davor marijan - storm - oluja engleski - za net

7/21/2019 Davor Marijan - Storm - Oluja Engleski - Za Net

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Davor Marijan

S O R M


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Published byCroatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre

For the publisherAnte Nazor, Ph.D.

EditorAnte Nazor, Ph. D.

AuthorDavor Marijan, Ph.D.

Appendix editorMate Rupi

English translationJanko Paravi

Tis translation rom Croatian into English has been made possible by Ante Kosteli

Reviewers:Nikica Bari, Ph.D.

Zdenko Radeli, Ph.D.

Staff General Antun us, ret.

Index editoreljka Krie Graanin

Document copyIndira Alpeza

MakereadyNaklada Stih

Printed by

Run

CIP record available in the computer catalogue o the National and University Libraryin Zagreb under no. 650140

ISBN 978-953-7493-08-8


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Davor Marijan

S O R M

Zagreb, August 2010


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Croatian soldier (guardsman)


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ABLE OF CONENS

Editors introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Authors biography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

Appendices (edited by Mate Rupi) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383List o names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

List o places . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393


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EDIORS INRODUCION

EDIORS INRODUCION

he signicance o the liberation military-police operation Stormor the destinyo Croatia is extraordinary. With its victorious Storm in August 1995 Croatiasuccessully brought to a close a very dramatic period in its history whichstarted with the armed rebellion o the Serbs in Croatia and the terrorist activity oSerbian extremists afer August 1990. Tat was the introduction to the open aggressionagainst the Republic o Croatia carried out, afer July 1991, by the armed orces o the

Socialist Federal Republic o Yugoslavia (JNA and the territorial deence units o Serbia,Montenegro and Bosnia&Herzegovina), that is, o Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbianparamilitary, largely pro-chetnik units. It can reely be claimed that the survival o Croatiawithin its internationally recognized borders depended on the outcome o Storm, andthat the ailure o the operation would have had ateul and lasting consequences orthe territorial integrity o the Republic o Croatia. oday, twelve years afer victory, it isdiffi cult even to imagine the drama behind the decision to launch Storm, because Croatiawould never again, probably, have had another chance to reincorporate the occupiedterritory into its constitutional and legal system.

Although a cool scientic analysis might show that Operation Storm, because o a

number o problems in its preparation and execution, was not so irreproachable as somepeople claim - which is understandable considering the circumstances in which it wascarried out and the great number o mobilized troops - or most Croats and citizenso other ethnic backgrounds who live in Croatia and consider it their homeland it isa magnicent event. First o all because o its result - the liberation o the occupiedterritory o the Republic o Croatia and the rescue o thousands o people rom certaindeath in Biha. Tis is why not even comments o military analysts and historians relatedto the shortcomings in the implementation o the operation can challenge its success.Tis is particularly true i we take into account - in the nal assessment o the success

o Storm- the act that such a complex operation was carried out by an army createdin a very short time and organized in wartime conditions afer Croatia managed todeend itsel, in 1991, rom the aggression o the superior Serbian orces and rom totaloccupation ocused on the creation o so-called Greater Serbia. Storm is actually thecrown o Croatias Homeland War and the conrmation o the military skill o Croatianoffi cers, non-commissioned offi cers and soldiers, o their courage and determination,organization and ability to apply scientic achievements, but also o their skill inimprovisation. Regardless o the higher or lower perormance o his unit, every Croatiansoldier or policeman who took honourable part in Storm deserves the appreciation andgratitude o other Croatian citizens who had waited or years or the liberation o theirhomeland and or the end o the war.

* We express our deep gratitude to Mr. Ante Kosteli for making this translation possible.


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Tis crucial operation o the Croatian armed orces has been the subject o almosteveryday discussions or comments. However, there are ew studies based on historicalsources such as Dr. Davor Marijans Storm. For the rst time in Croatian historiographyit presents, chronologically and in terms o the corps districts o the Croatian armed

orces, the preparation and the course o this military-police operation. Although thebook presents relevant documents, it is precisely the lack o accessible sources - mainlybecause o still unsorted archive material, but also because some documents are in privatehands - that creates major problems to anybody wishing to write about the operation.Maybe some people will not be satised with the presentation o their own role in Storm,some participants in the events will note, perhaps, certain incorrect data in the mentioneddocuments, which may raise the question o the objectivity o specic sources, or o theirintegrity and accuracy o the mentioned data. Because o that we would kindly ask allpersons having argumented comments with regard to the contents o this study to pass

them on to the Centre, so that we can record and le them, and make them availableor a uture publication. However, in spite o any possible shortcomings, this study isan excellent oundation or any uture discussion o Operation Storm, the more so as itwould be diffi cult to expect the very rst study o this type to answer all questions anddeal with all problems related to a complex event such as this one. Tis study offers the public an overview o Operation Stormrom the perspective oa historian, based on currently accessible historical sources. Te author has limited hisaccount to the involvement o HV corps districts, and does not present the action o eachbrigade separately. Tere is still hope, however, that this study will stimulate the writing

o special monographs on the role o each corps district in Storm, describing in detailthe engagement o each brigade and its battalions, and other units. Some already exist(e.g., Jaka Ragu, Te HV 151stSamobor Brigade in the War, Samobor, 2006; AleksandarBoi - Damir Goreta, Te HV 153rdVelika Gorica Brigade, Velika Gorica, 2002). Butmost are still to be written in order to conrm or correct the current analyses. It is precisely in order to improve objectivity that distinguished commanders o theCroatian armed orces were given the opportunity to read the study and the parts relatedto specic corps districts; their remarks improved the quality and objectivity o thebook, and offered in some cases different views regarding certain sources. Insight into

written sources and comments by highly-positioned participants in the events coveredin the book make this study a particularly valuable document. Te intention was, alongwith the authors interpretation o the written source, to draw attention as well to the

views o the commanders personally involved in the events, whose statements have aparticular bearing on the subject under consideration. In this way the reader can obtainthe conrmation o the accuracy o the written source, but also witness the inevitabledifferences between the written source and memoir material, as well as requentlydifferent interpretations o a specic event by people personally involved in it. Tat isto say, reports are ofen written automatically and mainly deal with results and less with

explanations o the reasons why such results were achieved, and may thereore offeran incomplete picture o a specic event. Tis is why, in order to assure an objectivepresentation o an event, interviews with participants are desirable in order to explain


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why something was done in a specic way and not as planned. O course, there is alwaysthe danger that the participants story might be too subjective just as various reports andother written documents, and it is up to historians and other scientists to assess the case.Moreover, there is always the public correction as well. Tis is why it is important to

publish the sources (verbal and written) as soon as possible, or to have as many interviewsas possible on the subject with the participants. At any rate, the reader ought to get, in asingle spot, the substance or the interpretation o a historical source, and the explanationo the participants to which the source reers, because this will make his conclusion morerealistic and more objective. Tis is why due gratitude ought to be expressed, or their readiness to help in the editingo this book, to the generals and commanders o the Croatian Army and special units othe Ministry o the Interior o the Republic o Croatia, as well as to the associations othe Croatian Homeland War veterans, whose useul comments enhanced objectivity in

the presentation o those parts o Stormin which they were personally involved. Teirnames are mentioned in the notes, and next to their comments on the text or on thementioned sources. Te reviewers o the book, General Anton us, Zdenko Radeli,Ph.D., and Nikica Bari, Ph.D., deserve particular gratitude.

In addition to the mentioned scientic study, this book is enriched by theAppendices,documents on important political and military events on the eve o Storm, whichinuenced its initiation (the process o annexation to Serbia and the unication o theso-called Republic o Srpska Krajina1and Republika Srpska, that is, o the Serbs rom

Croatia and the Serbs rom Bosnia&Herzegovina, into a single state, and the Biha crisis),and on its afermath (the exodus o the Serbs rom the occupied area), selected andedited by senior archivist Mate Rupi, Head o the Archival Material Department o theCroatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre. Te chosen topics, and therespective selected and chronologically arranged documents, ought to help in ndinganswers to the question o why the issue, i.e., the occupied territory o the Republic oCroatia, could not be resolved by diplomatic means and peaceully, why Stormcould notbe deerred any longer, and why claims that the Croatian leadership expelled the Serbsrom the so-called Krajina and carried out ethnic cleansing are historically unounded.

Te documents in theAppendiceso this book cover the period between 1991 and 1995in order to draw attention to the act that the launching o Stormwas not a sudden whimo the Croatian leadership but, rather, the consequence o a long process o ruitless

1In its publications the Croatian Homeland War Memorial&Documentation Centre mainly ollows the rule where-by the names o sel-proclaimed or unrecognized states or political creations are placed in inverted commas orqualied as so-called. However, on this occasion we accepted the authors view that the names o all states,political creations and movements, whether internationally recognized or not, lawul or unlawul, accepted or re-jected - in a nutshell, good or bad - ought to be written without inverted commas, that is, as they call themselves,or as listed in historical sources (see Nikica Bari, Te Serbian Rebellion in Croatia 1990-1995, Zagreb, 2005, pp.

13-14). O course, the act that the text, when mentioning the SAO Krajina or the Republic o Serbian Krajinaand its paramilitary ormations, will have no inverted commas or the qualication o so-called, does not implythat the author considers the occupied territory o the Republic o Croatia, in which the Serbians established theircontrol and proclaimed their para-state, to be a legitimate state entity. Quite the contrary.


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negotiations with the leadership o the rebel Serbs on the peaceul reintegration o theoccupied Croatian territory and o ineffi cient moves by the international community,and, nally, to stress that the launching o Stormcannot be limited to the events in Julyand August 1995. Since the intentions o the leadership o the rebel Serbs in Croatia

to unite with Serbia and create, together with the Serbs rom Bosnia&Herzegovina, asingle Serbian state are conrmed best by the documents produced by their own or bytheir allied (Belgrade) political and military institutions, the editor o the Appendiceshas limited his selection to sources o Serbian provenance. Te same holds true or thepart o theAppendicespresenting the plans and preparations or the organized departureo Serbs rom Croatia. A slight exception to this has only been made in the section o

Appendices on the Biha crisis; in order to recall the diplomatic efforts o the Croatianleadership and the role o the big powers with regard to the developments in Croatiaand Bosnia&Herzegovina, that section starts with a Croatian offi cials account o the

negotiations or the settlement o the rst Biha crisis. In order to evoke the dramaticsituation in which the population o the Biha enclave ound itsel late in July 1995,this section also includes several documents, actually cries or help sent to the Croatianleadership rom besieged Biha.

Te series o documents on the attempted unication o the rebel Serbs romCroatia with Serbia starts with the Decision on the unication o SAO Krajina with theRepublic o Serbia, enacted by the Executive Council o SAO Krajina on 1 April 1991;the documents on the process o unication o the Serbs rom Bosnia&Herzegovina andCroatia start with the Declaration on the Unication o the Association o Municipalities

o Bosnian Krajina and the Serbian Autonomous District o Krajina o 27 June 1991.Te list includes altogether 30 documents bearing witness to the intensive activities oSerbian politicians ocused on preparing the unication o the Serbs rom the Republico Serbia and rom Bosnia&Herzegovina (i.e., rom the so-called Republic o SerbianKrajina and Republika Srpska) in a single Serbian state. It includes, in chronologicalterms, the Protocol on Cooperation between the Government o Republika Srpska andthe Republic o Serbian Krajina (Banja Luka, 22 September 1992), the Declarationon the Unication o the Assemblies o the Republic o Serbian Krajina and RepublikaSrpska (Prijedor, 31 October 1992), the Decision on the Constitution o the National

Assembly o the Republic o Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska (Banja Luka, 24 April1993), the Proposal o the National Assembly o Republika Srpska and the NationalAssembly o the Republic o Serbian Krajina to the National Assemblies o Serbia andMontenegro concerning Unication in a Single State (18 August 1994), the Decisiono the Assembly o the Republic o Serbian Krajina Concerning the Agreement on theConstitutional Law about the Provisional Constitutional Arrangement o the UnitedRepublika Srpska (Knin, 29 May 1995), and other documents showing that the Serbsin Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina continued to prepare legislative documents orthe proclamation o the United Republika Srpska even afer their deeat in OperationBljesak (Flash; May 1995), and that the process, but a step away rom its realization, wasinterrupted by Operation Storm.

Te collection o documents on the Biha crisis, caused by attacks o Serbs romBosnia&Herzegovina and Croatia on the UN sae area o Biha starts with a memoir


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material, the reminiscences o General Kreimir osi regarding negotiations withAmerican political and military offi cials in the United States, resulting in OperationZima 94 (Winter 94) by Croatian armed orces and the resolution o the rst Bihacrisis. Tis is ollowed by 44 documents, largely o Serbian provenance, on events in the

Biha area - between 27 October 1994 and 3 August 1995 - showing that Biha was anextremely important objective in the Serbian plans, which could not easily be achievedbecause o the tough resistance o the ARBiH 5thCorps. Moreover, the documents showthat Serbian strategists did not shrink rom any means in their attempt to take Biha.Tey even carried out a covert operation involving the use o biological agents or oodpoisoning, to be smuggled into Biha and intended to cause large scale poisoning o the5thCorps troops and knocking them out o action. Te third thematic section presents the plans o the rebel Serbs or the evacuation othe population rom the occupied territory o Croatia. Te 22 documents, demonstrating

that evacuation plans in the case o an HV attack such as Stormhad existed already in1993, include the Decision o the RSK Supreme Deence Council on the Evacuation othe Population rom the Municipalities o Benkovac, Obrovac, Drni, Graac and Knintowards Srb and Lapac adopted in the afernoon on 4 August 1995 in Knin. At the end, the Appendices present the contents o the so-called Plan Z-4, whichthe rebel Serbs reused even to consider, and reminiscences o the representatives othe international community involved in the attempt to implement the plan. Teirstatements on how the leaders o the Serbs in Croatia reused to accept the offered Planas a negotiating platorm clearly conrm that any attempt to peaceully reintegrate the

occupied areas into the constitutional and legal system o the Republic o Croatia wouldhave been utile because o the narrow-mindedness o the Serbian leaders.

Te documents in Appendices are the direct and well-argumented answer toquestions such as why, unortunately, there was no alternative to the military option,why the Croatian leadership could no longer deer Storm, and who was responsibleor the exodus o Croatian citizens, ethnic Serbs, on the eve o Stormand during theoperation. Te dramatic condition o Biha deences, the collapse o which would havereinorced almost decisively the position o Serbian orces and their reusal o all peaceinitiatives - whether promoted by the Government o the Republic o Croatia or by

the international community - and even o the Plan Z-4 which granted the Serbs inCroatia an extraordinarily broad autonomy, and the continuous endeavours, ever since1991, o the Serbs rom Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina to create a single Serbianstate in the occupied territory o the Republic o Croatia and Bosnia&Herzegovina,which had entered, on the eve o Storm, the nal stage by the adoption o their commonConstitution, clearly demonstrate how unconvincing are the claims that Croatia hadbeen hasty in resorting to a military solution and that more time should have beenoreseen or negotiations. In view o the experience acquired throughout the process o negotiation on the

peaceul reintegration o occupied territory into the constitutional and legal system othe Republic o Croatia, it would indeed be very diffi cult to explain in a reasoned way theassumption that the rebel Serbs - i they had succeeded in taking Biha and strategically


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improving, to a substantial extent, their military position with respect to Croatia - wouldhave agreed to negotiate peaceul integration. Along with many documents, some owhich are included in theAppendices o this book, this is also conrmed by the interviewgiven by SVK commander, Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrki, on the occasion

o St. Vitus Day, 28 June 1995, in which he addressed all SVK members by lookingorward to the celebration o the next St. Vitus Day united - in one Serbian state (VojskaKrajine/Army o the Krajina/;11 July 1995, p. 24). Te extraordinary importance o Biha, the all o which would probably have hadcrucial consequences or the eventual outcome o the war, was also conrmed bythe attention paid the Biha crisis by the media. In early August 1995 Biha was alsomentioned in the Serbian press as the key in uture warare and developments in B&Hand Croatia; the conclusion was reinorced by quotations rom oreign media. Tus,according to Te Independent, the all o the Biha sae area would deal a colossal and

maybe even deadly blow to the overall UN operation (Sedma vojska/Te Seventh Army/;Nin, 2327, 4 Aug. 1995, pp. 10-11). Accordingly, the situation on the ground in late July1995 simply demanded either the unconditional acceptance o immediate reintegrationin the constitutional and legal order in the Republic o Croatia by the rebel Serbs inCroatia or a military action by the Croatian armed orces. O course, in addition to military and strategic reasons due to the Biha crisis, thedecision o the Croatian Government to accelerate the process o reincorporation othe occupied territories into its constitutional and legal system was also inuenced byeconomic reasons, which are not presented in this study. Te Croatian economy was

considerably affected by the Serbian aggression and occupation o a part o the Republico Croatia, and particularly by the severance o communications between the southernand northern parts o Croatia via Knin as well as by the destruction o many industrialand business acilities due to the armed Serbian rebellion and aggression against Croatia.Any delay in eliminating the existing condition and the deerred reintegration ooccupied territory meant new losses every day and the irreversible loss o considerablepossible revenues - primarily o the tourist industry. It would be diffi cult to say how longthe Croatian economy could have withstood such conditions, particularly with respectto the numerous displaced persons and reugees looked afer by Croatia, or whom any

delayed return caused new rustrations and threatened to develop into riots. In thisregard, the question can also be raised o how Croatian authorities could have explainedto the tens o thousands o displaced persons and the very dissatised and rustratedCroatian citizens, who had been waiting to return to their homes since 1991, that theywould have to spend another year in exile and await a solution leading to their return orwho knows how long.

In his study the author has also reviewed one o the most intriguing issues relatedto Storm: did the rebel Serbs abandon the occupied area o the Republic o Croatia

(UNPA Sectors North and South) o their own ree will, or were they expelled - that is,did Croatia carry out ethnic cleansing o the rebel Serbs with its Operation Storm? Teconclusion that the mass departure o the Serbs rom Croatia during the operation was


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logical and that is was organized by the Serbian leadership, meaning that the CroatianArmy could not have carried out any ethnic cleansing, is based on historical sources.Some o the documents o the so-called RSK, showing that the departure o the Serbsrom the occupied area during Storm was planned and implemented by the political and

military leadership o the rebel Serbs, are included in theAppendicesto this book; this isalso borne out by the testimony o Serbs who ed Croatia. Similarly, a review o Serbian press reports published immediately afer Stormconrmsthat the political and military leadership o the rebel Serbs in Croatia was responsible orthe exodus o the Serbian population rom Croatia during Storm.2Many questions andcomments in the Serbian press suggest the conclusion that the Serbian journalists, butalso the public, believed that the Krajina leadership was responsible or the tribulationo the Serbian people in Croatia: Why didnt the Krajina leadership accept peace in timei it could not prevail in war? Who really issued the orders or the retreat o the people and

o the troops? I they were independent enough to turn down the peace proposals, and thesuggestions and demands in this respect rom Belgrade, why didnt they deend themselves?Tese are only some o the questions raised in the Serbian press. Te Serbian publicwanted the Krajina leaders, who did not ee at the rear o the column to reply tothe question: Why, and on whose advice, did they decide to get hundreds o thousands oinhabitants moving towards Serbia? (Zoran Jevovi, Beanje na elu kolone/Flight atthe Head o the Column/; Veernje novosti, 16 Aug. 1995). Actually, on the very rst day o Stormthe Yugoslav press denounced the behaviouro the RSK leadership because it sought justication or its deeat by claiming that that

it was allegedly sold out by Belgrade instead o admitting to its very rigid and disloyalattitude towards Serbia: Tey spin a story about uniting all Serbian lands, and when the

going gets tough, they call on Serbia to help them. Serbia gave them weapons, it sent thema commander to organize them. Tey were told to negotiate with Croatia and thus paciythe situation. No! Tey wanted a big show, a heavenly drama. However, the Croats are nowdeep in their territory and they have cut them off; thus, they have also lost their diplomatic

position and their stake is much lower. (Pakao na Drini/Hell on the Drina/;Monitor,independent MonteneHellHHegrin weekly, 250, 4 Aug. 1995, pp. 8-9). When appearing in the media the RSK offi cials themselves accused one another or

justied their decisions, and thereby actually admitted their responsibility. Tus, thelast president o the RSK government, Milan Babi, expressed his dismay at the actthat the SVK General Staff and President Marti had ordered the general evacuationo the population and retreat o the troops. (Povlaenje umesto borbe/Retreat Insteado Battle/; Veernje novosti, 9 Aug. 1995). Te censured president, Milan Marti, deniedthe allegations and claimed that he had only issued orders to provide shelter or thepopulation in surrounding villages, and that no mention was made o troop retreat.(Nisam naredio povlaenje vojske/I Did Not Order roop Retreat/; Politika, 13 Aug.

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Te Serbian press rom August to December 1995 was examined by Ivan Rado, who also reviewed some o thecollected articles together with Ana Holjevi urkovi. Teir observations were used or this presentation. BorisAni also deserves gratitude or the translation and analysis o selected texts rom publications in English relatedto Operation Storm.


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1995). However, his statement about the provision o shelter or the population only inthe surrounding villages is denied by the letter o Milivoj Vojnovi, oreign minister oRSK, o 5 August, sent to the UNPROFOR spokesman Yury Miyahotnik, inorming himthat the Government o the RSK and the SVK General Staff had decided to immediately

evacuate children, women and old people rom the territory o the so-called RSK toYugoslavia, and asked or UNPROFOR help. (Radovan Kovaevi, Ko je doneo odlukuo evakuaciji?/Who Decided to Evacuate?/; Politika, 27 Aug. 1995). But all ambiguities about who ordered evacuation, when and to which points wereeliminated at the press conerence in Belgrade on 22 August 1995; afer the all o theRSK, that was the rst public appearance o the members o its government and assembly,who actually conrmed that the political and military leadership o the Serbs in theRepublic o Croatia was responsible or the departure o the Serbs rom Croatia. Tat is,the journalists were shown the Decision on the evacuation o the population rom the

municipalities o Knin, Benkovac, Obrovac, Drni and Graac, issued by the SupremeDeence Cuncil and signed by Milan Marti. In their report o the conerence Veernjenovostiand Politikapublished a acsimile o the Decision according to which personsunt or combat duty were supposed to pull out via Otri towards Srb and Lapac. Teull text o the Decision was published in Radovan Pavlovis article Te people wereled rom Knin by the Supreme Deence Council o RSK Politika, 23 Aug. 1995): Becauseo the new situation caused by the outright general aggression o Croatia against theRSK, and afer the rst initial deence successes, a substantial part o northern Dalmatiaand part o Lika became endangered, and we have thereore decided as ollows: planned

evacuation o all combat-unt persons must be carried out rom the municipalities o Knin,Benkovac, Obrovac, Drni and Graac. Te evacuation shall be carried out in accordancewith prepared plans along routes towards Knin and urther on via Otri towards Srb andLapac. For evacuation purposes request the help o the UNPROFOR Command or SectorSouth headquartered in Knin. Te statements o RSK offi cials issued afer that were attempts to disclaim theirresponsibility. Te President o the RSK Assembly Rajko Leaji stated that he did notknow about the decision, but thought that the population should have been evacuatedonly to the neighbouring villages because the RSK did not even have a proessional

army, the people were the army, and it was thereore logical that athers, husbands,brothers and sons should ollow the weak and the inrm. Milan Ivani, adviser toMilan Marti, declared the decision to be unlawul because there was no quorum atthe meeting o the VSO (Supreme Deence Council) and all the decisions were madeby Milan Marti and Mile Mrki as the other VSO members were not even in Knin.(Milan Babi was in Belgrade, the minister o the interior oo Paji in Kordun, andthe minister o deence Milan uput in Korenica). In his assessment o the Decisionthe oreign minister Milivoj Vojnovi claimed that its goal was to draw the SRJ into warand conrmed the existence o a split between two groups, the negotiation-prone and

the war-mongering one, in the leadership o the so-called RSK. Although those presentdid not give an accurate answer to the question concerning the person who orderedthe retreat o the army (M. Bonjak, D. Dimitrovska, Beaniju naredio Marti/Marti


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ordered the Flight/;Veernje novosti, 23 August 1995; Odluku o evakuaciji doneo Marti/Marti Ordered the Evacuation/; Politika, 23 August 1995), it seems that everybodyalready knew clearly that the leadership o the so-called RSK was responsible or theevacuation and tribulation o the Serbs in Croatia. A comment rom the Serbian press

is maybe the most appropriate conrmation o this evaluation: Te ight rom Krajinahas a clear identiying code... by adopting the policy set at Pale, the entire RSK leadership,including the President o the Republic, the Government and the military leadership ailedtheir history test and are exclusively responsible or the ate o 200,000 Serbs rom thewestern part o Krajina (Radovan Kovaevi, Ko je doneo odluku o evakuaciji RSK?/Who Decided to Evacuate the RSK?/; Politika, 27 August 1995.) Vuk Drakovi, at the time the leader o the opposition Serbian Renewal Movement,also sought the culprits in his own back yard by emphasizing the narrow-mindednesso the Serbs and their determination in the implementation o the decision according

to which all Serbs had to live in one state. His answer to the reporters decision on theblame or the all o Krajina and the ate o the Serbian population in the region clearlyshows why the Serbian people experienced tragedy in Croatia and who was responsibleor it: For years people in Serbia have been shouting that Krajina will never think o livinganywhere else except in Greater Serbia. Tis unreality is so powerul that it has entered theconsciousness and unconsciousness o quite a ew people. Tose that ed the people such adangerous illusion are to be blamed. On the other hand we, who had a different view, wereunable to explain to the people that they were being grossly deluded. We did not tell our

people in time what lay in store, and we are guilty. (Gurat u na svaka vrata/Ill Push any

Door/;Vreme, 21 August 1995). Te Serbian press also described the circumstances in which evacuation was decidedand the way in which the population was inormed about it. Tus, according to thereport o Milorad Bonjak, journalist assigned to the State Inormation Pool o theRSK (since 10 June 1993), on 4 August 1995, at about 12 oclock noon, in the ArmyHall in Knin the commander o UN orces in Sector South Alain Forand met with themilitary and political offi cials o the so-called RSK (Colonel Kosta Novakovi - assistantSVK commander, Colonel Milan rgovi - head o the SVK military negotiating team,Mladen Kalapa - liaison offi cer with UNPROFOR, and Sava trbac - Secretary o the

Government); at the same time, the Supreme RSK Deence Council was in permanentsession; its members were RSK President Milan Marti, Prime Minister Milan Babi (thenin Belgrade), SVK Commander Mile Mrki, Minister o the Interior oo Paji (thenin Kordun) and Deence Minister Milan uput (then in Korenica). At about 7 p.m., theaccount continues, Colonel Novakovi inormed the reporters about the order accordingto which the VSK General Staff and government institutions would be evacuated to thesmall town o Srb in Lika and added that, in accordance with the agreement betweenColonel Novakovi and the press, it was decided that civil protection runners wouldinorm the population because they did not want the Croats to hear the explanation o

the order on Radio Knin. Te reporter also quoted part o the explanation o the order:Te evacuation is carried out or preventive security reasons. Te ghters on the ront willalso be relieved knowing that their loved ones are sae in Srb and Donji Lapac (Milorad


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Bonjak, vrdoglavost i naiva/Stubbornness and Naivet/; Veernje novosti, 22 August1995).

Accordingly, even the debates in the Serbian press, in particular the statements

o the offi cials o the so-called RSK, demonstrate how unconvincing and historicallyunounded are the claims about the ethnic cleansing carried out by the HV duringStormand about the responsibility o the Croatian leadership or the exodus o the Serbsrom Croatia. However, in view o the oregoing, the debate about evacuation has nowmainly shifed to questions about whether it was devised and agreed with somebody inadvance (reerence to the alleged agreement between uman and Miloevi) or dueto the military situation and to the evaluation o the SVK military and political commandthat they could not stand up to the Croatian Army and that such a singular strategicmove was made in the hope that the evacuation o civilians rom the Knin area would

make possible more concentrated operations by the SVK. Tus, the book o the CroatianHelsinki Committee (HHO) or Human Rights entitled Te Military Operation Stormand Its Afermath (Vojna operacija Oluja i poslije); Zagreb, 2001, pp. 13, 14, 21, 23ff.) lists examples showing that the retreat o the civilian population rom the so-calledRSK started even beore Operation Storm, and that civilians were even orced to retreat,threatened by their compatriots at gunpoint; however, the text mainly suggests thatthe retreat was the result o a scenario planned in advance (alleged agreement betweenuman and Miloevi). In addition to such scientically unounded suggestions, thebook claims that the Croatian leadership was also responsible or the departure o the

rebel Serbs rom Croatia because the statements o the Croatian leaders, particularlyuman and the late Gojko uak, did not inspire hope in a possibly dignied andhonourable deeat, whether by peaceul reintegration or by any other kind o agreement(HHO, Te Military Operation Storm and Its Afermath/Vojna operacija Oluja i poslije,p. 21). Te ate o the so-called Plan Z-4, which the leadership o the rebel Serbs did noteven want to consider, is the best proo that such claims are neither correct nor objectiveand that, considering the position and the actions o the political leadership o the rebelSerbs, peaceul reintegration was not realistically possible. It is a historical act that the public statements o the President o the Republic o

Croatia F. uman and o the Croatian Deence Minister G. uak did not inuence thedecision o the rebel Serbs in Croatia to turn down Plan Z-4, and that their leadershiprmly rejected every suggestion on the reintegration o occupied Croatian territory, oro the so-called RSK, into the constitutional and legal system o the Republic o Croatia,although it was avourable or them, actually maximalist considering the internationallyrecognized borders o the Republic o Croatia. Afer all, the view that Plan Z-4 shouldhave been accepted prevailed even in the Serbian press afer Storm. Tus, one o thearticles analyzing Plan -4 reported that Serbs, among other things, were offered theirown ag, coat o arms, currency, police; in the authors view, that was a maximum which

should have been accepted because o the act that the West would never have recognizedthe RSK (Zato zvona ne zvone?/Why Dont Bells Ring?/; Vojska, 159, 24 August1995, l2).


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In addition to the comment that Plan Z-4 was the last chance plan permittingthe Serbs to achieve the maximum because the West would never recognize the RSK,the Serbian press reported that many political actors in Belgrade were also behind therejection o the plan and uelling the unrealistic ambitions o the so-called RSK. Tus,

Borisav Jovi is reported to have said that Krajina is militarily strong enough to resistthe possible attack o the Croatian Army; according to Vojislav eelj, Plan Z-4 wastotally unacceptable. Even Zoran ini thought that the act that the Serbian peoplein the RSK do not support the Plan suggests that we should not support it either. In thesame group o comments the most consistent advocate o Plan Z-4 was Vuk Drakovi(Miljenko Pei, Da li je proputena istorijska ansa?/Was a Historic Chance Missed?/;Politika, 8 August 1995). He obviously understood it as an inevitable reality because hisposition, publicly proclaimed some days beore, that 85 percent o the territory o Bosniaand Herzegovina should be made part o a conederation with Serbia and Montenegro,

showed that he had not given up his idea about a Greater Serbia: When I say that I acceptthe Contact Group plan as a basis or uture negotiations, I do not mean, on any account,that 49% percent o Bosnia&Herzegovina ought to be Serbian, and the rest non-Serbian.No way! Even i the peace plan said that 60% o Bosnia is Serbian, and the rest non-Serbian,I would be against it! (I dalje za veliku Srbiju/On or Greater Serbia/; Intervju; 21 July1995, pp. 12-13).

As opposed to the unargumented view that the exodus o the Serbs rom Croatiaduring Storm was caused by the Miloevi-uman agreement, in various analyses o

the operation military experts explain the evacuation o civilians rom the RSK as a moveintended to prevent SVK deeat, i.e., a move prompted by conditions on the ront and theoreboding o total military deeat. Tus, according to the CIA analysis, evacuation wasordered only in Knin, and not in Sector North, in order to allow the SVK 7 thCorps toocus on ghting, and SVK commanders were orced to a choice - retreat or destructiono their orces (Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History o the Yugoslav Conict, 1990-1995, Central Intelligence Agency, Offi ce o Russian and European Analysis, Washington,DC 25505, May 2002, Chapter 89, pp. 371-372. 375).

According to the same analysis (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 374), it is not

true that ormer US military offi cers trained the Croatian Army (and planned Storm),or that NAO supported the Croatian offensive, or that Miloevi sent General Mrkito the RSK in order to prepare the withdrawal o the Army and the population, andthat the SVK did not really ght but simply retreated as soon as the HV attacked, orthat Belgrade had sold out the RSK, as SVK General M. Sekuli claims in his book.On the contrary, the analysis emphasizes that the HVs stunning victory rested on acombination o improvements made in orce structure and doctrine beore the operationand the key penetration o Serbian positions that the HV and the ARBiH 5thCorps wereable to open and exploit during the operation itsel and that unraveled the SVKs deence

system. Tereore, as pointed out, the success o Stormwas based on improvements inHV doctrine and orce structure, implemented since 1993, because these proessionalimprovements enhanced the HVs capacity in planning and organizing operations o


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impressive magnitude and complexity, and the capacity o executing rapid breakthroughsdeep behind the enemys deences. O course, comments the analysis, doctrine in itseldid not produce victory but had to be aithully executed on the battleeld. However,since the Croatian Army was not immediately or everywhere successul in its planned

attacks, its success, according to the analysis, lay in achieving breakthroughs in keysectors, enhanced by the disruption o the SVK command and control system, andall that undermined the SVKs deensive system as a whole and caused its collapse. Asa precondition or the successul completion o Storm, and its rst and most visiblecritical individual action, the analysis mentions the HVs long-term advance up theDinara Mountains and the Livno Valley, that gave it excellent jump-off positions or aquick and direct strike at Knin, bypassing the main SVK deences south o the town. Tetaking o Bosansko Grahovo, continues the analysis, effectively sealed Knins ate evenbeore Storm got off the ground (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, pp. 374-375). Te

loss o Bosansko Grahovo and the HV attack on Knin rom that direction was a majorsurprise or the SVK leadership, as shown by their Evaluation o threat, and protectionand rescue options prepared in Knin in April 1995. Tat is, in listing the possible lineso HV action towards Knin it mentions Zadar, Split (Mu), ibenik and Sinj as jump-off points, while the leaders o the rebel Serbs did not even think o a possible attack byCroatian orces rom Mount Dinara (see Appendix 3, document 10).

Similarly, according to the CIA analysis, the battleeld successes o the HV and theARBiH were acilitated by the SVK structural weaknesses - which, o course, the HVstaff had calculated on exploiting. Te SVKs biggest problem was not that its troops were

unwilling or unprepared to ght but that there were not enough o them - a problemrecognized when General Mrki was brought in to reallocate deensive ormations andestablish a bigger and better mobile reserve orce. Te Krajina Serbs had ought well,notes the analysis, in the attack in another country, during the Biha battles, and duringStormmany SVK ormations were able to hold their ground against rontal attacks bystronger HV orces. However, the SVK General Staff and its corps commanders did nothave enough combat ormations to maintain the depth and mobility needed to containan HV penetration. Tus, when the HV struck through SVK static deences at Knin, theSVK 7thCorps had no units in reserve to resist and prevent its capture. Te only unit lef

uncommitted had been cobbled together rom bits and pieces stripped out o the corpsline brigades. Lack o reserves to cushion a ank attack orced the evacuation o the well-deended area south o Karlovac, and Petrinjas stout deences yielded when the reservesit counted on were committed elsewhere (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 375).

O course, the reasons underlying the military collapse o the so-called RSK were alsodiscussed in the Serbian press. In one o the analyses o the causes leading to SVKs deeat,two unnamed Yugoslav Army generals agreed that there were many shortcomings, sincethe very beginning, in the organization o the deence o the so-called RSK and in thestructure o its army. Tus, they pointed out the ollowing:- lack o discipline, courage and brains, and the act that the morale o the army wasdestroyed by the awareness that some people were always getting rich while otherslanguish in the trenches... and only the poor are ghting;


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- the population was signicantly committed to deensive tasks, and the ratio o theactive to the reserve component was denitively in avour o the ormer; thus, out o50,000 troops, as many as 38,000 were on the active list;3

- conicts in the state leadership and requent relie o command and corps offi cers, with

no effect in terms o improved deence;- markedly negative impact o different lines o command, primarily o special units othe ministry o the interior which ofen exceeded authority, controlled the army andharassed offi cers;- undisciplined volunteer paramilitary units with sel-styled voivode, unwilling toaccept subordination to the joint command. In remarking that his [Mrkis] job was made even more diffi cult because he gotback feen thousand mobilized reugees, the generals noted that no major progressin the organization o the army was made either by Mile Mrki, offi cer o an elite

Yugoslav Army unit, who was expected to organize rapid intervention units capableo deep strikes and splitting Croatian territory. Te conclusion was that in terms opersonnel and equipment the SVK was inerior to the aggressor; however, it also reerredto exaggerated data about HVs strength oated around in the public, which createdpanic in the population along with rumours such as the ustashi (ustae)are comingand slaughtering people etc. Attention was also drawn to the mistaken convictionthat Knin was being deended in Belgrade (Radovan Pavlovi, Uzroci vojnog porazaKrajine. Serija propusta u organizaciji vojske RSK/Causes o the Military Deeat o theKrajina - A Series o Omissions in the Organization o the RSK army/; Politika, 27 August

1995). Te causes o deeat were also commented on in an interview by Dragan Vasiljkovi- Captain Dragan. Disappointed by the outcome o the situation, he expressed apronouncedly negative view about the constantly poor effect o Serbian mythsbecause o which since the Kosovo battle the Serbians have not admitted deeat andkeep looking all the time or a new Vuk Brankovi. According to his opinion, based onexperience acquired over our years o combat action and training, the deeat was causedby lack o concern or the army, military and government disorganization, and neglecto basic military requirements such as ood and equipment, resulting ultimately in a

poorly prepared army. According to Vasiljkovi, Krajina was in total disarray rom thebeginning to the very end. When explaining the reason why he lef the so-called RSK,he said that on the eve o the attack he met in Knin with Patriarch Pavle, Milan Marti,Mile Mrki and Ratko Mladi - who then claimed then that his army would deendevery inch o the RSK. Since the all o Bosansko Grahovo opened to the Croatian orcesthe route to Knin, Vasiljkovi claims that he suggested counter-strikes towards ibenikand Zadar, but his proposals were pessimistically opposed by General Duan Lonar.

3When considering the number o SVK troops, it is interesting to note that the proposal o SVK com-mitment plan, prepared in early 1995, mentions 69,000 possible SVK members according to the variantwhere SVK engages in deence without major reliance on the Yugoslav Army and the Army o the RepublikaSrpska. See Appendix 1, document 18.


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According to Vasiljkovi, the pessimistic position o one o the commanders and theact that he could not set off on his own with only 60 trained men and lead them intosure death led him to leave Knin.4In the interview it was also mentioned that CaptainDragan had spent more than our years - rom 4 April 1991 to 31 July 1995 - in the so-

called-RSK, that he had, afer arriving in Knin in 1991 - in spite o antagonism o MilanBabi, who wanted to turn the Krajina into his own empire - put in order the exerciserange at Golubi near Knin, and trained 1200 troops in the rst three months; in settingup the training centre he was assisted by a ellow soldier rom a British paratrooperregiment called Marko (Dijana Dimitrovska, Politika oborila Krajinu/Politics BroughtDown Krajina/; Veernje novosti; 29 August 1995). Te reasons underlying the all o the so-called RSK, but also the role o the YugoslavArmy and Yugoslavia in the Serbian rebellion in Croatia, and the relation o the Krajinaleadership with Belgrade, are also discussed in Miroslav Lazanskis article Strategija

lako emo (No Problem Strategy). In Lazanskis estimate, Eastern Slavonija and Baranjacannot be deended without the protection o Yugoslavia, just as it was clear, alreadyback in 1991, that Krajina could not hold its ground without Yugoslavia. Te reporterstressed that the Croatian Army o 1995 was not the army o 1991 and that Zagrebhad taken advantage o the our years o RSKs existence in order to create a proessionalarmy 75,000 strong organized in eight brigades and several sel-contained battalions, andan additional component o 140,000 Home Guardsmen. Moreover, continued Lazanski,Zagreb has a military budget o 5.6 billion US dollars as compared to the total militarybudget o the RSK, Republika Srpska and the SRJ which does not exceed 1.3 billion

dollars (Strategija lako emo/ No Problem Strategy; Nin; 2328, 11 August 1995, 16-17). In consideration o the oregoing, the ollowing sentence rom the magazine Nincanserve as a general conclusion o the analyses regarding SVKs deeat in Operation Stormpublished in the Serbian press: War is won by rst-class organization, discipline and

governance, and the Croats have achieved all that during these our years (Hrvatska neenapustiti Baranju i Istonu Slavoniju/Croatia Will Not Abandon Baranja and EasternSlavonija/; Nin; 2329, 18 August 1995).

Te absence o powerul support by the Army o Republika Srpska and the YugoslavArmy, that is, o their attack on the Republic o Croatia afer the start o Storm, hasalso been debated at length. Although some people see in that act the conrmationo the alleged uman-Miloevi agreement on the resettlement o the population, theconclusion that the military orces o Republika Srpska and SR o Yugoslavia were not atthe moment capable o a major commitment in terms o an attack against the Republico Croatia seems to be more likely. Tus, according to the CIA analysis o Storm, the SVK

4

As opposed to his statement, the daily report o the Security department o the G SVK o 3 August 1995states that Captain Dragan demonstratively lef the Krajina because the SVK commander did not agreewith his request to be appointed commander o the 92nd motorized brigade o the SVK 7th Corps. (SeeAppendix 3, document 21).


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General Staff had traditionally counted on the Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav armies to actas their strategic reserve, and during Storm these reserves were not available. Te Armyo Republika Srpska (VRS) was still more than willing to ulll this role, but the VRSGeneral Staff itsel was short o reserve ormations it needed to contend with ARBiH

attacks across Bosnia. Te battleeld situation in Bosnia made it impossible or theBosnian Serbs to contribute anything more than a ew counterattacks around Grahovoand Biha (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376). An overview o the war in Bosnia shows that such a conclusion is justied. Accordingto the CIA analysis, on instructions o the military leadership o Republika Srpska o 8March 1995 the Army o Republika Srpska (VRS) planned a number o offensive actions(Sarajevo 95, Sprea 95, Sadejstvo 95, Lukavac 95, Zvijezda 95), intended toseize a large portion o ARBiH-held territory north o uzla, the areas o Mounts Igmanand Bjelanica, expand the Posavina corridor and remove the threat acing Doboj,

strangle the enclaves o epa and Srebrenica and capture them i their UN protectorswithdrew, and reduce the enclave o Gorade to a 3 km radius around the town itsel.Plans had to include two additional operations to cut routes through the Neretva valleyto the sea near Dubrovnik (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 73, pp. 289-290). Tese veryambitious plans or the VRS show that that the Serbs wanted to use military actionsin order to orce the Muslim and Croatian leadership, and thereby the internationalcommunity as well, to acknowledge the acts on the ground, which were abundantly tothe avour o the Serbian cause. However, these plans were largely beyond the momentary capacity o the VRS because

the changes in the balance o orces between the ARBiH and VRS, which rst becameapparent in 1994, were very obvious by 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-303). Tus, instead o capturing territory the VRS had to deend itsel rom the reorganizedArmy o BiH.5Moreover, the VRS also had to deend itsel rom the attack o Croatian

5Tus, on 20 March 1995 the ARBiH launched spring offensives, the targets being the Serbian-held radiotransmitters atop Mount Vlai near ravnik (Operation Domet) and Stolice on Mount Majevica east ouzla. Tere was also erce ghting on Mount reskavica. Te ARBiH was very successul in the rst attack,while in the second it suffered a major deeat. However, in spite o its substantial losses in both operations,

UN military observers reported obvious improvements in terms o equipment, planning, organization andexecution o attacks; Bosnian soldiers now had adequate small arms and ammunition, ak jackets, helmetsand radios. Similarly, the ailure o the Serbian operation Sadejstvo 95 in April 1995, intended to expandthe corridor at Boderite 8 km south o Brko, deended by ARBiH orces and the Croatian Deence Council(HVO) 108th brigade shows that the VRS - in spite o its superiority in armour, artillery and other heavyweapons - was unable to break through ARBiH deences (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 78, pp. 300-303).O course, the VRS also had to prepare or deence rom the long announced ARBiH offensive intended torelieve Sarajevo, which started in mid-June 1995; although it ailed and even i ARBiH had extremely highlosses, the offensive tied down considerable VRS orces which could not be committed elsewhere. Te VRSalso suffered considerable losses (Chapter 80, pp. 307-314). Afer January 1995 the ghting was particularlyintensive in the Biha enclave where the ARBiH 5th Corps assisted by the HVO 101st regiment and logistic

support rom Croatia put up a tough and active deence against the superior orces o Bosnian and CroatianSerbs, and special orce units rom Serbia. Tis is supported by the operations Una 95 and Zora 95 othe ARBiH 5th Corps in May 1995, and operations rokut 1 in June 1995 (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapters74, 75, 79).


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orces in Livanjsko Polje and on Mount Dinara. Afer the success o Operation Cincarand the liberation o Kupres in early November 1994, the Croatian orces carried out onMount Dinara a serious o actions and operations which began to erode the strong VRSpositions (Zima 94, Skok 1 and Skok 2); afer Operation Ljeto 95 they entered

Bosansko Grahovo and Glamo, and opened the route or Knin (Balkan Battlegrounds,Chapter 77, pp. 364-365). In the meantime, Operation Flash (Bljesak) also liberatedWestern Slavonija. Te SVK was unable to help their ellow ghters, and neither was theVRS; they retaliated instead by cowardly and terrorist attacks on Croatian cities withOrkan rockets tted with cluster munitions, to which Croatia did not respond (BalkanBattlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 296-298).6

Tereore, being overstretched and overloaded, VRS orces could not providesignicant help to the SVK even during Operation Flash. Following that, ailure in theretaliatory VRS offensive (Plamen 95; the Croats called it Revenge) against Oraje

(5 May to 10 June 1995), deended by HVO orces, vividly conrmed the declining VRScapacity as compared with the rst war years. Although the attack was spearheaded byarmoured and elite inantry units, o course with very strong re support, the Serbianarmy ailed to achieve the planned targets because, unlike the case in 1992 and 1993, itwas now attacking a well-organized enemy backed by considerably better re support ascompared with previous years (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77, pp. 298-299). However, afer Lieutenant Colonel General Mile Mrki was appointed on 16 May1995 to command the SVK and run its reorganization, including the creation o the SVKSpecial Units Corps, the all o Biha into Serbian hands seemed to be inevitable in July

1995; that was the starting date o the ateul Serbian offensive against Biha - OperationSword 95.7Afer a strategic dilemma - crush rst the ARBiH 5thCorps or the Croatianorces on Mount Dinara, on 19 July 1995 the Serbian orces attacked the Biha enclaveand, in the battle or Cazin on 19-26 July 1995, brought the ARBiH 5 thCorps to thebrink o deeat. Te commander o the ARBiH 5thCorps, General Ati Dudakovi, laterdescribed this VSK offensive as his most diffi cult experience o the war. Any objectiveanalysis can easily conrm the dramatic situation in which, in the event o Biha allinginto the hands o the Serbs, they would enjoy an extraordinary strategic advantage overthe HV and cause a new, vast humanitarian disaster.8

6Te author o the comment in the CIA analysis notes that President uman showed unusual restraintwhen he rerained rom ordering retaliatory strikes against the Serbs (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 77,p. 298).7Te CIA analysis stresses in particular that the Yugoslav Army had also sent to Krajina a number o veter-ans, ormer JNA offi cers (at the time offi cers o the Yugoslav Army), in order to help with the implementa-tion o changes, in the analysis o the SVK strategic and tactical-operational situation, and reinorce deence,because they also brought along additional equipment or the SVK new mobile reserve orces (BalkanBattlegrounds, Chapter 88. p. 363).8According to the CIA analysis, involved in the SVK offensive were also an estimated 500 special opera-

tions troops o the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian State Security Service and Arkans Serbian Volunteer Guard,with additional reinorcements - troops rom the VJ Special Units Corps - intended to provide shock troopsand combat leaders during the attack o the VSK Special Units Corps (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88,p. 363).


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However, afer the Split Agreement o 22 July 1995 between the Croatian PresidentFranjo uman and the President o the BiH Presidency Alija Izetbegovi, along withthe President o the BiH Federation Kreimir Zubak and the BiH Prime MinisterHaris Silajdi, the Croatian orces launched Operation Summer 95 and, aferliberating Bosansko Grahovo and Glamo in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and mobilizingand deploying their troops, orced the Serbian army to relegate Biha to a position osecondary importance and ace the jeopardy o the Croatian strategic attack on the RSKwith its threat o atal changes in the battleeld (Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 88, p.363). Accordingly, the capture o the enclaves o Srebrenica and epa was actually theonly achieved VRS target among the many planned in March 1995, but even this wassoon neutralized by the loss o Bosansko Grahovo and Glamo. It was in such conditions- torn and overstretched, with a considerably eroded morale - that the VRS was aced

with the Croatian military-police operation Storm, and even this brie overview o thewar in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995 shows why the so-called RSK and its army did notget the anticipated military help rom the Bosnian Serbs, i.e., the VRS, during Storm.

According to the CIA comment on the reasons why the Yugoslav Army did not givedirect help and why Serbia allegedly sold the RSK out, the claims o SVK GeneralMilisav Sekuli that Miloevi intentionally orced decisions that would lead to RSKaall do not hold water, because their were good arguments or most o them. Tus,evacuation was ordered only in Knin, and not in Sector North, Moreover, the Yugoslav

Army had already started (actually continued) - with Miloevis concurrence - to supplyequipment to the SVK and provide offi cers to stiffen its units, as well as some specialoperations units. Furthermore, sending VJ units openly across its borders in support othe SVK was apparently more than Miloevi was willing to do to save the RSK. But eveni he had been willing, the rapidity with which the HV struck and enveloped the RSK lef

very little time or the VJ to send adequate orces to the region. Stormdid cause the VJ tomobilize and deploy large numbers o armour, artillery and inantry to the border withEastern Slavonia as a warning to Zagreb, but it would have taken a major VJ-supportedoffensive out o the RSK enclave to actually deter or slow down the HV offensive. In the

view o the CIA analysts, even i Miloevis ailure to order in the VJ is taken as a signo his indifference or at least callousness about the RSKs ate, this does not imply thatMiloevi wanted the RSK to all. He had committed his personal prestige and a lot oYugoslav resources to propping up the RSK, and he had been sending VJ offi cers andequipment to help deend the Krajina Serbs since 1992. But, as the conclusion goes,there was a line beyond which he was not willing to go (or could not go?) i by crossingit Yugoslavia incurred prolonged or increased Western sanctions or high militarycosts. With Western governments and their peoples increasingly ocused on what washappening in places like Srebrenica and Biha, Miloevi had nally come to that line

(Balkan Battlegrounds, Chapter 89, p. 376). O course, the lack o direct VJ commitment in the deence o Krajina stirred upquite a reaction in the Serbian public. However, such developments did not surprise the


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people responsible or the deence o the so-called RSK. Specically, already in early1995 the draf o the new RSK Deence Plan indicated that at present it would notbe realistically possible to plan the commitment, in the case o an attack on the RSK,o either VJ or VRS units (see Appendix 1, document 18). Similarly, the Serbian pressreported already in July 1995 that SR Yugoslavia, under the pressure o internationaleconomic sanctions, was not longer capable o helping the Serbs across the Drina eithereconomically or militarily, and that precisely international sanctions had orced SlobodanMiloevi to try to change his past policies by offering his good services as a peace brokerin the Balkans. Tus, in his interview to Te imesMiloevi claimed that Yugoslavia,i the sanctions were abolished, would bring the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating tableand added that he would bring reasonable peace to that part o the country within sixmonths (Poruka iz Srbije/Message rom Serbia/; Nin; 2327, 14 July 1995, pp. 13-14).

Tereore, it seems that open intervention in Croatia was not acceptable or Miloevibecause it would have directly jeopardized his negotiating status and possible lifingo sanctions against Yugoslavia. In spite o that, however, Yugoslavia seems to havepromised military help and diplomatic pressure on Croatia to the Krajina leadership.Specically, Momir Bulatovi, then member o the Yugoslav Supreme Deence Council,claimed that the Supreme Council had sent a telegram - rom its extraordinary sessionheld on 4 August 1995 in the command post at Dobanovci near Belgrade - to GeneralMrki encouraging him to keep organizing stiff resistance or at least another two days,afer which Yugoslavia would be capable o helping him with all available resources (M.

Bulatovi, Pravila utanja: istiniti politiki triler sa poznatim zavretkom/Te SilenceRules: A rue Political Triller with a Known Ending/; Belgrade, 2004, pp. 181-182; Rat uHrvatskoj 1991-1995/War in Croatia 1991-1995/; www.centerorhistory.net). Mentionis also made o Miloevis telephone message to Marti, on the rst day o Storm,to hold out or ve to six days, in order to leave Belgrade scope or action (MilisavSekuli, Knin je pao u Beogradu/Knin Fell in Belgrade/; Bad Vilbel, 2001; 178). Tis isalso supported by the statement o Goran Hadi, ormer RSK prime minister, aferStorm; along with his aith in the survival o the RSK in Slavonia and Srijem and themessage that he would never accept the act that Krajina was gone, he answered to the

question on a possible attack o the Croatian Army: I am certain that Serbia will helpthis part o Krajina and I have sure indications or that, but I cannot disclose them to the

press at present. I am sure it would have helped that part o Krajina as well i it had putup at least some resistance(Srbija e pomoi/Serbia Will Help/; Nin; 2329, 18 August1995; pp. 17-19). Milan Milanovi, assistant RSK deence minister, also spoke aboutthe organizational capacity and readiness o the remaining RSK army to deend itsel,noted that it would expect help rom Yugoslavia i it were attacked by a bigger orce, andadded that no plans or actions were done without the agreement o Belgrade (Svi seboje Srbije/Everybody is Araid o Serbia/; Intervju; 22 September 1995; pp. 6-7).

Denying the allegations in the Serbian press about the poor military preparation and

lack o nancial support to the SVK, Borislav Mikeli indirectly conrmed Yugoslavias


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military support to the RSK. Specically, he mentioned the considerable armaments othe RSK army - weapons inherited rom the JNA and acquired later, and noted: It isknown that the RSK Army had an air orce at Udbina, that it had rocket systems, that ithad quite a ew tanks, anti-aircraf guns, artillery, missiles. Tis is conrmed by the actthat the Croatian Army captured weapons and ammunitions worth at least 700 millionor up to an estimated one billion Deutschmarks (ko je prevario Miloevia?/WhoDeceived Miloevi?/; Intervju; 368; 8 September 1995; 110-11). O course, numerousdocuments conrm the help provided by Yugoslavia to the so-called RSK and the SVK.Tus, the extraordinary operational report o the SVK General Staff sent to thePresident o the Republic o Serbia Slobodan Miloevi, the President o RSK MilanMarti and the Chie o the Yugoslav Army General Staff Colonel General MomiloPerii on 11 June 1995 mentions the overall help sent by SR Yugoslavia to the Serbian

Army o Krajina, including primarily the mobilization o combat-capable persons whohad ed the area and sending them back to the Krajina. Te same document mentionsunder point 7 the reception, currently under way, o the materiel authorized or therequirements o the Serbian Army o Krajina rom the Yugoslav Army (see Appendix2, document 26). Actually, because o the numerous documents conrming this point,nobody can seriously deny the act that the JNA, and subsequently the VJ, openlysupported the rebellion o the Serbs in Croatia and the structuring o the SVK - tothe extent that they may have been considered to be one and the same army. Tis wasgenerally known, especially to the offi cials o the so-called RSK, as borne out by the

statement o the Deputy RSK Prime Minister Stojan panovi at the joint session othe Goverment o Republika Srpska and the RSK Government held on 19 July 1993in Knin: In terms o offi cial SRJ documents the SVK is part o the Yugoslav Army (seeAppendix 1, document 10). Miloevi seems to have understood that he could not achieve the planned targetsby military means, and tried instead to keep what he had already realized, or actuallyconquered, by a policy o agreement which he believed, together with the KrajinaPrime Minister Borislav Mikeli, to be the most avourable or the Serbs in Croatia.However, the Krajina leadership turned to Pale claiming that Mikeli was a traitor

and opposing his policy. At the session o the Krajina Assembly held in Knin on 29May 1995, Borislav Mikeli was relieved, and the Assembly expressed agreement withthe decision on the state unication o the RSK and Republika Srpska. Because o this,in an interview given on 9 June 1995, Mikeli censured Milan Marti and Milan Babior openly obstructing any attempt to come to an agreement with Croatia. In explainingthe reasons why he opposed any ast, hasty and ill-considered unication he actuallyhighlighted Miloevis plan ocused on lifing the sanctions against Yugoslavia andachieving the ultimate goal o Serbian policy - the unication o Serbian lands in one state:I have rst o all in mind the lifing o sanctions against SR Yugoslavia and the acceptance o

the Contact Group Plan by the leadership in Pale. In that case SR Yugoslavia could enter aconederation or establish a ederal relation with Republika Srpska, and RS Krajina wouldthen rely on such an arrangement (Jesam Miloeviev ovjek /I Am Miloevis Man/;


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Intervju; 362, 9 June 1995, 15). Later on, the Belgrade daily Veernje novosticarried anarticle which criticized the policy o the Krajina leadership because o its drifing apartrom Belgrade and collusion with the Bosnian Serbs, and presented - as evidence that theBosnian and Croatian Serbs pursued the policy o immediate mutual unication - theDecision on the State Unication o the RSK and the RS, the document prepared or theannounced session o the assemblies o the RSK and the RS, never held because o Storm(vrdoglavost i naiva/Stubbornness and Naivet/; Veernje novosti; 22 August 1995).

Miloevi and Mikeli must have been angry when their idea was not accepted (orunderstood?) by the leading politicians o the so-called RSK, who probably thoughtthat the realization o such a plan would be too slow. Tis is why Mikeli accused theRSK leaders o thwarting every peace initiative and, in particular, ound ault with the

rightist extremism o Milan Marti and Milan Babi and with their political links withthe capital o the Bosnian Serbs, Pale, and Radovan Karadi. Mikeli reviewed theevents on 29 March 1994 and the Zagreb Ceasere Agreement, and pointed out that itwas concluded on the initiative o Belgrade with the objective to place Krajina underinternational protection afer the unavourable developments - the loss o Maslenica,the Miljevac Plateau, Zemunik, Perua and the Medak pocket. Te establishment opeace, continued Mikeli, was to be ollowed by economic negotiations, the openingo the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway link and the opening o the oil pipeline. In Mikeliswords, such a development avoured the Krajina because it implied the extension o the

agreement with the peacekeeping orces. He also mentioned the negotiations in Erdutwith the participation o the Russian deence minister Pavel Grachev who guaranteedthe RSK, i it accepted the plan, the status o a state within a state, and added thatthe opposition o Babi and Marti, and their insistence on unication with RepublicSrpska, led to the interruption o peace negotiations and to conict between them andhim - and thereby to conict with Belgrade. Tus, in Mikelis interpretation, Martisorder to pull back the army in Stormand put up no resistance was in accordance withKaradis slogan: I Petrinja and Knin all, Belgrade will all! (Ko je prevario Miloevia/Who Deceived Miloevi/; Intervju; 368, 8 Sept. 1995, 10-11).

Just as the accusations about ethnic cleansing, equally unounded are the accusations

about the Croatian excessive shelling o Knin, which some try to push by incorrectlyreerring only to statements supporting such claims. An example is the statement thatthe Croats knew they were shelling civilian acilities, and out o the 3000 shells red onKnin only 250 hit military targets, given according to Te New York imesto the ICYinvestigators by General Alain Forand, commander o UN orces in Sector South (HHO,Te military operation Storm and Its Afermath, p. 28). However, all those who visitedKnin immediately afer Stormknow how convincing is the claim, or actually accusation,

about the excessive and uncontrolled shelling o civilian targets in Knin. Especiallywhen they remember the JNA attacks on Croatian towns and villages in 1991... SVKcommanding offi cers also know it because their reports on the start o the operation


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warrant the conclusion that Croatian artillery attacked military targets.9 At any rate, thestory about the excessive shelling o Knin passed off by RSK offi cials has been disprovedby photographs o Knin, shown on V and published in a Serbian newspaper. Te samepaper published the statement o Slobodan Jarevi, adviser to Milan Marti and ormer

RSK minister o oreign affairs, according to which there was in Knin no building thathad not been shelled (M.A., Egzodus naroda/Exodus o the people; Veernje novosti, 6August 1995), along with the comment that according to photographs taken in some oKnins main streets, no signs o major armed conicts can be observed; only some treesare down, and tanks and troops are all over town (S.P., Snimci iz Knina/Photographs

rom Knin/; Veernje novosti, 6 August 1995).

In his study o Storm, which constitutes the main part o this book, the author didnot omit certain problems such as the undisciplined conduct o some HV troops, and

incidents - dishonourable actions (murder and torching o property) - committed againstparts o the remaining Serbian population and their property in the just liberated area othe Republic o Croatia. Tey are presented in greater detail in the book Vojna operacijaOluja i poslije(Military Operation Storm and Its Afermath) published by the CroatianHelsinki Committee or Human Rights (Zagreb 2001). Te book is actually a report onthe conditions and events in the area liberated by the military-police Operation Storm-the ormer UN Sectors South and North - covering mainly the period between the starto the operation until the end o 1995, but also some later developments. O course,the victims on the Serbian side during Stormare also discussed in the publications o

the Veritas Inormation&Documentation Centre rom Belgrade. However, there is noneed to comment on them in particular because in its activity to date Veritas has notdemonstrated any wish or a well-argumented record and objective representation o

9Tus, the report o the command o the SVK 11th Inantry Brigade (str. con. No. 239/2-95.) o 4 August1995 reads, among other things: Knin was shelled rom Livanjsko Polje and rom several directions, anduntil the drafing o this report the town was hit by 200 to 300 projectiles o different types and calibres. Tetarget o the rst strike was the building o the Headquarters o the Serbian Army o the Krajina, which su-

ered great damage and the almost complete loss o the motor pool. Subsequently the re was ocused on the1300 Corporals Barracks, the vik plant, the railway marshalling yard, housing below the ortress, and oth-er targets... Tis is also borne out by a record o an SVK offi cer who was present in Knin when Storm started:the drumre barrage started all over Krajina. Everything had been planned rom the smallest detail. Everyshell and every artillery attack. Several days ago observers and gunners were inltrated in order to direct re.Te most important targets in the town include the Headquarters building, the residence o the presidento the state, the northern barracks, the Senjak barracks and the main crossroads in Knin... I jumped overthe ence o the northern barracks and entered the building in which I had worked our months ago... Tebarracks was hit by quite a ew shells, but we were lucky and avoided shells alling on our head... We got intoa Gol and set off towards Headquarters. Shells were still alling, this time less requently. We arrived at theDeli crossroads. Te area round Headquarters was hit more heavily. I stopped the driver and told him to

return to the barracks, and proceeded on oot... Seeking shelter behind trees I reached Headquarters. I enterthe building: what a sight. wo shells hit the parking space between the buildings and destroyed the entireHeadquarters motor pool. Tat must have been quite a gunner, to land them right there (Marko Vrcelj, Ratza srpsku krajinu, 1991-1995/War or the Serbian Krajina, 1991-1995/; Belgrade, 2002, pp. 212-213).


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history. Afer all, it was precisely the Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO) that drewattention to the unreliable data in Veritaspublications and the latters exaggerations inreporting the number o victims. Tus, HHO demonstrated that Veritaspassed off, in itslist o victims (e.g., in the pamphlet published in 1998), many members o the Krajina

paramilitary as civilian victims, and claimed that living persons were dead (HHOupozorava na lane podatke beogradskog Veritasa/HHO draws attention to alse data

published by Veritas o Belgrade/; Vjesnik, 11 January 2001). Te abovementioned HHO report (Military Operation Storm and Its Afermath) lists410 persons who died or were killed in the ormer UN Sector South during OperationStormuntil the end o 1995. Te data reported in the list suggest that, during OperationStormin the area under consideration, the death o approximately 31 persons was dueto military action (mainly shelling), that approximately 52 Serbs and 2 Croats werekilled by unknown perpetrators (no details are reported), and 43 persons are reported to

have been killed by Croatian soldiers or persons wearing HV uniorms; the remainder,according to the report, died or were killed afer the end o the operation (HHO,MilitaryOperation Storm and Its Afermath; pp. 131-157). Te report also lists 191 civilianpersons who died, were killed or turned up missing in the ormer UN Sector North; theinormation suggests that, during Operation Storm, death in approximately 7 cases wasdue to military action (mainly shelling), approximately 30 ethnic Serbs were killed byunknown perpetrators (no details are reported), approximately 37 persons were killedby Croatian soldiers persons wearing HV uniorms, 7 persons were killed by soldiers othe Army o B&H, 3 persons (out o whom a Croatian couple) were killed by members

o the so-called Army o Krajina, 24 persons turned up missing, and the remainderdied, were killed or turned up missing afer the end o the operation (HHO, MilitaryOperation Storm and Its Afermath, pp. 221-244). A separate list includes 76 persons whodied, were killed or turned up missing in the reugee column, mainly due to militaryaction, while some are reported to have been killed by Croatian soldiers (HHO,MilitaryOperation Storm and Its Afermath, pp. 208-215). Unortunately, many allegations in the book are not accompanied by the requiredscholarly apparatus, and this the leaves the question o the reason why some notesinclude ull inormation on the source or a specic event, while some events are

mentioned without reerence to any source. Similarly, this worthy attempt to collect dataon dishonourable actions (murder, plunder and torching o property) committed by theCroatian side during and afer Stormis partly encumbered by oisting an unargumentedconsideration o the political and military context o the operation, i.e., by emphasizingthe alleged Miloevi-uman agreement on the so-called humane resettlement othe population. O course, these observations do not deny the act that individuals onthe Croatian side (soldiers or civilians) killed Serbian civilians during and afer Storm;instead, and on the basis o insight into diverse sources, attention is only drawn to theneed or a ully argumented and accurate presentation o inormation, especially when

comments reer to the way the victims died or to who killed them. It would be diffi cult to explain the motives o crimes committed against innocent andhelpless people, and even more diffi cult to accept them as a reality which recurs in every


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war. But, it is certain that they cannot be justied, regardless o their perpetrators, and thattruth and justice require the detection and punishment o all those who were personallyresponsible or the crimes. Tis would give the victims at least some satisaction, andthe punishment o the actual perpetrators would demonstrate that the crimes were

committed by individuals whose actions were in opposition to the action and conduct othe overwhelming majority o Croatian commanders, soldiers and policemen, who tookhonourable part in Operation Storm.

Tis is also in the interest o historical truth: it requires the nal and accuratedetermination o the dishonourable deeds (murders o civilians and POWs, and torchingo homes) committed against the Serbian population in the area covered by OperationStormby members o the armed orces or civilians on the Croatian side, by members othe Army o B&H, and by members o the Serbian military units or Serbian civilians.10

10Te HHO book mainly mentions crimes against Serbian civilians committed by individuals on the Croatianside or members o the Army o B&H. However, the reports o reugee Serbs also mention the tribulations oSerbs and reugees o other ethnic groups due to the actions o the Serbian army, murders o Serbs by theirellow-countrymen and suicides during withdrawal. Tus, a note in the HHO book also mentions peoplekilled because they did not want to join the reugee column: Our leadership inormed the people about ouright. People were made araid o the Croatian army, and we had to ee. Tose o us who did not want toleave hid well, we did not want them to nd out that we were staying; otherwise, we would be orced to leaveor Serbs would have killed us... Tey went rom home to home and checked whether people were leaving...(Statement by N. Draa, 23 July 1998; HHO, Te Military Operation Storm and Its Afermath; 14). Tesewere not mere threats, as shown by the statement o M.P. (details in the HMDCDR); she said that Martispeople killed her son because he reused to join the column (HMDCDR, verbal testimony o O.N., details

in the HMDCDR). M.K. (details in the HMDCDR) stated as ollows: We were in the basement o the build-ing in which Milan Babi, the dentist, had an apartment. Te militia came and orced us to join the column(HMDCDR, protocol 1396 o 18 September 1995). M.M. (details in the HMDCDR) stated: I was woundedby a Serbian sniper. I came to save my son and we all wanted to come back (HMDCDR, protocol 1360 o14 September 1995). M.J. (details in the HMDCDR) , a Croat rom Graac who had to leave his home andwas orced to join the column at gunpoint, stated that one o his neighbours was killed because she did notwant to join the column (HMDCDR, protocol 1269 o 1 September 1995).L.I. (details in the HMDCDR)rom Glina resisted when they tried to orce him to join the column, and was beaten up by RSK soldiers(HMDCDR, protocol 74 o 19 January 1996). D.. (details in the HMDCDR) stated that he had joined thecolumn because terror groups were lef behind (HMDCDR, protocol 247 o 12 March 1996). Te dailyDelo (Ljubljana) reported on the ate o the Serbian reugees rocketed by the Serbian air orce: HP://www.hrt.hr/arhiv/oluja/950808/H/080895174801.html.

Some Serbs in the reugee columns were crushed by tanks, e.g., the man in the militia car ran over by in Kninby an SVK tank beore the arrival o Croatian troops... On the right side o the road (by the administrationo the diesel uel storage acility) I ound a militia car, a stojadin (Zastava 101). racks showed that it hadbeen run over by a tank. It was quite attened, and a human leg protruded rom it... I went on to CorpsCommand... I saw a lada with two dead men in camouage RSK Army uniorms, 25-30 years old... Teside o the car was riddled with bullet holes at chest level. Croatian troops had not yet entered the town, andI dont know how they died. Tey must have been killed by a burst. (HHO, Te Military Operation Stormand Its Afermath, p. 27). Tere is a well-known story about retreating Serbian tanks running over a columno Serbian reugee vehicles in the region o Banovina. Tus, commenting on the sad column o 32,000reugees), the Zagreb reporter o Belgrades daily Veernje novosti, Milenko Predragovi wrote: Accordingto eyewitnesses, the said column was rolled over by tanks under the command o the Serbian General MileNovakovi as he ed rom Petrova Gora. O course, he believed that Croatian media interpreted this ver-sion in order to blame the Serbian leadership or the ate o the Serbian reugees. He even suggested thatthe column had been rolled over by Serbian, but captured tanks (Milenko Predragovi, Kolona izgaenatenkovima (Column Rolled over by anks; Veernje novosti, 14 August 1995). Te construction is not true,as conrmed by recollections o Storm participants (HMDCDR, memoir material).


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O course, the number o Serbian suicides must also be determined accuratelybecause sources have shown that such cases were not rare either.11Another questionis the suffering o the Serbs in the reugee columns because civilians were mixed withsoldiers, and tractors and cars with tanks. Moreover, many people not wearing uniorms(civilians) were armed. Croatian soldiers remembered being shot at by civilians rom

various weapons and attacked with grenades.12 Te same goes or the list o the torchedand plundered houses abandoned by the Serbs because sources show that some o theproperty (homes, buildings) was set on re by the Serbs as they ed during Storm.13

11Tis is also borne out by the reporters interview with a Serbian reugee who ed Croatia:...While he [theSerbian reugee] was telling me about the many suicides during their ight, babies and old people whohad died, about the lack o bread and water, his ellow reugee sternly warned us that the stuff could not be

published, that everything was alright but that it was orbidden to write anything about it. Who orbade it,I asked, but he just shrugged and went away... An old man, seventy-three, killed himsel. He just got off theroad into a maize eld and killed himsel with a grenade... Te bridge at Nova Grada was destroyed, and awomen killed hersel there. When we got to the bridge, she just jumped into the water, poor soul (Progoniistono od raja/Persecutions East o Eden; Intervju; 367, 25 August 1995). Here is part o the moving storyo Radmila Dragievi (34): Five babies died in our column, and many old people; we lef them by the roadbecause they told us that ambulances would collect them. Milo Brada (39): A man who had no more uelin his tractor, probably deranged, took out a gun and killed his wie, their two children and then himsel.Tey tried to stop him, but ailed. (Ljudi s traktora/Te people on the tractors; Nin, 2329, 18 August 1995,29). An old reugee also described the chaos in the Serbian reugee columns eeing Croatia: In the opuskopocket we heard that the Muslims were slaughtering everybody at Glina. Chaos ollowed, people cried,

moaned, armed and drunken soldiers threatened, two men killed themselves. Ten the police rom Kordunrestored order. Tey beat people with sticks... (Milena Markovi, Kroz psovke i batine/Trough Cursesand Beating; Veernje novosti, 15 August 1995). estimony o Vinja, 32: We were in the column rom 5 to10 August 1995. We just stood on the spot or moved slowly. We had ood, what we had taken along, but Icould hardly eat. I lost my appetite because o everything that had happened to us. We heard that there hadbeen some negotiations and that we should move on. Tey ormed us into rank, set the column in order(Croatian militia) and ordered everyone to leave their weapons because the border could not be crossed withweapons. Tey let people take the uel rom the remaining tanks, but not weapons. Some people could notbear being separated rom their weapons and committed suicide... (ene Krajine - rat, egzodus i izbeglitvo/Te Women o Krajina - War, Exodus and Exile/, Belgrade, 1996, 287).12Tis is borne out by the example, amply covered by the media, o grandmother Danica Obradovi (shown

on the Krajina television afer the Medak Pocket operation), but also by the moving story o the widowMarina, 27: ... Near my house [v

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