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Page 1: Cultural differences in emotions: a context for interpreting emotional

Behaviour Research and Therapy 41 (2003) 777–793www.elsevier.com/locate/brat

Cultural differences in emotions: a context for interpretingemotional experiences

B. Mesquita∗, R. WalkerDepartment of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA

Received 26 February 2002; accepted 12 March 2002

Abstract

In this article, it is suggested that cross-cultural assessment of emotional disturbances would benefit fromthe consideration of cultural differences in the modal, and normative emotions. A summary of the researchliterature on cultural differences in emotions, in particular in antecedent events, subjective feeling, appraisal,and behavior is provided. Cultural differences in emotions are understood functionally, such that the mostprevalent emotional phenomena in a culture are those that fit and reinforce the distinct cultural models(i.e. goals and practices) of self and relationship. It is argued that a culture-sensitive approach to emotionaldisturbances would entail the assessment of emotional phenomena that are dysfunctional to the culturalmodels of self and relationship. 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Culture; Functionality; Emotional disturbance; Emotion; Appraisal; Behavior

1. Introduction

Emotions vary across cultures. That is, there are cultural differences in the prevalent, modal,and normative emotional responses (Mesquita, in press; Mesquita, Frijda, & Scherer, 1997). Thishas important implications for the assessment ofemotional disturbances. Emotional disturbanceshave been defined as “‘excesses’ in emotions, ‘deficits’ in emotions, or the lack of coherence inemotional components” (Kring, 2001, p. 337). Implicit in the definitions of emotional disturbancesis the standard of comparison, the prevalent, modal, and normative practices of emotions. Asthese practices vary across different cultural contexts, we propose that emotional disturbances are

∗ Corresponding author. Tel.:+1-336-758-4171; fax:+1-336-758-4733.E-mail address: [email protected] (B. Mesquita).

0005-7967/03/$ - see front matter 2003 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/S0005-7967(02)00189-4

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to some extent relative to the cultural emotion norms and practices that form their context (Jenkins,1994, 1996).

The main focus of this article will be to provide a general synthesis of the patterns of availableresearch findings on cross-cultural differences in emotions. From those differences in emotionpractices, we will infer some hypotheses on the potential consequences for emotional disturbancesacross cultures. To date, very little empirical evidence exists that allows for evaluation of thesehypotheses.

Importantly, our attempt to contextualize emotional disturbances is not to suggest that deviantemotional phenomena are merely socially constructed as emotional disturbances. This point ofview would deny the real suffering involved in many emotional disturbances. It would also beinconsistent with evidence cited by the World Health Organization that certain patterns ofemotional disturbances, as they occur in mental and behavioral disorders, are found across manydifferent cultures (Murthy et al., 2001). Yet, insight in the differences in culturally functionalemotional lives will facilitate and enhance the assessment of dysfunctional or disturbed emotionsin ways described in this article.

2. Conceptualization of cultural differences in emotions

Emotions are biological as well as socio-cultural in nature. Much cross-cultural research onemotions has focused on the universal, biological aspects of emotions (Kitayama & Markus, 1994;Mesquita & Frijda, 1992). The socio-cultural aspects of emotions have been largely ignored, atleast in psychology. More recently, several steps have been made towards conceptualization ofemotions that allows the finding of cross-cultural differences in the phenomena.

First, many current emotion theories (e.g. Ellsworth, 1994; Frijda, 1986; Lang, 1988; Scherer,1984) conceive of emotions as configurations of outcomes of multiple aspects, such as appraisal,action readiness, autonomic nervous system activity, and behavioral goal setting. These differentaspects of emotions do not automatically follow from each other. Each has its own determinantsin addition to the eliciting event. Thus, the ‘emergent’ emotion (Feldman Barrett, 1998, 2001) isconstituted by the independent outcomes of the emotion components and may vary from oneoccurrence to the next. This view is in stark contrast with the idea that emotions are basic,invariant states of the body that can be turned on and off (Mesquita, 2001).

Furthermore, building on these multi-aspect theories of emotions, Mesquita et al. have dis-tinguished between emotional practices—the actual emotions that people experience andexpress—and the potential for emotions—the emotional responses that people are capable of hav-ing in principle (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001; Mesquita et al., 1997). As emotions unfold, peopleselect and activate outputs from the emotional potential. The combined outputs form the emotionalpractice, or experience (Mesquita, in press). Whereas many cross-cultural studies traditionallyfocused on the potential for emotions (e.g. the potential to recognize facial expressions in similarway Ekman et al., 1987; Izard, 1994), cultural differences in emotions are primarily to be expectedat the level of emotional practices. In fact, work on emotional practices in other disciplines, suchas anthropology, does reveal cultural differences in the prevalence, patterns, and specific contextsof emotional outputs in a given culture (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Briggs, 1970; Levy, 1973; Lutz,1988).

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Research on culture and emotion has also been furthered by adopting systematic approachesto culture that have allowed for the understanding and prediction of cultural differences inemotions in a coherent and effective way (e.g. Kitayama, Matsumoto, Markus, & Norasakkunkit,1997; Mesquita, in press). These systematic approaches start from the cultural models of what isgood, particularly in the domains of self and relationships. Cultural models involve beliefs aswell as social practices that underwrite and afford what is moral, imperative, and desirable (e.g.,Bruner, 1986; Hofstede, 2001) For example, a prevalent middle class American cultural modelemphasizes personal success due to one’s own contributions, whereas a prevalent middle classJapanese cultural model underlines the fit with one’s social environment. These cultural modelsare hypothesized to be important constituents of the emotion practice.

Emotional practices differ across cultures when there are cultural differences in the likelihoodthat certain outputs are selected (Mesquita, in press). For example, Americans tend to appraisepositive as well as negative events in terms of personal agency (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001).Consistent with the American cultural model that underlines the importance of one’s own contri-butions to positive outcomes, Americans have been found to claim agency for positive outcomeswhereas agency was much less prevalent in cultures that stress fate and multi-determination (seeSection 3.8) (Mesquita, Karasawa, Haire, & Izumi, in preparation). Thus, the cultural likelihoodof particular emotional outputs—agency appraisals in this case—depends on the centrality of theemotional output to the pertinent cultural models. Outputs are less likely to occur when they areat odds with the cultural model, whereas outputs consistent with the cultural model are morelikely to be activated.

The introduction of cultural models as a context for understanding and predicting emotionalphenomena does not build on the assumption that cultures are homogenous groups of people. Asindividuals in a culture will engage the model in different ways, their individual experiences willdiffer as well (Markus, Mullally, & Kitayama, 1997). What is critical, though, is that the world—the ways in which things are done in the culture—still powerfully reflects the dominant culturalmodels. Those models set the reality boundaries within which emotions are defined, formed, andpromoted (Bruner, 1986). Therefore, contextualizing emotions in these specific cultural modelsbuilds on the recognition that emotional experiences and behaviors are better understood andpredicted at every level if we have knowledge of the cultural models in which they occur.

3. Differences in emotion practices

This section will address cultural differences in four aspects of emotions: antecedent events,subjective feeling, appraisal, and expression/behavior. Differences in the emotion practices withineach of those components will be described as they seem to relate to the pertinent cultural models.The relevance of cultural differences in emotion practices for cross-cultural assessment ofemotional disturbances will be discussed as well.

3.1. Differences in antecedent events

There are cultural differences in prevalent antecedent events. The differences in prevalent ante-cedent events may underlie some of the differences in emotions. A particular type of emotion

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may be prevalent due to a high rate of conditions that are conducive for those emotions, andsimilarly, other types of emotions may be rare because of the rare occurrence of their elicitors.

3.1.1. Differences in the social production of antecedent eventsLiving conditions vary because different cultural models promote and afford different kinds of

events (Cohen, 2001). Cultures tend to promote and create events that elicit culturally desirableemotions, whereas they fail to promote or even suppress events that lead to less desirableemotions. For example, Americans promote happiness— a highly desirable emotion in the Amer-ican cultural context—by creating and promoting many contexts in which happiness is likely tooccur (Mesquita & Markus, in press). They praise, compliment and encourage each other, giveawards and trophies for many varieties and levels of accomplishment, avoid being critical orinattentive, and generally foster a positive and optimistic view of themselves (D’Andrade, 1987).In a similar vein, cultures that devalue anger, such as the Utku Inuits, the Chewong of aboriginalMalaysia, the Tahitians, and the Japanese tend to reduce the in-group contexts in which anger islikely to emerge (Briggs, 1970; Heelas, 1984; Levy, 1973; Mesquita et al., in preparation). Inthose cultures, the acts of thwarting and frustrating in-group members are largely absent, thusavoiding the experience of ‘ improper’ emotions.

Event ecologies also vary across cultures as an effect of cultural differences in personal goalsas afforded by the culture. Individualist cultures, such as the US, put emphasis on standing outand becoming distinguished from others through self-sufficiency and personal accomplishment.Collectivist cultures such as Japan underline meeting social obligations and responsibilities inorder to maintain interpersonal relationships and group harmony (Elliott, Chirkov, Kim, & Shel-don, 2001; Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999; Karasawa, 2001; Kitayama et al., 1997;Markus, Kitayama, & Heiman, 1996). The events that are promoted and created by a culture varyaccording to its prevalent cultural goals. Events that positively reflect on the self are found to bemore frequent in a US context, whereas events that keep the individual modest or self-critical arefound to be more frequent in a Japanese cultural context. For example, in one study both Americanand Japanese respondents recognized situations that were generated by Americans as more self-enhancing—i.e. inducing positive changes in self-esteem—and situations that were generated byJapanese as more conducive to self-criticism—i.e. inducing negative changes in self-esteem(Kitayama et al., 1997). Thus the types of situations that were most prevalent, as perceived byrespondents in both cultures, were different across cultures. This different ecology of events poss-ibly leads to different practices of emotions.

3.1.2. Differences in the significance of eventsThe ecology of antecedent events may also be culture-specific because certain events derive

their meaning from the specific cultural models, for example, those in which spiritual or religiousbeliefs are central. Spiritual beliefs constitute the antecedents of emotion in the case of Surinamesewho attribute their misfortune and failure to black magic (Wooding, 1979), in the case of manyAfrican cultures who attribute bad outcomes to evil spirits and discontented ancestors(Anderson & Kanyana, 1996; Offiong, 1991), and in the case of Tahitians who interpret beingalone as an opportunity for spirits to bother a person, and thus as a situation of fear or uncannyfeelings (described in Levy, 1973). Thus, cultural models promote particular interpretations ofevents which in turn affect the emotion elicitation.

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This point has also been made in the literature on honor cultures. Many events in these culturesderive meaning from their relevance to honor, and are thus likely to induce emotions. Culturesof honor define honor as respect of the sort that situates the individual socially and determineshis (or her) right to precedence. Honor in this sense is based on a person’s (often a man’s) strengthand power to enforce his will on others (Abu-Lughod, 1986; Cohen, 1996; Cohen, & Nisbett1994, 1997; Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Peristiany, 1966). In cultures of honor,the perception of honor violations or potential honor violations is abundant, inevitably elicitingemotions in the categories of either shame or anger.

Similarly, values as endorsed at the cultural level predict the significance of certain events.Hofstede (2001, p. 161) found, for example, that cultures differed in the value of uncertaintyavoidance, “ the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknownsituations” . Consequently, children in cultures that are high on uncertainty avoidance (e.g. Greece,Portugal, Japan) tend to be more guided by a set of rules of what is right and wrong, or morespecifically clean and dirty, than children in cultures low on uncertainty avoidance (e.g. HongKong, Sweden, Jamaica). Children in the high uncertainty avoidance cultures, therefore, conceiveof more actions as (potential) norm transgressions, and thus more readily feel anxious, guiltyand sinful.

Importantly, an understanding of the relevance of emotion-eliciting events in terms of the cul-tural models renders the emotion practices more transparent (Mesquita et al., 1997). It is themeaning of the events as derived from the cultural models that makes the subsequent feelingsand emotional acts comprehensible. For example, the prevalence of anger and angry responsesamong the Surinamese in response to misfortune (Mesquita, 1993) becomes comprehensible whenconsidering that many Surinamese understand their misfortune as incurred by Black Magic(Wooding, 1979). Also it is important to understand that insults are conceived of as honorviolations in the South of the US, because this interpretation explains why, in response to insults,Southerners show more anger and aggressive responses than Northerners, but also why they arelikely to bear less resentment than Northerners after they have expressed their anger (the bill isevened; strength is being exhibited) (Cohen, 1999). In order to understand the practice ofemotional responses, it is thus important to consider the cultural models that lend meaning to theantecedent event.

3.1.3. Differences in focusCultural models may also affect which aspects of antecedent events are the focus of attention.

There are, for example, cultural differences in the relative focus on either negative or positiveoutcomes that can be understood from different cultural models. Individualist cultural modelsemphasize the approach of positive outcomes, whereas collectivist models focus on the avoidanceof bad outcomes (e.g Elliott et al., 2001; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). These differences inemphasis can be understood from different self goals. Individualist cultural models emphasizestrengthening good qualities and thus becoming autonomous and unique. Collectivist models, onthe other hand, emphasize the importance of living up to obligations and responsibilities, and themain focus is thus on the prevention of bad outcomes (i.e. not living up to the standards).

These cultural differences in the salient aspects of events have implications for emotional prac-tices. Within a North American context, Higgins, Shah, and Friedman (1997) found evidence thata prevention focus fosters relaxation or relief when the goals are achieved, and anxiety when the

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goals are not reached. On the other hand, these authors found that a promotion focus affordsfeelings of happiness when the goals are achieved, and feelings of sadness, when the goals arenot met. In a cross-cultural vignette study on success and failure, Lee et al. (2000) found that theindividualist American group, consistent with what should be hypothesized on the basis of theircultural focus on promotion, reported a higher intensity of happiness/depressed emotions thanrelief/anxiety emotions. Conversely, a collectivist Chinese group, consistent with their focus onprevention, reported a higher intensity of relief/anxiety than happiness/depressed emotions. Thedifferent emphases on promotion/approach or prevention/avoidance give rise to differences in thesalience of certain events, and thus to differences in the prevalent types of emotions.

3.1.4. Implications for cross-cultural assessmentDifferent cultural models may thus contribute to the ecology of antecedent events as it appears

to individuals in that culture. Events that afford the cultural models are promoted and created(e.g. awards in the US), whereas events that interfere with them are suppressed and transformed(e.g. thwarting in many cultures that focus on harmony). Cultural models also lend meaning toa large array of events by relating them to central themes in the cultural models (for example,honor). Finally, cultural models draw attention to particular aspects of events (for example, thepotential negative outcomes). The resulting differences in the ecology of events are likely to leadto differences in emotion practices.

Through their effect on the occurrence of antecedent events, cultural models may render certainemotions prevalent and others rare. Cultural models that stress the importance of social rulesproduce many situations in which social expectations play a role, foster the interpretation of manyacts and events as relevant to meeting or not meeting social rules, and focus attention on thepossibility of falling short of expectations (a focus on the negative outcomes). All these culture-specific practices of emotion antecedents contribute to anxiety. There is some suggestion thatcultural models stressing the importance of social rules facilitate excessive anxiety (Hofstede,2001). Cultural models, through the way they shape the ecology of emotion antecedents, maythus be predictive of certain emotional disturbances.

One may also formulate a hypothesis to the opposite, which would hold that cultural modelsthat emphasize social rules and obligations sanction high levels of anxiety. Thus, in cultures wherethe models afford and value high modal levels of emotion, the threshold for judging anxiety levelsas disturbed, is higher. In fact, a higher level of anxiety may be functional by particular models,because it keeps people in place, and makes them less likely to break rules or take personal risks(cf. Hofstede, 2001). Living in fear may be a value in cultural contexts that emphasize the needto fulfill social roles and to meet social expectations (e.g Lutz, 1987). Recognition of emotionaldisturbance may, then, be relative to the modal or desirable levels of emotions as specified bythe cultural model, rather than being an absolute concept.

3.2. Differences in experience: valence

An important dimension of subjective experience is that of valence: pleasure and displeasure(Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998, 1999). All languages appear to have words to distinguishbetween pleasure and displeasure (Wierzbicka, 1992), and valence is an organizing dimension ofmany emotion lexicons (Russell, 1983). However, cultures appear to differ with regard to thepreferred state on that dimension in ways that can be understood from the cultural models.

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Independent cultural models, the American in particular, appear to foster a positive outlook onlife; being happy is one of the goals (Kitayama & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama). Anindividual is accountable for his/ her happiness (Hochschild, 1995) and is expected to pro-activelymaintain a positive view of the self (Heine et al., 1999). In contrast, East Asian cultural modelsdo not seem to favor the positive. If anything, a self-critical, self-corrective approach is promotedas a way to keep the individual aligned with the group (Karasawa, 2001; Lewis, 1995). Generally,however, the East Asian cultural model emphasizes receptivity, which means to be receptive toboth positive and negative features of the context.

Consistent with these cultural models, several studies have suggested that Americans tend toappraise emotional situations as more pleasant than East Asians. In a large experience-samplingstudy, we sampled the emotions of American, Japanese and Taiwanese students for the durationof a week (Mesquita & Karasawa, 2002; Mesquita, Karasawa, & Chu, in preparation) it wasfound that, on average, American students appraised the emotional situations in their lives aspositively different from neutral, whereas Japanese and Taiwanese students evaluated their liveson average as neither positive nor negative.

Other studies with different methodologies have established convergent results. Kitayama,Markus and Kurokawa (2000) asked Japanese and American respondents to rate how often theyexperienced each of a list of emotions. Americans reported a much higher frequency of positivethan negative emotions, whereas the frequencies of positive and negative emotions did not differin the Japanese group. Thus, consistent with the cultural models, Americans experienced morepleasure, whereas Japanese had emotions that were balanced with respect to valence.

Furthermore, in the same study (Kitayama et al., 2000), pleasant and unpleasant experienceswere negatively correlated in the US sample. In contrast, they were positively correlated in theJapanese group. One interpretation of this finding is that the negative correlation in the Americangroup reflects the American objective to maximize positive and minimize negative feelings. Thepositive correlation in the Japanese group can be interpreted to reflect that the de-emphasizing ofpositive feelings in this group coincided with de-emphasizing negative feelings (Kitayama et al.,2000). The latter finding may indicate that balance, rather than pleasantness, is sought after inthe Japanese group, and that some people—those who are able to regulate both positive andnegative emotions—are better at it than others (Kitayama & Markus, 1999).

There is other evidence indicating that pleasure is a more important source of motivation inindividualist than collectivist cultures. Suh, Diener, Oishi, and Triandis (1998) found that‘Emotion’ (i.e. the positive affect minus the negative affect experienced in the last week) wasthe best predictor of life satisfaction in countries with individualist cultural models. Emotionpredicted significantly less variance in life satisfaction for countries with collectivist cultural mod-els. In these countries, the normative amount of life satisfaction (i.e. ‘How satisfied would an idealperson be?’ ) accounted as much for life satisfaction as the emotions an individual experienced inthe past week. In other words, individualist cultural models set the criterion for ‘a good life’ asthe frequency of pleasure minus the frequency of displeasure. Pleasure and displeasure seem tobe less central to the quality of life in other, more collectivist cultural contexts.

This finding was corroborated by recent experimental research comparing the task motivationbetween North American and Japanese respondents (Heine et al., 2001; Oishi & Diener, 2001).In these experiments, respondents received either failure or success feedback on a particular task(e.g., a word association test). After this false feedback, all respondents were given the opportunity

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to spend more time on task for which they had received an evaluation. Though Japanese andNorth American respondents both liked the success feedback better than the failure feedback,Japanese were more motivated to work on a task after failure feedback, whereas North Americanswere more motivated for a task after success feedback. Thus, the general conclusion from thisresearch is that there are cultural differences in the extent to which pleasure is desirable andsought after. In fact, when cultural models foster individuals to keep up with social responsibilitiesand standards, individuals seem to choose these responsibilities over pleasure, and this processmay not be conscious at all.

3.2.1. Implications for cross-cultural assessmentIt is clear that excesses and deficits in pleasure and displeasure have to be assessed in the

context of the desirable or modal levels of pleasure and displeasure. If the pursuit of pleasure isnot unequivocally positive in all cultures, then the lack of pleasure may not be equally problematicin all cultures. Pleasure, for example, was shown to have limited value in predicting life satisfac-tion and motivation in cultures with collectivist models. In that context, the concept of ‘anhedonia’may be problematic. Lack of pleasure may not automatically imply lack of drive in cultures whereactivities are instigated by role and obligation, rather than self-guided to begin with. That is, whenpleasure is not the main motivating force for activity, the lack of pleasure may not have the samedegree of maladaptive effects. We know of no literature addressing this issue cross-culturally.

Dissociations between pleasure and negative affect should also be assessed within the contextof cultural models. It appears from the scarce cross-cultural evidence so far that the modal ordesirable associations between pleasure and displeasure differ across cultures. For example, apositive correlation between positive and negative emotions was found in Japan, whereas a nega-tive correlation was found in the US (Kitayama et al., 2000). Associations or disassociationsbetween pleasure and displeasure may be only problematic to the extent that they are deviantfrom the cultural models.

3.3. Differences in appraisal

A major aspect of current emotion theories is the notion that emotional experience is constitutedby the individual’s appraisal of the eliciting events (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnston, 2001). Culturaldifferences in the prevalence of certain appraisals can be understood from cultural models(Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001). Cultural models can be thought to facilitate and render desirablecertain appraisals of events, while making the occurrence of others less likely and less valued.Cultural models thus foster culture-specific appraisal tendencies that are reflected in culturallydistinct patterns of emotional experience. There is ample evidence to support this point. Thecurrent discussion will focus on differences in agency appraisals.

Agency is an attribution of responsibility for and control over the event. The attribution maybe made to the self, a particular other, fate, God, all circumstances together, or nobody in parti-cular. Most of the cross-cultural research on appraisal has investigated attribution to a specificagent: self or other (for an exception see Oettingen, Little, Lindenberger, & Baltes, 1994).

Cultural models appear to differ with respect to the role of personal agency. A key aspectof Western cultural models, American in particular, is success through independent, personalaccomplishment (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Claiming responsibility and a personal sense of

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control are at the center of what it is to be a person in Western culture. In many other cultures,agency is differently instantiated (e.g. by magic spells, ancestors, spirits), or is not valued asmuch. An example of the latter is constituted by East Asian cultural models that stress fate,the multi-determination of events and the interdependence of an individual and his/her (social)environment (Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Heine et al., 1999; Nisbett, Peng,Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). Personal agency has very limited applicability in these models. Con-sistently, the East Asian cultural model emphasizes secondary control or adjustment to the situ-ation, as situations are not considered subject to personal influence (Morling & Kitayama, 1999;Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984).

Cultural differences in agency appraisal—i.e. responsibility and control—have been establishedin a number of questionnaire studies. Participants in most of these studies were asked to rememberan instance of a given emotion, describe the situation, and then rate the situation on a number ofappraisal scales that were provided by the researchers (Mesquita & Ellsworth, 2001).

In an early study, Matsumoto, Kudoh, Scherer, and Wallbott (1988) comparing Japanese andAmerican students found that Japanese students judged the dimension of responsibility more oftento be not applicable to emotional situations than American students, possibly because of the ideathat situations are constituted by the combination of many factors together. Mauro, Sato, andTucker (1992), studying emotional appraisal in students from the US, the People’s Republic ofChina, Hong Kong and Japan, consistently, found the dimensions of control and responsibility tobe two of three dimensions for which substantial cross-cultural differences were observed. In thisstudy the differences in appraisal meant that similar emotions loaded in cross culturally differentways on these dimensions. Similarly, agency emerged as one of the three appraisal dimensionsthat differed across cultures in Scherer’s study among students from 37 different countries in sixgeopolitical regions: northern and central Europe, Mediterranean countries, Anglo-American NewWorld countries, Latin American, Asian, and African countries (Scherer, 1997a,b). The tendencyto attribute agency thus appears to differ persistently across cultures.

Finally, the results from a recent experience-sampling study, monitoring the daily emotions of50 Japanese and 50 American students throughout a week, provided evidence that the impact ofagency appraisals to subjective experience might in fact be different cross culturally. For Americanstudents personal responsibility and control were good predictors of pleasantness, whereas forJapanese students agency appraisals were not the primary predictors of pleasantness (Mesquita &Karasawa, 2002). Overall, Americans thus not only have a higher tendency to appraise emotionalsituations as under control, but they also experience more positive emotions as a result thando Japanese.

3.3.1. Implications for cross-cultural assessmentThere are cultural differences in the prevalent agency appraisals, with Westerners appraising

emotional events as more relevant to the dimensions of responsibility and control than, forexample, East Asians. As agency appraisals are central in some emotional experiences, such asanger, differences in the prevalence of agency appraisals may be reflected in different patterns ofemotions. As mentioned before, anger is more prevalent in American than Japanese culture(Kitayama et al., 2000). Differences in the tendency of personal agency attribution form anotherpotential explanation for these differences in anger prevalence, in addition to the explanation ofdifferent event ecologies. It is important to note that the modal level of emotions in one culture

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(anger in the US for example) may seem to be excessive, and therefore emotionally disturbed,from another culture’s point of view.

There are also cultural differences in the weight attached to agency appraisals: personal control,or the lack thereof, is a more important predictor of pleasure and displeasure in the West than itis in East Asian groups. It is not clear, therefore, whether perceived lack of control, which in theWest has been found to contribute to excesses in sadness, fear, and worry (Berenbaum, Raghavan,Le, Vernon, & Gomez 1999), is equally important in other cultures. In fact, there is some evidencethat not feeling in control may be the default state of mind in many cultures, where the worldtends to be perceived as one in which an individual has no control (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). It isvery possible that some of the detrimental effects of uncontrollability are specific to those cultureswhose models contain assumptions of individuals having control, and where the uncontrollableis a violation of expectations and norms. The more general rule may be that situations that violatecultural expectations are stressful, rather than that the uncontrollable itself is necessarily stressful.A case could be made, therefore, that the nature of stressors varies along with the cultural modelsof the right, the good, and the expected.

3.4. Differences in expression and behavior

Cultural differences in the frequencies of certain types of expressions and behaviors tend toreflect differences in cultural models as well. Cultural models may be thought of as influencingthe relative salience of different behavioral options. Expressions and behaviors that are consistentwith cultural models tend to have a high rate of occurrence whereas responses that are contraryto cultural models tend to be infrequent.

East Asian cultural models, for example, stress relational harmony and promote that individualstake their proper place. These cultural models discourage individuals from occupying too muchspace in the relationship, both figuratively and literally. Thus, expansive behavior, such as generalsomatic activity, is a signal that the individual is taking more than his/her proper space. Consist-ently, in a questionnaire study, Japanese respondents reported many fewer hand and arm gesturesand whole body activity than did Americans in situations of anger, sadness, fear, and happiness(Scherer, Matsumoto, Wallbott, & Kudoh, 1988). Furthermore, Chinese American couples thatdiscussed a conflict area in their relationship displayed less general somatic activity than didEuropean American couples (Tsai & Levenson, 1997).

There is some indication that the expression of happiness, another expansive behavior, is alsorare in cultures that place an emphasis on harmony in relationships. Happiness expressions areseen as potentially disruptive because they may painfully contrast with the emotional state ofothers (M. Karasawa, personal communication, August, 1999), or because they may be seen toindicate the plausibility of an individual challenging social obligations and evading responsibilities(Lutz, 1987).

Cultural models of self and relationship thus imbue certain behaviors with valence. Aggressiveand happy expansiveness may universally emphasize individuality and self-other boundaries, butthis is consistent with some cultural models—and thus good—and inconsistent with other—andtherefore bad. The culture-specific valence of certain behaviors may affect their rate of occurrence.Again, this suggests that the standards by which to judge surpluses and deficits in expressivebehaviors will cross-culturally differ according to the cultural models.

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Evidence is accumulating that the most common types of emotional behaviors in a cultures arethose that promote the cultural models of relationships. In a large-scale interview study withEuropean American, Mexican, and Japanese respondents, the prevalent emotional responses tothree types of situations could be understood from the respective cultural models. Respondents,both men and women, were selected both from community as well as college student samples(Mesquita et al., in preparation). In the interviews, each respondent reported different emotionalsituations from their own past, among which were situations of ‘offense’ and ‘humiliation’ .Respondents were asked to report on their behavioral outputs, which included actual behavior aswell as behavioral urges. The behavioral outputs in each culture could be understood as instantia-tions of the cultural models.

The most prevalently reported behavioral outputs in the American group consisted of blame,aggression, and distancing oneself from the relationship. Blaming another person realizes that self-esteem maintenance by discounting the possibility that the offense or humiliation was deserved.Aggression serves individual gain, as it is an attempt to influence the offender into conformingto the wishes of the respondent. Distancing oneself from the relationship with the other person,and thus discontinuing exposure to a person that is potentially humiliating and offensive, benefitsthe individual at the expense of the relationship. Thus, the majority of American respondentsreported behavioral outputs that served the model of self-esteem and separateness.

The most prevalent Mexican behaviors were blame, moving away, and distancing oneself.Blame realized the goal of maintaining dignity, which was empirically indistinguishable fromrealization of the American goal of maintaining self-esteem. Moving away and distancing oneselfwere clearly consistent with another emphasis of the Mexican cultural model on simpatıa, whichstands for friendly and smooth behavior as well as avoidance of direct confrontation (Condon,1985; Sanchez-Burks, Nisbett, & Ybarra, 2000; Triandis, Marın, Lisansky, & Betancourt, 1984).

The prevalent responses in both the American and the Mexican group thus focused on changingthe relationship with the other person who was held responsible for the offense or humiliation,but they did so in partially different ways that promoted their respective cultural models: in theAmerican context by confronting the other person and trying to influence their behavior, in theMexican model by avoiding confrontation and escaping from the situation. The aggressiveresponses frequently reported by the American group were infrequent in the Mexican context.This is consistent with the Mexican cultural emphasis on avoidance of direct confrontation.

The Japanese cultural model emphasizes maintenance of relationships (Heine et al., 1999;Lebra, 1992; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). The individual’s focus should be on restoring internalbalance and contributing to the relationship (cf. Morling & Kitayama, 1999; Weisz et al., 1984).The most prevalent Japanese behavior was blaming the self, a behavior that can be seen asopposite to blaming the other, thus saving the relationship rather than the self. Consistently,Japanese tried to justify the behavior of the other person, and tried to actively re-mediate thesituation. Japanese also sought to be closer to the person who offended or humiliated them.Finally, in the situation of offense, the most prevalent response was to do nothing, and to de-emphasize the importance of one’s feelings. Internal balance is thus sought, rather than influenceon the other person or on the situation.

In sum, the interviews suggested that emotional behaviors in the contexts of these interpersonalsituations are instrumental in realizing the cultural models of self and relationship. However, oneproblem with the interview was that the behavioral outputs yielded were in response to self-

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reported antecedent events. To rule out that the different behavioral styles could be attributed todifferences in the reported events, a follow-up study was conducted that used standardized vig-nettes as starting points of comparison. The study was conducted among comparable groups ofEuropean American and Japanese college students. The study replicated the findings of the openinterviews, in that, regardless of the origin of the vignettes, American respondents reported moreAmerican behavioral outputs (e.g. ‘Yelling at the other person’ ) and Japanese more Japanesebehavioral outputs (e.g. ‘Doing nothing’ ). There were no differences in the types of emotionsreported (Idzelis, Mesquita, Karasawa, & Hayashi, 2002). This study, using a more standardizedapproach, thus confirmed the idea that cultural models help to predict cultural differences withregard to the behavioral outputs in emotional situations.

Finally, even when the frequency of emotional behaviors does not seem to vary across cultures,the meaning of—universal—emotional behaviors may be interdependent with the cultural models.For example, the lack of initiative that can be found in sad people (depressed patients in particular)across the world has different meaning in collectivist and individualist cultures (Tanaka-Mats-umi & Draguns, 1997). In collectivist cultures, the social networks of individuals tend to makedecisions for them anyway, and passivity on the part of the individual does not interfere in decisiveways with their functioning. In individualist cultures, on the other hand, personal agency isrequired to function well. Depressed patients in individualist cultures are often unable to overcomethe stress of personal decisions, and the same emotional passivity is thus more likely to affecttheir the individual’s social status and their well-being as a person. Thus, cultural models—beliefsas well as practices—constitute the meaning of universal behaviors in the particular social context.

3.4.1. Implications for cross-cultural assessmentThe prevalence of certain expressions and behaviors appears to be affected by their meaning

to the cultural models. Culturally prevalent expressive and instrumental behaviors tend to fit thespecific cultural model, and the conspicuous absence of certain expressions and behaviors can beunderstood from their conflict with the focal cultural models. Again, this suggests that the modalrates of occurrence of certain expressive and instrumental behaviors will vary across cultures.Therefore, the standards by which to judge surpluses and deficits in expressive and instrumentalbehaviors will cross-culturally differ according to the cultural models. What seems a normal levelof aggression in one culture may be seen as either excessive or deficient in another. Assessmentsof emotional disorders in expression across cultures should thus be made with extreme caution.

Expressions and behaviors ultimately serve the fit of an individual in his/her cultural environ-ment. Cultural models help to define what counts as ‘fi t’ . This means that the ‘healthy’ emotionalresponses may vary as a function of cultural models of self and relationship. Depending on thecultural models, healthy (i.e. functional) expressive and instrumental behaviors may be those thatpromote separation and autonomy, or alternatively, those that realize relatedness and belong-ingness. The cultural models also constitute what counts as dysfunctional. The cultural(dys)functionality of expression and behavior should thus be considered in the assessment ofemotional disorders of expression and behavior.

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4. Discussion

Emotional disturbances have been defined as excesses, deficits, and lacks of coherence inemotions. In order to judge an excess or deficit in emotion, one needs to be aware of the ‘normalamount’ of emotion. Similarly, an observed lack of coherence among emotional components islikely to signify a digression from the modal or normative coherence. Thus, cross-cultural assess-ment of emotional disturbances requires the consideration of standard—i.e. modal and norma-tive—emotion practices.

There is evidence that these modal and normative emotion practices vary across cultures inways that can be understood and predicted from cultural models of the good. Emotional outputsthat are functional to the cultural models appear to be promoted, whereas emotional phenomenathat are dysfunctional appear to be inhibited. The modal, and normative emotional phenomenaare thus consistent with the cultural models of what is good.

There is evidence for cultural differences in antecedent events, and in the interpretations ofantecedent events consistent with cultural models. For example, cultural models that emphasizesocial obligations afford interpretations of events in terms of potential negative outcomes. Theseinterpretations may be determining of the prevalence of consequent emotions. We have suggestedthat the focus on social obligations—and thus on potential negative outcomes—may increase theoccurrence of anxiety. Cultures that center on social obligations may thus have higher defaultlevels of anxiety, and it is important to consider those levels when assessing excesses in anxiety.

There is also evidence for cultural differences in subjective feelings. Cultural models seem todiffer with respect to the emphasis they put on pleasure, and these differences in emphasis arereflected in the reported average levels of pleasure, the connection between reported pleasure anddispleasure, and the drive that pleasure provides. Thus, when cultural models focus on socialobligations, rather than the pursuit of pleasure, the level of reported pleasure is found to be lower,it is found to be uncorrelated with the level of displeasure, and it is not found to be as importantfor the motivation of behavior.

Cultural differences in the relevance and level of agency appraisals can also be attributed todifferent cultural models. Individuals more readily appraise antecedent events as relevant toagency as well as find agency more pleasant when their cultural models place an emphasis onthe personal agency of individuals.

Finally, there is evidence that cultural differences in expressive and instrumental behaviors area function of the prevailing cultural models of the good. Behaviors that realize the cultural modelsare most prevalent, whereas behaviors that obstruct the cultural models are rare. For example,doing nothing in response to an offense is the functional and most prevalent behavior in Japan,because it helps to realize the central cultural model of preserving harmony in relationships.

In sum, the modal and normative cultural practices of emotion antecedents, subjective feeling,appraisal, and expressive and instrumental behaviors vary along with the cultural models. Thus,the modal emotion practices appear to be the ones that are functional in light of the culturalmodels of what is good, especially in the domain of self and relationships. Emotional disturbancescan then be defined as phenomena that deviate from the modal and normative cultural practices.In this line of reasoning, cultural models help to understand and predict the modal emotionalpractices, by which emotional disturbances are judged.

However, cultural models may also help to understand emotional disturbances in a more direct

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way. Just as the ‘normal’ emotional lives of people in a given culture can be understood andpredicted from cultural models of the good, so may emotional disturbances. Emotional disturb-ances, then, would be those emotional outputs that interfere with the desirable cultural outcomes,and that are likely to be felt as disturbances, if not by the individual him or herself, by his orher social environment. Thus, for example, sadness would be particularly salient when the culturalmodel promotes happiness (as is the case in the US). A cultural approach to emotions—emotionaldisturbances included—thus enables an assessment of emotional functioning that is sensitive tothe perspective of an individual’s own culture.

Acknowledgements

We are thankful to Will Fleeson and Ashleigh Haire for their thoughtful comments on earlierversions of this paper.

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