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Democratisation in Taiwan revisitedJ. Bruce Jacobs aa Department of Asian Languages and Studies , Monash UniversityPublished online: 27 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: J. Bruce Jacobs (1997) Democratisation in Taiwan revisited, Asian Studies Review, 21:2-3, 149-157, DOI:10.1080/03147539708713169

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November 1997 Democracy in Asia Revisited 149

contradictions inherent in the adaptation of Western political values and practicesin a developing country would have meant the demise of democracy and politicaldisintegration, pregnant with the imminent danger of creating another Cambodiaor even Burma, with the imposition of a ruthless military regime ... Despite theintractable obstacles it has encountered, [Sri TanVa will] continue to evolve as aliberal democracy in a developing society; and ... its undoubted political andsocial achievements [will] not be sacrificed easily.23

Democratisation in Taiwan Revisited

J. Bruce Jacobs1

Department of Asian Languages and StudiesMonash University

In early 1993, the author wrote: "Taiwan's political system has undergone aremarkable transformation. Once strongly authoritarian, Taiwan has now movedwell along the road of democratisation".2 In the whole of Asia, Taiwan—joinedperhaps by South Korea and to a lesser extent by the Philippines and Malaysia—remains one of the few Asian cases of democratisation. Yet, in 1993 the writerremained cautious, seeing "the military and security agencies as a potential threatto Taiwan's process of democratisation".3 In late 1997, however, the writerbelieves democracy has in fact planted firm roots in the island's soil and society.

In tracing the emergence of democratisation on Taiwan during the late 1980sand early 1990s, the earlier analysis noted that a foundation had developedduring the authoritarian period. In the 1950s, using the breathing space providedby the American insertion of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Straits at thebeginning of the Korean War, the Nationalists conducted their Party Reform of1950-52, implemented land reform in the countryside, and initiated "local self-government" and relatively open local elections. During the 1960s, rapideconomic growth gave economic specialists and technocrats a new voice andstatus within the political system. Following Taiwan's increasing diplomaticisolation in the early 1970s, many more young and well-educated people as wellas more native Taiwanese gained high-level political positions. Furthermore,

23 Jayasuriya, op. cit., p. 34.1 The author gratefully acknowledges grants from the Australian Research Council

which facilitated the several field research trips underpinning this article.2 J. Bruce Jacobs, "Democratisation in Taiwan", Asian Studies Review 17, 1 (July

1993), 116-26; quote from p. 116.3 Ibid., p. 126.

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despite the projection of a very conservative image externally, the Nationalistsimplemented quite progressive social policies on Taiwan.4

In the last eighteen months of his life, President Chiang Ching-kuo (whodied on 13 January 1988) implemented three key reforms. First, he allowed atrue opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, founded on28 September 1986, to exist and to contest the December 1986 election. Previ-ously, the leaders of all opposition parties had been arrested. Secondly,President Chiang Ching-kuo abolished martial law, a decision announced on15 October 1986 and implemented in July 1987. Finally, beginning in October1987, he allowed residents of Taiwan to visit the Mainland, a key policy changewhich punctured myths about the Mainland and made Taiwan residents muchmore aware of the poverty, dictatorship and bureaucratisation which existedthere.5 These reforms clearly signalled that the President supported movestowards democratisation.

When President Chiang Ching-kuo died, Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, aTaiwanese technocrat, succeeded to the presidency. Yet many members of theMainlander elite tried to stop Lee from gaining true power. President Lee,whom many saw as a nice but bumbling scholar, proved a masterful politician.He used the contradictions within the Mainlander elite to defeat a succession ofpowerful Mainlander leaders representing the government bureaucracy, the partyand the military. Thus, Lee Huan (whose power base was in the party) replacedYu Kuo-hua as premier in June 1989, and following the failure of an abortiveMainlander-inspired alternative slate for president and vice-president against LeeTeng-hui in 1990, Lee replaced Lee Huan with Hau Pei-tsun as premier in May1990. Hau, whose base was in the military, was forced to resign in the after-math of the 19 December 1992 parliamentary election when he realised he lackedsupport among a majority of the new parliamentarians.6 This resignation by therelatively hardline, conservative Hau also reinforced Taiwan's democraticdevelopment.

President Lee also relied on cooperation and tacit agreements with theopposition, many of whose leaders had only recently been released from prison.In retrospect, the National Affairs Conference, which Lee convened in July 1990after he had been elected president in his own right, proved a masterful stroke.7

The National Affairs Conference brought together a wide variety of people fromwithin the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), the academic community and the

4 Ibid., pp. 117-19.5 Ibid., pp. 120-21.6 Ibid., pp. 121-23.7 In earlier years the writer underestimated the importance of the National Affairs

Conference; thus it is not mentioned in the author's 1993 paper referred to in fn. 2.

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November 1997 Democracy in Asia Revisited 151

opposition, including political prisoners just released from custody. At the time,the wide variety of opinions and lack of consensus made the unofficial talkfestseem fairly unimportant, but in fact the National Affairs Conference enabled theopen discussion of many previously forbidden subjects. Remarkably, consensuson many of the most disputed topics—for example, whether or not the presidentshould be popularly elected—emerged within a few years.

The early 1993 analysis pointed to four important constitutional and quasi-constitutional changes from mid-1990 to mid-1992 which greatly alteredTaiwan's constitutional and political framework. First, the Council of GrandJustices (Taiwan's High Court) terminated the previously indefinitely extendedterms of the parliamentarians elected on the Mainland in the late 1940s. Thisconstitutional interpretation swept away the remnants of the old Mainlander elite.Second, a set of ten constitutional amendments passed on 22 April 1991 estab-lished the basis for new parliamentary elections and terminated any laws intendedto apply solely to the Period of National Mobilisation for Suppression of theCommunist Rebellion. Third, eight further constitutional amendments wereapproved in early 1992, though the National Assembly was deadlocked overwhether the president should be popularly-elected, and postponed resolution ofthe issue until 1995. Finally, on 15 May 1992 the parliament amendedArticle 100 of the Criminal Law, which concerns the Crime of Insurrection,significantly enhancing freedom of speech because advocacy of ideas or evennon-violent action no longer qualified as insurrection.8

Since the early 1993 analysis, five key events have helped consolidateTaiwan's democratisation.

(1) The Establishment of the New Party

In 1990 the open conflict between President Lee Teng-hui and the Mainlanderelite divided the Nationalist Party into Mainstream and Anti-Mainstream factions.President Lee's Mainstream faction tended to draw support from Taiwanese(though some Mainlanders also supported it) and from people with more"liberal", "open-minded" and "democratic" views. The Anti-Mainstream drewsupport mainly from the older Mainlander conservative elite and from youngerMainlanders concerned with their future in a "Taiwanese" Taiwan as opposed toa "Chinese" Taiwan.9 These tensions finally led to a formal split in theNationalist Party with many supporters of the Anti-Mainstream faction formingthe New Party on 10 August 1993.

8 Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 123-24.9 Ibid., p. 122.

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The New Party has emphasised its strong support for a Chinese identity forTaiwan, but it has also called for clean politics and social welfare. In succeed-ing elections it has polled strongly among white-collar and professional people inurban areas. Interestingly, though widely perceived as a Mainlander party, theNew Party receives about half of its votes from Taiwanese.10 Like the Nation-alist Party and Democratic Progressive Party, the New Party is riven withfactions. The older Mainlanders stress Chinese identity while the youngermembers stress clean politics and social welfare. Personality conflicts alsodivide the New Party; its image suffered grievously when a breakfast meeting ofits parliamentary members deteriorated into a food fight.11 In late 1996 a smallTaiwan Independence Party split off from the Democratic Progressive Party andover the years numerous other political parties have been founded in Taiwan, butnone of the new parties has affected the political landscape as much as the NewParty.

(2) The Constitution Amendments of 1994

In mid-1994 the constitutional amendments of 1991 and 1992 were consolidatedinto ten "additional articles" to the Constitution. Mostly importantly, Article 2provided for the direct election of the president and vice-president beginning in1996. Thus, consensus had been reached on a key constitutional issue not longafter the great division of the National Affairs Conference of mid-1990 and theconstitutional amendments of early 1992. This originally contentious issue,which was to have been revisited in 1995, was thus solved in 1994. Those whohad originally opposed the direct election of the president had feared leavingsuch a key decision to the people. The widespread support for this changeindicates the rapidity and depth of democratic development among various groupsin Taiwan.

The mid-1994 constitutional amendments also provided for direct election ofthe governor of Taiwan province and for the election of the mayors of theprovincial-level municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung. (Previously these lead-ers had been appointed by the central government.) These elections took placeon 3 December 1994. Since Taiwan province covers 98 per cent of the island'sarea and 80 per cent of its population, the gubernatorial election was especiallysignificant. Despite the overwhelmingly Taiwanese population of Taiwanprovince, President Lee supported the nomination of James Soong, a Mainlander,who won handily. In Taipei Municipality, Chen Shui-bian, a Taiwanese leader

10 This observation is based on several polls conducted by both the Nationalist Party andthe Democratic Progressive Party.

11 See Taiwan press of 26 February 1997.

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of the Democratic Progressive Party won a three-way election over the NewParty and Nationalist Party candidates, thus giving the opposition DemocraticProgressive Party control over Taiwan's most important city, an importantinstitutional power base.

(3) The Parliamentary Election of 2 December 1995

In retrospect, the 2 December 1995 parliamentary election was important becausethe Nationalist Party almost lost its parliamentary majority, signalling thepossibility of a peaceful transfer of power from government to opposition.Because party discipline in the Nationalist Party has never been as strong as inthe Democratic Progressive Party and the New Party, the Nationalist parliament-ary majority seemed slim indeed. Yet the Nationalists benefited from holdingthe political middle ground, as cooperation between the Democratic Progressiveand New parties seemed unlikely even though both supported political reform.

To the surprise of many in and out of politics, the first ballot for the speakerof the parliament resulted in a tied vote between the nominees of the Nationalistand Democratic Progressive parties. Investigation revealed that an aboriginalNationalist parliamentarian had voted with the opposition. The crucial votes ofthe aboriginal parliamentarians in the evenly-divided parliament enabled them tobargain hard with the Nationalist leadership to gain several long-sought abori-ginal goals including a Commission (Ministry) of Aboriginal Affairs. Thesepromises enabled the Nationalist candidate for Speaker to win the next ballot andassured the Nationalist Party that President Lee's nomination of Lien Chan, whowas originally appointed in early 1993, would receive parliamentary support tocontinue as premier. The inability of the ruling Nationalist Party to controlparliament, however, led to the constitutional changes of mid-1997 (see below).

A noteworthy aspect of the parliamentary election of 2 December 1995 andthe National Assembly election held simultaneously with the presidential electionof 23 March 1996 was an explicit attempt by the Nationalist Party to break downthe gap between the government and the people. During the authoritarian periodthe top leadership remained immune to popular election. Beginning in 1995 theNationalist Party required top leaders to face the electorate. As a result of thisnew policy, Vincent Siew, a Taiwanese cabinet minister with extensive experi-ence, resigned from his government positions and entered the December 1995race for parliament from Chiayi Municipality, an opposition stronghold. (Siewwon and was later appointed premier in 1997.) Two prominent Mainlanders,Foreign Minister Frederick Chien and Jason Hu, Director-General of theGovernment Information Office, had to seek support from the populace in theNational Assembly election, though members of the National Assembly do nothave to resign executive positions. (Chien became Speaker of the NationalAssembly, while Hu later became the government representative in the United

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States and was appointed Foreign Minister in October 1997.) This policy hasreduced the gap between high officials and citizens and increased a sense ofresponsible government.

(4) The Presidential Election of 23 March 1996 and the Taiwan Straits Crisis

The popular election of Taiwan's president—an event feared by Taiwan's conser-vatives in 1990 and 1992, yet approved with wide consensus in 1994—took placeamid the Mainland Chinese military exercises and threats of the Taiwan Straitscrisis of March 1996. In many ways the Chinese threats proved counterproduct-ive. The Chinese clearly tried to reduce President Lee's votes, but widespreadpolling indicates that the threats actually increased his support on the island asTaiwanese determined to show the Chinese that they would not bow to intimida-tion. Lee would probably have obtained about one-third of the votes in thefour-way race, but in fact he ended with 54 per cent of the vote. Thus, Leegained a legitimacy—both domestically and internationally—which he otherwisewould not have received. Taiwan also gained superb publicity and internationalunderstanding as literally hundreds of foreign journalists reported from the islandduring the election and the crisis. And the crisis also demonstrated that theUnited States would support Taiwan in the event of Chinese aggression, anindication which strengthened Taiwan's hand in its relationship with China.12

President Lee's running mate was Premier Lien Chan. The Nationalists hadpromised Lien would resign as premier after the election, but could not gainparliamentary support for another candidate for premier, and Lien thus had toserve as both vice-president and premier. Angered, parliament refused to letLien Chan, in his role as premier, deliver the government report to parliament.This caused a governmental deadlock and led to the constitutional amendments ofmid-1997.

(5) The National Development Conference of December 1996 and theConstitutional Amendments of July 1997

The government deadlock and the tense relationship with China led President LeeTeng-hui to convene a National Development Conference in December 1996,which harkened back to the National Affairs Conference of 1990. While non-

12 For an analysis of the counterproductivity of China's policies towards Taiwan, seeJ. Bruce Jacobs, "China's Policies Toward Taiwan", in C.L. Chiou (ed.), Taiwan-Hong Kong-PRC Relations after 1997 (St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1998), inpress. An abbreviated version appears as J. Bruce Jacobs, "China-Taiwan Relations",Harvard Asia Pacific Review 2, 1 (Winter 1997), in press (December 1997).

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partisan academics played a role, the delegates from the three key politicalparties explicitly participated as party representatives. The Conference discussedtopics grouped in three areas: constitutional government and multi-party politics,cross-Straits relations, and economic development. Importantly, all three polit-ical parties reached consensus on a wide variety of issues, though the New Partywithdrew on a minor issue after having approved the key constitutional changesand the cross-Straits policies. Thus, the Taiwan political system entered 1997with considerable consensus over the key issues of relations with China and therules of the political game.

The constitutional changes promulgated on 21 July 1997 can be grouped intotwo areas: adjustment of executive-legislative relations and downsizing ofgovernment. The Taiwan constitution, drawing on the theories of Sun Yat-sen,has a president who sits over five branches of government. In fact, this hasgiven Taiwan a bifurcated executive with a president and premier, not unlike theFifth Republic of France. In the authoritarian period, this bifurcation caused fewproblems, for the key leader headed the party and it made little differencewhether he occupied the presidency or the premiership. However, the deadlockbetween the premier and parliament following the popular election of thepresident in March 1996 indicated that some readjustment was necessary.

Political scientists, politicians and other observers have debated widely aboutwhether the changes have strengthened the presidency and, by implication,diminished the democratic nature of Taiwan's political system. Final judgementswill probably have to await the actions of future presidents and parliaments. Thechanges can be summarised as follows:

- The parliament no longer has the right to approve the president's nomination ofpremier, but it gains the power to oust the premier with a vote of no-confidence.

- The president now has the power to dissolve parliament if it expresses no-confidence in the premier.

- In the past it took a two-thirds vote of the parliament to override an executiverequest for reconsideration of a bill, but now it only requires a simple major-ity. This strengthens the parliament's ability to force the executive toimplement legislation against the executive's will.

Following approval of the constitutional revisions, President Lee appointedVincent Siew as premier on 21 August 1997, an appointment widely welcomedon the island.

The downsizing of government attempts to reduce Taiwan's four layers ofgovernment—central, provincial, county and township—to two. People havelong noted the anomaly of having a central government controlling Taiwan (anda few small offshore islands) as well as a provincial government which controls

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98 per cent of the island's area and 80 per cent of its population. The 1997constitutional changes call for the freezing (and ultimate abolition) of theprovincial government. Thus, the provincial governor and the provincialassembly will no longer be popularly elected. On the other hand, the centralparliament has been increased in size. Most people applauded the elimination ofthis wasteful duplication of government, though the New Party claimed the aboli-tion of the separate provincial government was actually a de facto declaration ofTaiwan independence, an argument which Beijing has repeated.

Another change, which has been approved but will not be implemented foranother four years, is the appointment rather than the popular election oftownship executives. This change reflects growing concern about the role oforganised crime and money politics in local factional politics, but the writerbelieves the elimination of democratic election at the basic level of government isa retrograde move in Taiwan's progression towards democracy. Voters, even inthe authoritarian period, felt free to drop in on township executives to discussmatters of local concern. The average citizen lacks such access to the countyexecutive, who controls a much larger administrative unit.13 Rather thaneliminating community democracy, Taiwan's leaders should take measures whichdirectly address the problems of organised crime and money politics.

In summary, the step-by-step democratisation which President Lee Teng-huihas implemented with the cooperation and contribution of the opposition hascontinued relatively smoothly. In early 1993, the writer expressed concern aboutcivilian control over the military and security agencies.14 While militaryprocurement remains a source of financial scandal and a difficult area for civiliangovernment to control, there are clear indications that civilian control over themilitary and security agencies has firmed since 1995.

The main internal problems facing Taiwan's democratisation remain theroles of organised crime and money in the political system. These "black andgold" elements have led to considerable corruption and even to some spectacularpolitical murders. Such problems—quite familiar in many developing democra-cies—will not be solved easily, but the overwhelming impression of the writer,who has observed Taiwan politics for over thirty years, is that the vast majority

13 On the role of the township during the authoritarian period, see J. Bruce Jacobs, LocalPolitics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan(Canberra: Contemporary China Centre, Australian National University, 1980). Foran analysis arguing that the proposed appointment of township executives was anti-democratic in the authoritarian period, see Jia Bo (J. Bruce Jacobs), "Taiwan xiangcundifang zhengzhi de liang ge wenti" ("Two Problems about Local Politics in RuralTaiwan), trans, by Wang Shun, Daxue zazhi (The Intellectual) 100 (September 1976),53-54.

14 Jacobs, 1993, op. cit., p. 126.

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of Taiwan's citizens truly value their freedom and input into the political system.Any attempts to chop down Taiwan's tree of democracy will find that the rootshave deeply embedded into the soil and that the wood has become very hard.

Democratisation in Thailand Revisited

Nerida M. CookDepartment of Sociology and Social Work

University of Tasmania

Introduction

The first half of 1997 in Thailand seemed an ordinary enough period in terms ofdemocratic practice, representing, once again, an ongoing restabilisation of theelectoral process after the bloody military suppression of unarmed civilians in thestreets of Bangkok during May 1992. By 1991, at least some analysts of Thaidemocracy thought that military intervention had become an anachronism after asustained twelve-year period of stable constitutional government during the1980s. Yet the military coup of February 1991, which eventually led to thearmed suppression nine months later, was no novelty in purporting to restoreorder through eradicating rampant corruption in the government of the time.

So poor was the then government's reputation that the coup became anotable example of how even those social groups which might normally object toundemocratic process, namely Bangkok's substantial middle class and the busi-ness sector, were initially supportive of the military's actions. As has previouslybeen the case in Thailand, these same social groups were among those who laterprotested the prolongation of military control the following fateful May. In whatwas eventually a rather broad-based protest movement, however, they were not,on the whole, among those who died.1 The military's deliberate choice ofarmed suppression of civilians was profoundly disturbing to the Bangkok popula-tion who witnessed the unprecedented extent of violence.

The 1992 widespread protest against the unelected Prime Minister GeneralSuchinda Kraprayoon and the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC) receivedmore extensive and more immediate international media coverage than had beenthe case with previous similar confrontations in Bangkok. Thanks to the earlyand extensive use of modern communications technology, such as faxes, mobile

l Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "State and Society in Thailand. How Fragile theDemocracy?", Asian Survey XXXIII, 9 (September 1993), 888-89.

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