defining the implementation problem: organizational ... · defining the implementation problem:...

Defining the Implementation Problem:Organizational Management versus Cooperation

Kurt D. ClineColorado State University

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this article is to determine which definitionof the implementation problem, organizational management orcooperation, provides the best understanding of the implemen-tation process. In order to do this, I will compare models of theimplementation process that use different conceptions of the prob-lem. The models that are used in this analysis are (1) Gogginet al 's. communications model of intergovernmental policy imple-mentation (CM) and (2) implementation regime framework (IRF).The CM conceives of the implementation problem as one oforganizational management; the IRF conceives of the implementa-tion problem as achieving cooperation. These models are evalu-ated using four criteria: the treatment of both the top-down andbottom-up approaches; the role of communication in the imple-mentation process; the level of conflict/cooperation in theimplementation process; and applicability to the concept ofnetworks. The results of this analysis reveal that Stoker's IRF,which defines the implementation problem as achieving coopera-tion, provides a better understanding of the implementationprocess. The CM, which is based on the organizational manage-ment perspective, is much more limited. The implications thisanalysis has for future research of the implementation process arealso discussed.

The main thrust of research in the area of public-policyimplementation has been to analyze the problems of implement-ing public policy. In other words, What accounts for the differ-ential success of public policies in the implementation process?Few researchers have sought to examine the impact of implemen-tation problem definition on the analytic frameworks they use.This is important because how one defines the implementationproblem shapes both the analysis of key issues in the process andthe recommendations that result from the analysis. If the imple-mentation problem is incorrectly defined in a model, the results

J-PART 10(2000):3:551-571 of any analysis that uses this model will be flawed. Thus it is

551/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

Organizational Management versus Cooperation

important to step back and examine the adequacy of differentdefinitions of the implementation problem. Doing so will result inimplementation research that provides a better understanding ofthe process.

The implementation problem can be defined in two basicways (Stoker 1983). The first and more traditional focus ofimplementation studies is on problems of organizational manage-ment. This approach concentrates on the ability of single author-ity structures (i.e., an organization or central authority) toeffectively manage the implementation process. According to thisview, policy managers see goal specification and control of sub-ordinates as the essential implementation problems (p. 6). Factorsthat inhibit effective management include such things as "(1)technical incompetence . . . of bureaucratic agents, (2) theenforcement of illegitimate political preferences by the agents,(3) the structural characteristics of the implementing institutions,and (4) communication failures between policy makers and subor-dinates" (p. 10). Policy makers and managers are seen to havelegitimate control of the process. The politics of implementationis viewed in terms of the administrative process, not as a basiccontradictions of values. Therefore, any conflict that might arisein the implementation process is not viewed as legitimate. Thesolutions that result from this definition of the implementationproblem focus on creating more effective ways to manage com-munications, resources, and bureaucratic dispositions. Effectivemanagement is the key to solving the implementation problem.

The implementation problem also can be conceived of as aconflict of interest in the process. Given the existence of thisconflict, such a conception of the problem would focus on how toelicit cooperation from those who participate in the implementa-tion process. Thus "[m]anagement of potential [interorganiza-tional] conflict would be an essential part of the policy makingprocess . . . " (Stoker 1983, 7). Power in the implementationprocess is seen as disbursed so that participants must bargain inorder to gain a capacity to act. This makes the strategic contextsin which actors participate an important element of the implemen-tation process. Since power is shared, this perspective suggeststhat conflict of interest in the process is a legitimate struggle overbasic values (Stoker 1989). Thus it is conflict over values thatmore often than not hinders the implementation of a policy.Problems of generating cooperation in situations of conflict ofinterest are likely to stymie implementation before issues oforganizational management become an obstacle. The solutionoffered by this perspective is to build institutions or mechanismsthat create a cooperative context for those who participate in theimplementation process.

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'The third generation of implementationliterature refers to the development ofresearch in this area. The first generationwas based on case study methodology.The second generation developed analyticframeworks and tested them. The thirdgeneration has revised and synthesizedthese prior analytic frameworks.

The central question to be addressed in this analysis is,Which definition of the implementation problem provides a betterunderstanding of the process? The answer has important implica-tions for the future of implementation research. If implementationresearch is to be useful, it must focus on the problems that arisein the implementation process. To deal with these issues, theanalysis is structured as follows. First, I will select appropriateanalytic frameworks of the implementation process and brieflyoutline the implementation models. I will evaluate the models ona set of criteria that consists of important issues that must beaddressed. These criteria include the following: top-down versusbottom-up debate; role of communication; conflict/cooperation;and networked implementation settings. I will discuss the findingsof this evaluation and conclude with a focus on the directions andimplications the findings have for future implementation research.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TOIMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS

In examining the effects of using different conceptions of theimplementation problem, it is important to select the appropriatemodels to analyze. The first criterion is to choose one model thatuses each of the different conceptions of the implementationproblem. A second important criterion is to select implementationmodels from the "third generation" of the implementation litera-ture.1 This is important because these models have attempted toresolve the issue of "wherner attention should be focused onfidelity to the designer's plan or on the general consequences ofthe implementation actions when determining success" (Matland1995, 154). This allows for a clearer focus on other importantimplementation issues. It is important to select models that offera more developed or unique approach to the analysis of theimplementation process. By doing this, these implementationmodels offer a real contribution to the study of implementation.

The communication model of intergovernmental policyimplementation offered by Goggin et al. (1990) is one of theimplementation frameworks that will be examined in this study.The communications model (CM) is based on the assumption thatorganizational management issues are the primary implementationproblem. The CM is also one of the most theoretically developedthird generation models. Underlying its development is meconceptual and methodological critique of previous implementa-tion research (Bowman and Lester 1993; Lester et al. 1987).Thus the CM is not only an analytical framework, it is also theembodiment of a larger research program meant to guide futureimplementation research.



The implementation regime framework (Stoker 1991 and1990; Stone 1990; Stone and Sanders 1987) is the other imple-mentation framework that will be examined in this study. Theimplementation regime framework (IRF) is based on the conflictof interest conception of the implementation problem. It wasdeveloped primarily by Stoker in response to his critiques of thedominant organizational management perspective in implementa-tion studies. This is the only third generation implementationframework that explicitly states that the problems of elicitingcooperation in conflictual settings is central to more effectiveimplementation. Thus it provides the necessary contrast to theorganizational management conception offered by Goggin et al.(1990).

The Communication Model ofIntergovernmental Policy Implementation

Underlying the communication model of intergovernmentalpolicy implementation (CM) is the conceptualization of inter-governmental policy making as an "implementation subsystemfull of messages, messengers, channels, and targets operatingwithin a broader communications system" (Goggin et al. 1990,33). Essentially, state-level implementers form the nexus forcommunications coming from both national and local levelsenders. The interpretation of these messages is a function of thecontextually different settings in which it is received.

The CM conceptualizes state implementation as its depen-dent variable. State-level implementation has three elements. Thefirst is a process or series of state decisions and actions that leadto the timely and satisfactory performance of putting a nationalmandate into effect. The CM also includes outputs (programgoals achieved) and outcomes (substantive results) as parts ofimplementation. Goggin et al. (1990, 48) use implementationstyle, which is "a function of behavior having to do with both thetiming of implementation and the nature and direction of changein the program objectives and the tools and instruments adoptedto achieve them." Periodic assessments of implementation styleare to be conducted in order to avoid a one-time determination ofpolicy success or failure.

State-level implementation is seen as the product of induce-ments and constraints from national, state, and local levels.Federal policy "consists of information, expectations, exhorta-tions, often resources and sanctions intended to influence theactions of these others" (Goggin et al. 1990, 75). Federal policyis seen as a political message. Factors that account for the



varying responses among states include content, the form of themessage itself, and the reputation of the communicators. The CMalso stresses the importance of the organization at the state andlocal levels. This is the component that examines the interactionof organized interests, elected and appointed officials, and thefocal state agency that "generatefs] the climate of receptivity thefederal directive encounters" by sending messages to the stateimplementers (Bowman and Lester 1993).

These national, state, and local inducements and constraintsimpact a state's decisional outcome, as well as its capacity to act.Whether or not state decision makers decide to act is influencedby their perception of the messages and information flowing fromthe national, state, and local levels. The decision to implement isa necessary precursor to the next part of the process: the state'scapacity to act. A state's capacity to act also influences a state'sability to act in compliance with a national mandate. It is madeup of two factors. One of tiiese factors is organizational capacity.The structure, personnel, and financial resources of its imple-menting agency or agencies determine a state's organizationalcapacity. Ecological capacity is the other factor. This "pertains tothe contextual environment in which state government operates"(Goggin et al. 1990, 38). A state's economic, political, and situa-tional capacity are all part of its larger ecological capacity.

In addition to these conceptual issues, Goggin et al. alsoaddress methodological concerns. They believe implementationshould be studied in a genuinely comparative manner. Thusimplementation should be examined in a combination of macro-and microenvironments (i.e., a combination of large andsmall n studies) and across policy areas. They also see the needto generate measurable variables of the implementation phenom-ena. This will help to identify variables that are crucial to dieimplementation process (Lester et al. 1987). The ability tomeasure these variables across time is also important. However,this raises additional measurement concerns. One must developreliable and valid data for diachronic studies. While this may bea daunting task, Goggin et al. believe that is necessary to addressboth conceptual and methodological issues to attain theoreticalcumulation and clarity in implementation research.

Implementation Regime Framework

According to Stoker (1991, 55), a regime is "a politicalarrangement that institutionalizes values important in publicdecision making; but a regime is also a set of organizationalarrangements that helps define and support the political in it."



At the organizational level, a regime consists of a set of rules,norms, and procedures that guides the interaction of participantsin collective decision making. These political arrangements orregimes may be able to alter such things as the costs of trans-actions, availability of information, or level of uncertainty(Axelrod and Keohane 1985). It can promote cooperation by pro-viding a setting in which relationships are more predictable.

This concept can be applied to implementation in the contextof federal governance. An implementation regime "can be anarrangement among implementation participants that identifies thevalues to be served during the implementation process and pro-vides an organizational framework to promote those values"(Stoker 1991, 55). According to Stone (1980, 269), regimes areshaped by "potentially conflicting principles." With respect to thefederal system, the imperatives that must be reconciled are thedesires for central leadership and diffuse implementation author-ity. In the federal context, national policies must contend with theforces of federalism and liberalism, which diffuse authority(Stoker 1991, 10-13). It is this diffusion that requires the partici-pation of implementers who may represent interests or perspec-tives that are divergent from the national policy. The use ofreluctant partners in the implementation process requires nationalpolicy formulators to seek cooperation and coordination andallows for strategic behavior on the part of the subnational inter-mediaries (Stoker 1991, 53).

The primary task of implementation is to create a contextthat will induce the participants to cooperate in the presence ofconflict of interest. Thus to determine the success of the imple-mentation process, one must examine the strategic and institu-tional contexts that make up a particular regime. The strategiccontext refers to the degree of conflict that exists between par-ticipants in the implementation process. Institutional contextalludes to mechanisms or arrangements in the process that pro-mote cooperation. The exact nature of the influence of these onthe inclination of participants to cooperate in the implementationprocess requires further elaboration. Before moving into an in-depth discussion of the strategic context envisioned by the regimeframework, it is important to examine the relationship betweenconflict and cooperation.

The source of conflict in the implementation process arisesfrom the nature of the process itself as specification andreassessment occur (Stone 1980). Stoker (1991) suggests that thisconflict takes place in the larger context of federalism andliberalism as reluctant partners represent different values and



interests. According to Keohane (1984), cooperation only canoccur in the aftermath of conflict between implementation partici-pants. Specifically, he describes cooperation as "negotiation tobring separate entities into conformity with one another; thishighly political activity can occur only when actors adjust theirbehavior to the actual or anticipated behavior of others" (Keo-hane quoted in Stoker 1991, 61).

The strategic context envisioned by the regime frameworkinvolves situations in which the motives of the participants aremixed. In other words, incentives exist for both cooperation anddefection. Stoker (1991) conceives of the relationship amongimplementation participants as one that takes place in these mixedmotive games.2 Axelrod (1970) suggests an inverse relationshipbetween the level of conflict and the incentives that implementa-tion participants have to cooperate in mixed motive games. Thispoints to the idea that cooperation can be induced by implementa-tion participants' manipulation of the strategic context.

Given this mixed motive context, it is important to investi-gate the institutional context—specifically, the presence orabsence of mechanisms and arrangements that promote coopera-tion. The regime framework posits that over time the implemen-tation process will move from a situation where the cost of defec-tion is low to one where it is high and cooperation is encouraged.The establishment of long-term relationships relies on such thingsas the expectation of future interactions and a commitment ofresources to promote trust and reciprocity (Stoker 1989, 41-43).Other mechanisms and arrangements also work to promote coop-eration in the short term: side payments, issue linkages, andstandards of conduct, for example, can be used to alter the per-ceived payoff structure among implementation participants. Bothlong- and short-term mechanisms and arrangements are an impor-tant focus for implementation analysts.

The regime framework also recognizes that these efforts toinduce cooperation do not take place in a political vacuum.Stoker (1991) suggests that there are political consequences to theformation of implementation regimes as they seek to reconcile thecompeting federal imperatives of centralized leadership and dif-fused implementation authority and ability. In this context,national policy formulators must seek partnerships with thosewho control "enough resources to have leverage in an otherwise

„ _, ^ gridlocked world" (Stone 1989, 230). As a result, those who'In order for games to be considered ° . . . . • • . . . . . .mixed, two conditions must be met: first, c011*01 P° h c y resources are in a position to implicitly makesome benefit to cooperation and second, a political judgments that shape the design of regimes as well asneed for cooperation (Stoker 1991,61). the evolution of policy within them. Regime development is very

551IJ-PART, July 2000


much a political process and has political consequences for theimplementation process.

A COMPARISON OF THE APPROACHES

Both the communications model (CM) and the implementa-tion regime framework (IRF) explain the implementation process.However, by focusing on different definitions of the implementa-tion problem, these models offer a different analysis of the imple-mentation process. This basic difference invites a comparisonacross a number of criteria that will be used to evaluate the util-ity of each model. These criteria include the following: (1) thetreatment of the top-down and bottom-up approaches; (2) the roleof communication in the process; (3) the treatment of the level ofconflict/cooperation in the process; and (4) the applicability tonetworks.

Treatment of the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

The major point of contention between top-down andbottom-up theorists is how to evaluate the success of implementa-tion. The top-down perspective focuses on factors that can bemanipulated by policy designers at the central level (Matland1995, 146). Measures of success are tied directly to the statute.Bottom-up theorists emphasize the importance of target groupsand service deliverers in policy making (p. 146). They favor amuch broader evaluation of success based on what can be seen aspositive outcomes. Stoker (1989, 29) suggests that both thesecompeting perspectives are important to implementation in afederal system. Failure to reconcile the two perspectives will onlyhinder the development of implementation research. This has ledto third generation efforts to synthesize these perspectives oroffer wholly different directions for future implementationresearch.

The CM suggests that the top-down and bottom-up perspec-tives are not necessarily wrong in how they view the implementa-tion process, but when they are used separately they each providean incomplete analysis. Accordingly, it synthesizes theseapproaches into a more comprehensive framework using com-munications theory. State-level implementers receive policymessages from the national, state, and local levels. National-levelinducements and constraints are used to incorporate top-downinfluences. The bottom-up influence of state and local actors isrepresented in the model by state and local inducements andconstraints. Thus state implementers are at the nexus of commun-ication in the federal system.



While the Goggin et al. approach offers a synthesis of theseperspectives, it places the ultimate authority of the implementa-tion process in the hands of the federal policy leadership.According to Lester and Goggin (1998, 23), "[TJn order toresolve the implementation paradox . . . ways must be found toenhance the control over the implementation process that nationalformulators enjoy." Change in the implementation process doesnot arise out of the process itself, but must be sent as a policymessage from state implementers to policy designers at thefederal level. It is here that the problems of implementation willbe handled by "better 'policy design' or by 'framing smarterstatutes'" (Lester and Goggin 1998, 23). These structured solu-tions will then be sent back to state implementers via the policymessage and will provide an organizational framework to serveand promote the proper values in the implementation process.Thus the Goggin et al. approach, which reflects the organiza-tional management view of the implementation problem, offers apredominantly top-down model of the implementation process.

The implementation regime framework (IRF) offers a verydifferent conception of how to define the problem of implementa-tion in a context of diffuse authority. In doing so, it draws on thelessons provided by the view of the implementation problem pro-vided by the top-down and bottom-up perspectives. The top-downperspective points to the need for instrumentally effective imple-mentation of policy but is overreliant on coercive control toattempt to bring about cooperation. The bottom-up perspectiveprovides the view that national government control is diffuse asstrategic interests have a right to bargain in the implementationprocess. However, this approach does not take into account con-flict, and thus it severely restricts the kinds of policy thatgovernment can pursue. These approaches both are based on theconcept that power is created at the federal level only to bediluted by the reluctant partners.

The IRF builds on these lessons and suggest a new concep-tion of the implementation problem. In defining implementationas the problem of governance, the regime framework suggests adifferent conception of power as its foundation. It suggests thatpower is created in the implementation process in order to pro-duce the "capacity to act" (Stone 1989). Furthermore, the imple-mentation regime framework places this conflict in a larger socialand political context. From this vantage point, government is notnecessarily disabled by diffuse authority and can achieve instru-mentally rational policy, but it must induce cooperation to do so.



Role of Communication

The importance of communication in the implementation pro-cess is not a point of contention among those who study imple-mentation. Communication is considered to be necessary if onewants to successfully implement a policy. However, importantdifferences arise when the exact function of communication isdiscussed. One way to view communication is to emphasize theneed for clarity and consistency in form and content in order toincrease the likelihood of compliance and execution of a particu-lar policy. Clear communication also can lead to better-designedpolicy. Of course, if communication among parties is lacking inthese respects, the resulting distortions could very well lead toimplementation failure. Another way to view communication is tostress its importance with respect to conflict resolution. It isimportant in building trust, increasing cooperation, and increas-ing the right kind of involvement among actors in the imple-mentation process (Scheberle 1997, ch. 6). The two modelsexamined in this article have opposing views about the functioncommunication serves. These opposing views reflect how each ofthese models perceives the nature of the implementation problem.

The CM uses communication theory as the basis for inter-action among its participants in the implementation process. Itconceptualizes intergovernmental policy making as the interactionof message senders and receivers in a broader communicationsystem. State implementers are placed at the hub of this commun-ication system. They receive messages from both the national andthe state and local levels. The variability of state-level implemen-tation is a function of how the state implementers interpret themessages they receive, given their different contextual settings.

In addition to this, the CM also conceives of a feedbackmechanism from the implementers and those who are targets of aparticular policy. In this instance, the federal-level principals arethe receivers of messages from the agents at the state and locallevels. The purpose of this feedback is to improve policy designwith the implication of improving future implementation of apolicy. Goggin et al. (1990, 161) suggest one of the most effec-tive means of communicating information to the federal principalsis through formal policy analysis and demonstration projects. Allin all, the CM conceives of communication as something to beused in order to increase the effectiveness of policy implementa-tion through improved policy design.

Even though Goggin et al. use communication as the basisfor their model, they offer a limited view of the uses of com-munication. Ostrom (1998, 13) provides a fuller picture of the



potential of communication in the implementation process: "Witha repeated chance to see and talk with others, a participant canassess whether s/he trusts others sufficiently to try to reach asimple contingent agreement regarding the level of joint effortand its allocation." Thus, communication is important in thedevelopment of trust, reputations, and norms of reciprocityamong participants in the implementation process. Furthermore,Ostrom (pp. 13, 15) links these elements of the "core relation-ship" to levels of cooperation. The approach offered by Gogginet al., grounded in organizational management, fails to acknowl-edge any of tihese potentialities. It is simply too confining in itsconception of the role of communication.

The IRF conceives of communication in its role as aresolver of conflict. The IRF suggests that over time, regimestend to move along a predictable dynamic toward cooperation.Specific factors such as reliability of information and quickfeedback can help to build mutual trust and cooperation amongregime participants. These factors can be especially important inthe early stages of relationships in which parties expect to havefuture interactions. Regime arrangements that have a history ofcooperation and the expectation of future interaction can buildstronger relationships by using such strategies as reciprocity tobuild trust and reputation as well as to reduce the costs oftransactions and the level of uncertainty. Many mechanisms thatpromote cooperation in the IRF are reliant on good communica-tion between participants in the implementation process. The roleof communication is more than a means of communicating thewill of policy formulators. Face-to-face communication is ameans of attaining cooperation in an implementation process fullof potential conflicts of interest. It offers participants in theprocess the opportunity to combine resources in order to accomp-lish things they could not accomplish separately. Stoker's IRFincorporates Ostrom's more comprehensive view about the roleof communication in the implementation process.

The Treatment of Conflict and Cooperation

Much like the issue of communication, there is no disagree-ment that conflict exists in the implementation process among thevarious actors. Scheberle (1997) states that conflict in the imple-mentation relationship is much more prevalent than cooperationand that it is not guaranteed in the implementation relationship.Furthermore, Scheberle (p. 18) enumerates the benefits of coop-erative relationships or "pulling together." The differences onthis issue arise concerning the legitimacy of conflict. One viewsuggests that conflict is dysfunctional and needs to be controlled.This view acknowledges the presence of a conflict of interests

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among different actors at different levels (federal and state) ofgovernment. According to Stoker (1983, 6), this conception ofconflict "creates a view of the implementation process thatimplies that goal specification and control of subordinates are theessential implementation problems." Conflict is linked withpolicy failure. Another perspective sees conflict as a legitimatepart of the implementation process. Conflict in the implementa-tion process is simply a reflection of the conflict in largersociety. Hence the implementation problem is one of resolvingconflicts or achieving cooperation.

The CM recognizes that conflict in the implementation pro-cess is common and is a result of the differences betweennational and subnational priorities. It also acknowledges the needfor cooperation and coordination in response to the complexity ofjoint action present in the process. However, this is the extent ofits treatment of cooperation and conflict. By not placing conflictin the larger social and political context, it is seen to arise solelyin the administrative process and not larger society. This makes itan organizational management problem. The CM offers commun-ication as one remedy for conflict. Clear and consistent messagesfrom the principal to the agent informed by feedback can lead toa policy design to address issues of conflict in the implementationcontext. This perspective sees the policy development process asresolving, not creating, conflict in the implementation stage.

The view of conflict presented by the CM is limited. It doesnot link conflict in the implementation process to conflicts overlarger social values. As I have mentioned, conflict is somethingthat can be designed out of the process by policy formulators anddesigners. Cooperation is passed from the top down. It is notnegotiated among those participating in the implementation pro-cess itself. Any type of politics or political bargaining that mighttake place among those participating in the implementation pro-cess would be deemed illegitimate. This view tends to delinkimplementation not only from the rest of the policy process butfrom larger society as well. Thus conflict is viewed only in termsof the administrative process.

The ERF conceives of the implementation problem as con-flict resolution or the ability to create a cooperative context. Therelationship between conflict and cooperation is important to adiscussion of the ERF. According to Stoker, the extent of conflictand the likelihood of cooperation are conceptually separate."Cooperation is more properly seen as a response to conflict, notthe absence of it" (1989, 50; also see Axelrod 1984). The rela-tionship of conflict and cooperation are clear only in the rare



situations of total consensus or total conflict.3 Otherwise, thisrelationship is ambiguous at best.

Stoker (1991, 50) suggests that in mixed motive situations"the likelihood of cooperation can be altered even when theamount of conflict is held constant." As a result of this, creatinga context for cooperation in the midst of conflicts of interest isseen as the major task of implementation. It is important in help-ing to generate the capacity to act and accomplish goals. Thepresence or absence of mechanisms or arrangements that promotecooperation is the explanation IRF provides for the nonrealizationof policy. It, along with conflict, forms the basis for the strategicand institutional contexts so important to the IRF. Efforts toinduce cooperation are in part responsible for creation and devel-opment of implementation regimes, which can have their owneffect on implementation.

Furthermore, the ERF sees conflict in the implementationprocess as legitimate. Stone (1980) suggests that it is inherent inthe process as specification and reassessment of goals and priori-ties occur. Stoker (1991) also sees conflict of interest as legiti-mate due to the inclusion of reluctant partners in the implemen-tation process. Their presence guarantees them the right to repre-sent their interests, which may be at odds with the nationalpolicy. As this diffuse authority is created by the larger forces offederalism and liberalism, conflict is placed within a larger socialand political context (Stoker 1983).4

This larger social conflict manifests itself in the implementa-tion process via the policy development process. Stoker sees thepolicy development process as important in shaping the conflict

3Stoker (1991,50) uses game theory to that takes place in the implementation phase. It is during policyanalyze the implementation process. Thus development that structures in the implementation process arehe conceptualizes total consensus or . , _ , . . . , . . . . . .agreement as the case of harmony and B l v e n relevance. Certain entities are designated as authorities andtotal conflict or disagreement as the case given resources (financial, legal, and so forth), while others areof deadlock. designated as the targets of the policy. Policy development is not„ „ , _. . seen as separate from the implementation process; instead, it is'Stoker's effort to place conflict in a , , , , , _f . . . .larger social and political context is relevant to the level of conflict or cooperation m implementationrelated to Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's relationships.(1993) critique of the policy stages modeland eventual move to advocacy coalitions. Q n e o m n e e d 1 ( ) o k t Q ^ r e s e a r c h o n intergovernmentalBoth take issue with the idea of separating • • j , • « ,• . • J i L

the policy process into distinct stages. grants-in-aid to see the influence of policy development on theinstead, a problem in the implementation implementation process. Ingram (1977) examines the role ofphase is one of the entire policy-making federal grants-in-aid in the implementation process and arguessystem. Sabaner and Jenkins-Smith devel- ±at 0 Q e s h o u l d v i e w m e relationship between the federal govern-oped the advocacy coalition framework to . . . ,. . , • • , . • • uexamine the function of conflict in m e n t and l t s intermediaries as bargaining rather than principal/generating policy learning and change in agent. Thus "[r]ather than gaining compliance, the funds seemthe entire policy process. only to provide the opportunity to engage in strategic interaction



'Milward et al. (1993, 317) define thehollow state as "the degree to whichgovernment agencies are separated fromtheir output." This can include govern-ment agencies contracting out and takinga larger oversight role. Milward andothers do not see this as a positive trend.For a more detailed discussion of thistopic see "Symposium on the HollowState: Capacity, Control, and Perform-ance in Interorganizational Settings" inthe Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory 6:2.

*The instrumental perspective describedby Kickert et al. (1997) is similar to whatKlijn (1996) calls the "classical (intra-organizanonal) perspective on manage-ment." Here the policy process is muchmore orderly, with a manager who hasenough control of the process to engagein such activities as organization andplanning.

and bargaining. . . . " (Stoker 1989, 54). The very form of thegrant-in-aid shapes this strategic interaction. The more restrictiveand demanding nature of categorical grants tends to give theupper hand to federal agencies and actors. The use of categoricalgrants is driven in part by federal distrust of subordinate levels ofgovernment (ACIR 1977). On the other hand, block grants givestate and local actors more freedom to pursue their own objec-tives and goals. The use of these different forms of grants-in-aidshapes the strategic interaction between implementation partici-pants and the likelihood that federal goals will be achieved(Stoker 1983, 55).

Applicability to Networked Settings

O'Toole (1997a) and Milward (1996) make the argumentthat pubic administration increasingly is taking place in net-worked settings. O'Toole offers evidence that networks increas-ingly are becoming common. Federal activities increasingly arebecoming interagency; they are also involving not-for-profitorganizations and for-profit firms. O'Toole (pp. 46-47) takes theargument further by suggesting that complex networks increas-ingly are becoming important due to such things as "wickedproblems," contexts of dispersed power, layers of mandates, andcrossover sanctions. Milward (1996) sees that the delivery ofgovernment services increasingly is taking place in networkedsettings or a "hollow state."3 The consequences of these argu-ments suggest that those who research implementation policyneed to be able to explain how networks effect the implementa-tion process.

While each of the models is applicable to networked set-tings, they approach it with a different emphasis. The CM takesan instrumental view of networked settings in the implementationprocess. According to Kickert et al. (1997), the instrumentalview acknowledges the presence of networks but retains "mefundamental assumption of one 'steering' actor who exercisesgoal-oriented influence on other actors—target groups" (p. 183).6

In the case of the CM, the participants steering the process arenational policy formulators. Their targets are state implementers.The problem of implementing policy is one of properly adjustingthe policy through the policy design process based on feedbackfrom the state and local agents. The problems of uncertainty andlack of institutionalization would be resolved at the federal levelthrough policy development, not through the actual implementersof the policy. The goals of the national policy formulators anddesigners are to be served in the implementation process.According to Lester and Goggin (1998, 23), the key to resolving



the implementation problem is enhancement of the controlnational fonnulators have in the policy process.

While the CM focuses on the goal attainment of nationalpolicy fonnulators in the implementation process, it fails toaddress the limits "set on goal-oriented operations in networks"(Kickert et al. 1997, 184). It does not take into account "theinterests, objectives, perceptions, and strategies of other actorsand the institutional context in which they function" (Kickertet al. 1997, 184). The failure of the CM to adequately deal withissues of interaction and the roles of institutions limits itsapplicability to networked settings.

The CM also fails to address important issues of interaction.It has a restricted view of the politics of the implementationprocess. The interactions of those who implement policy is con-sidered to be a problem that must be dealt with. The goals andstrategies of state implementers are to be subordinated to those ofthe national policy fonnulators. Important decisions about imple-mentation are communicated through policy messages from stateimplementers to policy designers. Implementation issues are dealtwith at the policy development stage. Thus there is not muchroom, if any, for legitimate interaction in the implementationprocess according to the CM.

The CM lacks any discussion of the relationship betweenactors in the implementation process and institutions. Due to thislack of discussion about the roles of institutions in the implemen-tation process, the CM portrays the process as somehow separatefrom the rest of society. It is viewed out of context. This pointcan be illustrated by the CM's treatment of the issue of conflictof interest. Conflict is not considered to be a contest overcompeting social values (i.e., the value of central leadershipversus diffuse authority) but as something produced in theadministrative process. Thus conflict that arises out of the imple-mentation process is treated as an organizational problem to beresolved by the design of better statutes.

The IRF approaches the concept of networks involved inimplementation differently than does the CM. First of ail, theIRF operates on the assumption of dispersed authority. This isexactly why regimes are formed in the first place. Governmentdoes not possess the capacity by itself to execute its policyinitiatives. Stoker models the strategic context of the regime,which could be conceived of as a network, using game theory.Not only can intergovernmental behavior be analyzed by usingthis approach, but actors in the private sector can be as well(Stoker 1991; Stone 1989: Stone and Sanders 1987).



O'Toole (1997b) sees implementation in networks as a prob-lem of cooperation. Problems of uncertainty and a lack of institu-tionalization at the formative stages of implementation createchallenges for those who would manage or facilitate the imple-mentation of innovative policy. The ERF also conceives of theimplementation problem as inducing cooperation in situationswhere conflict is prevalent. According to Stoker (1991, 54),"Cooperation is more likely when participants are engaged in anongoing relationship that creates a record of constructiveinteraction and expectations for the future." When these condi-tions are absent, implementation regime participants may usesuch mechanisms as side payments, issue linkage, and norms ofreciprocity in order to build trust and cooperation.

Klijn (1996, 104) argues that managing or steering networksis not the sole province of government. Instead, it takes place ina "shared power world," giving rise to what Klijn sees as anetwork perspective on management. The IRF embodies many ofthe same characteristics of this network management perspective.The IRF views policy implementation as a complex interactionbetween different actors where there is no clear indisputableauthority (Klijn 1996, 106). The role of a manager or facilitatoris to construct a context for successful interaction. The IRFsuggests the need to create a context of cooperation in order tofacilitate this interaction. With respect to the activities of amanager or facilitator, the ERF suggests the necessity of coalitionbuilding through communication. Many of the recommendationsflowing from the IRF fit this network management perspective.

To deal properly with networked settings, a framework mustgo beyond simply looking at the interaction among network par-ticipants; it must also acknowledge the important role of insti-tutions in the implementation process. Hjern and Porter's (1981)idea of implementation structures captures this linkage of actorand institution in the process. According to Hjern and Porter, theimplementation of programs may not include whole organiza-tions, but rather the interactions of program-relevant individualsin these organizations (see also O'Toole, Hanf, and Hupe 1997).These individuals do not operate totally independent of theirorganizations; they carry the organization they are representingas a "frame of reference" (Kaufman 1986). The views of individ-ual actors and their organizational frames of reference shape theirinteraction in the implementation network or structure.

Stoker's discussion of the institutional context of implemen-tation regimes acknowledges the significance of placing imple-mentation participants in their proper institutional settings.Specifically, Stoker's IRF stresses the important "role of rules



and organizational frameworks, which set the stage for strategyformulation and interactions" (Kickert et al. 1997, 185). Stoker'scombination of interactional and institutional contexts alsoacknowledges the importance of repeated games between actorsin forming the rules and norms of the implementation regime(Klijn and Teisman 1997, 104). Stoker's ERF places the strategicinteraction of regime/network participants in their larger struc-tural and cultural contexts.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this article has been to address the question,Which implementation problem definition provides a betterunderstanding of the implementation process? The ERF focuses ondie problem of achieving cooperation in the midst of a conflict ofinterest among implementation participants. The CM focuses ondie problem of implementation as involving issues of organiza-tional management. Bureaucratic incompetence, lack of resour-ces, and unclear messages block execution of policy and compli-ance with directives. The comparison of models that use differentconceptions of the implementation problem across important cri-teria has led to several important implications for future imple-mentation research.

One important implication drawn from this comparison isthe inadequacy of defining die problem of implementation as onetiiat is primarily related to organizational management. The CMpresents an overly restricted view of the implementation processand adopts an overly centralized view of the process. Legitimateauthority is placed in the hands of national policy formulators andno one else. Therefore, adaptations on die part of other actors areseen as subverting die goals of the process. The roles of com-munication and conflict are also viewed too narrowly. Communi-cation is used to emphasize and clarify die goals of diese top-down authorities. This neglects die larger role Ostrom (1998)suggests it has in generating trust and cooperation. Conflictamong participants is seen as a problem to be solved and not as alegitimate part of die process. Networked implementation settingsare approached from an instrumental viewpoint. By taking thisview, die CM neglects a discussion of die strategic and institu-tional contexts of die implementation process, in essence incor-recdy isolating die process from its larger social and politicalcontext. Analysis diat results from the use of tiiis model willsuffer from construing the process too narrowly.

Stoker's ERF provides a much better framework from whichto analyze die implementation process. It is guided by its under-lying assumption that the primary implementation problem is to



achieve cooperation in a context of conflicting interests. The IRFcorrectly places implementation in its larger social and politicalcontexts, which can be seen in its treatment of conflict andnetworked settings. Conflict is viewed as legitimate amongcompeting social values. Politics within the implementationprocess is seen as a continuation of conflict from the policydevelopment stage. Thus the ERF links the implementation phaseto other stages in the policy process. In addressing networkedsettings, the IRF examines the importance of the strategic inter-actions of participants in their larger institutional context. Theimplementation process is not seen as an isolated process, but inits larger context as a type of social dilemma (Ostrom 1998). Theanalysis that results from this model provides a more completeview of what crucial variables are at work in the process.

Beyond defining the implementation problem correctly, thereis the issue of how to pursue implementation research. While themodel, CM, presented by Goggin et al. (1990) is flawed in itsprimary focus on organizational management issues, their largerperspective on implementation research does have some merit. Intheir critique of the implementation literature, Goggin andcolleagues focus on several important conceptual and methodo-logical issues in building a larger research program for imple-mentation issues. One of these is to extend the analysis of imple-mentation beyond a simple success/failure dichotomy. By viewingimplementation in terms of outputs, processes, and outcomes,analysts can provide a more detailed picture of the actual pro-cess. Another important element of Goggin et al.'s suggestedresearch program is a genuinely comparative design that incorpo-rates both large and small n studies. This combination couldcapture any large or systemic pattern, as well as important con-textual variations, of influential factors in the implementationprocess. Finally, they emphasize the need to focus implementa-tion analysis over time. While it may be difficult to find ordevelop the necessary data, longitudinal analysis is necessary tocapture the dynamic nature of interaction in the implementationprocess. These recommendations provide the conceptual andmethodological foundations for any future research effort.

Increasingly, implementation of government policy is takingplace in networked settings (Provan and Milward 1995; O'Toole1997a and 1997b; O'Toole et al. 1997; Klijn 1996). If futureimplementation research is to provide useful analysis, it mustfocus on the interaction of those implementing policy in thesenetworked settings. In turn this analysis needs to be guided by alarger research program centered around a proper definition ofthe implementation problem, as well as good conceptual andmethodological approach. The findings I have demonstrated in


'Scheberie's (1997) focus of analysis isthe relations between federal, regional,and state actors who are involved inimplementing the same environmentalprograms.


this article show the importance of defining the primary imple-mentation problem as one of generating cooperation in a poten-tially conflictual setting. This problem definition can provide thebase for directing the conceptual and methodological suggestionsmade by Goggin et al. (1990).

Following these directions, implementation research couldfocus on examining the interaction in implementation structuresand working relationships (Hanf and O'Toole 1992; Scheberle1997). The concept of implementation structures places the stra-tegic interactions of participants into their larger institutionalcontexts. The utilizing of implementation structures allows one tofocus on different actors involved in different processes atdifferent levels. One could look at the impact of resources, policycharacteristics, and information on the level of cooperation overtime in a given policy network. Scheberie's focus on workingrelationships could be expanded, using a state comparative frame-work to examine which factors inhibit or promote cooperationamong federal, regional, and state actors.7 The focal point of thisresearch is the explanation of variation of levels of cooperationamong the states. This larger comparison could be bolstered bycase studies that provide a more detailed look at a state's rela-tionship with its federal counterpart. With a focus on the natureof interaction, die implementation structure approach and dieconcept of working relationships provide useful starting pointsfor implementation research concerned with the problem of coop-eration.

The comparison of these two models has illuminated severalimportant points for future implementation research to address.Stoker's ERF shows the benefits of defining the primary problemas one of gaining cooperation among participants. By doing so, itis able to place the strategic interaction of participants in uieirlarger social and political contexts. This has the effect of makingcontextual analysis more important in implementation research.Goggin et al. provide a useful conceptual and mediodological cri-tique of previous research. While their focus on organizationalmanagement as the primary problem is flawed, the foundation onwhich it is laid is not. By suggesting that implementation is notmerely a success or failure and by using a genuinely comparativedesign and longitudinal analysis, Goggin et al. furnish thefoundations upon which future research should be based. A syn-thesis of the significant contributions of each of these modelsprovides future researchers with an approach diat will yieldmeaningful analysis of the implementation process.



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