denial of service - service provider overview

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Denial of Service Service Provider Overview Martin Oravec Systems Engineer Sales CZ/SK/HU

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Denial of ServiceService Provider Overview

Martin Oravec

Systems Engineer Sales CZ/SK/HU

PeeringRouter

Internet

PeeringRouter

Internet

CloudScrubbing

Service

Silverline

EdgeRouter

EdgeRouter

PGW

Radio

Access

GiFW/L4 DDOS

BNG

CMTS

DSL/FTTH

Cable IP/MPLS

Backbone

EnterpriseData Center

CPE

L4-L7 inline DDOS

Mobile Broadband

Fixed Broadband

Enterprise

Data Center (control, mgmt, apps)

L4-L7 inline DDOS

1

4

4

2

1

2

3

4

Protect international transit

links

Inline L4-L7 DDOS for control plane

elements and application servers

Gi Firewall with L4 DDoS, GiFW

and optional CGNAT, DNS, …

EdgeRouter

CGFW/L4 DDOS

3

CG Firewall with L4 DDoS and

optional CGNAT, DNS …

Service Provider DDoS solutions overview

© F5 Networks, Inc 3

DNS

Web Presentations in 90ties and today

DNS stats

DNS Demand

AVERAGE DAILY QUERY LOAD FOR DNS (.COM/.NET)

DNSSEC DEPLOYMENT EXPANDING

100+ DNS QUERIES FOR SINGLE WEB PAGE

ONE OF MOST ATTACKED PROTOCOLS

GLOBAL MOBILE DATA = DNS GROWTH

DISTRIBUTED, HIGH-PERFORMANCE NEEDS

18X Growth 2011-20164G LTE

2.4GB/mo

Non-4G LTE

86MB/mo

Reflection/amplification DDoS

Cache poisoning attacks

Drive for DNSSEC adoption

Total app and service availability

Geographically dispersed

DNS capacity close to clients

82

‘15‘14‘13‘12‘111

20

11

0

57 7

7

82

In Billions

Denial of Service Attacks - DNS

Why DNS is popular for DDoS?

• Widely used protocol, open on FWs, open recursion

• DNS is based on UDP

• DNS DDoS often uses spoofed sources

• Large Amplification Factor (100x) - using open resolvers or ANY type to an authoritative NS

Traditional mitigations are failing

• Using an ACL block legitimate clients

• DNS attacks use massive volumes of source addresses, breaking many firewalls

Denial of Service Attacks targeting DNS infrastructure are often complex and standard tools can not provide adequate response to mitigate it without inhibiting the ability of DNS to do its job

DNS Flood

SynopsysMany attackers or botnets flood an authoritative name server,

attempting to exceed its capacity.

Dropped responses = reduced or no site availability.

Mitigation – PERFORMANCE, PERFORMANCE, ….• F5 offers exceptional DNS capacity, over 2M RPS in case of appliance and

to over 20M RPS for chassis. Additionally the possibility to use Rapid

Response Mode to double during the attack.

• Identify unusually high traffic patterns to specific clients using F5 DNS

DDoS Profiles - ICSA–certified FW with support for 30+ DDoS vectors

• Use DNS Anycast to distribute the load between regional DCsDNS Requests DNS Responses

Target DNS

infrastructure

DNS Amplification Attack

DNS Requests Large DNS Responses

SynopsysBy spoofing a UDP source address, attackers can target a common

source. By requesting for large record types (ANY, DNSSEC, etc), a

36 byte request can result in a response over 100 times larger.

Mitigation• DNS request type validation– force TCP in case of type ANY

• BIG-IP supports DNS type ACLs - filters for acceptable DNS query types

• Identify unusually high traffic patterns to specific clients or from

specific sources via DNS DoS Profiles and apply mitigations

• Drop all unsolicited responses (BIG IP’s default behavior)

[Target Site]

Random Sub-domain / NXDOMAIN

Attackers Web bots Open Resolvers

<randomstring>.www.example.com

<anotherstring>.www.example.comDoes not exist | Exists

Increased outbound NXDOMAIN

and SERVFAIL responses

[Target DNS]

NXDOMAIN DDoS: DMARC

• Domain-based message authentication, reporting, and conformance (DMARC) is a mechanism for improving mail handling by mail-receiving organizations.

• The _dmarc DDoS attack vector is interesting in that it makes use of Google’s and Yahoo’s legitimate DNS servers to launch a DDoS attack on another entity’s DNS infrastructure

https://devcentral.f5.com/d/a-new-twist-on-dns-nxdomain-ddos-dmarc-attack-vector-analysis

DNS the F5 Way

External

Firewall

DNS Load

Balancing

Array of DNS

Servers

Hidden Master

DNS

Internal

FirewallInternet

DMZ

Master DNS

InfrastructureInternet

• Traditional DNS servers with

vulnerabilities

• Adding performance = DNS boxes

• Weak DoS/DDoS Protection

• Firewall is THE bottleneck

Datacenter

F5 DNS Delivery Reimagined

Conventional DNS Thinking

DNS Firewall

DNS DDoS Protection

Protocol Validation

Authoritative DNS

Caching Resolver

Transparent Caching

High Performance DNSSEC

DNSSEC Validation

Intelligent GSLB

BIG-IP DNS

• Massive performance over 20M RPS!

• Double query max responses in Rapid Res. Mode

• Consolidation: LDNS integration for higher scale

• DoS / DDoS Protection included

• Less CAPEX and OPEX

Mitigate Malicious Communication

• Prevent malware and sites hosting malicious content from ever communicating with a client

• Inhibit the threat at the earliest

opportunity ‒ Internet activity starts

with a DNS request

Domain

Reputation

• Mitigate DNS threats by blocking access to malicious IPs

• Reduce malware and virus infections

Response Policy Zone (RPZ) Feed IP Intelligence / URL categories Feed

IP Reputation

URL Categorisation

DNS

Complete DNS Protection & Performance with F5

BIG-IP

DNS Firewall Apps

DNS

Servers

LDNSInternet

Devices DMZ Data Center

*Requires provisioning only BIG-IP® Advanced Firewall Manager™ to access functionality.

• DNS DDoS mitigation with DNS Express

• Protocol inspection and validation

• DNS record type ACL*

• Block access to Malicious IPs

• High performance DNS cache

• RPZ – Outbound Domain Filtering

• Stateful – Never accepts unsolicited responses

• ICSA Certified - deployment in the DMZ

• Scale across devices – IP Anycast

• Secure responses – DNSSEC

• Complete DNS control – iRules

• DDoS threshold alerting*

• DNS logging and reporting

• Hardened F5 DNS code – NOT BIND

F5 DNS Firewall Services

© F5 Networks, Inc 15

AFM

F5 Carrier Class Network Firewall

Provides Multi-Layer

Security Protection

Comprehensive Purpose-built & Virtual Appliances

Standards & Protocol Support

Highly Scalable & Manageable

Consolidation of Network Functions

HIGH PERFORMANCE / SCALABLE / HIGH AVAILABILITY / PROGRAMMABLE / CONSOLIDATION OF NETWORK FUNCTIONS

• Protects from malformed and malicious traffic at scale

• L2-L4 DoS Vectors• Malformed/bad, suspicious, and volumetric attack vectors

• Hardware accelerated on many platforms

• Per-endpoint limits (src & dst)

• Includes also protocol specific DoS detection and mitigation

(DNS+SIP)

DOS capabilities throughout the product• Purpose-built hardware

• SYN cookies in hardware to protect CPS resources

• Per source CPS limits on virtual servers

• Sweeper to protect connection table

• Various timer and protocol knobs

AFM DDoS detection and mitigation

IMS & VoLTE Security Threat - Signaling Storm

SGi LAN

PGW PEeNodeB SecuritySGW

Internet APN

IMS APN

Internet APN

IMS APN

User Equipment

P-CSCF

Signaling (SIP)*

Legend

Symptom = DOS attack / Signaling Storm

Impact = Disruption of Service

Cause = Fault (PGW Down) / Bad Software / Mis-configuration / DDoS using mobiles

Remedy = Per Prefix (/64) Rate Limiting*

*implement on SGi Firewall or P-CSCF Firewall (or both) with SIP DDoS capabilities

*High PPS

*Aggressive retries

*Multiple UEs

IMS & IMS & VoLTE Security Threat - Unsolicited Scan

SGi LAN

PGW PEeNodeB SecuritySGW

Internet APN

IMS APN

Internet APN

IMS APN

User Equipment

P-CSCF

Symptom = DOS attack / Prefix Scan / Unsolicited Packets

Impact = Disruption of Service / Excessive Signaling

Cause = Virus / Worm / Malicious User

Remedy = Firewall Policy with SIP ALG

IP Packets*

Legend

*High PPS

*Increment per /64

*Multiple UEs

Leveraging the F5 Carrier Class Firewall for High-Scale DDoS Mitigation on the Gi-LAN

• Internet or mobile device-based DDoS attacks, such as TCP/ICMP/UDP/SYN floods, impacting network resources, resulting in service outages or degradation

• Internet-based IP port sweeps causing RAN exhaustion and battery drain

• Malware/botnets infecting mobile devices

DDoS Threats

• Use a powerful and flexible network firewall with policy rules, DDoS vectors, and scripting to protect AN and device resources

• Use IP intelligence and dynamically updateable list of blocked IP addresses (temporarily)

Solution

PGW/GGSN

BNG AFM

Internet

Attacker

Web bot

Dynamically updateable list of blocked IP addresses for a period of time

Sources of “shunned” IPs

• Internal: Explicit (CLI/GUI), Auto Sweep/flood, Behavioral DNS DoS, WAF

• External (via API): SIEM, IDS/IPS, other security management system

Sub-second mitigation, thousands of entries

SIEM / IDP

PGW/GGSN

BNGAFM

Internet

Attacker

Web bot

Sweep/Flood, DNS, WAFINTERNAL SHUN

EXTERNAL SHUN

Leveraging the F5 Carrier Class Firewall for Dynamic Security Enforcement

Solving the Full-Pipe Problem (RTBH rfc5635)

• Volumetric DDoS Attack fills Datacenter’s Upstream

Bandwidth “Full-Pipe Problem”

• Availability is suffering; Attack traffic must be stopped

further upstream then Datacenter

• AFM signals to upstream network to drop specific

source or destination traffic using BGP

• Specific traffic is dropped on Network Edge

• The network can be sectioned into multiple

communities -> an ability to drop in specific parts of

their network.

Data Center

ISP Router

Customer/ISP Transit Network

AFM

1.2.3.4

1.2.3.5

1.2.3.6

1.2.3.7

AFM Signals Upstream Networkto Drop Attack

Traffic

IPv6 traffic does not pass through CGNAT• Need to avoid unsolicited traffic from Internet (back to basics)

ICMPv6: Essential for network operations• Neighbour discovery - Replaces router advertisement

• Essential for hacking IPv6 networks

Tunneling• Used as transition path from v4 to v6

• Hide attack/malware traffic from security devices

Capacities• Dual-stack IPv4/IPv6 will require higher CPS and higher connection count

How IPv6 Changes Security

Integrated Firewall + CGNAT on the Gi-LAN

NAT44

Gi-FW Internet

Private

IPv4

Public

IPv6

Public

IPv6

Public

IPv4 IPv4

CGNAT

IPv6

Gi-FW

Time

Traffic

distribution

UNPRECEDENTED SCALE ANDPERFORMANCE

NAT44 → NAT64

PGW / BNG

GRADUAL TRANSITION FROM IPV4 CGNAT TO IPV6 GI-FW

INVESTMENT PROTECTION

© F5 Networks, Inc 25

CONS

AFM

DNS

CGNAT Consolidate with

Consolidating SP’s security

Protection for networks

and applications

Fewer devices translates to

lower latency for

subscribers

Consolidation of firewall,

application security, and

traffic management

BEFORE F5

WITH F5

Load

Balancer

Firewall

DNS Security

Network DDoS

LoadBalancer & SSL

Application DDoS

Web Application Firewall

Web AccessManagement

BEFORE F5

WITH F5

Load

Balancer

Firewall

DNS Security

Network DDoS

LoadBalancer & SSL

Application DDoS

Web Application Firewall

Web AccessManagement

Consolidating SP’s security

Protection for networks

and applications

Fewer devices translates to

lower latency for

subscribers

Consolidation of firewall,

application security, and

traffic management

Protection for mobility

and core infrastructure

with user awareness

High scale for the

demands of 4G and IPv6

deployments

Consolidation of security,

address, and traffic

management

BEFORE F5

WITH F5

FirewallPGW/

GGSN

DPI, Parental

Control, …CG-NAT

Consolidating SP’s service functions

Protection for mobility

and core infrastructure

with user awareness

High scale for the

demands of 4G and IPv6

deployments

Consolidation of security,

address, and traffic

management

BEFORE F5

WITH F5

FirewallPGW/

GGSN

DPI CG-NAT

PGW/

GGSN

FirewallDPI CG-NAT

Consolidating SP’s service functions