critical cause analysis of delayed evacuation in the great east japan earthquake and tsunami

Critical Cause Analysis of Delayed Evacuation in the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

1

IRDR International Conference, Beijing1 November, 2011

Junko SagaraCTI 　 Engineering Co., Ltd. Japan

ICHARM International Centre for Water Hazard Risk Management under the auspices of UNESCO

2

Forensic Investigation onForensic Investigation onGreat East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET)

Meta & Longitudinal Analysis Characteristics of tsunami fatalities and

losses Comparison with historical events

Critical Cause Analysis Analysis of critical causes for human

loss expansion caused by delayed evacuation

Preparation of a question list for human loss vulnerability evaluation

Scenario Analysis Estimation of damages and losses

caused by tsunami of a similar magnitude to GEJET in central Japan.

Identification of issues and proposal of measures to tsunami of an unexpected magnitude

ObjectivesObjectives Preliminary effort to conduct FORIN analysis of Great East Japan

Earthquake and Tsunami. Investigate how the delay in evacuation from tsunami occurred,

and how it lead to enormous human losses. Identify critical points for considering vulnerability of communities

against human losses caused by delayed evacuation from tsunami.

1. Overview of the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET)2. Critical causes analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuation3. Case Study of Rikuzentakata4. Conclusion

3

Outline

1. Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET)1. Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJET) M9.0 earthquake occurred on

March 11, 2011 at 14:46 Massive ground motion was

observed throughout Japan Mega-tsunami of about 1,000

year return period and subsidence led to enormous damages

Complex disaster (earthquake, tsunami, nuclear accident)

Historic Tsunami Events in the region◦ 1897: [M8.5] 21,959 dead◦ 1933: [M8.1] 3,064 dead or

missing

4

Japan Meteorological Agency

Seismic Intensity

Iwate

Miyagi

Fukushima

Hirono(0)

Kuji(4)Noda(38)

Fudai(1)Tanohata(31)

Iwaizumi(7)Tarou(180)

Miyako(362)

Yamada(823)Otsuchi(1,397)Kamaishi(1,091)

Ofunato(452)Rikuzentakata(1,951)

Kesennuma(1,405)

Minamisanriku(901)Ishinomaki(3,959)Onagawa(963)

Higashimatsushima(1,145)Matsushima(2)

Rifu(50)Shiogama(21)Tagajou(189) Shichigahama(71)

Miyagino-ku, Sendai(293)

Wakabayashi-ku, Sendai(332)Taihaku-ku, Sendai(53) Natori(984)

Iwanuma(184)Watari(270)Yamamoto(691)Shinchi(110)Soma(459)

Minamisoma(663)Namie(184)Futaba(35)Okuma(81)Tomioka(25)Naraha(13)Hirono(3)

Iwaki(347)

Overview of DamagesOverview of Damages Inundated area by tsunami ： 561km2

Human casualties: 15,829 dead, 3,745 missing, 5,942 injured (as of Oct 25)

Building damages: 118,790 completely destroyed, 184,343 half destroyed, 280 burned down, 10,961 inundated (above floor), 13,867 inundated (below floor)

Agricultural land losses: 23,600ha Direct damages to infrastructure stock

： approx. 16.9 trillion yen (US$200 billion, estimated by cabinet office, not including damages caused by nuclear accident)

5Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011)

National Police Agency （ As of Oct 25, 2011)2011 White Paper on Disaster Management

　 Dead or Missing

1～9　

10～99　

100～499　

500～999　

1000～　

Human losses in coastal municipalities

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Population ofIwate, Miyagi & Fukushima

（As of Oct 2010）

People killed in the GEJET（As of 8 Aug 2011）

0～910～1920～2930～3940～4950～5960～6970～7980～

Human LossesHuman Losses 92.4% of people died in Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima lost their

lives due to tsunami.

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Tsunami was the main cause of death

Death causes in GEJET(Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima)

Age structure of population and people died in GEJET（ Iwate, Miyagi & Fukushima ）

65% of fatalities were 60 years or older

Source: 2011 White paper on disaster management

Tsunami92.4 ％

Fire 1.1%

Crushed by buildings, etc

4.4%Unknown 2%

2. Critical cause analysis of human losses due to 2. Critical cause analysis of human losses due to delayed evacuationdelayed evacuation

7

Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami? Why were so many people not able to escape from the tsunami?

Strong ground motion (seismic intensity of 6 or greater)

Large tsunami attack could have been conceivable by people?

Quake occurred during the day. 30 minutes to 2 hours of time available before tsunami arrived.

Evacuation actions could have been easily taken?

Tohoku region (especially Iwate) have experienced tsunami disasters repeatedly in the past

Lessons learned in the past not effectively utilized?

Coastal levees had been constructed along much of the coast line

Misperception about tsunami safety existed (people thought tsunami disaster will never occur)?

The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET.The critical points for human losses and delayed evacuation were analyzed by reviewing various reports published after GEJET.

0 5 10 15 20 25

Hirono(0.0)Kuji(0.1)

Noda(1.2)Fudai(0.1)

Tanohata(2.0)Iwaizumi(0.6)Tarou(13.5)Miyako(2.4)Yamada(7.2)Otsuchi(11.7)Kamaishi(8.3)Ofunato(2.4)

Rikuzentakata(11.7)Kesennuma(3.5)

Minamisanriku(6.3)Ishinomaki(3.5)Onagawa(12.0)

Higashimatsushima(3.4)Matsushima(0.0)Shiogama(0.1)

Shichigahama(0.8)Sendai(2.4)Natori(8.1)

Iwanuma(2.3)Watari(1.9)

Yamamoto(7.7)Shinchi(2.4)Soma(4.4)

Minamisoma(5.0)Namie(5.5)Futaba(2.7)Okuma(7.2)

Tomioka(1.8)Naraha(0.7)Hirono(0.2)Iwaki(1.1)

(m)

design　levee　heightcurrent　levee　heighttsunam

i　trace　height

Magnitude of Tsunami in GEJETMagnitude of Tsunami in GEJET

8

Otsuchi: levee height 6.4m, tsunami height 12.9mOtsuchi: levee height 6.4m, tsunami height 12.9m

Rikuzentakata: levee height 6.15m, tsunami height 16.4mRikuzentakata: levee height 6.15m, tsunami height 16.4m

Onagawa: levee height 4.4m, tsunami height 15.9mOnagawa: levee height 4.4m, tsunami height 15.9m

Tsunami height exceeded twice the height of coastal levees

Tsunami height exceeded twice the height of coastal levees

※ levee height and tsunami trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT.

(Number of fatalities & missing) / (population in inundated area)

% of people died or missing in inundated area

Tarou: levee height 10m, tsunami height 15.5m, run-up height approx. 38m

Tarou: levee height 10m, tsunami height 15.5m, run-up height approx. 38m

Iwate

Miyagi

Fukushima

Fire and Disaster Management Agency (As of Sept 9, 2011)

　 0～1　％　

1～3　％　

3～5　％　

5～10　％　

10　％　 <　

Effectiveness of Structural MeasuresEffectiveness of Structural Measures

9

Coastal levee (T.P.+12.0m ） was higher than the tsunami height (tsunami run-up height T.P.+9.5m)

Hirono, Iwate

Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake

Structural measures proved to be effective and protected lives in certain areas

City located far from the coast was protected by the gate.

Fudai, Iwate

No inundationTown center

Inundated area

Fudai Gate

Fudai Gate

Upstream of the gate

Levee height T.P.+12.0m

Tsunami height T.P.+9.5m

Estimated overflow depth 7.2m

Inundation height near the gate T.P.+22.6m

Gate height T.P.+15.5m

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

-10 -5 0 5 10 15

% human loss in inundated area

Tsunami height - Levee height (m)

Effectiveness of Structural MeasuresEffectiveness of Structural Measures The greater the tsunami height compared to the levee height the

greater the human losses. Many other factors influenced the extent or severity of human losses .

10

TaroTaro

OnagawaOnagawa

OtsuchiOtsuchi RikuzentakataRikuzentakata

Tanohata(urban center located far from the coast)

Tanohata(urban center located far from the coast)

※ levee height and tsunami trace height near the levee in front of the coastal cities and towns were plotted from the maps produced by the Tohoku regional bureau of MLIT. % Human loss based on the data announced on Sept 9 2011 by the Fire and disaster Management Agency

Flow of Human Losses due to delay in evacuationFlow of Human Losses due to delay in evacuation

11

self-judged

quakequake

Critical Point 1Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate

Flow of human losses due to delay in evacuation in case of tsunami to identify the critical points for human loss expansion. Flow of human losses due to delay in evacuation in case of tsunami to identify the critical points for human loss expansion.

Warning not accessibleWarning not accessible

Warning accessible

Critical Point 2Accurate evacuation warning/information

Did not evacuateDid not evacuate

info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated

Critical Point 3Evacuation actions

Arrived at evacuation

shelters

Did not arrive at evacuation

shelters


shelters

Critical Point 4Obstacles during evacuation

Evacuation shelter not stricken by

tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Critical Point 5Safety of evacuation shelters

Escaped from

tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Critical Point 6Detection of danger and progressive evacuation

Fundamental action to be taken by people

CP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuateCP1 Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate

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self-judged

quakequake

Evacuated

57%31%

11% 1%

TotalN=870

Immediately evacuated

Evacuated after completing other

actions

Evacuated only after noticing that

tsunami was approaching

Did not evacuate(already in safe

area)

Timing of Evacuation

Source: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake

About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake. About half of the people who survived tsunami evacuated immediately after the earthquake.



13

self-judged

quakequake

Evacuated

People who evacuated only after noticing that tsunami was approaching didn’t evacuate immediately because “tsunami didn’t occur in past earthquakes” or “tsunami never came up to their mind” 1※

In Miyagi, about half of the people survived thought tsunami wouldn’t come or didn’t think about tsunami. Only 4% had seen tsunami hazard maps. 2※

Source: ※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake※2: Survey Research Center “ 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート”　 May 2011


Even among those who survived, many were not aware of tsunami risks. Even among those who survived, many were not aware of tsunami risks.


14

self-judged

quakequake

Evacuated

Many of the people that didn’t immediately evacuate were out of their homes. Instead of evacuating they went back home or went out to look for their families. 1※

The disaster occurred during the day time when family members were scattered. People worried about the safety of their family and moved immediately to get together with their family members. 2※



Because the tsunami occurred during the day, many were away from home. Instead of evacuating people went searching for their family members.

Because the tsunami occurred during the day, many were away from home. Instead of evacuating people went searching for their family members.


15

self-judged

quakequake

Evacuated



Disaster education and evacuation procedures in schools proved to be very effective, saving lives of school children.

Disaster education and evacuation procedures in schools proved to be very effective, saving lives of school children.

Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. Disaster education in schools proved very effective.

Risk or danger of tsunami and necessity to evacuate not recognized by all people. Many prioritized actions to search for their family members over evacuation. Disaster education in schools proved very effective.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0～4

5～9

10～14

15～19

20～24

25～29

30～34

35～39

40～44

45～49

50～54

55～59

60～64

65～69

70～74

75～79

80～84

85～89

90～94

95～99

100～

%　Human　loss　in　inundated　area

Iwate

Miyako

Ofunato

Rikuzentakata

Kamaishi

Otsuchi

Yamada

Very small human loss rate in ages of 5 to 14

CP2: Accurate evacuation informationCP2: Accurate evacuation information

16

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible


Evacuated

Average time required to obtain tsunami warning or advisory was 16.4 minutes. 1※

In tsunami prone areas 13% did not know that tsunami warning was announced. 1※

Many of usual communication methods became inaccessible due to power outage, overwhelmed phone lines, etc 2※

Underestimated preliminary forecast was misinterpreted as “safe”. 3※

Due to power outage, updated information was not accessible. 3※

Source:※1 weathernews “Survey Results of Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami” （ April 2011 ）※2 Crisis and Environment Management Policy Institute “Preliminary Report on the Survey on Tohoku Pacific Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami” (May 2011)※3 　 Japan Meteorological Agency “Issues with regard to improvement of tsunami warning “ (June 2011)

Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc.

Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”.

Accurate and most up-to-date tsunami warning information was not accessible for many people due to power outage, etc.

Underestimated preliminary forecast lead to misconception that it is “safe”.

CP3: Evacuation actionsCP3: Evacuation actions

17

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible



info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated


In average it took 17 minutes to begin evacuation. Almost 80% evacuated with others, 53% with their family members. 1※

Among people who heard evacuation warnings clearly from disaster management radio, 70 to 80% felt the necessity to evacuate. 2※

Many people lost their lives while convincing or guiding other people to evacuate, including over 300 fire and disaster department staffs, fire fighters and police officers delivering evacuation warnings or guiding evacuation. 3※

Source:※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake※2: Survey Research Center “ 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート”　 May 2011※3: Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Police Agency

Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people.

Evacuation warnings and evacuation advices by neighbors and families triggered evacuation actions for many people.

CP4: Obstacles during evacuationCP4: Obstacles during evacuation

18

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible



info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated



shelters


shelters


shelters


60% evacuated by cars and 1/3 were caught in traffic.

1※

Many used cars because they thought otherwise they wouldn’t make it, or they wanted to evacuate with family members. 1※

In Miyagi, many people older than 60 or women used cars. Among those caught in traffic, only 7.3% changed the mean of transportation. 2※

Source:※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake※2: Survey Research Center “ 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート”　 May 2011

Many evacuated using cars and got trapped in traffic. Many evacuated using cars and got trapped in traffic.

CP4: Obstacles during evacuationCP4: Obstacles during evacuation

19

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible



info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated



shelters


shelters


shelters


Source:Asahi NewspaperIwaizumi Town Paper (April 2011)

Evacuation routes played big role in securing safety of people, especially school children.

Evacuation routes played big role in securing safety of people, especially school children.

Emergency route from Omoto Elementary School to national route highway

Emergency route from the second floor of Okirai Elementary School

Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective. Use of cars during evacuation caused traffic congestion and many got trapped. Pre-installed tsunami emergency routes in schools proved very effective.

CP5: Safety of evacuation sheltersCP5: Safety of evacuation shelters

20

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible



info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated



shelters


shelters


shelters



tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami


In 11 cities of Iwate prefecture 48 evacuation shelters out of 411 were inundated. 1※

In Onagawa Town, reinforced concrete buildings often used as evacuation shelters were collapsed from the foundation. 2※

Source:※1 Kahoku Shinpo (April 14, 2011)※2 Japanese Society of Civil Engineers Emergency Investigation Group Report

Safety (location and structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some cases

Safety (location and structural) of evacuation shelters was insufficient in some cases

CP6: Detection of danger and progressive evacuationCP6: Detection of danger and progressive evacuation

21

Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters.Many evacuated to safer location regardless of the designated shelters.

self-judged

quakequake



Warning accessible



info-reactive

follow others

Evacuated



shelters


shelters


shelters



tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami


Escaped from

tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Critical Point 6Detection of danger and progressive evacuation

Among those who evacuated from tsunami in Miyagi, 60.8% evacuated from the primary evacuation shelter to the next. Among them 55.5% said the first shelter was stricken by tsunami. 1※

For most people the primary evacuation shelter was “publicly designated shelter such as community centers and schools”. About 40% moved further to evacuate to higher elevation or safer facilities. 2※

Source:※1: The Expert Panel on Earthquake and Tsunami Countermeasures in Light of the Lessons Learned from the 2011 Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake※2: Survey Research Center “ 宮城県沿岸部における被災地アンケート”　 May 2011

Check List to assess Human Loss VulnerabilityCheck List to assess Human Loss Vulnerability

Are there ways to disseminate tsunami warnings or evacuation information?

Are there ways to disseminate information at once?

Is information accessible during power outage?

Is information disseminated received/understood by people appropriately?

Are there community efforts to promote evacuation among neighbors?

Is the safety of officers providing evacuation guidance ensured?

Is the evacuation route safety ensured?

Are people aware of the location of evacuation shelters?

Are evacuation shelters located in ways so that people can walk to shelters?

Are there emergency routes secured that ensure immediate evacuation to higher elevation?

Is the safety of evacuation shelter ensured (height & structural safety)?

In flat areas far from hills, are there safe evacuation shelters (such as tsunami evacuation buildings) designated?

Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated evacuation shelters?

Can the real time tsunami information be obtained to detect danger early?

Evacuated・ Self-judged

・ Info-reactive・ Following

others



shelters


shelters


shelters

Evacuation shelter was not stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter stricken

by tsunami


by tsunami

Accurate evacuation information not accessible


Accurate evacuation information accessible

Escaped from tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

quakequake

CP1:Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate

Is the risk of tsunami recognized from past tsunami disasters or hazard maps?

Are methods of safety confirmation among family members ensured ？

CP2:Accurate evacuation warning/info

CP3:Evacuation actions

CP4:Obstacles during evacuation

CP5:Safety of evacuation shelters

CP6:Detection of danger and progressive evacuation

Rikuzentakata City Hall

Red ： Inundated Area Tsunami submerged up to 4th floor

Rikuzentakata City Hall was devastated by tsunami

Buildings destroyed 　 3,159Dead and missing 　 2,191 　Inundated area 　 1,300haPopulation in inundated area 　 16,640# households in inundated area 5,592

３．３． Case Study of Rikuzentakata CityCase Study of Rikuzentakata City Approx. 2,000 persons (10% of total population) are dead or

missing in Rikuzentakata

0

50

100

150

200

250

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0～4

5～9

10～14

15～19

20～24

25～29

30～34

35～39

40～44

45～49

50～54

55～59

60～64

65～69

70～74

75～79

80～84

85～89

90～94

95～99

100～

unknow

n

FatalitiesPopulation Rikuzentakata

Population

Population　in　inundated　area

dead

dead　or　missing

Flow of Human Losses in RikuzentakataFlow of Human Losses in Rikuzentakata

24

self-judged

quakequake


Warning accessible


info-reactive

follow others

EvacuatedArrived at evacuation

shelters


shelters


shelters


tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Escaped from

tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Lack of awareness regarding tsunami risks lead to delay in evacuation. Lack of awareness regarding tsunami risks lead to delay in evacuation.

Source:※1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動－将来の防災へ向けて―　 ICHARM, UNESCAP

Only 33 out of 180 immediately evacuated. Out of 33 only 1 died. 1※

Among those who didn’t immediately evacuate half didn’t think tsunami would arrive to their location 1※

Among 147 that didn’t immediately evacuate 1/3 (42) died. 1※


25

self-judged

quakequake


Warning accessible


info-reactive

follow others


shelters


shelters


shelters


tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Escaped from

tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Safety of evacuation shelters was not secured. Safety of evacuation shelters was not secured.

Source:※1: 陸前高田市における東日本大震災大津波襲来時の住民行動－将来の防災へ向けて―　 ICHARM, UNESCAP

Examination of bodies indicated that many had finished evacuation or were in the midst of evacuation. 2※

Number of designated evacuation shelters were located within the inundated area and many died at the evacuation shelters. 1※

Out of 68 primary evacuation shelters 35 were inundated by tsunami. 2※

City Gymnasium was a designated evacuation center but was inundated to 14m depth. 100 persons evacuated to this facility and most of them lost their lives.


26

self-judged

quakequake


Warning accessible


info-reactive

follow others


shelters


shelters


shelters


tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Evacuation shelter

stricken by tsunami

Escaped from

tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Human loss of younger generations could be explained by the fact that many lost their lives at evacuation shelters upon completion of evacuation

Human loss of younger generations could be explained by the fact that many lost their lives at evacuation shelters upon completion of evacuation

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

0～4

5～9

10～14

15～19

20～24

25～29

30～34

35～39

40～44

45～49

50～54

55～59

60～64

65～69

70～74

75～79

80～84

85～89

90～94

95～99

100～

%　Human　loss　in　inundated　area

Iwate

Miyako

Ofunato

Rikuzentakata

Kamaishi

Otsuchi

Yamada

High % human loss of younger generations in Rikuzentakata

Critical Causes for Human Losses in RikuzentakataCritical Causes for Human Losses in Rikuzentakata Lack of awareness regarding tsunami risks ◦Hazard maps◦Urban development in areas of high tsunami risks (revealed by

Meta Analysis) Inappropriate designation of evacuation shelters

27

４．４． ConclusionConclusion The critical causes for human losses vary depending on the

physical settings and social characteristics of the communities, and the extent of tsunami prevention/preparedness measures (both structural and non-structural).

The current FORIN template is useful in obtaining the in-depth and exhaustive picture of the phenomenon of the disaster and its impact. But to do this in full scale it would require much time and resources.

In order to identify critical causes or bottlenecks for certain area, utilization of hierarchical check list as prepared in this study could be useful.

An investigation sheet consisting of check list can be prepared for different entities (administrator, community, general public, etc. ) to measure their vulnerability against disasters. Such tool could assist identifying weakness or necessity for future measures.

28

29

Thank you very much

Example of human loss vulnerability review sheet (municipality)Example of human loss vulnerability review sheet (municipality)

Are there ways to disseminate tsunami warnings or evacuation information?

Are there ways to disseminate information at once?

Is information accessible during power outage?

Is information disseminated received/understood by people appropriately?

Are there community efforts to promote evacuation among neighbors?

Is the safety of officers providing evacuation guidance ensured?

Is the evacuation route safety ensured?

Are people aware of the location of evacuation shelters?

Are evacuation shelters located in ways so that people can walk to shelters?

Are there emergency routes secured that ensure immediate evacuation to higher elevation?

Is the safety of evacuation shelter ensured (height & structural safety)?

In flat areas far from hills, are there safe evacuation shelters (such as tsunami evacuation buildings) designated?

Are people provided with disaster education to evacuate to safer places regardless of designated evacuation shelters?

Can the real time tsunami information be obtained to detect danger early?

Evacuated・ Self-judged

・ Info-reactive・ Following

others



shelters


shelters


shelters

Evacuation shelter was not stricken by tsunami


by tsunami


by tsunami



Accurate evacuation information accessible

Escaped from tsunami

Caught by tsunami

Caught by tsunami

quakequake

CP1:Immediate recognition of necessity to evacuate

Is a tsunami hazard map being prepared?

Are there programs implemented to enhance disaster awareness of residents?

Is disaster awareness education provided at schools?

CP2:Accurate evacuation warning/info

CP3:Evacuation actions

CP4:Obstacles during evacuation

CP5:Safety of evacuation shelters

CP6:Detection of danger and progressive evacuation

Is a tsunami hazard map being prepared appropriately?

Are there programs implemented to enhance disaster awareness of residents (evacuation drills, etc)?

Is disaster awareness education provided at schools?

Additional Suggestions to FORIN Question ListAdditional Suggestions to FORIN Question List In the GEJET many infrastructure services were impacted in enormous

scale. Propagation of damages among infrastructure and its impact to socio economic activities are critical issue.

By knowing critical points in damage propagation, effective measures could be implemented to mitigate propagation of damages and to minimizing extent of impacts.

Further questions could be added to the FORIN Questions List. ◦ What were the consequences of breakdown or malfunctioning of

infrastructure networks (e.g., electricity, water supply, sewerage, transportation, communication, health services, educational services, etc) ?

◦ How did the effect on an infrastructure network propagate to another infrastructure network?

◦ How were the economic activities of the affected area impacted and how did it propagate to other areas/regions?

◦ What actions were taken in order to compensate the infrastructure or service network failure .

◦ How were the infrastructure or service networks restored?

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critical cause analysis of delayed evacuation in the great east japan earthquake and tsunami

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