czech pan-slavism before the first world war

Czech Pan-Slavism before the First World WarAuthor(s): J. F. N. BradleySource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 40, No. 94 (Dec., 1961), pp. 184-205Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4205330 .

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Czech Pan-Slavism Before

the First World War

J. F. N. BRADLEY

I

THE clash between German and Czech nationalismin Bohemia reached a decisive phase in the last decade of the I gth century.' In the past the Germans had attacked and manhandled Czech Sokol excursionists in German districts and in turn had been attacked and manhandled in Czech regions; but such clashes seemed relatively innocuous in comparison with the riots and scenes of violence in the I89os. The Pan- Germans, especially, organised themselves for riot and the Czechs, though in a less organised way, were able to retaliate successfully.2 Perhaps by then the Pan-Germans had come to realise that they were fighting a losing battle; hence their desperate arrogance. Explosive mass rioting, which had so far been a German monopoly, was now being used to justify the Czech demands.3 The Pan-Germans were thus forced to turn more and more towards their brothers in the Reich and gradually became a cause of concern not only to the Czechs but also to the Austrian authorities.4

On 7 May I897 K. H. Wolf, one of the leading Bohemian deputies, declared amid violent scenes in the Reichsrath, that 'the Germans would not stand everything from the Czechs, Slovenes and other-in- ferior nationalities'.5 His arrogance was only equalled by the brutally clear enunciation of his aims by the Pan-German leader Schbnerer, who demanded an Anschluss which would incorporate the Austrian lands in a German Confederation. Since they unfortunately lived in those lands the Czechs and Slovenes would have to be completely Germanised.6 If the Pan-Germans were clear and precise in formu- lating their aims they were however vague and confused in dealing with their Pan-Slav opponents.

1 Based on a quantitative comparison of Czech and German demonstrations and riots, Vienna, Verwaltungsarchiv, Bdhmen, 22, Statthalter 11239, 31 October I890; Ministerium des Innern (hereafter quoted as M. des L) Protokol Hummer4058, i o October i891I; PN2344, 4July I893; PN2775, i i August I893; Statt. I238I, 3 December I893; Statt. 399, 22January i894; PNI239, 6 May I894; PNI462, 23 March 1895; PN4226, 28June I896; PN800g, 7 August I897; PN9I94, 8 September I897; PN646i, 4 August I898 etc. The documents referred to as Ministerium des Innern, Statthalter, and Prague police president or Prague police reports are in the Verwaltungsarchiv, Vienna. All other documents, such as Slawische Angelegenheiten, Polizei Direktion, Wien, telegrams and reports from or to ambassadors or consuls are in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna.

2 See the Badeni demonstrations, Bohmen 1897, Protokol Nummer 8oo I-I23458. 3 For German demonstrations see Statt. I 1239, 31 October I890; PN4058, IO October

I89I ;4173, i8October I89I ;Statt. 5046, i7December I891 ;4244,244,24October I89I etc. 4 M. des L PN9927, 29 September 1897; Statt. I I i83, 24June I899 etc. 5 E. Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, London, I 938, p. 44. 6 Wiskemann, Op. Cit., p. 40-I.



CZECH PAN-SLAVISM BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR I85

The Pan-Germans remembered the Pan-Slav movement in Russia during the Balkan war in the I870S. From this and other manifestations of Pan-Slavism they deduced that Russia was a menace to German- dom above all in the Balkans,7 and they feared most a united Pan-Slav front, such as had brought success in the Balkans in the i870S.8 Russian influence in the Balkans was a threat to Germandom; its more immediate Slavonic opponents in Bohemia were linked with this threat and the Germans of Bohemia were therefore assured of the sympathies and help of all Germans; hence Dr Karel Kramar's 'Neo-Slavism' became for them 'eine Neuauflage des alten politischen Panslawismus'9 and (quoting Professor Pogodin) 'Der Neoslawismus ... schon durch seine blosse Existenz eine Bedrohung des osterreichischen Deutsch- tums.'10

The Pan-Germans proved excellent propagandists who succeeded in confusing the issue to such an extent that Pan-Slavism was believed to be a political reality. Above all they succeeded in compromising the Slavs with the crown, by revelations of alleged treasonable conspira- cies.1' As a result even now the nature of Czech Pan-Slavism has not been fully understood.

Pan-Slavism has been defined in many ways and interpreted in even more. At the time the term was applied to any and every manifestation of Slavonic solidarity regardless of its nature and extent.'2 It is indeed evident, although some doubt it, that Pan-Slavism existed in many forms, that there were phases in its development and that it was chiefly an ideology and a 'public sentiment' rather than a political movement.13

The effectiveness of Pan-Slavism as an ideology and the importance of its practical application in Bohemia (known as Slavonic reciprocity -slovanska vzajemnost) in the first stages of the Czech Revival are more or less established.'4 The Slavophiles, as a Russian phenomenon and at the same time an aspect of Pan-Slavism, have also been thoroughly studied;15 so has the Pan-Slav movement in Russia in the I 88os.16

7 Das Verhalten der Tschechen im Weltkriege, Vienna, I 9 I 8, p. 16. 8 Ibid., p. I4. 9 Ibid., p. 12. 10 Ibid., p. I5- 11 Ibid., pp. 8-I23; see also Dr Kramar's trial, Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Polizei

Direktion Wien, Pr Z 2 I636/83, 15 May I9I 6; Vzudee generacf, ed. V. Skrach, 2 vols., Prague, I930-31, II, pp. 289 if.

12 Cf. E. Benes, Uvahy o slovanstvi, London, no date, p. 56; for definitions see M. Weingart, Slovanskd vzajemnost, Bratislava, I926, pp. 5, 200; H. Kohn, Pan-Slavism, Indiana, 1953, p. I; A. Fischel, Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg, Berlin-Stuttgart, I 9 I 9; alsoJ. Pekar 's review of that book, 6eskj casopis historickj, I919, p. 36 *; B. H. Sumner, Survey of Russian History, London, I 944, p. 242; H. Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, London, 1952, pp. 90-3.

13 H. Arenth, The Burden of Our Time, London, 1951, pp. 227, 238. 14 A. Prazak, Nas'e obrozeni, Prague, 1940, pp. I58-72; I. Pfaff, V. Zavodsky, Tradice

cesko-ruskych vztahui v dejinach, Prague, I957, pp. 46-127; Kohn, op. cit., pp. 9-I I; Weingart, op. cit., pp. I70-229.

15 Cf. N. V. Riazanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles, Cambridge, Mass., 1952.

16 Cf. B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans, I870-I880, London, I937.



I86 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

Little attention however seems to have been paid to the later phase of Pan-Slavism, a phase lasting some thirty years, immediately preceding the first world war.17

The little that has been written on this period originates mostly in Germany and jumbles together ideology and power politics so as to justify the description of this phase of Pan-Slavism as that sinister, purposeful plotting of 'Slavdom against Germandom which eventually caused the war'.18 Slavonic writers who have dealt with the subject were either scholars who were not analysing the phenomenon but mainly speculating on selected facts, often of great anthropological value but with little bearing on the socio-political aspect of the problem,19 or they were journalists who were more interested in arguments about the usefulness or disadvantages of Pan-Slavism than in analysis. The few Slavonic politicians who have treated the subject in their memoirs or essays either over-emphasised or under-estimated its importance. 20

Pan-Slavism is an important element for the understanding of the later phase of Czech nationalism and for the study of the causes of the first world war for, though originally a purely internal factor in Czech policy, as foreign affairs began to dominate political life in the Habs- burg monarchy and Pan-German pressure mounted, it gradually became the foreign policy of Czech nationalism. It thus posed the problem of'official' (state) and 'unofficial' (national) foreign relations, particularly among the Slavonic nations. While it is generally accepted that 'official' Russia pursued her foreign policy without much regard for the other Slavonic nations21 unless her interests happened to coincide with theirs,22 it is also clear that these interests often did coincide in Europe, and their coincidence in the Balkans was the actual cause of the final eruption in I914.23

The German and Austrian foreign offices came to believe that the dangerous situation in the Balkans was not merely the result of Serbian and Russian ambitions in the area but part of a larger and more omi- nous conspiracy in which all Slavonic states and nations (the whole

17 A great number of 'pamphlets' has appeared on this subject and it has also been dis- cussed within the context of state relations but no scholarly treatment of 'unofficial' (non- state) relations has yet been published.

18J. Pekaf, op. cit., p. 36I; Kohn, op. cit., p. I98; G. P. Gooch, Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft, London, I946, p. 54.

19 Cf.J. Horak, Z djin slovanskjch literatur, Prague, 1948; M. Weingart, Slovanskd vzajemnost, Bratislava, I926; Pfaff-Zavodsky, op. cit., etc.

20 On Kramiar 's views see E. Benes, op. cit., pp. 15-I7; Benes assessed various Pan-Slav aberrations critically and came to believe in a 'realistic' conception of Pan-Slavism, namely constant cultural relations and occasional political assistance, op. cit., pp. 30, 66-70; cf. also Z. Fierlinger, Ve sluZbach CSR, Prague, I948, pp. I82-6.

21 A.J. P. Taylor, The Strugglefor Mastery in Europe, London, 1954, pp. 442, 463; also T. G. Masaryk, Svetova revoluce, Prague, 1925, pp. 25-7.

22 Taylor, op. cit., p. 45I; Masaryk, op. cit., p. 29. 23 Gooch, op. cit., p. 104; Taylor, op. cit., p. 485.




'race') were to some extent implicated. 24 This seemed especially true of the Czechs; hence the importance of Czech Pan-Slavism in the development of Czech nationalism and of Czech nationalism in foreign affairs.

It would be untrue to say that no one in Serbia or even in Bohemia wished for the destruction of Austria-Hungary.25 The real question however seems to be -whether the combination of the minor Slavonic peoples and Russia was possible and whether, even if possible, it would have been able to bring about the collapse of the monarchy. The Austrian foreign office based its assessment of the situation on suspicions, and possibly the greatest factor in determining their direction was the traditional Pan-Slavism of the Czechs.26 By starting a war in order to teach the Serbs a lesson and to liquidate the Southern Slav question, it was believed that internal problems, especially the Czech question would be solved as well. 27

II

Whether German or Slavonic, all writers on Pan-Slavism agree on one of the sources of this phenomenon, linguistic affinity.28 Czech writers usually over-estimated the importance of this affinity and conveniently enlargedit toinclude otherless plausible similarities such as the 'national character', and 'Slavonic democracy' and in the end developed these similarities into a cultural doctrine. While the Czechs were more interested in tracing the awareness of linguistic similarities among the Slavs and in advocating a common Slavonic language, or three basic langu- ages, or at least a Slavonic alphabet, the Germans concentrated on the political implications of these philological interests and proposals. A. Fischel, while claiming for German savants the initial scientific research in Slavonic philology, detected in Dobrovsky's suggestion for printing Serbian orthodox books in Austria the first beginnings of the Pan-Slav conspiracy. 30

24 Bethmann-Hollweg's 'struggle between Slavdom and Germandom' might have been arhetorical means to get a war budget passed (Gooch, op. cit., p. 54), but Moltke and Conrad were absolutely sure of the inevitability of war (Taylor, op. Cit., p. 496).

25 Taylor, op. cit., p. 485; J. Kiziek, 'OeskU burzoasni politika a "6eska otAzka" v letech 1900-19 I4', (6eskoslovenskj casopis historicky, IV, Prague, 1958, pp. 656-9).

26 The Austrian ministry of the interior passed on to the foreign office all police reports concerning Czech Pan-Slavism, whether they concerned the National Council and its planned foreign relations committees (Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, 113/4 I.B., I6 January I908 to Berchtold), Polish visitors (ibid. 445/4 I.B., 2 March I908) or Russian students in Prague (ibid. I I 4/4 I.B., I 6January I 908).

27 A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, London, I952, 2nd imprint, p. 232. 28 K. Horalek, Uvod do studia slovanskychjazykuz, Prague, 1955, p. 40; Benes, op. cit., p. I 2;

Masaryk, op. cit., pp. 5i6-I 7; Weingart, op. cit., p. 3-14;J. Bidlo, DMjiny slovanstva, Prague, 1927, p. 8; A. Prazki, Nd rod se brdnil, Prague, p. I I.

29 Horalek, op. cit., p. i i; Benes, op. cit., pp. 66-7; Hlidka, III, 1898, p. 3I8; J. Vlcek, Dejiny eeske literatury, Prague, 1951, p. 317.

30 Fischel, op. cit., p- 57-

G



i88 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

J. Kollar's exposition of philological Pan-Slavism remained for a long time the basis for further philological and scholarly interest in Slavonic studies. However he supplemented his philological theories with useful cutural ideas and suggestions, such as exchanges of books among Slavonic scholars, and thus gave his theories an ideological and even practical value. 3l Since his 'ideological' treatise, Uberdie literarische Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stdmmen und Mundarten der slavischen Nation, appeared at a time when there was no Czech political leadership, it became a manifesto of the Czech intelligentsia, naturally interested in the Czech language and Slavonic philology. When cir- cumstances changed and the Czech intelligentsia overnight turned into the political leaders of the Czech nation, Koll'ar's treatise became a practical political instrument in the constitutional era after the I848 revolution, and one of its results was the Slavonic Congress of I848.32

The consequences of the Slavonic Congress, of the Slavonic Exhibi- tion of i 867 in Moscow, and of similar cultural ventures were distressing enough politically, but the Czechs never learned from these failures; for in spite of political setbacks at this stage, culturally Czech nationalism was benefiting.33 In the first period of the national revival, when national consciousness was still tenuous, there was a natural desire for alliances with existing Slavonic states who, like the Czechs, were represented by their intelligentsias. At this stage 'Pan-Slav tribalism appeared as the nationalism of those peoples who had not participated in the national emancipation and had not achieved the sovereignty of a nation-state'.34 T. G. Masaryk's 'escape from smallness' is still a valid psychological explanation of this philological Pan-Slav and nationalist phase.35 Generation after generation was instructed in and influenced by philological arguments, whether those of A. Marek in the I 820S,36 of K. Krama'r in I 898,37 of F. Barto's in I 89938 or of the professors who drafted the resolution of the Slavonic Congress in Sofia in I9 I.39

This persistent philological Pan-Slav tradition was accompanied by imnportant social factors: the Czech nationalist leadership was mostly

31 Uber die Wechselseitigkeit zwischen den verschiedenen Stdmmen und Mundarten der slavischen Nation, Pest, 1837; cf. summary of Kollar's views in J. Horak, Z dejin literatur slovanskfch, Prague, 1948, p. 33; also A. Prazak, 'Kollar and Literary Pan-Slavism', (The Slavonic Review, V, London, 1927, p. 336 ff.).

32 J. M. Cernry, Boj za prdvo, Prague, I 893, p. I 70; T. G. Masaryk, Karel Havlicek, Prague, I896, pp. 398-9.

33 V. A. Francev, Korespondence P. j. Safafika, 3 vols, Prague, I928, II, p. 955; K. Krofta, Dejiny leskoslovenskl, Prague, 1946, p. 633.

34 Arenth, op. cit., p. 222. 35 Masaryk, op. cit., p. 397; F. Vodicka repeats this idea in 'Vztah obrozensk6 literatury k

literarnimu dedictvi', (Studie a prdce linguisticke, K 6o. narozeninadm akademika Bohuslava Havrdnka, I, Prague, 1954, p. 448).

36 V1cek, op. cit., p. 317- 37 Dr Kramar's proposal for an all-Slav language in Ndrodni Listy quoted in Hlidka, IV,

Brno, I899, p. 3I8. 38 F. Bartos, 'Nekolik slov o literarni vzsajemnosti slovanske', (Hlidka, IV, 1899, p. 357 if.). 39J. HorAk, Nasle kulturni ukoly v slovanstvu, Prague, 1936, pp. 23-4.




composed of intellectuals40 and Czech intellectuals needed jobs and some kind of social recognition. From the beginning they received both from Russia and other Slavonic countries. In the early part of the century Russians made grants to Czech scholars and some of them were given positions in Russia.41 Throughout the igth century the unem- ployed Czech intellectual found refuge in Russia,42 Serbia,43 Croatia,44 and Bulgaria.45 Pan-Slav sympathy on the Czech side was certainly based on solid foundations and as late as 19I2, during the Balkan wars, the Czechs opposed Austrian entrance into the war against the Balkan Slavs partly on this account.46

Considering the social position of the early Czech nationalists in their own country it must have seemed a great honour when the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences and the various other Slavonic societies elected them to honorary membership.47 Hanka was very proud of his Russian order48 and Dr Brauner was extremely vexed that he did not receive a Russian decoration because of intervention by the Austrian ambassador.49 These three factors alone, namely philological interests, economic dependence and the outlet for social ambitions would not however have sufficed to sustain such a public sentiment as Pan- Slavism became in Bohemia in the i gth century. Repressive measures and Czech press publicity were mainly responsible for its survival.

In his history of Russia Florinsky considers that the chief importance of Russian Pan-Slavism was the reaction which it produced outside Russia. 50 It would not be far from the truth to say that in Bohemia Pan- Slavism's chief achievement was the reaction which it provoked among the Germans. It was perhaps understandable that the police should arrest young Czech patriots (in the period before I848) when they

40J. M. Cerny, op. cit., p. 12 1; cf. the composition of the National Committee in I848. 41 Bidlo, op. cit., p. I77 f; Sir B. Pares, A History of Russia, London, I947, p. 419; on

Chleborad see C. Horacek, Pocdtky &esk6ho hnuti dilnickt'ho, Prague, 1933, p. 59; on Zeyer see 'Z korespondenceJ. Zeyera', ((asopis ceskeho musea, Prague, 1902, pp. 233, 244-5).

42 Sebrane listy F. L. Celakovskeho, Prague, I869, Celakovsky to Kamaryt, 29 April I830, pp. 177 ff; F. Kovarik, Zd5itky a dojmy ruskiho Cecha za carstvi, Prague, I932, pp. 25-30; Rodinne listy Karla Sabiny, Prague, 1947, p. 15.

43 In i88o Rieger was asked officially by Risti6 to send Czech railway technicians to Serbia, cf.J. Heidler, Pfispevky k listari Dra Frant. Lad. Riegra, 2 vols, Prague, I925-I926, II (1926), p. 134.

44J. Polivka, 'Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti', (6eskl casopis historicky, Prague, 1917, pp. 262-77); cf. also Bidlo, op. cit., p. 187.

45 J. K. Jirec'ek became Bulgarian minister of education at the age of 25, see Iz arkhiva K. Irechek, Sofia, 1953, pp. 82-3; also D. Slaisova, 'Ohlas prvni vailky balkansk6 1912-I9 13 v cesk6m prostredi', (Slovanske' historicke studie, IL, Prague, I955, p. 244).

46 Slaisova, op. Cit., p. 240. 47 Cf. K. Paul, 'Safarik a Vuk', (Slavia, VIII, Prague, 1929, p. 555); B. Vaclavek, 6eskj

listdr', Prague, I949, KollAr to Stanek, I9 May I844, p. 239; V. A. Francev, op. cit., II, p. 955, Safarik to Vostokov, 8 July I836; cf. also T. Schiemann, 'Einer russische Denkschrift aus demJahre I859 oder i86o', (Zeitschriftjur osterreichische Geschichte, Vienna, 191 2, pp. 247 ff.).

48J. Neruda, 'V. Hanka' ((as, I5, Prague, 20January i86i, pp. 240-270). 49 'Dr F. A. Brauner', Otttiv slovnik nauInj, IV, Prague, I89I, pp. 6oo-6o I; also ibid, XXI,

1904, p. 713, onRieger. 50 M. T. Florinsky, Russia. A History and an Interpretation, 2 vols, New York, I 953, I, p. 89.




congregated with refugee revolutionary Poles. 51 But the secret police was equally disquieted by Kollar's Wechselseitigkeit and had Kollar shadowed.52 Young Czech students were arrested in Vienna on suspicion of Pan-Slav activity as early as I 829. After interrogation the police had to release them for they proved utterly innocent: their political ideas reflected the high level of literary sophistication they were so actively pursuing. 53 The Slavonic Congress of I 848 caused the authorities to put a stop to this relatively benevolent handling of suspected Pan-Slavs. The Hungarians especially proved both suspicious and ruthless.54 Patriotic Czechs were roughly treated on suspicion of being Pan-Slavs.55 Such petty persecutions not only helped to keep these ideas alive, but gave them a quality of national resistence. The hue and cry of the German press and the gradual organisation of the Pan- German elements only intensified public interest and led to a corre- sponding reaction in the Czech press.

In the I 870s the Pan-Germans set up a loose organisation and carried out their agitation by means of symbols, songs, national uniforms and mutual visits. 56 The Czechs quickly took over this technique and intro- duced Slavonic caps, uniforms,57 adopted a Pan-Slav song, Hej, Slovane', which they sang on any and every occasion,58 and when they grew more prosperous they also organised visits to Slavonic 'brethren'.59

Perhaps one of the main reasons for the survival of Pan-Slavism as a public sentiment in Bohemia was the incessant attention paid to it by the Czech nationalist press. In the early days of the revival the Czech press was partly dependent on Slavonic subscribers. Even later, newspaper editors were interested in cultivating Slavonic reciprocity, which meant exchanges of books and news.60 Pan-Slav influence in the Czech press however made itself really felt in the late i 86os. In I867 Dr J. Gregr visited Russia with Palacky and Rieger to 'demonstrate' and on returning to Bohemia he became a convert to uncritical russophilism.61

51J. Heidler, op. cit., I, p. io; Z. H'ajek, 'Zapomenuty rusofil Dr F. Ott', (Pocta Fr. Trdvnf6kovi a F. Wollmanovi, Brno, I948, pp. I30-2).

52 V. A. Francev, 'Kollar i russkie uchenye v Zagrebe', (Sveslavenski zbornik, Zagreb, 1930, pp. 273-82).

53 Hajek, op. cit., pp. I34-44. 54 B. Nemcova, Listy, I, Prague, 195I, p. 231: 'u nichje kazdy rusofil, kdo mluvi slovansky

jazyk'. 55 Z. V. Tobolka, Ceskd Politika, III, Prague, I909, pp. i69-70; Krofta, op. cit., pp. 630-

632. 56 Arenth, op. cit., p. 38. 57 R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, I94I, pp. 2I2-I3,

228-29. 58 M. des I., PN3o6o, i 6 September I 893; PN5382, I 9 August i 896; PN2542, I 7 March

I 898; PN3794,25 April I 898; Statthalter 7670, i 6August i89 I; cf. also Benes, op. cit., p. 8o. 59 K. KramAr , Slovanstvo, Obraz jeho minulosti a pfttomnosti, Prague, I9I 2, p. XIV, also

J. Schreiner, 'Sokolstvo', ibid., pp. 7I-20. 60 VAclavek, op. cit., p. 289, Erben to Vraz, 20 July I842; p. 955, Safarik to Pogodin, 6

August I837; V. St'astny, 'Krymska valka a soudoba ceska spolecnost' (Slovansk6 historicke studie, I, Prague, I955, p. I35); E. Chalupny, Karel Havlieek, Prague, I921, p. 32;J. Kaizl, Z mMhozivota, 5 vols, Prague, I909-I9I2, III, Part i (9 i I), p. 26I.

61 M. Prelog, Pout' Slovanui do Moskvy roku I867, Prague, 193 1, p. I 14.



CZECH PAN-SLAVISM BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 191

He was still further confirmed in his Pan-Slav sympathies by the Balkan war of I877-8, when the Russians actively helped their Serbian and Bulgarian brothers; this war also saved his newspaper, Ndrodnz Listy, from bankruptcy. Until the war the newspaper had run at a loss; but during the war, which was extensively covered in the newspaper, sales went up and never dropped again.62 Ndrodni Listy was the most effi- ciently run Czech newspaper and other Czech newspapers had to imitate its vivid style and journalistic ability if they were to survive its competition.63 Imitation of Ndrodni Listy was not confined only to its style but extended also to the ideas which it propagated. The Pan-Slav theme which ]drodni Listy dwelt on so constantly could not be ignored by other newspapers.64

In addition to the nationalist political press, the second half of the I gth century saw many attempts to publish Slavonic newspapers and journals in Bohemia. Sometimes these publications were stimulated by events in Slavonic countries,65 at other times by subsidies from Slavonic personalities, or simply by individual enthusiasm.66

There were also Slavonic scholarly reviews.67 Though the number of Slavonicjournals differed from year to year they were always numerous enough to keep the public informed.68 Even the conservative clerical journal Hlidka had a regular Slavonic page.69 In I898 the publisher Simacek began to publish the Slovansky pfehled which eventually devoted the most systematic interest to Slavonic problems.70

Against this background the problem of Pan-Slavism in Bohemia appears in quite a different light and certainly no longer appears as a political conspiracy. But the political activity of Czechs who had been moulded by this atmosphere acquired a new complexity of which they were not always aware themselves, especially since they frequently did not realise the full impact on others of the Pan-Slav aspect of Czech nationalism. On the whole they disregarded the implications of Pan- Slavism in foreign affairs, and their almost inevitable blunders only served to strengthen official distrust.

In the I 88os this distrust was kept alive by Rieger's inability to understand his new position or the implications of his 'social contacts' with other Slavs. Though he was sometimes willing to forego his

62 K. Tuima, '50 let boje a prace', (Pul stoleti Ndrodnich List', Prague, I9I0, p. i6). 63 Heidler, op. cit., II, pp. 280-8I, 383. 64 Heidler, ibid., pp. 156, 389; cf. also Osve'ta, Prague, i888, II, pp. 957-75. 65 A. Frinta, Nate tiskove orgdny slovansk?vzajemnosti, Prague, I932, pp. 14, I8, 29-30. 66 Frinta, op. cit., pp. i6, 20, 31. 67 Frinta, ibid., pp. I5-I6, 24; Slovanska pedagogicka revue, Slovanske listy, Ndrodopis?o

sbornlk Ieskoslovanskj, Vestnfk slovanskych starozitnosti, etc. 68 Frinta, op cit., p. 44; see the list of Slavonic publications, I848-19I4. 69 Hlidka, II, pp. 49, 209-I i etc.; IV, pp. 62-3 etc.; XVIII, p. 366 etc.; XIX, pp. 393,

470 etc. 70 Frinta, op. cit., p. 26; I898-I914 (and after the first world war to date with an inter-

ruption from I939-1945) published monthly by Simiac'ek in conjunction with the Czech Academy of Sciences: cf. Slovanski prehled, III, Prague, I90 1, p. 347.




western, mostly French, connections and was even prepared to cancel projected tours in France in order to avoid foreign policy compli- cations,71 he showed much less sense when Slavs were involved. He kept his house open to any Slavonic visitor,72 paid visits to the various Slavonic parts of the monarchy73 and called regularly on the Russian ambassador in Vienna.74 These moves were not calculated political actions but the result of sentimental habits. It was beyond Rieger's comprehension that Count Martinic should avoid meeting some Slavs who hadjust been with him.75

Together with this clumsiness in personal relations went Rieger's ideas on foreign affairs. He realised that owing to historical and geo- graphical conditions the Russians could not be of great help to the Czechs and he dreaded a German hegemony in Central Europe.76 The crown however was bound to come into conflict with German interests and in this conflict Rieger saw a chance for the Czechs.77 His ultimate aim in foreign affairs therefore was to lead Austria, which in fact meant Francis Joseph, away from the German Reich. But the emperor was very sensitive to any interference in foreign affairs, which he regarded as his exclusive domain, and the way in which Rieger chose to drive a wedge between Austria and Germany, namely the sporadic advocacy of a pro-Slav and pro-Russian policy, clearly irritated him.78 Rieger was defeating himselfbefore he could even attempt to win the emperor's favour.

Rieger's Slavonic susceptibilities also created internal problems. He could not seek an alliance with the Magyars, though he realised how powerful they were, because the Slovaks would have called him a traitor.79 Endless considerations of what Russia would say if the Czechs reached an understanding with the Germans interfered with any nego- tiations.80 For all these mistakes Rieger had satisfactory excuses: his Pan-Slav past was the most plausible. He was essentially a man of the revival and he had no consistent foreign policy apart from occasional impulses in favour of the Slavs.81 In any case his judgments were based on insufficient and often dubious information which he gathered most unsystematically.82 He blundered with good intentions and though he

71 Heidler, Op. cit., pp. 243 f., also pp. I28, I41, I45, 249, 436. 72 Ibid., pp. 145, I72,236,286. 73 Ibid., pp. 173, 25I- 74 Ibid., pp. I44, 272, 299, 356, 389, 402. 75 Ibid., p- I 30- 76 Ibid., pp. 229, 297-9. 77 Ibid., pp. 207, 413. 78 Ibid., pp. I63, 266; as early as I870 Rieger advanced his views in a memorandum to

Beust, cf. 'Rieger', Ottziv slovnik nauiny, op. cit., p. 709. " Ibid., pp. 138, 214; also F. Dominois, 'Hurban, Rieger et l'unite tch6coslovaque', (Melanges publils en l'honneur de M. P. Boyer, Paris, I925, pp. 2 I6-22).

80 Heidler, II, op. cit., pp. 128, 379. 81 Ibid., pp. 34 I, 404, I 46. 82 Ibid., pp. 144, 250, 259, 263, 267, 300, 314, 324, 343-5, 346-8.




personally suffered for his blunders he could not harm the Czech nation at this stage.

There was no change in the nationalist foreign policy when the Young Czechs achieved power in i890.83 Their first years were spent in relative political isolation84 and, at the end of the century, in hopeful but abortive bids for power in Vienna.85 This internal preoccupation prevented them from devoting systematic attention to foreign affairs. Not that they were any less enthusiastic about Slavs in general and Russia in particular,86 nor did they sever their cultural contacts with the various Slavonic periodicals and journals ;87 this activity was simply less advertised and the press devoted more of its space to the political struggle in Vienna and the frequent riots at home.88

The rise of the Young Czechs brought with it Dr K. Kramair. His entry into political life was inconspicuous, as a junior partner of Pro- fessor Kaizl and Professor T. G. Masaryk.89 From the start however Kramair showed a predilection for foreign affairs. In I 890 he character- istically wrote to his friend Dr Kaizl: 'We must all systematically "cultivate" the Slavonic Idea [inter-Slavonic contacts in Czech termi- nology], for in the end it is our ultimum refiigium'.90 As a member of the Reichsrat he spoke in the Delegations and repeated Rieger's old mis- take of advocating friendly relations with Russia and cold-shouldering Germany, without having acquired sufficient influence with the foreign office or the emperor.9' In I898 he embarrassed the Austrian foreign office with hiis articles in the Revue de Paris, in which he called the Austro-Hungarian alliance with Germany an outworn luxury.92 Though there were one or two other extremist foreign experts besides Kramar among the Young Czechs,93 Kaizl's influence soon became decisive and foreign affairs were relegated for the time being to the background.

Kaizl proved a cautious and shrewd politician. He refused to see in the Slavonic idea anything but loose cultural inter-Slavonic contacts,

83 Tobolka, op. cit., pp. 522 ff.; Kaizl, op. cit., III, Part 2, p. I 5; H. Traub, Nae politicke dijiiy v I9. stoleti, Prague, I926, pp. 134-5.

84 K. Kramaf, Ceskc Politika, III, Prague, I909, p. 526. 85 Ibid., pp. 570-645. 86 K. Capek, Hovory s TGM, London, I941, pp. 99-I00; Kaizl, op. cit., I, pp. 315-I6,

340-I . 87 Kaizl, op. cit., II, Part I, p. 584 Kaizl to Kramar, 13 March I890, on the exchange of

books and periodicals with Russian scholars via the Atheneum. 88 The I890S saw extensive rioting in Bohemia, particularly in Prague: Statthalter

I 1 239,3 I October I 89o; M. des I, PN4338, 30 October I 89 I, PN3377, i July I 892; PN2344, 4 July I893; (Omladina) PN2850, I9 August I893; PN399, 27 January I894; PN1462, 23 March I895; PN132, 7January I896; Statt. I25, 3January I897; PN4253, 9 September 1897; 8 January I898; PN535, 2I January I899 etc.

89 Kaizl, op. cit., II, p. 391, 592; III, Part I, pp. 58-9. 90 Ibid., II, p. 599, Kramair to Kaizl, 28 July I89O; see also V. Sis, K. Kramacf, Prague,

I930, p. 27. 91 Kaizl, op. cit., III, Part I, pp. 532-3; cf. also K. Kramar, Ceska Politika, III, p. 676. 92 0. H. Wedel, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations I908-I914, California, 1932, p. 24. 93 Kaizl, op. cit., III, Part i, on Dr Vasata, pp. I46, 245; on DrJ. Gregr. p. 242.



194 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

preferably within the monarchy. When the enthusiastic Kramar wanted to advocate an Austro-Russian alliance, Kaizl shrewdly pointed out that Austria was incapable of such a policy. She was not a great power and could only play the role of a greater Switzerland with any hope of success.94 After the fall of Badeni in I897 and of Thun it became increasingly obvious that the Czechs would not come to power by constitutional means, though Kaizl did not give up hope.95

Krama"r had certainly been frustrated by the failures at home and he began to look round for new possibilities. This period of searching for new ways coincided with a renewal of interest in Slavonic contacts.96 In I898 a purely nationalist cultural celebration commemorating the centenary of Palacky's birth was organised in Prague. Since Palacky was a Slavonic personality Slavonic guests were invited. The Austrian government did not object for only academic personalities were asked. Naturally a great number of Slavonic journalists also attended.97 The police took no chances and paid tactful attention, especially to the Russian guests, who, obviously used to such measures, responded well and bowed courteously to the detectives who were detailed to shadow them.98 The celebration was not organised for any Pan-Slav purpose. However the Russians were allowed to make appreciative speeches about Palacky. The retired professor of the Petersburg Military Academy, General Komarov, spoiled the occasion by his purely political and anti-German speech.99 After the celebration the Slavonic guests were entertained and conducted round the sights by the standing committee organising the Palacky celebration.'00 Another totally un- planned event occurred. The Czechjournalists, profiting from the large number of their Slavonic colleagues present in Prague, improvised a Slavonic journalists' conference. The chief item on the agenda of this conference was a Russian-Polish rapprochement. However a less formid- able problem, that of the conflict between Serbs and Croats over the right to export newspapers to Bosnia and Hercegovina almost wrecked the conference. Naturally nothing was settled in either case and in the end the Czechs issued a hopeful declaration that the conference had arrived at the conclusion that journalism was a useful ground for 'Slavonic reciprocity'. This motion was carried.101 But even if the conference proved a political failure it was a great social success. The

94 Kaizl, op cit., III, Part I, pp. 89, 251, 323, especially pp. 532-3, Kaizl to Kramar, i8 June I896.

95 Ibid., pp. 778, 865, i087; cf. also KramrAf, op. cit., p. 792; Taylor, op. Cit., p. 198. 96 A. J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy I867-I9I4, Cambridge, Mass., I 95 1, pp. 328-9 cf.

M. des I., PN3794, 25 April I898; Pfaff-Zavodsky, op. cit., p. 234. 97 Pamatnlk na oslavu Ioo. narozenin F. Palack6ho, Prague, I898, 'Introduction'; also 'Die

Slavische Gaste', (Politik, 23 June I898). 98 M. des I., PN5726, 4July I898 99 Kaizl, op. cit., III, Part 2, pp. 795-6: 'Let Mommsen preach such vulgar nationalist

hatred among his own, but not a Russian, a guest with us. How tactless.' (Kaizl to Skarda 24 June I 898).

100 Hltdka, III, Brno, I898, p. 395. 101 Hlidka, III, Brno, I898, pp. 639-41.




journalists continued their meetings in Slavonic countries, particularly in summer holiday resorts.'02

The social contacts established with the Russians in Prague were renewed in I 90 I in St Petersburg on the occasion of the first perform- ance of the Czech opera Dalibor. General Komarov acted as host. At the banquet he gave in honour of the 'Slavonic' (Czech) guests, a Russian, Doroshevich, again spoiled the occasion by tactlessly pro- claiming that the Slavs looked to Russia only in two cases: when they wanted money or when they wanted to threaten Europe. 103

The Czechs continued to meet the Russians and other Slavs at various international congresses'04 and there was a spate of new Slav- onic journals and periodicals in Bohemia, especially in I903 with the Russian-Japanese war'05 and in I 905 when the first Russian revolution broke out.'06

Despite increased Pan-Slav social activity and journalistic interest in Slavonic affairs, in contrast to the Pan-Germans the Pan-Slavs did nothing to organise popular sentiment into a movement. In Bohemia only two social clubs existed in Prague which boasted of a limited membership and complete devotion to the Slavonic cause.107 The Ndrodni Rada, the supreme nationalist council, began to organise its foreign section only in I 907,108 at a time when the 'Neo-Slav' movement was under way; it was the first attempt at creating an elite group, if not a mass organisation, of Pan-Slav sympathisers.'09 Bohemia not only lacked an organisation to sustain and direct the Pan-Slav sentiments; it lacked unanimity of views on any kind of Slavonic policy. The Ndrodnz Listy was consistently russophile, but its russophilism was that of official Russia, while most of the other Czech papers were opposed to tsarism.110 Thus when Professor Kareyev lectured in Prague the Ndrodnz Listy and the Slovansky klub boycotted the lecture, for he was considered persona non grata from the official Russian point of view."'

102 Hlidka, IV, I899, pp. 22I ff.; Slovansky pfehled, II, Prague, I900, p. 23-4; ibid., III, Prague, I901, pp. 346-7; 399, 396; Hlidka, XIX, Brno, 1902, p. 470.

103 Slovanskj pfehled, III, Prague, 1901, p. 244. 104 Slovansky piehled, II, I900, pp. 23-4; ibid., III, I901, p. 5O, 84, 193; Hlldka, XXI, Brno,

I 904, p. 6 I 3; 6eska Revue, IV, Prague, 1900, pp. 324-6. 105 Frinta, op. cit., pp. 28-9; May, op. cit., p. 396. 106 Prague police report I 8 I83 pras/ai 1905; Statt. 19599, 22 November 1905; Dr Soukup's

speech on 28 November I905; cf. also Pfaff-Z6vodsky, op. cit., pp. 246 if. 107 Hlidka, XIX, Brno, 1902, p. 773; they were the Rusky krouzek and the Slovanskj klub;

the latter was founded in I899 (Rocenka slovansklho uistavu, V-VII, Prague, I932-I934, p. I 257).

108 M. des L, PN348, I 4 January 1907; Statt. 2 I 8 I 6,28 October I 907; 24124,3O November 1907.

109 In 1907 Dr Schreiner raised the idea of making the Sokol Congress into a Pan-Slav demonstration. The foreign office was alarmed at first (M. des I., PN2443, 30 March 1907) and Pacak and Coudenhove uttered warnings. Though Pan-Slav matters were raised at the conference nothing came of it (Statt. I 5403, 24 August I 907) .

110 Fischel, op. cit., p. 472; Slovansky pfehled, III, Prague, 190I, p. 396; Horak, Z deiin literatur slovanskych, Prague, I 948, p. 480.

1 Slovanskj pfehled, III, Prague, 1901, p. 498.

G*



i96 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW

Clerical Slovaks and with them Czech clericals, accused the Slovanskj prehled of beingjust another progressive paper, an offshoot of Masaryk's journal (Cas (odnoz Casu), not a Slavonic organ.112

Into this organisational and ideological chaos in Bohemia Kramar launched his 'Neo-Slav Movement', a serious attempt to sort out the ideological confusion and create some order and organisation, which however was doomed to fail. Kramar's name is rightly linked with the Neo-Slav movement.113 At the time when he began to take part in Pan- Slav activity, he was already an experienced politician who had suffered frustration in both Vienna and Prague.114 He had behind him the bitter disappointment of the general election of I907 when after successfully fighting for universal suffrage he was not elected in the first ballot.115 His party failed also in this election and lost importance in comparison with the social democrats and agrarians. He saw clearly that his role in parliament would be that of a deputy of a minor party and not that of a national leader.'16 His career in domestic politics was in fact finished. Therefore, perceiving the trend of Slavonic sentiment in Bohemiall7 and realising that, with Aehrenthal's ascendency, there was a concentration of interest on foreign affairs'18 Kramairf decided to experiment.

On 29 May I 907 a Czech cultural weekly Maj called for a celebration ofthe anniversary of the I 848 Slavonic Congress.119 Independently of this Czech call Professor Brodzenko published in a Russian paper an offer of ioo,ooo rubles to hold a Slavonic Congress, and the Austrian Slavonic deputies were asked by letter to express their views on the idea.'20 They met in Vienna on 27 November I907 to discuss the offer, and elected a committee, with Krama6r as chairman, to study conditions in various Slavonic countries and then recommend acceptance or rejection of the Russian proposal.'2' The proposal was accepted and conference followed upon conference; in I908 the Prague conference took place, in I 909 the Petersburg conference, in I 9 I O the congress in Sofia.'22 Even if Kramar had had personal motives for embarking on the new Slavonic movement, his initial ideas were simple and sound. The movement was to be a Slavonic reply to Pan-German political and

112 Hlidka, XXI, Brno, I904, p. 202. 113 Benes, op. cit., pp. 30, 97; Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 247. 114 Kramai, op. cit. pp. 789-92. 115 M. Sisova, 'Zivot', (K. Kramadr k 50. narozeninm jeho, Prague, 19IO, pp. 39-40); also

Sis, Op. cit., p. I7I. 116 SiS, op. cit., pp. I 79-80; Z. Tobolka, Politick6 dejiny &eskoslovensklho ndroda od roku I848

az do dnedni doby, 3 vols, 1932I-936, Prague, III, Part 2, (1936), pp. 3 I2-I8. 117 Sis, op. cit., p. 200. 118 Taylor, op. cit., p. 2I4. 119 Benes, op. cit., p. IOI. 120 Benes, ibid., p. 10 1-3; cf. also Verwaltungsarchiv Prague police report I I 3/4 I.B., i 6

January I908, confidential to Berchtold and 253/4 I.B., 4 February I908, confidential to Berchtold. 121 Bened, op. cit., p. I02.

122J. S. Hevera, 'Novoslovanstvi', (K. Kramdr' k 50. narozenindm jeho, Prague, 19IO, pp. 130-47); Benes, op. cit., pp. I04-22; also Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Telegram N I5 H to Aehrenthal from St Petersburg 24 April I909; I 8-C, 25 May I909; from Sofia I i June I 9 i o; from St Petersburg 26-E, 6 July I 9 I 0.




economic expansion.123 The economic problem seemed easy enough, but by explaining the political programme of the movement Krama"r was inviting failure. The slogan 'Equality, Fraternity, Liberty' was interpreted by him in the following manner: the movement must bring about a Russian-Polish rapprochement; Russia will beprimus inter pares, a natural protector and leader in spiritual and cultural efforts; and all this would be achieved without revolutions or bloodshed, without destruction of existing states, through cultural and economic activity.124

At first Kramar's personality carried the day and the various partici- pants in the Prague conference were in agreement with his programme.125 Even the Austrian foreign office gave its blessing to the movement but it was much sooner undeceived than Dr Krama' 126 Kramar planned to form a political committee consisting of Slavonic politicians who would formulate policies and influence their individual foreign offices. He wanted a centralised Slavonic press bureau to spread, mould and exploit the Pan-Slav sentiment which already existed, especially in Russia and Bohemia; he wanted to negotiate economic help and expansion and establish an organisational basis for a mass movement by means of the Sokol gymnastic organisations which existed by then in all Slavonic countries.127

Dr Kramar's ideas were never realised and all his efforts failed. The Polish-Russian problem was insoluble.128 Aehrenthal cherished quite different ambitions and refused to be influenced by Dr Kram'r.129 The Poles deserted the movement first.130 The press bureau was never established,131 and the plans for economic expansion also failed to materialise for lack of understanding on the part of the various Slavonic governments or because of unstable political conditions.'32 All that the movement seemed to have achieved was to arouse official suspicions and misunderstanding.

III

The distrust with which the authorities regarded inter-Slavonic relations even within the monarchy was intensified during Aehrenthal's period of office. As far back as I 899 a special file on Pan-Slav activity

123 Benes, op. cit., p. 98; Hevera, op. cit., pp. 132-3. 124 K. Kramar, 'Predmluva', (Slovanstvo, Prague, I9I2, pp. VI-VII); Hevera, ibid., pp.

134-5- 125 Kram'a, ibid., p. VI; Benes, ibid., p. 121. 126 Sis, op. cit., pp. I86-7; Benes, ibid., p. 115. 127 Kramar, op. cit., pp. VII-XIV; Benes, op. cit., pp. 105-10. 128 Benes, op. cit., p. i i i. 129 Benes, op. cit., p. I I5; May, op. cit., p. 451. 130 Hevera, Op. cit., p. 146. 131 Statthalter 24I24, 30 November 1907; J. Horak, op. cit., p. 24; J. Hejret does not even

mention the project ('Slovanske novinarstvi', Slovanstvo, cit. sup.) 132 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Telegram 771, 8 April, 9 i I, confidential to Berchtold;

Dr Preiss negotiated with Stolypin, but there were no results. In the Balkans the Czechs also fared badly; cf. Slaisova, op. cit., pp. 231-244.




(Slawische Angelegenheiten) had existed at the foreign office; up to I 899 Pan-Slav activity was a purely internal matter dealt with by the secret police and the ministry of interior.133 The imperial police always paid meticulous attention to any foreigner who arrived in Bohemia and was likely to interfere in Czech affairs.'34 The most systematic attention was paid to manifestations of Pan-Slav sentiment and the police acted in typical high-handed manner. In I889 the ministry of interior intervened with the archbishop of Prague about allegedly Pan-Slav trends among Czech theological students. It transpired that some of the students were learning Russian and for this offence they were placed under police supervision.135 There were also disturbing rumours rife in Prague which were thoroughly investigated by the police: a philological institute was to be founded in Prague by Dr Zivrna and Pobedonostsev.136 Naturally the institute was never founded and the theological students possibly stopped learning Russian because they found themselves busy enough with their own syllabus, as the archbishop pointed out. But the ministry remained watchful. In I 890 when some Czech settlers from Croatia wanted to visit their motherland the police made searching enquiries. Since no grounds for suspecting such poor devout peasants could be found the visit was allowed.137 Visits of Croat politicians to Prague, where they sometimes received votes of confidence from Czech audiences, were also suspect to the police.138 Most attention however was attracted by the various Slavonic folk- songs which the Czechs sang during agricultural exhibitions,'39 Prague fairs'40 and commemorative celebrations.'4' Though the Marseillaise was also considered dangerous the police seem to have concentrated on countering the Hej, Slovane.'142

While such assiduous attention was paid to Pan-Slav sentiments among the Czechs, Aehrenthal reported to Kalnoky (then minister of foreign affairs) from St Petersburg that though there was no direct Russian interest in Pan-Slavism at the moment, Pan-Slav demonstrations in Prague were being commented upon. In I89I Aehrenthal did not see any danger in this sentiment, especially as far as Russia was concerned.'43 In the i 89os Austrian diplomats seemed to have agreed

133 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Slawische Angelegenheiten I889-I 914. 134 M. des I., PN39I6,24 April i888; 843,2I February I889; 2940, I7August 1892; 5726,

4July I898; 3362, 6June I900 (Danish students football team); 9342, I4June I905; Statt. io830, 7July I905; 2 I 54, 3I October i906, etc.

135 M. des I., PN604, 6 February i889. 136 M. des L, PN5097, 8 December i889; Statt. 904, 6January i89o;952,4January I890. 137 M. des L, 844, 26 February I890; Statt. ii i 8, 9 February I89o; 2I77, Io March I890. 138 M. des L, 1928, 25 May I892; 3794, 25 April I898. 139 AL. des I., 3060, i6 September 1893. 140 Statthalter io830, 7 July 1905. 141 M. des L, 532I, 5372, 5434, 5494, I7, etc. 142 Statt. 3060, i6 September I893; 5382, I9 August i896; M. des I., PN3794, 25 April

3898, etc. 143 Benes, op. cit., p. 83, Aehrenthal to Kalnoky, 24 August I89I.




that Russian Pan-Slavism was dead, but that among the minor Slavs it was in a sense a reaction against Pan-Germanism.144 In I 899 Aehren- thal was certain that Russia was not interested in the Slavs, least of all in the Czechs,'45 and in I903 he attempted to demonstrate that even cultural Pan-Slavism was impossible at this stage and that political Pan-Slavism would mean the destruction of Russia.146

When Aehrenthal became foreign minister he was reputed to be pro-Russian and perhaps at that stage he did believe in the Dreikaiser- bund as the touchstone of Austrian foreign policy.'47 Domestic problems and the atmosphere of the foreign office however soon changed his ideas. Already in I 898 in a secret memorandum to the emperor he had pointed to Russian lack of interest in Slavonic affairs and urged that advantage be taken of this fact to establish Austrian domination in the Balkans. The primary danger to the monarchy, weakened as it was by internal problems, lay in the Balkans, argued Aehrenthal, and a strong new Slavonic state on the Adriatic could easily lend a helping hand to the Czechs and Poles. While advocating German hegemony at home he recommended a strong purposeful policy in the Balkans. Power and purpose were to be represented by 'more and more thousands of bayonets' (hinter der wieder so und so viele tausend Bajonette stehen).148

Aehrenthal never, in I904 or after, fundamentally changed the views outlined in this memorandum. But while he sought to divide the southern Slavs by favouring the Croats,'49 he began to hate the Czechs and Serbs even more than before, for they complicated his task and aims. In I 908 he came to the conclusion that he could not appease the Serbs'50 and the Czechs invalidated (even if the Magyars had per- mitted it) his idea of favouring the Croats by demanding the same treatment for themselves.'5' Finally the Czechs, especially T. G. Masaryk, discredited his Balkan policy by showing the spurious nature of the material on which it was based.'52

Aehrenthal's first years in office were mainly concerned with Russia and Serbia and their Pan-Slavism. He disliked Izvol'sky and thought him responsible for the Pan-Slav influences around the tsar,153 though Berchtold reported that the I907 Slavonic Congress (Sokol Festival) found no favour with Izvol'sky nor with the Russians in general.'54 By

144 Benes, op. cit., p. 87 on Wolkenstein, p. 89 on Pallavicini. 145 Benes, ibid., p. go, Aehrenthal to Kalnoky, 29 September I899. 146 Benes, ibid., p. 84, Aehrenthal to Kalnoky, 12 October I903. 147 Wedel, op. cit., p. 38. 148 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Streng Geheime Akten, I 897-I go 1, fascicle 3, 3 I December

I898. 149 Wedel, Op. cit., p- 55. 150 Wedel, op. cit., p. 55. -151 Ibid., p. 6o. 152 P. Selver, Masaryk, London, 1940, pp. 2I6-43. 153 Wedel, op. cit., p. 52; Benes, op. cit.. p. 123-4. 154 Benes, op. cit., p. I30 Berchtold to Aehrenthal 28 December 1907.




I 908 he was deeply suspicious of Pan-Slavism. Internal Czech develop- ments probably contributed to this hardening of his views. Though the Czech deputies had voted for the annexation of Bosnia and Herce- govina, there had been pro-Serbian demonstrations in Prague.155 The head of the Prague police was now reporting to the foreign ministry that Prague was teeming with activity. The Ndrodni Rada was planning another Slavonic Congress'56 and Aehrenthal feared some concerted Slavonic action. He was not reassured by Forbach's report from Bel- grade that the Serbs were not interested in the 'Neo-Slav movement' and that it was a Czech invention for domestic purposes.'57 At the same time Aehrenthal put much faith in various Serbian documents which were mostly forgeries. One of these documents linked Pan-Serb and Pan-Slav propaganda and activity together and above all implicated Prague and the Czech radicals.158 Aehrenthal's personal struggle with Professor Masaryk over the Friedjung forgeries, even if it discredited his method, could not but strengthen his prejudices.159 Secret information concerning the 'Neo-Slav' movement proved con- tradictory; some reports indicated the fantastic character of some of the Pan-Slavs. The Russian Professor Brodzenko proved to be a fake who had no money;160 English money however appeared in time in support of Pan-Slavism.'61 A report originating from a Czech newspaper and passed to the foreign office stated that a certain Volodi- mirov, a retired professor, was the sinister organiser of a mysterious Pan-Slav League whose organisation network was to be based on the local branches of the Sokol.162

The St Petersburg conference of I 909 increased the confusion; diffi- culties were reported to have arisen between the Neo- and old Pan- Slavs. They appeared so great as to allay all previous suspicions.163 But further events again aroused the authorities. The celebration of the centenary of Gogol"s birth in I909 was one, despite attacks delivered on this occasion by the Russians on Dr Krama".164 Even the failure of the Slavonic Congress in Sofia did not dispel official suspicions. For- bach reported from Belgrade that in Serbia no one took the projected congress seriously.165 Serbian disapproval of Neo-Slavism without the

155 Wedel, op. cit., p. 38; Benes, ibid., p. I34. 156 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Aehrenthal to Berchtold I I3/4 I.B., i6 January I908. 157 Benes, op. cit., pp. I36-7, Forbach to Aehrenthal, i6July i9o8; 5June I909, I7June

I9I0. 158 Wedel, op. cit., pp. 95-7 quotes Conrad, I, i8i-8. 159 Selver, op. cit., p. 237 ff. 160 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Aehrenthal to Berchtold, I47/4/I.B., i8January I908;

253/4/I.B. 4 February I908. 161 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Aehrenthal to Berchtold, Confidential, 445/4/I.B.,

2 March i908. 162 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Aehrenthal to Berchtold, 828/4/I.B., 8 April 1908. 163 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Berchtold to Aehrenthal, Telegram I sH, St Petersburg,

24 April 1909. 164 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Berchtold to Aehrenthal, I8-C, 25 May I909. 165 Benes, op. cit., p. I37, Forbach to Aehrenthal, I7June I9I0.



CZECH PAN-SLAVISM BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR 20I

Poles, and the conflicts raging among the delegates themselves should have shown the evident decline of the Neo-Slav movement, though Masaryk and Klofac still remained personally popular with the Serbs.166

Only the Czechs now continued with their Neo-Slav activity, or what the Austrian foreign office conceived as such. An exhibition in Odessa was visited by a group of Czech teachers who also called on Dr Kramar in the Crimea.167 In I9I I the foreign office learned of yet another Pan-Slav exhibition in Prague. Dr Krama"r consulted the government directly about it and Dr Preiss negotiated with Stolypin, another confusing Czech initiative.168

Aehrenthal died in I9I2 without unravelling the mystery of the Pan- Slav 'conspiracy'. He was succeeded by Berchtold who soon adopted the same line of reasoning on foreign policy, though earlier, like Aehrenthal, he had quite realistically advocated friendly relations with Russia.169 The Pan-Slav nightmare haunted a number ofAustrians and the Czechs did their best to increase suspicions and create greater nervousness.

In I907 the foreign office had received several reports on the Pan- Slav aims of the Sokol organisation. When in June I9I2, some four months before the outbreak of the Balkan wars, another Sokol Congress took place,170 the Austrian foreign office treated the whole affair as a Pan-Slav demonstration. With the arrival of foreign guests the Prague railway station became the centre of Pan-Slav activity. The police reported that the Russians were loudly cheered on their arrival and that afterwards a group of some 200 Czech youths staged a march through Prague and on reaching the editorial offices of Ceske, Slovo dispersed.171 The following day the Russians were cheered again.172

However the importance of the Russian participation in the Sokol Congress must have seemed over-rated even to the foreign office. Among the leaders of the Russian delegation there was only one politician, a duma deputy, A. S. Gizhitsky, a well-known member of the St Peters- burg Slavonic Committee and a participant in the Slavonic Congress in Sofia. The other leading figures were schoolmasters, some ofthem of Czech descent. Delegates from Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia were mostly Sokol leaders with previous connections with the Neo-Slav movement, and personal acquaintances of Dr Krama"r. Dr S. Budisavljevic, a Serbian deputy, was Klofac's friend.'73

166 Benes, ibid., p. 139, Forbach to Aehrenthal, I I April I 9' I ; also Haus-, Hof-, und Staats- archiv, Telegram from Sofia, i I June I9IO, Allslavische Kongress; Aehrenthal, 26E, 6 July I9IO, Pressstimme Russland.

167 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsatchiv, Consul General Odessa, 8/pol, 29July I 9 I O, to Berchtold. 168 Ibid., Aehrenthal to Berchtold, Confidential, 771, 8 April igi i. 169 Wedel, Op. cit., p- 73- 170 Kramar, op. cit., p. XIV. 171 Prague Police President's report I 78, 26 June I 9 I 2. 172 Ibid., I79, 27 June I912. 173 Statthalter I3687, 27June I9I2.




The Prague police was more impressed by the crowd than by the composition of its leadership. Some 500,000 people watched the gymnastic exhibition and above all remained calm and orderly, which for Prague was an exceptional show of discipline.174 If the congress proved a little disappointing from the official point of view, soon the authorities had another chance to suspect that Pan-Slavism was at work.

The Czech bourgeoisie did not want a Balkan war, for it had certain economic stakes on the opposite side.175 The Czech working class disliked wars on principle and organised protest meetings against Austrian intervention. Some Czech reservists refused to board trains taking them to the southern frontier, and when they were forced into them they defiantly sang forbidden Slavonic songs.176 However significant these incidents might have been, the Czechs on the whole, as earlier during the various Polish uprisings and Balkan wars,177 limited themselves to accurate reporting from the front, to moderate medical and financial help to the fighting Slavs and panegyrics by leading Czech poets.178 In contrast the Czech deputies, with very few exceptions, voted for defence allocations for a possible campaign.179

Even to a detached observer the situation must have appeared, to say the least, baffling. A number of Czechs understood the results of the Balkan wars. The Old Czechs, still an influential group, perceived that the wars gave greater importance to the Balkan question and that the Southern Slavs were earning a new political respect.'80 But few people now thought in Pan-Slav terms. The Balkan wars were the business of individual Slavonic and non-Slavonic countries. Politically minded Czechs admitted that the Balkan peninsula should be divided into spheres of interest: the eastern part in the Russian sphere (Bulgaria, Rumania and the Straits) and the western part (Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece) in the Austrian sphere. Such a division would foster international understanding and stabilise the situation. But a stable agreement could only be reached if the national questions within the monarchy were solved.'81 It is clear that given even a vague hope the Czechs were still thinking in terms of the monarchy and the Austrian state.

Yet government distrust of the Czechs was too deeply rooted and in the last two years before the war it was further increased by the private contacts of some Czech politicians with the Russians and the Serbs.'82

174 Statt. 13687, 27 June I9I2; also Prague police report I8I, 29 June I9I2. 175 Prague police report I 8 i, 29 June I 9 I 2. 176 Slaisovd, op. cit., pp. 230-44. 177 Ibid., pp. 248-59- 178 Cf. Slovanskd historicke studie, Prague, 1955, pp. I49-80; I I6-39. 179 Slaisovd, op. cit., p. 256. 180 K. Mattus, Pame'ti, Prague, 192 1, pp. 17 I -3. 181 Mattus, op. cit., pp. 234-5. 182J. Dolezal, 'Masarykovy boje s Aehrenthalem' (Vz2dce generact, 2 vols, Prague, 9103-

1931, II, pp. I33-63).




These contacts were the more suspect the more they remained outside the reach of the secret police. Not only the Austrian foreign office was perturbed by these contacts183 but also German public opinion.'84 During a fact-finding tour of Bosnia and Hercegovina Professor Masa- ryk, to his amusement, was closely watched by the police ;185 he was yet another Slavonic visitor to these dangerous parts. Even Russian teachers who visited the area disturbed the foreign office.186

Dr Kramar, though in a sense a trusted Austrian politician, incurred the greatest hatred of the Germans.'87 He was in the happy position of being married to a Russian lady and owning an estate in the Crimea.188 But Krama"r was far from being the Machiavellian plotter portrayed by the Germans. He devised schemes and movements in which he would find an outlet for his political frustration, but though full of clever ideas he was incapable of carrying them out. Furthermore his influence at home was steadily declining.189 Besides this respectable but hated Pan- Slav, Czech political life numbered in these two years many unsteady and over-ambitious politicians of even lesser stature. They might have inspired legitimate fears had the Austrian foreign office only known about their activity. Perhaps the most important of these was the National Socialist leader J. Klofac, whose party and influence were limited,190 but whose ambition was boundless and political methods truly Machiavellian. Conscious of the weakness of his party he personally or with a few friends excited numberless political demonstrations and riots,191 but in time he realised that success could not be achieved by such methods alone and he started looking for allies not among the Czechs whose weakness he knew, but outside Austria. In 1905 he had dealings with Hungarians: perhaps he realised their influence; in any case he received financial encouragement.'92 But the Hungarians, though at first helpful, soon broke off the alliance and Klofac turned to his Slavonic brothers. He made numerous acquaintances in Serbia193 and also arranged dubious political and espionage deals with minor Russian politicians and agents.'94 Though he was not seriously listened

183 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Slawische Angelegenheiten I899-1914 , 828/411.13. 8 April I 908; I 5H, 24 April I 909.

184 Das Verhalten der Tschechen im Weltkrieg, Vienna, I9I8, pp. 6 ff. 185 Selver, op. cit., p. 223; Dolezal, op. cit., p. 140. 186 Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv, Slawische Angelegenheiten, Russian tourists in the Balkans,

I909-I9I I. 187 Das Verhalten... , op. cit., pp. 7-35, 38-43. 188 Ceskd Politika, III, op. cit., PP. 710 if.; Sis, op. cit., p. I33. 189 Sisova, op. cit., p. 44- 190 Prague Police President's report E. 103 I PP, 4 May I 906; Ceska Politika, III, pp. 77 I -

772. 191 Statthalter 2I 157, 3i December I904; M. des I., PN8927, i i November 1907, PNI23,

51, I908 192 Prague police report E. 10788 PP, 7 June 1905. 193 Statthalter I 3687, 2 7 June I 9 I 2. 194J. Kiziek, 'IeskA burzoasni politika a "ceska otazka" v letech 1900-1914' (6esko-.

slovensky easopis historickj, IV, Prague, 1958, pp. 655-7).




to he was one of a number of Czech politicians and capitalists who were maintaining similar contacts and pursuing the same aims.'95

It was evident that Czech nationalism had reached a critical stage in its evolution when nationalists looked beyond constitutional means and domestic alliances in order to achieve their aspirations. The foreign office and the crown meanwhile, instead of trying to clarify the contra- dictory evidence before it and diverting the Czechs by reform to more worthwhile aims, launched the country into a war.

Professor Harrison Thomson has fittingly described Pan-Slavism as a phantom.196 After all this feverish Pan-Slav activity the Czechs achieved only muddle and confusion. The outbreak of war in I914 found the Czech Pan-Slavs without policy or organisation and Czech Pan-Slav sentiment was as inarticulate as before.'97 With very few exceptions, notably T. G. Masaryk, who consistently propagated purely cultural contacts and directed his interest in foreign affairs mainly to the western powers,'98 almost all Czech politicians believed in some sort of Pan-Slavism. But Pan-Slavism proved an empty word in Bohemia. It was not a foreign policy, it was not a movement, it was simply Kramar's refugium ultimum, a desperate gesture of domestic insolvency.

The consequences of this lack of policy became apparent during the war. Though minor incidents occurred at the beginning'99 Czech regiments often fought very bravely on all fronts, including the Russian.200 When the Russians advanced into Poland Dr Krama"r conceived the plan of placing a Russian grand duke on the Bohemian throne. These hopeful Pan-Slav designs however did not help the Russian armies much and when the Russians retreated the plan was quietly dropped.

In I9I5, after a year of hard fighting, Czech regiments began to crack up and desert, 201 not as a result of Pan-Slavpolicyorpropaganda, but simply as an expression of protest against the hardships of war;202 passive resistance was naturally being carried on all the time. 203 At the same time official Russia treated all Czechs as Austrians and in conse- quence they were either interned or at least effectively hindered in their efforts to participate in the war.204 The old ideological differences

195 J. Khriek, pp. 658-c. 196 S. Harrison Thomson, ' "A Century of a Phantom", Pan-Slavism among the Western

Slavs' (journalfor Central European Affairs, Boulder, Colorado, 195I-2, p. 6I if.). 197 R. Aron, The Century of Total War, London, I952, pp. 28-9. 198 Benes, op. cit., p. I 14; Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 285-6. 199 L. Ota'halova, Souhrnnd hlM?end presidia prazskeho mistodrzitelstvi o protistdtni, protirakouske

a protivdlecne' ciinnosti v 6echdch I9I5-I9I8, Prague, I957, pp. 411-15. 200 T. G. Masaryk, Sve'tovd revoluce, Prague, 1925, p. 455. 201 Das Verhalten .. ., pp. 55, 50, 46, i86, 246, 26i, 325, 332, 352, 365, 366. 202 Aron, op. cit., p. 29. 203 J. Hasek's Dobrj vojdk gvejk gives perhaps the truest illustration of this passive resistance;

see also Otahalovai, op. cit., pp. 34, 39, 58, etc. 204 T. Syllaba, T. G. Masaryk a revoluce v Rusku, Prague, 1959, p. I20; Masaryk, op. cit.,

P. 457.




among the Czechs abroad prevented them from approaching the R~ussians with an agreed programme and the vagueness and disorgan- isation of Pan-Slavism made itself felt even in this emergency.205

In Bohemia in the meantime the Pan-Germans had temporarily gained the upper hand and they now took their revenge on the Pan- Slavs. Krama"r, Ra'sin, Klofac and others were tried and sentenced to death. 206 The trials however did not prove the existence of a Pan-Slav conspiracy; they only enhanced the waning reputation of these politicians. In the end they were amnestied, but by then Pan-Slavism had reached a new phase of development: the October revolution in Russia utterly dispelled the last illusions of the Czech Pan-Slavs.

205 Syllaba, op. cit., pp. I4I-4- 206 Cf. Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsatchiv, Polizei Direktion Wien, Pr.Z. 2I636/83, I5 May I9I6

-the proceedings are in fact an interpretation of Neo-Slavism from the Pan-German point of view.



czech pan-slavism before the first world war

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