defections from parties: tactical voting, split voting and protest voting eva-maria otto

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Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

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Page 1: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

Defections from Parties:

Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting

Eva-Maria Otto

Page 2: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

1. Definitions1. Definitions

Tactical Voting– Someone who votes for another party (or party

candidate) other than their most preferred one if he or she expects to be more likely to influence the outcome of this election than by casting a sincere vote.

Page 3: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

1. Definitions1. Definitions

Split Voting– In a electoral system in which voters have two votes,

they can decide to cast a Straight ticket: giving both votes to the same party OR Split ticket: giving their votes to two different parties

Protest Voting– “Voters reacting against specific policies or failures of

their ‘natural‘ parties rather than being positively attracted to another party“ (Heath et al., 1985: 113)

Page 4: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2. Tactical Voting2. Tactical Voting

Assumptions– The literature on tactical voting agrees that institutional

incentives are the driving force that spurs tactical voting

– Duverger: Political consequences of electoral systems Mechanical effect: how electoral systems affect the way votes

are transformed into seats affect the outcome Psychological effect: how the electoral system affect voter‘s

choice affect the vote

Page 5: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2. Tactical Voting2. Tactical Voting

– Voters have rational expectations about electoral outcomes

– “Voters are servants of two masters“: Their preferences and Their expectations

– Politicaly aware and informed voters: discussions and pre-election polls

– Voters who do not follow the campaign: previous elections

Page 6: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.1. Plurality system2.1. Plurality system

Mechanical effect – Single Member Plurality system’s under-

representation of minor parties

Psycological effect – Voters’ reactions to this systematic under-

representation

Page 7: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.1. Plurality system2.1. Plurality system

Wasted-vote hypothesisSupporters of parties that are likely to come third (or

worse) in a local constituency would do better to cast their vote for whichever of the top two parties they find more acceptable instead of “wasting“ their vote if they vote for their preference

Especially when the race between the top two parties is close

Do you think this is only true for smaller party supporters (e.g. Liberal Democrats supporters)?

Page 8: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.2 Mixed electoral system2.2 Mixed electoral system Germany

– Two votes Candidate Vote (Erststimme): the electorate vote for a

candidate in single member districts and the victor is determined by a simply plurality casts the first half of MdBs

List Vote: (Zweitstimme) vote for the list of a Land party and elects the other half of MdBs (Members of the Bundetag), which are elected in such a way that the total number of seats which a party receives including any constituency seat won is proportional to its percentage share of such list votes. This gives the system a proportional represention component.

– Threshold: 5%– Parties and Coalitions

SPD (major party) and Greens (smaller party) CDU (major party) and FDP (smaller party)

Page 9: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.2 Mixed electoral system2.2 Mixed electoral system

Mechanical effect – Mixed electoral systems‘ tendency to let more

than two parties be represented in the Parliament

Psyciological effect – Voters’ reactions to possible coalition

formations

Page 10: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.2. Mixed electoral system2.2. Mixed electoral system

Influence of electoral rules on how voters behave– Wasted-vote hypothesis

The closer the district race, the more likely small party supporters are to cast a strategic candidate vote.

– Coalitions-insurance hypothesis If major party supporters are unsure about the expectations

whether or not the smaller coalition‘s partner will be represented in parliament and the higher their tendency to desert their most preferred party, the more likely they are to cast a strategic list vote.

Under which system is tactical voting more likely: the plurality or mixed electoral system?

Page 11: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto
Page 12: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.2. Mixed electoral system 2.2. Mixed electoral system

Voter‘s proclivity to vote strategically – Motivations hypothesis

The weaker the voter‘s partisanship, the more strongly motivated they are to split their ticket

– Capability Hypothesis The higher the voter‘s level of political sophistication, the

more likely they are to cast a strategic vote

Does that mean that tactical voting will increase

in the future?

Page 13: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.3. PR electoral system2.3. PR electoral system

Israel– One Vote: The unicameral Knesset is elected via a

single, nation-wide district under proportional representation

– Threshold: 2%– 2006 Israeli election

It was quite clear that the major centre party Kadima would win a plurality of the seats and serve as a senior partner in a multi-member government

It was unclear which smaller party would join the coalition (unlike the German case)

Page 14: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

2.3. PR electoral system2.3. PR electoral system

Coalition Hypothesis– When voters perceive membership in the coalition to be out

of reach for their preferred small party they desert it and instead endorse the lesser of the evils among those parties (ideologically nearest party) they perceive as potential coalition members

– Extension of Duvergerian logic: not party entry into parliament, but party entry into government

Do you think that there will be a lot of tactical voting in this case, because there are many small parties and theoutcome is difficult to predict?

Page 15: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

3. Split Voting 3. Split Voting

Different meanings of split voting in different electoral systems– US: selecting candidates of different parties for

different types of offices (e. g. voting for a Democratic president and for a Republican senator and/or representative)

– Bicameral parliamentary systems in which elections for both houses are held on the same day: voting for different parties for the two houses

– Mixed electoral systems: split ticket for members of the same house

Page 16: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

3. Split Voting3. Split Voting

Reasons for split voting– Special preference for a viable

constituency candidates of another party

– Wasted vote hypothesis: voters may see no chance of winning for their most preferred candidate tactical

– Coalition Insurance strategy: votingsupport a particular coalition

– Voters misunderstand the relative importance of the respective votes

Page 17: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

3. Split Voting3. Split Voting

Difference between split voting and tactical voting– Tactical Voting: Comparison of party

preference and vote intention or decision– Split Voting: Comparison of first and second

vote Two forms of tactical voting are sufficient

conditions of split ticket voting, but there are other causes

Page 18: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

3. Split Voting3. Split Voting

Germany– Small party voters (according to second vote) desert their

constituency candidates more in favour of large-party candidates than do large-party voters the other way around especially FDP voters

– Random splitting: other vote combinations than CDU/FDP or SPD/Greens

Attractive candidates: this is only the case for the Left party , which won some Berlin constituencies

1990 survey: 50% were unable to answer the question which of the two votes is the party vote

Ticket splitting has increased in Germany over the time: In 2005 24.4% of the voters split their ticket

Page 19: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

What do you think the main reason is for the increasing split voting in Germany (e. g. weaker partisanship, voters do not understand the system etc.)?

Page 20: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

4. Protest Voting4. Protest Voting

Dissatisfied voters have two options– Protest voting

Lack of a genuinely preferred alternative (especially in Plurality systems)

Signal their disaffection from their normal first-preference party

– Abstention

Page 21: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

4. Protest Voting4. Protest Voting

Theoretical backround– Rational Choice (Downs)

Protest voting is irrational When voters are disaffected with their first-

preference choice, they will be more likely to abstain considering the cost of voting

If voters no longer prefer party A but instead rank party B higher, then protest voting disappears in favour of a simple switch of alignments

Page 22: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

4. Protest Voting4. Protest Voting

– Alternative approch (Dunleavy and Margetts) Individuals define an appropiate ‘aspiration level‘ against

which to judge their involvement, continuing to participate if this level is achieved, and dropping out if it is not.

Do you think that decreasing in turnout in Western countries and the formation of new extremist parties like the “Lefts“ in Germany or the “New Zealand First“ are signals for an increasing in dissatisfied voters?

Page 23: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

5. Conclusion5. Conclusion

Tactical Voting– The character of tactical voting differs between

different electoral systems and the circumstances of each individual election

– The more proportional a system is the less motivation there is for voters to cast a strategic vote

Page 24: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

5. Conclusion5. Conclusion

Split Voting– The character of split voting also differs

between different electoral systems – Tactical voting can be one reason for a voter to

split their ticket, but there are other reasons too– The increasing in split voting in Germany is

mostly due to easing behavioural norms of partisans, not partisan declinement in general

Page 25: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

5. Conclusion5. Conclusion

Protest Voting– The character of Protest Voting also differs

between different electoral systems– Dissatisfied voters have the choice between

protest voting (voting for extremist parties) and abstention (lowers the turnout)

Page 26: Defections from Parties: Tactical Voting, Split Voting and Protest Voting Eva-Maria Otto

The EndThe End

Thank you very much for your attention!