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Page 1: Depledge Striving For No
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9

Joanna DepledgeStriving for No

Research Articles

Striving for No: Saudi Arabia in theClimate Change Regime

Joanna Depledge

Introduction

A key starting point for the conduct of global negotiations under the UN systemis that delegations are actively seeking an agreement that will meaningfully ad-dress the problem at hand. Sometimes, however, negotiations must contendwith cases of obstructionism, that is, negotiators who are at the table with theaim of preventing an agreement. Given that they face no imperative of striking adeal, governments for whom “no” is the preferred outcome can have a dispro-portionately high impact on the negotiations, not only by formally blockingagreements, but on a day-to-day basis by slowing down progress or souring theatmosphere. This article examines Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the climatechange regime, and argues that the delegation has long played the role of ob-structionist. This is not the only case of obstruction on the international stage,or indeed in the climate change regime, but it merits particular analysis for twomain reasons. Firstly, as a strong example of obstruction, Saudi Arabia’s partici-pation in the climate change negotiations sheds light on this rather under-studied phenomenon in international relations.1 Secondly, the story of theSaudi delegation’s role throughout the history of the climate change negotia-tions remains largely untold in the literature, despite its inºuence on the politi-cal dynamics of the regime.2

The article begins with a discussion of the nature of obstructionism, be-fore analyzing the speciªc circumstances of Saudi Arabia, and the setting of theclimate change regime, that have facilitated its emergence as an obstructionist.The article then examines Saudi Arabia’s participation in the climate change ne-gotiations, and considers its effectiveness in the pursuit of its goals. Finally, thearticle investigates options for addressing obstructionism, and considers possi-ble signs of change in Saudi Arabia’s approach to climate change and the negoti-ations.

1. Although see Wallihan 1998; and Zartman and Rubin 2000.2. Although see Grubb et al. 1999, 57; and Oberthür and Ott 1999, 26, 64 and 84.

Global Environmental Politics 8:4, November 2008© 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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Diagnosing Obstructionism

The study of obstructionism can face a tricky problem of diagnosis.3 It is to beexpected of all negotiators that they will vigorously defend their national inter-ests. To this end, negotiating strategies can span a wide spectrum, from coopera-tive, problem solving approaches, to more competitive, aggressive behavior.Blufªng, posturing, double-blufªng, threatening, bribing, horse-trading, exag-gerating demands, sealing secret deals—all are integral to global negotiations,even among negotiators anxious for a strong agreement. To a large extent, there-fore, obstructionism is a matter of degree. What distinguishes a systematic ob-structionist from an occasional one, however, is the sustained and aggressive useof obstructionist tactics over time, applied not just on one or two issues but onthe general thrust of the negotiation process. In essence, obstructionists are ac-tively seeking as little progress as possible, as late as possible, and would be con-tent with, and even prefer, no agreement.

Why do governments join a negotiation whose concerns they apparentlydo not share, or whose aims they reject? The short answer is because they fearthe agreement that others might reach. In this sense, obstructionism is a particu-lar feature of large multilateral negotiations on collective action problems, nota-bly environmental ones, where a state may harbor concerns over the negativeside effects of serious measures to tackle the problem. In such cases, a state mayjoin a negotiation process not only to promulgate its own concerns, but also inan attempt to stop others from reaching a strong collective deal, or to delay andweaken that deal. This is made easier by the fact that the UN system rarely placesconstraints on participation in global negotiations, especially on environmentalmatters, where maximum involvement is seen as desirable, even from thosewho do not share the negotiating aims.

Obstructionist delegations do not need to be large or powerful, in terms ofpolitical, economic or military resources, to exert considerable inºuence overthe course of a negotiation. Downie, for example, refers to an “exploitablepower to destroy,” of which Saudi Arabia would be a prime example, given itslarge oil reserves.4 Saudi Arabia, however, does not need to invoke the potentialcarbon emissions that lie under its territory in order to obstruct negotiations.There are many other, more prosaic tools at the disposal of potential obstruc-tionists. Zartman and Rubin, for example, note that dawdling, blustering, stone-walling, appealing to rules and “generally making a nuisance” are highly effec-tive tactics, enabling comparatively weaker states to upstage the more powerful,especially in a context of consensus decision-making;5 it is, of course, alwayseasier to block consensus than to advance a new initiative. Fundamentally, how-ever, the leverage exerted by obstructionists lies in the fact that their negotiatinggoal is not a substantively meaningful agreement. As Fisher et al. note in the

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3. Wallihan 1998.4. Downie 1999, 104.5. Zartman and Rubin 2000, 277.

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elaboration of their concept of “best alternative to a negotiated agreement”(BATNA), “the relative negotiating power of two parties depends primarilyupon how attractive to each is the option of not reaching agreement.”6 Thevery attractive BATNA of obstructionists—that is, they actually prefer non-agreement—raises their bargaining leverage in the negotiation.

Linked to this, obstructionists tend to be relatively unconcerned aboutseeming obdurate or extreme in their positions, thus increasing their room formaneuver compared with other delegations, for whom maintaining a reputa-tion for cooperation may be more important. The most active obstructionistsalso tend to be those who do not fear domestic opprobrium, either because thedominant domestic constituencies approve of the policy of obstructionism,or because the government is not operating within an open political systemwith active channels of accountability, such as a free press and strong non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Saudi Arabia and the Climate Change Regime

Diagnosis of Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism in the climate change regime ismade easier by the openness of the delegation concerning its aims and tactics.The Saudi delegation is often very candid in threatening to block progress (seeexamples below). Perceptions of Saudi obstructionism are also widely heldamong climate change delegates and other observers of the climate negotia-tions. Oberthür and Ott, for example, claim that “OPEC [Organization of Petro-leum Exporting Countries] members . . . and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in partic-ular . . . missed few opportunities to slow down progress”7 during the KyotoProtocol negotiations. The environmentalist newsletter ECO agrees that “SaudiArabia’s efforts to destroy the Kyoto Protocol are now legendary.”8 Kjellén, a vet-eran negotiator, speaks of the “sometimes ªlibustering tactics of the Saudis”that have “undoubtedly slowed down negotiations.”9 Developing country dele-gates interviewed by Dessai widely perceived OPEC “as having a negative, ob-structive role in the process.”10 Reporting on negotiations in 2004, the inde-pendent newsletter the Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) wrote of the“concern” of delegates “at the clear endeavors by oil-producing countries . . . towash down all attempts to address future actions and adaptation . . .”11 Re-porting on the 2007 Bali Conference, the Guardian newspaper (UK) describedSaudi Arabia as “a regular obstructer at such talks.”12

On most days during the climate negotiations, ECO awards a “fossil of the

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6. Fisher et al. 1992, 1067. Oberthür and Ott 1999, 26.8. ECO 2000.9. Kjellén 2008, 77.

10. Dessai 2004, 20.11. ENB 2004e.12. Adam 2007.

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day” to the delegation deemed to have taken the most environmentally regres-sive stance that day. Saudi Arabia is a frequent recipient of that award. Onawarding Saudi Arabia a “fossil of the day” at the eighth Conference of theParties13 (COP 8) in 2002, ECO commented “never have we seen more success-fully destructive tactics on their part.”14 In 2004, ECO reported hearing from aSaudi delegate that the delegation “viewed receipt of the Fossil awards as a mat-ter of national pride and aspired to get as many as possible to show how effec-tive (obstructive) it was.”15

The nature and timing of Saudi Arabia’s adherence to the 1992 UN Frame-work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 1997 Kyoto Protocolsuggest a possible obstructionist motive for joining the climate change regime.Saudi Arabia only acceded to the UNFCCC once it had already come into force,and just in time to enable its full participation in decision-making during thelast few days of the ªrst COP in 1995, where it fought hard—although ulti-mately in vain—to prevent the launch of negotiations on what became theKyoto Protocol. Its accession to the Kyoto Protocol also appears strategic, onlytaking place once it became clear that the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force,following ratiªcation by the Russian Federation. Saudi Arabia acceded in timeto ensure that it would become a Party—and therefore able to fully inºuenceproceedings—at the ªrst session of the Conference of the Parties serving as themeeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 1) in November 2005.16 It isinteresting to note that eight OPEC members waited until there was certaintythat the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force, and then acceded to it within afew months17 (the Protocol had been open for ratiªcation for six years, receiving128 ratiªcations, before that point).

The Saudi Position on Climate Change

Saudi Arabia’s position on climate change is clearly founded on its fears over thepotential negative impacts of climate change mitigation policies on its econ-omy. These fears are unsurprising, given Saudi Arabia’s heavy dependence onthe oil sector, which in 2002 accounted for 77 percent of government reve-nues.18 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ªnds that de-veloping country oil exporters are the most exposed to efforts to cut greenhousegases, and will tend to bear costs higher than those of the mitigating developedcountries.19 Beneath this headline, however, the story is more complex. Re-

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13. The annual Conference of the Parties is the regime’s supreme decision-making body.14. ECO 2002.15. ECO 2004.16. The CMP is the main decision-making body under the Kyoto Protocol. Kyoto Protocol non-

Parties may participate as observers, but may not take part in decision-making.17. Out of the other two OPEC members that are Convention Parties, and therefore eligible to be-

come Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Iran acceded in August 2005 and Libya in August 2006.18. Saudi Arabia 2005, ªg 3.6.1, p. 20.19. IPCC 2007, chapter 11.7.5; also Bartsch and Müller 2000.

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viewing the literature, the IPCC predicts “lower demand and prices and lowerGDP growth” for oil exporters, but notes that the extent of impacts “dependsstrongly on assumptions related to policy decisions and oil market condi-tions.”20 Predicted economic impacts therefore vary widely.21 What can be saidwith certainty is that the choice of instruments to tackle climate change is criti-cal. Economic modeling shows that emissions trading can signiªcantly lowernegative “spillover” effects on oil exporters, while there is also potential for oil-price protection policies. The IPCC concludes that studies tend to overstate costsacross the board, because they do not model for non-energy means of tacklingclimate change (e.g. forestry measures), as well as policies such as removal ofsubsidies on all fuels and energy tax restructuring. At another level, oil marketsare subject to a host of driving forces and, given the lack of readily available al-ternatives to oil in the transport sector, it is unlikely that climate change policywill be the major factor determining oil revenues in the foreseeable future (atthe time of writing, oil prices were around the $100 mark). All these analysesalso ignore the economic costs and other impacts of climate change itself. Thesituation is therefore complex, inherently uncertain, and subject to considerableamelioration through policy intervention.

Saudi Arabia, however, has consistently focused on “bad news” in relationto the costs of mitigation, focusing on studies that predict the most dramaticeconomic losses. On announcing that the Kingdom would accede to the KyotoProtocol, for example, Minister Al Naimi (Ministry of Petroleum and MineralResources), predicted that, by 2010, Saudi Arabia would “lose at least $19 bil-lion a year as a result of the policies the industrialized nations will adopt to re-duce their greenhouse gas emissions.”22 This “bad news” interpretation is, inturn, bound up with wider Saudi discontent over perceived market distortionsin industrialized countries,23 which are seen to disadvantage oil relative to otherfossil fuels (coal still receives considerable support in some developed coun-tries).

Linked to this, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a skeptical—or “goodnews”—attitude towards climate change science, honing in on uncertainties anddownplaying potential impacts. Its attacks on the IPCC’s 1996 Second Assess-ment Report, both in the IPCC itself and later in political discussions under theclimate change regime, are legendary.24 Although straight denial of climatechange science is no longer tenable, and Saudi Arabia now states its acceptanceof the reality of the problem,25 this has not stopped the delegation from contin-uing to seek to water down the conclusions of the IPCC, including in its mostrecent fourth assessment report (4AR).26 This skepticism towards the science,

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20. IPCC 2007, Summary for Policymakers, para.9, emphasis added.21. See IPCC 2007, chapter 11.7.5; also Barnett et al. 2004.22. Reuters 2004.23. See, for example, Saudi Arabia 2007.24. Oberthür 1996; Gelbspan 1997; and Leggett 1999.25. Saudi Arabia 2005; 2007; 2008.26. See ENB/IPCC 2007a and b; also New Scientist 2007.

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coupled with a bad news interpretation of mitigation, means that Saudi Arabiaappears to view action to tackle climate change as more of a threat than theproblem itself. Even today, Saudi Arabia regularly insists that the Convention isnot an energy treaty. While this is self-evident to most delegations, the fact thatSaudi Arabia feels the need to make this point indicates the extent to which itfeels threatened by the regime.

Although such a stance was probably inevitable at the start of the climatechange negotiations, it is remarkable how stable it has remained over time.27

The Saudi position can be contrasted with that of South Africa, another fossilfuel exporter. Although the South African economy is more diversiªed than thatof Saudi Arabia, it is still highly dependent on the coal sector. South Africa is theworld’s second largest coal exporter, with developed countries accounting for 80percent of its coal exports.28 South Africa is much poorer than Saudi Arabia, andcoal is more vulnerable to climate policy than oil, given its higher carbon con-tent and the greater availability of alternatives. South Africa, however, hasadopted a more balanced view of the risks posed by climate change and mitiga-tion measures, translating into a far more constructive role in the negotiations.

Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism has manifested itself in different ways overtime. In some cases, Saudi Arabia has explicitly argued for proposals that woulddirectly lead to a weaker or less effective outcome. An example is Saudi Arabia’s2005 proposal that the compliance system agreed under the Kyoto Protocolshould be adopted by a formal amendment.29 Given that an amendment mustbe ratiªed by three-quarters of the Protocol’s Parties before it enters into force,and is only binding on those Parties having ratiªed it, this would have stalledthe work of the compliance committee and weakened the Protocol’s impact.30

In many other cases, Saudi Arabia has simply sought to prevent or slow downprogress, either on the general thrust of the negotiations, or on speciªc agendaitems. Saudi Arabia was very active, for example, in seeking to stall the adoptionof the emerging Convention in the early 1990s.31 Saudi Arabia then tried hard toblock the 1995 Berlin Mandate that would launch negotiations on what becamethe Kyoto Protocol.32 In 1996, Saudi Arabia was again at the forefront of effortsto stop recognition of the Geneva Ministerial Declaration,33 an important mile-stone in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. In 1999, Saudi Arabia played an im-portant role in blocking the appointment of facilitators to help advance negoti-ations in the run-up to the crucial COP 6 meeting.34 In terms of speciªc agendaitems, key targets for Saudi Arabia have been emissions from international avia-

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27. Kjellén 2008. Kjellén suggests that “the policy choice” of obstructionism “was not necessarilyobvious.” During the 1970s oil shocks, the Saudi Oil Minister took the line that, as oil wasbound to become increasingly valuable, it should stay in the ground as long as possible. Kjellén2008, 75.

28. South Africa 2000, section 3.9.29. UNFCCC 2005.30. Wittneben et al. 2006; and Müller 2006.31. See Kjellén 1994; and Paterson, 1996.32. See Paterson 1996; and Oberthür and Ott 1995.33. See Oberthür 1996.34. ENB 1999, 7.

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tion and shipping (“bunker fuels”), debates on the IPCC, compliance under theKyoto Protocol, and good practices in policies and measures.

The “Adverse Effects” Agenda

As noted above, Saudi Arabia has understandable concerns about securing itseconomic future in a carbon-constrained world. The Convention itself recog-nizes the special situation of developing countries in a range of circumstances,35

including countries “highly dependent on income generated from . . . fossil fu-els . . .”.36 The Kyoto Protocol carried through this recognition.37 In the post-Kyoto negotiations, Saudi Arabia’s concerns have been addressed through a de-bate on so-called “adverse effects.”38 As part of this debate, Saudi Arabia high-lights the potential negative impacts of climate policy on oil exporters, and lob-bies for special provisions, from more research to ªnancial and technicalassistance. Within this agenda, and in the wider negotiating arena, Saudi Arabiaalso seeks to uphold the continuing use of oil and promote non-energy meansof tackling climate change, notably carbon capture and storage (CCS), as well ascleaner fossil fuel technologies, elimination of coal subsidies and tax restructur-ing.39

The “adverse effects” agenda has an instructive history. In late 1996, in theheat of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, the Chairman, frustrated at Saudi Ara-bia’s continuous complaints over the economic impacts of emission targets,called for constructive suggestions on how to address these concerns. The resultwas a proposal for ªnancial compensation for adverse economic impacts, whichwas presented simultaneously by Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the UnitedArab Emirates and Venezuela.40 Demands for such compensation were unac-ceptable to the developed countries who would be taking on targets, and wereinterpreted by some as simply a means of narrowing the zone of agreement,that is, making demands without any real hope that they would be accepted,but simply in order to block consensus. Whatever the motivation, agreeing afollow-up analytical process on adverse effects41 was one of the prices paid forsecuring OPEC acquiescence to the adoption of the Protocol.42

The post-Kyoto “adverse effects” agenda could have formed the basis for a

Joanna Depledge • 15

35. Article 4.8. The range is so broad—from mountainous territories to land-locked nations—thatone is hard-pressed to identify a developing country not reºected there.

36. Article 4.8h. See also Article 4.10, which refers to all Parties (not just developing countries) po-tentially adversely affected by response measures.

37. See Articles 2.3 and 3.14.38. See www.unfccc.int, link on “cooperation and support,” then “response measures,” for a brief

introduction (accessed on 10 September 2008).39. A more detailed exposition of Saudi Arabia’s negotiating position can be obtained from its sub-

missions to the UNFCCC, reprinted in ofªcial “MISC” documentation, all of which are avail-able from the UNFCCC website documentation search engine.

40. See UNFCCC 1997. Rumors claimed that the proposal was drafted by a US climate-skepticlobby group.

41. See Kyoto Protocol Articles 2.3 and 3.14; decision 3/CP.3.42. For a negotiating history, see UNFCCC 2000.

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more cooperative negotiating strategy on the part of Saudi Arabia. This has hap-pened to some degree, in the sense that Saudi Arabia has shown itself willing(albeit reluctantly and often aggressively) to compromise, modify and scaleback its demands on this topic in order to accommodate a consensus. Work-shops and expert meetings have been held on related issues, and demands forcompensation have been largely superseded by (more realistic) calls for win-win policies, technical assistance with economic diversiªcation, and help withªnancial risk management in order to achieve economic “resilience.”

However, in other respects, the issue of adverse effects has been used bySaudi Arabia as another platform for obstruction (see examples below). A majorcasualty in this respect has been the issue of adaptation to the impacts of cli-mate change. Early on in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, Saudi Arabia soughtto link its situation with the much more widely-held concerns of many otherdeveloping countries over the impacts of climate change itself. By forging and ex-ploiting this link,43 Saudi Arabia secured sufªcient support from the G-77,along with the reluctant attention of the industrialized countries, who are com-mitted to assisting developing countries adapt to the impacts of climate change.This linkage, however, has been to the profound detriment of negotiations onadaptation,44 not least because Saudi Arabia has often made its support forprogress on adaptation contingent on progress on its own concerns relating toresponse measures.

Political Circumstances and Alliances

Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism is best understood in the broader context of cli-mate change politics. Most importantly, Saudi Arabia is allied to powerful oiland coal lobbies within industrialized countries, primarily the US, and alsoAustralia.45 In this sense, Saudi Arabia represents the more extreme end of abroad coalition of fossil fuel interests who still oppose strong action on climatechange. The economic and political power held by these interests undeniablystrengthens Saudi Arabia’s hand, and vice-versa. Accounts abound of how SaudiArabia and other OPEC members collaborate with lobby groups from the coaland oil industries in the climate change negotiations.46 OPEC delegates deep inconversation with well-known industry lobbyists are a familiar sight in the cor-ridors of the climate change meeting halls, and there is little doubt that well-funded climate-skeptic lobbyists47 have provided strategic and legal advice toOPEC delegations. Following the US repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol, SaudiArabia and the US delegation itself appeared to be working more closely to-

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43. See Mwandosya 2000; Dessai 2003 and 2004; and Barnett and Dessai 2002.44. Dessai 2004.45. Leggett 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; and Dessai 2004.46. Oberthür and Ott 1999; Leggett 1999; Newell 2000; Gupta 2001; and Dessai 2004.47. Such as the Climate Council, under the late Don Pearlman.

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gether,48 with the Saudi and US delegations not infrequently the lone voicesholding out against agreement.49

In formal terms, Saudi Arabia operates within the Gulf CooperationCouncil (GCC) and the wider OPEC.50 Although the GCC and OPEC rarely for-mally speak together, their members do coordinate positions. The GCC, in par-ticular, is “well-disciplined, with a uniªed policy”51 in the climate change re-gime, and GCC members can be relied upon to echo Saudi statements in thenegotiations.52 The wider OPEC, however, is a more heterogeneous group. Non-GCC OPEC states, such as Libya, Nigeria or Venezuela, often support Saudi Ara-bia, but not automatically so.

A very important dynamic shaping the actions of Saudi Arabia concerns itsrelationship with the wider developing country Group of 77, whose 130 plusmembers coordinate their negotiating positions in many UN forums. OPEC is akey player in the G-77, with an OPEC member (but not Saudi Arabia) havingchaired the Group in the UN ªve times in the past decade.53 This has enhancedOPEC’s inºuence over the G-77 position in the climate change regime, althoughthe extent to which this has veered towards obstructionism has varied depend-ing on the G-77 Chair.

One of the puzzles for observers of the climate change regime is why theG-77 has tolerated Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism for so long, given that somany of its members are among the most vulnerable to the adverse impacts ofclimate change. Alliance of Small Island States, for example, have long called foraggressive emission cuts in order to stave off sea level rise, while least developedcountries are highly vulnerable to drought, ºoods and other weather extremes.Of course, it helps that Saudi Arabia is among the best resourced of the develop-ing countries, and has impressive negotiating capacity and skills. Reportedly,Saudi Arabia has also offered ªnancial incentives to poorer developing coun-tries in return for their support in the negotiations.54 More generally, Saudi Ara-bia has ªnancial ties outside the regime that poorer developing countries willwish to protect.

Importantly, Saudi Arabia has been able to capitalize on the underlyingmistrust that many developing countries feel towards industrialized countries,and the strong desire of the G-77 to remain united. The mediocre progress madeby industrialized countries in tackling their emissions, the small sums of moneydisbursed to assist developing countries in tackling climate change, the lack ofany serious effort on technology transfer—all these are very real issues, and play

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48. Ott 2002.49. Wittneben et al. 2007, 100.50. OPEC has 11 members, 10 of which are Convention Parties: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait*,

Libya, Nigeria, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia*, United Arab Emirates*, Venezuela (* indicates GCCmembers, which also include Oman and Bahrain).

51. Müller 2003.52. For an example of the GCC view on climate change, see Arab Times 2007.53. 1998 (Indonesia), 2000 (Nigeria), 2001 (Iran), 2002 (Venezuela), 2004 (Qatar).54. Personal communication by a G-77 delegate, 2008.

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into the hands of the obstructionists.55 In this sense, Saudi Arabia does genu-inely articulate many concerns shared (though perhaps not so extremely) byother developing countries. Its procedural quibbles reºect wider disquietamong small developing countries over the difªculties they face in effectivelyparticipating in the negotiations. Its emphasis on the negative economic im-pacts of mitigation policies echoes the (perhaps more nuanced) fears of somelarger developing countries. At times, therefore, Saudi Arabia may act as a partic-ularly strident mouthpiece behind which others—although rarely the poorestand weakest—can hide.

The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the broader G-77 is a symbi-otic one. On issues where other powerful developing countries are active, orwhere the G-77 as a whole has a well-developed position that extends beyondthe climate change regime, such as technology transfer, ªnancial issues, and de-veloping country reporting, Saudi Arabia remains largely silent. Similarly, onthe key question of developing country commitments, although Saudi Arabiahas been active in opposing these, it has not needed to take a particularly prom-inent role, given the strong positions of China, India, Brazil and other large na-tions. Instead, Saudi Arabia tends to focus on those issues where there is nouniªed G-77 position (notably adverse effects), or which have traditionallybeen of less interest to most other developing countries (notably bunker fuels,and policies and measures). Just as the G-77 generally tolerates Saudi Arabia,Saudi Arabia is absolutely dependent on the G-77 for the pursuit of many of itsdemands.56 As discussed further below, on the few occasions where Saudi Ara-bia has been isolated within the G-77, and other inºuential G-77 members havebeen prepared to oppose its proposals, it has had to retreat.57

Interestingly, Saudi Arabia tends to be most active during sessions of theregime’s more technical subsidiary bodies—the Subsidiary Body for Scientiªcand Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation(SBI)—the two Ad Hoc Working Groups,58 and lower-proªle COP and CMP ses-sions. During the most important sessions, where key decisions are to beadopted, Saudi Arabia tends to play a less prominent role,59 with its obstruc-tionism obscured by wider, and higher level, political dynamics. Like delega-tions from other groups, the G-77 itself is more active and better resourced dur-ing major negotiating sessions, often with higher-ranking negotiators. SaudiArabia’s room for maneuver is therefore more restricted at those times.

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55. Kjellén 2008, 77.56. Kjellén 2008, 77.57. For more on the inner workings of the G-77, see Mwandosya 2000.58. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention

(AWGLCA), and the Ad Hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I Parties underthe Kyoto Protocol (AWGKP), are negotiating the next set of agreements under the climatechange regime, with a deadline of COP 5/CMP 15 in Copenhagen, December 2009.

59. The formative stages of the negotiations, on the Convention and Berlin Mandate, were an ex-ception.

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The Saudi Delegation

The Saudi delegation is highly skilled. The de facto head of delegation,Mohamed Al Sabban, is renowned for his ability to spot opportunities to pushhis country’s agenda forward. “Brilliant and stubborn,”60 he possesses many ofthe traits deemed necessary to exert inºuence in a negotiation: self-assurance, te-nacity, eloquence, excellent English skills, and profound knowledge and under-standing of the issue at hand.61 Mr. Al Sabban’s impact on the Saudi delegation,and on the climate change negotiations as a whole, has been immense. Leggettdescribes him as “a man with years of experience of how to frustrate progressand slow the pace of climate negotiations,”62 while a highly-respected veterannegotiator, interviewed by the author in 2000, described him as “the mainªlibuster of the whole exercise.”63 In this respect, it is important to rememberthat negotiations are highly socialized and personal processes, where individualpersonalities and dynamics can inºuence outcomes as much as national posi-tions.64

The Saudi delegation is medium-sized, averaging around 13 memberssince 2002 at subsidiary body sessions,65 and nearly 18 members at COP/CMPsessions. This delegation size is roughly what would be expected, given SaudiArabia’s population and GDP.66 A striking feature of the delegation, however, isits consistency. This has undoubtedly helped to increase the effectiveness of thedelegation, as well as contributing to the stability of the Saudi position on cli-mate change. Mr. Al Sabban, for example, is almost unique among governmentdelegates in having apparently attended every single climate change negotiatingsession since 1991. Moreover, the same minister—Mr. Al Naimi—has repre-sented Saudi Arabia at all COP sessions since 1998.

Another feature of the Saudi delegation is the sustained dominance of theMinistry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources (MPMR). Minister Al Naimi andMr. Al Sabban hail from the MPMR, which has the largest number of representa-tives on the delegation. This dominance by an energy ministry is atypical in theclimate change negotiations, where environment ministries tend to enjoy thegreatest representation on the average delegation. Even among the delegationsthat deviate from this average, there is generally a more even spread of represen-tatives among ministries.67

The dominance of the MPMR reºects the early focus of Saudi Arabian cli-mate change policy on its economic, rather than environmental, dimension. Inthis sense, Saudi Arabia could be said to be ahead of the game among develop-

Joanna Depledge • 19

60. Kjellén 2008, 77.61. See Zartman and Berman 1982; Fisher et al. 1992; and case studies in Kaufmann 1996.62. Leggett 1999, 227.63. Depledge 2001, 115.64. See Kramer and Messick 1995; also Kaufmann 1996.65. The Bangkok meetings in 2008 were an exception, with a delegation of only 5 members.66. See analysis in Müller 2003.67. Müller 2003.

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ing countries; several commentators, including a former Executive Secretary ofthe climate change secretariat, have called for the greater involvement of eco-nomic ministries in the negotiations.68 Without such involvement, it is argued,climate change will only be seen as a soft issue, and not be taken seriouslywithin national polities. Developing countries, in particular, traditionally sentdelegates from meteorological or other scientiªc departments to the negotia-tions, rather than the industry or planning ministries who set the policies thatreally affect carbon emissions. The structure of the Saudi delegation shows it hastaken the opposite tack; it took the economics of climate change very seriouslyalmost immediately, focusing almost entirely on the economic implications ofa carbon-constrained world, rather than the negative environmental impacts ofclimate change.

Saudi Arabia’s ability to act in an obstructive manner may well be en-hanced by the nature of its government. The Saudi delegation evidently enjoys abroad mandate, and is less constrained than, for example, the EU by scrutinyfrom a critical media and watchful domestic NGOs. Its comparative wealthmeans it can adequately ªnance and support its delegation, certainly more sothan most developing countries, while it can also draw on the resources of theVienna-based intergovernmental organization that supports OPEC.

Procedural Power

A key way in which Saudi Arabia has maximized its impact has been by assum-ing positions of procedural power within the regime, either for itself, or for fel-low OPEC countries. Saudi Arabia and OPEC colleagues have, for example, se-cured continuous representation on the COP Bureau, a group of 10 delegates,elected on rotation, with responsibility for advising the COP President. Al-though OPEC does not have a formal seat on the Bureau (these are allocated ac-cording to the ªve UN regions, with an extra seat for the small-island states),there is an understanding that it must always be represented through one of theregional groups. COP Bureau members are privy to the thoughts of the COPPresidency, as well as advance and conªdential information, so participation isuseful to anyone seeking to inºuence the negotiation process. Having an OPECrepresentative on the COP Bureau can also be useful for the Presidency and sec-retariat, in order to provide advance warning of anything that could provoke ob-structionist moves. Saudi Arabia has also managed to get itself appointed as is-sue coordinator for the G-77 on many of the issues it cares about most deeply.G-77 issue coordinators can exert considerable inºuence over the position ofthe Group, as it is their job to liaise with interested developing countries, helpforge a common position, and negotiate on behalf of the Group. In addition, anOPEC member has often served as the developing country Co-Chair for infor-mal negotiating groups on the adverse effects agenda. Unsurprisingly, OPEC hasextended this approach to other UN forums where climate change is discussed.

20 • Striving for No

68. Personal communication; also Zammit Cutajar 2004.

Page 14: Depledge Striving For No

Qatar, for example, served as Chair of the Commission on Sustainable Develop-ment (CSD) during its 15th session in 2007, when climate change and energyfeatured as major themes.

Saudi Arabia’s power in the climate change regime is magniªed by thepractice of consensus decision-making. The Parties to the climate regime havefamously been unable to agree on a voting rule for substantive decisions, and ef-forts to do so have now almost ground to a halt. Saudi Arabia has played a keystalling role in this respect, thereby ensuring that its preferred decision-makingpractice—consensus—has become the default in the regime. The implicationsof this have been explored elsewhere.69 The key point, however, is that consen-sus is an onerous requirement, and one that potentially enables a single countryto block the adoption of a decision, or threaten to do so. This strengthens thehand of obstructionists, who are most likely to want to block decisions. More-over, the looseness of the concept—there is no ofªcially recognized deªnitionof consensus—means there is considerable room for a skilful negotiator to out-wit an unwary Chair (but also, of course, vice-versa).

Obstructionist Tactics

How does Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism manifest itself? Some of the tactics de-ployed for obstructionist purposes are outlined below. These are not mutuallyexclusive and often overlap, or have been employed to varying extents at differ-ent points in the negotiations. It is also important to stress that these tactics arenot the preserve of Saudi Arabia. Other Parties may be moved, at times, to blockprogress through procedural arguments, or invoke implausible excuses for re-fusing to negotiate. What marks Saudi Arabia out as an obstructionist, however,is the sustained use of such tactics throughout the regime’s history. It is alsonoteworthy that these tactics are often accompanied by a confrontational ap-proach, which can be unusually aggressive for a UN diplomatic setting. In 2005,for example, ECO awarded Saudi Arabia a “fossil of the day” for its “rude inter-ventions targeted at the Chair and other Parties.”70

Although Saudi Arabia was similarly, if not more, active during earlier ne-gotiations,71 most of the examples below have been taken from the post-Kyotoperiod, speciªcally from 1999 onwards, in order to demonstrate the contempo-rary relevance of the delegation’s role.

Parallel Progress

A key tactic deployed by Saudi Arabia has been to demand “parallel progress.”That is, the delegation has repeatedly and openly threatened to block progress

Joanna Depledge • 21

69. See Yamin and Depledge 2004.70. ECO 2005.71. For brief references to Saudi Arabia’s participation in the Convention and Protocol negotia-

tions, see Mintzer and Leonard 1994; Leggett 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999; Mwandosya 2000;and Depledge 2005.

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on an item it is less concerned about, if insufªcient progress is made on anotherissue that it does care about, usually adverse effects.72 In 1999,73 for example,Saudi Arabia withdrew its objections to a text on compliance only when agree-ment was reached in another negotiating forum on adverse effects.74 In 2000, atthe critical COP 6 meeting, Saudi Arabia threatened that, if a “friends of thechair” group was convened on policies and measures, it would withdraw its sup-port for a similar group to be established on the ºexibility mechanisms.75 In an-other example, in 2002, Saudi Arabia “refused to negotiate after a time” on poli-cies and measures “citing a lack of progress”76 in negotiations on adverse effects.In 2007, Saudi Arabia warned that, if developed countries did not agree to itsdemands on adverse effects, this “could result in issues of importance to certainother parties being blocked, too.”77

As noted above, the key casualty of “parallel progress” has been the issueof adaptation. Consideration of the topic has been frequently held up—not justin the formal negotiations but also internally within the G-77—by insistence onthe part of Saudi Arabia that advances in discussions on adaptation, such asconsideration of a workshop report or debate on new proposed text, be mir-rored by the same advance in debates on the impacts of response measures.78 In2008, for example, insistence on symmetrical language relating to funding/insurance/technology transfer for adaptation to climate change on the onehand, and for the “impacts of response measures” on the other, was the ªnalquestion to be resolved in negotiations on the review of the Protocol.79

Repetition and Propagation

Saudi Arabia has adopted what might be termed a “repetition and propagation”strategy on adverse effects, that is, repeatedly proposing new agenda items onthe matter and continuously invoking the issue under other agenda items. It hasdone so to such an extent that it has, at times, become an obstruction to negoti-ations on other issues, expending time, energy and goodwill. The opening of ne-gotiating sessions in the climate change regime have often involved “agendaªghts” resulting from Saudi Arabia’s efforts to raise the proªle of adverse ef-fects.80 Unswerving insistence on a dominant focus on adverse effects underother agenda items has also frequently thrown the item in question into stale-mate. At the 2007 Bali Conference, for example, ECO awarded Saudi Arabia a“fossil of the day” for its aggressive insistence on language relating to adverse ef-

22 • Striving for No

72. Dessai 2004.73. To improve readability, reference is made to the dates of negotiating sessions, rather than their

formal names.74. ENB 1999, 10.75. ENB 2000e, 3.76. ENB 2002c, 14.77. ENB 2007a, 13.78. Personal communication by a G-77 delegate, 2008.79. ENB 2008b, 16; and UNFCCC 2008.80. E.g. see ENB 2002a; ENB 2002c, 3; and ENB 2007a, 3 and 13;

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fects in negotiations on the review of the Protocol.81 Such aggressive insistencehappened again on the same issue in 2008, as noted above. In this case, “min-imization of adverse effects” already appeared as a core issue to be considered inthe Protocol review, but Saudi Arabia argued that “impacts of response mea-sures” should also be added to a new list of “other issues,” in parallel with pro-posed language on adaptation.82

Most notably, the slow progress in negotiations on policies and measuresover the past few years can be largely attributed to Saudi Arabia’s determinationthat discussions should focus overwhelmingly on adverse effects. The item onpolicies and measures was ªnally removed from the SBSTA’s agenda in 2008. Al-though this was, ostensibly, to avoid duplication, there is little doubt that it rep-resented a victory for OPEC countries, which have long sought to sideline the is-sue.

The tactic of “repetition and propagation” has, at times, backªred. In2006, for example, Saudi Arabia called for an item on Kyoto Protocol Article3.14 (minimizing impacts of emission targets) to be added to the SBI agenda.83

This was a perfectly legitimate move, given that CMP 1 had adopted a decisionon this topic the previous year. However, an item on Kyoto Protocol Article 2.3(minimizing impacts of policies/measures) also featured on the SBSTA agenda(in addition to another SBI item covering adverse impacts under the Conven-tion). Developed countries, highlighting duplication, insisted that the items onArticles 2.3 and 3.14 should be addressed together. Saudi Arabia, leading the G-77, refused, arguing that the two items should be dealt with separately in differ-ent groups. The result was no substantive discussion under either item. Finally,in 2008, Saudi Arabia acquiesced to the discussion of the two items in a singlecontact group,84 with its willingness to compromise no doubt motivated by theclosure of the agenda item on policies and measures.

Postponement and Delay

A common means of obstructing proceedings is to seek postponement and de-lay. The IPCC, policies and measures, and bunker fuels agenda items have beenthe main focus of Saudi Arabia’s efforts in this respect. At COP 7 in 2001, for ex-ample, Saudi Arabia held up agreement on follow-up work on the IPCC’s ThirdAssessment Report (TAR), calling for postponement until the next session.85 Indoing so, it gained important concessions on other points. Earlier in 2001, atthe resumed COP 6, Saudi Arabia called, ultimately unsuccessfully, for the post-ponement of work on policies and measures until after COP 7.86 Then, in 2002,it insisted, successfully, on delaying the adoption of any substantive conclusions

Joanna Depledge • 23

81. ECO 2007.82. ENB 2008b, 16; and UNFCCC 2008.83. UNFCCC 2006, paragraph 5; and ENB 2006b, 15.84. ENB 2008b, 15.85. ENB 2001b, 8.86. ENB 2001a, 9.

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on the topic until the following session.87 In 2006 (with the US and Australia),it objected to a proposed roundtable, and argued instead for removing the itemon policies and measures from the agenda for four years (a two-year postpone-ment was agreed).88

A similar approach has been used on bunker fuels. In 2002, for example,Saudi Arabia called for further work on the topic to be set back by two years (aone year postponement was agreed).89 In 2005, the delegation, with otherOPEC states, successfully prevented the launch of a process on bunker fuels.90 In2006, it proposed to delete the entire agenda item; although this was not ac-cepted, no substantive conclusions could be agreed, leading Norway to makethe unusual comment that “no progress was made due to ‘small number of par-ties’ objections.”91 An almost identical scenario took place in 2007.92 In 2008,Saudi Arabia claimed that discussion on further action to tackle bunker fuelswould require an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. The delegation then suc-cessfully insisted that the Chair’s summary of views on this particular issue (butnot on others) be placed in square brackets, despite the intent of the Chair’ssummary to reºect all views.93

Refusal to Negotiate

A related means of delaying proceedings is to refuse to negotiate, invoking (un-likely) excuses. There are many examples of Saudi Arabia doing this, includingwhen serving as G-77 coordinator (see below). In 1999, for example, Saudi Ara-bia repeatedly missed small-group meetings on bunker fuels, despite its posi-tion as G-77 coordinator, citing the improbable cause of the smallness of its del-egation; it then refused to consider text presented to plenary, on the groundsthat it had not been able to participate in the talks.94 In 2000, in the run-up tothe crucial COP 6 meeting, Saudi Arabia was serving as G-77 coordinator on re-porting/review provisions under the Kyoto Protocol. Day after day, and eachtime new text was presented, Saudi Arabia claimed that the G-77 had hadinsufªcient time to consider the issues and therefore refused to participate fullyin negotiations.95 In 2002, when Saudi Arabia was serving as G-77 coordinatoron policies and measures, the delegation claimed that the G-77 “had not hadenough time”96 to consider the text and refused to negotiate. It did so again in2004, repeatedly asking for more time to consider a secretariat document.97

24 • Striving for No

87. ENB, 2002c, 6.88. ENB 2006a, 12.89. ENB 2002b.90. ENB 2005a, 5.91. ENB 2006b, 9.92. ENB 2007a, 12.93. ENB 2008b, 7.94. ENB 1999, 15; and ECO 1999.95. ENB 2000a, b, c, d.96. ENB 2002c, 6.97. E.g. ENB 2004b.

Page 18: Depledge Striving For No

Holding Out

Saudi Arabia is well known for holding out—that is, refusing to join the consen-sus, either alone or with a small number of supporters—for as long as possible.In 2004, for example, proceedings were delayed for many hours by Saudi Ara-bia’s insistence (and that of the Russian Federation) on the inclusion of its pro-posals in conclusions on the IPCC TAR, despite the fact that these had alreadybeen debated at length in an informal group.98 At a previous session of theSBSTA, Saudi Arabia alone had held up agreement with its objections to conclu-sions on the TAR, on the grounds that the negotiation process had been “un-fair.”99 When the IPCC’s subsequent 4AR was presented to the climate changeregime, Saudi Arabia insisted (successfully) on the deletion of text inviting min-isters to consider that report in their statements to the forthcoming Bali Confer-ence.100 Even on technology transfer, which is not usually a focus for Saudi Ara-bia, the delegation held up agreement in 2004 by insisting on a paragraph onfossil-fuel technologies.101 In 2003, Saudi Arabia allegedly went back on its wordgiven in an informal group that it would support a text on adverse effects.102 Thiswas especially signiªcant, as a key norm of global negotiations is that text ex-plicitly agreed by a delegation in an informal group will not then be reopenedonce it reaches plenary. In negotiations preceding the 2007 Bali Conference, is-sues relating to the possible adverse spillover effects of climate mitigation mea-sures, along with references to the lowest emission stabilization scenarios (thelatter opposed by Saudi Arabia), were the ªnal questions holding up the close ofthe session.103

Exploiting the Position of G-77 Coordinator

There is evidence that Saudi Arabia has exploited its position as G-77 coordina-tor on particular agenda items, notably bunker fuels, and policies and measures.On these issues, Saudi Arabia has been accused—including by fellow G-77delegates—of articulating a distorted G-77 position, claiming a common G-77position where there is none, failing to attend meetings or comment on circu-lated text, and neglecting to keep the wider G-77 informed of developments.104

In 2003, for example, other G-77 members, notably Samoa, objected that “oneparty” had adopted “more than a liberal interpretation”105 of the mandate givento it by the G-77 on policies and measures. This happened again on the same is-sue in 2004, when Saudi Arabia’s claim to speak for the G77 was challenged bythe group of least developed countries.106 At the same session in 2004, there was

Joanna Depledge • 25

98. ENB 2004d.99. ENB 2002b.

100. ENB 2007a, 7.101. ENB 2004c.102. ENB 2003b.103. ENB 2007b, 4.104. Dessai 2004.105. ENB 2003a.106. ENB 2004a, 6.

Page 19: Depledge Striving For No

also disquiet at the stance taken by Saudi Arabia as G-77 coordinator on bunkerfuels, whereby it had opposed any future work on the topic. In the ªnal plenary,Argentina and the Alliance of Small Island States (G-77 members), contestedSaudi Arabia’s claim to speak for the Group, but no substantive text could beagreed.107

Procedural Blockage

A classic obstructionist tactic is to invoke procedural rules to delay the negotia-tions, crossing the ªne line that exists between lodging genuinely held concernsover procedural issues in good faith, and deliberately using ªne print to frus-trate the negotiation process. Saudi Arabia has undoubtedly sought to interpretparticular rules in such a way as to stall the regime’s progress, although this is atactic that has been less used in recent years. For example, during the Kyoto Pro-tocol negotiations, Saudi Arabia put forward an interpretation of the Conven-tion’s rules whereby the complete text of the protocol under negotiation wouldhave to be circulated six months before its adoption, and then remain un-changed. This interpretation was clearly unworkable, and would have broughtthe negotiations to a halt. It was eventually dismissed by an alternative opinionfrom the UN Ofªce of Legal Affairs.108 More routine procedural rules that havebeen invoked by Saudi Arabia mostly concern demands for interpretation andtranslation, as well as objections to the convening of small groups and insis-tence on the completion of meetings exactly on schedule. Interpretation andtranslation are of great importance to all non-Anglophone delegates, especiallysmall developing countries. However, at critical points in a negotiation process,lapsing into English-only is usually tolerated, if reluctantly, as the only way tostrike a deal. Similarly, an established practice in the climate change regime lim-its the number of meetings that can take place simultaneously to two. However,when negotiations are at their most intense, a proliferation of negotiating fo-rums is usually endured.109 Saudi Arabia has sometimes taken an opportuniststance to these rules and practices, choosing to raise procedural objections spe-ciªcally when it would advance its aims in relation to particular agenda items.For example, in negotiations to design a compliance system for the Kyoto Proto-col, Saudi Arabia (and other OPEC states) refused to proceed with a ªrst readingof a draft text, on the grounds that it was circulated only in English.110 Objec-tions by the G-77 on procedural grounds were also an important feature of COP6 in The Hague, where negotiations eventually collapsed. On just one day of ne-gotiations, for example, Saudi Arabia itself objected to proposals to convenesmall groups on reporting, policies and measures, and compliance.111 Although

26 • Striving for No

107. ENB 2004a, 4.108. See Depledge 2005.109. See Depledge 2005.110. ECO 1999.111. ENB 2000e.

Page 20: Depledge Striving For No

not the primary cause of collapse, such procedural blockage undoubtedly con-tributed to that session’s failure.

The Effectiveness of Obstructionism

To what extent has Saudi Arabia been successful in its obstructionism? The an-swer is complex. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia has failed to stop the develop-ment and strengthening of the climate change regime, including the adoptionand entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol and Marrakesh Accords, and thelaunch of a new round of negotiations in Bali in 2007. Indeed, the only case sofar when negotiations actually collapsed, at COP 6, was not primarily caused bySaudi Arabia, but by disputes among the industrialized countries. It is thereforeimportant not to overstate Saudi Arabia’s inºuence. In Bali, for example, it wasthe political struggle between the US and the largest developing countries—notably China, India and South Africa—that decided the ªnal outcome, notSaudi Arabia. This conªrms the observation that Saudi Arabia tends to be moreactive during lower-proªle negotiating sessions, rather than the landmark con-ferences.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia has been extremely successful in diverting theagenda and debates of the climate change regime away from those issues it op-poses, and towards those it supports. In this respect, the glacial pace of progresson its key targeted agenda items—especially bunker fuels and policies and mea-sures—is striking compared with the increasing time and energy devoted to ad-verse effects. Another consequence has been to spoil the atmosphere of the cli-mate change negotiations on a day-to-day basis, taking up valuable time andgenerally fraying the nerves of delegates. Perhaps most signiªcant is the exacer-bation of mistrust between industrialized and developing countries. Many in-dustrialized country delegates ªnd it difªcult to understand why, as they see it,the G-77 indulges Saudi Arabia in this way, and the lack of comprehension,even irritation, felt by some increases the alienation between the two groups.112

By pushing the broader G-77 to support, or at least acquiesce to, many of its de-mands, Saudi Arabia has made it more difªcult to reconcile industrialized anddeveloping country positions. Misrepresentation of the G-77 position has beenparticularly problematic. In this sense, Saudi Arabia’s actions have probablyheld back the emergence of more constructive alliances and relationships acrossindustrialized and developing countries.

Ironically, although Saudi Arabia may have scored some success in ad-vancing its interests, its tactics may eventually backªre. By adopting such ex-treme and aggressive positions, Saudi Arabia has alienated other delegations, in-cluding donor countries, and has mostly failed to persuade others of its case.Instead, Saudi Arabia has largely become a caricature in the climate change re-

Joanna Depledge • 27

112. Kjellén 2008, 77.

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gime, with its demands and complaints almost summarily dismissed by manyothers as predictable and unreasonable.

Tackling Obstructionism

Tackling obstructionism is not easy, because of the ªne line between it and legit-imate hardball bargaining. The presumption of good faith held by both aca-demics and practitioners also means they largely lack the tools to analyze ordeal with the problem. The veneer of courtesy and diplomacy that pervades aglobal negotiation in all but its most heated moments makes it difªcult to con-demn obstructionists. To publicly accuse a country of obstructionism is a veryserious charge, and one that diplomats are loath to level at one another. Evenwhen tempers have snapped and delegates have denounced obstructionism,they have tended not to actually name the parties involved (see, for example, theNorwegian statement cited above).

Obstructionism can be managed in a variety of ways. One is throughstrong and judicious chairing, whereby the chair of the negotiations can distin-guish cases of obstructionism from good faith grievances, in order to exposeand isolate these in an authoritative manner, and then to defuse them in variousways. Examples of such skilled chairs include Raul Estrada-Oyuela, Chair of theKyoto Protocol negotiations, and Espen Ronneberg, Chair of the post-Kyotocompliance negotiations.113

A second effective means of tackling obstructionism has been through theunity of the G-77, which has also been helped by skilful chairing of the Group.On the few occasions where Saudi Arabia has been isolated within the G-77, ithas been compelled to back down. The classic example of this occurred at COP1, where India led the majority of the G-77 to break away from OPEC and en-dorse a mandate to launch negotiations on what became the Kyoto Protocol.This led to a split in the G-77, which has never been repeated since.114 A less dra-matic, but still important, example was the incident in 1999, where Saudi Ara-bia’s refusal to endorse a decision on compliance was ªnally resolved partly be-cause Iran, a fellow and inºuential OPEC member, appealed to Saudi Arabia tojoin the consensus.115 Something similar happened at CMP 1 in 2005, wherelack of support from the G-77 encouraged Saudi Arabia to eventually backdown from its insistence that the compliance system should be adopted only byway of an amendment.116 Kjellén, co-chair of the post-Kyoto negotiations on ad-verse effects, recalls that “it was striking how Dr. Al Sabban could change his po-sition very rapidly, if G 77 consensus risked being jeopardized.”117 A further ex-

28 • Striving for No

113. Depledge 2005, chapter 4.114. See Mwandosya 2000, for an account of how this G-77 Chairman maintained the Group’s

unity.115. ENB 1999.116. ENB 2005b, 12–13.117. Kjellén 2008 , 77.

Page 22: Depledge Striving For No

ample occurred in 2005, when Saudi Arabia had to withdraw its objections tothe SBSTA agenda when the G-77 spokesperson and several individual develop-ing countries refused to support its demands.118

Another strategy that has, at times, averted obstructionism has been sidepayments, or trade-offs, made outside the regime. One intriguing question iswhy Saudi Arabia did not object to the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, when itcould have declared no consensus, or objected on (perfectly valid) proceduralgrounds (e.g. absence of interpretation at the point of adoption). Judiciouschairing provides some explanation, as does the possible reluctance of SaudiArabia to block major decisions at the point of adoption, despite its threats todo so. Probably just as important, however, were the promises that were report-edly made to Saudi Arabia by Japan to purchase oil, along with other pledges.119

Examples of such trade-offs are, of course, difªcult to pin down with any cer-tainty, but a possible more recent case is worth mentioning. The 2008 Bangkokmeetings saw a breakthrough of sorts on bunker fuels, with Saudi Arabia quietlyscaling down its participation in the negotiations, and in so doing, enabling asubstantive discussion on the topic for the ªrst time in many years.120 A fewweeks previously, following a visit to Riyadh by the Norwegian Oil and EnergyMinister, Norway and Saudi Arabia had agreed to work together to promotethe inclusion of CCS technology under the clean development mechanism(CDM).121 Norway is at the vanguard of CCS technology, which is, as notedabove, an area of considerable interest to Saudi Arabia. It is difªcult to dismissthe thought that Saudi Arabia’s less obstructive stance on bunker fuels at thatsession may have been connected to its new found alliance with Norway, one ofthe strongest supporters of action on that issue.

Generally, the parties to the climate change regime have shown remark-able tolerance towards Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism. This partly reºects thepervasive view in the global environmental arena that regimes should be all-inclusive and embrace even the most reluctant participant, even if this slowsdown the regime. This view, in turn, is founded on the liberal institutionalist be-lief that learning promoted by regimes—through the diffusion of informationand exchange of views—will eventually soften extreme positions and persuadereluctant participants to modify their approach. In the case of Saudi Arabia,there have been moves to persuade the Kingdom away from its bad news stance,notably by seeking to demonstrate that oil markets are unlikely to be seriouslythreatened by climate policy.122 Addressing the 2007 Third OPEC Summit, forexample, the UNFCCC Executive Secretary used energy data to argue that cli-mate change mitigation could open up economic opportunities, and that “forthe coming decades—possibly longer—oil is here to stay.” Tellingly, he advised

Joanna Depledge • 29

118. ENB 2005a, 3.119. See Oberthür and Ott 1999.120. See ENB 2008a.121. Reuters 2008.122. E.g., see Grubb et al. 1999, 57, footnote 18.

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OPEC delegates that “your opportunity lies in becoming key to the solution,rather than being perceived as part of the problem.”123 As argued throughout thispaper, however, Saudi Arabia’s position has remained remarkably stable andconsistent over the past 15 years. Part of the problem may be that, while endur-ing Saudi Arabia’s obstructionism, other delegations have not really taken itsconcerns seriously and genuinely sought to address them. Certainly, oil-import-ing industrialized countries have dealt inconsistently with Saudi Arabia, speak-ing to the Kingdom in one voice in the climate change regime, and with anotherin forums where they seek stable and plentiful supplies of oil.124

Conclusion: Beyond Obstruction?

Saudi Arabia’s ªrst national communication to the Convention,125 submitted in2005, hints at a possible reorientation of the Saudi approach. This report, pre-pared under the responsibility of the Presidency of Meteorology and Environ-ment, presents a more balanced approach than that propounded by the delega-tion in the negotiations. Although the report maintains that responding toclimate change will badly harm the Saudi economy, it takes for granted the po-tential severity of climate change, acknowledges that “Saudi Arabia is particu-larly vulnerable”126 to its impacts, presents a detailed discussion of that vulnera-bility, and puts forward a reasoned and measured case for assistance witheconomic diversiªcation. Another development in 2006 was the convening, atSaudi Arabia’s initiative, of an international conference on the CDM.127 Thissuggests growing recognition within Saudi Arabia of the economic opportuni-ties presented by the CDM and the pragmatic calculation that these should notbe squandered. There is certainly great potential for external investment in car-bon mitigation in Saudi Arabia, given its large per capita emissions—especiallyif CCS activities are included in the future. Despite concerns over its economiccosts, environmental implications, and technical feasibility, CCS is an area withpotential for constructive cross-over between the interests of Saudi Arabia andsome other industrialized nations, as illustrated by the case of cooperation withNorway discussed above.

In late 2007, Saudi Arabia hosted the Third OPEC Summit, where envi-ronmental concerns featured as one of the primary themes. The Declaration em-anating from the Summit displays a clear acceptance of human-induced climatechange, and the responsibility of OPEC countries to address the problem.128 Aswould be expected, it emphasizes technological responses to climate change,along with non-energy sectors such as forestry, and the special circumstances of

30 • Striving for No

123. UNFCCC 2007, emphasis added.124. Zammit Cutajar 2004.125. Saudi Arabia 2005.126. Saudi Arabia 2005, 51.127. See http://www.cdm-saudiconference.com/cdm/home.do; and report at IISD 2006.128. OPEC 2008.

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oil-dependent countries. It does so, however, in a constructive manner. At theSummit, Saudi Arabia pledged $300 million for research on energy, environ-ment and climate change, with other OPEC countries also pledging funds.129 Ina possible parallel to the (very gradual) evolution of thinking within the GeorgeW. Bush US Administration, these developments may suggest that Saudi Arabia,and other OPEC nations, are at last starting to “catch up” with most of the restof the world in moving towards a response to climate change focused on con-structive solutions tailored to their national circumstances, rather than obstruc-tion and denial.

The question is whether, and if so how, these developments will eventu-ally feed through to changes in the Saudi delegation’s approach to the negotia-tions themselves, especially leading up to the landmark Copenhagen meeting inDecember 2009. For now (up to the June 2008 sessions), any signs of a soften-ing in the Saudi negotiating position remained well hidden.

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