This article was downloaded by: [Bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal]On: 01 December 2014, At: 13:59Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Israel AffairsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20

Diaspora Nationality vs Diaspora Nationalism: AmericanJewish Identity and Zionism after the Jewish StateAlice A. Butler-Smith aa Dr. Alice A. Butler-Smith is assistant professor of History at the School of Advanced MilitaryStudies, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, and adjunct faculty in Middle East History at theUniversity of Kansas, Lawrence, KansasPublished online: 15 Apr 2009.

To cite this article: Alice A. Butler-Smith (2009) Diaspora Nationality vs Diaspora Nationalism: American Jewish Identity andZionism after the Jewish State, Israel Affairs, 15:2, 159-179, DOI: 10.1080/13537120902734434

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537120902734434

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Diaspora Nationality vs DiasporaNationalism: American JewishIdentity and Zionism after the

Jewish State

ALICE A. BUTLER-SMITH

Shall we perhaps begin anew,small and toddling with a small folk?We two, homeless and wandering among the nations?Begin once more! Be the small God of a small people!Us didst thou choose.Thou hast chosen us.A small God. A small people.They have acclaimed us both as great,in order to scatter us as dustAnd to undo us completely.Why did you abandon your tabernacle and your small tent,faring forth to become the god of the Universe?Save yourself! Together with the pilgrims, return,return to a small land.Become once more the small God of a small people.1

The American Jewish community was on the ‘threshold of history’, IsraelKnox wrote at the end of 1946.2 Regardless of time or place, Jewish self-perception has always been complex and fraught with ambiguities. Untilrecently a people with no option but Diaspora, it continuously sought todefine its nationhood in spiritual, cultural, territorial and racial contextsand terms. Whenever these unresolved tensions encountered newcircumstances, ideas or dramatic events, the result was a period ofreassessment of personal and communal identity in relation to the changedenvironment. It was at once a vague, varied and ever changing sense of self.

Israel Affairs, Vol.15, No.2, April 2009, pp.159–179ISSN 1353-7121 print/ISSN 1743-9086 online

DOI: 10.1080/13537120902734434 q 2009 Taylor & Francis

Dr. Alice A. Butler-Smith is assistant professor of History at the School of Advanced MilitaryStudies, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas, and adjunct faculty in Middle East History at theUniversity of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

There were no two more significant or defining moments in modern Jewishhistory than the Holocaust and the realization of Jewish nationalaspirations in Palestine. As American Jews entered into this new decade oftransition—one which most agreed found them with ‘new status and newself-consciousness’—it was an opportunity that required them to develop‘an understanding of the American Jew in terms of the American scene, aswell as in relation to Jews abroad, an analysis of his institutional andcommunal experience as a Jew, and a redefinition of values, an appraisal ofthe content of Jewishness’.3 And as Etta Blum’s poem (above) intimates, thequestions that remained were issues most fundamental to Jewish identity.As they found resolution, the Jewish community, particularly in America,found its place and purpose for the first time.

A comparison between American and Jewish identities in dimension,arena and orientation sheds important light on the complexities of theJewish community and is essential to an appreciation of the perpetualtensions, and personal and communal evaluation processes. Thosedifferences in histories and outlooks carry implications for the relationshipbetween the Jewish community and non-Jewish majority, and ultimatelyfor the role Jews find for themselves in American society. The chronologicaldimension of self-understanding illustrates the most striking differencebetween Jew and America with a concomitant difference in attitudetowards time. America is new, where a new man, divested of any traditionentertained new ideas. By contrast Jews have a historical orientation thatoriginated in the generations of Judaism. So Americans see time asprecious—and in national terms have engaged in a race for continent,treasure and possession. For the Jew time has been marked from creation.American history seems ‘closed’ at both ends: it has a clear beginning,direction and destination. Jewish history is ‘open’: God made the beginningand the end and ‘the creation of the world merges indefinitely into thecreation of the Law and the mystery of truth’. The Messiah has alwaysbeen ‘about’ to come. American history has taken place within the arena of‘nature’ but Jewish history has unfolded in society, so accomplishment wasdefined within these distinctly different contexts. Americans tamed andexploited nature, Jews survived persecution within many differentcontexts. Americans have valued practical education and tend towardslegalism while Jews tackled the ‘eternal’ conceptions of the Law. Jewry hasalways searched for the definition of a Jew—Americans were citizens witha creed in the shortest order. The United States found summation in linearmovement across a map and has most often emphasized quantity—aconcept totally at odds with Jewish history which instead valued mentalexploration and perfection while living in a microcosm.4

The Jew has known older days, and they were days of constant thinkingand speculating; he has older eyes and ears than most people. . . and the

ISRAEL AFFAIRS160

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

Jewish mind was a mind in motion. . . often acutely tensed with strain.The Jew was always in the midst of the Jewish fact and the Jewishproblem. He might forsake them, they never forsook him.5

Although Jews were in America from 1754, the federal government beganto count the number of people immigrating to the United States whobelonged to the ‘Hebrew race’ in 1900. There were already about 1 millionAmerican Jews by that time. In spite of various Congressional efforts torestrict immigration, over the next 25 years an additional 2 million Jewscame to America. Many of the institutions that would later definecommunal character began to develop in that vibrant period of AmericanJewish history. Until the end of World War II, the population increased onlyslightly under restrictive immigration regulation designed to limit thenumber of East Europeans, particularly those who were Jews, entering theUnited States. By the time Congress finally revised the law to permit greaternumbers of war refugees to enter the US, Israel was a state. And it was Israelthat relieved much of the pressure by taking nearly 200,000 of the JewishDisplaced Persons (DPs) from the refugee camps in Europe. Nonetheless,the consequences of World War II and the extermination camps left the USwith the largest national Jewish population of nearly 5 million souls.6

The notion that Jewry has a communal quality that transcends nationalboundaries is as common as it is old, yet the phrase ‘Jewish community’ onlycame into use in America in the late 1880s. It emerged from the specifichistorical context of emancipation as a way to describe and sustain the ideaof a corporate identity—but in terms that were sufficiently neutral, if notambiguous. These qualities allowed community members to enjoy civilequality while avoiding notice as a Jewish minority and the potential dangersof anti-Semitism. It was equally practical for its inclusiveness. In fact, thephrase ‘Jewish community’ came to mean virtually the same thing to Jewsand non-Jews alike: it implied a unity that encompassed the variously definedreligious and cultural aspects of being Jewish, national and ethnic ties thatexisted between individuals, and the political aspirations of Jews acrossnational boundaries. Jews were thus bound together by an understanding, orimplicit consent, but not in any strict sense or by any single link.7 To put itanother way, it was ‘a community held together by the strength andmagnetism at its core rather than by any clear boundaries at its periphery’.8

This vagueness both reflected and perpetuated a complex diversity ofthought with regard to Jewish identity—in cultural, religious, and ethnicterms—of a practical and philosophical nature in relation to US citizenshipand its consequences. The Jewish experience outside America had requiredstrategies for communal survival owing to persecution, as a group withminority status living in a hostile environment. Life in the ghetto andbeyond the pale had clearly distinguished Jews from Gentiles socially andculturally. Whether that segregation was the result of voluntary separation

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 161

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

or was externally enforced, it often strengthened people’s commitments tothe community and its religion. In fact, it enhanced perceptions of self-worth and ethnic pride. And for those few who would continue to viewsuffering in a theological context, persecution was even closely bound upwith divine destiny.9 But the openness, freedom and liberties in the USpresented entirely different challenges to that survival. Typicallyemancipation and modernization had led to a decrease in Jews’ religiouscharacter and consequently to civil and national identity. Because theseidentities overlapped, the process of adjusting to tolerance was particularlyconvoluted.10 Some questioned whether Jews would be able to participatefully in society as individuals and still retain their character and identity asa community. At a time when Jewish immigration to America was at itspeak, the fear—or challenge—was that a religion and culture that hassustained itself against ‘the billows of hatred and storms of persecution[would] melt. . . away like wax under the mild rays of freedom’.11

Until the 1920s American Jews were essentially a community ofimmigrants. Perspectives on the nature of that community have varied.In some respects the newness of American Jews as a group and the influx ofnew immigrants obscured, or even precluded, the existence of a singlecommunity. Some have gone so far as to suggest that a ‘genuine’ Jewishcommunity did not yet exist, but that there were two communities. Thenative, or German population and the East European ‘Russian’ immigrantswere indeed separated by disparities in wealth, religious orientation and,by virtue of differing lengths of tenure in America, also prestige. As onemight expect, the established community had greater wealth and lookeddown on the new immigrants who were poor, distinctly apolitical andOrthodox. The Reform and Orthodox were distrustful of each other andboth disapproved of the secular ideology of the Jewish labour union.12

Earlier immigrants from central and western Europe were influenced bytheir exposure to republicanism. As elites were pitted against theimmigrant masses, political differences divided conservatives from liberals,and democrats from socialists. And the traditional leadership of theestablished German Jewish population was challenged by the largenumbers of East Europeans who hoped to form one all-encompassingnational American Jewish community.13

All of these differences worked against cohesiveness and unity ofpurpose except in the most extreme circumstances and they translatedthemselves into a plethora of organizations. By 1920 the JewishCommunal Register of New York City listed a total of 3600organizations.14 In fact some years later an observer noted that, ‘to beJewish is to belong to an organization’.15 This kind of over-organizationtogether with lack of coordination—and even competition—was to beone of the more enduring characteristics of the American Jewishcommunity generally, whether in intra-communal activities or in relation

ISRAEL AFFAIRS162

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

to the non-Jewish world. In spite of a strong sense of community,factionalism ultimately limited its effectiveness and would continue toprevent the establishment of any effective national representative body.Perhaps, more importantly, it often contributed to perceptions, somecontradictory and some already existing ones, about the weight andascendancy of the small minority. One of the most persistent consequencesof the inability to organize was the duplication and overlapping of efforts.Often when confronted with a barrage of requests or petitions on a subjectof interest to the Jewish community, non-Jewish recipients’ initial responsewas to the pressure of what they felt was a powerful monolith akin to the‘Jewish conspiracy’. The more observant were confused by seeminglysimilar representations from an array of organizations. This combinedwith their existing predispositions would often put them off regardless ofthe nature of the appeal.16 Although this trend persisted, by the late 1930sAmerican Jews recognized that, as one of several minorities, they mightfind strength as a ‘majority’ by combining to claim equality. It was inactuality the old socialistic strategy on which they had relied 50 yearsearlier, but with an American twist: protect the American people as awhole, and defend all of its component parts, or groups, at the same time.By endorsing fairness in education, business and accommodation laws andpractices for others, one’s minority status becomes irrelevant.17

While the US may not have provided a unique environment for fosteringnational communal unity—any more than any other national context—itwas singular for the historical context it provided for the development,expression and self-perception of the community, and ultimately the role itfound for itself in relation to the larger world Jewish community. VeteranZionist Ahad Ha’am noted American exceptionalism in ‘America’sexemption from the workings of an iron law of anti-Semitism’.18 In hisreflection on American Jewish culture another author said simply, ‘ForJews, America is different’.19 Although questions of emancipation and self-emancipation that were central in the Diasporas particularly of Europewere no longer relevant, some concerns persisted about assimilation,whether by choice in a democratic environment, or as a result of externalpressures.20 There was also the fear that the freedom and equality to whichmany had become accustomed might somehow be qualified: ‘TheAmerican Jew is not fully accustomed to his new security and alternatelyrevels in it and doubts it. . . [he] knows that his quest for status within thegeneral community has pre-defined limits.’21 So the problem both for Jewsand for Judaism in America continued—marginality and identity.22

Debates over political rights and equality for Jews living in Americawere of course long since settled in every real sense, though at a personaland even a communal level they remained unresolved. A famous Polishfolk-tale recounted the story of a thoroughly assimilated Jew who was stillfrightened by the sound of barking dogs—a reminder of those who

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 163

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

belonged to a Christian farmer whose home he passed daily as a child onhis way home from school. Looking back over ‘The Golden Age’ ofAmerican Jewish history, 1945–1967, one contemporary argued thatpsychologically the ‘dogs still bark[ed] for the American Jew. . . In America,as elsewhere in the long history of their Diaspora. . . Jews [were] still inexile’.23 This Jew of the post-war era was different from his ancestors whorecognized and accepted their alien status.

much of the ambivalence of the American Jew toward himself stemsfrom his pathetic confusion: he knows that in many non-Jewish hearts heis regarded as a stranger, while in his own heart he stubbornly refuses tobe one. . . When he has tried to forget that he is a Jew, the others haveremembered. But when he tries to remember that he is a Jew, he oftenforgets how to be one.

Critical of the secular middle class and intellectuals alike, he could onlyprophesy the continued alienation of the middle class Jew from the Angloneighbours he hoped to imitate, and the rejection of the thinker by hisfellow Jews. Religious identification was perverted in the first instance andunattainable in the second.24

The most significant response to the persistent themes of alienation, exileand integration was Jewish nationalism. The putatively indeterminate natureof the ‘authentic Jew’ and questions that persisted from the turn of thetwentieth century about whether Jews—authentic or otherwise—would everbe able to adjust permanently to life in the US supplied supporters for theJewish home in Palestine. Zionism was particularly important as a vent forthe fears of the second generation. Problems of social and economicadjustment, anti-Semitism, finding their place in American culture all existedwithin the context of the American Jewish ‘burden’. The movement hadseveral significant features. Advocates of Zionism increasingly saw that theircommitment was to the solution of the Jewish problem. It was not a rigidideology and, by supporting its general aspiration, they in no way denied thepossibilities of successful life in exile. In fact American Jews did not expectthat they would be the ones to leave the US and settle in Palestine. Thisincrease in nationalist sentiment in the period leading up to World War IIenhanced support for communal unity. Non-Zionists who were accustomedto centralization in the East European tradition believed a unified authoritywas necessary for Jewish survival. And they were joined by supporters ofZionism who thought of Jewry as a ‘peoplehood’ imbued with politicalcharacteristics that should be realized in the US as well as Palestine.25

A PEOPLE AND A CAUSE IN SEARCH OF THEMSELVES

‘For Americans, America is Zion; but for Jews even the achievement of aJewish state does not make Zion attained.’26 These words encapsulated the

ISRAEL AFFAIRS164

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

range of questions posed by the creation of Israel for Jews everywhere, butparticularly for American Jewry—questions of religion, nationality,relationship, exile, dispersion and identity. They were utterly fundamentalideas about which there had never been consensus—Judaism, Zionism andthe place of American Jews in relation to their government and the non-Jewish environment in which they lived: ‘Who is a Jew’ and ‘Who is aZionist’?

The realization of Zionism put all of these old issues back on the tableand demanded resolution and redirection. Jews everywhere recognizedthat the communal centre of gravity might well be shifting to Israel whereIsraeli Jews would become the repository of the Jewish future and thoughtthere might well be unpleasant practical consequences. Speaking at aCommonwealth Conference in Israel in 1950, its chairman outlined whatall Jews knew:

we shall have need to consider the implications of our legal position vis-a-vis the Government of Israel and our respective Governments,because. . . it imposes on us important duties and restraints and gives usimportant rights. In strictness Israel is legally a foreign state, but for Jewsto regard Israel only as a foreign state is. . . a moral impossibility. Undernormal conditions of peace civilized Governments cannot fail torecognize the spiritual connection of their Jewish citizens with Israel,which to religious Jews and even to Jews without any particular religiousaffiliation is something more and in certain aspects something greaterthan a political unit of the type of modern state.27

Jews had feared accusations of dual loyalty since the Balfour Declaration,and the existence of Israel raised the issue again but much more urgently.Their sensitivity about this threat exceeded tangible evidence of awidespread sentiment, at least among non-Jews in Western countries,which would produce such charges.28 It remained a topic of debate in theAmerican Jewish community through most of the 1950s and was kept aliveand used by anti-Zionists—Christians and Jews—who were fairly small innumber.

Some Christian denominations that had sponsored mission work inPalestine as early as the 1840s remained solidly ‘pro-Arab’ after Israelbecame a state—notably the Quakers. But among the most visible non-Jewish anti-Zionists at the time of Israel’s statehood was DorothyThompson and members of her organization, American Friends of theMiddle East. Their predisposition was also ‘pro-Arab’ and the names ofunabashed anti-Semites were on its membership roll. She worked withintellectuals, philanthropists and religious groups and maintained ties withthe Near East Society, the Near East Foundation, and the Near EastCollege Association, universities such as Harvard and Lafayette, as well assuch important Christian organizations as the World Council of Churches

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 165

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

and the National Council of Churches.29 In 1950—as the debate overnational loyalty was reaching a pitch—she denied that ‘minorities’ existedin America and wrote, ‘[t]he concept and the basis of the United Statesprecludes them’. Thompson disdained ‘hyphenates’, and acknowledgedonly a ‘latent’ interest in Zionism among the Orthodox. It was Hitler whogave the ‘greatest impetus to Jewish nationalism’. Her biggest concern wasthat a world Zionist movement would come ‘under the political disciplineof the state it has created’.30

Rabbi Elmer Berger, the ideologue and architect of the anti-ZionistCouncil for American Judaism, shared some of Thompson’s perspective,though his motives were different. He originally formed the organizationto fight the creation of Israel. Berger railed against the evils of Zionism,Jewish nationalism and non-Zionism—all of which contributed to thedecline of American Judaism and which were an assault on the Americancitizenship of Jews. The crux of his argument was that Jews wereassociated only by virtue of a shared universal faith—Judaism representedonly a religion, not a nationality or a people. Berger’s Americans of Jewishfaith were descendants of the prophets who, ‘conceived a Judaism elevatedabove tribal or nationalistic horizons’. The demons of Jewish nationalismwere produced by Herzl who introduced the notion of the ‘Jewish people’which had ‘no validity in Judaism. It [did] not exist in any of the sacredwritings of the Jews. . . and [was] a perversion and vulgarization of thephrase “people of Israel”’.31 It was a view that had been widely discreditedon historical and theological grounds. His views, and those of similarmind, both fed and fed off the Dorothy Thompsons of the time.By rejecting all aspects of ‘Jewishness’ and ‘community’ save religion,Berger was, in all ways that counted, an assimilationist.32 Animated byhatred and a fear of anti-Semitism perhaps more than Biblicalinterpretation, anti-Zionists tended to give important additional weightto their non-Jewish counterparts.33

The much more imminent threat than this agitation on the peripherywas conflict between Israel and the Diaspora. ‘[A] practical issuethreaten[ed] to divide Jews from each other. . . the theory passionatelyheld by some and equally passionately denounced by others, that the finalconsummation of Jewishness is the taking up of permanent residence in theland of Israel.’34 The issue of exile was a sensitive one for all Jews, butperhaps more so for American Jews as the largest and most visiblesupporters of Zionism over the previous 50 years. It became very publicwhen the prime minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, began stating openlythat the next task consisted in bringing all the Jews to Israel, ‘becausethe State of Israel was created not only for its inhabitants, but for theingathering of the exiles, a task perhaps more difficult than both theestablishment of the State and the War of Independence put together’.35 Hefired the first shot at a Zionist banquet in New York when he interjected

ISRAEL AFFAIRS166

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

into a discussion, ‘A Zionist is a person who settles in Israel’.36 It becamebitter when he engaged in open debate at the World Zionist Congress in1951—the first since the creation of Israel—about the centrality of the‘ingathering of the exiles’ to the realization of Zionism:

unlike most Zionists, I believe that the meaning of Zionism is life in theLand of Israel, not an affiliation with a Zionist organisation. . . Whoeverpresupposes the survival of Jews in the dispersion, and wishes along withit the existence of the Jewish people wherever it might be wishes tomaintain the impossible. . . this desire has no way to free itself from innercontradictions. But even as a Zionist I cannot free myself from thequestion of the existence of Judaism in the dispersion. . . what will uniteour grandchildren here and your grandchildren there?. . . the State ofIsrael and the Book of Books.37

Ben-Gurion and many Israelis held that Zionism required ‘fulfilment’—there could be no Zionism in the Diaspora, only in immigrating to Israel,leaving exile, was there meaningful and authentic Jewish life. So theywould continue to challenge, ‘how does Zionism differ from non-Zionismif you do not come and settle with us?’ That single act of aliyah became theheart of Zionism and its acid test.38 Nahum Goldman, co-chairman of theJewish Agency for Palestine, believed that if Ben-Gurion’s understanding ofZionism was to be adopted, organizations abroad would wither tonothing.

The simple statement, acceptable for centuries, ‘I am a Jew’ is no longerfelt to be enough: unless one can testify to a ‘total commitment’ or firmaffiliation with this or that set of principles or this or that program ororganization, one may find one’s right to call oneself a Jew questioned—and one’s right to speak or write as a Jew challenged.39

The most vociferous debate at the Zionist Congress centred on the conceptof exile which had a ‘deeply rooted mystic and religious significance inJewish life’ and which had the most fundamental implications forimmigration. It combined an ‘ideal of the Return to Zion as a precedent forthe coming of the Messiah; the ideal of the Millennium, the perfectibility ofthe world in which we live; and in which Zion is to function as the centre ofJewish life, passing from Redemption to Fulfilment’.40 Or perhaps morethan ideology—the debate was the result of differing philosophies ofhistory among those who were present at the meeting. There were Israelispresent who reiterated Herzl and who argued that what happened toEuropean Jews in World War II could happen anywhere. Ben-Gurion’sparty maintained that there was no future for Jews in the Diaspora. ButAmerican Zionists protested, and drew distinctions between galut or exile,and golah which was dispersion—America may have been the Diasporabut it was certainly not exile. Still there were others from the US who

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 167

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

agreed that indeed galut was every country in the Diaspora, and shouldFascism rise in American, Israel would be a necessary refuge.41 Thiscontroversy was not resolved in 1951, or even by the end of the 1950s.Differences, particularly between the Israelis and the Americans on theCongress’ ‘commission on the fundamental issues of Zionism’, were sosharp that they agreed that no efforts should be made to define a newideological programme for Zionism, but to simply set out the movement’spractical tasks: strengthen the state, gather the exiles, and promote unityamong the Jewish people.42 Ben-Gurion would continue to agitate byposing the question to Zionists year after year—regardless of whether hewas in office or not—was the Zionist movement even feasible after thecreation of the state without the duty of immigration? And if it was, whatduties were incumbent on a Zionist that would distinguish him from onewho was not? Surely without making aliyah Zionism was no more thansentimentalism—no more than any other humanitarian or philanthropicaid given to Israel.

Ben-Gurion exerted additional pressure on Zionists by striking a dealwith non-Zionists—led by Jacob Blaustein, representing the AmericanJewish Committee. Non-Zionists in America were concerned that Zionistswould curry extra favour with Israel especially in the form of political ordiplomatic recognition and were anxious to prevent any for ‘Jews [or]Jewish communities in America or anywhere else outside of Israel’.Leadership in the Zionist Organization was incensed that anyone wouldaccuse them of attempting to exert any more authority in relation to Israelthan they had ever done in pre-state years. Moreover, non-Zionists wereconcerned that Zionists might receive some ‘special status’ or possibly gainleverage that would allow them to ‘interfere in the internal affairs ofAmerican Jews’.43 The American Jewish Committee was equally exercisedat Ben-Gurion’s insistence on speaking for Jews everywhere—at the veryleast giving that appearance in his calls for immigration—insinuating asovereignty over them that seemed improper given that they were nationalsof other countries. By 1950 he and Jacob Blaustein, president of the non-Zionist Committee, issued joint statements setting out the basis of theirworking arrangement. The Israeli prime minister agreed to limit hisauthority to Israeli Jews. More significantly, for his part, Ben-Gurion sawno inconsistency in reaching agreement with non-Zionists. He saw nocontradiction in this with his basic principles which called for aliyah as‘those who [were] not Zionists had chosen a different road from his own’.44

While they may have been wrong, the risks and responsibilities for theirchoice lay with them. After the creation of the state, they merely continuedwith their original work on the basis of their existing ideologicalpredisposition, and that benefited Israel. Immigration was not incumbenton those non-Zionists who did not believe it was required.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS168

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

For Ben-Gurion, and for Israel, there was a practical side to the issue ofingathering—there was a tremendous need in the new nation for peoplewith Western education and expertise. There was widespread but quietconcern throughout the government over the need to create a balanceagainst the huge influx of refugees, as well as the possible threat of‘Levantization’—or the assimilation of Israel into the ‘backwardness’ ofthe Middle East. Of the total number of Jews living outside Israel and theSoviet Union, 80 percent lived in the US. Israel was still experiencing thecleavages that remained between old immigrant groups from differentnational origins. These tensions were exacerbated by the addition ofEuropean DPs. The Jewish Agency Immigration Department outlinedadditional sources of immigration: Nearly 100,000 Jews still lived in theArab countries of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. There were another100,000 in Iran, 4000 in Afghanistan, 50,000 in Turkey, 30,000 in India,500,000 in North Africa, as well as 250,000 in Romania and another50,000 from Europe. This balance in immigration figures illustrates whyIsraelis were anxious to see Americans, and Westerners, come to Israel.

The great and many-sided immigration faces the State and the ZionistMovement not only with problems of economic integration; no lessdifficult and important are the problems of spiritual integration. Themany languages, the differences in standards of life, customs, usages andhabits, and in the forms of reaction, necessitate and demand a supremespiritual effort at once to start in the Diaspora. Its object must be toachieve the coalescence of all communities, to undertake psychologicalpreparation, to deepen the roots of Judaism so that it can be a completeIn-Gathering of the Exiles.45

Of the 40,000 immigrants from Yemen, there was not one doctor amongthem. In some cases those with liberal or technical professions wereprohibited from leaving their countries for Israel. Of course thegovernment saw this as both unhealthy and undesirable. ‘Moreover, thisimmigration [was not] a proper expression to the national structure’ and ‘itdecrease[d] the cultural and professional level of the state’.46

Historian Maurice Samuel noted also that there was a ‘sundering’ ofIsrael and American Jewry—a two-fold separation between ‘contemporaryIsrael and the Jewish past, and between contemporary Israel and the rest ofthe world’.47 Indeed, by the mid-1950s the Israeli Ministry of Educationfelt it necessary for schools to instruct Israelis in Jewish history, religionand culture—‘Jewish consciousness’ classes.48 And even though there wereAmerican technological and cultural influences felt and admired in Israel,there was little if any contact with American Jews, nor was there anymeaning for Israelis in the products of American Jewish thought, faith orculture.49 By the end of the 1950s, Ben-Gurion’s emphasis on halutziot, orthe pioneering spirit in the Land, together with the lack of serious emphasis

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 169

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

on the mind-set of the Diaspora, left a widening ‘psychological gulfbetween those Jews within and those outside Israel’s borders’.50

There was yet another aspect to this complex relationship betweenIsraelis and American Diaspora Jews and it had to do with money. IsraeliZionists, including a generation of native-born Sabra, saw themselves as achosen, front-line, prototype of the Jewish people, with a duty to save anyand all of those in exile ‘for their own good’. But at the same time they hadwhat Rabbi Hertzberger noted as a lack of eagerness ‘to render preciseaccountings of gratitude’ not dissimilar to the British bitterness towardsAmerica and the Marshall Plan. While both wanted more aid—they alsowanted to be on their own as quickly as possible and they resented boththeir sacrifices and their dependency. Israelis, who required assistance forsurvival, could rely on the refugees as the most visible reason for theirpoverty, and at the same time appealed to American guilt by pointing outtheir responsibility to the DPs and for the strains on the Israeli economy.Public opinion in Israel ‘insisted on financial aid without feeling inferior fortaking it’. And while Israelis were ‘passionately engaged in the enterprise offeeling native and indigenous. . . there [was] great admiration forAmerican. . . achievement and a desire to learn and emulate’.51

It was a common view of secular Zionists generally that the destructionof European Jewry, as well as the precarious life of Jews in Asia and Africa,made it incumbent upon American Jews to offer material support as hadbeen its tradition. This responsibility for ‘co-religionists’ greatly increasedby virtue of the role history had thrust upon it, and because of its‘sympathies’ and assets.52 This understanding of Zionist responsibility wascastigated both within the US and abroad. For American Jews it illustratedthe ‘degradation of [the] movement and the barrenness of Zionism. Therise of the promoter and fundraiser spelled the decline of AmericanZionism as an intellectual movement’ and the ‘professional communityorganizers’ largely erased the distinctions between Zionists and non-Zionists.53 At best, Jews abroad failed to recognize that American Jewryhad absorbed aspects of the larger cultural environment and as aconsequence became philanthropic in its outlook and practice. It is fair tosay that mistaking social action for charity was understandable for thoseunaccustomed to the American ‘social gospel’ impulse. At worst, however,the secularization of Zionism was seen as an effort ‘to be like all thenations’ in both its impulse and character.54 While it might have been unfairto criticize secular Zionism for its absence of loftiness, probably the mostscathing implication for Zionist philanthropy was not its ineffectiveness—in comparison to non-Zionists whose raison d’etre was strengthening andsupporting Jewry by administering aid—but that Zionism itself wassomehow solely a response to and remedy for suffering.55 The distinctionsbetween Zionism with a religious orientation and ‘secular’ Zionism were amatter of outlook and principle, and were inherently problematic for the

ISRAEL AFFAIRS170

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

American Jew—if he was going to find his place within that scheme. Notmerely a reaction to persecution, ‘true’ Zionism was a three part concept.First of all Zionism addressed Jews’ desire to live an authentic Jewish life,which had remained unavailable in the Diaspora. Some would have alsosuggested that this life had not been unavailable, but impossible, given thecentrality of the Land of Israel, Ha Eretz, to the notion of a completeJewish existence. Independence and resolution of the social problems ofDiaspora Jewry were the other components, or desires, of Zionism. In otherwords, Israel represented a place where an existing people lived ‘their ownway of life’ in freedom in their own land: ‘Real Zionism involve[d] belief inthe Jewish people and the strong determination that it existed again as anindependent people in Israel in order to fulfil the ideal of Judaism.’56 Astrictly religious perspective on Israel’s character and purpose furthercomplicated the position of American Jews. While all Jews in the Diasporaadopted behaviours and attitudes of those countries where they had lived—and ultimately, by definition, had become secularized—American Jewsposed more of a danger to the creation of an Israeli-Jewish way of life bytheir numbers and potential influence, even if they remained abroad. Thiswas particularly the case in relation to Reform Judaism—a uniquelyAmerican creation that, among other relaxed tenets, provided forconversion to Judaism. So the ideal, or ‘authentic’, Zionist Jew would beborn Jewish, and forge a new independent life in Eretz Israel—a Jewishstate—in which he would adhere to Torah. Thus Judaism, Jewishness andnationality were bound up with religious and historical understandings ofblood and soil.57

A number of factors worked to inhibit American emigration en masse.58

Not the least of these was cost and hardship—doubly unattractive toZionists who never saw their support of the movement in terms of theirown departure from the US. Social idealism had most typically been areserve for intellectuals, and the American Zionist movement wasessentially non-Zionist in the decades before Israel’s statehood. It wasalso suggested that the post-war atmosphere and the lack of moralstrictures that often accompanies this might have put off those who hadbeen inclined toward Israel with a missionary impulse. Fear of beingidentified with communism dampened the political enthusiasm of youngerAmericans. Those who might not have been thoroughly dissuaded toemigrate for any of these reasons probably would have been offended byBen-Gurion, his understanding of Jewish nationalism and his insistencethat, as the prime minister of Israel and the Jewish state, he spoke for allJews everywhere.59

If Americans were repelled for some reason at the idea of moving toIsrael, or if they simply remained unconvinced, they nonetheless joinedIsraelis in their criticisms of American Zionism. While many Israelis simplysaw it as obsolete, American Jews were critical of their own failure to

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 171

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

produce a movement that could meet the practical needs of the new state,as well as defining and supporting the spiritual and cultural requirementsof both Israeli and American Jewry.60 Israel Knox noted for instance thatthe weekly publication of the American Jewish Congress presented itsbelief that it must provide

leadership and guidance for a Jewish way of life in the Americancommunity. . . [as] we cannot make our life as totally Jewish as Palestine’sJews do, we must strive to make it as thoroughly Jewish within theframework of the American democracy as will express our historicawareness and will to survive.

Its contributors added to that theme by suggesting that America fell into amiddle class—between Israel and life in the Land on the one hand and lifein exile on the other.61 Somehow ardent Zionist nationalism in Americahad remained cold to the need for Jewish education and culturaldevelopment in its own community. And at the same time organizationshad become exploitative, competitive and many of them presentedthemselves as the representative voice of American and European Jewryeven though their active memberships were small and the majority of theJewish population remained unaffiliated. Any form of unity remained achimera except for the brief period between 1945 and 1948.

The lowest common denominator between secular and religiousZionists’ goals then was a Jewish state that would protect the beleaguered,safeguard an independent Jewish citizenry, and produce a Jewish society—so what did this mean for Zionism? Did 1948 represent a beginning or theending? American Zionism became ‘a cause in search of itself’. Judd Teller,a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, said that ‘the sorriest lot in somecommunities are the Zionists’.62 And it was a situation that persistedthroughout the 1950s though most were out of the debate. As late as 1957‘that the Zionist movement is in grave decline is well known but littletalked about. After all, one does not talk about a rope in the home of ahanged man’.63 They resented the dominance of the philanthropic anddefence organizations, but had little to suggest for themselves, beyondredefining their purpose and reaffirming their position.

Most looked for ways to create a Jewish identity and awareness inAmerica and offered variously defined efforts at education. But the bottomline was that there was a Jewish state. Now what? Some critics went so far asto argue that Zionism was dead. The fact was that American Zionists’feeling of inadequacy, their declining prestige, and failure to gain anyendorsement or approval from Israel—most importantly from Ben-Gurion—meant that without a new vision of a progressive programmeand purpose, they would not continue. The oft repeated analogy was thatthe American Zionist movement was like the mother who had married offher last child, and who had nothing left to live for. Two years after the Jewish

ISRAEL AFFAIRS172

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

national home was created it was widely recognized, and feared, at thetwenty-third World Zionist Congress that neither the Americans nor Israelishad come to grips with their new circumstances. The Jewish movement forindependence had produced a sovereign people with a sovereigngovernment and, while proud, the American Jews who had helped tobring this about were uncertain of their position.64 And they were fatigued.

Since 1933 American Jewry had lived under prolonged tension, enduringa succession of severe traumatic shocks from abroad. The expected post-war letup had been postponed by news crises and new slogans. ‘KeepThem Alive!’ had melted at white heat into ‘Bring Them Home!’ Thecommunity had obediently marched through the ‘Year of Survival’ andthe ‘Year of Destiny’; but by the ‘Year of Deliverance’ it began to bogdown. The European camps were closing, the Arabs were defeated, andthe immigrants were on their way. Ecstasy over Israel was giving way to asoberer mood. The realization was dawning that the Jewish state was notgoing to settle everything after all.65

Arguably the strongest remaining community in the world in terms of its sizeand resources, American Jews were at the same time weak in relation to theirenvironment as they faced the challenge of finding their place and purpose.

TOWARDS A NATIONWIDE JEWISH COMMUNITY

Implementation has become more important than philosophy.66 In 1951 theJewish Agency reached agreement with the World Jewish Congress based onits appreciation for the efforts of the Congress towards ‘organizing the Jewishpeople in the Diaspora on a democratic basis for the defence of its rights andposition and for the strengthening of Jewish life, these activities being carriedout in the spirit of the unity of the Jewish people and its solidarity withIsrael’.67 As part of this agreement, the Jewish Agency undertook to allocateproceeds from fundraising campaigns to the Congress based on the mutualdecision of the Agency and Congress Executives. Of course in this partnershipthe American Jewish Congress, as a member of the World Congress, becamepart of this agreement as well. These types of arrangements exposed a side ofthe disagreements between organizations that was not so altogether holy. It isimportant tounderstand that, while strenuous effortswere made tocreate setsof operating principles and structures that permitted working relationships,there was a competition between groups that was also based on matters ofprestige, position, power and money. Non-Zionist organizations—in thisinstance the American Jewish Committee and its European counterparts—may have been annoyed over this alliance because ‘the Jewish Agency. . .conducted itself exclusively as a Zionist body. . . and [had no] jurisdiction. . .with regard to the work of organizations whose purpose is the protection ofJewish rights in countries other than Israel’. But the real basis of the irritation

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 173

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

more likely owed to the funding and prestige the World Jewish Congresswas to receive under the arrangements. Citing impropriety in the allocationof money from funds that had been given by Jews throughout the worldfor use in Israel, the likelihood of harm to future united appeals, theinappropriate ‘political’ nature of the agreement and of the special status thatrecognition and financial support it gave to the Congress—the final flourishto Blaustein’s complaint to the Jewish Agency, ‘[I] do not have to tell youto what extent we have been helpful to Israel’ perhaps revealed the most.68

This would be the more decisive aspect of the complex character of the Jewishcommunity as it endeavoured to work together on behalf of Israel.

American Zionists and the Israeli leadership also realized that theurgency of practical needs, both in Israel and in the local communities, andthe survival of an admittedly undefined Zionist movement required theestablishment of a practical working arrangement and mutually agreeablepriorities. Continuing to postpone the ‘definition’ of Zionism—particu-larly in the exclusive terms demanded by Ben-Gurion that would havespelled its end—allowed American Zionist leaders to organize theirefforts in spite of widespread guilt and low self-esteem in the ranks.Ironically, non-Zionists, and as well as some anti-Zionists, found pro-Israelwork a comfortable and even ‘cheerful’ part of their programme or socialagenda. ‘The enthusiasm [they] did not invest in the Zionist dream [was]. . .poured into the endeavour to keep the dream-come-true alive. [They]readily [found] everything connected with Israel wonderful.’69 It wouldnot be fair to suggest that partisan ideologies became unimportant. Therather extraordinary number of Jewish organizations, each with its owncarefully worded philosophy and defined areas of interest, but withactivities that overlapped and duplicated those of others, was testimony tothe continued complexity of the American Jewish community. But as hasalready been seen, the line between Zionist and non-Zionist had becomeblurred by the Americanization of Zionist ideology and its political andmaterial emphases. Even the Zionist leader Nahum Goldman said,

that Zionism had ceased to be the great dividing line in Jewish life. . . thatthe real division in Jewish life. . . was not between Zionists and non-Zionists, but between those who believed in the unity of Jewish peopleeverywhere. . . and all the others.70

‘The majority of Jews [everywhere] are united in their desire to help thestate of Israel’, and in a variety of ways that demonstrated their support,almost all American Jews became ‘friends of Israel’.71

The practical plan that emerged from the World Zionist Congress in1951, and which became the basis for subsequent redefinition, was wide-ranging in its scope and was predicated on a new working relationshipbetween the Zionist movement and the Israeli government. The work ofthe Zionist Organization was to encourage immigration, absorption and

ISRAEL AFFAIRS174

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

integration of immigrants into Israel and to promote Youth Aliyah, as wellas support agricultural settlement and economic development; to engage inwork for pioneering and training for pioneering; to raise money andencourage the investment of private capital to ‘carry out the tasks ofZionism’; to cultivate ‘Jewish consciousness’ by promoting Hebreweducation and language study, and the values of Judaism; to mobilize‘world public opinion for Israel and Zionism’; and defend and maintainJewish rights and encourage the organization of Jewish life on democraticprinciples.72 Thus the Zionist organization was not political, even thoughits activities supported a political entity. This plan was to be administeredby the Jewish Agency, as

the representative and spokesman for the whole Jewish people in allmatters concerning Israel. . . all organisations—whether Zionist or non-Zionist—seeking to operate philanthropically in Israel, must. . . seek theapproval of the Jewish Agency as the executive arm of the World ZionistOrganisation.73

This was going to be the first time that responsibility for outsidephilanthropic work in Israel would be centralized in a single agency. Thetechnical aspects of the relationship were formalized in the Knesset in1952.74 This status did not apply in relation to pro-Israel activities that tookplace ‘entirely outside the borders of the Jewish State’. If the state of Israelwas interested in obtaining support in the Diaspora for a given project, itwould first consult the Jewish Agency for planning and then direct itsrequest to whichever person or group it chose.75 It is important to clarifythat membership in the World Zionist movement was made possible byrepresentation in the Israeli government in the form of a political party. Forexample Mizrahi was a Zionist political party in Israel, a member of theWZO, and was also a Zionist organization that was active in the US. In thislight, ‘entirely outside’ Israel’s borders had more complex implications.

So long as there [was] no more comprehensive organisation embracingfor this purpose all the other Jewish groups and organisations, theZionist movement and Zionist Organisation [would] serve as theprincipal instrument expressing the historic will the people, and [would]operate in the State of Israel in cooperation and coordination with theState of Israel, on behalf of the ingathering of the dispersed—thecommon mission of the State and the Zionist Organisation.76

NOTES

1. Jacob Glatstein, excerpts from a Yiddish poem, ‘The Beginning’, translated by Etta Blum,Commentary (September 1950), p. 214.

2. Israel Knox, ‘Is America Exile or Home? We Must Begin to Build for Permanence’,Commentary (November 1946), pp. 401–405.

3. Ibid., p. 402.

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 175

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

4. Daniel J. Boorstin, ‘A Dialogue of Two Histories: Jewish Contributions to America in a NewLight’, Commentary (October 1949), pp. 311–316.

5. Leo S. Baek, ‘The Task of Being and American Jew: The Modern Rediscovery of Jewish Lifeand Faith’, Commentary (March 1951), p. 218.

6. Evyatar Friesel, ‘Criterion and Conception in the Historiography of German and AmericanZionism’, in Jehuda Reinharz and Anita Shapira (eds.), Essential Papers on Zionism, London,1996, p. 307; Howard Sachar, A History of the Jews in America, New York, 1993, pp. 117,274–294; Eric Rosenthal, ‘Five Million American Jews: Progress in Demography’,Commentary (December 1958), pp. 499–507; Jacob R. Marcus, Background for the Historyof the American Jew, Cincinnati, 1969, pp. 195–203. Nathan Glazer, ‘What Sociology KnowsAbout American Jews: Many Problems, Some Studies, Few Conclusions’, Commentary(March 1950), p. 276; Jacob Javits, Jacob Javits: The Autobiography of a Public Man, Boston,1981, pp. 174, 175. Population and immigration figures quoted by various sources aredisparate owing to a range of issues in counting strategies.

7. Daniel J. Elazar, Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry,Philadelphia, 1976, pp. 4, 5, 14.

8. Ibid., p. 7.9. Arthur Goren, The Politics and Public Culture of American Jews, Bloomington, 1999, pp. 3,

13; Ofira Seliktar, New Zionism and the Foreign Policy System of Israel, London, 1986,pp. 43–47.

10. Ibid.; Jonathan Sarna, ‘The Ever Vanishing American Jew’, The International Jerusalem Post,18 June 2004. The pessimism about Jewish survival in America was reflected in the lack ofattention to American Jewish history as a discipline. In the early 1970s there were only fivetenured positions in the whole of the US in this field. Its foremost academic advised Sarna,‘American Jewish history can be summarised. . .: “The Jews came to America, they abandonedtheir faith, they began to behave like Gentiles, and after a generation or two they intermarriedand disappeared. That is American Jewish history—all the rest is commentary”’. Thediscipline has since grown.

11. Goren quotes Israel Friedlander in ‘The Problems of Judaism in America’, Past and Present:A Collection of Jewish Essays, Cincinnati, OH, 1919, pp. 277–278. There has been anongoing debate over influence of European patterns on American Jews and the degree ofuniqueness in the American Jewish experience.

12. Marcus, Background, pp. 203, 204.13. Ibid.14. Friesel, ‘Criterion and Conception’, pp. 307–308; Marcus, Background, pp. 211–212.15. Goren, Politics and Public Culture, p. 203, quoting Harold Weisberg, ‘Ideologies of American

Jews’, in Oscar Janowsky (ed.), The American Jews: A Reappraisal, Philadelphia, PA, 1964,pp. 347–356.

16. The same phenomenon existed in Great Britain, though the Jewish community was not asactive or visible.

17. Oscar Handlin, Adventures in Freedom: 300 Years of Jewish Life in America, New York,1954, pp. 213–217; Marcus, Background, pp. 205, 206.

18. Milton Himmelfarb, ‘Ben Gurion Against the Diaspora: Three Comments’, Commentary(March 1961), p. 197.

19. Steward E. Rosenberg, ‘American is Different’, in Peter I. Rose (ed.), The Ghetto and Beyond:Essays on Jewish Life in America, New York, 1969, p. 83.

20. Glazer, ‘What Sociology Knows’, p. 282. ‘Assimilation’ was a term that implied specificpolemics. Zionists accused non-Zionists of being assimilationist, while non-Zionistssometimes returned the favour. Yiddish speakers tended to feel the same way about non-Yiddish speakers. Quantitative approaches used intermarriage as a measure.

21. Rosenberg, ‘America is Different’, pp. 88, 89.22. Glazer, ‘What Sociology Knows’, pp. 277–279. Notions such as the ‘marginal man’, the

‘pariah’, the ‘urban type’ were products of sociology and attempts by practitioners tounderstand social types. The majority of sociological studies fell into this category at the time.Glazer argued that the notion of the ‘marginal man’—one who lives in two cultures—was themost helpful, although reliance on ideal types obscured through generalization more than itrevealed particularly about the unique character of Jews in America. Studies that were not‘apologetic’ revealed that American Jews advanced more quickly than other ethnic immigrant

ISRAEL AFFAIRS176

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

groups arriving in America at the same time and, in spite their prosperity, showed littleinclination to assimilate.

23. Rosenberg, ‘America is Different’, pp. 83, 85; Lucy Dawidowicz, On Equal Terms: Jews inAmerica, 1881–1981, New York, 1982. Dawidowicz identified 1945–1967 as a ‘Golden Age’for Jews in America.

24. Ibid., Rosenberg, ‘America is Different’.25. Handlin, Adventures, pp. 215–217, 225.26. Boorstin, ‘A Dialogue’, p. 313.27. B.B. Lieberman, chairman of the Commonwealth Conference, Israel, 17 July 1950. Opening

Statement, Archives of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, ACC3121-C14.34.1, Palestineand Eretz Israel Committee, 1950–1957, Greater London Record Office, Farringdon, London.

28. J. Halevi, Jewish Agency to Commonwealth Conference, Israel, 17 July 1950, meetingminutes, BDBJ, ACC3121-C14.34.1, GLRO.

29. Survey, Arnold K. Israeli, ‘Pro-Arab Propaganda in America’, written for the AmericanZionist Council, February 1952, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel, Z6-586, Papersof Nahum Goldmann.

30. Dorothy Thompson, ‘American Demands a Single Loyalty: The Perils of a “Favourite”Foreign Nation’, Commentary (May 1950), pp. 210–219.

31. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, ‘Jewish Survival and the American Council for Judaism’, review ofElmer Berger, Judaism or Jewish Nationalism: The Alternative to Zionism, in Commentary(October 1957), pp. 366–370; Dr. James G. Heller, President Labour Zionist Organization ofAmerica, Member Executive Committee American Zionist Council, Paper, ‘An Analysis of theAmerican Council for Judaism’, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, Israel, Z6-795, Papers ofNahum Goldmann, General Correspondence, 1953.

32. Clement Greenberg, ‘Self-hatred and Jewish Chauvinism: Some Reflections on “PositiveJewishness”’, Commentary (November 1950), pp. 426–433.

33. Not all anti-Zionists were liberal in the religious sense. Orthodox anti-Zionists were notvisible in the political debate until early-mid 1950s but were active in attempting to preventIsrael’s statehood.

34. Lieberman, Opening Statement. Dorothy Thompson and those like-minded were noteworthygiven the post-war context in which they were operating.

35. Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, ‘American Zionism at an Impasse: A Movement in Search of aProgram’, Commentary (1949), p. 344. To a delegation of American Zionists in Tel Aviv Ben-Gurion said, ‘Although we realised our dream of establishing the Jewish State, we are still atthe beginning. . .. The greater part of the Jewish people are still abroad. Our next step will notbe easier than the creation of the Jewish State’. David Ben-Gurion, A Personal History,New York and Tel Aviv, 1971, pp. 384, 396. The cost of absorbing one immigrant was $2500.The average Israeli produced $600 yearly.

36. Benno Weiser, ‘Ben Gurion’s Dispute with American Zionists: Why They Reject the “Duty toEmigrate”’, Commentary (August 1954), pp. 93–101.

37. Letter, Ben Gurion to Rabbi Simon Dolgin, Commentary (September 1953), pp. 233–240.38. Judd Teller, ‘America’s Two Zionist Traditions: Brandeis and Weizmann’, Commentary

(October 1955), pp. 349–351.39. Harold Rosenberg, ‘Jewish Identity in a Free Society: On Current Efforts to Enforce “Total

Commitment”’, Commentary (June 1950), pp. 508–514.40. ‘The American Jewish Committee in Retreat’, Louis Lipsky, Chairman of the American

Zionist Council, CZA, Jerusalem, Israel, Z5-5626, The Jewish Agency for Palestine—American Section, 1939 onwards.

41. Weiser, ‘Ben Gurion’s Dispute’, pp. 93, 94; Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, ‘Israel and the Diaspora’,Zionist Yearbook, 5719 (1957–1958), pp. 309–316. The Israel–Diaspora debate of the1950s dated to the Babylonian captivity. The golah was always the counterpoint to the Yishuv.Consequently Jewish customary law came to govern that relationship which said: there wasequality, in the human sense, between golah and Yishuv; Eretz Israel was supreme—‘thecountry and the soil—over any other country of Jewish settlement; The golah had specialobligations to the yishuv—material support and spiritual submission. The notion of exile, assomething that a Jew could be ‘of’ as well as ‘in’ was very modern—‘Jewish alienation’ wasterminology that came with ‘emancipation’ and ‘assimilation’ and did not exist before.

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 177

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

42. Dr. S. Levenberg, ‘The 24th Zionist Congress: Background and Problems’, Zionist Yearbook,5716 (1956–1957), pp. 140–152.

43. Press release, Rose Halprin, Acting Chairman of the Jewish Agency, on behalf of the JewishAgency in New York, 21 October 1951, CZA, Jerusalem, Israel, Z5-5626, Jewish Agency forPalestine, American Section, 1939 onwards.

44. Oscar Handlin, ‘Ben Gurion Against the Diaspora: Three Comments’, Commentary (March1961), pp. 193; Letter, William Frankel, American Jewish Committee, to S.D. Temkin, Anglo-Jewish Association, 2 February 1950, Anglo-Jewish Archives, Archives of the Anglo-JewishAssociation, Hartley Library, University of Southampton, File AJ37 6/5/8, American JewishCommittee, 1950; Draft Letter, Neville Laski to American Jewish Committee and AllianceIsraelite Universelle, 2 November 1953, Archives of the Anglo-Jewish Association, File AJ376/5/9 American Jewish Committee.

45. Itzhak Raphael, Head of the Jewish Agency Immigration Department, ‘Future Sources ofImmigration’, Zionist Information Office, Weekly News Digest, Supplement, 7 November1951. Compiled and published by the Information Office of the Jewish Agency, London.

46. Ibid.47. Maurice Samuel, ‘The Sundering of Israel and American Jewry: Has the New State Rejected

Its Jewish Past’, Commentary (September 1953), pp. 199–206.48. Rabbi Charles Shulman, ‘Ben Gurion Against the Diaspora: Three Comments’, Commentary

(March 1961), p. 200.49. Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, ‘American Jews through Israeli Eyes: A Traveler’s Report on some

Current Attitudes’, Commentary (January 1950), pp. 1–7.50. Shulman, ‘Ben Gurion Against the Diaspora’.51. Hertzberg, ‘American Jews’.52. Marcus, Background, p. 219.53. Teller, ‘America’s Two Zionist Traditions’; Teller explained that Jews always took

responsibility for fellow Jews in need. But American Jewish identity and purpose becamecommunity defence and philanthropy. Chaim Weizmann called this ‘the degradation of the[Zionist] movement’.

54. Milton Himmelfarb, ‘Emancipation as Villain’, review of Ludwig Lewisohn, The AmericanJew: Character and Destiny, 1950, Commentary (May 1951), pp. 504, 505.

55. S.Z. Shragai, Jewish Agency Executive Council member to Editor of Commentary, July 1950.56. Ibid.57. Himmelfarb, ‘Emancipation’.58. Weiser, ‘Ben Gurion’s Dispute’, p. 94. Americans emigrating from Israel were: 1949—325;

1950—438; 1951—375; 1952—190; 1953—110.59. Teller, ‘America’s Two Zionist Traditions’.60. Ibid.; Melvin Urofsky, ‘A Cause in Search of Itself: American Zionism After the State’,

American Jewish History (September 1979), pp. 85, 86. What appeared to be a lapse inforesight was the consequence of Brandeis’ ascendance in 1921 within American Zionism andhis support of a secular Zionism that wed social reform with political and philanthropicsupport for Israel. He differed from Chaim Weizmann significantly on the issue of galut in thesame way that Ben Gurion and most Israelis later disagreed with Americans on the topic.

61. Knox, ‘Is America Exile or Home?’, p. 403.62. Urofsky, ‘A Cause in Search of Itself’, pp. 79–91.63. Dawidowicz, ‘Jewish Survival’, p. 367.64. Judd L. Teller, ‘American Zionists Move Toward Clarity: To Be or Not Be “Ingathered”’,

Commentary (November 1951), pp. 444–450.65. Hal Leherman, ‘Turning Point in Jewish Philanthropy? New Perspectives in Community

Giving’, Commentary (September 1950), pp. 201–214.66. Dr. Robert Weltsch, ‘Israel, Human Rights, and American Jewry: New Roles in the Centuries-

Old Struggle’, Commentary (April 1950), pp. 354–358.67. Jacob Blaustein, AJC to Berl Locker, Chairman of Jewish Agency Executive, 20 March 1951,

Archives of the Anglo-Jewish Association, File AJ37 6/5/8.68. Ibid.69. Weiser, ‘Ben Gurion’s Dispute’, p. 96.

ISRAEL AFFAIRS178

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014

70. Note, Unknown to Lord Barnett Janner, June 1954, Archives of the Board of Deputies ofBritish Jews, Greater London Record Office, ACC3121 B6/1/3 Coordination in ForeignAffairs.

71. Dr. Schneider Levenberg, ‘The Zionist Executive will discuss the participation of all Jewishforces in the work of reconstruction’, Davar, 29 June 1953, Papers of Dr. SchneiderLevenberg, Archives, British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School ofEconomics and Political Science, London. Levenberg held various positions in the JewishAgency in London ‘Friends of Israel’. Ben-Gurion had suggested ‘Friends of Israel’ as analternative for ‘former’ Zionists who would not immigrate to Israel.

72. Schneider Levenberg, ‘The 24th Zionist Congress: Background and Problems’, ZionistYearbook 5716 (1956–1957), pp. 140–152.

73. Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Statement, ‘Jewish Agency’s Tasks After the Jerusalem Conference’,Zionist Information Office, Weekly News Digest, 9 October 1951.

74. ‘Status of the Jewish Agency’, Draft Bill Before Knesset, ZIO, Weekly News Digest, 12 May1952. David Ben-Gurion, ‘Zionism and the State’, speech before the Knesset introducing thedraft bill defining the status of the Zionist Organization, ZIO, Weekly News Digest, 21 May1952. The Israeli government and Zionist Organization established a formal relationshipbecause of the declining influence of Diaspora Zionists—their failures detailed in the Knessetbill. Israel’s function was ‘confined to the state. . . to the rule of the country. . . development,absorption of new immigrants and their settlement’ would be down to the Jewish Agency. TheBill of Status was seen as an infusion of prestige into the movement as a technical basis foroperation. Ben-Gurion said, ‘This enactment is intended to maintain, to confirm, and to givelegal force and State recognition’. ‘Law on the Status of the Zionist Organisation’, ZIO,Jewish Agency, Weekly News Digest, 10 December 1952; Statement, OrganizationDepartment, Executive of the World Zionist Organization, ZIO, Jewish Agency, WeeklyNews Digest, 31 December 1952. Berl Locker, Executive Chairman, said ‘It is clear to all of usthat the Law does not contain a reply to all our questions. It is but a framework which enablesus to arrive at a settlement and a normalization of our relations with the State and theGovernment’.

75. Goldmann, ‘Jewish Agency’s Task’.76. Ben-Gurion, ‘Zionism and the State’; Minutes, ‘Zionist General Council “Appreciates”

Government Bill’, ZIO, Weekly News Digest, 21 May 1952 (emphasis added).

AMERICAN JEWISH IDENTITY AND ZIONISM 179

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Bib

lioth

èque

s de

l'U

nive

rsité

de

Mon

tréa

l] a

t 13:

59 0

1 D

ecem

ber

2014