Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons since 1945

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<ul><li><p>DEADLY CULTURE S</p></li><li><p>Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rzsa,</p><p>and Malcolm Dando, Editors</p><p>Deadly Cultures</p><p>Biological Weapons since 1945</p><p>HARVARD UN IVERS I T Y PRE S S</p><p>Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England</p><p>2006</p></li><li><p>Copyright 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College</p><p>All rights reserved</p><p>Printed in the United States of America</p><p>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data</p><p>Deadly cultures : biological weapons since 1945 / Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rzsa,</p><p>and Malcolm Dando, editors.</p><p>p. cm.</p><p>Includes bibliographical references and index.</p><p>ISBN 0-674-01699-8 (cloth : alk. paper)</p><p>1. Biological weaponsTesting. 2. Biological weaponsResearch.</p><p>I. Wheelis, Mark. II. Rzsa, Lajos, 1961 III. Dando, Malcolm.</p><p>UG447.8.D43 2005</p><p>358.388209dc22 2005050225</p></li><li><p>Contents</p><p>Preface vii</p><p>Abbreviations ix</p><p>1 Historical Context and Overview 1</p><p>Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rzsa, and Malcolm Dando</p><p>2 The US Biological Weapons Program 9</p><p>John Ellis van Courtland Moon</p><p>3 The UK Biological Weapons Program 47</p><p>Brian Balmer</p><p>4 The Canadian Biological Weapons Program andthe Tripartite Alliance 84</p><p>Donald Avery</p><p>5 The French Biological Weapons Program 108</p><p>Olivier Lepick</p><p>6 The Soviet Biological Weapons Program 132</p><p>John Hart</p><p>7 Biological Weapons in Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries 157</p><p>Lajos Rzsa and Kathryn Nixdorff</p><p>8 The Iraqi Biological Weapons Program 169</p><p>Graham S. Pearson</p><p>9 The South African Biological Weapons Program 191</p><p>Chandr Gould and Alastair Hay</p></li><li><p>10 Anticrop Biological Weapons Programs 213</p><p>Simon M. Whitby</p><p>11 Antianimal Biological Weapons Programs 224</p><p>Piers Millet</p><p>12 Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs 236</p><p>Malcolm Dando and Martin Furmanski</p><p>13 Allegations of Biological Weapons Use 252</p><p>Martin Furmanski and Mark Wheelis</p><p>14 Terrorist Use of Biological Weapons 284</p><p>Mark Wheelis and Masaaki Sugishima</p><p>15 The Politics of Biological Disarmament 304</p><p>Marie Isabelle Chevrier</p><p>16 Legal Constraints on Biological Weapons 329</p><p>Nicholas A. Sims</p><p>17 Analysis and Implications 355</p><p>Malcolm Dando, Graham Pearson, Lajos Rzsa,Julian Perry Robinson, and Mark Wheelis</p><p>Appendix. The Biological Weapons Convention 375</p><p>Notes 381</p><p>Contributors 463</p><p>Index 465</p><p>vi Contents</p></li><li><p>Preface</p><p>This book originated when two of us (Malcolm Dando and Mark</p><p>Wheelis) were at a meeting of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and</p><p>World Affairs in Geneva, whose topic was strengthening the biological</p><p>disarmament regime. We lamented the fact that there was no recent</p><p>scholarly history, based on primary sources, of offensive biological weap-</p><p>ons (BW) programs. How, we wondered, could effective policy be gener-</p><p>ated if there was widespread ignorance of BW developments in recent de-</p><p>cades? There were good recent sources for BW history up to 1945, and</p><p>older sources for the period until the early 1970s, but the critical period</p><p>since thenwhich saw the negotiation of the Biological Weapons Con-</p><p>vention, the discovery of the illegal Soviet, Iraqi, and South African BW</p><p>programs, the arduous and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to negoti-</p><p>ate an inspection regime for BW, and resurgent fears of bioterrorism</p><p>was discussed only in popular books based on secondary or incomplete</p><p>sources. We resolved at that time to fill this obvious gap.</p><p>Shortly thereafter, at a NATO Science Program Advanced Study Insti-</p><p>tute in Budapest, we met Lajos Rzsa, and the three of us applied for a</p><p>grant from the same NATO program to fund meetings of the authors se-</p><p>lected to write the chapters of the book, and to provide some support for</p><p>the archival research that would be necessary. That grant (977940) al-</p><p>lowed us to hold two sets of meetings: one at the beginning of the project,</p><p>when authors presented outlines of their chapters; and one near the end,</p><p>when first drafts were available. One of the authors, Nicholas Sims, did</p><p>not participate in these NATO-funded meetings and did not accept any</p><p>NATO research funds, for reasons of conscience.</p><p>In addition to the authors, two senior scholars in the fieldJulian</p><p>vii</p></li><li><p>Perry Robinson and Graham Pearsonagreed to comment on the drafts,</p><p>and both have been actively involved in advising authors upon each</p><p>chapter and in collaborating with the editors in writing the final chapter.</p><p>The contributions of these two scholars have greatly strengthened the en-</p><p>tire book; any remaining weaknesses persist despite their efforts.</p><p>An additional grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York</p><p>(D03044) provided financial assistance for the authors research, the au-</p><p>thors final meeting, and the editorial work. We are grateful to both</p><p>NATO and Carnegie for their support, which has been critical to produc-</p><p>ing a book this complex.</p><p>We are also most grateful to all those who have reviewed and com-</p><p>mented on draft chapters; their contributions have greatly improved the</p><p>quality of the book. In addition to Robinson and Pearson, all authors</p><p>read all chapters and made constructive comments (even when they may</p><p>have disagreed with particular points). Martin Hugh-Jones read the en-</p><p>tire manuscript and made very helpful comments, as did two anonymous</p><p>reviewers selected by Harvard University Press. Ann Hawthornes edit-</p><p>ing improved the writing significantly and helped to unify the disparate</p><p>chapters. Catherine Rhodes provided organizational support that assisted</p><p>the editors greatly. Thanks to Claudia Graham, of UC Davis Mediaworks,</p><p>who drew all the figures. Michael Fisher, Executive Editor for Science</p><p>and Medicine (now Editor in Chief) at Harvard University Press, has been</p><p>actively involved in the project from early on, and we are grateful for his</p><p>support and advice.</p><p>We hope that this book will assist in the crucial public discussions and</p><p>state-level policy decisions that must take place in coming years if the re-</p><p>newed development and potential use of biological weapons are to be</p><p>prevented.</p><p>viii Preface</p></li><li><p>Abbreviations</p><p>ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament AgencyADAC Agricultural Defence Advisory Committee</p><p>AHG Ad Hoc Group of Governmental ExpertsARMET Armement et Etudes of the EMA</p><p>ASF African swine feverBG Bacillus globigii</p><p>Biopreparat Main Directorate for Biological PreparationsBRAB Biological Research Advisory Board</p><p>BW biological weapons; in quoted material may stand for biologicalwarfare</p><p>BWCBWS</p><p>Biological Weapons ConventionBiological Warfare Sub-Committee</p><p>BZ 3-quinuclidiny benzilateCASDN Comit dAction Scientifique de la Dfense Nationale</p><p>CB chemical and biologicalCBM confidence-building measureCBR chemical, biological, and radiological</p><p>CBW chemical and biological weapons; in quoted material may standfor chemical and biological warfare</p><p>CCD Conference of the Committee on DisarmamentCD Conference on Disarmament</p><p>CDAB Chemical Defence Advisory BoardCDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention</p><p>CDEE Chemical Defence Experimental EstablishmentCEB Centre dEtudes du Bouchet</p><p>CEECB Commission des Etudes et Exprimentations Chimiques etBactriologiques</p><p>CIA Central Intelligence AgencyCIAS Commandement Interarmes des Armes Spciales</p><p>CIEECB Commission Interarmes dEtudes et dExprimentationsChimique et Bactriologique</p><p>CINBC Comit Interarmes du NBC</p><p>ix</p></li><li><p>CmlC US Army Chemical CorpsCRSSA Centre de Recherches du Service de Sant des Armes</p><p>CW chemical weapons; in quoted material may stand for chemicalwarfare</p><p>CWC Chemical Weapons ConventionCWS Chemical Warfare ServiceDEA Department of External Affairs</p><p>DERA Defence Evaluation and Research AgencyDIA Defense Intelligence Agency</p><p>DMA Dlgation Ministrielle lArmementDND Department of National DefenceDOD Department of DefenseDRB Defence Research BoardDRC Defence Research Committee</p><p>DREO Defence Research Establishment Ottawa/Shirleys BayDRES Defence Research Establishment SuffieldDRPC Defence Research Policy CommitteeDRPS DRPC StaffEMA Etat-Major des Armes</p><p>ENDC Eighteen Nation Committee on DisarmamentFBI Federal Bureau of Investigation</p><p>FFCD full, final, and complete declarationsFMD foot and mouth diseaseFOIA Freedom of Information Act</p><p>4P prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposesGABA gamma-aminobutyric acid</p><p>GDR German Democratic RepublicGML General Medical LaboratoryICRC International Committee of the Red Cross</p><p>ISC International Scientific CommissionISG Iraq Survey Group</p><p>ISSBW Inter-Services Sub-Committee on Biological WarfareJCS Joint Chiefs of Staff</p><p>KGB Committee for State SecurityLAC large area concept</p><p>LMRV Laboratoire Militaire de Recherches VtrinairesLSD lysergic acid diethylamide</p><p>LTBT Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, inOuter Space and Under Water (Partial, or Limited, Test-BanTreaty)</p><p>MOD Ministry of DefenseMRD Microbiological Research DepartmentMRE Microbiological Research Establishment</p><p>x Abbreviations</p></li><li><p>MSE Al Muthanna State EstablishmentNARA National Archives Research Administration, College Park, Md.NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization</p><p>NBC nuclear, biological, and chemicalND Newcastle disease</p><p>NGO nongovernmental organizationNPO military-scientific production facilityNPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Prolif-</p><p>eration Treaty)NSC National Security Council</p><p>POW prisoner of warPRO Public Records Office, LondonR&amp;D research and developmentRRL Roodeplaat Research Laboratories</p><p>SADF South African Defence ForceSALT Strategic Arms Limitation TreatySBVA Service Biologique et Vtrinaire des ArmesSGA Special Group Augmented</p><p>SGTEB Sous Groupe de Travail et dEtudes BiologiquesSHAD Shipboard Hazard and Defense</p><p>SHAPE NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers EuropeSHAT Service Historique de lArme de TerreSIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research InstituteSOD Special Operations Division of the US Army Biological Laboratory</p><p>at Fort DetrickSTA Service Technique de lArmeTHC tetrahydrocannabinolTRC Technical Research Center; or Truth and Reconciliation Commis-</p><p>sionUN United Nations</p><p>UNMOVIC United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commis-sion</p><p>UNSCOM United Nations Special CommissionUSGPO US Government Printing Office</p><p>VEE Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (sometimes encephalitis)WMD weapons of mass destruction</p><p>WP Warsaw Pact Treaty</p><p>Abbreviations xi</p></li><li><p>DEADLY CULTURE S</p></li><li><p>CHAPTER 1</p><p>Historical Context</p><p>and Overview</p><p>MARK WHEELIS ,</p><p>LAJOS RZSA,</p><p>AND MALCOLM DANDO</p><p>The threat of biological weapons (BW) use by either states</p><p>or terrorists has never attracted so much public attention as in the past</p><p>five years, when heads of state and other governmental leaders have spo-</p><p>ken repeatedly about the dangers from weapons of mass destruction and</p><p>the threat of bioterrorism. BW proliferation among states has been a con-</p><p>cern since before the end of the Cold War, and concerns about BW in</p><p>terrorist hands became a prominent issue in the early 1990s. The US an-</p><p>thrax letter attacks of 2001 seemed to validate these concerns, and intelli-</p><p>gence suggesting interest in BW among international terrorist organiza-</p><p>tions has exacerbated them, especially in the US. Currently the threat of</p><p>BW attracts keen international attention at the highest levels.</p><p>These contemporary concerns relate largely to the threat of BW acqui-</p><p>sition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. However, the BW threat</p><p>has much deeper roots, and it has changed markedly over the past 60</p><p>years. During most of the Cold War period, major global powers invested</p><p>substantial resources to develop a strategic BW capability aimed at the</p><p>military forces, civilian populations, or agricultural resources of their ad-</p><p>versaries. Indeed, early in this period BW were considered to rival nu-</p><p>clear weapons in strategic importance.</p><p>Despite the shifting view of the nature of the BW threat, it has been ev-</p><p>ident for over 60 years that biological agents can be used to cause mass</p><p>casualties and large-scale economic damage. However, BW are not well</p><p>understood, and there has been little historical analysisand hence little</p><p>1</p></li><li><p>appreciationof the various ways in which such weapons have been re-</p><p>garded over those decades. The following chapters attempt to fill this gap,</p><p>by providing a concise and accurate history of offensive BW programs</p><p>since 1945, and by drawing possible lessons from that history with regard</p><p>to strengthening the long-standing total prohibition of BW. Whenever</p><p>possible we use primary sources to provide an accurate account of why</p><p>some countries sought biological weapons and why some abandoned</p><p>such programs. Because primary sources are not uniformly available for</p><p>all countries and periods, however, there is inevitable variation in the</p><p>depth of coverage.</p><p>Despite these limitations, there is an immense amount of material</p><p>2 Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rzsa, and Malcolm Dando</p><p>1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005</p><p>1925 Geneva Protocol</p><p>1972 BWC</p><p>1993 CWC</p><p>USA</p><p>USSR</p><p>UK</p><p>France</p><p>Canada</p><p>South Africa</p><p>Iraq</p><p>Figure 1.1 Major arms control and disarmament treaties limiting BW (top)and known offensive BW programs (bottom) since 1945.</p></li><li><p>available. Multivolume works could easily be written on several of our</p><p>topics. Consequently, our aims of brevity and comprehensiveness are</p><p>necessarily often in conflict. Each chapter cites reliable secondary</p><p>sources, when available, to which the interested reader is referred for ad-</p><p>ditional material.</p><p>Our reliance on verifiable primary sources has another consequence:</p><p>we cannot treat in any detail events in the very recent past for which</p><p>documentation is not yet available. For instance, the failed attempt to ne-</p><p>gotiate a verification protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention</p><p>(BWC), the extensive reorganization of the US government following the</p><p>2001 terrorist attacks, and the nature of current US biodefense programs</p><p>are all topics for which much of the primary-source documentation re-</p><p>mains classified. Until these documents are declassified, these important</p><p>topics will not be amenable to rigorous historical treatment and must re-</p><p>ceive only passing comment here.</p><p>Biological Weapons before 1945</p><p>The history of biological weapons before 1945 has been addressed in sev-</p><p>eral monographs. Most important are The Problem of Chemical and Bio-</p><p>logical Warfare, produced in six volumes by the Stockholm International</p><p>Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which covers the period until approxi-</p><p>mately 1970; and Biological and Toxin Weapons Research, Development and</p><p>Use from the Middle Ages to 1945, edited by Erhard Geissler and John Ellis</p><p>van Courtland Moon.1 Our volume is conceived as a sequel to the latter,</p><p>but it owes much to the earlier SIPRI series as well.</p><p>Geissler and Moons volume covers BW from the Middle Ages to World</p><p>War I, BW use in World War I, BW programs from the 1920s to 1945 in a</p><p>number of individual states, and BW use in World War II. The resulting</p><p>picture shows that after the Golden Age of bacteriology at the end of</p><p>the nineteenth century, when scientists first unraveled the causes of in-</p><p>fectious diseases, the military applications of this knowledge intrigued</p><p>several countries, some of which initiated offensive programs. These be-</p><p>gan with efforts by Germany in World War I (and by France on a much</p><p>more limited scale) to attack military draft animals covertly with the dis-</p><p>eases anthrax and glanders. Following the war, there was widespread</p><p>speculation in the press and in military circles that...</p></li></ul>