deliberation and moral expertise in plato's crito

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Deliberation and Moral Expertise in Plato's "Crito"Author(s): Eugenio BenitezReviewed work(s):Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 29, No. 4, DialoguesWITH PLATO (December 1996), pp. 21-47Published by: De GruyterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40913792 .Accessed: 01/08/2012 14:44

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Deliberation and Moral Expertise in Plato's Crito Eugenio Benitez

In one's words there should be something to teach others, . . . In one's activities there should be something to serve as a

model for others. - Chang Tsai1

I

Deliberation is the intellectual activity of rational agents in their capacity as rational agents, and good deliberation is the mark of those who have practical wisdom. That is Aristotle's general view,2 one we may safely attribute to Plato as well. Some philosophers, however, have tried to specifiy Plato's view in ways that accentuate the differences between him and Aristotle. They align Plato's views about deliberation and virtue closely with views the fifth-century sophists, and suppose that Plato borrows from the sophists certain suppositions that Aristotle would reject.

In the Protagoras, for example, when Protagoras asserts that he teaches virtue, he claims to teach it as the expertise (xe^vrj) of good deliberation

1 Quoted in Cua (1978:43)

2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI 5, 1140a25: 8ok£i 5f| cppovi^icn) elvai to 8'>vaa6ai KaAxoq poi)Xe')aac6ai rcepi xa aoxcp dya0a mi av^Kpepo-uvxa ('indeed the ability to deliberate well about things good and advantageous for oneself seems to be [characteristic] of the practically wise man').

22 Eugenio Benitez

(cf. EvfiovXia, 318e). Plato, it is said, shares with Protagoras this technical conception of virtue. In fact, Plato construes 'expertise' and 'good deliberation' even more strongly than Protagoras does, for he thinks that knowledge (Enicvr'[ir'), not mere opinion, is a necessary condition for any expertise (xe^vri).3 Consequently, he also thinks that insofar as good deliberation is a form of expertise, it presupposes some sort of knowledge. This knowledge is of two kinds: (1) knowledge of the right end of deliberation (call this moral EniGr!'[n') and (2) knowledge of how to obtain this end (call this procedural erciaTrin'n).4 Only a combination of moral and procedural eniov(''L'r' could allow us to rest assured that we may always make the right choices about action.5

3 It is difficult to generalise how strong the knowledge condition is. Plato regularly correlates xexvn with eniGxr''n' (in fact, he treats the plurals xexvoci and ercurrrjiiai as synonyms, see Symposium 207e-8a; Republic VII 522c8, 533d-e, Philebus 55c-9d). But there are many grades of ercurcriiin, ranging from knowledge of Forms to knowledge of observable particulars (for the latter see Phaedo 73c-d, Phaedrus 247d-e). On the strongest reading of envarr''a', the one most commonly attributed to Plato, infallible knowledge is required (see &van<xpxnxo<;, Republic V 477e6). Occasionally, however, Plato writes as if opinion (86£a) and even good guessing (eiraaia) are minimally enough for xexvri (see Republic VII 533b3-5, Philebus 55d-9a). For a discussion of Plato's varied uses of ejciaxri^Ti in the middle dialogues see Benitez (1989:ch. 5). For the view that Eniarr''Lr' is used in Socratic dialogues in a weak sense, corresponding to 'know-how', see Gould (1972), chapter 1, 'The Socratic Theory of Knowledge and Morality' (3-30).

4 I derive these conditions about the kinds of knowledge mainly from the Gorgias (464d ff., 501a ff.). The condition on moral enioTT''iT' stems from Socrates' claim that a real xexvn must 'take thought for what is best' (xofc p,ev ^ekxioxov . . . <ppovx(£ei, 464d). The condition on procedural e7tiaxf|HT| stems from his claim that a real art 'has a rule by which it does what it does' (cf . Atfyov . . . <p rcpoacpepei a rcpoacpepei, 465a). Note that these are general conditions applicable to various arts. A xexvri of deliberation would have to have at least a unique end, perhaps also a unique procedure (see/<m531dff.).

5 It may seem, however, that the condition on moral e.niovr''ir' does not appply to expert deliberation, for the reason that we deliberate only about means, not about ends (cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,). David Wiggins (1980:221-40) has shown, however, that even in Aristotle deliberation is very much concerned with how to discern the right end. For possible agreement in Plato, see Charmides 167b-173e, which concerns whether a life lived according to xexvp (including especially a xexvn of deliberation) would be a happy one.

Deliberation and Moral Expertise in Plato's Crito 23

We may illustrate this point about moral and procedural erciaxfuiTi from what Plato has Socrates say in the Protagoras (351c-60d). There Socrates proposes (ironically?) that pleasure alone is what makes a life good.6 He further proposes that the goal of all our deliberations, our salvation,7 is to 'live life through with pleasure and without pain/8 Thus it follows that happiness, doing well, consists in9 the 'correct choice of pleasure over pain/10 Now Plato does not, on the whole, think that pleasure is the good. The point is that if we knew pleasure to be the good, we would have satisfied the condition for moral eTcioTrui'n. With that condition satisfied we would then only have to satisfy the condition for procedural EKiorc''n) in order to have moral expertise. But how can we make the correct choice of pleasure over pain? Socrates points the way by insisting that pleasures differ only quantitatively - our deliberations have to consider only whether one pleasure is 'more or less, greater or smaller, nearer or more distant' (357a-b) than another. Obviously, if there is a single qualitatively homogeneous standard of value, then the procedural condition can be met, and moral expertise is possible.

The illustration from the Protagoras is supposed to reveal three things: First, Plato thinks that moral expertise is necessary for a good life. Second, Plato assumes that the good, whatever it turns out to be, is qualitatively homogeneous. And third, Plato thinks that what is needed for moral expertise is knowledge of the good plus a t£%vti of measur- ing or calculating value. This view about Plato has been predomi-

6 See 351c: eyd) yap Ai^co, mO' tffi8ea eaxiv, apa Kara touto <n>K &Ya9d ... (Tor I say, insofar as things are pleasant, are they not thus also good ...'). For the arguments in favour of Socrates' commitment to hedonism here, see Gosling and Taylor (1982:ch. 3) and Irwin (1995:85-7).

7 See acornpia 356d, 356e, 357a; a(p£ew 356e.

8 See 355a: . . . apicei i)^iv to fi8eco<; raxctpicovai tov p(ov ave') tamcov;

9 See 356d: Ei ox>v ev xot>xcp fm.iv r'v to ev TipaTTeiv ... To be precise, Socrates is here speaking counterfactually, about the art of calculating lengths: 'If then this [sc. calculating lengths] was to do well', etc. It is clear, however, that for the purposes of the argument Socrates means to equate to ev Ttparceiv with r' ocorripia xov pioi) (salvation/safety in life), a very controversial equation.

10 See 357a: fi8ovf|q te mi Xx>m'q ev 6p0fi x'' alpeaei.

24 Eugenio Benitez

nant,11 but it is misleading. I hope to show that, in the Crito at least, Plato actually rejects these technical conceptions of human deliberation and expertise (he considers moral expertise to be a condition not met by any living human being). While it is not possible to generalise from one dialogue, our investigation should be sufficient to throw doubt on the usual way Plato has been understood.

II

I have suggested that we can make a start towards understanding Plato's views about deliberation by considering a single dialogue, the Crito. Yet the Crito will seem ill-suited to this purpose, for two reasons. First, it is generally regarded as a very early dialogue, and sometimes this is supposed to indicate that it expresses no more than the actual arguments made by Socrates in opposition to Crito's plan of escape.12 I do not oppose the judgement that the Crito is early - though even that has been questioned13 - but I think there are plenty of reasons to see more in the dialogue than a historical record. Woozley pointed out,

11 See Nussbaum (1986: chs. 6, 10). Gould delineates the scholars, including Taylor, Robin, Cornford and Ryle, who held such a view earlier in this century (1972:4-6). More recent advocates include, in addition to Nussbaum: Myles Burnyeat (1984:69- 70), Terence Irwin (1995:83-94), Trevor Saunders (1987:27-8), and Gregory Vlastos (1988:362, 365, 376). Note that many scholars believe Plato later came to abandon or revise his 'technical conception of virtue' (e.g. see Irwin, 1995:339-53).

12 See Woozley (1979:1, 3, 6). Woozley remarks that, 'it is extremely difficult not to believe that it [sc. the Crito] is offered as a substantially accurate account of Socrates' conduct at the time, and of his views which determined that conduct/ A slightly weaker view is taken by Allen (1980:66, 135nl), who claims 'that the Crito probably represents the mind of the historical Socrates with some accuracy/ I do not deny that the principles attributed to Socrates in the Crito are authentic, but that does not mean they are not also Plato's principles, or that Plato accomplishes nothing else in the dialogue besides a recounting of these principles.

13 See Ryle (1996:ch. 5). Woozley dismisses Ryle's view as one of mere ingenuity, preferring to rely instead on 'the latest stylistic analysis' (1979:3). Stylometric tests are often blunt, however. Recent investigations by Harold Tarrant indicate that many early dialogues, including the Crito, bear the mark of later revisions (1993:71-2, with notes 7, 8).


for example, that there is at least one respect in which the Crito is very unlike other 'Socratic' dialogues: 'Instead of Socrates asking the questions we have Socrates giving the answers.'14 And Harold Tarrant has argued that the dialogue's 'Apollinine' images (the woman in white, the ercocicov, and the Corybantes) are more Platonic than Socratic.15 Regardless of how Socratic the Crito is, however, if it presents a viable non-technical model for deliberation, then we have to ask more ear- nestly what could bring Plato swiftly to the sort of position he is supposed to take in that other early, Socratic, dialogue - the Pro- tagoras.16

The second reason that the Crito might be thought ill-suited to a discussion of deliberation is that it is usually taken to be a dialogue about

14 Woozley (1979:4). This is an overstatement of course, but there is no denying that the way the Crito has Socrates make arguments for his own position resembles more the Gorgias and the Phaedo than it does the Lysis, Charmides, Laches, or even the Protagoras.

15 See Tarrant (1993:71-2, with notes 7, 8).

16 Vlastos (1988) argues a reason for such a change, viz. Tlato has taken that deep long plunge into mathematical studies ...' (374). Vlastos' argument is bound up with a theory about Plato's philosophical development, and with discussions of passages in dialogues that I am not able to treat here. But it may be worth mentioning two points: (1) Vlastos thinks that the change from the Socratic Plato of the early dialogues to the mathematical Plato of the Republic is precipitated in the Euthydemus, where 'for the first time in Plato's corpus we see Socrates unloading his philosophiz- ing on the interlocutor' (372, my emphasis). Indeed, Vlastos thinks this is what requires the hypothesis of change (373). But in the Crito, no less than the Euthydemus, Socrates 'unloads' on his interlocutor, and the Crito does not show signs of a 'deep long plunge' into mathematics. (2) Vlastos centres his argument about the mathematical Plato on passages in the Republic that prescribe ten years of mathematical study as a prerequisite for dialectic. He then asks, 'Where in the annals of Western philosophy could we find a sharper antithesis to this restriction of ethical inquiry to a carefully selected, rigorously trained elite than in the Socrates of Plato's earlier dialogues?' (365). Vlastos neither mentions nor attempts to explain that the sharper antithesis is in the Republic itself, where Socrates expresses these very ideas in a dialectic about justice and injustice, which is conducted with ordinary untrained interlocutors met by chance at the festival of Bendis.

26 Eugenio Benitez

legal obligation.17 But fidelity to the law is not its only theme. To see this it will be helpful to have some context. Shortly before his death Socrates' dearest friend Crito visits him in prison and describes to him a plan (Po')Ar|) of escape. The appropriate people can be bribed, a place in Thessaly has been prepared for him, his friends have more than enough money to carry out the plan and they are willing to accept the risks. Moreover, there are reasons why Socrates should escape: by dying he is playing into the hands of his enemies and betraying his sons. He will bring down shame on himself, his family, and his friends for not allowing them to save him. He seems to be choosing the easy choice, not the choice of the good and brave man.18 He can escape, but he must act swiftly, that very night in fact. After describing the plan and reasons for escape Crito urges Socrates: 'So deliberate,' he says, 'or rather, there is no longer time to deliberate but to have deliberated.'19

Following this remark of Crito's approximately one-fourth of the dialogue (46b-9a) is concerned with the issue of good deliberation and moral expertise: e.g., Socrates poses the question of how he and Crito might consider the plan of escape in a way that is 'most reasonable',20

17 See Allen (1980), Brickhouse and Smith (1994:142-55), Gomez-Lobo (1994:45-70), Kraut (1984), Santas (1979:10-43), and Woozley (1979). None of these books exam- ines deliberation or practical reasoning in the Crito in any detail. A notable exception to the rule is to be found in Frankena's Ethics (1963:1-3). Frankena rightly cites the Crito as presenting an example of moral reasoning, but he focuses only on Socrates' moral principles and his reasons for thinking his particular case falls under them. Frankena notices, but does not discuss Socrates' principle of deliberation (see p.l), and he does not say anything about whether Socratic deliberation in the Crito is supposed to be technical or expert.

18 See 45d. Note the emphasis on choice (cf. aipeoGcci, which appears twice 45d6, 45d7; and etouo, 45d7).

19 See 46a4-5: aMot pouAôv - 'iaXXov 8e oi>8e po')Aêa6ai exi ©pa &Ma pe- PovXevaGai - 'i'a 8e PovAtj •

20 'Most reasonable' here renders 'êTpicbraxa' (46c6); the term deserves comment. Literally it means 'most measured', but its sense is usually 'most moderate, fair or reasonable/ The stem 'iexp- may arouse suspicion that Plato has a technical conception of deliberation. I don't think we can make much of this, however. Aristotle also uses 'mathematical' terms, often without qualification, when discussing deliberation and virtue (e.g. see Nicomachean Ethics 1112bl9-21: avaMeiv ; 1117al7-22, 1140a24-31, 1142b2: XoyCCeaGai).


what sort of argument ought to be decisive, whose opinion is worth heeding, and so on. The Greek text from this point to the end is replete with words relating to advising, counselling, considering, choosing and persuading. Most important for us here are the words with the PouX- stem (e.g., Pot)X,e')|xa, poa)A,£t>co, |3oi)A,f|, PouXojiai), which occur seventeen times, but we should not miss the echo of the gkotu- stem (gk£tut£ov, aK£7cxo^ai, aiameco), which occurs fourteen times, or the verbs aipeco and jceOco which occur six and twenty-four times respectively (see Appen- dix).21

Moreover, the significance of the remaining part of the Crito surely extends beyond verbal and thematic elements. These passages are of interest to us because they organise and rehearse a particular Socratic deliberation, and because they depict a Socrates who has extraordinary confidence in his decision and yet denies that the source or the reason of his confidence is an expertise he has.22 He recognises that moral expertise, if it were possible, would belong to someone, or something else: 'the one who understands things just and unjust, the one and the truth itself (6 eTccc&ov jcepi tSv 8ikoucov mi &8ikcov, 6 eiq mi ax>ir' i' &A,f|0£ioc, 48a6-7).23

21 See the Appendix for a list of these terms, their location in the text, and the speaker who uses them. It might be objected that the verb jceOco does not deserve inclusion here since persuasion does not entail deliberation. A person can be prevailed upon to do things or choose a course of action she has not considered. There are such things as persuasive reasons, however, and that suits the deliberative context (see esp. 46b5). The uses of rceOoo in the Crito vary, many are open to interpretation. I simply list them for the reader's consideration.

22 The source of Socrates' confidence may be extra-rational: his dream-vision of a woman who says 'On the third day you shall reach fertile Phthia', for example, or his daimonion, supposing that it did not oppose him (see Apology 40a3-c3). In addition to this he may have deliberate reason to be confident: the arguments he presents on behalf of the laws of Athens. Neither these sources of confidence nor the laws of Athens are presented to us as moral experts, however (about the laws I say more below).

23 Socrates speaks as if 6 ercaicov is a person, but it is unclear whether he thinks that any human being is or can be ercaicov. He once couches his reference in a hypothetical: et xiq eaxw ercauov, (47dl-2), and it is difficult to think that a'>xx' fi &A,f|0£ia can refer to any human being. The assumption that the ercoucov is not a human being, moreover, is consistent with Socrates' claim in the Apology that 'in actuality God is wise' (x(p ovxi 6 6eo<; aocpoq edvat, 23a).

28 Eugenio Benitez

Plato's depiction of Socrates, so often neglected by modern commentators, is crucial here. The dialogues of Plato, and the Crito in particular, idealise Socrates as 'the most just man of his time' (Letter VII, 324e; cf. Letter II, 314c). Plato's Socrates functions as what Jaspers called a paradigmatic individual, a Tjeacon by which to gain an orientation in life.'24 It will become clear in what follows that Socrates' deliberation in the Crito is meant to be paradigmatic. Socrates is Plato's 'criterion of correct choice', yet he remains always a 'thoroughly human being', who does not 'take up a stand outside the conditions of human life.'25 But this will not entirely settle our question about Plato's account of deliberation. For Socrates himself proposes another, yet more idealised standard - the ercccuov - one who does seem like a superhuman moral expert.26 We must ask, then, whether Plato depicts the enaicov as a standard for deliberation as well as, or perhaps in place of Socrates, and we must consider why he presents us with both. If it turns out that, as I contend, Plato prefers Socrates to the ercauov as a model for human deliberation, then we have good reason to doubt the usual accounts of Plato on moral expertise. In fact, no mere developmental story will ground these accounts, since the Crito already anticipates and declines such a development.

24 Jaspers (1957:96). Note that in the Apology Socrates states that God uses him as a paradigm: [6 6eo<;] e'ik 7t<xpd8evyn.a noio'>'ieyoq (23b).

25 The quoted phrases come from Nussbaum (1986:290), who uses them not of Plato's Socrates, but of Aristotle's man of practical wisdom (her paradigm for non-technical deliberation). Nussbaum claims, erroneously, that Aristotle's conception of the man of practical wisdom, so described, is 'anti-Platonic'.

26 The importance of the ercocicov to the Crito must not be underestimated. The verb enou©, a relatively rare word in Plato, occurs five times in this passage (47bll, c3, d2, d9; 48a6), more than in any other passage of comparable length except Republic X, 601-2.


III

In what follows I will take up three questions: (1) How is the Crito concerned with deliberation? (2) Does the Crito equate moral expertise with excellence in deliberation? and (3) Does the Crito depict Socrates as a moral expert? I will consider each of these questions in detail, but I want to start by making some brief comments about all three. The first question is preliminary, but it is crucial to showing how the Crito is even relevant to a discussion of deliberation. To say that Socrates in the Crito presents a theory of deliberation would exaggerate. So perhaps this is a sign that the Crito is not about deliberation at all. All I will say now, by way of a general response, is that the Crito does provide a context for Plato to present a theory of deliberation, if he had one. From my point of view, the absence of a theory is a desirable outcome: it is consistent with the hypothesis that Plato does not think deliberation is or should be technical. I follow Bernard Williams, who suggests that if the Ancient Greek conception of deliberation is not abstract or theoretical, that does not necessarily mean it is primitive (or worse, non-existent). As Williams points out, although Homer had no word for 'decide', he clearly had the notion. He depicts characters who (a) wonder what to do, (b) come to a conclusion, and (c) do x because of coming to a conclusion, and that, remarks Williams, 'is what a decision is (strictly, what a deliberated decision is)/27

It is obvious that the Crito depicts Socrates as wondering or having wondered what to do, coming or having come to a conclusion, and doing or preparing to do x because of coming to that conclusion. The Crito therefore rehearses a deliberated decision: Socrates teaches Crito why he chooses to die rather than escape. When Plato rehearses this instance of Socratic deliberation, does he have only the same first-order aim that his character Socrates has - showing us why it was better for Socrates to die - or does he also have the wider aim of showing us what good deliberation consists in? I will suggest that Plato takes the wider aim; at any rate I will argue that we can discern a principle of good deliberation in Socrates' response to Crito, and therefore we have some means of judging what sort of results Plato thinks can be expected from moral reasoning.

We will find it fruitful to compare Socrates' principle of deliberation to his remarks about the moral expert (my second question). Such compari-

27 Williams (1993:36, 180n33).

30 Eugenio Benitez

son will show why the aspiration for moral expertise is important even if we do not expect that aspiration ever to be satisfied. For Socrates is, we should say, a moral realist: the moral expert, if there is one (cf . ei xiq ecmv ercocuov, Crito 47dl-2), would know the objectively right thing to do. The moral expert serves as a reminder of objective right; he is a standard for the aspiration to make right choices. In one respect, then, the moral expert appears to be a criterion of correct choice: If we knew what the expert would do, we would know what choice is correct. But this is trivial. Even Aristotle's (pp6vi|io<; is a perfect criterion in precisely this sense; he does not, in his capacity as criterion, make mistakes.28 The importance of the phrase 'criterion of correct choice', then, must lie in how that criterion represents the correct way of reaching decisions. In this respect the eicaicov is not a criterion of correct choice at all, we are told nothing in the Crito about the way that the ercccicov reaches decisions.

Nevertheless, as a standard for aspiration the ercaicov has an important ethical function. If we deny even the possibility of moral expertise, then we can observe no difference between what one is justified in doing and what it is right to do. In hindsight we often wish to observe such a difference, as for example in the jury's decision at the trial of Socrates. The ideal of expertise as a goal for deliberation is to bring constant pressure to bear on our present view of the adequacy of moral justification. It is a Promethean ideal;29 not a sceptical pressure designed to undermine justification, but a goad, consistent with Socrates' mission to Athens, always to do the best.30

28 See Nicomachean Ethics, VI 9-10, esp. 1142bl-10, 1142b34-1143a5; discussed briefly in§V.

29 Notice that Crito urges Socrates to 'have no regard (forethought)' for him or the other Socratics (&pd ye 'a' e'iov npo'ir'Q^ rai tcov aAAcov etcithSeCcov ixtj, 44e2-3). But Socrates responds, 'I regard even these things, Crito, and many others' (Kcti xavxa 7tpo^T)8(n)nai, © Kpkcov, mi aXka. noXka, 45a4-5).

30 The aspiration toward the superlative is underscored in Socrates' vocabulary. See: (1) 44c8, Socrates states that the most reasonable people (oi eicieiKeaxaxoi) are the ones whose opinion is worth considering; (2) 46b2, Socrates claims that Crito's zeal is worthwhile provided it is most right (opOonycoq); (3) 46b6, Socrates claims he is

persuaded only by the best (PiXxiaxoq) argument; (4) 46c6, Socrates asks Crito how the two of them might consider the plan most reasonably ((leTpKoraxa); (5) 49a2, Socrates asks Crito to consider in the way he thinks best ('iaXiaxa ovn). The contrasting extreme is to be found twice, once in a remark of Crito's - that Socrates is choosing


The third question will prove the most difficult to answer, hence I will say little about it by way of introduction. I adopt the view that the Crito does not portray Socrates as a moral expert, nor does it portray him as someone who is certain that the right thing to do in his particular case is to suffer the death penalty. Socrates in the Crito speaks of the moral expert as someone whose praise we should seek; as someone we should respect, fear, follow, obey, and be ashamed before, but most importantly he always speaks of the moral expert as someone else. Socrates and Crito are the only ones who are called on to deliberate. Because of this, I will argue, Socrates maintains a distinction between the moral expert and the good deliberator. The deliberator aspires to the knowledge of the expert, but is always in the position of having to consider advice from several sources and to decide, on the basis of opinion, which advice is best. But let us take up all three questions in greater detail.

IV

First, how is the Crito about deliberation? As I mentioned earlier, the middle section of the dialogue (46b-9a) mostly concerns how Socrates and Crito should consider the question of escape and what sort of argument ought to be decisive. This whole section is quite general in scope. Socrates and Crito consider:

(1) whether the view of the majority is worth heeding, or only the view of one who understands (46c-8a),

(2) whether fear, threat or reputation is a justifiable motive for action (46c, 48a-b),

the easiest way out (paSp-oraxa aipeaGai, 45d6), and once in a remark of the Laws - that Socrates, by running away, would be doing what the worst sort of person would do ((pauXoTaxcx; npd^ei, 52dl). The function of two of these superlatives (fieXxiGxoq and ̂expicbxaxa) is discussed by Kurt Pritzl (1993:32-4), who points out that 'the best logos or the most measured inquiry may not be the logos best or most measured simpliciter, but relative to the available logoi or the circumstances of the specific situation of inquiry/ (33). I agree, but I would hasten to add that Socrates use of the superlative is a prod in the direction of best simpliciter.

32 Eugenio Benitez

(3) whether past decisions in similar matters govern present decisions (46d), and

(4) whether the question of right outweighs all question of conse- quence (48b-d).

We can easily imagine these same considerations arising if the question was whether one should kill in self-defence, or whether one should prosecute a sibling for a crime. So, it is possible for us to abstract from the issue of suffering the death penalty when one is innocent, even though Socrates, as a character in the dialogue has no such abstraction in mind.31

There is some additional evidence to support reading the dialogue as generally about deliberation. Consider the context in which Plato exhibits Socrates' reasoning about his impending execution. By the time Crito presents the opportunity for escape, Socrates has decided that he must suffer the death penalty. As the personified Laws of Athens point out (53c), Socrates had already claimed in his defence that he would choose death before exile.32 Even then he was not just reaching a decision in court, for Socrates does not reason while the clock is running.33 If he is to have deliberated properly, he must have considered these matters before his trial and imprisonment. By that I do not mean he must have

31 Note that it is not possible to abstract completely from the particular deliberative context, however (thus, Plato is not recommending that we take up a stand outside of human life). This is Socrates' deliberation with Crito; the argument might have gone differently with someone like John Rawls. Rawls discusses some of the issues involved in the Crito in the context of civil disobedience (1971:§§53-9). Like Socrates, he considers the requirement of a convict to suffer punishment a matter of fidelity to law (366), but unlike Socrates he thinks that when the convicted is conscientious and morally justified, 'Courts should . . . reduce and in some cases suspend the legal sanction' (387). That point would enhance Crito's position considerably.

32 Note that Socrates said nothing in his defence about escape (Apology 37c-d), but the reasons he gives for avoiding exile are similar to some of the things the laws say. For example, both dialogues speak about Socrates' apparent greed for life if he leaves Athens (Apology 37c, Crito 53e), both dialogues speak about the irritation Socrates would bring to a new city (Apology 37c, Crito 53b). Note also the analogy between exile and escape, employed by the Laws at 52c: the only difference observed is that the former is legally sanctioned and the latter is not.

33 See Gorgias 455a; Theaetetus 172e, 201b.


deliberated about escape even before he was brought to trial. I mean that he must have deliberated the principles on which his reasoning about escape is based,34 principles that tell him not to pay heed to the many, or to consequences; never to return a wrong or do ill to anyone, and to fulfil one's agreements, provided that the things agreed to are just. Accordingly, Crito is reminded ten times of past discussions involving these principles35 Plato adds two dramatic touches that enhance the finality of Socrates' predicament: the prophetic dream that informs Socrates 'On the third day you will arrive at fertile Phthia' (44b2), and Crito's comically late realisation that the time for deliberating is over (46a).

How does this help to show that the Crito concerns, in part, what it is to deliberate? The fact that Socrates has already decided to die means that his deliberation in the dialogue is rehearsed for Crito's sake. Now to deliberate is one thing, but to apprehend and represent a deliberation is another. Merely to consider a plan may be construed as exhibiting or stemming from some conception of the deliberative process, but the most one needs to suppose is that such conceptions are tacit; no reflection about what it means to deliberate is required. Thus Crito might consider an escape plan for Socrates, taking into account the opinions of the many as well as the general utility of the plan, and all of this without any explicit conception of reasoning or deliberation. (Crito deliberates much better than the many do, but he does not reflect on his own thinking, as Socrates does.)

Representing a deliberation, however, demands reflection about one's method of reaching a decision. As part of such reflection one may

34 On this point Frankena's discussion is useful (1963:2-3). Frankena shows how Socrates' reasoning makes use of both derivative and basic principles, and more importantly, how Socratic deliberation turns to examine even the basic principles. This provides a sharp contrast to the reasoning of the many, which, if it uses principles at all, uses them in the form of pre-established conceptions of lightness which are not questioned. (In fact, Socrates in the Crito is more disparaging than this about the many, see 44d9-10 and 48c6).

35 See 46b3, 46b6, 46cl, 46c8, 46d2, 47al3, 48b5, 49a5-6, 49b2, 49el. I am tempted to add 46d7-8: ekerfexo 5e ncoq . . . emaxoTe a>6e hub tcov oion-evoov, since it is a virtual echo of 46c8: jcoxepov koXSx; eXeyexo eKaaxoxe, and taking it to be a reference to Socrates' and Crito's earlier discussions would have the comic result of making them the oio^evoi. Note anyway the repetition of e^eyexo, which occurs six times in this stretch of text and not elsewhere in the Crito.

34 Eugenio Benitez

organise reasons and arguments or articulate guiding principles that were originally implicit. The representation, we should expect, aims at making one's reasoning as perspicuous and cogent as possible. Of course the representing may take the form of a description, but there is a difference between describing a deliberation, even one's habitual mode of deliberation, and what Socrates does in the Crito. For he has to convince Crito that the decision he has reached is the best one. To use a medieval distinction, when Socrates replies to Crito his thoughts hover between first and second intentions: he must convince Crito that it is better not to flee, and at the same time he must show that this is an instance of deliberating well. Insofar as he does the latter, Socrates is concerned with what it means to deliberate.

If we to look at the dialogue in this way, then it appears that at the very beginning of his reply to Crito Socrates states a principle of deliberation, a rule for reaching decisions. He says, 'I am not just now but have always been the sort of person to be persuaded by nothing else than the argument that would, on my reckoning, appear best.'36 When Socra- tes says this he is not merely describing a deliberative habit. He is making a claim about what deliberation is. He is stating the principle of deliberation that he will apply in what follows. That explains the significance of Socrates' next question, 'How then might we consider these things most reasonably?' (nihq ow av jietpicoraTa OKonoi'iEQa aura; 46c6). This question, with its emphasis on procedure ('how' and 'most reasonably'), reinforces the principle. This question is not, however, a prelude to a theory of deliberation - there is no theory - it is just an indication that the rehearsed deliberation which follows has been organised to be as

36 See 46b4-6: ax; eyd) ox> vuv rcpcoxov aAAa m! ael toioutcx; oloq tcov e'l6)v 'n'bev' aXkcd TteOeoOcci ii xq> Xoyq) oq av jioi Axyyi^opivG) peXxiaioq qxxwnxai. Here too the verb Xoyi^eaGai may suggest to some that Plato is thinking in terms of a xexvn of deliberation, but this is leaping to conclusions. Socrates does not say anything about how he would cany out a technical calculation of arguments. We can assume no more from this use of the verb than we can assume of Aristotle's use of it in similar contexts (see note 19 above).


thorough and persuasive as possible.37 And the lack of anything more theoretical than this supports the view that when Plato writes the Crito he is not after a science (xexvil) of deliberation, but only seeking to under- stand deliberating well in the manner in which humans can deliberate well.

So, a good deliberator turns out to be someone who presents or follows the best argument available. Socrates presents no theory about what in general constitutes the best argument, but he does give some rudimentary guidelines: we ought not to be influenced by the many, or by fear, or by consequences, but by reason alone. And he does provide an example: against the argument of Crito he poses an argument (the argument of the Laws of Athens) that he takes to be a better argument than any other he can hear. The Crito is about deliberation because it presents a view of what good deliberation consists in and then illustrates that view in a particular instance.

V

Let us turn then to the second question, 'Does the Crito equate moral expertise with excellence in deliberation?' In order to answer this question properly we must adopt some definitions of what moral expertise and good deliberation are. Suppose we begin with the view about deliberation suggested by 46bl: good deliberation just is being persuaded by nothing other than argument, in particular the argument that appears best upon reflection.38 For moral expertise, let us go back to the

37 A reading on which the Crito presents a theory of deliberation would be far too strong. Apart from the principle of deliberation I have referred to there is very little that could be called theoretical about deliberation in the Crito. Socrates several times asks Crito to 'examine7 this or that argument, but he says nothing about how to examine them and the arguments themselves are not about deliberation. Socrates' talk about a starting point (tt'v &pxt|V/ 48e5; xx'<; dpxfte, 49d9) sounds vaguely theoretical, but his moral principles, while clearly instrumental in his reaching a decision, are given no precise rules of application.

38 Most translators and commentators have missed an important point of Socrates' principle of deliberation. To be sure, he proposes to reckon up the arguments and decide which is best. But he is also contrasting the case of deciding by way of argument to the way that the many decide: they just act at random (cf . Ttoiofcai 8e xoako <m av xt>xcooi, 44d9-10) with no concern for reason (cf. o'>8evi £i>v vq>, 48c6).

36 Eugenio Benitez

beginning of our discussion. Let us say that moral expertise consists in two kinds of knowledge, moral and procedural excioTn^Ti. The Cn'fo does not present us with a moral expert in precisely this sense. The ercccuov, 'the one who understands' things just and unjust, certainly has moral enicTr''ir' but we are never told anything about the procedure he would use or how it yields certainty. But let us suppose that he has some such procedure.

Nevertheless, if we now compare good deliberation with moral expertise, we shall find it impossible to identify the two. For obviously a decision based on 'what appears best upon reflection' could diverge from a decision reached by one who understands justice and injustice. The Athenian jury that reached a verdict of guilty in the trial of Socrates, for example, might (counterfactual) have deliberated well. Even as it stands its decision was legally correct, and we can imagine ways in which it might have been justified even on a careful consideration of the evidence, but it was not the right decision.39

There remain two reasons why, given this difficulty, we might still be tempted to identify good deliberation with moral expertise. One reason is that decisions based on what appears best can coincide with decisions based on expert knowledge - the jury might have found Socrates innocent - and if deliberation is to be excellent, its results must more often than not (always?) coincide with what is actually best. Thus, in our definition of good deliberation we must construe 'what appears best' and 'reflection' both in a strong sense - good deliberation cannot be simply what strikes me as best at a moment's notice (that is how the many decide). A good deliberator abhors a gap between what is really best and what appears to be so. But precisely because good deliberation is a matter of choosing on the basis of appearance (cf . cpawtjiai, 46b6), we cannot rule out the possibility of a difference between real and apparent best. Judicial decision is a paradigm case in Plato: even the jury

39 The understanding of justice and injustice is of crucial importance here, for the jury's decision is certainly not legally incorrect (see Allen, 1980:22). Allen goes on to argue, however, that the 'legal quality' (my emphasis) of the conviction may be questioned, because the vagueness of the charges brought against Socrates made real procedural fairness impossible. My point here is only that by Athenian standards of fairness, the verdict was properly reached; Allen admits this much.


that deliberates well and reaches the right verdict, says Socrates, cannot be said to have knowledge, but only opinion (Theaetetus 201b).40

Another reason for thinking that Socrates identifies good deliberation with moral expertise stems from consideration of an asymmetry in his familiar analogy between experts in matters of physical health and experts in health of the soul (47b). There is an obvious difference between the effects of following expert advice of a doctor and following the expert advice of a sage. The body may be improved simply by adhering to the doctor's prescription, but whether the soul can be improved simply by adopting sage advice is another matter. Of course you could not go wrong in heeding the sage (I am not sure you could even go wrong by heeding the paradoxical advice, 'Don't take my advice!'), but you would not learn how to decide for yourself either. You would, to use Kant's language, always have a heteronomous principle of the will. Now in the Crito Socrates says nothing explicit against such a heteronomous principle, but it is characteristic of him to demand of everyone that they personally conduct a thorough examination on all questions of moral excellence (cf. Euthyphro 9e), and Socrates does seem to make that demand on Crito.41

Thus Socrates' principle of good deliberation suggests that autonomy is an essential part of moral expertise. Moreover, this way of looking at things has the effect of strengthening Socrates' principle of deliberation significantly. Consider, for example, the stock Aristotelian character who is admittedly inept at reasoning about action, but fairly good at reasoning about whose advice to follow. Upon reflection such a person might adopt, as the decision that appears best, the course of action recommended by

40 It might be suggested that the Crito conflates knowledge and opinion, when Socrates speaks of 'the opinion of one man, if there is someone who understands/ etc. (tfl [86§fl, cf. 47cll] xox) evoq et xiq eaxiv etccucdv ... [47dl-2]). The apparent conflation is an accidental result of the sentence construction which begins by using 86£ct for the advice of the many (47cll) and so continues in a coordinate way (cf. xfl, 47dl) for the ercauov. Notice, however, that the sentence actually avoids reiterating the word 86£cc for the erccticov. If anything, the sense of the passage seems to me to stress the difference between mere opinion (which is what the many have) and expert knowledge (which is what the ercocuov has). For the use of ercauo in a context where it is clear that knowledge, not opinion, is what the expert has, see Gorgias 464b-466a, see especially 464c-d with eitaiei at 464d7.

41 See aKorcei, etc. in appendix.

38 Eugenio Benitez

some expert (a doctor, lawyer, broker, psychologist), without having any transparent understanding why that is the best course of action. In a rudimentary way he meets the proposed conditions for good deliberation, but his reasoning clearly falls short of moral expertise.

With the condition on autonomous reasoning added, however, our view of good deliberation must exclude this fellow, we must reason in the best way we can directly about action. This suggests that the moral expert cannot be somebody external to us. We may still think of the expert as an 'other', but now more along the lines of what Bernard Williams, speaking of the interactive effects of shame, calls an 'internalised other', a person who 'is conceived as one whose reaction I would respect.'42 This line of thinking can be carried a bit further. There is a peculiar tension that one notices in the Crito between Socrates' principle of deliberation, which requires him to decide on thebasis of the argument that appears best to him, and his talk about obtaining and following the advice of an expert. There are two non-mutually exclusive ways of resolving this tension. One way is to say that the expert is just an internalised other, in this case the voice of reason and argument. This line of interpretation is supported by Socrates' striking identification of the expert not as a person but as 'the truth itself. It gets additional support from the passage in which Socrates maintains that 'the argument chooses this way' (6 AxSycx; ovtgx; cdpei, 48c6-7), i.e., the way that requires consideration of the truth (see xf' aXy'Qeia 48d2, cf . 'ir' ox; ahfi&c, xaika in connection with the many, 48c4). On this reading Socra- tes' exhortation to heed the expert is just a call to deliberate as well as possible (i.e., toward the superlative, toward the truth itself).

Someone trying to deliberate as well as possible, however, may want to consider whether she or he has the best argument, and one way to do this is to consult genuine others. These others might be approached as if they were experts,43 in the sense either that (i) they might turn out to have

42 Williams (1993:84). Williams cites as an example Nausikaa's statement, 'And I

myself would think badly of a girl who acted so' (Odyssey VI 285), but he might have used the Crito even more effectively. For Socrates, the enauov is 'one whom we ought to feel shame before and fear more than all the rest' (ov 8ei rai aia%{>vea0ai rai cpopeiaGai ^aAAov r' av'inavxaq xaix; olXXjoxk;, 47d2-3).

43 It is characteristic of Socrates to treat his interlocutor as an expert. Even in the Crito he supposes that Crito may have better judgement because he is not under the threat of execution (46e-7a).


a better view or (ii) a discussion with them might reveal a better view. Appeal to others as if they were experts is the second way of resolving the tension between autonomy and heteronomy in the Crito. Like the first way, it resolves the tension in favour of autonomy, because the advice of external others will not be sought just to be followed, but to be considered along with or against one's own reasons. So in both cases the issue of the expert - conceived as someone external whose advice is simply to be followed - evaporates. Good deliberation must be autonomous.

Does good deliberation amount to moral expertise when understood this way? It does not, for the autonomous deliberations of intelligent, thoughtful people about a difficult course of action will sometimes be uneven, and their opinions about which decision is best may differ. It is in cases like these, cases like the one portrayed in the Crito, that even Aristotle backs away from any strong concept of expertise: 'When it comes to great matters/ he says, 'we invite co-counsellors, distrusting ourselves as insufficient to decide/44

When several intelligent, thoughtful people differ about a difficult course of action, will we say that only one of them can be a moral expert? How then will we distinguish the expert from the non-expert? It seems that in order to do this another sort of expertise is necessary (being an expert about the expert), and then another, and so on.45 There is no easy way out of this regress of expertise. Will we deny that there is one expert, then, and say that all are moral experts? If we say that they are, then we take the view that there is no difference between justifiable action and right action (or we deny that there is such a thing as right action). We deny that there is a distinction to

44 Nicomachean Ethics III 3, 1112b9-10: oDnPouAxnx; 8e napafax'i$avo'LEv eiq xa 'ieyafax, owtiaxovvxeq r''ilv avxoiq ox; o'>x iravoiq Suxyvcovai. Compare Crito 46d4-5: enidv'i6> 8' eyoy/ e7ucnce'|/aa6ai, a> KpCxcov, koivtj |iexa aox> . . . (l>ut I want to consider together with you, Crito ...').

45 Among the early dialogues it is the Charmides that most squarely addresses this problem (see esp. 167-73, cf. Laches 185-7, Gorgias 459). We could add that one task of the Socratic elenchus is to determine who the experts are, but in that task it does not succeed. Even if it did we would have to turn our critical gaze to the elenchus itself (as the Eleatic Stranger does in the Sophist) and so on and on. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate this regress of expertise; I only point out that Plato was aware of the difficulty.

40 Eugenio Benitez

be drawn between what appears and what really is best. This antirealist view of moral expertise has some able exponents,46 but Plato is not one of them. The moral expert of Crito 48a - the person who understands things just and unjust, who is the truth itself - represents the 'real' ground against which moral reasoning is to be measured. Good deliberation aims at making that the ground on which we stand, but because it can fail to achieve that ground, it is not moral expertise. If this implies that there are no moral experts, that is not a claim alien to Socrates or Plato.47

The view that Plato thinks the good deliberator must be a moral expert thus faces considerable difficulty. We have seen that the two cannot be identified so long as the expert requires knowledge rather than opinion. Is it possible to weaken the condition for moral expertise? Aristotle, for instance, has a view of moral expertise according to which the 'expert' - the man of practical wisdom - attains to a state of correctness, understanding, and judgment, but he insists that these states are neither knowledge nor opinion.48 For him it is characteristic of the moral 'expert' merely to have deliberated well; good deliberation involves correctness, understanding and judgment; and so good deliberation is tantamount to moral expertise (in the weak sense). It seems impossible, however, to read this view of Aristotle's back into the Crito. Between apparent and real, between opinion and knowledge, there is no additional middle ground of correctness and understanding for the Platonic moral expert to stand on. Here lies one genuine difference between Plato and Aristotle on deliberation.

VI

This brings us to my third and last question: Does the Crito depict Socrates as a moral expert? If expertise requires objective knowledge, as

46 For example see Reinhardt (1988:477 ff.). Reinhardt defends an antirealist position according to which 'there is no more and no less to action being right than there is to its being justified' where justification requires neither knowledge nor true belief.

47 See Prot. 319a-20c, Meno 89e, Apology. 20b; cf. Crito 47dl-2: ei xi<; eaxw enauov.

48 See note 25 above.


I have argued above, Socrates' customary avowals of ignorance, so far as they are genuine, rule him out. Yet on some occasions Socrates is not so modest (cf. Gorgias 521 d). What is his position in the Crito? We must acknowledge that Socrates hardly appears tentative about the conclusion of his particular deliberation. Some of the evidence for this has already been mentioned: Socrates' dream, for example, which suggests that he is to die 'on the third day' (44b2). In fact, Socrates' subjective certainty extends over the whole course of the dialogue. At 46c2-3 he tells Crito, If we do not have better things to say at present, know well that I will not agree with you' (a>v eav 'n' Pe^xico exco^iev Aiyeiv ev xcp rcapovxi, e'> i'aOi oxi o'> |xf| ooi auyxcGpriaco) and, more strongly, at 54d5-6: 'But know this, that as for the things I now think, if you would argue against these things, you will speak in vain' (dcAAoc i'oOi, oocc ye xa vfiv e|ioi 8oKot>vxa, eav Aiyflc; rcapa xauxa, |idxr|v epeiq).

These statements do not show, however, that Socrates is a moral expert. The statement at 46c, in fact, would be unsurprising without the follow-up at 54d. In the former, Socrates still speaks as if it were possible to be persuaded by Crito ('if we can't find better arguments ...'), but the latter statement, a much stronger one, echoes the first (cf. i'oGi, 'know you!', 46c2; 54d2, d5) and suggests reinterpreting 46c as a counterfactual.49 Nevertheless, 54d only settles the fact of Socrates' decision, not its expertise: Socrates continues to speak of how things seem to him (xa vvv E'io' 8oko')vxoc, 54d6), and he immediately adds, after this second statement, 'Still, if you suppose you can accomplish anything, please speak.' If Socrates were claiming expert knowledge for himself, there would be no reason for this addition. His decision to act remains firm only so long as Crito admits that there is nothing more he can say (cf. 50a4-5, 54d8).

49 The formal structure of the two statements is something of a distraction, however. The striking point of logic here is that in 46c the operator ibGi is embedded in the consequent of the conditional, whereas at 54d it has the entire conditional as its scope. The first statement is thus hypothetical, the second categorical. It is often inferred that Plato does not recognise scope fallacies (e.g., the fallacy: /[p->q] is equivalent to p- »/[q], where / is some logical operator); so we are tempted to see a scope fallacy here. But the content of the propositions is the important thing here, 54d is materially and not just logically distinct from 46c. Leaving the operator i'oGi aside, 46c is open to the possibility of Socrates' being persuaded by Crito, but 54d is not - even if Crito argues against Socrates, he will speak in vain.

42 Eugenio Benitez

What is interesting about Socrates' confidence in the Crito, however, is that it suggests that he knows what he is doing (thus, he is a moral expert). I want to suggest something weaker: Socrates only knows what he is going to do.50 He knows this on the basis of his vision, and perhaps also because the daimonion does not oppose him (cf. Apology 40a-c). But he does not know (in the sense of having expert knowledge) what he is doing, because he does not know if his reasons for choosing to stay and die are the best simpliciter (only that they are the best he has been able to discover).

Yet it will be objected that the one voice Socrates is prepared to heed as expert is the voice of the Laws of Athens. This, it will be said, is the voice that rings in Socrates' ears at the end of the dialogue; this is the source of his extraordinary confidence.51 Moreover, it will be insisted that the voice of the Laws is in reality only Socrates' alter ego, and that therefore the Crito depicts Socrates as a moral expert after all.

The Laws of Athens are a source of confidence, to be sure, but they are not an expert source. I think we can distinguish between the Laws and the expert on several points:

(1) The laws are many, but the expert is only one. This would seem an insignificant point except for the stress laid on the one vs. many antithesis earlier in the dialogue. There we find the expert identified explicitly as 'one' person six times (47b2, b6,blO,cl,cl;48a7).

(2) The speech of the laws is, in Socrates' own words, the sort of speech that an orator (pf|xcop) might make.52 In fact the arguments of the Laws do look like the arguments of fifth-century

50 This suggests a kind of fatalism, but even so it is a fatalism consistent with the view that Socrates chooses and deliberates what to do. See Williams (1993:139 ff): Williams uses the example of Eteocles in Seven Against Thebes. Though Eteocles says, 'When the Gods decree it you may not escape evil/ his words, 'need to be taken to present the gods' necessity as itself one of Eteocles' reasons. He has given his reasons, what he last expresses is the necessity of the situation in which these must be his reasons.' Socrates in the Crito is in a similar situation, which perhaps explains his final remark: 'let us do this, since in this God leads the way' (jcpaTTco^ev xavxp, eneiSfi xauTfl 6 9eo<; ixpriyeixai, 54el-2; cf. ixpnyeo^ai at Sophocles, Electra 1502 and Euripides, Electra 664).

51 This objection was suggested to me by Harold Tarrant.


orators in an important sense: however good their reasoning is, they have the result of promoting the unjust cause (Socra- tes' execution) over the just cause. By likening the speech of the Laws to that of an orator, someone regularly distin- guished from the expert in Plato, we are led to suspect irony rather than expertise in that speech.53

(3) The Laws are explicitly identified as the Laws of Athens. This makes it very difficult to equate them with the expert who is 'the truth itself. Indeed, it makes us reflect that these laws are the very ones publicly accepted by the Athenian people. They may represent the best collective judgement of the many,54 but they are not expert.

(4) The laws repeatedly offer Socrates the choice, 'persuade or obey' (51b, 51e, 52a) but the possibility of persuading an expert must ruled out.

The best reason for distinguishing Socrates from the moral expert, whether the Laws represent his alter ego or not, is that in the Crito the moral expert is not identified with any person in particular. The moral expert is personified as 'the one who understands' (6 ercoucov), so as to have a 'voice'. That voice, however, does not belong to a person, still less to the Laws of Athens, but to the truth itself. Socrates' refusal to identify himself with the moral expert shows how strongly he adheres to the view that he personally lacks moral understanding. Socrates can reach a confident conclusion in virtue of the unusual inspiration visited him in his last days. Nevertheless, being the sort of man he is, he must always leave room for more consideration.

52 See 50b6-8: noXTJx yap dv xi<; exoi, aXkoaq xe mi pf|TO)p, eijieiv bnkp to'>to') xo'> vo'lov anoXkx>'ievox> oq xaq 8{ra<; xaq 8iKaa0e(aa<; jcpoaxdxxei icup(a<; eivcu ('There are many things that someone, especially an orator, would have to say about the destruction of this law which enacts that judgments judicially rendered are binding7).

53 The case for irony is made out in Mitchell Miller's paper (1993).

54 See Pritzl (1993:13-21) for a distinction between the random many and the collective, nomos-ordered many. Pritzl draws on a parallel with Heraclitus fr. DK B114 (cf. Crito 48c6) to reveal the importance of law to the good judgment of a nobler kind of many.

44 Eugenio Benitez

To conclude, then, the Crito teaches us the Socratic principle of deliberation (that we must always be persuaded only by argument, in particular the argument that on reflection appears best) and it shows us the application of that principle in Socrates' reasoning about his impending execution. The lengthy struggle to obtain the best argument, which occupied Socrates for most of his life, shows us how Socratic deliberation is related to the quest for moral expertise. The Crito does not equate good deliberation with moral expertise, however. It shows us at most that good deliberation is necessary for moral expertise. Indeed, the Crito shows us the importance of maintaining a distinction between a human deliberator and the moral expert. The voice of the expert is the voice of truth itself; it always stands external to the deliberator as a voice to be sought out in the din of the many. If even two voices that can be heard, however, the deliberator must make a decision based on judgment, not knowledge. Although Socrates is extremely confident in his choice, he does not, even in the end, become the expert.55

55 This paper grew out of a critical response to work by Jack Montgomery. I would like to thank Harold Tarrant and Dougal Blyth for advice and comments when the

paper was in its early stages. Drafts of the present version were presented at the University of New South Wales (1994) and the University of Texas at Austin (1995).


Appendix: poi)A,-, gkek-/gkok-, TueiGco, ocipeco, in the Crito

A $ox>'- locus speaker C rcelBco locus speaker

1. (3o')A,f| 45c2 Kpixcov 1. mQox) 44b6 Kpixcov 2. poDôêvoi 45c8 Kpixcov 2. rceiaovxcxi 44c3-4 Kpixcov 3. Po')tat>(n) 46a4 Kpixcov 3. ne{6au 45a3 Kpixcov 4. povtaveoOcxi 46a4 Kpixcov 4. neiQov 46a8 Kpixcov 5. p£poi)A,efta0ai 46a5 Kpixcov 5. 7iei6ea9ai 46b5 Icbicpcxxeq 6. PodAti 46a5 Kpixcov 6. JieiaoîeGa 46d7 IcoKpaxeq 7. Poa)X,f| 47cll ZcoKpaxeq 7. (X7ceiGf|aa<; 47cl IcoKpaxeq 8. pcn)A,f| 49d3 ZcoKpaxeq 8. neiaexai 47c3 ScoKpaxeq 9. PovAêiJâxa 49d5 IcoKpaxeq 9. dTceiGovvxaq 47c6 IcoKpaxeq 10. po'uA.e'uop.evoi 49d7 IcoKpaxeq 10. rcei06n.evoi 47d9 ZcbKpaxeq 11. pcnAe-oonevcp 51d2 (I)v6p.oi 11. neioo'iai 48el ScbKpaxeq 12. Po')X,Tixai 51d5 (Z)voîoi 12. neicaq 48e4 IcbKpaxeq 13. po')A,T|xcxi 51d6 (2)vojioi 13. rceiaavxeq 50al IcoKpaxeq 14. PovXrixai 51el (I)voôi 14. 7ce(9eiv 51b3 (I)voôi 15. ePovA,ov 52c4 (I)voîoi 15. rceCGew 51cl (S)voôi 16. povta-oaaaOai 52e3 (I)v6|lioi 16. 7cei06îevov 51e4 (Z)vop.oi 17. Povêi 54a2 (Z)voôi 17. TceOexai 51e5-6 (Z)voôi

18. rcetaeaGi 51e6 (I)v6p.oi 19. JceOexai 51e7 (I)v6fioi

B oKeji-/oKon- locus speaker 20. TieiGei 51e7 (I)voôi 21. JceCGeiv 52a2 (Z)voôi

1. eTciaKexjfaoGai 46d5 IcbKpaxeq 22. mid]} 53a6 (2)v6^.oi 2. aKoiceioOai 46b3 ZcoKpaxeq 23. 7iei06|ievo(; 54b2 (Z)voôi 3. aKO7to{(ie6a 46c6 ZcbKpaxeq 24. micrr' 54dl (I)vop.oi 4. aKOTcei 47a2 ZcbKpaxeq 5. aKOTcei 48b5 ZcbKpaxeq 6. aKETcxeov 48bll IcbKpaxeq D aip«» locus speaker 7. aKe'|/ei<; 48c2 ScoKpaxeq 8. aKETcxeov 48c7 ZcbKpaxeq 1. aipeiaGai 45d6 Kpixcov 9. ZKOTccojiev 48d8 Icbicpcxxeq 2. eXoixo 45d7 Kpixcov 10. cnce'|feco<; 48e5 IcbKpaxeq 3. aipeiaGai 45d7 Kpixcov 11. aKOTcei 49d5 IcbKpaxeq 4. aipei 48c7 ZcbKpaxeq 12. aKO7cei 50a6 ZcbKpaxeq 5. ftpcn) 52c2 (I)voôi 13. iKorcei 51c6 (I)v6(ioi 6. Tipov 52c7 (I)vop.oi 14. ZKO7cei 53a8 (L) v6|ioi

46 Eugenio Benitez

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deliberation and moral expertise in plato's crito

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