culture, mind, and the brain: current evidence and future directions

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Culture, Mind, and the Brain: Current Evidence and Future Directions Shinobu Kitayama 1 and Ayse K. Uskul 2 1 Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109; email: [email protected] 2 Department of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ United Kingdom; email: [email protected] Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2011. 62:419–49 The Annual Review of Psychology is online at psych.annualreviews.org This article’s doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145357 Copyright c 2011 by Annual Reviews. All rights reserved 0066-4308/11/0110-0419$20.00 Key Words neuro-culture interaction, cultural values and practices, independence/interdependence, individualism/collectivism, neuro-plasticity, gene-culture interaction Abstract Current research on culture focuses on independence and interdepen- dence and documents numerous East-West psychological differences, with an increasing emphasis placed on cognitive mediating mechanisms. Lost in this literature is a time-honored idea of culture as a collective process composed of cross-generationally transmitted values and associ- ated behavioral patterns (i.e., practices). A new model of neuro-culture interaction proposed here addresses this conceptual gap by hypothe- sizing that the brain serves as a crucial site that accumulates effects of cultural experience, insofar as neural connectivity is likely modified through sustained engagement in cultural practices. Thus, culture is “embrained,” and moreover, this process requires no cognitive media- tion. The model is supported in a review of empirical evidence regarding (a) collective-level factors involved in both production and adoption of cultural values and practices and (b) neural changes that result from en- gagement in cultural practices. Future directions of research on culture, mind, and the brain are discussed. 419 Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2011.62:419-449. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org by University of Michigan - Ann Arbor on 12/05/12. For personal use only.

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Page 1: Culture, Mind, and the Brain: Current Evidence and Future Directions

PS62CH16-Kitayama ARI 10 November 2010 7:52

Culture, Mind, and the Brain:Current Evidence andFuture DirectionsShinobu Kitayama1 and Ayse K. Uskul21Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109;email: [email protected] of Psychology, University of Essex, Colchester CO4 3SQ United Kingdom;email: [email protected]

Annu. Rev. Psychol. 2011. 62:419–49

The Annual Review of Psychology is online atpsych.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145357

Copyright c© 2011 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

0066-4308/11/0110-0419$20.00

Key Words

neuro-culture interaction, cultural values and practices,independence/interdependence, individualism/collectivism,neuro-plasticity, gene-culture interaction

Abstract

Current research on culture focuses on independence and interdepen-dence and documents numerous East-West psychological differences,with an increasing emphasis placed on cognitive mediating mechanisms.Lost in this literature is a time-honored idea of culture as a collectiveprocess composed of cross-generationally transmitted values and associ-ated behavioral patterns (i.e., practices). A new model of neuro-cultureinteraction proposed here addresses this conceptual gap by hypothe-sizing that the brain serves as a crucial site that accumulates effectsof cultural experience, insofar as neural connectivity is likely modifiedthrough sustained engagement in cultural practices. Thus, culture is“embrained,” and moreover, this process requires no cognitive media-tion. The model is supported in a review of empirical evidence regarding(a) collective-level factors involved in both production and adoption ofcultural values and practices and (b) neural changes that result from en-gagement in cultural practices. Future directions of research on culture,mind, and the brain are discussed.

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Independence versusinterdependence:social orientations thatemphasize eachindividual’sdistinctness,uniqueness, andseparation from others(e.g., self-promotion,self-expression, andself-sustenance) versuseach individual’sembeddedness andconnectedness withothers (e.g., socialharmony andcoordination,relational attachment,and social duties),respectively

Contents

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420INTERACTION BETWEEN

CULTURE AND THE BRAIN . . . 422A Model of Neuro-Culture

Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422Two Important Questions . . . . . . . . . . 425

COLLECTIVE-LEVEL REALITYOF CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425Production and Adoption Processes

in Cultural Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425Production of Independent and

Interdependent Values andPractices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426

Adoption Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 429Gene × Culture Interaction? . . . . . . 431CULTURAL SHAPING

OF THE BRAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432Available Evidence on Culture

and Brain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433Individual Differences in Neural

Versus Behavioral Responses . . . . 438CONCLUSIONS AND

FUTURE DIRECTIONS . . . . . . . . . 440

INTRODUCTION

The history of the study of culture in psy-chology can be traced back at least to thevery early days of empirical psychology (seeCole 1996, Jahoda 1993). As a modern dis-cipline, however, cultural psychology was re-discovered and reborn around the year 1990.Jerome Bruner (1990) emphasized canonicalcultural scripts as a source of meanings thatare deeply ingrained in every human action.Further, Richard Shweder (1991) brought to-gether several strands of thought related to theinterface of culture and the mind and mem-orably observed that “culture and the psychemake each other up.” Around the same time,the field also witnessed some highly influen-tial reviews of empirical evidence for culturalinfluences on human psychology (Markus &Kitayama 1991, Triandis 1989). These reviews

demonstrated substantial cross-cultural varia-tion in psychological processes, thereby show-casing the possibility that many psychologicalprocesses might be linked systematically, andmuch more closely than had ever before beenimagined, to certain aspects of socio-culturalcontexts (Campbell 1975).

As seen in several Annual Review of Psychologyarticles on culture and psychology publishedsince the year 1990 (see, e.g., Gelfand et al.2007a, Heine & Buchtel 2009 for the mostrecent reviews), considerable progress has beenmade in the past two decades. Much of this workinitially focused on systematic comparisonsbetween Western cultures (as exemplified byNorth American cultures) and Eastern cultures(as exemplified by East Asian cultures) (e.g.,Kitayama et al. 2006a, Markus & Kitayama1991, Nisbett et al. 2001). Unlike its predeces-sors that used surveys as the primary instrument(e.g., Hofstede 1980), this new work reliedmuch more heavily on experimental methodsand suggested that some fundamental aspects ofbasic psychological processes such as cognition,emotion, and motivation can be systematicallyinfluenced by culture. Although this work wasguided by the general hypothesis that socialorientation of independence versus interde-pendence or individualism versus collectivismis a key dimension underlying the culturalvariation (Markus & Kitayama 1991, Triandis1989), researchers have also examined alter-native dimensions including honor (Nisbett& Cohen 1996), tightness (Gelfand et al.2007b), religiosity (Cohen & Rozin 2001), andhierarchy, (Shavitt et al. 2010) among others.

More recently, the field has become increas-ingly more diverse in empirical content andmore mature in theoretical orientation. Thischange is evident in a greater focus on mech-anisms of cultural influence (Lehman et al.2004, Schaller & Crandall 2004). A number ofresearchers have focused on cognitive mech-anisms that mediate cultural influences withingenious use of priming techniques. A situ-ated cognition approach of Oyserman and col-leagues (e.g., Oyserman & Lee 2008) conceptu-alizes culture as a bundle of cues that effectively

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activate independent or interdependent socialorientations; whereas a dynamic constructivistapproach of Hong and colleagues (e.g., Honget al. 2000) hypothesizes that cultural knowl-edge becomes highly accessible and, as such,most likely to be brought to bear on social judg-ment and behavior when people have higherneeds for cognitive closure. Although different,these approaches share the assumption that cul-ture influences social judgment and behavior byactivating relevant cognitive representations,such as independence and interdependence.

Important as these new developmentsclearly are, however, cognition might not be theonly place where underlying mechanisms canbe fruitfully sought. Some other researchershave remained true to an earlier insight of cul-ture as fundamentally collective (e.g., Cohen1998, Kitayama et al. 1997, Markus & Kitayama2004). As noted by some founding parents ofthe research on culture (Kroeber & Kluckhohn1952, Shweder & Bourne 1984), culture may bedefined best at macro, ecological, and societallevels in terms of values (general goal states) andpractices (behavioral routines often designedto achieve the values) that are collectively dis-tributed and, to some important extent, shared.These ideas and practices vary as a function ofecology, economy, and other social structuralfactors. These researchers have sought to gobeyond the East-West paradigm by looking ateffects of some macrolevel variables includingregions (Varnum et al. 2010), subsistence sys-tems (Uskul et al. 2008), social class (Snibbe& Markus 2005), residential mobility (Oishi2010), and settlement (Kitayama et al. 2006b).Major theoretical efforts have been devotedto the understanding of production and dis-semination of cultural ideas and practices (e.g.,Kitayama et al. 2010, Richerson & Boyd 2005,Schaller & Crandall 2004, Sperber 1996). Muchof this work can be united by its commitmentto the hypothesis that it is behaviors and sharedsocial representations in a collective, social con-text, not cognitive representations in the headper se, that ultimately matter most in under-standing culture.

Individualism versuscollectivism: culturalsyndromes thatemphasizeindependence versusinterdependence,respectively

Cultural tasks:culturally prescribedmeans to achievecultural mandates suchas independence (e.g.,expressing unique self )and interdependence(e.g., being sensitive toothers’ feelings)

It might strike one as paradoxical to statethat the commitment to the collective levelreality of culture has recently begun high-lighting the brain as a crucial site of culturalinfluence. After all, the brain is a biologicalentity that would seem much “deeper” thancognition and, in that sense, diametrically op-posite to the collective culture as research foci.In fact, the focus on the brain might seem un-forgivably reductionistic. However, there is animportant logical linkage that deserves an em-phasis. As noted, public behavioral patterns thatare afforded by myriad macrolevel factors arecentral in defining culture. At the same time,recent work on neuroplasticity has suggestedthat such public patterns of behavior, over anumber of repeated occurrences, are likely tocause systematic changes in neural connectivityof the brain (Schwartz 2002; see also Anderson2009). It is thus reasonable to hypothesize thatrecurrent, active, and long-term engagement inscripted behavioral sequences (what we call cul-tural practices or tasks) can powerfully shapeand modify brain pathways (Kitayama & Park2010). The influence of cultural behaviors onthe brain, then, is unmediated by any symbolicor cognitive representations. The culture-mindinterface could be much more “hard” and be-havioral (Zajonc & Markus 1984), rather than“soft” and cognitive, than one might imaginebased on the cognitive theories. Admittedly,cognitions such as self-concepts, identities, andattitudes can powerfully influence which valuesone may endorse or which practices one mayengage in as his or her life tasks. Nevertheless,once individuals define their own cultural tasksand begin practicing them, the resulting cul-tural behaviors will directly influence the brain.This insight would lead the field naturally to ex-plorations into the link between culture and thebrain (e.g., Chiao & Ambady 2007, Fiske 2009,Han & Horthoff 2008, Kitayama & Park 2010).

In our assessment, then, after the early in-fatuation with a bold idea that the mind itselfmight vary across cultures and after the inter-vening years of the earnest effort to document,one by one, the East-West differences that are

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both sizable and deep (see, e.g., Kitayama &Cohen 2007, Markus & Kitayama 2010 for re-views), cultural psychology has gradually comeof age, aspiring to be a mature empirical disci-pline committed to the theoretical understand-ing and explication of the interrelations amongculture, mind, and the brain. Human psycho-logical processes and functions are linked, onthe one hand, to various macrolevel factors,which are involved in the production, dissipa-tion, and adoption of a variety of cultural ideassuch as values and beliefs, practices, and tasks.They are also tied, on the other hand, to brainprocesses that plastically change as a functionof one’s engagement in the ideas, practices, andtasks of the culture.

The goal of this review is to take stockof the two recent developments in the studyof culture in psychology, thereby to projectthis knowledge to the future of the discipline.We will first present an overarching theoreticalframework that regards the brain as one crucialsite that accumulates effects of cultural experi-ence. This cultural experience is patterned andorganized by cross-generationally transmittedvalues, such as independence and interdepen-dence, and associated practices that are formedas a function of a variety of collective-level fac-tors including ecology, economy, and other so-cial structural variables. In the second section,we examine some of these macrolevel factorsthat foster independence and interdependence.The focus of the third section is cultural influ-ences on the brain. Finally, we will concludewith a brief discussion of future directions ofresearch on culture, mind, and the brain.

INTERACTION BETWEENCULTURE AND THE BRAIN

A Model of Neuro-Culture Interaction

Our discussion so far implies that once indi-viduals define for themselves a particular setof cultural practices as their tasks and repeat-edly engage themselves with these tasks, the re-sulting cultural behaviors have systematic in-fluences on the brain. This basic premise of our

analysis, however, needs to be expanded in twoways. First, it is important to specify the pro-cesses by which a set of cultural practices aremade available in a given cultural context and,further, by which individuals choose some ofthem as their cultural tasks. Second, it is alsonecessary to understand what consequences thecultural influences on the brain would have oneach individual’s ability to achieve cultural and,eventually, biological adaptation. Our modeldepicting the interaction between culture andthe brain, called the neuro-culture interactionmodel, is designed to address these two issues.The model, shown in Figure 1, is based on sev-eral important assumptions.

Collective-level reality of culture. Themodel is grounded in a view, consensually ac-cepted by both past (e.g., Kroeber & Kluckhohn1952) and current researchers (e.g., Bruner1990, Markus & Kitayama 2010, Shweder &Bourne 1984), that culture is best conceptu-alized as a collective-level phenomenon thatis composed of both socially shared mean-ings such as ideas and beliefs and associatedscripted behavioral patterns called practices,tasks, and conventions. These ideas and prac-tices are quite variable both within and betweencultures. Elaborating on this conception of cul-ture, we suggest that culture can be conceptual-ized as an amalgam of both cross-generationallytransmitted values and corresponding scriptedbehavioral patterns called practices (Kitayamaet al. 2009, Kitayama & Park 2010). These twocomponents of culture are anchored in icons,stories, and other ideational elements of cultureto be situated in a given place and time.

One dimension that has proven useful indescribing observed variations in culture is thedimension of independence versus interde-pendence (Markus & Kitayama 1991) or indi-vidualism versus collectivism (Triandis 1995).Both independence (e.g., self-promotion,self-expression, and self-sustenance) andinterdependence (e.g., social harmony andcoordination, relational attachment, and socialduties) are necessary for all humans, and thesetwo sets of goals and tasks are available in

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Production,dissemination,and adoption

of cultural values and practices

Cultural valuesand tasks

(practices designedto achieve thecultural values)

Repeatedengagementin a select set

of cultural tasks

Neuroplasticity:formation of

culturally patternedneural activities

Spontaneousenactment of

culturally scriptedbehaviors

when called for

Establishingone’s identity

and reputationin the localcommunity

Biologicaladaptation

as assessed byreproductive

success

1 2 3 4

5 6 7

Figure 1A neuro-culture interaction model. Values and practices of culture are produced, disseminated, and adoptedas a function of a variety of collective-level factors. Individuals choose some select set of available culturalpractices as their own cultural tasks. They then actively engage in them so as to realize their culture’s primaryvalues such as independence and interdependence in their own idiosyncratic ways. Repeated engagement inthe cultural tasks results in culturally patterned brain activities, which in turn enable the individuals tospontaneously and seamlessly enact the culturally scripted behaviors when such behaviors are called for bysituational norms. The ability of the individuals to perform the culturally scripted behaviors whennormatively required to do so enhances their own identity and reputation as a decent member of the culturaltradition and, eventually, their ability to achieve biological adaptation as assessed by reproductive fitness.

all cultures. At the same time, however, bothindependence and interdependence requirepsychological resources to carry out and,moreover, they are sometimes in conflict withone another. Thus, any given individuals andgroups must often place different priorities. Asa function of a variety of ecological and societalfactors, Western societies have historicallyplaced a greater emphasis on independenceover interdependence (i.e., more individual-istic), whereas Eastern societies have givenpriority to interdependence over independence(i.e., more collectivistic) (Kitayama et al. 1997;Markus & Kitayama 1991, 2010; Shweder& Bourne 1984; Triandis 1989, 1995). Thisassumption has been used to integrate a largeand growing body of cross-cultural literature.

Factors inducing independence and inter-dependence. As collective-level realities ofculture, constituted by values and practices,independence and interdependence are likelyto be afforded by various collective-level factors(Box 1 in Figure 1). Further, cross-regionaldissemination of values and practices andsubsequent adoption of them by people indifferent regions or cultures has proved to be

equally important. It is fair to summarize thisliterature by noting that, on the one hand, acold and dry environment, combined with highresidential or geographical mobility and lowpopulation density, which are often linked tonomadic and herding lifestyles (at least tradi-tionally), lends itself to a greater emphasis onindependence over interdependence. On theother hand, a warm and humid environment,combined with low residential or geographicmobility and high population density, whichare linked to farming lifestyle (at least tradi-tionally), gives rise to a greater emphasis oninterdependence over independence.

Cultural participation, identity formation,and brain change. Any given culture offersa number of practices. For example, contem-porary American culture offers a number ofpractices designed to achieve the overarchingcultural values of independence such as self-promotion, self-expression, strong leadership,and so on. We assume that as each individualgradually forms his or her own self-identity, theindividual chooses from the pool of availablepractices the ones that suit his or her developingidentity best and incorporates them as their cul-

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tural tasks—tasks they perform repeatedly andearnestly to become a respectable member ofthe culture (Boxes 2 and 3 of Figure 1). Nancymay become a good cultural member by tryingto be unique in most situations, whereas Davidmay do so by trying to be argumentative. Weassume that there are substantial individual dif-ferences in both the kind of practices that arechosen as one’s own cultural tasks and the de-gree of commitment to the identity formationthat goes along with the foundational values ofone’s cultural group. If, for example, Nancy be-lieved herself to be a very independent person,she would pursue the task of being unique quiteconsistently and willingly, whereas if David didnot hold this belief as strongly, his engagementin his own cultural task of being argumentativewould be less consistent and less earnest.

As a result of repeated, sustained engage-ment in cultural tasks, relevant brain pathwaysare likely to change (Box 4 of Figure 1). Asnoted by a number of neuroscientists who studyneuroplasticity, neurons that are fired togetherwill get wired together. This Hebbian princi-ple of long-term potentiation, if adequately ex-panded to include possible macrolevel rewiringacross subsystems of the brain (Anderson 2009),can provide a simple yet believable mechanismby which behavioral patterns (as defined by cul-tural tasks) plastically shape the actor’s brain.What results will be culturally induced activa-tion patterns of the brain that support the per-son when he or she intends to perform his orher cultural tasks.

One clear indication that a cultural condi-tioning of the brain in fact takes place comesfrom the past two decades of research incultural psychology that compared people inEastern cultures (mostly East Asians) and thosein Western cultures (mostly North Americans).This work shows, for example, that as comparedto interdependent Easterners, independentWesterners are more likely (a) to define theself in terms of personal (versus relationalor collective) attributes in a context-generalfashion (Cousins 1989, Rhee et al. 1995,Triandis 1995), (b) to seek the self ’s uniqueness

(versus similarity with ingroup members)(Kim & Markus 1999), (c) to perceive anotherperson’s behaviors as internally motivated evenin the presence of situational constraints (Choiet al. 1999, Kitayama et al. 2009), (d ) to focustheir attention on a focal object in lieu of itscontext, instead of holistically attending to theentire scene (Kitayama et al. 2003, Masuda &Nisbett 2001), (e) to use linguistic (as opposedto spacial) code in problem solving (Kim 2002)and to be more linear in reasoning (Nisbettet al. 2001), ( f ) to experience personal (versussocial) happiness (Kitayama et al. 2006c), ( g) tofocus on positive (versus negative) features ofthe self (Heine et al. 1999), (h) to show a greaterself-serving or self-enhancing bias (Heine et al.1999), (i ) to seek to influence (rather thanadjust to) the social surrounding (Morling et al.2002), and ( j ) to place significance on personal(versus public) decisions and choices (Iyengar& Lepper 1999, Kitayama et al. 2004). As wediscuss below, recent neuroscience work hasbegun to uncover neural underpinnings ofmany of these cultural differences.

Situational norm, socially situated behavior,and adaptation. The above discussion shouldnot be taken to imply that individuals alwaysact as dictated by their culture. To the con-trary, behaviors are extremely flexible and canbe finely regulated by situational norms andrelevant concerns (e.g., Zou et al. 2009). Cul-turally shaped activation patterns of the brain,however, would enable the person to performculturally scripted behaviors (for example, tobe unique or to be argumentative) when thesevery behaviors are called for by the specificsituation at issue so that the person can en-act the required behaviors both automaticallyand seamlessly (Box 5 of Figure 1). Becausethe behaviors are spontaneous, they will be per-ceived as internally motivated and thus genuineby the self and others alike, which in turn willaffirm the person’s status as a cultural mem-ber of good standing in the eyes of both theindividuals themselves (i.e., cultural identities)and the community at large (i.e., reputations)

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(Box 6 of Figure 1), which will in turn increasethe chance of eventual biological adaptationas assessed by reproductive success (Box 7 ofFigure 1). It may therefore be anticipated thatculture can serve as a potentially potent selec-tive force in biological evolution (e.g., Lalandet al. 2010).

Two Important Questions

The model illustrated in Figure 1 places keyroles in two important processes. The first pro-cess involves the way in which both values andpractices of culture become constitutive ele-ments of collective realities. It may be antic-ipated that various macrolevel features of theworld we live in are likely to influence this pro-cess. The second process concerns the relativelylong-term change in the brain that is expectedto occur as a result of sustained engagement inthe collective reality of culture. In particular,we hypothesized that such change happens as aresult of sustained engagement in cultural prac-tices each individual chooses and adopts as hisor her own tasks to achieve the culture’s founda-tional values and, thus, to be a respectable cul-tural member, thereby enhancing the chance ofadaptation in the culture.

Now we turn to each of these two issues.First, we discuss how the collective realitiesof culture may be constructed by focusing onboth production and adoption of cultural val-ues and practices. Second, we review availablecultural neuroscience studies to assess the cur-rently available evidence on the hypothesizedcultural shaping of the brain.

COLLECTIVE-LEVEL REALITYOF CULTURE

In this section, we review currently availableevidence for factors that are implicated in thechange of culture, with a focus on independenceand interdependence. We start by distinguish-ing between two processes involved in culturalchange, namely, production and adoption ofcultural values and practices. This brief discus-

sion is followed by a review of factors linkedto the production of independence or interde-pendence. We then consider factors involvedin the adoption of existing values and practices.This section concludes with a brief discussionon possible gene-culture interactions.

Production and Adoption Processesin Cultural Change

In theorizing the process of cultural change,both production of new practices and dissipa-tion and eventual adoption of existing prac-tices must be taken into account. One recenthypothesis is that novel values and practicesmay be produced when there is a dire needfor them because of a threat to biological, eco-nomic, and political survival (Kitayama et al.2010). For example, new practice of indepen-dence may have been produced in large quan-tity in the wild frontier of the American Westduring the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.Independent practices that highlight, for exam-ple, self-promotion, self-protection, and hardwork motivated by self-efficaciousness might bean adaptation to the harsh ecological environ-ment with minimal social infrastructures duringthat period. Furthermore, once new values havebeen established, they are likely to be transmit-ted vertically because inculcation of values—especially those that are deep and strong—requires an assortment of supportive beliefs andemotional conditionings and, as such, may bebest accomplished by parents and other long-term caretakers such as neighbors and teachers(Schonpflug 2009).

Adoption of existing practices from othercultural regions or groups may be very different.One important factor that motivates people toadopt existing practices is a desire to win within-group social competition for status and pres-tige (Kitayama et al. 2010). Adoption is likelyto be most effective for those aspects of cul-ture that can be easily imitated. Clothes andother aspects of fashion are highly imitable. Soare a number of overt behavioral characteris-tics. Practices may be more likely to be adopted

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if they confer high social prestige and statuson the adoptees (Richerson & Boyd 2005). Forexample, Kitayama et al. (2010) argue that thefrontier practices of independence were likelypropagated backward to Eastern, nonfrontierregions of the United States through this mech-anism. Because adoption occurs through imita-tion, it can happen quite rapidly through spaceand time. Geographic spread of fashion, for ex-ample, can be quite rapid. Likewise, as scriptedbehavioral routines, cultural practices can alsotravel through space with relative ease.

Production of Independent andInterdependent Values and Practices

Ecology. Defined in terms of climate andvarious geographic features (Berry 1976,Diamond 1997, Georgas & Berry 1995), ecol-ogy has direct impacts on flora and fauna andthus availability of food, thereby shaping set-tlement patterns (e.g., nomadic or sedentary);demographic distributions (dispersed in smallgroups or densely concentrated in large units);economic, political, and educational systems(Georgas & Berry 1995); and the emergenceof symbolically marked groups (Boyd &Richerson 1985, McElreath et al. 2003). Assuch, ecology can have a substantial impact onpsychological processes by affording differentsocio-cultural systems—particularly subsis-tence systems. One well-tested idea is thatherding and nomadism require independent-style social behaviors and associated psycholog-ical features such as assertiveness, competition,and individual decision making (but see alsoPaciotti et al. 2005), whereas farming and, tosome extent, group-based fishing encourageinterdependent-style social behaviors andassociated psychological features such as col-laboration and sedentary lifestyle. For example,East African farmers were found to consult eachother more frequently and act less individuallythan East African herders (Edgerton 1965). Alarge cross-national comparison showed thatsocialization practices of agricultural societiestend to foster compliance, conscientiousness,and conservatism, whereas those in hunting

and gathering societies encourage independentdecision making, individualism, assertiveness,and risk taking (Barry et al. 1959).

Independent social orientation is often asso-ciated with a decontextualized, analytic modeof thought, whereas interdependent socialorientation is associated with a contextualized,holistic mode of thought (Varnum et al. 2010).Consistent with this, Berry (1966) found that incomparison to Eskimo hunters and gatherers ofthe Baffin Island in Canada, Temne farmers ofSierra Leone had a greater difficulty in disen-tangling objects from their surrounding field.Berry and colleagues (1986) made a similarpoint in a comparison between agriculturalistBagandu villagers and hunter-gatherer Biakapygmies of the Central African Republic. Astrong demonstration of the same point was alsoobtained by Uskul and colleagues (2008), whofocused on neighboring villages in the easternBlack Sea region of Turkey that share national-ity, language, and numerous aspects of cultureexcept for the mode of production. Relative tothe members of sedentary farming communitiesand cooperative small-scale fishing communi-ties, those in herding communities were moreanalytic in cognitive style in that their decisionswere rule based (rather than similarity based),their classification was category based (ratherthan thematically based), and their attentionwas more focused (rather than holistic).

Economic development and industrializa-tion. Commercialization and industrializationmay foster independence because they requireindependent decisions and judgments as well asinteraction with people outside of one’s imme-diate community. Evidence for this possibilityhas been obtained in a study on Mayan com-munities that vary in the degree of commer-cialization (versus agriculture) (Loucky 1976).An extensive cross-cultural experiment with aneconomic game has suggested that industrial-ization is linked to the emergence of the senseof fairness (Henrich et al. 2010).

A recent longitudinal study in ZinantecMayan communities in Chiapas, Mexico findsthat, over a period of 30 years, a shift from

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agricultural subsistence to entrepreneurialcommerce was associated with a change froma conservative weaving apprenticeship (empha-sizing compliance to the master) to an innova-tive apprenticeship (characterized by learner in-dependence and experimentation) (Greenfieldet al. 2003). Moreover, this change in socialorganization was associated with a shift fromconcrete to abstract representation of weavingpatterns. An extensive, 30-year-long study inTurkey (Kagıtcıbası & Ataca 2005) observedthat children were increasingly more likely tobe appreciated for their psychological valuesrather than their utilitarian, material values(e.g., as labor force) from the 1980s onward. In-creasing wealth is a likely reason for this change.Using the World Value Survey, Inglehart &Baker (2000) find that over the span of 10 to20 years since the 1980s, most countries of theworld shifted their values in the direction ofself-expression (as opposed to survival). Theonly exception to this general trend is a clusterof ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe,where the economy (as well as political systems)collapsed during the period.

Socio-economic status. The distribution ofresources—including economic, educational,and symbolic ones—within a given society isdiscussed under the rubric of socio-economicstatus (SES) (e.g., Hauser & Warren 1997).The foregoing discussion suggests that amountof resources (as assessed by industrializationand urbanization) is associated with indepen-dent practices. Extrapolating from this lit-erature, it would seem reasonable to expectthat SES within a given society is also as-sociated with independence. Consistent withthis reasoning, higher SES is positively associ-ated with a number of psychological featuresrelated to independence, including personalmastery (Lachman & Weaver 1998) and self-directedness (Kohn & Schooler 1983). Morerecently, Markus and colleagues (Snibbe &Markus 2005, Stephens et al. 2007) have em-ployed a series of experimental tasks involvingchoice to show that middle-class (i.e., college-educated) individuals are more likely than

working-class (i.e., high school–educated) indi-viduals to express uniqueness and seek control.For example, middle-class (but not working-class) participants like their choices less whenthey are constrained. In fact, middle-class par-ticipants justify their freely made choice more(Snibbe & Markus 2005). Moreover, unlikeworking-class participants, who seek their like-ness to their fellow workers through theirchoice, middle-class participants seek personaldistinctiveness through their choice (Stephenset al. 2007).

If independent social orientation promotes amore analytic (versus holistic) mode of thought,middle-class individuals may prove to be moreanalytic than working-class individuals. In alarge-scale community-based study, middle-class individuals (defined by both educationalattainment and occupational prestige) werefound to be more analytic than their working-class counterparts in terms of attention to anobject (vis-a-vis its visual context), greater useof semantic categories (rather than thematicassociations) in classification, and a more lin-ear (versus dialectic) view of change (Na et al.2010). A similar pattern has been identified byKraus et al. (2009), who used a subjective indica-tor of social class and found that analytic modeof thought becomes more prominent with per-ceived social class. An analogous social classdifference has been observed not only in theUnited States but also in Russia (Grossmann &Varnum 2010).

Residential mobility. As compared to indi-viduals living in a relatively small and stablecommunity for an extended period of time, in-dividuals who are more mobile, changing theirresidence often, are more likely to ground theirselves and identities on relatively stable inter-nal attributes such as personality traits, abilities,and skills of the self rather than on social rolesand positions within a community. As may bepredicted, as compared to nonmovers, frequentmovers are more likely to rate personality traitsas more central and group affiliations as lesscentral in their identity and have an extensivefriendship network (Oishi 2010). Intriguingly,

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Voluntary frontiersettlement: voluntarysettlement in afrontier, motivated bydesires for personalwealth and freedom,requiring majorinvestment andpersonal sacrifice

baseball fans in residentially stable cities tend tosupport their local professional baseball teamseven when the teams are struggling (showinga strong sense of one’s identity to one’s localteams), but those in residentially mobile citiestend to support their teams only when the teamsplay well and, thus, the teams are instrumen-tal in boosting the residents’ self-esteem (Oishiet al. 2007).

Residential mobility may account, at least inpart, for the cross-cultural differences betweenmore mobile Americans and more sedentaryAsians (Sato et al. 2008). In all likelihood,however, the causal relationship betweenresidential mobility and independence is bidi-rectional: Residential mobility can enhance theindependence of the self, while at the same timeindependent social orientation motivates in-dividuals to move from one place to the next,depending on their own personal goals anddesires (see Chen et al. 2009 for a similar pointmade with respect to occupational mobility).This issue deserves more careful attention infuture work.

Pathogen susceptibility. One novel idea pur-ported to account for cultural collectivism(versus individualism) comes from evolution-ary psychology. Thornhill and colleagues (e.g.,Fincher et al. 2008) have argued that in addi-tion to a sophisticated biological immune sys-tem designed to detect and kill or neutralizevarious pathogens, humans have evolved a “be-havioral immune system” that seeks to preventthe pathogens from coming into contact withthe body in the first place. Individuals are there-fore predisposed to avoid groups or individualsthat are likely to pose an increased threat ofcontagion, especially when they are vulnerable(see also McElreath et al. 2003).

In support of this idea, xenophobic re-sponses are stronger among people whosebiological immune systems are temporarilycompromised (Navarrete et al. 2007) and areamplified by disease cues (Faulkner et al. 2004).Moreover, people with greater chronic worriesabout disease demonstrate stronger negativeresponses to foreign ethnic groups (e.g.,

Faulkner et al. 2004). These individual-levelcorrelations are mirrored at the cultural level.Using an index of historical prevalence of infec-tious diseases in dozens of countries worldwide,Schaller & Murray (2010) showed that ecolog-ical variability in disease prevalence predictscross-cultural variability in xenophobia.

Because exclusion of outgroup members(of which xenophobia is an extreme exam-ple) is more common in collectivistic cultures(Triandis 1995), collectivism in general mightalso be associated with pathogen susceptibility.It might be the case that the tight social controlassociated with collectivism is a defensive re-sponse to a chronic pathogen threat the societyfaces over time. Consistent with this reasoning,Fincher et al. (2008) have shown that diseaseprevalence—especially the historical (ratherthan contemporary) prevalence—correlatespositively with collectivism and negatively withindividualism even after controlling for a num-ber of potentially confounding country-levelvariables, such as gross domestic product percapita, inequity in the distribution of wealth,population density, and life expectancy.

Voluntary frontier settlement. In theirvoluntary frontier settlement hypothesis,Kitayama and colleagues propose that vol-untary settlement in sparsely populated,novel environments that impose significantsurvival threats, such as the Western frontierin the United States during the eighteenthand nineteenth centuries, bred strong valuesand associated practices and mentalities ofindependence (Kitayama et al. 2010). This hy-pothesis integrates some of the considerationsnoted above: Low population density and highresidential or geographic mobility, in combi-nation, would make it very hard to form stable,reciprocal social relations. Further, given theseecological conditions, herding provides a viableeconomic means. In addition, low populationdensity combined with cold and dry climate,especially in winter times, may substantiallyreduce the susceptibility to pathogens. Thefrontier conditions multiply defined by thefactors noted above may then be expected to

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foster a strong cultural ethos of independence.Equally important, such regions may wellattract people who are independently minded.

The voluntary settlement hypothesis pro-vides a sensible interpretation for the findingthat North Americans are quite independent(as assessed by several implicit indicators suchas dispositional attribution, personal versus so-cial happiness, and self-enhancement), even incomparison with Western Europeans such asthe English and Northern Germans (Kitayamaet al. 2009). Further evidence indicates thatsimilar frontier conditions breed independenceeven outside of the West. In particular, resi-dents of a northern island of Japan (Hokkaido),an island that has a recent, 100-year historyof massive settlement by ethnic Japanese, havebeen shown to be more independent than acomparable group of mainland Japanese resi-dents (Kitayama et al. 2006b).

Turning to regional differences in theUnited States, Vandello & Cohen (1999)used census data to examine several face-validbehavioral indicators of individualism, suchas percent of people living alone, divorce-to-marriage ratio, and percent of people votinglibertarian in past presidential elections. Asexpected, the Mountain West, the westernstates in the Great Plain, and the PacificNorthwest were the most individualistic in thiscriterion. Further, Plaut and colleagues (Plautet al. 2002) have observed similar differencesin well-being and self. In a more recent study,Park and colleagues (2010) had college studentsin four flagship state universities report theirvalue priorities and found that values of bothindividualism (for example, defined positivelyby self-direction and negatively by conformity)and antipower (for example, defined positivelyby benevolence and negatively by power) aresystematically higher in a Western region(Montana) than in Eastern regions (Mas-sachusetts and Georgia). Curiously, in thisstudy the pattern in Michigan was closer to thepattern in Montana due, perhaps, to a sustainedperiod of frontier settlement historically. Theregional variation was evident only for thosestudents all of whose ancestors were born in the

United States over three successive generations,suggesting the significance of family lineagein the transmission of cultural values. Futurework should explore other frontier regions ofthe world to refine the original hypothesis.

Adoption Process

So far, our discussion has focused on theproduction of new values and practices of in-dependence or interdependence. To completeour discussion, it is important to note thatcultural change can also occur as a result ofadoption of existing values, practices, and as-sociated ideas from other cultures and regions(Box 1 of Figure 1). Whereas the productionof values and practices is likely to be motivatedby the need to achieve biological, economic,and political survival, the adoption of existingvalues and practices is likely to be motivatedby very different concerns. Following anearlier analysis by Richerson & Boyd (2005),Kitayama et al. (2010) have argued that whenpeople experience no major threat to theirsurvival, culture is used as a means for socialcompetition for status and prestige withinone’s own community and, as a consequence,practices and other aspects of higher-statusgroups are likely to be imitated and adoptedby lower-status groups (Henrich & Gil-White2001). In understanding the adoption process,several considerations are important.

Inadoptability of values. Cultural values—at least the values that are long-lasting andthat provide foundations of a given culturalgroup such as Confucianism in East China orProtestantism in Western Europe and NorthAmerica—are quite deep and strongly held inthat they are embedded in a rich array of as-sociated beliefs and a cascade of emotionalconditionings. The cognitive and emotionalstructure that anchors the foundational culturalvalues is not easy to adopt. For one thing, itis not easily observable. But more importantly,this underlying psychological structure willhave to be inculcated through long-term social-ization process by caretakers such as parents and

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teachers with the aid of various cultural arti-facts such as moral stories and proverbs thatare designed to highlight and bolster the val-ues at hand (see, e.g., Keller 2007 for a review).In other words, foundational values of a societyare likely to be transmitted vertically throughfamily lines. They may also be transmitted hor-izontally across regions or countries. But whenthis happens, this process may be rather slowand ineffective.

One implication of this analysis is that tradi-tional values can be surprisingly stable. Indeed,when values of different countries are followedover 20 years, they are, in fact, resistant tochange (Inglehart & Baker 2000). Moreover,evidence shows that values are transmitted ver-tically. Several researchers have found positivecross-generational correlations in value en-dorsement (see Schonpflug 2009 for a review).A further demonstration of the same pointcomes from a study by Rice & Steele (2004). Itis known that European nations vary system-atically in life satisfaction ratings. Intriguingly,the ranking is preserved almost perfectlywhen the same set of ethnic groups are testedwithin the United States. It would appearthat relevant values have been transmittedalong family lines. We also noted above thatregional variations within the United Statesare largely preserved. It is important to keepin mind that the measures used in these studiestap on explicit values of independence (versusinterdependence) (e.g., Park et al. 2010, Plautet al. 2002) or deliberate behaviors directlylinked to such values (e.g., Vandello & Cohen1999). The well-preserved regional variationis not only consistent with the hypothesisthat values are transmitted vertically, but alsosuggests that cross-regional or cross-culturaldissemination of explicit cultural values shouldbe very ineffective and slow if it does happenat all (Hout et al. 2001).

Behavioral imitation. Cultural practices maybe very different in this respect: They may betransmitted horizontally, across geographicalspace. Because they are represented as behav-ioral scripts, they can be easily imitated even

when the behavior is not directly observableas long as it is cognitively represented in theform of stories (Bruner 1990). Studies in sev-eral fields of psychology, including evolutionarypsychology (Richerson & Boyd 2005), devel-opmental psychology (Tomasello 1999), per-sonality psychology (Bandura 1973), and socialcognition (Chartrand & Bargh 1999) have con-verged to suggest that behavioral routines canbe imitated, often quite automatically and spon-taneously, as long as the adopters hold positiveattitudes to, and thus identify with, the model(Lakin et al. 2008). The discovery of mirrorneuron systems in humans (Iacoboni 2009) sup-plies a plausible neural mechanism by which theimitation takes place. The hypothesis that peo-ple imitate behaviors of higher-status, likableothers is consistent with research in both evo-lutionary psychology (Henrich & Gil-White2001) and social psychology (Cialdini 2001). Itis also well known that behavioral imitation orconformity need not be accompanied by corre-sponding change in underlying beliefs or values(Asch 1951).

The consideration of adoption processis important in understanding one curiousdissociation that can happen between explicitlyheld values and practices. We noted abovethat a regional variation is well preserved incontemporary United States, with independentvalues more strongly endorsed in Western(or non-Eastern) regions than in Easternregions. Curiously, however, there is everyreason to believe that cultural practices thatencourage independence such as “show-and-tell” or “publish-or-perish” are quite widelyshared, without any obvious regional variation.Kitayama et al. (2010) argued that thesepractices were originally produced by believersof the corresponding values of indepen-dence, namely, frontier settlers during theWest-bound settlement period. However,the American Western frontier experiencedmassive economic success. Moreover, it wasofficially endorsed by the federal governmentand, as a consequence, Western frontier cul-tural practices were subsequently adopted (i.e.,“imitated”) by residents of the Eastern regions

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of the country. If repeated participation incultural practices gives rise to automaticcultural biases in cognition and emotion, ashypothesized in the neuro-culture interactionmodel (Boxes 3–5 of Figure 1), the regionalvariation should be much weaker when implicitpsychological tendencies of independence(versus interdependence), such as dispositionalbias in attribution, self-serving bias, andpersonal (versus social) happiness, are tested.This prediction has received empirical support(Park et al. 2010).

Gene × Culture Interaction?

Will any of the cultural or even regional dif-ferences we have reviewed so far involve anygenetic components? For a long time it was ataboo in social sciences to talk about ethnic orcultural differences in mental processes in termsof genetic differences. This is likely to change,however, because of a more sophisticated un-derstanding of gene-environment interaction.One clue to possible involvement of geneticprocess is already noted in the discussion ofthe neuro-culture interaction model. We hy-pothesize that spontaneous and seamless per-formance of cultural tasks when it is called for bya given situation is likely to help individuals tosucceed in the culture at issue and eventually tofind desirable mates, thereby achieving biolog-ical adaptation as assessed by their reproductivesuccess (Box 7 of Figure 1). It is possible, then,that genes that help individuals perform avail-able cultural tasks may be positively selected inthe long run. Not much is known. Yet, given itssignificance, it is worthwhile to briefly discussa current perspective on the issue.

Accelerated pace of human evolution in thepast 10,000 years. It has been known for sometime that frequencies of very simple genetic mu-tations [called single nucleotide polymorphisms(SNPs)] are vastly influenced by local condi-tions of ecology and culture. Although thesepolymorphisms are tiny and by no means in-fluence the basic design of the body or minditself, some of them can have important con-sequences for specific aspects of mentality and

Dopamine receptorgene 4 (DRD4):a gene that codes for areceptor for dopamine,one of the chemicalmessengers used in thebrain. This gene isthought to interactwith early experienceto influence certainaffective traits

Single-nucleotidepolymorphisms(SNPs): single-nucleotide variationsin a genetic sequencethat occur atappreciable frequencyin the population

behavior (as well as morphology and physio-logical processes) under appropriate environ-mental conditions. Furthermore, it has been re-cently uncovered that evolution did not stopwhen humans diverged from their evolutionarycousins. Instead, if anything, the speed of hu-man evolution (as assessed by the rate of SNPsthat are preserved in the human genomes) hasincreased dramatically in the past 10,000 years,ever since the invention of agriculture (Cochran& Harpending 2009). This exponential increaseof the speed in evolutionary change is caused byincreased population size and increased com-plexity of ecological, social, and cultural envi-ronments in respect to which biological adap-tation is achieved. As may be expected, the vastmajority of the SNPs are selected for their adap-tive values relative to highly local ecologicaland cultural environments. For example, lac-tose tolerance is contingent on pastoral no-madic modes of living (for reviews, see Boyd& Richerson 1985, Laland et al. 2010).

One consequence of the recent expansionof human genetic variability is that a numberof culturally relevant SNPs are also local andcross-culturally variable in frequencies. For ex-ample, long (e.g., 7-repeat) allelic versions ofdopamine receptor gene 4 (DRD4) have beenlinked to attention deficit hyperactivity disor-der and novelty seeking. Importantly, these ver-sions of the gene are quite common amongCaucasian Americans, but they are virtually ab-sent among Asians. Chen et al. (1999) hypothe-size that long allelic versions of DRD4 providea selective advantage in new, challenging en-vironments because they are increasingly pre-dominant as a function of the distance by whichdifferent ethnic groups immigrated in historicand evolutionary times (for alternative possibil-ities, see Cochran & Harpending 2009). Find-ings such as these strongly suggest that to fullyunderstand the origins of cultural differences inpsychological processes, genetic processes mustbe taken into account.

Gene-environment interaction and culture.It bears an emphasis that it is not genesalone but rather the intricate interactions be-tween genetic potentials and environments that

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5-HTTLPR: a genethat codes for theserotonin transporter.This gene is thoughtto interact with earlyexperience to influencecertain affective traits

ultimately give concrete shapes to behavior. Forexample, Sheese and colleagues (2007) reportthat DRD4 functions differently depending onthe quality of parenting. Long-allelic versionsof the gene were associated with sensation seek-ing, high-intensity pleasure, and impulsivityonly for the children who receive poor-qualityparenting. A similar effect has been observedfor a serotonin transporter gene, 5-HTTLPR(Caspi et al. 2003; but also see Risch et al. 2009).

One important shortcoming of the literatureat this point is that it is premised on the assump-tion that any given phenotype, say, depressionor schizophrenia, is always regulated by a singlegenetic locus. In fact, even in schizophrenia—amental disorder that has an arguably large ge-netic component—large-scale genome associ-ation studies have failed to identify any singlegene that controls this disease. The alternativehypothesis that has been recently advanced isthat the phenotype is dynamically controlled bymultiple different genetic loci, or “rare muta-tions” (Dickson et al. 2010, Robinson 2010).

Furthermore, at present, most studies ongene × environment interaction in the de-velopment of mental disorders have been con-ducted in Western cultures. It is assumed thatthese interactions take the same functional formacross different societies and cultural groups,but there is some reason to cast doubt on thisassumption. For example, cultures are differ-ent in terms of normatively sanctioned levels ofarousal, with Western cultures placing greatervalues on high (as opposed to low) arousal thanEastern cultures do (Tsai et al. 2006). It isnot too far-fetched to hypothesize that certaingenetic “risk factors” might be risky in somecultures but not in others. For example, thedouble short allelic combination of the sero-tonin transporter gene is considered a risk fac-tor because it inhibits extraversion and sensa-tion seeking. It might seem possible, however,that a subdued behavioral style fostered by thedouble short allelic combination is valued moreunder conditions produced by cultural collec-tivism. Consistent with this reasoning, Chiao &Blizinsky (2010) report that population-levelprevalence of this particular allelic combination

is associated with cultural collectivism, which inturn is linked to lower population-level preva-lence of depression.

In short, it is fair to summarize the cur-rent literature on culture and genes by not-ing first that gene expressions are contingenton environments, including cultural environ-ments. Second, genes themselves (particularly,frequencies of SNPs) are contingent on rel-atively long-lasting environmental conditions,including cultural conditions. Third, culturalenvironments themselves are the creation ofhumans who show various culture-contingentbehavioral tendencies. By considering thesethree points together, one would begin to seethat behavior (and the brain), culture, and genesare mutually related to one another to a fargreater extent than has ever before been imag-ined. Explicating this dynamic is an importantfuture agenda for the field.

CULTURAL SHAPINGOF THE BRAIN

The neuro-culture interaction model(Figure 1) suggests that repeated participationin a set of independent or interdependentcultural tasks results in the correspondingpatterns of brain activations and the corre-sponding psychological tendencies. Note,however, that behaviors are influenced bymyriad situational factors in addition to theoverlearned cultural information in the brain.This means that expected cultural variationsshould be demonstrated just as clearly or evenmore so with neural measures as comparedwith more traditional behavioral or self-reportmeasures.

Furthermore, relevant neural activitiesshould become culturally patterned increas-ingly more as a function of the person’s ac-tive engagement in pertinent cultural tasks overa relatively long span of time. It would fol-low, then, that cultural influences on neu-ral processes should become clearer for thosewho have high commitments to the values andthe corresponding worldviews that are sanc-tioned by their culture. Last but not least, one

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potentially important prediction of this analysiswould be that one’s commitment to the valuesand worldviews (as reflected in one’s own self-beliefs and identities) might not predict overtbehaviors as clearly as they predict the underly-ing neural activity patterns. The reason is thatbehaviors are influenced not just by the un-derlying neural activation patterns but also bypertinent situational norms and concerns. Re-search in this area is still very new. Thus, evi-dence is incomplete at best. Nevertheless, eachof these predictions has received some prelim-inary support in several domains.

Aside from the fact that neuroscience mea-sures are necessary to test any theoretical ideason the culture-brain interface, these measureshave potential for moving the field beyondthe level that can be achieved with behavioralmeasures alone (Kitayama & Tompson 2010,Zhou & Cacioppo 2010). Already it is clear that(a) cross-cultural brain differences can existeven in the absence of any behavioral differ-ences (e.g., Hedden et al. 2008) and moreoverthat (b) the same behaviors can be mediated bydifferent brain pathways across cultures (e.g.,Tang et al. 2006). Further, neuroscience mea-sures enable researchers to more directly testprior theories and assumptions embedded inthem (e.g., Zhu et al. 2007). Altogether, it isfair to say that neuroscience measures carry in-formation that is related to but substantiallynonredundant from information obtained withbehavioral measures.

Available Evidence on Cultureand Brain

Neural representations of the self. A fairnumber of cross-cultural studies have investi-gated cognitive representation of the self with a20-statement test that asks participants to list 20aspects or features of themselves. As expected,these studies have shown that whereas ab-stract traits are frequently generated by NorthAmericans, relational or collective features ofthe self are relatively more frequent in EastAsians’ self-descriptions (e.g., Cousins 1989,Rhee et al. 1995). The same prediction was

Medial prefrontalcortex (mPFC): thecenter part of theprefrontal cortex. ThemPFC is thought toserve a variety offunctions includingretrieving,manipulating, andintegrating self-relevant information

recently tested with a functional magnetic res-onance imaging (fMRI) method. Zhu et al.(2007) had Chinese and Westerners in Bei-jing go through a series of self-reference judg-ments. Relative to a control condition wherejudgment was requested in reference to a pub-lic figure (e.g., the prime minister or presi-dent of the respective countries at the time ofthe study), self-reference judgment resulted insubstantially increased activations in the me-dial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), consistent withprevious work in this area. Further, this wasthe case for both Chinese and Western partic-ipants. An interesting cross-cultural differenceappeared, however, when the participants wereasked to make comparable judgments in ref-erence to their mother. Relative to the publicfigure control, Chinese participants showed asubstantial increase in the mPFC in the motherjudgment, indicating that the area of the brainused in the self-judgment was also recruitedin the mother judgment. In contrast, West-erners showed no such increased activation inthe mother-reference condition. This evidenceis consistent with the notion that the self andthe mother are mutually interdependent amongChinese but not among Westerners. That is,they are closely related to the point where muchis shared between the self-representation andthe representation of the mother.

Another interesting prediction that wouldfollow from the present analysis is that whereasindependent cultural tasks foster decontextual-ized, abstract self-representations, interdepen-dent cultural tasks give rise to more contextu-alized self-representations. Initial evidence forthis prediction came from a study by Cousins(1989), wherein both Japanese and Americanhigh school students were asked to produce fea-tures of the self. In line with the pattern ofthe results reviewed above, Americans were farmore likely to generate abstract traits than wereJapanese students in this condition, suggestingthat American selves are more context indepen-dent. However, consistent with the hypothesisthat Japanese selves are more contextual, thelikelihood of abstract traits to be generated wasmuch higher for Japanese than for American

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students once a specific social context was spec-ified (e.g., in school, at home).

Chiao et al. (2009) have used the fMRImethod to further investigate the hypothe-sis that independent people hold clear self-representations (as reflected in the productionof unqualified general traits) when no context isspecified, but interdependent people hold clearself-representations when a specific context isspecified. Japanese participants in Japan andEuropean Americans in the United States per-formed a series of self-reference judgments witha context either unspecified or specified. Theresearchers measured each participant’s inde-pendent versus interdependent self-construalswith the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale.Across the two cultures, independent peopletend to show greater mPFC activations in thecontext-general condition than in the contex-tualized condition, but interdependent peopleexhibited the opposite pattern, showing greateractivations in the contextualized condition thanin the context-general condition. The study isnotable because of its demonstration of a strongeffect of a self-belief measure of independenceand interdependence moderating the brain re-sponse. One caveat, however, is that the studydid not replicate the cross-cultural evidence byCousins (1989), possibly owing to a selectionbias in subject recruitment, especially in Japan,where imaging research was still new and likelyperceived as a high-risk, high-return means toearn a participation fee.

Another recent study by Chiao et al. (2010)primed either independence or interdepen-dence by having participants read a short storyinvolving the selection of a general on the ba-sis of either individual merit (the independentprime) or connection by kinship (the interde-pendent prime). Results show that these primescaused differential brain activations such thatthe independent prime leads to greater mPFCactivation in the context-general (rather thancontextualized) condition, but the interdepen-dent prime results in greater mPFC activa-tion in the contextualized (rather than context-general) condition.

Person perception and underlying neuralpathways. The social psychology literature oncorrespondence bias or dispositional attribu-tion has provided abundant evidence that whenasked to explain another person’s behavior, thesocial perceiver does so by focusing on disposi-tional characteristics of the person such as his orher attitudes and personality traits while ignor-ing situational constraints even when these con-straints are blatantly clear (Gilbert & Malone1995, Jones 1979). This bias is quite pervasiveand, in some cases at least, clearly erroneous(as when participants who merely see someonereading an attitudinal statement allegedly com-posed by someone else still infer and attributean attitude corresponding to the statementto the person). The bias has thus been calledfundamental attribution error (Ross 1977).

One consensually accepted theory of thebias (Gilbert & Malone 1995) states that froman observed behavior, the social perceiverautomatically and spontaneously infers thecorresponding trait or attitude. This sponta-neous inference of dispositions is then to befollowed by an optional process of situationaladjustment, wherein any effects of availablesituational constraints are taken into account.However, because the situational adjustmentis optional and resource dependent, it will notbe complete, resulting in a relatively greaterweight assigned to disposition rather than situa-tion in accounting for the cause of the behavior.

It might be predicted that interdependentpeople would show a lesser degree of disposi-tional bias because they are relatively more at-tuned to situational constraints. Since an orig-inal demonstration of this point by Joan Miller(1984), there is now a quite solid body of evi-dence for this point (see Choi et al. 1999 for a re-view). It has been shown, for example, that whenasked to explain another person’s behavior,which is described in a short vignette, EuropeanAmericans are more likely than Asians to assigngreater importance to dispositional factors (e.g.,the person’s personality and attitude) than tosituational factors (e.g., social norms and atmo-sphere of the situation) (Kitayama et al. 2006b).

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Moreover, when asked to infer another person’s“real” attitude while observing the person stat-ing his opinion on the issue at hand, EuropeanAmericans ignore obvious situational con-straints and conclude that the person’s “real” at-titude would correspond to the stated opinion.Unlike European Americans, however, Asiansshow little or no such tendency, especiallywhen the situational constraint is made salient(Masuda & Kitayama 2004).

From the evidence described above, how-ever, it is not clear whether Asians show lessor even no dispositional bias because of theirsensitivity or attentional attunement to situa-tional constraint alone. It is also possible thatAsians do not draw any dispositional infer-ences to begin with when observing anotherperson’s behavior. In a recent study, Na &Kitayama (2010a) presented European Amer-icans and Asian Americans with a number ofpairs of a facial photo and a behavioral descrip-tion. Subsequently, participants were given alexical judgment task. On each trial they wereshown the facial photo first as a fixation point,which was immediately followed by a trait wordthat was either congruent or incongruent withthe trait implied by the pertinent behavior. AnERP component that is known to be sensitive tothe detection of semantic incongruity (the neg-ative polarity that occurs approximately 400 mspoststimulus) was assessed. As predicted, thisERP component was significantly greater inresponse to incongruous traits than to con-gruous traits for European Americans, indicat-ing that the corresponding trait was abstractedand linked to the facial photo when the be-havior was presented in the first phase of thestudy. Importantly, in support for the supposi-tion that Asians and Asian Americans do not en-gage in spontaneous trait inference, this effectcompletely vanished for Asian Americans. Thisstudy assessed each participant’s beliefs of theself as independent or interdependence with theSingelis (1994) scale. The relative magnitude ofthe negativity to inconsistent traits was associ-ated positively with independence (versus in-terdependence). Indeed, the cultural difference

was partially mediated by independence (versusinterdependence).

In a recent fMRI study, Kobayashi et al.(2007) presented European American andJapanese participants with stories that would re-quire mind reading of a protagonist or controlstories that would not require mind reading.Relative to the control stories, the stories thatrequired mind reading tended to activate areasof the brain that are typically linked to inferenceof traits and other internal states such as inten-tions and desires, including the temporal pole,the temporo-parietal junction, and the mPFC.Although this effect was commonly observedfor both European American and Japanese par-ticipants, it was significantly more pronouncedfor the former than for the latter, thereby pro-viding initial brain evidence for the cultural dif-ference abundantly documented in the past twodecades of research on dispositional inference.Interestingly, this cultural difference was ob-served even when Japanese participants weretested in English. Because these Japanese livedin Japan for most of their lives, this might im-ply the relative significance of early socializa-tion (rather than language per se) in establishingone’s style of social perception and social infer-ence (see Ishii et al. 2003 for a similar point).

Neural pathways of holistic attention. Evi-dence indicates that the tendency to focus at-tention on the “inside” of a target person inlieu of his or her surrounding context (the dis-positional bias), which is quite common amongEuropean Americans but not among Asians orAsian Americans, is generalizable to nonsocialdomains. Masuda & Nisbett (2001) find thatwhen asked to explain an underwater scene,Americans start their story with a descriptionof the focal fish, whereas Asians start theirswith a description of the contextual scene andelaborate on the scene before moving on to de-scribe the focal fish. In an even more nonso-cial rendition of the same idea, Kitayama et al.(2003) invented a framed-line test and showedthat Americans are quite accurate in drawing aline that is identical to the standard in absolute

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P3: an event-relatedbrain potential,indicated by a positivedeflection in voltagewith a latency ofroughly 300 to 600 msafter stimuluspresentation. It isthought to indexattention

N400: an event-related brain potentialindicated by a negativedeflection peakingapproximately 400 msafter stimuluspresentation. It isthought to index thedetection of semanticincongruity

length while ignoring square frames of varyingsize. However, they are less accurate in draw-ing a line that is identical in proportion (rel-ative to the height of a square frame) to whatthe standard is relative to its own square frame.Thus, Americans are better at ignoring contextthan attending to it. In contrast, Japanese showa greater accuracy in the drawing of the relativeline than in the drawing of the absolute line,demonstrating ease in attending to context thanignoring it.

With fMRI, Hedden et al. (2008) showedthat Americans in fact engage more deliber-ate and intentional attention (as signified bythe fronto-parietal attention network) whenperforming the relative framed-line task, butAsians engage the same brain network whenperforming the absolute framed-line task. Im-portantly, the American effect increased sys-tematically as a function of Americans’ inde-pendent construal of the self. In contrast, theAsian effect decreased systematically as a func-tion of the participants’ reported acculturationin the American culture. In this study, there wasno cultural difference in a performance measurethat was tested, supposedly owing to the atten-tional compensation that occurred at the brainlevel. D. Park and colleagues (Goh et al. 2007,Jenkins et al. 2010) have amassed evidencefrom their imaging work that goes beyond theHedden et al. (2008) finding by providing ini-tial evidence for the specific neural pathways ofholistic perception.

Lewis et al. (2008) used an ERP oddballparadigm and investigated the idea that rela-tive to European Americans, Asian Americanspay more attention to contextual stimuli, andas a consequence, they should be more sur-prised when presented with a novel stimulus.Participants were exposed to a number of stim-uli one at a time in a random order. Seventy-six percent of them were standard (the number8), 12% of them were target (the number 6),and the remaining 12% were oddballs (Englishwords, consonants, and numbers; e.g., DOG,TCQ, and 305). Their task was to press a keywhen the target was presented. Previous workwith this oddball paradigm finds two different

positive polarities of electrical signal that oc-cur around 300 ms after stimulus presentation(thus referred to as P3). A target P3 occurs whenthe target stimulus is presented. This ERP re-sponse is most prominent in the posterior areaand considered to indicate attention focused onthe target. A novelty P3 occurs in response to anoddball and is most prominent in more anteriorregions of the brain. As predicted, as comparedto European Americans, Asian Americans’ re-sponse showed a greater intensity in the nov-elty P3; moreover, this response was predictedby their construal of the self as interdependentas assessed by a scale by Triandis (1995). Asalso predicted, European Americans showed amarginally greater intensity in the target P3than did Asian Americans.

Another ERP component that is potentiallyquite useful in investigating holistic attention isN400, which is often associated with the detec-tion of semantic incongruity. One might expectthat when a focal object (e.g., a car) is placedin a context that does not go together (e.g.,an oceanic scene), Asian Americans might bemore prone to detecting the incongruity thanEuropean Americans due to their relative sen-sitivity to context. This in fact was the case ina recent study by Goto et al. (2009); moreover,the N400 was reliably associated with interde-pendent self-construal as assessed by the Trian-dis scale. In yet another related study, Ishii et al.(2010) used the N400 as an indicator of the de-tection of incongruous vocal context in under-standing the meaning of emotionally valencedwords. The researchers validated the measure,and further found that the N400 was reliablypredicted by one’s interdependence (vis-a-visindependence) as assessed by the reported in-tensity of experiencing interdependent emo-tions such as friendly feelings and guilt relativeto independent emotions such as pride in theself and anger.

Choice, motivation, and the brain. One clas-sic effect in social psychology involves choice.Early on, Lewin (1952) investigated effectsof choices (or “decisions” in Lewin’s termi-nology) on behavioral change and behavioral

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persistence. Later, choice was at the center ofcognitive dissonance research (Festinger 1957).Choice has recently become one central topicin cultural psychology (Iyengar & Lepper 1999,Savani et al. 2010).

Behavioral research has shown that NorthAmericans often interpret their behaviors interms of personal choices they made (Savaniet al. 2010); moreover, once they have made achoice in private, they invest themselves in it. Asa consequence, they work harder on a task theychoose (Patall et al. 2008), and further, theyjustify their choice by engaging in dissonance-reduction maneuvers (Steele 1988). This effect,however, may not be as pronounced for peopleengaging in interdependent cultures becausefor them internal attributes that are highlightedin the private choice might not be as importantas they are to people in independent cultures.Iyengar & Lepper (1999) provided initialevidence for this possibility by showing thatas compared to European American children,Asian American children show a lesser intrinsicmotivation on a task they have chosen by them-selves. More recent data by Bao & Lam (2008)challenged the Iyengar & Lepper (1999) find-ing, showing that Hong Kong Chinese childrenare strongly motivated by their personal choice.Caution is in order because Bao & Lam’s ex-perimental instructions strongly implied thatpersonal choice was something of a “specialprivilege” that only a small group of participantscould have (not given to other children who hadearlier participated in the study). It is possiblethat the Hong Kong children in the Bao & Lam(2008) study were motivated because of thissuperfluous element in the procedure. Withoutthis procedural element, Asians are in fact muchless motivated by personal choice than areEuropean Americans (Na & Kitayama 2010a).

Would interdependent people invest them-selves in choices that are witnessed by oth-ers and thus are public? Theoretically, publicchoices would implicate social aspects of theself such as reputation, face, and status, whichare arguably more important than personal at-tributes in defining the identity of interdepen-dent selves. In their original work, Iyengar &

Lepper (1999) showed that Asian Americanchildren are more motivated to work on a taskshown by their ingroup members, such as theirmother and classroom teacher. This effect likelyhappened because of emotional identificationthe children had with the ingroup members(Bao & Lam 2008). Thus, the mother/teacherchoice was likely perceived by the AsianAmerican children as no different from thechoice they would make. Further, the knowl-edge about the choice is obviously shared withthe significant other (because this person actu-ally did make it); it was public. Thus, the findingis consistent with the hypothesis that interde-pendent selves invest themselves on their ownpublic choices.

Also consistent is a finding that Asians (butnot European Americans or Canadians) jus-tify their choice when the choice is for theirfriend (Hoshino-Browne et al. 2005). This ef-fect occurs because the friend would come toknow the choice they make. Under such condi-tions, European Americans show little justifica-tion effect, possibly because the choice does notimplicate their ever-important personal self.Further, Asians justify their choice when sig-nificant others are merely primed as long asthey care about the others who are primed(Kitayama et al. 2004). This is the case evenwhen the priming is very subtle, no more thanan exposure to a set of schematic faces that ap-pear to be “watching” them from the partici-pants’ perspectives. The last finding has beenreplicated with performance in a cognitive taskas a measure of motivation (Na & Kitayama2010a). European Americans appear to showa weaker motivation effect under such publicchoice conditions, reportedly because the eyesof others are experienced as unnecessary im-positions on their freedom (Imada & Kitayama2010).

Brain mechanisms underlying the self-investment on personal versus public choicehave also been investigated. Park et al. (2009)tested a negative neural electric peak that oc-curs when an error is committed in a cognitivetask (called error-related negativity or ERN).Evidence indicates that ERN increases as a

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function of motivational significance of the er-rors (Hajcak et al. 2005). In the Park et al. (2009)experiment, immediately before each trial par-ticipants were briefly exposed to a face prime(which is designed to induce an impression ofbeing seen by others) (the face-priming trials)or a control prime (the control trials). As wouldbe predicted, Asians showed a greater ERN inthe face-priming trials than in the control trials,but European Americans showed a reversedpattern, with a weaker ERN in the face-primingtrials than in the control trials. Of importance,the ERN magnitude in the witnessing-eyes-priming condition was significantly correlatedwith self-reported levels of interdependence(versus independence) as assessed by theSingelis (1994) self-construal scale, and in fact,the cultural difference in ERN in this conditionwas completely mediated by interdependent(versus independent) self-construal.

Because the ERN has been localized to theanterior cingulate cortex (Dehaene et al. 1994),we suggest that when a motivationally signif-icant choice is made, the anterior cingulatecortex is recruited to detect any errors or con-flicts, which in turn informs associated brainareas serving motivational functions, includingreward processing (e.g., nucleus accumbens;Knutson et al. 2001), negative somatic arousal(called cognitive dissonance) (e.g., anteriorinsula; Van Veen et al. 2009), and the midlinedefault network recruited for episodic recon-struction of the self (e.g., mPFC; D’Argembeauet al. 2007). These neural circuitries might beresponsible for the behavioral effects of choice.

Individual Differences in NeuralVersus Behavioral Responses

In the previous section, we presented a se-lective review of recent evidence indicatingthat repeated participation in cultural practicesof independence and interdependence doresult in cross-culturally divergent brainpathways. Building on previous behavioralstudies that demonstrate consistent cross-cultural differences in a given domain, thisnew neuroscience research examines whether

the corresponding differences could be ob-served in relevant brain responses. Althoughstill small in volume, the initial evidence ishighly encouraging.

Notably, several studies have demonstratedthat culturally contingent brain responses arepredicted by self-reported levels of indepen-dence or interdependence. The pertinent stud-ies (some of which are discussed above) aresummarized in Table 1. This evidence is quiteimpressive because relevant behavioral studieshave consistently failed to observe similar cor-relations. For example, given the correlationobserved by Chiao et al. (2009) between in-dependence (versus interdependence) and themPFC activation in the context-general condi-tion, one might expect to find an equally strongcorrelation between the frequency of abstracttraits in a 20-statement test and a measure ofindependence (versus interdependence). Sucha correlation is directly tested by Na and col-leagues (2010). The observed correlation wasnegligible. Likewise, given the reliable correla-tion between novelty P3 and interdependenceobserved by Lewis and colleagues (2008), onemight expect a positive correlation between abehavioral measure of holistic attention andinterdependence. Such a correlation, directlytested by Kitayama et al. (2009), was negligi-ble in the four countries tested.

Informally, we contacted eight psycholo-gists, active in the field of culture, who have ex-amined various behavioral measures. We askedthem if they have observed any systematic cor-relations between the behavioral measures theyused and any self-belief measures of indepen-dence, interdependence, and related constructs.Judging from the responses we received fromthe researchers, when examined, these cor-relations are almost always negligible, whichis rather consistent with the present authors’own experiences over the years. This does notmean that no such correlations ever happen. Inparticular, in numerous studies that use scalemeasures as dependent variables (e.g., Singelis& Brown 1995), these measures do correlatewith self-belief measures of independence orinterdependence. Note, however, that these

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Table 1 Studies that show significant correlations exist between self-belief measures of independence and interdependenceand brain responses

Studies Indices tested ResultsChiao et al.(2009)

mPFC activation in the context-generalself-judgment condition—mPFC activation inthe context-specific self-judgment condition

The index was positively correlated with independence(versus interdependence) as assessed by Triandis scale ofindividualism and collectivism in a sample composed ofboth European Americans and Japanese.

Goto et al. (2009) N400 response in a semantic incongruity ERPparadigm

The incongruity-induced N400 was larger as a function ofincreased independence as assessed by Singelis scale in asample of European and Asian Americans.

Goto et al. (2010) N400 response in a semantic incongruity ERPparadigm with face stimuli that display consistentversus inconsistent emotional expressions

The incongruity-induced N400 was larger as a function ofincreased interdependence as assessed by the Singelisscale in a sample of European and Asian Americans.

Hedden et al.(2008)

Activation of fronto-parietal attention networkeither in a cognitive task that requires focusedattention (FLT absolute task) or in a cognitivetask that requires holistic attention (FLT relativetask)

The activation of the attention network in the relative taskwas positively correlated with independence as assessed byTriandis scale for European Americans. (The activation ofthe attention network in the absolute task was negativelycorrelated with acculturation for Asian sojourners in theUnited States.)

Ishii et al. (2010) N400 response associated with detection ofincongruity of semantic meaning of a spokenword with an attendant vocal tone

Only Japanese were tested. The magnitude of N400 waspositively associated with interdependence as assessed by aKitayama & Park (2007) emotion-based measure [i.e.,relative intensity of experiencing socially engagedemotions such as friendly feelings and guilt (versussocially disengaged emotions such as pride in self andanger)]. This index is correlated with interdependence asassessed by Singelis scale.

Lewis et al.(2008)

Novelty P3 response in an oddball ERP paradigm The index was positively correlated with interdependenceas assessed by Triandis scale of collectivism. This effectfully mediated a cultural difference observed betweenEuropean Americans and Asian Americans.

Na & Kitayama(2010b)

After having memorized pairs of a facial photo anda behavior, participants were shown the facialphoto, which was followed by a trait that waseither consistent or inconsistent with the traitimplied by the behavior. The relative magnitudeof negative ERP response (approximately300–400 ms post stimulus) to the inconsistent(versus consistent) traits was assessed

The relative magnitude of the negativity to inconsistenttraits was greater for European Americans than for AsianAmericans. Moreover, it increased as a function ofindependence (versus interdependence) as assessed by theSingelis scale. The cultural difference was partiallymediated by independence (versus interdependence).

J. Park et al.(2009)

ERN magnitude (the more negative, the greater)in the face prime condition minus ERN in thecontrol prime condition

The index was positively correlated with interdependence(versus independence) as assessed by Singelis scale. Thiseffect completely mediated a difference observed betweenEuropean Americans and Asians.

Ray et al. (2010) Activation in the MPFC and the PCC inself-reference judgment minus the correspondingactivation in mother-reference judgment

Only European Americans were tested. The index waspositively correlated with interdependence as assessed bySingelis scale.

Abbreviations: ERN, error-related negativity; ERP, event-related potential; FLT, framed-line test; MPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; PCC, posteriorcingulated cortex.

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correlations can be accounted for by semanticoverlap, shared method, or both.

How can it be that self-belief measures ofindependence/interdependence rarely predictbehavioral responses (in, e.g., self, cognition,and attention), and yet they do predict corre-sponding brain responses? It might seem thatthe magnitude of the correlations betweenself-belief measures and brain responses isvastly inflated. Vul et al. (2009) argue thatbecause brain responses are so numerous, theylend themselves to false positives. Even if thisargument were true for some fMRI studies,it is unlikely to apply to studies with ERPsbecause possible data points are much smallerin number in the case of ERPs. For example,researchers investigating novelty P3 (Lewiset al. 2008) typically focus on an anterior, mid-line electrode during a specific time window(e.g., 300–400 ms after the stimulus onset). Itmight also seem that behavioral responses arenot as reliable as brain responses. However, afew studies that are now available show that thetest-retest reliability of many of the behavioralmeasures currently used in the literature isquite high (e.g., Na et al. 2010).

It is worthy of note that the observation ofstronger correlations for brain measures thanfor behavioral measures is in fact highly consis-tent with the neuro-culture interaction model.This model proposes that through repeatedengagement in cultural tasks, brain pathwayschange gradually. Because self-belief measuresof independence/interdependence are likelyto influence the degree to which individualswillfully engage in pertinent cultural tasks,they should predict the degree to which thepertinent culturally patterned brain pathwaysare formed.

In contrast, behavioral responses are influ-enced not only by the culturally patterned brainpathway, but also by myriad other situationalfactors.

The predictive power of the self-belief mea-sures of independence/interdependence may beexpected to be greater for brain responses thanfor comparable behavioral responses.

CONCLUSIONS ANDFUTURE DIRECTIONS

Drawing on a neuro-culture interaction model(Figure 1), we reviewed two emerging linesof work in cultural psychology. In the firstline of work reviewed here, researchers havetested specific macrolevel factors that are linkedto independence and interdependence. Thisliterature helps us go beyond the East-Westparadigm by identifying specific collective-levelprocesses underlying the observed differencesbetween East and West. Moreover, it allows usto systematically explore within-culture varia-tions and subgroup differences. In the secondline of work we examined, neuroscience meth-ods such as fMRI and ERP are used to inves-tigate neural underpinnings of known culturaldifferences in self, cognition, attention, and mo-tivation. Given the rapid pace with which thisarea of research has unfolded, we will be seeingmany more demonstrations of cultural effectson the brain in many other domains in the verynear future.

Although there is no question that the tworecent developments summarized herein areimportant, and even impressive in both thewidth of coverage and the increasing level oftheoretical and empirical sophistication, it isalso quite clear that the findings have raised justas many or even more questions while solvingsome existing ones. This state of affairs is a clearindication of the vitality of the field. There is ev-ery reason to believe that the field will continueto grow in the years to come. To conclude thisreview, we suggest several important directionsfor future work.

First, the East-West paradigm will continueto be important in cultural psychology. It islikely to provide a model case for cultural psy-chologists as much as rodents have served as amodel animal for animal psychologists. Thereis nothing wrong with this as long as due cau-tions are made and new cultures are broughtin to the literature whenever possible. In alllikelihood, substantial progress will be madewith a concerted research effort to documentone-by-one the brain mechanisms underlying

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the known East-West differences in cognition,emotion, and motivation. As noted, this workhas just begun and holds considerable promise,but much has yet to be done.

The focus on the East-West paradigmwould surely be limiting and even debilitat-ing to the development of the field if it werenot duly accompanied by other approaches andparadigms. Thus, the second important direc-tion of research involves effortful expansion ofsamples and populations. This effort might al-low us to identify cultural dimensions otherthan independence and interdependence thatare just as important and powerful. Religios-ity, cultural tightness, and culture of honor areonly three of the possible dimensions or cul-tural complexes that deserve far more research.Moreover, the deliberate expansion of samplesand populations would also provide an excellentopportunity for theory building (Henrich et al.2010). For example, recent work on the pro-duction and adoption process in cultural changewas motivated by questions regarding regionalvariations both within the United States andbetween the United States and its WesternEuropean cousins (Kitayama et al. 2010).

Third, both cognitive and socio-culturalmediating processes will receive intense re-search attention in the near future. The presentreview focuses on the “hard” (i.e., noncogni-tive) interface between collective-level cultureand the embrained mind. This, of course, byno means precludes cognition as a major the-oretical element. In particular, cognitive pro-cesses are crucial in guiding one’s deliberateactions, constructing the meanings for one’s ac-tions and immediate situations, and further de-veloping self-identities. Thus, there is no ques-tion that cultural priming can play an importantrole in moderating cultural differences. Clearly,both cognitive and noncognitive processes areinvolved in the full understanding of the inter-action among culture, mind, and the brain. Weare hopeful that the neuro-culture interactionmodel is an important component of this com-prehensive understanding.

Fourth, although much has been learnedabout cultural differences in behavior and brain

responses in recent years, much less is knownabout how such different responses are learnedand acquired. For example, we know very lit-tle about when cultural differences begin toemerge. Although developmental evidence isstrong that certain cultural differences are quiteevident very early on in life, it is often notcertain whether and to what degree the dif-ferences are due to environmental affordancesprovided, for example, by caretakers (e.g.,Rothbaum et al. 2010). Further, many sojourn-ers seem to know, first hand, that once onemisses a certain critical or sensitive period, onecan never get “it” in full, regardless of how longand how hard the person tries to be a mem-ber of a new culture. As argued by Kitayama &Park (2010), if culture is a means for biologicaladaptation, it is to be anticipated that pubertydefines a sensitive period where cultural learn-ing is to be maximized, because the learning ofthe most up-to-date culture would prepare theperson very well for the “reproductivemarket”—a point that is supported by the factthat neurogenesis is quite active in early adoles-cence (see Giedd et al. 2006 and Minoura 1992for initial behavioral evidence). Yet much hasyet to be learned.

The fifth direction we foresee pertains togenetic and epigenetic processes that are linkedclosely to both brain and culture. The activeselections humans have undergone in the past10,000 years, discussed previously in this re-view, are likely to be very miniscule in quantity,confined largely to single-nucleotide polymor-phisms (SNPs). Yet a small change can causelarge effects given appropriate external condi-tions. Thus, consequences of the miniscule ge-netic change on body morphologies and psy-chological functions can sometimes be quitesizable and crucially important in understand-ing local forms of adaptation. For example, ef-fects of double-short allelic combinations of theserotonin transporter gene are likely to be dra-matically different depending on specific con-ditions of early socialization (Caspi et al. 2003,Suomi 2009).

The active genetic selections over thepast 10,000 years are made possible by both

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the increasing population size and the highpopulation density that accompanied theinvention of agriculture. The SNPs may thusbe expected to be responsive to specific socio-cultural modes of adaptation. It no longer ispossible to separate culture and biology asmatters of learning and organismic design,respectively. To the contrary, culture servesas a context for genetic selection, and at thesame time, particular genetic characteristics oflocal groups are constantly motivating certainforms of culture in lieu of others. Explicatingthis dynamic is going to be a massive endeavorthat can be achieved only through extensiveinterdisciplinary collaboration.

We began this review by noting that themodern research on culture in psychology wasinitiated, in the early 1990s, with an arrestingidea that culture might in fact influence basicpsychological processes. The idea had an intox-icating quality at the time when the computermetaphor was still alive and well, rigidly be-lieved and practiced, with cognitive psychology(which did and still does espouse the most uni-

versalistic view in psychology) enshrined as themodel case of all human psychologies, includingan elder sister of the current cultural psychol-ogy, i.e., cross-cultural psychology (e.g., Berryet al. 1996).

The times have changed, however. Withincreasing knowledge on brain plasticity, it isno longer possible to ignore the potent in-fluences that socio-cultural environments canhave on human brain development and the psy-chological processes that ensue. Furthermore,with increasing availability of international orcross-cultural data and ideas, the news of enor-mous diversity in the human mode of exis-tence has arrived in psychology at long last.The sibling rivalry between cultural psychol-ogy and cross-cultural psychology has naturallysubsided without any scars left on either side.The time is quite ripe, then, for the field, nowunited, to renew its commitment to the studyof the human mind as enabled by the brain andthe underlying biology and evolution, and yet atthe same time, profoundly shaped and enabledby the socio-cultural environment.

SUMMARY POINTS

1. Culture is a collective-level phenomenon that is composed of both socially shared mean-ings such as ideas and beliefs and associated scripted behavioral patterns, called practices,tasks, and conventions.

2. Values and practices of independence and interdependence are encouraged by variouscollective-level factors, including ecology, economic development and industrialization,socio-economic status, residential mobility, pathogen susceptibility, and voluntary fron-tier settlement. Whereas cultural values are likely to be transmitted vertically throughfamily lines, cultural practices are likely to be disseminated horizontally, across space, viabehavioral imitation.

3. As each individual gradually forms his or her own self-identity, the individual choosesfrom the pool of available practices the ones that suit his or her developing identity bestand incorporates them as cultural tasks—tasks they perform repeatedly and earnestly tobecome a respectable member of the culture.

4. As a result of repeated, sustained engagement in cultural tasks, relevant brain pathwayswill undergo substantial rewiring, thus revealing a hitherto unexpected degree of neuro-plasticity. Evidence is growing that cultures vary substantially in certain brain processesas assessed by fMRI and ERP. Moreover, these cultural signatures of the brain are sys-tematically linked to self-beliefs on the pertinent cultural dimensions.

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5. Culturally shaped activation patterns of the brain foster culturally scripted behav-iors when these very behaviors are called for by the specific situation at issue. Theytherefore enable the person to enact the required behaviors both automatically andseamlessly. This, in turn, can help individuals achieve biological adaptation as as-sessed by their reproductive success. Culture then can serve as a context for biologicalselection.

6. Behavior (and the brain), culture, and genes are mutually related to one another. First,gene expressions are contingent on environments, including cultural environments. Sec-ond, genes themselves are contingent on relatively long-lasting environmental condi-tions, including cultural conditions. Third, cultural environments themselves are thecreation of humans who show various culture-contingent behavioral tendencies.

FUTURE ISSUES

1. The East-West paradigm will continue to be an important model case for cultural psy-chologists. Substantial progress will be achieved with concerted research efforts to doc-ument brain mechanisms underlying the known East-West differences in cognition,emotion, and motivation.

2. Future research should go beyond the East-West paradigm by expanding research pop-ulations. This effort will enable us to identify cultural dimensions that have so far beenlargely ignored, such as religiosity, tightness, honor, and hierarchy, thereby affordingexcellent opportunities for further theory building.

3. Both cognitive and socio-cultural mediating processes must be investigated. In partic-ular, cognitive processes are crucial in understanding how people guide their actions,constructing the meanings for their actions and thus developing their self-identities.The self-identities, in turn, serve as an indispensable element in regulating one’s en-gagement in culture, which defines a necessary condition for cultural shaping of brainprocessing pathways. At the same time, an in-depth analysis of socio-cultural pro-cesses is also indispensable in explicating the available set of cultural practices that arebrought to bear on the construction of self-identities and the subsequent engagement inculture.

4. Although much has been learned about cultural differences in behavior and brain re-sponses in the recent years, much less is known about how such different responses arelearned and acquired. Developmental processes involved in the acquisition of culturemust be investigated, with a focus on neuro-biological mechanisms involved in putativesensitive periods in cultural acquisition.

5. It no longer is possible to separate culture and biology as matters of learning and or-ganismic design, respectively. To the contrary, culture serves as a context for geneticselection, while at the same time, particular genetic characteristics of local groups areconstantly motivating certain forms of culture in lieu of others. Explicating this dynamicis going to be a massive research endeavor that can only be achieved through extensiveinterdisciplinary collaboration.

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DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

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Annual Review ofPsychology

Volume 62, 2011 Contents

Prefatory

The Development of Problem Solving in Young Children:A Critical Cognitive SkillRachel Keen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

Decision Making

The Neuroscience of Social Decision-MakingJames K. Rilling and Alan G. Sanfey � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �23

Speech Perception

Speech PerceptionArthur G. Samuel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �49

Attention and Performance

A Taxonomy of External and Internal AttentionMarvin M. Chun, Julie D. Golomb, and Nicholas B. Turk-Browne � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �73

Language Processing

The Neural Bases of Social Cognition and Story ComprehensionRaymond A. Mar � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 103

Reasoning and Problem Solving

Causal Learning and Inference as a Rational Process:The New SynthesisKeith J. Holyoak and Patricia W. Cheng � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 135

Emotional, Social, and Personality Development

Development in the Early Years: Socialization, Motor Development,and ConsciousnessClaire B. Kopp � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 165

Peer Contagion in Child and Adolescent Socialand Emotional DevelopmentThomas J. Dishion and Jessica M. Tipsord � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 189

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Adulthood and Aging

Psychological Wisdom Research: Commonalities and Differences in aGrowing FieldUrsula M. Staudinger and Judith Gluck � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 215

Development in the Family

Socialization Processes in the Family: Social andEmotional DevelopmentJoan E. Grusec � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 243

Psychopathology

Delusional BeliefMax Coltheart, Robyn Langdon, and Ryan McKay � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 271

Therapy for Specific Problems

Long-Term Impact of Prevention Programs to Promote EffectiveParenting: Lasting Effects but Uncertain ProcessesIrwin N. Sandler, Erin N. Schoenfelder, Sharlene A. Wolchik,

and David P. MacKinnon � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 299

Self and Identity

Do Conscious Thoughts Cause Behavior?Roy F. Baumeister, E.J. Masicampo, and Kathleen D. Vohs � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 331

Neuroscience of Self and Self-RegulationTodd F. Heatherton � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 363

Attitude Change and Persuasion

Attitudes and Attitude ChangeGerd Bohner and Nina Dickel � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 391

Cross-Country or Regional Comparisons

Culture, Mind, and the Brain: Current Evidence and Future DirectionsShinobu Kitayama and Ayse K. Uskul � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 419

Cognition in Organizations

Heuristic Decision MakingGerd Gigerenzer and Wolfgang Gaissmaier � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 451

Structures and Goals of Educational Settings

Early Care, Education, and Child DevelopmentDeborah A. Phillips and Amy E. Lowenstein � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 483

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Psychophysiological Disorders and Psychological Dimensionson Medical Disorders

Psychological Perspectives on Pathways Linking Socioeconomic Statusand Physical HealthKaren A. Matthews and Linda C. Gallo � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 501

Psychological Science on Pregnancy: Stress Processes, BiopsychosocialModels, and Emerging Research IssuesChristine Dunkel Schetter � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 531

Research Methodology

The Development of Autobiographical MemoryRobyn Fivush � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 559

The Disaggregation of Within-Person and Between-Person Effects inLongitudinal Models of ChangePatrick J. Curran and Daniel J. Bauer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 583

Thirty Years and Counting: Finding Meaning in the N400Component of the Event-Related Brain Potential (ERP)Marta Kutas and Kara D. Federmeier � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 621

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 52–62 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 000

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 52–62 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 000

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Psychology articles may be found athttp://psych.AnnualReviews.org/errata.shtml

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