demarcation problem - wikipedia

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Demarcation problem

The demarcation problem in the philosophy of sci-ence is about how to distinguish between science andnonscience,[1] including between science,pseudoscience,other activities, and beliefs.[2][3] The debate continues af-ter over a century of dialogue amongphilosophers of sci-ence and scientists in various fields, and despite broadagreement on the basics ofscientific method.[4][5]

1 Ancient Greek science

An early attempt at demarcation can be seen in the effortsof Greek natural philosophers and medical practitionersto distinguish their methods and their accounts of naturefrom the mythological or mystical accounts of their pre-decessors and contemporaries.[6]

Aristotle described at length what wasinvolved in having scientific knowledge of

something. To be scientific, he said, onemust deal with causes, one must use logicaldemonstration, and one must identify theuniversals which 'inhere' in the particulars ofsense. But above all, to have science one musthave apodictic certainty. It is the last featurewhich, for Aristotle, most clearly distinguishedthe scientific way of knowing.[2]

Larry Laudan,Physics, Philosophy, and Psy-choanalysis, The Demise of the DemarcationProblem

G. E. R. Lloydnotes that there was a sense in which thegroups engaged in various forms of inquiry into nature setout to legitimate their own positions,[7] laying claim toa new kind of wisdom ... that purported to yield superiorenlightenment, even superior practical effectiveness.[8]

Medical writers in theHippocratic tradition maintainedthat their discussions were basedon necessary demonstra-tions, a theme developed byAristotlein hisPosterior An-alytics.[9] One element of this polemic for science was aninsistence on a clear and unequivocal presentation of ar-guments, rejecting the imagery, analogy, and myth of the

old wisdom.[10] Some of their claimed naturalistic expla-nations of phenomena have been found to be quite fanci-ful, with little reliance on actual observations.[11]

2 Logical positivism

Logical positivismheld that only statements about mat-ters of fact or logical relations between concepts aremeaningful. All other statements lack sense and are la-belled 'metaphysics' (seethe verifiability theory of mean-ingalso known as verificationism). This distinction be-tween science, which in the view of the Vienna Cir-clepossessed empirically verifiable statements, and whatthey pejoratively called 'metaphysics, which lacked such

statements, can be seen as representing another aspect ofthe demarcation problem.[12] Logical positivism is oftendiscussed in the context of the demarcation between sci-ence and non-science or pseudoscience. However, Theverificationist proposals had the aim of solving a distinctlydifferent demarcation problem, namely that between sci-ence and metaphysics.[13]

3 Falsifiability

Falsifiability is the demarcation criterion proposed byKarl Popper as opposed to verificationism: statementsor systems of statements, in order to be ranked as scien-tific, must be capable of conflicting with possible, or con-ceivable observations.[14] Popper saw demarcation as acentral problem in the philosophy of science. Unlike theVienna Circle, Popper stated that his proposal was not acriterion of meaningfulness.

Poppers demarcation criterion has beencriticized both for excluding legitimate sci-ence and for giving some pseudosciencesthe status of being scientific Accordingto Larry Laudan (1983, 121), it has theuntoward consequence of countenancing as'scientific' every crank claim which makesascertainably false assertions. Astrology,rightly taken by Popper as an unusually clearexample of a pseudoscience, has in fact beentested and thoroughly refuted Similarly,the major threats to the scientific status ofpsychoanalysis, another of his major targets,do not come from claims that it is untestablebut from claims that it has been tested andfailed the tests.[14]

Sven Ove Hansson, The Stanford En-cyclopedia of Philosophy, Science andPseudo-Science

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2 6 THAGARD

In Poppers later work, he stated that falsifiability is botha necessary and a sufficient criterion for demarcation. Hedescribed falsifiability as a property of the logical struc-

ture of sentences and classes of sentences, so that a state-ments scientific or non-scientific status does not changeover time. This has been summarized as a statement be-ing falsifiable if and only if it logically contradicts some(empirical) sentence that describes a logically possibleevent that it would be logically possible to observe.[14]

4 Postpositivism

Thomas Kuhn, an American historian and philosopherof science, is often connected with what has been called

postpositivism or postempiricism. In his 1962 bookThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn divided theprocess of doing science into two different endeavors,which he called normal science and extraordinary sci-ence(which he sometimes also called revolutionary sci-ence). In Kuhns view, 'it is normal science, in whichSir Karls sort of testing does not occur, rather than ex-traordinary science which most nearly distinguishes sci-ence from other enterprises"[14] That is, the utility ofa scientific paradigm for puzzle-solving, which suggestssolutions to new problems while continuing to satisfy allof the problems solved by the paradigm that it replaces.

Kuhns view of demarcation is most clearlyexpressed in his comparison of astronomywith astrology. Since antiquity, astronomy hasbeen a puzzle-solving activity and therefore ascience. If an astronomers prediction failed,then this was a puzzle that he could hope tosolve for instance with more measurements orwith adjustments of the theory. In contrast,the astrologer had no such puzzles since inthat discipline particular failures did notgive rise to research puzzles, for no man,

however skilled, could make use of them in aconstructive attempt to revise the astrologicaltradition" Therefore, according to Kuhn,astrology has never been a science.[14]

Sven Ove Hansson, The Stanford En-cyclopedia of Philosophy, Science andPseudo-Science

Popper criticized Kuhns demarcation criterion, sayingthat astrologers are engaged in puzzle solving, and thattherefore Kuhns criterion recognized astrology as a sci-

ence. He stated that Kuhns criterion leads to a majordisaster[the] replacement of a rational criterion of sci-ence by a sociological one.[14]

5 Feyerabend and Lakatos

Kuhns work largely called into question Poppers demar-cation, and emphasized the human,subjectivequality ofscientific change. Paul Feyerabendwas concerned thatthe very question of demarcation was insidious: scienceitself had no need of a demarcation criterion, but insteadsome philosophers were seeking to justify a special posi-tion of authority from which science could dominate pub-lic discourse.[15] Feyerabend argued that science does notin fact occupy a special place in terms of either its logic ormethod, and no claim to special authority made by scien-tists can be upheld. He argued that, within the historyof scientific practice, no rule or method can be foundthat has not been violated or circumvented at some pointin order to advance scientific knowledge. BothLakatosand Feyerabend suggest that science is not an autonomousform of reasoning, but is inseparable from the larger body

of human thought and inquiry.

6 Thagard

Paul R. Thagardhas proposed another set of principlesto try to overcome these difficulties, and believes it is im-portant for society to find a way of doing so. According toThagards method, a theory is not scientific if it satisfiestwo conditions:

1. The theory has been less progressivethan alternative theories over a long pe-riod of time, and faces many unsolvedproblems; and...

2. The community of practitioners makeslittle attempt to develop the theory to-wards solutions of the problems, showsno concern for attempts to evaluate thetheory in relation to others, and is se-lective in considering confirmations anddisconfirmations. [16]

Thagard specifies that sometimes theories will spendsome time as merely unpromising before they truly de-serve the title of pseudoscience. He cites astrology asan example: it was stagnant compared to advances inphysics during the 17th century, and only later becamepseudoscience in the advent of alternative explanationsprovided by psychology during the 19th century.

Thagard also states that his criteria should not be inter-preted so narrowly as to allow willful ignorance of alterna-tive explanations, or so broadly as to discount our modernscience compared to science of the future. His definition

is a practical one, which generally seeks to distinguishpseudoscience as areas of inquiry which are stagnant andwithout active scientific investigation.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignorancehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_R._Thagardhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imre_Lakatoshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabendhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivityhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sven_Ove_Hanssonhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraordinary_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extraordinary_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normal_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutionshttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postempiricismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Postpositivismhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Kuhn


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7 Some historians perspectives

Many historians of science are concerned with the de-velopment of science from its primitive origins; conse-quently they define science in sufficiently broad terms toinclude early forms of natural knowledge. In the articleon science in the eleventh edition of the EncyclopdiaBritannica, the scientist and historian William CecilDampier Whethamdefined science as ordered knowl-edge of natural phenomena and of the relations betweenthem.[17] In his study of Greek science,Marshall Clagettdefined science as first, the orderly and systematic com-prehension, description and/or explanation of naturalphenomena and, secondly, the [mathematical and logical]tools necessary for the undertaking.[18] A similar defi-nition appeared more recently inDavid Pingreesstudyof early science: Science is a systematic explanation ofperceived or imaginary phenomena, or else is based on

such an explanation. Mathematics finds a place in sci-ence only as one of the symbolical languages in whichscientific explanations may be expressed. [19] These def-initions tend to focus more on the subject matter of sci-ence than on its method and from these perspectives, thephilosophical concern to establish a line of demarcationbetween science and non-science becomes problematic,if not futile.[20]

8 Laudan

Larry Laudanconcluded, after examining various histor-ical attempts to establish a demarcation criterion, thatphilosophy has failed to deliver the goods in its attemptsto distinguish science from non-scienceto distinguishscience from pseudoscience. None of the past attemptswould be accepted by a majority of philosophers nor, inhis view, should they be accepted by them or by anyoneelse. He stated that many well-founded beliefs are notscientific and, conversely, many scientific conjectures arenot well-founded. He also stated that demarcation criteriawere historically used as "machines de guerre" in polemi-cal disputes between scientists and pseudo-scientists.

Advancing a number of examples from everyday practiceof football and carpentry and non-scientific scholarshipsuch as literary criticism and philosophy, he saw the ques-tion of whether a belief is well-founded or not to be morepractically and philosophically significant than whetherit is scientific or not. In his judgment, the demarcationbetween science and non-science was a pseudo-problemthat would best be replaced by focusing on the distinctionbetween reliable and unreliable knowledge, without both-ering to ask whether that knowledge is scientific or not.He would consign phrases like pseudo-science or un-scientific to the rhetoric of politicians or sociologists.[2]

Others have disagreed with Laudan. Sebastian Lutz, forexample, argues that demarcation does not have to bea single necessary and sufficient condition as Laudan

implied.[2] Rather, Laudans reasoning at the most estab-lishes that there has to be one necessary criterion andone possibly different sufficient criterion.[21] Other crit-ics have argued for multiple demarcation criteria suggest-ing that there should be one set of criteria for the naturalsciences; another set of criteria for the social sciences,

and claims involving the supernatural could have a set ofpseudoscientific criteria. Scientific claims that are con-troversial, e.g.,psychoanalysisandintelligent design, willusually have no generally accepted demarcation criteria.Massimo Pigliuccinotes that science generally conformstoWittgensteinsconcept offamily resemblances.[22]

9 See also

Boundary-work

Ascertainment bias

Fold change

10 References

[1] Resnik, David B. (2000). A pragmatic approach to the

demarcation problem. Studies In History and Philosophy

of Science Part A 31 (2): 249267. doi:10.1016/S0039-

3681(00)00004-2.

[2] Laudan, Larry(1983),The Demise of the Demarcation

Problem, in Cohen, R.S.; Laudan, L., Physics, Philoso-

phy and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grn-

baum, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 76,

Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 111127,ISBN 90-277-1533-

5

[3] Lakatos, I.; Feyerabend, P.; Motterlini, M. (1999). For

and Against Method: Including Lakatoss Lectures on Sci-

entific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspon-

dence. University of Chicago Press. p. 20. ISBN

9780226467740. LCCN 99013581. The demarcation

problem may be formulated in the following terms: what

distinguishes science from pseudoscience? This is an ex-

treme way of putting it, since the more general problem,

called theGeneralized Demarcation Problem,is really theproblem of the appraisal of scientific theories, and at-

tempts to answer the question: when is one theory better

than another?"

[4] Gauch, Hugh G., Jr. (2003).Scientific Method in Practice.

pp. 37.ISBN 978-0-521-81689-2.

[5] Cover, J. A.; Curd, Martin, eds. (1998). Philosophy of

Science: The Central Issues. pp. 182. ISBN 978-0-393-

97175-0.

[6] Lloyd, G. E. R. (1983), Science, Folklore and Ideology:

Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece, Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, pp. 7980,ISBN 0-521-

27307-2, Faced with ... competition from a variety ofmore or less exploitative rival healers, the doctors respon-

sible for many or most of the Hippocratic treatises unite,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-27307-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-27307-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloydhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-393-97175-0https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-393-97175-0https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/978-0-521-81689-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://lccn.loc.gov/99013581https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Congress_Control_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226467740https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://books.google.com/books?id=osMnuvLZvPoC&pg=PA20http://books.google.com/books?id=osMnuvLZvPoC&pg=PA20http://books.google.com/books?id=osMnuvLZvPoC&pg=PA20http://books.google.com/books?id=osMnuvLZvPoC&pg=PA20https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/90-277-1533-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/90-277-1533-5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://books.google.com/books?id=AEvprSJzv2MC&pg=PA111http://books.google.com/books?id=AEvprSJzv2MC&pg=PA111https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Laudanhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016%252FS0039-3681%252800%252900004-2http://dx.doi.org/10.1016%252FS0039-3681%252800%252900004-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_object_identifierhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fold_changehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ascertainment_biashttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boundary-workhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Family_resemblancehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgensteinhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massimo_Pigliuccihttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligent_designhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychoanalysishttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Larry_Laudanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pingreehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Clagetthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Cecil_Dampier_Whethamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Cecil_Dampier_Whethamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannicahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannicahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encyclop%C3%A6dia_Britannica_Eleventh_Edition


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4 10 REFERENCES

at least, in their desire to turn the practice of healing into

a .... [N]ot only do they reject interference in most

cases from priests and prophets, they also criticise many

current practices and assumptions.

[7] Lloyd, G. E. R. (1983), Science, Folklore and Ideology:

Studies in the Life Sciences in Ancient Greece, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, p. 215,ISBN 0-521-27307-

2

[8] Lloyd, G.E.R.(1986),The Revolutions of Wisdom: Stud-

ies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science,

Sather Classical Lectures 52, Berkeley and Los Angeles:

University of California Press, pp. 117118, ISBN 0-520-

06742-8





06742-8





06742-8

[11] Lloyd, G.E.R. (1979), Magic Reason and Experience:

Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science,

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1527,

ISBN 0-521-29641-2

[12] Grayling, AC., Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction,

Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 67-68.

[13] Hansson, Sven Ove (2008). Zalta, Edward N., ed.

Science and Pseudo-Science. The Stanford Encyclope-

dia of Philosophy(Fall 2008 ed.). 4.1 The Logical Posi-

tivists.

[14] Hansson, Sven Ove (2008). Zalta, Edward N., ed.

Science and Pseudo-Science. The Stanford Encyclope-

dia of Philosophy(Fall 2008 ed.). 4.2 Falsificationism.

[15] Taylor, C.A. (1996). Defining Science: A Rhetoric of

Demarcation. Rhetoric of the Human Sciences Se-

ries. University of Wisconsin Press. p. 41. ISBN9780299150341.LCCN 96000180.

[16] Why Astrology Is A Pseudoscience, Paul R. Thagard, In

Philosophy of Science Association1978 Volume 1, edited

by P.D. Asquith and I. Hacking (East Lansing: Philosophy

of Science Association, 1978).

[17] Dampier Whetham, William Cecil (1911),Science, En-

cyclopdia Britannica, New York: Encyclopedia Britan-

nica, Inc.

[18] Clagett, Marshall(1963),Greek Science in Antiquity, New

York: Collier Books, p. 4

[19] Pingree, David(1992),Hellenophilia versus the History of

Science,Isis83: 554563,doi:10.1086/356288

[20] McCluskey, Stephen C. (2005), Different Astronomies,

Different Cultures and the Question of Cultural Rela-

tivism, in Fountain, John W.; Sinclair, Rolf M.,Current

Studies in Archaeoastronomy: Conversations Across Time

and Space, Durham, NC: Carolina AcademicPress, p. 71,

ISBN 0-89089-771-9

[21] Lutz, Sebastian (2011),On an Allegedly Essential Feature

of Criteria for the Demarcation of Science ,The Reasoner

5(8): 125126

[22] Pigliucci, Massimo (2013). The Demarcation Problem:

A (Belated) Response to Laudan in Pigliucci, Massimo;

Boudry, Maarten, eds. Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Re-

considering the Demarcation Problem chapter 1. ISBN

978-0-226-05196-3. Pigliuccis chapter is available on-

line athttp://philpapers.org/rec/PIGTDP.
http://philpapers.org/rec/PIGTDPhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226051963https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780226051963http://www.thereasoner.org/http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol5/TheReasoner-5(8).pdfhttp://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/jw/TheReasoner/vol5/TheReasoner-5(8).pdfhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-89089-771-9https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1086%252F356288https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_object_identifierhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Pingreehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_Clagetthttps://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Encyclop%25C3%25A6dia_Britannica/Sciencehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Cecil_Dampier_Whethamhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_R._Thagardhttp://www.cavehill.uwi.edu/bnccde/PH29A/thagard.htmlhttp://lccn.loc.gov/96000180https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Library_of_Congress_Control_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/9780299150341https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttp://books.google.com/books?id=NdkDiqh5ySYC&pg=PA41http://books.google.com/books?id=NdkDiqh5ySYC&pg=PA41http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/pseudo-science#KarPophttp://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/pseudo-science#LogPoshttp://books.google.co.uk/books?id=kYUFhlIRZA4C&pg=PT97&dq=demarcation+%2522logical+positivism%2522&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Z9n8U7vdEuKw7AbYgIG4DA&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBDhG#v=onepage&q=demarcation%2520%2522logical%2520positivism%2522&f=falsehttp://books.google.co.uk/books?id=kYUFhlIRZA4C&pg=PT97&dq=demarcation+%2522logical+positivism%2522&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Z9n8U7vdEuKw7AbYgIG4DA&ved=0CDoQ6AEwBDhG#v=onepage&q=demarcation%2520%2522logical%2520positivism%2522&f=falsehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-29641-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloydhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloydhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloydhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-520-06742-8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloydhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-27307-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:BookSources/0-521-27307-2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Standard_Book_Numberhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._R._Lloyd


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