deregulation and privatization: the british local bus industry following the transport act 1985

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This article was downloaded by: [University of Teeside] On: 08 October 2014, At: 11:20 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Transport Reviews: A Transnational Transdisciplinary Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ttrv20 Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industry following the transport act 1985 B. J. Simpson a a Civil Engineering Department , Aston University , Birmingham, B4 7ET, U.K. Published online: 13 Mar 2007. To cite this article: B. J. Simpson (1996) Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industry following the transport act 1985, Transport Reviews: A Transnational Transdisciplinary Journal, 16:3, 213-223, DOI: 10.1080/01441649608716948 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01441649608716948 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

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Page 1: Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industry following the transport act 1985

This article was downloaded by: [University of Teeside]On: 08 October 2014, At: 11:20Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Transport Reviews: ATransnational TransdisciplinaryJournalPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ttrv20

Deregulation and privatization:the British local bus industryfollowing the transport act 1985B. J. Simpson aa Civil Engineering Department , Aston University ,Birmingham, B4 7ET, U.K.Published online: 13 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: B. J. Simpson (1996) Deregulation and privatization: the Britishlocal bus industry following the transport act 1985, Transport Reviews: A TransnationalTransdisciplinary Journal, 16:3, 213-223, DOI: 10.1080/01441649608716948

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01441649608716948

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information(the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor& Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warrantieswhatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purposeof the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are theopinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed byTaylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands,costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever causedarising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of theuse of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

Page 2: Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industry following the transport act 1985

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 3: Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industry following the transport act 1985

TRANSPORT REVIEWS, 1996, VOL. 16, No. 3, 213-223

Deregulation and privatization: the British local bus industryfollowing the Transport Act 1985

B. J. SIMPSON

Civil Engineering Department, Aston University, Birmingham B4 7ET, U.K.

In the U.K., increasing attention is being given by policy makers to shift modalsplit from private to public transport. This is a response to increasing concernsabout the environmental effects of the private car and increasing public oppositionto further road building. A great deal of reliance is being placed on bus services toaccommodate such a change in modal split. The Transport Act 1985 imposed threemain changes on local bus services: deregulation, involving the removal of barriersto providing local bus services, the transfer to the private sector of publicly-ownedbus companies, and competitive tendering whereby local authorities were givenpowers to fund socially necessary but unprofitable services by tendering routes tobus companies. The author argues that these changes have had a number ofadverse effects and have left bus services even less likely to meet the expectationsbeing placed on them than previously. Suggestions for change are discussedbearing in mind the political realities of the environment in which local publictransport has to operate. The question of how far such changes could contribute toa shift in modal split is analysed.

1. Reliance on busesThere is now an overwhelming view that there is a need for public transport of

such quality as to be a credible alternative to the private car. All the main politicalparties have made commitments to some change of funding from private to publictransport and, indeed, some change has taken place. Planning Policy Guidance Note13 (Department of the Environment/Department of Transport 1994) set out theGovernment's intentions to foster a change in modal split from private to publictransport. In October 1994 the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollutionproposed a target of 30% of passenger miles by public transport by 2020, comparedwith 12% at present.

In the late 1980s, light rail was seen as being what was needed to attract motoristsaway from their cars, if only for some of their journeys into town. With the slowprogress on all but three or four of the 50 light rail projects initiated mostly between1987 and 1989, attention has now turned to the buses. A brief description of all 50projects and analysis of the context in which they have been planned is contained inSimpson (1994).

Even a radical change in central government policy towards contributions topublic transport infrastructure would not allow local railways to take over more thanperhaps 10% or 20% of the passenger numbers presently carried by local buses.British cities do not have the land use patterns and densities compatible with railtaking over a large proportion of local journeys. And the chances of such a radicalchange of heart are small. For the same reasons, the prospects for existing suburbanrail are no better. Suburban rail is even more unsuited to the land use patterns ofBritish cities than is light rail. Buses will remain necessary for the great majority of

0144-1647/96 $12.00 © 1996 Taylor & Francis Ltd

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214 B. J. Simpson

local public transport journeys, even in the few cities which have or might develop alight rail network.

London has a much more public transport-orientated and particularly rail-orientated modal split than other British cities for two main reasons. Firstly roadtraffic congestion in intensity and extent, scarcity and cost of parking are such that thecar owner is deterred from travelling by car. Secondly, it has had well-developed railnetworks for a century or more. There has been time for land uses and access by rail toadapt to each other. Building densities are much higher in London than in any otherBritish city and are adapted to the high capacity access that rail can provide.

It is possible that other British cities will change in the same directions to becomecloser to what London is like now but it will happen only very slowly. In most towns,only about 1 % of the building stock is renewed each year. In other British cities,traffic congestion and scarcity of parking may approach London conditions in kindbut not in extent. The conclusion is clear. Particularly outside London, a large scalechange in modal split towards public transport will only be possible where there arepublicly acceptable bus services able to play a bigger part in satisfying local transportdemands. Acceptable bus services may not be a sufficient condition to cause a changein modal split but they are a necessary one.

2. What is wrong with bus services?Rising demand for travel has become such an issue that the Government has

published a Planning Policy Guidance Note (PPG 13) aimed at curbing it. Expectationsof buses fulfilling an increased role are rising. Usage has been declining, particularlyfollowing the Transport Act 1985. In the six years following the coming into force of the1985 Act, the number of bus passenger journeys in the metropolitan counties fell by 23%and in the shire counties by 17% (Department of Transport 1994). The exception wasLondon, where deregulation of buses has not take place and where ridership remainedstable. Recently there have been some signs of a reversal in the general decline. Buspatronage over the whole of the U.K. rose slightly in 1994/95, mainly due to a rise inLondon and to a lesser extent, Wales. Elsewhere the decline continued but at a lower rate(Department of Transport 1995).

Whilst the Transport Act 1985 has not stopped the decline in bus usage, neither isit the only cause of it. The decline since 1986 follows a much longer decline, except forsome revival in the large cities in the early 1980s. In the large cities outside London, itappears that there was some success in stopping the decline in bus use until theTransport Act 1985 came into force.

Bus services have been caught in a downward spiral initiated by loss of customersto the car and, in London certainly, and perhaps a few of the other large cities too, bythe traffic congestion largely caused by the private car. The bus has become muchmore 'downmarket' than it was two or three decades ago. Vandalism, bad language,litter, feet on seats and other cases of misbehaviour have become more commonwhilst the standard of travel expected has risen. To what extent the lowering ofstandards on buses is due to the decline in standard of behaviour amongst childrenand teenagers generally, and to what extent buses have come to cater increasingly forthose who do not care, is a matter for speculation. The result is the same: what busesprovide and what many people expect has diverged.

In London and for periods in a few other large cities, unreliability of servicescaused by traffic congestion is a big problem. However, traffic congestion is notalways the cause of buses failing to keep to timetables. Unreliability and the related

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problem of low speed are being addressed by bus priority, one of the main ways ofimproving bus services to date. Lack of information about services is still amongst themain sources of complaint against bus services and probably amongst the reasonswhy those who have a car available will use it. There is still a desperate andinexplicable lack of information at bus stops: information about times, routes andfares (especially important if passengers are expected to produce the exact fare) arecommonly absent at most stops outside town centres. Electronic real time informationsystems with visual displays at stops are becoming more common. Whilst they mayprovide some assurance of the arrival time of the next bus, most displays are in thecentral areas of cities where bus services are frequent. Far less costly and more useful topassengers would be conventional timetables where bus services are infrequent. As Lowe(1994) points out following a study of passenger requirements in Milton Keynes,Northampton, Aylesbury, Kettering and the county of Essex, new technology doesnot appear to greatly appeal to passengers and overall they have a preference fortimetable leaflets.

Most bus companies continue to fail to take the opportunities of free advertisingof services on the buses themselves: inside the bus and on the side and back.Unfortunately it is still common practice for bus companies to be satisfied with anumber and destination on the front of the bus. Whilst motorists are sometimeharangued by advertisements on the backs of buses about the folly of using their carsit is all too common for bus companies to fail to take the opportunity to tell thefrustrated motorist behind more about the service which is on offer. More companiescould follow the lead taken by several of those in London. Providing informationabout bus services would not require much expenditure. Lack of funding is not thereason for the absence of it. Failure to take the opportunity of advertising almostfree of cost is particularly regrettable considering the accepted view that publicityand co-ordination of services are amongst the most potent factors in attracting newusers (Hughes 1995).

3. Deregulation and privatizationThe Transport Act 1985 reflected a desire to introduce competition into local

public transport and concern with increasing subsidies. The main ways of addressingthese issues were by deregulation, the introduction of competitive tendering forunprofitable routes and the transfer of bus operations from the public to the privatesector. The Act does not apply to London.

Bus operators outside London no longer have to get permission from the TrafficCommissioners to run a service. They simple have to register a local service with theCommissioners 42 days in advance giving details of route, timetable and maximumsize of vehicle (to judge the possibility of them being unsuitable for the route). At leastone member of the management must hold a Certificate of Professional Competenceand the vehicles must have been inspected and passed as safe (renewable annually).No information on fares is required.

The previous arrangements of support for the whole public transport system havebeen replaced by giving powers to local authorities to support what they regard as'socially necessary' services which are subject to competitive tender. Concessionaryfares have been continued, commercial operators being compensated by localauthorities. Grants for the purchase of new buses have been phased out. The 100%fuel duty rebate for local bus services was continued until November 1993 butsubsequent increases in fuel duty are not covered by the rebate.

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216 B. J. Simpson

One of the main purposes of deregulation and competitive tendering was toeliminate cross-subsidy of services. This was regarded as bad practice as it results inhigher fares for passengers on profitable routes and because, in a regulated environment,companies willing and able to provide a cheaper service on profitable routes wereprevented from doing so. It is still possible, however, for large companies to cross-subsidize routes temporarily as a means of warding off competition by submittingloss-making tenders or as part of a predatory strategy. Langridge (1995) analyses thesituations in which cross-subsidy occurs.

Fifty independent companies were formed from the transport undertakingspreviously operated by local authorities, 31 of which had been sold to the privatesector by mid-1995. These have to compete for any subsidies in the same way as othercommercial operators. In London, bus operations were split into separate companiesin 1989. The National Bus Company, which carried about a quarter of all localpublic transport journeys in England and Wales before 1985, was split up and soldas 62 separate companies. The Scottish Bus Group was sold as eleven.

Thus an initial phase of the splitting of the National Bus Company and theScottish Bus Group and competition between service operators has been followed bytakeovers and mergers. By mid-1995, three large groupings of companies hademerged: FirstBus, operating around 5 600 buses, and Stagecoach and British Bus(3 600 each). FirstBus, Stagecoach and the Go-Ahead Group (1 000 buses), the CowieGroup controlling three companies in London, and National Express, controllingWest Midlands Travel, are currently quoted on the London stock market. In anindustry of declining demand there is as added temptation amongst quoted companiesto meet expectations for growth and expansion by acquisition. In fact, these five quotedcompanies and British Bus together accounted for 52-5% of the turnover of the busindustry in 1993/94, according to the Bus Industry Monitor (published in Preston, U.K.)for 1995.

Large companies do bring some benefits to the travelling public. They are betterable to raise money for investments in new fleets, for example. In 1993/94, FirstBus,Stagecoach and British Bus together invested 12% of turnover compared with 8%amongst smaller companies and only 3% in employee-owned companies (Cheek1995). Large companies are also better able to plan services for the longer term.Badgerline (merged with GR.T in April 1995 to form FirstBus) have been involved instudies for light rail transit for example. The bus industry is beginning to undertakeco-ordination of services and strategic planning despite the 1985 Transport Act.Takeovers and mergers have also provided large capital windfalls for a few managementbuy-out teams. This raises questions about the original selling price from the publicsector, but the scale of gain is nowhere near the excesses of those in other former publicutilities.

There must be few bus routes which can support more than one operator. Wherethere is more than one, the emptiness of many of the buses is conspicuous. We mayspeculate on the economics of setting up new services to act as a nuisance to existingoperators in the hope of being bought out. On the other hand, there are cases wherelarge companies have moved into what is to them a new area and deliberately put anestablished operator out of business. In July 1994, Darlington Transport, a municipally-owned company was put up for sale. Bids were received and one from YorkshireTraction was preferred. An unsuccessful bidder, Busways (a subsidiary of Stagecoach),offered Darlington Transport staff a bonus of £1000 each to join them, registeredservices on all Darlington Transport routes, and ran free bus services for five weeks.

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Yorkshire Traction withdrew their offer and Darlington Transport went intoadministration. The Council Tax payers (i.e. the public) lost the value of DarlingtonTransport as a going concern. The U.K.'s Director of Fair Trading asked theMonopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) to investigate. The Office of FairTrading (OFT) can demand withdrawal of a service if this has the result of anti-competitive or predatory action involving the deliberate acceptance of short-termlosses with the intention of eliminating competition. Although the MMC was harshlycritical of the tactics used by Stagecoach, it did not recommend their withdrawal fromDarlington as this would have been against the public interest in the circumstanceswhich prevailed a year later when their report was published (Monopolies andMergers Commission 1995).

Whereas previously local authorities had a duty to plan and co-ordinate local busservices, co-ordination of all services is not now permissible. Any practice which maybe deemed anti-competitive has to be registered with the Office of Fair Trading. Thisincludes agreements between operators about fares and timetables, which bus stopsand what kind of livery to use. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission maybecome involved if operators within a local area are bought-up with the result that acompany then controls more than one quarter of the services in the U.K. or asubstantial part of it (Fair Trading Act 1973).

The rules regarding anti-competitive practice discourage companies agreeing tooperate a joint timetable because any agreement to do this must not inhibit either ofthem from putting extra services on the route. Even where operators are prepared toco-operate in the provision of a network timetable both in their own and thepassengers' interest, the laws regarding anti-competitive practice make it difficultfor them to do so. The immediate needs of the passenger are not the primaryconsideration of either the Monopolies and Mergers Commission or the Government.

As from 1 February 1995, the Traffic Commissioners were given powers to limit thenumber of vehicles used or the frequency at which vehicles may be operated in localbus services [Public Service Vehicles (Traffic Regulation Conditions)(Amendment)Regulations 1994] and to limit duplicate buses to situations where normal buseshave insufficient capacity [Public Service Vehicles (Registration of Local Services)(Amendment) Regulations 1994].

Deregulation has not achieved the main objective as summed up by NicholasRidley, Secretary of State for Transport when the legislation was introduced, 'to haltthe decline that has afflicted the bus industry for more than 20 years'. It has notresulted in many small and medium sized companies competing to provide a moreefficient public transport service at lower cost to travellers and taxpayers as wasenvisaged. The Transport Act 1985 has resulted, however, in lower subsidies. InLondon, where buses are still regulated, support rose temporarily in the early 1990s.This was mainly associated with redundancy costs. Government subsidies includeconcessionary fare rebates, payments for secured services and fuel duty rebate. TheBus Industry Monitor for 1994 records that secured services, which can be expected tobe most affected by privatization, have been reduced from £424 million in 1986/87to £136 million in 1993/94 for England and Wales.

Although consolidation of bus services has had some public advantages, there isnot much evidence of competition between large operators (Monopolies and MergersCommission 1995). Competition between large operators would be expensive forboth, whereas a large company can target smaller ones with far less damage to itselfand can eliminate such competition more easily.

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218 B. J. Simpson

As would be expected, competition in small towns and rural areas has been limitedas was found in a recent study of Burton-on-Trent and surrounding small towns(Birch 1995). Despite the limited competition, however, in examining fares on 142routes which were operated between 1988 and 1994, it was found that fares increasedby less than the Retail Price Index (RPI) on 75 of them and above the RPI on only 67of them. One possible reason for the decline in fares relative to the RPI was believedto be that demand on many routes had a high level of elasticity, especially for journeysto or from the neighbouring towns of Ashby-de-la-Zouch and Swadlincote where farerises were less than to or from Burton-on-Trent.

In large towns and cities, competition means small bus companies imitating thelarge, former council-owned bus company by setting up similar services bearing thesame route numbers operating from about 7 am to 6 pm weekdays, 9 to 5 onSaturdays and not at all Sundays. They are taking away some of the peak hourcustom, relieving some overcrowding, but mostly providing extra services where andwhen the main bus company already provides a good service. In some cases, the mainoperator has bought up some of the competitors, raised fares to its own level, andcontinued to use the small bus company livery, particularly if the small companyoperates elsewhere as well, as was the case in the acquisition of Your Bus by WestMidlands Travel in 1994.

Lack of co-operation between operators has resulted in poor connections betweenservices. Companies are discouraged from agreeing to operate joint timetablesbecause this might be deemed as preventing competition. Competition has meantoffice staff from bus companies paying weekly visits to the Traffic Commissioners'offices to see whether any new services likely to be in competition to their own havebeen registered. A new service may have been registered with buses a few minutesearlier than their own to pick up their passengers. Consequently we get another newservice a few minutes earlier still. And so it goes on. Eventually one of the companiesemerges victorious and other services are withdrawn at short notice. Meanwhile backat the bus stop, customers are still waiting for a reliable, understandable and stableservice.

There are many routes where the services are too frequent, at least from the pointof view of economic efficiency and the environmental effects on those occupyingproperties bordering the routes. Sheffield's is not the only city centre where someroads are congested by queues of buses. The House of Commons TransportCommittee recently heard reports of over 300 buses per hour along some routes inDarlington. Even in the suburbs, the high frequency of buses is a nuisance to someresidents if we are able to believe the many reports in local newspapers.

Although bus mileage has increased since deregulation by around 25% overall,away from the larger cities this is far from the case. In the area around Burton-on-Trent, Birch (1995) found the majority of services to have declined in frequencybetween 1986 and 1993. Of 154 routes examined, services on 28 increased and 103decreased in frequency on Monday to Friday. The corresponding figures forSaturdays were 35 and 95 and for Sundays 20 and 42.

Due to pressure to award tenders at the lowest price, more old, shabby vehicleshave been retained. New purchases decreased from 4832 in 1988 to 2804 in 1991 but,according to the Bus Industry Monitor for 1995, they have recently increased to 3763in 1994. The consolidation of the bus industry into large companies seems to havebeen the main reason. The number of maintenance staff employed in the bus industrydeclined sharply from 37300 in 1985/6 to 24500 in 1992/93. If the rules for a bus

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operator are set such that a 5p reduction in fares has more important commercialconsequences than in a plume of black fumes belching from the back of a 20-year-oldbus, then we should not be surprised if environmental objectives are threatened.Responsibility for monitoring and control of air pollution has recently been bestowedupon local authorities under the Environment Act 1995.

4. The need for review of legislationDeregulation of local bus services resulting from the Transport Act 1985 has had

consequences widely accepted within the bus industry and amongst bus users andthe public at large as being mistakes which must surely not have been intended bythe legislators. It would appear that even the Government is beginning to acknowledgepublicly the shortcomings of the regulatory mechanism as witnessed by the reportedendorsement of the MMC criticism of the regulatory framework (Local TransportToday, 17 August 1995). Following the same report, Jonathan Evans, a Minister at theDepartment of Trade and Industry, approached the OFT to secure undertakings fromStagecoach and Go-Ahead, which also operate in the north-east of England, to patch upsome of the most obvious unwanted consequences of competition. These undertakingswere to prevent the running of services which would not cover their variable and semi-variable costs and to ensure that if fares are reduced below those of a competitor or iffares are increased or services timed before those of a competitor, they should becontinued for a minimum period of three years.

There is a need for a review of the legislation on bus deregulation. The MMCreport recommended the introduction of some regulation including controls on thetiming of new registered services to prevent 'bunching' and 'leapfrogging', review ofthe powers of the Traffic Commissioners to control the number of vehicles by route,and ensuring that operators comply with services registered. The powers of the OFTand MMC to prevent predation of small companies are liable to be rendered a deadletter. As the Darlington case showed, by the time they can act, it is too late becausethose providing competition, in this case Yorkshire Traction, will have pulled outlong ago.

In giving evidence to the House of Commons Transport Committee, Sir BryanCarsberg, Director of Fair Trading, suggested a licensing system under whichoperators would have to comply with specified conditions or else pay penalties orhave the licence revoked (Bond 1995).

Competition on-route, as practised, has proved to be wasteful of resources anddamaging to the street environment. Alternatives exist. There is a strong case forroute monopolies in order to reduce the likelihood of service instability and toeliminate the possibility of an excessive number of buses and duplication of routes ashas accompanied competition so far. There is no reason at all why there should not becompetition for franchises for such route monopolies.

5. Feasibility of policies favouring a change in modal split towards public transportDeregulation and privatization have certainly not helped to achieve a change in

modal split. Changes in legislation are needed but would any such changes besufficient to achieve the change in modal split that we are aiming for? To date,local buses have not proved an acceptable alternative to the car. Those who have a caravailable will use it unless traffic conditions are so bad or parking so scarce or soexpensive that using the cars becomes close to impractical.

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220 B. J. Simpson

For journeys with no parking charges, the marginal cost of motoring is much lessthan bus fares even when there is only the driver in the car. There is little empiricalevidence that reducing bus fares would have much effect within the scale of reductionsthat would be economically and politically feasible. A Transport Research Laboratoryreport showed that halving bus fares increased bus use by only 7-20% and that this hadonly a minor effect on car use (Dasgupta, Oldfield, Sharman and Webster 1995). Half ofthe extra bus trips were formerly made on foot. Occasional bus users, as motorists mightbe, tend to pay higher fares because usually they cannot benefit from pre-paid unlimitedtravelcards. Smartcards, whereby users pay for each journey, could be made to be moreattractive to occasional users than are most travelcards.

It is also doubtful whether even the raising of the cost of motoring, except perhapslocally as parking charges, would have much effect until it reaches the sort of levelswhich no politician would dare to propose, and restraint policies would possiblyresult in trip-relocation (Dasgupta, Oldfield, Sharman and Webster 1995). It would bewishful thinking to hope that bus services alone, however good they are, will attractmotorists out of their cars. Although disincentives to car use will have to be used toget motorists on to public transport, if the public transport is of a high standard wecan expect the necessary arm-twisting to be less fierce and motorists' resentmentreduced. Getting tough with the motorist will become closer to being politicallyfeasible if there is an adequate public transport system, although it has to be said thateven with a good public transport system, the disincentives needed to get motorists touse it in significant numbers may have to be too tough to be possible politically.

We have to face up to the possibility, however unfortunate, that any disincentivesto car use tough enough to be effective may be so unacceptable to motorists as tocause any political party which implements them to lose office, or at least fear it willlose office. The problem is that external damage caused by the motor car is not takensufficiently seriously to allow the behaviour of large numbers of people to be affected.Public attitudes take a lot of convincing about damage to the environment and health.

Attitudes towards smoking are an interesting comparison. For a long time themedical profession has warned us that smoking, including passive smoking, damageshealth. There must now be millions of people in Britain with friends and relatives whosmoked and suffered from the illnesses predicted.There are consequently millions ofpeople with first-hand experience of the correctness of the warnings. Despite this, theprohibition of smoking in public places is recent and still only partial. Restrictions onthe advertising of tobacco have been gentle. Whilst there is a lobby urging politiciansto be tougher there are also strong bodies of opinion which take the opposite view. Onbalance, the gentle approach by politicians probably reflects public opinion quiteaccurately. Public opinion takes a great deal of convincing when warnings abouthealth risks are published.

There is a growing number of people who accept that exhaust gases aggravate andperhaps cause asthma. I do not know whether the connection between smoking andill-health is scientifically more justifiable than that between vehicle exhausts and ill-health. Certainly smoking has had more publicity and certainly more people havefirst-hand experience to convince them of the risks associated with it. Consideringhow cautious have been the policies and how unconvinced have been public attitudestowards the damaging effects of smoking, despite the overwhelming evidence, theprospects of public support for policies which get tough on road vehicles for healthreasons do not look good. Costs of motoring can be raised slightly faster thaninflation, but even that is only very recent: between 1981 and 1994, rail, bus and coach

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fares increased by 142% whilst motoring costs increased by 96% (Central StatisticalOffice, London, 1995). However, we have to be sceptical as to whether public attitudesare ready to accept a drastic reduction in car use and switch to public transport.

6. ConclusionsWe cannot look towards the revision of legislation on deregulation for the key to

changing modal split. There was a long decline in bus and coach usage before 1985.However, it is possible to foster much better, more publicly acceptable bus servicesthan we have now. This would enable bus services to become in better shape to satisfyany transferred demand resulting from restrictive policies towards road traffic and inany case, is a worthwhile objective quite apart from any contribution towardschanging modal split.

'More funding is needed for public transport', 'We invest in roads but subsidisepublic transport'. These are sentiments often heard, with some justification. It is truethat public expenditure on public transport has been scrutinized very carefully andhas generally been more stingy than expenditure on roads. The case for a transfer offunds from private to public transport rests on the more favourable external effects ofpublic transport such as benefits to air quality and land use patterns. Certainly thereare aspects of bus infrastructure where a very good case can be made for fundingimprovements. Bus priority is a strong candidate although there remain certainquestions to be resolved relating to the effects on speed and reliability and subsequenteffects on ridership. The case for funding improvements to bus services is beingundermined by the continuation of many deficiencies which would cost next tonothing to remedy. The lack of passenger information at bus stops needs urgentattention.

Recent practice suggests that there remains a discrepancy between the perceptionsof issues amongst those who make decisions on funding and those who use busservices. There remains a need to relate funding to issues felt by users and potentialusers of bus services. Too little attention still seems to have been paid to finding outwhat improvements to bus services are wanted by those who are expected to travel onthem, both to retain present customers and to attract new ones.

Deregulation and privatization have aggravated some of the problems but are notthe only cause. Deregulation has been an additional obstacle to the compilation ofinformation for passengers, but there is also room for improved managementpractices. Nor is deregulation the only reason for rather odd investment decisionssuch as discrepancies between the locations of bus lanes on the one hand andfrequency of bus services and traffic congestion on the other (Simpson 1993).

The U.K. local bus industry lacks political champions both in the town hall and atWestminster. Conservation of energy resources, reduction of atmospheric pollution,or reduction of traffic congestion would raise a cheer at any party political conference.Bus services already contribute a great deal towards these ends and with a little help,could achieve a lot more. Few politicians have shown an interest in bus services exceptto reduce the level of subsidy, and very few people see bus services as a political issue.Complaints about buses are directed at operators, less frequently at the council,hardly ever at central government. The connection between faults in services andpolitical responsibility is not as clearly drawn as in the National Health Service, forexample. The passiveness of so many bus users allows this to continue.

Fortunately, the low profile nature of the bus industry in political terms, whichhas allowed the mistakes to continue, might also allow changes to be made with

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relatively little political embarrassment. Not only is the case for re-introduction ofsome aspects of regulation as strong, if not stronger, than it has been at any time over thedecade since the passing of the Transport Act 1985, but the chances of re-introductionare also higher than before. At least two ministries (Transport, Trade and Industry) haveaccepted some of the failings of deregulation. Clearly, deregulation has worked againstthe Department of the Environment policy aims of PPG 13 to limit the need to travel,especially by car, and to change modal split. The abandonment of deregulation inLondon could be seen as acceptance of failure elsewhere. At the time of writing (late1995) the House of Commons Transport Committee was due to report shortly. TheDarlington case may prove to have been the last straw.

Foreign summariesDans le domaine des transports, les décideurs sont, au Royaume-Uni, de plus en plus

convaincus de l'importance du transfert de voyageurs du transport privé au transport public.Ceci résulte des préoccupations croissantes concernant les conséquences environnementales del'usage de la voiture particulière et de l'opposition, également croissante, du public à laconstruction de nouvelles routes. Les décideurs comptent beaucoup sur les autobus pouraboutir à ce transfert modal. La loi de 1985 sur les transports prévoit trois modificationsessentielles pour les services locaux d'autobus: la dérégulation, qui supprime toutes barrières àl'entrée dans la profession, le transfert au secteur privé des entreprises publiques de transport etla mise en adjudication concurrentielle lorsque les Pouvoirs Publics locaux estiment nécessairede subventionner des services de bus indispensables mais non-rentables. Selong l'auteur, cestrois modifications ont eu un impact négatif sur les services locaux de transport par bus, quisont désormais encore moins aptes que par le passé à répondre aux espoirs de transfert modal. Ilpropose aussi des modifications à la loi qui tiennent compte des réalités politiques au sein desquelles les transporteurs doivent travailler ainsi que de leur incidence probable sur le transfertmodal recherché.

Die Britische Verkehrspolitik versucht verstärkt eine Verschiebung der Verkehrsmittelwahlvom privaten sum öffentlichen Verkehr zu erreichen. Dies ist eine Reaktion auf die wachsendenSorgen über die Umweltauswirkungen des PKW und den wachsenden Widerstand gegen weiterenStrassenbau. Der öffentlich Nahverkehr mit Bussen soll zum grossen Teil diese Verschiebungenbewirken und bedienen. Der Transport Act 1985 beinhaltete drei wesentliche Neuerungen für denNahverkehr: Deregulierung des Marktzugangs für den Busverkehr, Privatisierung der Busunter-nehmen der öffentlichen Hand und Ausschreibung der Buslinien durch die Gemeinden, die zwarsozial notwendig aber unwirtschaftlich sind. Der Autor argumentiert daß diese Veränderungennegative Auswirkungen haben und es weniger wahrscheinlich gemacht haben, daß der Bussektordie an ihn gestellten Erwartungen erfällen kann. Veränderungsvorschläge werden gemacht, die diegegebenen politischen Rahmenbedingungen berücksichtigen, und deren Auswirkungen auf dieVerkehrsmittelwahl analysiert.

Quienes toman decisiones de política en el Reino Unido tienen cada vez mayor interés enproducir un cambio en la partición modal, disminuyendo la proporción de viajes en transporteprivado en favor de transporte público. Esto constituye una respuesta frente a la crecientepreocupación por los efectos ambientales del auto privado y a la creciente oposición pública amás planes de construcción de vías. Sin embargo, se tiene bastante confianza en que losservicios de buses podrían acomodar este cambio de partición modal. El Acta de Transporte de1985 impuso tres cambios importantes en los servicios de buses locales: la desregulaciónasociada a la remoción de barreras de entrada a nuevos proveedores de servicios, la privatiza-ción de compañías de buses públicas, y la licitación competitiva, en que se otorgó poderes a lasautoridades locales para financiar servicios socialmente necesarios pero no rentables desde elpunto de vista privado, a través del mecanismo de licitación de rutas a compañías de buses. Enel trabajo se argumenta que estos cambios han producido una serie de efectos adversos y hanreducido la probabilidad de que los servicios de buses sean capaces de cumplir con la anteriorexpectativa. Se discuten sugerancias de cambio, tomando en cuenta la realidad politica delmedio en que deben operar los servicios de buses locales. También se analiza la pregunta de

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hasta que punto dichos cambios podrían contribuír a la deseada transferencia de particiónmodal.

References

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BOND, R., 1995, Bus wars and dirty tricks: lack of proper regulation fails deregulation.Surveyor, 4 May, p. 12.

CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, 1995, Social Trends (London, U.K.: HMSO).CHEEK, C., 1995, Britain's bus industry: a new structure emerges but the same underlying issues

remain. Local Transport Today, 25 May, pp. 13-17.DASGUPTA, M., OLDFIELD, R., SHARMAN, K., and WEBSTER, V., 1995, Impact of Transport

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upturn in usage. Local Transport Today, 2 March, pp. 12-13.LANGRIDGE, B., 1995, Price competition and competitive tendering: the bus industry since

deregulation, Report for the Natural and Built Environment Professions, 10, November, pp.20-22.

LOWE, C., 1994, What the public wants to know, Surveyor, 4 August, pp. 14-15.MONOPOLIES and MERGERS COMMISSION, 1995, The Supply of Bus Services in the North East of

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