprovetherealityoftheTrinity‘derogatesfrom

faith’.Moreover,andsurprisingasitmayseem,thisveryrighttograntTrinitariandogmaa

divinerightofexemptionfromtherulesoflogic,andallmerely‘natural’modesofreason,

canserveboththeChristianandtheMuslimtheologianintheirefforttoembraceeach

otherasfellow‐believers.126

FortheChristiancanclaimthatnothingessentialabouttheTrinityissacrificedinthis

embrace:inaffirmingwithMuslimsacommonbeliefinthetranscendentunityofGod,one

isaffirmingbeliefinoneaspectofthedoctrineoftheTrinity—therationallydemonstrable

unityofthecommonnaturesharedbythethreePersons;whileatthesametimekeeping

intactthespecificallyChristianmysterypropertotheotheraspectoftheTrinity—thefact

thatitisbeyondallrationaldemonstration,orratherthatitsdivine‘logic’onlybecomes

                                                            126 What Schuon says about ‘true ecumenism’ is pertinent here: ‘either it involves an understanding between the religions which is based upon their common interests in the face of a danger that threatens them all, or it may call into play the wisdom that can discern the one sole truth under the veil of different forms.’ Logic and Transcendence, op.cit., p.182. In this final section of the essay we have focused on the ‘common interests’ of all believers in the face of the dangers posed by atheism; whereas in section two of the essay, our concern was with the ‘wisdom which discerns the sole truth under the veil of different forms’.   

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apparentthroughplumbingthemysteriesofcontemplativefaith.Forhispart,theMuslim

theologiancanlikewiseaffirmwithChristiansacommonbeliefinthetranscendentunityof

God,withoutthisaffirmationinanywayimplyingacceptanceoftheTrinity:whatfor

ChristiansisbeyondallrationaldemonstrationisforMuslimssimplyillogical.

Inthisway,thetheologiansofbothtraditionscanexercisetheirright—socrucialtothe

definitionofthetheologianperse—tobearwitnesstotheirfaith,doingsointhevery

bosomoftheirbrotherlyembraceasfellowbelievers.Asnotedabove,theChristiancan

quoteStPaul’sdeclarationtotheAthenians:‘Whomthereforeyeignorantlyworship,Him

declareIuntoyou.’TheChristianinvitationtotheMuslimsmightbeenvisagedasfollows:

wenotonlybelieveintheone,transcendentGodasyoudo,but,inaddition,webelievethat

thisveryGodbecamemanwithoutsacrificinganyofHistranscendence;andthatthe

miraculousnatureofthisincarnation,onceitisacceptedandempoweredbyfaith,will

allowyoutoseethattheTrinityisinfacttheleastinadequateexpressionofthefull

plenitude,profoundmystery,andsalvificpowerofthedivinenature.

Forhispart,theMuslimtheologiancanembraceChristiansasfellow‐monotheists,while

invitingthemtoconsiderthecrystallineconsummationofthedefiningprincipleofthe

monotheismtheyshareincommon:lāilāhailla’Llāh,‘nodivinitybutGod’,suchasitis

expressedinamyriadwaysbyGod’sultimaterevelationtoman,theGloriousQur’ān.Once

itisacceptedthattheQur’āncompletesthecycleofpropheticrevelation,andthereby—

uniquelyamongworldscriptures—confirmsthevalidityofallpreviousrevelationsofGod,

andallpreviousProphets;andthatitrestoresnotjustthepristinepurityofthefaithof

Abraham,butalsotheprimordialnatureofmanassuch(al‐fitra),doingsothroughanall‐

embracing‘lawandaway’providentiallyadaptedtomeetboththeparticularneedsofman

inthislastphaseofthecycleofhumanityandtheuniversalneedsofallhumancultures

untiltheendofthisphase—whenthisisaccepted,thenitisentirelylogicaltotakethenext

step:followinthefootstepsofthelastMessengerwhowassentbyGodasthe‘sealofthe

Prophets’,hewhoembodiedtoperfectionboththeoutwardclarityandtheinnermystery

oftheMessagewithwhichhewascharged.Inotherwords,theinvitationwillbetoaddto

theuniversalmonotheisticprinciple,expressedbythefirsttestimony,‘nodivinitybutGod’,

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thespecificallyIslamicappeal,nottoGodbecomeman,butto‘thePerfectMan’(al‐Insānal‐

kāmil),thisbeingexpressedbythesecondtestimony:‘MuhammadistheMessengerof

God’.