Analogies Workshop

Create Meaningful Analogies and Distinctions

Part I: Read the explanation paragraphs on repentance of abandonment in Missouri.

Read the paragraphs carefully. The explanation paragraphs function as a kind of boundary for your application; your application can only refer to the rules and cases already mentioned in the explanation.

Part II: Write the corresponding application paragraphs: Step 1: LIST all the facts of your case that are comparable to the facts discussed in ¶C [Token Efforts] Step 2: Write a thesis sentence stating the argument to be proved in the first application paragraph (or two paragraphs) (note: thesis sentences should combine facts and law) Step 3:

(a) Write a sentence broadly identifying the points of comparison betweenyour case facts and those of the cases in ¶ C(e.g.: “Like in Case X, where____, in this case, ____.”).(b) Write as many sentences as needed to discuss/analyze/argue ALL thefacts of your case that you identified in Step 2 as comparable orcontrasting to the facts in ¶ C

Step 4: Write a sentence concluding the analogy. Step 5: Lather, rinse, repeat Steps 1-4 for explanation ¶¶ D-HStep 6: Check your paragraphs against the grading criteria for the application:

-thesis sentences apply rule to facts-uses terms consistently-thorough analysis of clients’ facts-uses specific analogy to / distinction from relevant authority-all cases in application were previously explained-mini-conclusions at end of paragraphs

Analogies Workshop

Anatomy of an analogy1

Buckley will be able to disaffirm the contract because she never fraudulently misrepresented her age to the salesman. Buckley’s representation that she was old enough to buy a car is significantly different from the representations in Carney, [cite,] where the minor fraudulently misrepresented his age and was estopped from disaffirming the contract. In that case, a minor entered into a contract to buy a car after affirmatively stating to the salesman that he was twenty-two; the salesman entered that information into the contract, which the minor signed. [Cite.] Buckley, however, never stated her age. Further, her answer—if construed to mean what she intended it to mean—was not false. The sales agent asked her if she was old enough to buy a car; she mistakenly thought he was asking her if she was old enough to drive, and answered “yes,” meaning that she was old enough to have a driver’s license. Buckley’s statement more closely resembles the one in Woodall, [cite,] in which the minor made an “unknowing” representation. In Woodall, the minor did not realize that he was making a representation of majority because he did not read the form contract before signing it. [Cite.] Similarly, Buckley did not realize that she was making a representation of majority because she misunderstood the agent’s question. Neither case involves the required intent to deceive. Therefore, assuming that a jury credits Buckley’s testimony that she honestly misunderstood the agent’s questions, the result in Buckley’s case should be the same as the result in Woodall, [cite]: an order permitting disaffirmance.

1 Adapted from Linda Edwards, LEGAL WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS, AND ORGANIZATION (5th ed. 2010), pp. 110-11.

Commented [AK1]: Thesis sentence asks for a conclusion (as opposed to “topic sentence”

Commented [AK2]: This sentences sets up the comparison between your case and the precedent case. Note that it mentions both facts from your case and one of the holdings from the precedent (fraudulent misrepresentation), in the same sentence.

Commented [AK3]: This sentence refreshes the reader’s memory about the precedent facts that are critical to this comparison. These facts need to have been previously addressed in the rule explanation section.

Commented [AK4]: Indicates contrast

Commented [AK5]: Detailed/thorough discussion of the client’s facts

Commented [AK6]: These words function as a transition and indicate that the next comparison will show similarity

Commented [AK7]: Sets up the comparison between your case and another precedent.

Commented [AK8]: Handy reminder of key facts from precedent.

Commented [AK9]: Restates the key fact from your case and concludes the comparison (makes it very explicit!)

Commented [AK10]: Reality check: reminds the reader that Buckley will need to be a credible witness or else the conclusion might not hold

Commented [AK11]: Concludes the paragraph

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

J.C., the child in this case (“Child”), was first brought to the circuit court’s

attention on January 22, 2016 as a “sibling petition” because of allegations of neglect

based on Child’s sibling being under court jurisdiction and concerns of domestic

violence. D10 p. 2. Child’s father J. C. (“Father”) stipulated to the allegations on March

21, 2016, and the circuit court took jurisdiction over Child by Judgment entered on

March 25, 2016. D13 p. 1. Initially, Child remained placed with Father and Child’s

mother ________ (“Mother”) until April 8, 2016, when she was placed with her

grandmother pursuant to a protective custody order following the Juvenile Officer’s

Motion to Modify. D14, D15. Nonetheless, the goal in the case remained reunification

from that time until it was changed on November 21, 2017, to termination of parental

rights and adoption. D22 p.1.

Initially, Father was offered services by the Children’s Division caseworkers

related to domestic violence and parenting, including a parent aide for supervised visits, a

psychological evaluation, and home visits. Tr. 235:21-236:19; 242:15-22. At the

beginning of the case, Father was not consistent in his engagement and participation. Tr.

266:22-267:4. His whereabouts were unknown to the Children’s Division and the circuit

court from approximately July 2016 through August 2017. Tr. 237:9-239:12. On August

31, 2017, Father attended a Family Support Team Meeting and requested services,

assistance, and visits. Tr. 65:5-12.

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Thereafter, Father fully reengaged in services. Tr. 269:12-17. At the review

hearing on November 22, 2017, the circuit court established conditions for Father to earn

back visits with Child, and appointed Father an attorney. D. 22 p. 2. Father met the

conditions to reestablish his visits by January 2018. Tr.81:7-14; 182:24-183:10. That

same month, on January 28, 2018, the Juvenile Officer filed the Termination of Parental

Rights (“TPR”) Petition. D2.

During summer 2017, when Father reached out to [Social Worker 1], the case

worker assigned to the family, Mother was absent from the case and Father then “had a

different mindset”: he reengaged in services, completed a psychological evaluation,

enrolled in domestic violence programming, and began visits and contact with his

daughter. Tr. 235:17; 310:20-25. By February 2018, even before Father had fully

graduated from the Batterer’s Program, Father began having regular weekly supervised

contact with Child. Tr. 244:21-245:5. During his regular visits with J.C., he helped his

daughter get accustomed to being around him, and slowly the two began to bond. Tr.

273:11-275:8. Seven months later, by the time the termination trial started, Father and

Child were comfortable with each other, enjoying their time together, and had formed a

bond. Tr. 275:19-276:5.

When the TPR trial began on September 7, 2018, Father and Child had been

having regular, consistent, appropriate visits for over seven months, and Father had been

paying child support by administrative income withholding order for over three months.

Tr. 132:3-6; J.O. Ex. 28. After two and a half days of trial on September 7, 12, and 17,

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2018, on December19, 2018, the circuit court issued its decision terminating the parental

rights of Father. D9. The circuit court terminated Father’s parental rights on several

grounds: (1) under §211.447.5(1), Child was an abandoned infant; (2) under

§211.447.5(3), Child had been under jurisdiction for over one year and the conditions that

led to the assumption of jurisdiction still persisted or conditions of a potentially harmful

nature continued to exist; such that there was little likelihood that those conditions would

be remedied at an early date so that Child could be returned to the parent in the near

future; and (3) under §211.447.5(6), Father was unfit to be a party to the parent-child

relationship. D9 pp.9-16. The circuit court then determined that under §211.447.7,

termination of Father’s rights would serve the best interests of the child. D9 pp.18-21.

This appeal followed.

Following is a summary of the relevant testimony and exhibits with specific

references, supporting this Statement of Facts.

A. Dr. Gregory S. , Psychologist.

Dr. [S] completed a psychological evaluation of Father on January 30, 2018.

Tr.10:4-9. He acknowledged that his final report indicated that the children in Father’s

care “are not at much risk of abuse and neglect.” Tr.30:19-21. Regarding his various

diagnoses of Father, Dr. S affirmed that “[a]mong these common diagnoses, many of

those parents [] end up being successful and still reunify. . . .” Tr. 29:22-25. Asked

whether he had “any question at all that [Father] wanted a relationship with his daughter

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and he wanted to try to establish a relationship, Dr. S. answered “[n]o I believe those

things.” Tr. 33:8-12.

B. Great-grandmother/placement provider.

M.O. (“Great-grandmother”) conceded that she had no problems with Father since

August 2017, when Father had returned and been involved in the case, despite describing

a history of prior concerns about him. Tr. 64:15-65:3. M.O. also conceded that despite

her reluctance for visits to restart between Father and Child in 2018, the visits had

seemed to go well and Child seemed to still be her happy self. Tr. 66:17-20. Finally,

M.O. testified that she had facilitated phone and FaceTime contact between Child and

Mother “in trying to do the right thing as far as her communicating with her children.”

Tr. 69:2-13. The undersigned attorney for Father asked: “[i]t’s really no different than

[Father] that wants a relationship and to be involved with his daughter, right?”; to which

M.O. responded “yes.” Tr. 69:18-21.

C. S.A., Parent Aide.

Mr. A started providing the supervision for the visits between Father and Child in

February 2018. Tr. 82:13-15. He further described how Child went from not really

knowing who Father was, to exhibiting signs of having a bond with him. Tr. 83:11-12,

86:18-25. Mr. A. described the progress made with Father’s visits, the growth of the

relationship, and Father’s frustrations with the process. Tr. 95:10-96:21. He testified to

the interest and commitment that Father had displayed and expressed for the child:

Q. So as a parent aide for parents in the system, how would you describe the consistency and commitment of J. C, to this process?

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A. He's been very consistent. I know one time he was not in town due to his

job so we didn't have a visit. There were some other things. The last time when we didn't have a visit that there was some conflict and he couldn't be there at the time. . . .

Q. Okay. But you've had a good deal of contact with him correct? A. Yes. Q. So, again, I'm asking you; what's your assessment of his commitment to his

daughter in this process? A. He's very committed.

Tr. 96:2-17. Mr. A. confirmed that he had no safety concerns from anything he had

observed in the visits, and that nothing he had seen would cause significant concerns, if

the circuit court were to decide not to terminate Father’s parental rights, and permit the

parent-child relationship to progress. Tr.111:8-12;116.

D. E.W., Case Worker for Children’s Division.

Ms. W. was the assigned worker at the time of the TPR trial and had been assigned

to the case for approximately six months. Tr. 135:17-21. She testified that the reinitiation

of Father’s supervised visits started just before she officially was assigned to the case.

Tr. 155:3-10. By the time of the TPR trial in September 2018, the Children’s Division

recommended that Father’s rights not be terminated, and Ms. W. confirmed that she had

no concerns that Child could not adjust to a more substantial relationship or full

reunification with her father. Tr.177:23-178:9. Ms. W. also confirmed that none of the

allegations in the Petition regarding abandonment were accurate: (1) Father had provided

some financial support; (2) Father had made efforts to visit or communicate with Child;

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(3) Father had been meaningfully involved in Child’s life since Ms. W. had been the case

worker; (4) Father had attended and completed the domestic violence programming; (5)

Father had worked with Children’s Division and the court in order to “provide assurance

he’s capable of safely caring for the child”; and (6) Father had shown interest in and

commitment to Child. Tr. 162:16-164:5.

Ms. W. testified that the concerns that brought Child into care relative to Father

were fully resolved, and there were no longer any safety concerns for parenting by the

time of the trial. Tr. 164:4-164:2. Ms. W. testified that she saw no concerns for domestic

violence and had no concerns that would have prevented Father from providing for or

parenting Child. Tr. 165:6-8. Ms. W. further testified that she had no concerns regarding

Father’s fitness as a parent, stating among other things, “I think J.C. is consistent. I think

he is dedicated. I think he’s remorseful for being absent.” Tr. 168:14-15; 169:18-21.

Moreover, Father had successfully participated in the services designed to assist with

reunification, including services aimed at addressing his prior domestic violence

concerns. Father had an appropriate home, and he:

[T]akes advice from everyone on the team. If Mr. A., his parent aid, gives him advice, he takes it. If I give my advice, he takes it. . . . If anyone suggests that he do something more, he takes it. He wants to learn. He asked for his therapist to be an older black male so that he could learn from that person.

Tr. 158:3-5; 168:16-169:17. Ms. W. testified that she believed Father’s participation in

domestic violence programming was “[d]efinitely a success. He’s given up every

Saturday. . . . [H]e’s given up $30 every Saturday of his own money. Children’s

Division doesn’t fund domestic violence.” Tr.168:20-24. An Administrative Order for

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child support was entered in June 2018—after Child had been under the court’s

jurisdiction for almost two years—and Father had been paying since the order was issued.

Tr.170:16-19. Finally, Ms. W. stated that if Father were given the opportunity to expand

his visits and contact with Child, he could reunify with Child within a reasonable period

of time. Tr. 165:14-20.

E. M.B., Domestic Violence Coordinator, Northland Dependency.

M.B. is the Domestic Violence Program Coordinator at Northland Dependency

Services. Tr. 186:2-5. Ms. B. described Father’s periodic voluntary participation in the

program beginning February 2015, through his graduation from the program on August

18, 2018. Tr.188:22-191:12. Ms. B. testified that Father had meaningfully confronted

the issue of domestic violence, he had fully completed the domestic violence program,

and Ms. B. had no safety concerns regarding domestic violence with respect to Father’s

parenting. Tr.194:20-195:12. Ms. B. also testified that Father had the tools and

education necessary to live free of violence, and that she had no concerns about Father

regarding domestic violence towards his daughter. Tr.192:11-193:15. Ms. B. stated that

Father had “absolutely” expressed interest and commitment to his daughter. Tr. 194:8-

12.

F. R.M., Former Case Worker for Children’s Division.

Ms. M. was the assigned worker when Child was born in January 2016, and

remained the assigned worker until early 2018. Tr. 230:19; 228:14. She testified that

Father’s supervised visits were reinitiated just before she went off the case. Tr. 237:12-

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19. Ms. M. believed she had been in contact with Father between April 2016 and the

court hearing on June 6, 2016. Tr. 231:23-232:9. On June 10, 2016, she was present for

a supervised visit between Father and Child at Raytown Park. Tr. 234:16-24.

Afterwards, Father disengaged from the case until sometime during Fall 2017, when he

sought to reestablish visitation through S.A., the parent aide. Tr. 237:9-16.

Ms. M. stated Father was permitted supervised visits once he became engaged in

services, so that Father and Child could reestablish a relationship. Tr. 244:25-245:2.

Asked whether she made a referral to Child Support prior to Father’s DNA test, she

stated she had “made contact with child support,” and that once the paternity test came

back, “[t]here were emails, yes, to get [child support] going.” Tr. 247:19-248:2. She

testified that she did not know why the child support office “didn’t follow through” on

establishing the order, but then agreed that because Child was in Children’s Division

custody, Ms. M. herself would have been obligated to make the referral. Tr. 248:3-10.

Ms. M. also stated that she did not tell Father that he should make some payments

towards child support, while he was waiting on the administrative order. Tr. 248:11-15.

Asked why she did not advise Father to make payments, Ms. M. answered, “I don’t really

have a reason.” Tr. 248:16-17.

G. J. C,, Father of J.C.

Father testified about his history with Mother, and his regrets over his prior

behavior. Tr. 265:9-266:18. He and Mother were living together when Child was born,

but Father admitted that “we was (sic) very young and really rushing into things and we

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wasn’t (sic) concentrating on being parents to our daughter.” Tr. 265:20-22. Father and

Mother disagreed often when it came to parenting, such that Father decided “I didn’t

want to do this for my daughter, that the atmosphere of being her parents and getting into

this type of violence and I didn’t want it,” so he began “trying to be careful when it came

to talking to [Mother] so far as us parenting. . . .” Tr. 266:8-18.

Father believed that after June 2016, while he was incarcerated, a no-contact order

had been issued and he was prohibited from seeing his daughter. Tr. 266:22-267:4. After

being released from jail, Father “knew I had to take action that involved me getting in

touch with the system and doing what I have to do to start either in a joint custody

arrangement or some type of visitation for me to be able to see her.” Tr. 267:14-18.

Prior to making contact with Children’s Division, Father was searching for steady

employment, and lived outside of the city with no public transportation and without his

own personal vehicle. Tr. 267:23-268:20. Once he had enough financial stability to

purchase a car and pay expenses in addition to child support, Father felt “comfortable

enough to come to the children’s agency and let them know that I’m ready.” Tr. 268:17-

23.

Father became reengaged in the case in August 2017. Tr. 268:24-269:5. Father

stated that he was working hard to address the issues “because I definitely want to show

how much I’ve taken account for when it comes to getting my daughter back. I know

what I’ve done. . .(sic) so whatever it takes, I’m willing to do for my daughter.” Tr.

272:8-12. He described his evolution as “I’m more of a thinker (sic). I think about

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everything I do now. I take action and. . .(sic) I think (before)(sic) having an action or

anything.” Tr. 278:8–12. Further, he testified that since the reinitiation of his visits in

February 2018, “we’re. . .(sic) slowly for surely regaining a great bond together,” “I

enjoy (her)(sic) so much,” and “(I’m) (sic) a father wanting to have a relationship with

his child.” Tr. 275:8-276:5, 283:6-8.

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Repentance of Abandonment in Missouri

¶ A [Big Rule statement ¶]

According to §211.447.5(1), a child is abandoned when “for a period of six

months or longer, . . . (b) the parent has, without good cause, left the child without any

provision for parental support and without making arrangements to visit or communicate

with the child, although able to do so.” Abandonment is defined as “the voluntary

relinquishment of child custody with the intention the severance be of a permanent

nature, or as the intentional withholding by a parent of his care, love, protection and

presence without just cause or excuse.” In the Interest of R.K., 982 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Mo.

App. W.D.1998). In determining abandonment, the circuit court focuses on the parent’s

intent, “taking into consideration all evidence of the parent's conduct before and after the

applicable statutory period.” In the Interest of G.M.T., 965 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Mo. App.

E.D. 1998).

¶ B [Repentance generally]

While the statute does not mention “repentance of abandonment,” Missouri courts

have held that a parent may repent any prior abandonment with the “actual or attempted

exercise of parental rights and duties following the abandonment.” In re J.W., 11 S.W.3d

699, 705 (Mo. App. W.D.1999). True repentance requires “at least . . . a reasonable

effort to assume parental responsibility and to perform parental duties, in which case the

abandonment is no longer a ground for termination of parental rights.” J.H.H. v. J.D., 662

S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo. App. E.D.1983). “[W]hether there has been a repentance requires

Commented [AK1]: This is the “Big Rule.” Start out broad, and in the introductory paragraph(s), give the Court a roadmap of where you are going and what you’ll discuss further.

Commented [AK2]: Now I’m introducing what I’m going to spend the rest of this section discussing. Write this (and all) paragraphs going broad to narrow with your rule statements.

Commented [AK3]: Word choices indicating that efforts and attempts to repent are included.

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an examination of the parent’s intent, an inferred fact, determined by considering all the

evidence of the parent’s conduct.” In re M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Mo. App.

W.D.1991). It is well-established that “not every gesture by a natural parent will

terminate . . . abandonment,” and that a trial court must consider all evidence of the

parent’s inferred intent, “including that before and after the statutory period.” In re

Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 455 (Mo. 1984).

¶C [Token Efforts]

A parent shows repentance by making more than “token efforts” to reestablish

parenting responsibilities. In re A.R., 52 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001).

Where the father in A.R. initiated telephone contact with the child, moved from

Mississippi to Kansas City to attempt to gain custody, obtained employment in Kansas

City, temporarily moved in with his sister, and had a paternity test, the father’s efforts

“established his intent to repent any prior abandonment.” Id. at 636. However, a parent

does not repent abandonment if he shows only a “superficial or tenuous relationship with

her child in order to avoid a determination of abandonment. . . . [T]rial court[s] may

attach little or no weight to infrequent visitations, communications or contributions. . . .

[and] may regard such efforts as token and terminate parental rights despite their

existence.” In re C.M.D., 18 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (citations omitted).

For instance, where a mother made one request for visitation during the statutory period,

her efforts were “token in nature,” and the circuit court properly terminated her parental

rights. In re M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Mo. App. W.D. 1991).

Commented [AK4]: This is really the part of the rule we’re trying to define. This sentence is a contract with your reader—“The rest of this Point will deal with the issue of a parent’s intent to repent, only intent to repent, and nothing but the intent to repent.”

Commented [AK5]: See what I did there? Take a statement of the law that you don’t like and try to make it a positive.

Commented [AK6]: Important to include facts from precedent cases for later analogies in RA

Commented [AK7]: Showing the range of factual scenarios

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¶¶ D-E [The timing of a parent’s repentance]

No law requires that post-filing efforts should be discounted entirely as “token

efforts.” As the Missouri Supreme Court established: “[a]n essential part of any

determination whether to terminate parental rights is whether, considered at the time of

the termination and looking to the future, the child would be harmed by a continued

relationship with the parent.” In re K.A.W., 133 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. banc 2004).

On the other hand, a parent’s conduct after the TPR Petition is filed cannot be the

“sole consideration of the trial court’s decision.” In re T.T., 954 S.W.2d 429, 432–33

(Mo. App. W.D. 1997). There, a father’s rights were properly terminated where the

father did not provide financial support, food, shelter. or education for the children; and

where the father had no contact with the children for a year and a half prior to the filing

of the TPR Petition. Id. at 432. This Court held that “[a]ll grounds for termination must

to some extent look to past conduct because the past provides vital clues to present and

future conduct. Otherwise, a parent may argue that he has reformed since the filing of the

petition; reformation having occurred while the child was away.” In re T.T., 954 S.W.2d

429, 432–33 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) (emphasis added).

¶¶ F-G [Short Term Improvements]

Over the past two decades Missouri courts have increasingly viewed any efforts

occurring after the filing of the TPR Petition as “short term improvements, . . . [and] not

necessarily compelling” or sufficient to satisfy the exception of repentance. In re J.W.,

Commented [AK8]: It’s trickier here to write a favorable rule because it’s a negative.

Commented [AK9]: Sole consideration” does not mean “must be disregarded entirely.”

Commented [AK10]: Setting up facts for comparison in RA

Commented [AK11]: “Sole consideration” does not mean “must be disregarded entirely.”

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11 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Mo. App. W.D. 1999). In J.W., even though the mother sought

drug treatment and had not used drugs for two and a half months, had obtained stable

housing, and asserted that she would undergo long-term inpatient drug treatment to be

reunited with her children, this Court upheld the circuit court’s decision terminating her

parental rights, noting: “[t]his does not mean that Mother is without sincerity in her

expressions of commitment. We assume Mother is sincere, but the evidence does not

demonstrate that Mother has undergone a degree of rehabilitation which will enable her

to perform as a parent.” Id.

Overall, post-filing efforts are treated “with great hesitancy as they are not always

consistent with the desire of a parent to establish a relationship with her child.” M.L.K.,

804 S.W.2d at 403–04 (“C.B.'s eighteen correspondences with M.L.K. all came after the

petition for termination of parental rights. The trial court may determine that these efforts

were token despite the fact that contrary evidence exists.”).

¶ H [ New Interpretation]

Not all conduct occurring after the petition is filed necessarily constitutes half-

hearted or token efforts. See In re Adoption of W.B.L., 681 S.W.2d 452, 456 (Mo. banc

1984) (Blackmar, J., dissenting). During the statutory period, the mother made one

attempt to visit the child, but “[a]t that time the father and stepmother had employed an

attorney to file this case. Upon the lawyer's advice, the father refused to extend visitation

to the appellant. . . . .” Id. at 455. The Missouri Supreme Court deferred to the trial

court’s determination that the mother’s attempts to contact the child were “half-hearted

Commented [AK12]: Again, setting up facts

Commented [AK13]: When you have good language like this from a dissenting opinion, include it as a suggestion for the interpretation you want, but not until you’ve explained the law as it exists.

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and token. . . . In so doing, the trial court set[] forth with particularity its reasons for

disregarding the belated activity of the natural mother.” Id. at 456.

In his dissenting opinion, Judge Blackmar reiterated, “[t]he removal of parental

rights without consent is a drastic thing, carefully limited by the statutes,” and that before

the petition for adoption was filed, “the natural mother took the only steps available to

her to repent of any abandonment. She sought to visit the child and was met by an abject,

wrongful refusal. Had the visit been allowed, the one-year period of abandonment would

have been interrupted.” Id. Furthermore:

The result makes a mockery of the proposition, to which the principal opinion does lip service, that “a parent may repent of abandonment.” . . .

There simply is no evidence to support the finding of willful abandonment during the critical period. The attempted contact, which was frustrated by the father's refusal, and the subsequent filing of a contempt action, were unequivocal and admitted steps refuting the claim of abandonment. There is no basis for the trial judge's branding them “half-hearted and token.” . . .

The legislature was wise in enunciating strict standards for abandonment. I doubt that the Court will help matters by relaxing these standards.

Id. at 456-57.

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