cook thesis final
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This the final version of my thesis: "ALP and unions: between dependence"TRANSCRIPT
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UNIONS AND THE ALP
Between dependence and independence
Trevor Cook
2012
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Government and International Relations,
Faculty of Arts, University of Sydney
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Statement of originality
This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my
own work. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.
I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work
and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources has been
acknowledged.
Trevor Cook
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................5 Abbreviations .......................................................................................................................6 List of Tables .........................................................................................................................9 Abstract................................................................................................................................ 11 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 12 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................. 19 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................19 2. Union decline and de-linking.............................................................................................20 3. Party type and individualism ............................................................................................27 4. Relationship type and political behaviour....................................................................35 5. Union revitalisation and strategic choice......................................................................46 6. Political independence and dependence.......................................................................50 7. Conclusion................................................................................................................................54
CHAPTER 3: APPROACH AND METHODS .................................................................. 55 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................55 2. Research questions ...............................................................................................................58 3. Previous studies.....................................................................................................................59 4. Case study research ..............................................................................................................64 5. Qualitative interviews..........................................................................................................68 6. Other data sources ................................................................................................................77 7. Conclusion................................................................................................................................78
CHAPTER 4: FRAGMENTATION.................................................................................... 79 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................79 2. Australian exceptionalism..................................................................................................81 3. Federalism ...............................................................................................................................85 4. Union movement structure ................................................................................................94 5. Sectarianism, ideological conflict and factionalism ..................................................98 6. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 103
CHAPTER 5: TWO RELATIONSHIPS ..........................................................................104 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 104 2. A question of balance ........................................................................................................ 105 3. Three perspectives............................................................................................................. 118 4. Current and former union officials............................................................................... 122 5. Social partner versus pressure group ......................................................................... 124 6. Union status and attitudes............................................................................................... 129 7. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 130
CHAPTER 6: UNION REVITALISATION .....................................................................131 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 131 2. Revitalisation ....................................................................................................................... 133 3. Generational change.......................................................................................................... 139 4. Re-thinking the Accord..................................................................................................... 143 5. Unity........................................................................................................................................ 150
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6. Scepticism ............................................................................................................................. 155 7. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 163
CHAPTER 7: ALP AFFILIATION...................................................................................165 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 165 2. Re-defining the relationship.......................................................................................... 167 3. Affiliation patterns............................................................................................................. 171 4. Affiliation exclusivity ........................................................................................................ 178 5. Connections .......................................................................................................................... 192 6. Non-affiliation...................................................................................................................... 200 7. Caucus attitudes.................................................................................................................. 203 8. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 212
CHAPTER 8: BENEFIT EXCHANGES ...........................................................................213 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 213 2. Benefit exchanges and relationship types ................................................................. 214 3. External symmetry............................................................................................................. 216 4. Internal symmetry ............................................................................................................. 226 5. Predictability ....................................................................................................................... 229 6. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 234
CHAPTER 9: YOUR RIGHTS AT WORK AND BEYOND ..........................................235 1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 235 2. 2007 election........................................................................................................................ 236 3. Campaign elements............................................................................................................ 246 4. Policy benefits...................................................................................................................... 254 5. A moment in time ............................................................................................................... 257 6. A second act? ........................................................................................................................ 260 7. Conclusion............................................................................................................................. 264
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION .........................................................................................266 Appendices .......................................................................................................................272
Appendix 1: Interview questions .................................................................................................. 272 Appendix 2: ALP vote share (1901 -‐ 2010): federal and major states.......................... 273 Appendix 3: ALP MPs, House of Representatives 2011: union backgrounds ............ 275 Appendix 4: Second Gillard Ministry: union backgrounds................................................. 280
Bibliography.....................................................................................................................283
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Acknowledgements
On an afternoon walk at Kilcare some years ago, John Edwards told me that a PhD
provided a rare opportunity to study a subject in a structured way. It was a
tantalising prospect for someone who had spent the past few decades working on
projects that rarely lasted more than a few hours or a few weeks. The past three
and a half years have been an enjoyable taste of the scholastic life.
The journey was all the better because I was able to share it with a supportive
group of fellow research students. In particular, I was delighted to find two other
Hawke Government staffers, Stephen Mills and Judy Betts, as well as another
Canberra ‘old’ hand, Stewart Jackson, in my student cohort. The company of
‘political insiders’ (old hacks) was like a reassuring balm on many occasions.
I would like to thank the staff of the Government and International Relations
Department at the University of Sydney for their encouragement and guidance
including Anika Gauja, Robert Howard, Michael Jackson, and Rodney Smith. Most
of all, I owe a large debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Ariadne Vromen, who has
provided generous, timely and extremely helpful advice throughout.
I also thank the interviewees, who gave freely of their time and insights. I suspect
many will not agree with my conclusions. I also thank the many colleagues,
friends and acquaintances with whom I have discussed, debated and argued many
of the ideas in this thesis over the past few decades.
I wish to thank three other people; my old friend, Robert Hinds, without his
encouragement and practical support I may never have completed a first degree
all those years ago; my wife, Julie Flynn, whose generosity, encouragement and
tolerance made it possible for me to undertake a doctorate; and, finally, my father,
Ray Cook, who gave me an interest in labour politics, a life-‐long love of learning
and an incurable attraction to the beauty of ideas.
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Abbreviations
ABCC Australian Building and Construction Commission
Accord The Prices and Incomes Accord between the ACTU
and the ALP
ACSPA Australian Council of Salaried and Professional
Associations
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions
AEU Australian Education Union
ANF Australian Nursing Federation
AFL-‐CIO American Federation of Labor – Congress of
Industrial Organisations
AIRC Australian Industrial Relations Commission
AFPC Australian Fair Pay Commission
ALAC Australian Labor Advisory Committee
ALP Australian Labor Party
AMWU Australian Manufacturing Workers Union
ANF Australian Nursing Federation
APESMA Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and
Managers Australia
ASU Australian Services Union
AWU Australian Workers Union
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BCA Business Council of Australia
BLP British Labour Party
CAGEO Council of Australian Government Employees
Organisation
CFMEU Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union
CIS Centre for Independent Studies
CPSU Community and Public Sector Union
CTW Change to Win Group (USA)
DLP Democratic Labour Party
FPLP Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (caucus)
FSU Financial Services Union
HoR House of Representatives
HSU Health Services Union
IEU Independent Education Union
IPA Institute of Public Affairs
LCNSW Labor Council of NSW (now UnionsNSW)
LEL Labor Electoral League
LHMU Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union
(now UnitedVoice)
LNP Liberal National Party Coalition
MP Member of Parliament
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MUA Maritime Union of Australia
NGO Non-‐government organisation
NSW New South Wales
NTEU National Tertiary Education Union
NUW National Union of Workers
NZ New Zealand
NZLP New Zealand Labour Party
OBU One Big Union
OEA Office of the Employment Advocate
SDA Shop, Distributive and Allied Industries Union
SEIU Service Employees International Union (USA)
TLC Trades and Labour Council
TUC Trade Union Congress (UK)
TWU Transport Workers Union
UFU United Firefighters Union
UK United Kingdom
USA United States of America
VTHC Victorian Trades Hall Council
WA Western Australia
WWF Waterside Workers Federation
YR@W Your Rights at Work campaign
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List of Tables
Table 1: Relationship type and political activities................................................ 52
Table 2: Methodology: descriptions........................................................................... 62
Table 3: Methodology: scholarly usage..................................................................... 63
Table 4: Methodology: strengths and weaknesses................................................ 63
Table 5: Interviewee characteristics ......................................................................... 74
Table 6: Unions and interviewees............................................................................... 76
Table 7: Other data sources .......................................................................................... 77
Table 8: Relationship comparisons............................................................................ 83
Table 9: An international timeline comparison..................................................... 84
Table 10: Overall attitudes to relationship ...........................................................119
Table 11: Relationship outcomes for unions ........................................................123
Table 12: Union satisfaction: current officials .....................................................124
Table 13: Relationship status and union connection.........................................126
Table 14: Current officials: status and satisfaction ............................................130
Table 15: Attitudes to new union agenda...............................................................141
Table 16: Union attitudes to the Accord .................................................................145
Table 17: Limited applicability of the US model ..................................................162
Table 18: ALP national reviews; attitudes to unions, community .................169
Table 19: Relationship dimensions..........................................................................177
Table 20: Caucus: union officials, affiliated and not affiliated ........................185
Table 21: Senators: union backgrounds .................................................................186
Table 22: Caucus: unions represented....................................................................188
Table 23: Union backgrounds: by gender ..............................................................189
Table 24: Ministry: union representation..............................................................190
Table 25: Federal caucus NGO experience.............................................................191
Table 26: Current union officials: Attitudes to ALP MPs...................................193
Table 27: Class of 2007: after 2010 election .........................................................205
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Table 28: Union role: comments of former officials ...........................................207
Table 29: New members: political class..................................................................211
Table 30: Benefits, dependency and relationship trends.................................216
Table 31: External symmetry – who benefits most?...........................................218
Table 32: Predictability: access and overall satisfaction..................................231
Table 33: Predictability: Influence and lobbying ................................................232
Table 34: Attitudes: YR@W and 2007 election outcome ..................................240
Table 35: Impact of YR@W on election...................................................................242
Table 36: Repertoires of contention ........................................................................248
Table 37: Attitudes: FWA outcomes .........................................................................254
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Abstract
Union movements in Western countries are using pressure group tactics, often
borrowed from unions in the United States of America (USA) and premised on
political independence, to augment the declining political resources they
traditionally derived from high union densities and close associations with
political parties. The Australian union movement was an early adopter of this
approach and a study of its experience provides insights into the value and
sustainability of this relatively new strategy.
This thesis presents a case study of the impact of union revitalisation on
weakening links between unions and social democratic (including labour) parties.
It examines the national relationship between unions and the Australian Labor
Party (ALP) over the period from 1983 to 2010. This period includes two
remarkable episodes: the Prices and Incomes Accord between the Australian
Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the ALP, which was a feature of the Hawke
and Keating Governments from 1983 to 1996; and, the Your Rights at Work
(YR@W) campaign conducted by the ACTU, from 2005 to 2007, against the
Howard Government’s WorkChoices legislation.
This thesis argues that the national unions-‐ALP relationship has undergone a
partial transformation towards greater independence, but has not been able to
find a sustainable balance between the dependence of the social democratic type
of unions-‐party relationships and the independence of the pressure group type.
This thesis also contributes to theoretical understanding of the weakening of
unions-‐party links as labour, and social democratic, parties transition from the
mass party to the electoral professional type. It argues that union revitalisation is
problematic in the context of a social democratic type unions-‐party relationship.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The case study developed in this thesis focuses on changes in the national
relationship between unions and the ALP from the Accord period through to the
2010 election, a period shaped by the ACTU’s adoption of revitalisation strategies
and its pursuit of an independent political role, particularly through the YR@W
campaign between 2005 and 2007. Union movements in Western Europe have
also adopted strategies of union revitalisation and greater political independence
in their efforts to augment significant declines in the power resources they have
traditionally derived from high union densities and close associations with
political parties. The ACTU was early, and quick, to pursue these strategies. The
case study in this thesis provides some early insights into whether these
augmentation strategies are sustainable and effective over the longer-‐term.
Union movements in Western countries use various combinations of repertoires
of contention (Gentile and Tarrow 2009, Hill 2007, Vandenberg 2006) based on
labour and citizen rights. Gentile and Tarrow (2009) argue that repertoires based
on labour rights are prevalent in corporatist capitalist economies, while
repertoires based on citizen rights are more prevalent in neo-‐liberal regimes
(Gentile and Tarrow 2009:467). The mix varies according to the capacity of
unions to take industrial action and the nature of their relationships with political
parties. Success in using repertoires of contention based on citizen rights
requires union democratisation, grass roots activism and access to highly
developed campaign skills. Union movements that have been traditionally reliant
on the exercise of labour rights can find it difficult to make the switch to a greater
reliance on citizen rights.
Although a mix of strategies is always available to unions, different types of
unions-‐party relationships are strongly associated with either internal or external
lobbying. The social democratic type of unions-‐party relationship found in
Australia, New Zealand (NZ) and the United Kingdom (UK) is associated with
internal lobbying, where unions influence policy through direct participation in
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party forums and through access to candidate selection processes for public
office. The pressure group relationship type found in the USA is associated with
external lobbying; typified by the efforts of unions to influence political decision-‐
making through public campaigns around particular causes and in support of
candidates that are favourably disposed towards union policy objectives.
Internal lobbying requires a dependent relationship between unions and parties.
The fortunes of unions and parties are closely intertwined in social democratic
type relationships. There is greater organisational integration in these
relationships and strong overlaps of leadership elites. External lobbying requires
a more independent relationship. Public campaigning by unions is more effective
if it is conducted independently of political parties.
Affiliation is the major institutional feature of social democratic type unions-‐party
relationships that distinguishes them from the pressure group type. Affiliation
ensures that labour1 parties are a special type of the mass party. Affiliation
strengthens the links between unions and political parties by facilitating union
influence over party policy and public office candidate selection. Affiliation allows
unions to formulate and enforce strategies and rules designed to constrain the
autonomy of the party’s Parliamentary representatives. Affiliation privileges
unions over other social groupings seeking to influence political parties.
Affiliation also ensures that the political exchange between unions and political
parties is more certain for unions. Without affiliation unions must rely on the
pressure group tactics of generating and focusing public support in favour of
particular causes and candidates. In the pressure group type, the political
exchange between unions and political parties is less certain. Union movements
have generally achieved better policy outcomes through affiliation than without
it; that is, other things being equal, internal lobbying is a superior political
strategy for unions than external lobbying. The superior effectiveness of internal
1 I use the spelling ‘labour’ to refer to labour parties in general and labour movements. I use the spelling ‘labor’ to refer to the ALP and in reference to American labor organisations.
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lobbying has encouraged unions to augment it with external lobbying, rather than
replace it, as that effectiveness has declined in a post-‐Keynesian era2.
The effectiveness of internal lobbying has dissipated with declines in union
density and the adoption of neo-‐liberal3 economic policies by union-‐aligned
parties. Union density declines, together with neo-‐liberal approaches to labour
market regulation, reduce the capacity for unions to take industrial action. Union
density declines also reduce the benefits that aligned parties derive from unions-‐
party relationships; encouraging parties to weaken links with affiliated unions
and create space for engagement with a broader range of community-‐based
organisations. In response, unions have sought to augment internal lobbying with
external lobbying. Unions also view the independence of external lobbying as
central to pursuing their key priority of union revitalisation through re-‐engaging
and rebuilding membership bases. Augmentation offers unions improvements in
both membership outcomes and political resources.
The use of augmentation suggests the possibility that two forms of unions-‐party
relationships can co-‐exist. It suggests that unions can use internal and external
lobbying simultaneously, or switch between the two strategies as circumstances
demand. Augmentation presents a contradiction between dependence and
independence, which became more apparent when the ALP was returned to
office. External lobbying, exemplified in Australia in the YR@W campaign, is a
viable option for unions campaigning against non-‐Labor Governments. External
lobbying is much more problematic for affiliated unions when the ALP holds
office.
2 Post-‐Keynesian here means the period from the 1970s up to the onset of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007; whether there will be a significant retreat from neo-‐liberalism as a result of the GFC is yet to be seen. 3 These policies have generally been called economic rationalism in Australia; however, the term neo-‐liberalism is more accurate especially in linking today’s policy frameworks to those that pre-‐dated Keynesianism. This thesis is mainly concerned with neo-‐liberal labour market policies, which are characterised by attempts to wind-‐back laws and practices that support collectivism in the workplace. The term ‘economic rationalism’ emerged during the Whitlam Government and initially had positive connotations, its pejorative use was popularized in the 1990s (Quiggin 1998:78, 81).
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There are historical and structural reasons for anticipating that the national
unions-‐ALP relationship is better suited to the adoption of an augmentation
strategy than most unions-‐party relationships in Western countries. Australian
unions affiliate with the ALP at state level, the decision of the various colonial
Labor Parties to federate and the absence of a national union organisation,
created a unique distance between unions and the national ALP. Unlike other
social democratic type unions-‐party relationships, there has never been a strong,
affiliation-‐based relationship between a national union movement and a national
party in Australia. This historical anomaly created the space for the development
of a relatively independent ACTU in the early 1980s capable of bargaining with
the ALP on behalf of all unions, as an organisation operating separately from the
ALP. The ACTU demonstrated a remarkable capacity to switch, in the space of a
decade or two, from pursuing a corporatist vision for its future along
Scandinavian lines to embracing the pressure group type strategies and tactics of
American unions. Yet, the capacity to make these switches is limited and the
prospects for achieving a sustainable balance between external and internal
lobbying are far from certain.
This thesis is essentially a study of the pressures and choices facing unions and
parties in a neo-‐liberal era. This thesis provides empirical insights, based largely
on qualitative interviews, into the national unions-‐ALP relationship at a time of
challenge and transformation. It also seeks to make a theoretical contribution to
two related bodies of literature. First, it seeks to provide a more detailed
understanding of some aspects of the internal processes by which a mass party
becomes an electoral professional party (Panebianco 1988:262-‐267). Specifically,
the processes by which institutionalised vertical links between unions and
aligned parties might undergo the weakening that Panebianco identified as a key
part of the overall process of becoming an electoral professional party. Second,
the thesis seeks to make a contribution to a smaller body of literature that
provides a theoretical understanding of the differences between unions-‐party
relationships. This thesis addresses the theoretical question of whether a social
democratic type relationship can be transformed into a pressure group type
without ending union affiliation to the party.
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This thesis is structured into ten chapters.
Chapter One is the introduction.
Chapter Two reviews the literature and identifies the concepts and arguments
that are used in this thesis. Four areas of literature are discussed. First, literature
is considered which discusses union density declines and the impact this has on
unions-‐party relationships, including through de-‐linking. Second, political party
literature dealing with changes from mass party to electoral professional is
considered; particularly, the importance of weakening vertical links. Third,
literature dealing with unions-‐party relationship types is reviewed. The key
differences between social democratic and pressure group types are identified
and the views of scholars on the possibility of transformations from the social
democratic to the pressure group type are reviewed. Fourth, the key political
content of revitalisation strategies is discussed, particularly the possibility of
union movements choosing to replace, or supplement, labour rights with citizen
rights to employ new repertoires of contention and the greater political
independence this requires.
Chapter Three outlines approach and methods. It explains the reasons for using
a case study approach and undertaking qualitative interviews with senior
participants in the national unions-‐ALP relationship. It explains how the data
from these interviews has been used in conjunction with data from other sources,
principally speeches, reports and biographical information.
Chapter Four analyses the key historical differences between Australia and other
countries with social democratic type unions-‐party relationships. It identifies
three key differences: federalism, union movement structure, and, the intensity of
sectarian and ideological conflict. This chapter demonstrates the ways in which
these differences created more fragmentation in the national unions-‐ALP
relationship than is usual in social democratic type relationships. It argues that
this additional fragmentation created space in the relationship that facilitated the
emergence of a more politically independent ACTU.
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Chapter Five reports and analyses the views expressed in interviews conducted
for this thesis on the general state of the contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship.
It points to the paradox arising from the emergence of an ACTU-‐ALP relationship
based on independence; and, the simultaneous retention of a dependent
relationship based on affiliation with its attendant enforcement rules and
strategies.
Chapter Six outlines the emergence of a more politically active ACTU through the
adoption of revitalisation strategies in response to the decline of union densities
and in response to the perceived dependence of the ACTU-‐ALP relationship
during the Accord period, which is blamed widely for disempowering union
members and exacerbating declines in union density. It points to a generational
change in union leadership and attitudes. It also notes that the union movement
has become more united, but that considerable scepticism remains about the
applicability and sustainability of US style union revitalisation strategies in
Australia.
Chapter Seven examines the impact of affiliation in the context of a changing
balance between blue collar and professional unions in the Australian union
movement. It finds that affiliation continues to provide exclusive access, among
social groupings, to affiliated unions and the virtual exclusion of non-‐affiliated
unions and other like-‐minded community organisations. It argues that this is a
negation of the ALP’s ambition to be a broadly based progressive party. It reflects
on an apparent trend for senior union officials to enter Parliament mid-‐career.
This chapter also examines the views of caucus members on the unions-‐ALP
relationship by comparing the first speeches of new members after the ALP’s
1983 and 2007 election wins. This chapter concludes that affiliation is losing its
meaning as a mechanism capable of representing the broader union movement
inside the party, much less the even broader base of community organisations
that the ALP hopes to engage. Affiliation is a barrier to the emergence of a more
modern progressive party, along the lines envisaged in the ALP’s 2010 National
Review.
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Chapter Eight discusses the growing asymmetry in the political benefit exchange
between unions and the ALP. Asymmetry is the product of the continuing
reliance of unions on the ALP for legislative protections in an otherwise hostile
environment and the concurrent declining reliance of the ALP on unions for
funding and the shrinking blue-‐collar union voter base for its identity as it seeks
to switch from being a workers’ party to becoming a more inclusive progressive
party.
Chapter Nine examines the meaning of the YR@W campaign and its aftermath
for the unions-‐ALP relationship. It argues that the campaign and its aftermath
highlight the contradiction between old and new relationship types based on
dependence and independence. It suggests that the disappointing aftermath of
the YR@W campaign underscores the difficulties unions face in pursuing an
augmentation strategy based on adding cherry-‐picked pressure-‐group tactics to a
declining social democratic relationship.
Chapter Ten is the conclusion, which explores the findings in this study and their
implications; and, opportunities for further research in the areas of party politics
and the unions-‐ALP relationship.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Introduction
Throughout the Western world, deinstitutionalisation and weakening links
between unions and social democratic, including labour, parties in the context of
neo-‐liberalism, have prompted changes in the strategic choices made by union
movements. These new strategic choices are usually framed in terms of union
revitalisation strategies and are variously located in theories of coalition,
community and social movement unionism (Vandenberg 2006). They have in
common the use of tactics centred on citizen rights (principally political
campaigning and legal action) to augment the declining efficacy of tactics centred
on labour rights, and political party associations and alignments (Hyman and
Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010). These new strategic choices, in turn, have
implications for relationships between unions and political parties; particularly,
the sustainability of relationships based on maintaining a balance between the
potentially contradictory strategies of external and internal lobbying.
This chapter discusses four bodies of scholarly literature that are relevant to
various aspects of the national unions-‐ALP relationship. The first is concerned
with the question of union decline and its consequences for unions-‐party
relationships. The second is concerned with party type change and its
relationship to ideology. The third is concerned with types of unions-‐party
relationships; the possibility of these relationships moving from the social
democratic type to the pressure group type; and, the causal link between unions-‐
party relationship type and political behaviour. In addition, particular attention is
given to the importance of dependence and independence in these relationships.
Finally, the political content of union revitalisation strategies is considered. These
strategies are strongly associated with the pressure group type relationship and
place a strong emphasis on the political independence of unions.
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2. Union decline and de-‐linking
The starting point for any discussion of changes in unions-‐party relationships is
the significant decline in membership and density experienced by unions in most
Western countries in recent decades. The decline of unions is a well-‐documented
and often told story (Bearfield 2003, Manning 1992, Peetz 1998, Peetz, Pocock
and Houghton 2007, Peetz and Pocock 2009, Perry 2007, Tattersall 2007, Terry
2003, Waddington and Kerr 2009). In these discussions, union density has
become a commonly used proxy for union power or strength (Dow and Lafferty
2007:564, Vernon 2006:191), with union density declines being accompanied by
falls in union power and resources (Quinn 2010: 368, Peetz and Pocock 2009:623,
627, Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009:520). Some scholars have argued that
declines in union density do not necessarily lead to declines in union political
power, although they do force changes in union political strategies (Dark 2001).
Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick (2010:327) have also argued that political
influence is “a function -‐ as both cause and effect -‐ of union vitality”, opening the
way to the possibility that more active unionism through the embrace of social
movement, community and coalition unionism might offset some of the loss of
power resources resulting from lower rates of unionisation. In the absence of
new strategies, union density declines might bring into question the viability of
unions as political actors (Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010:320).
One notable indicator of this decline in political power caused by lower union
densities is the incentive it is argued to have created for social democratic parties
to seek additional support among business, expanding middle classes and other
social groupings (Howell 2000:206, Leigh 2006), and for their parliamentary
representatives to pursue greater policy flexibility (Quinn 2010:357). The
weakening of links between unions and parties resulting from density declines
has been argued to facilitate the autonomy of parliamentary leaderships,
particularly in the adoption of neo-‐liberal policies (Schulman 2009:13) and to
have hastened the decline of Keynesian era policy frameworks such as the US
New Deal (Cowie and Salvatore 2008:5).
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The causal connections between union density and political effectiveness are not
necessarily linear. Looking at the relationship between American unions and
Democrats at the federal level, Dark (2001: 1, 29) challenged the conventional
view that declining union representation of the workforce has led to a
commensurate decline in union political power. Dark contends that we need to
look at union political bargaining to assess the extent of union political power,
and not rely on proxies like union density. Based on an examination of the
relationships and influence of unions during three Democrat presidential
administrations (Johnson, Carter and Clinton), Dark argues that there is a
remarkable degree of continuity in labor’s role in US national politics (2001: 2)
and a demonstrated capacity by unions to adapt to changed circumstances (2001:
13). Dark argued that American unions successfully replaced labour rights with
political campaigning; and, being highly effective political bargainers and the
nation’s largest interest group, the political power of unions did not decline to the
extent that would be expected if union political power was a simple product of
union density.
Scholars have also recognised that union decline has varied greatly in its size,
nature and impact across countries (Frege and Kelly 2003:8, Hyman and
Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010:316), with the impact of globalisation on unions being
less severe in many Western European countries than in the UK, USA, Australia
and NZ. In fact, Australia may have experienced sharper falls in union densities
than most other countries (Sadler and Fagan 2004: 32), though Dreher and
Gaston (2007:167) suggest a stronger fall in the UK than in Australia.
Union density is the proportion of union members in the overall workforce. It is
usually considered a more reliable indicator of union power than raw
membership numbers because union density is more suggestive of the relevance
of unionism to the broader population. Density, however, is not necessarily a fully
accurate indicator of public support for unions and unionism. Free riding and
unsatisfied demand for union services can result in union density levels that
under-‐report the level of support for unionism. Bearfield (2003), in a survey of
employee attitudes to unionism conducted for UnionsNSW, the NSW peak union
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organisation, found that about 50 per cent of employees would prefer to be in a
union, and that the main reasons for not joining a union were inertia or
indifference rather than ideological opposition. Some scholars in North America
(Lipset and Meltz 2004) and Australia (Perry 2007) have pointed to an inverse
relationship between union density levels and levels of industrial action, and
public support for unionism. In this relationship low union density levels, and
therefore a low incidence of industrial action, are associated with significantly
higher levels of public support for unionism. This suggests that it is the
disruption of industrial action that causes adverse public perceptions rather than
unionism itself. For this reason perhaps, severe restrictions on strike action
introduced by conservative governments tend to be wholly, or partially, retained
by the labour governments that replace them (Piazza 2001:415). The sharp fall in
industrial disputation levels in recent years (Bramble 2008, Perry 2007) may be a
sign of union decline, but the withdrawal of labour rights through changes in
industrial legislation does not necessarily mean a commensurate decline in public
support for unionism. Sympathy for unions in Australia may have been increasing
even as membership has dropped (Peetz and Bailey 2010:3). Peetz and Bailey
(2010:5) have argued that during earlier periods of high union density levels “the
public legitimacy of Australian unions was amongst the lowest in Western
countries”, another pointer to the often paradoxical relationship between union
membership and public support for unionism.
Nevertheless, with these qualifications in mind, union density is the best available
indicator of the level of workforce support for unionism. In the 1970s and 1980s,
Australia had one of the highest union densities in the capitalist world, after
Scandinavia, Belgium and Austria (Frankel 1997:9). Union membership and
union density had been in steady decline in Australia since peaking in either 1948
(Bowden 2011:51) or 1954 (Markey 2008:80), before it fell far more sharply in
the 1990s. Between 1986 and 2008, union density fell from 45.6 per cent to 18.9
per cent. Absolute membership fell from a peak of 2.7 million in 1990 to 1.7
million in 2008 (Bowden 2011:70). Australian unions lost 620,000 members,
almost a quarter of their membership in an eight-‐year period in the 1990s (Muir
23
and Peetz 2010:215). Union density had not fallen “below 40 per cent between
1913 and 1992, and typically had been much higher” (Bowden 2011:51). In areas
of blue collar employment the union density figure was closer to 75 per cent at its
peak levels in the 1950s (Bramble and Kuhn 2009:284), and “the blue collar
working class consistently made up two-‐thirds of the workforce between the
1890s and the 1950s” (Bowden 2011:52). Membership loss has largely plateaued
since the 1990s, but density continues to fall (Peetz and Bailey 2010:9).
Several reasons have been advanced for these marked declines in union density in
the last decades of the twentieth century. Union density decline has been
attributed to globalisation, economic restructuring, casualisation, government
policy changes, more hostile employer attitudes and poor organising by unions
themselves (Peetz 1998, Rachleff 2006:458, Teicher et. al., 2007:126, Frege and
Kelly 2003:8). Density decline may also be a self-‐fulfilling process, with weaker,
less activist, unions being less attractive to potential and existing members
(Bramble 2008, Terry 2003). Muir (2008:9) argues that a contributing factor in
union decline in the 1980s, and up until the mid 1990s, was the pre-‐occupation of
Australia’s union leadership “with the process of structural adjustment (union
amalgamations) and strategic unionism, leading them to place a lower emphasis
on recruiting and organising members.”
The most important reason for union density decline for the present discussion is
the economic change processes that resulted in a sharp fall in industrial, or blue-‐
collar, unionism (Bowden 2011). Blue-‐collar unions constitute the majority of the
unions affiliated to the ALP. By some estimates, about 30 per cent of the decline
in union membership in the 1990s was due to the changing nature and
distribution of employment, including from the decline in the manufacturing
sector where union membership had been traditionally high (Muir 2008:9).
Bowden argues that mechanisation was the main reason for the decline in blue-‐
collar unionism, but notes that policies of the Hawke and Keating Government
also played a significant part (Bowden 2011:66). The most important policies in
this connection were tariff reduction, enterprise bargaining and privatisation
(Bowden 2011). Related to the fall in blue-‐collar unionism has been the relative
24
growth in importance of professional and public sector unions. Throughout
Western Europe, public sector unions now represent majorities of unionised
workers (Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010:317).
This pattern has been repeated in Australia. By 1981 white-‐collar workers made
up almost 40 per cent of the workforce compared to 28 per cent in 1969 (Bowden
2011:67). Bearfield (2003) found that more highly qualified employees (i.e. in
terms of educational attainment) were more likely to hold positive views about
unions, and that employees with lower or no formal qualifications were more
likely to think Australia would be better off without unions. At the same time as
blue-‐collar unionism was declining, the ALP branches were starting to attract
white-‐collar members in the late 1940s (Markey 2008:79), and with his election
to federal Deputy Leader in 1960, Whitlam set out to attract more white collar
workers to the ranks of the ALP. During the 1960s, the ALP began to draw
increasing numbers of teachers and other tertiary educated professionals. In a
study of Victorian ALP local branches, Ward (1988) found that by 1981 blue-‐
collar workers comprised just over one-‐quarter (27.3%) of employed branch
members. The ALP now had a traditional blue-‐collar union base and a largely
white-‐collar and professional branch membership.
De-‐linking, or the separation, of unions and parties is commonly argued to be the
ultimate consequence of declining union densities (Piazza 2001, Quinn 2010).
De-‐linkage has occurred in Sweden, Norway and Denmark (Aylott 2003, Hyman
and Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010:323, Quinn 2010:357). Many social democratic
parties with close union ties have undertaken internal organisational reforms to
reduce or remove union influence. The ALP provided an example of this process
by reducing direct union representation in its state conferences to a nationally
consistent 50 per cent in 2003 (ALP 2009). According to some scholars, de-‐
linking can include an intermediate stage where unions become externalised as
interest groups. For instance, Lavelle (2010:55) has argued: “unions remain
important but are now expected to lobby their government just like any other
interest group in a pluralist society.”
25
Piazza (2001:413) described as ‘conventional wisdom’ the idea that globalisation
has prompted de-‐linking of social democratic parties and unions. Piazza (2001)
surveyed 16 countries (including Australia) and found a causal relationship
between globalisation, union decline and de-‐linking of social democratic party
electoral success from movements in union densities.
This research suggested that after globalisation, social democratic parties were no
longer dependent on a highly unionised workforce to achieve electoral success.
After 1980, Piazza argued, these parties could win elections without the support
of strong unions.
Many scholars have argued that the links between political parties and unions in
Western Europe have been in decline over recent decades (Howell 2000:201,
Moschonas 2002:319, Rueda 2007:2) and that unions-‐party relationships in
Western Europe have “without exception, weakened and soured” (Howell
2000:201). Howell (2000:201) described the changed relationship between left
parties and organised labour as the central element in the transformation of
European social democracy since the end of the 1970s.
In addition, scholars have identified weakening links in unions-‐party
relationships as a feature of transitions from ‘old’ to ‘new’ Labour, or in the U.S.
context, the transition to New Democrat (Pierson and Castles 2002). These
transitions are said to involve less enthusiasm for providing support for trade
union activity by their aligned parties (Dark 2001:13, Griffin, Nyland and
O’Rourke 2004:90); a reduction in the electoral benefit of union membership
(Goot and Watson 2007:270, Leigh 2006); and, a continuation of neo-‐liberalism
with concessions to unionism (Smith and Morton 2006) leading to a new
consensus between the main political parties around industrial relations (Howell,
2005:193) which is less favourable to trade unions and to workers. Terry (2003)
argued that “neo-‐liberalism is embedded within New Labour’s view of the labour
market” and that collectivism was re-‐legitimised under the Blair Government
(1997-‐2007), but only on the basis that it was not in conflict with
competitiveness. Howell (2000:201) also argued that the changed relationship
26
between parties and unions resulting from this hostility has involved an
“emasculation” of the political role of the union wing of the labour movement.
Some scholars have suggested that the weakening of links between unions and
parties may be irreversible. Lavelle (2010:55), for instance, has argued that a
“degree of permanency about the situation has now set in” around the current rift
and distance between unions and the ALP.
Despite declines in densities, unions can still mobilise significant community
support (Dow and Lafferty 2007:552). Some scholars have pointed out that
unions remain powerful interest groups, frequently the largest of any national
interest groups, and that they can deploy substantial financial and organisational
resources (Benyon 2003:73), including in Australia (Muir 2008:10). Dark (2002)
pointed out that even at dramatically lower union density levels, the union
movement is still by far the largest and best resourced social grouping in the USA
(Dark 2002). Moreover, membership numbers are not the same as influence in
politics. There are many examples of interest groups exercising political influence
that is disproportionate to their membership size (Dark 2001). Murray and Peetz
(2010) examine a dazzling array of business think tanks and interest groups in
Australia that have been highly influential with very small memberships;
including the Business Council of Australia (BCA), Institute of Public Affairs (IPA)
and the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS). In addition, Vernon (2006:191)
points out that not all union members are equal, much depends on whether the
members are activists (as they mainly are in France) or motivated by access to
welfare state benefits (as they are in many European countries). A smaller, highly
motivated and well-‐resourced union movement might be more significant than a
larger movement whose membership size relies on various forms of state
encouragement (including closed shop arrangements). Peetz (1998:175) argued
that a ‘paradigm shift’ in the determinants of union membership was significant in
sharply reduced densities, and the most important aspect of this paradigm shift
was the collapse of compulsory unionism, caused by the actions of employers and
governments. This analysis suggests that the Australian union movement may
have retained more of its active membership than its total membership.
27
Union density declines have had profound effects on the relationships between
unions and social democratic parties. They have resulted in declines in union
power resources and influence, weakened the links between unions and parties,
and prompted a search for alternate, or supplementary, strategies by unions to
offset these effects. Nevertheless, the decline and de-‐linking story is not a simple
one and unions retain significant political resources.
3. Party type and individualism
Weakening links and deinstitutionalisation in the social democratic type of
unions-‐party relationship can be seen through a number of changing
characteristics; these include greater autonomy of the parliamentary party and a
move away from collectivist ideology. The contemporary ALP exhibits both these
characteristics.
In their original form, labour parties are a special example of mass parties (Miller
2010). Archer (2007) defined labour parties as parties that attribute a uniquely
privileged position in their ideologies to workers and make the pursuit of
workers’ interests their prime objective, as well as embracing the symbolism of
the workers’ party as their self-‐identity. Similarly, the organisational structures
of labour parties give a privileged position to trade unions (Archer 2007:4,
Schulman 2009:3). These descriptions, however, are subject to important
qualifications. The relationship between unions and parties can be weakly or
strongly institutionalised, but there is always some element of separation in
terms of organisational structure, personnel and policy objectives. During the
twentieth century, Scandinavia provided examples of particularly close unions-‐
party integration. In Denmark, for instance, the social democratic party and the
peak union organisation provided representatives for each other’s executive
bodies (Hyman and Gumbrell 2010:323). Nevertheless, the unions-‐party
relationships were not comprehensive. Scandinavian social democratic parties
had close links with federations representing blue-‐collar unions and not with
smaller, but growing, peak organisations representing professional and white-‐
28
collar unions and the efforts of these parties to broaden their electoral support by
appealing to the latter organisations that represent non-‐affiliated unions was a
significant source of conflict in the relationships between affiliated union
organisations and social democratic parties (Hyman and Gumbrell 2010:323).
Labour parties are typically comprised of both branch members organised
according to geographical location and electoral boundaries and direct union
representation in governing bodies (e.g. state conferences and executives).
This bifurcated organisational structure has been a source of internal conflict in
the ALP since the 1890s (Cavalier 2010). In addition, unions rarely act as a bloc
within labour parties and tend to divide along factional lines (Minkin 1992).
Institutionalisation is always a relative and contingent concept in unions-‐party
relationships and the potential for fraternal conflict is ever present.
The ALP can also be considered to share aspects of Kirchheimer’s catch-‐all party
type (1966). Catch-‐all parties moderate ideological commitments, avoid divisive
issues and seek to add new constituencies to their base (Parkin and Warhurst
2000:36–37, Smith 2009). The federal ALP’s parliamentary party has exhibited
these catch-‐all tendencies, in varying degrees, from its earliest days (Bowden
2011:59, Patmore and Coates 2005), including through the White Australia policy
(Markey 2008:84). A catch-‐all approach was made all the more necessary
because unions were unable to even deliver all their own members as votes for
Labor (Patmore and Coates 2005). In addition, scholars have argued that the ALP
moved even more decisively towards the catch-‐all model under Whitlam’s
leadership (Manning 1992:14-‐15) and over recent decades more generally
(Charnock 2007:596). Former federal ALP leader H. V. Evatt (1951 -‐ 60) provided
a classic account of how, from its earliest days, and ahead of other labour parties,
the ALP placed a higher priority on electoral success, a classic concern of catch-‐all
parties, than on the promotion of an ideology, a common feature of mass parties.
29
Following successful period as a minor party swapping votes in Parliament for
policy concessions4, the ALP’s ambitions grew:
Its new resolve was to obtain a clear popular majority and to hold office
as a Government, but this bolder policy sometimes involved the
sacrifice of principle to expediency. Thus the doctrine of “gradualism”
was embraced in Australia long before the name acquired a general
currency in England. In this way socialist objectives were thrust into
the background and emphasis was placed on the “fighting platform”,
consisting mainly of liberal, radical or reformist proposals that
appealed to ever-‐widening circles, including the Irish Catholic and
Australian Nationalist groups. -‐ Evatt (1954:2)
The ALP, nevertheless, retains some key characteristics of mass parties. In
particular, it has rules and strategies designed to limit the autonomy of the party’s
parliamentarians. These rules and strategies include the policy-‐making authority
of state and national conferences, the parliamentary caucus system (which
requires MPs to vote according to majority decisions), and the pledge that MPs
take when accepting selection to run for public office as an ALP candidate (Childe
1923), sometimes referred to as the ‘tyranny of the pledge’ (Macintyre 2001:29).
The pledge essentially requires ALP parliamentarians to accept the policy-‐making
authority of party conferences and the discipline of the caucus system. Failure to
comply can, and has, resulted in the expulsion of ALP MPs and, during the
conscription split of 1916, a prime minister, Hughes, and a NSW premier, Holman
(Evatt 1954). Although the use of these rules and strategies has been less in
evidence in recent decades, they can still have potency in disputes between
Labor’s parliamentary parties and affiliated unions. The issue of the pledge
surfaced recently during the NSW ALP’s dispute over electricity privatisation
when the policy-‐making authority of State Conference was enforced and led
directly to the destruction of the premiership of Morris Iemma (Cavalier 2010).
4 The ‘votes for concessions’ strategy according to Childe (1923) was borrowed following the considerable success of Charles Stewart Parnell, the legendary Irish leader, in Westminster in the late nineteenth century.
30
Panebianco (1988: 265) argued that political parties adapt and evolve in response
to external challenges. Panebianco argued that mass bureaucratic parties would
transition to this new type under pressure from two external factors. The first
challenge was a consequence of changes in social stratification, including
reductions in the manual workforce and growth in the tertiary sector. Clear
evidence of the existence of this challenge in Australia was presented above in the
section on union decline. The second source of external pressure, according to
Panebianco, came from changes in political communication (e.g. television). The
electoral professional party type included a greater role for professionals, a focus
on the party’s parliamentary representatives (rather than its organisational
wing), and a focus on issues like leadership rather than ideology.
A transition from mass bureaucratic to electoral professional type requires a
weakening of vertical ties between party and unions and deinstitutionalisation of
the relationship. Panebianco (1988) argued that highly institutionalised parties
find it more difficult to adapt or evolve than more weakly institutionalised parties.
Panebianco essentially equates institutionalisation with bureaucracy, and with
the processes, structures, and practices that make a party different to a movement
and which become things of value in themselves. This point is of particular
relevance to this thesis and in Chapter 4, I argue that the greater looseness in the
structures of the national unions-‐ALP relationship facilitated the ACTU’s decision
to pursue union revitalisation strategies and, later, influenced the design and
conduct of the YR@W campaign.
Ideology distinguishes labour parties from other social democratic parties.
Ideology is a feature of mass parties (Panebianco 1988:264), yet labour parties as
trade union parties need have no ideological base beyond a belief in collective
workplace action (unionism) and practical improvements in the lives of working
people. Duverger (1964:xxx) observed that parties created by trade unions tend
to be “less ideological than socialist parties proper”. In Europe, unions have been
affiliated with parties with disparate ideological leanings: social democratic,
socialist, communist and Christian. Contemporary European observers often
commented on the absence of a strong socialist purpose in the early ALP (Frankel
31
1997). Scholars generally described the ALP’s ideology as labourist, the idea that
labour movement objectives could be achieved by a strong union movement
backed by a robust ALP in parliament (Manning 1992:14, Markey 2008:82-‐83,
Schulman 2009:11). A socialisation objective was finally adopted by the federal
ALP in 1921, but had minimal impact on the policies pursued subsequently by
successive leaderships of the FPLP (Catley 2005:99), and was mostly a symbolic
rallying call (Markey 2008:85). Patmore and Coates (2005), for instance, have
argued that Chifley’s attempts at bank nationalisation were based more on a
desire to retain tight control on the economy than a commitment to
nationalisation. That is, a pragmatic response to an immediate problem, not
unlike Whitlam’s 25 per cent across the board tariff cut made a quarter of a
century later to address an inflation problem (Whitlam 1985).
Many of the first speeches of ALP MPs after the 2007 election equated
collectivism with the Australian value of the ‘fair go’ (see Chapter 7). Despite this
pragmatic endorsement of collectivism, the ALP has adopted an individualistic
approach, and an aversion to making electoral appeals based on the ideologically
more divisive notions of class or social grouping. A continuing move towards
individualism5 allows the ALP to treat unions as pressure groups, advocating for
the interests of their members, rather than as representatives of a broader
working class. A move from a collectivist to an individualist focus is also
consistent with the proposition that the ALP is affirming the electoral professional
model, not by de-‐emphasising all ideology, but by de-‐emphasising ideologies that
served to bind unions and the ALP together. The ALP’s preference for
individualism is electorally driven. When the ACTU undertook the initial focus
groups for its YR@W campaign it found that the individualism of individual rights
tested strongly. Peter Lewis (2009), a principal with the ACTU’s marketing
5 Individualism is not entirely new in the rhetoric of federal ALP leaders particularly from Whitlam onwards, the point here is that individualism is far more prominent and ubiquitous than in the past, and is also a reflection of voter attitudes, including among union members.
32
consultants EMC6, recounted that focus group participants immediately
responded to the proposals that became WorkChoices with a concern that they
are ‘taking away our rights’. Lewis (2009) notes that a campaign based around
‘your rights’ was counter-‐intuitive for “a movement long defined by its
commitment to collectivism”. This episode suggests the political salience of
individualism in contemporary Australia and points to a deeper dilemma for
unions opting for the use of citizen rights, which stress individualism rather than
collectivism. It also highlights a key problem for union movements because
flexible responses to neo-‐liberalism can undermine the collectivism on which
union power resources are built (Briggs 2004:253).
The ideology of individualism is strongly associated with neo-‐liberalism (Murray
and Peetz 2010:230-‐235); it emphasises opportunities and personal choice rather
than the more collectivist ideas associated with equality and the advancement of
particular classes and social groupings. Following the end of the Cold War, ALP
ideology has settled into support for some general, uncontroversial values
centred on individualist ideals not dissimilar to “the powerful allure of individual
rights in American culture” (Cowie and Salvatore 2008:21) that has limited the
political role of the American union movement in recent decades especially
during and following the Reagan presidency (1980–88) which heralded the
arrival of the New Right (Cowie and Salvatore 2008:24). A review of first
speeches by newly elected federal ALP MPs following the 2007 election,
conducted for this thesis, revealed a preference for the language of opportunities
and fairness for individuals rather than a more collectivist concern for reducing
inequality of outcomes. A fuller discussion of the content of these speeches is
included in Chapter 7. In two major speeches on ALP philosophy, ideology and
culture given by Prime Minister Gillard in 2011 (Gillard 2011a, 2011b) equality
was replaced by the pursuit of ‘opportunities for all’7 and Gillard has moved to
6 Essential Media Communications (EMC) http://www.essentialmedia.com.au/ see Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan (2008 33:34) for a description of the role of EMC in the YR@W campaign. 7 This is a more individualist formulation than Whitlam’s earlier appeal to ‘equality of opportunities’.
33
explicitly temper the ALP’s collectivist past with a more individualist present.
The words ‘equality’ and ‘inequality’ are not mentioned in either speech and the
word ‘unions’ is mentioned once in the first speech and twice in the second
speech. Gillard’s campaign speech in 2010 also made no mention of equality and
inequality. By way of comparison, Whitlam’s famous policy speech delivered on
13 November 1972 (Whitlam 1972) mentioned ‘equality’ 17 times, ‘inequality’ 7
times and ‘inequalities’ 5 times. In the second of Gillard’s 2011 speeches on the
contemporary ALP, an address to the Chifley Research Centre in September 2011
(Gillard 2011b), Gillard sought to reconcile collectivism with individualism:
Today our ethos of collective action must respond to individual needs
and demands for choice and control.
In the first of these speeches, an address to the Whitlam Institute (2011a) in April
2011, Gillard gave this fairly anemic account of the relationship between unions
and the ALP. It reads more like a modern, corporate celebration of the merits of
teamwork than a commitment to the collectivism of the past:
Labor culture values the strength that comes from working as a team
and supports the role of unions in ensuring working people succeed
together and that their work is recognised, rewarded and appreciated.
This is the best self to which Labor must always be true.
Similarly, in 2009, then Prime Minister Rudd published a 7,700-‐word essay, “The
Global Financial Crisis”, (Rudd 2009), on his interpretation of social democracy
without discussing unions or unionism. Rudd did, however, mention equality
(twice) and inequality (twice). Rudd’s essay also contains the relatively strong, by
contemporary ALP standards, ideologically collectivist argument: “The social-‐
democratic pursuit of social justice is founded on a belief in the self-‐evident value
of equality”.
This individualisation of ALP ideology is consistent with the emergence of a post-‐
materialist culture that has resulted in a diminished concern with a class analysis
of social and political concerns. Individualism is an ideological challenge to social
34
democracy (Cowie and Salvatore 2008, Gould 2010), but it may also be a major
means by which unions are affected by globalisation, including through the
unions-‐party de-‐linking processes discussed in the previous section. Scruggs and
Lange (2002), using a nuanced multivariate analysis, argued that the impact of
globalisation on unions and social policy outcomes is mediated through national
institutions. Overall, they found that economic globalisation had insignificant
effects on union membership trends. Dreher and Gaston (2007) reported that
recent studies, including their own, confirmed this finding. Dreher and Gaston
(2007), however, found that social globalisation, a concept that refers to the flow
of culture and information, does have a significant impact on union membership
levels. In this context, social globalisation can also mean ‘americanisation’ or the
tendency of labour market institutions in non-‐US countries to converge with the
non-‐unionised deregulated US model (Dreher and Gaston 2007:74, Gould 2010).
The trend in the ALP from collectivism to individualism is significant in this
context.
Although the Rudd-‐Gillard Fair Work Act provides for collective bargaining, a key
ACTU objective, it embeds a far more individualist ideology than was present in
Australia’s arbitration system in the past. This embedding of individualism in the
industrial relations system is consistent with neo-‐liberalism rather than the
granting of categorical power to labour that characterises social democratic types
(Gentile and Tarrow 2009).
This more recent focus on individual, rather than collective outcomes, is evidence
of a widening gap, and weakening links, between the ALP and the union
movement, as the former transitions further away from the mass party type. The
move from collectivist ideology to the more inclusive, individualist rhetoric
associated with pressure group type relationships is an important step for the
ALP in its efforts to engage with a broader range of like-‐minded community
organisations (ALP 2010).
35
4. Relationship type and political behaviour
Studies of labour movements that focus on political exchanges between unions
and parties are rare (McIlroy 1998:537), yet such studies can offer important
insights into the political behaviour of both unions and parties. The changes in
the national unions-‐ALP relationship can be understood in the context of
typologies that categorise unions-‐party relationships according to their degree
and type of organisational integration. These typologies distinguish between
social democratic and pressure group types. The definition of social democratic
in this context includes labour parties. In social democratic type relationships,
unions have direct representation in the internal forums of the party (i.e. they are
affiliated). In the pressure group type, there is no direct representation in
internal forums and the unions-‐party relationship is weaker and subject to
continuous bargaining. Later in this chapter, two key relationship principles,
covering both relationship types, are identified and discussed; they are
organisational integration and policy confluence. The use of these typologies
provides a connection between the concern with weakening links in the literature
on party types discussed in the previous section and the strategic choices made
by unions about repertoires of contention discussed in the next section. Unions in
social democratic type relationships prefer internal lobbying; unions in pressure
group type relationships rely on external lobbying.
Unions-‐party relationship types vary significantly and these variances become
important in transitions from the mass party model towards catch-‐all, electoral
professional and cartel party models (Gunther and Diamond 2001, Katz and Mair
1995, Miller 2010). The key variances in unions-‐party relationship types relate to
the degree of institutionalisation of the links between unions and parties.
Institutionalisation in turn describes patterns of affiliation, and the internal party
influence of unions more broadly, particularly through key functions like policy
development and public office candidate selection. Weaker institutionalisation
within the mass party type creates more scope for unions to adopt independent
political action in the form of external lobbying. Following Panebianco (1988),
36
who argued that institutionalisation creates value, we would expect unions to
place a higher value on their links with political parties where those links are
more strongly institutionalised.
Scholars have identified important commonalities and differences in unions-‐party
relationships across different nations, particularly in relation to organisational
arrangements and ideology. This literature is mostly concerned with the decline
of social democracy and, commensurately, with the decline of union political
influence inside unions-‐party relationships. Earlier scholars (1990s) responded
to the questions of whether unions-‐party relationships change their character in
response to changed circumstances (Valenzuela 1992), or can even be expected to
come apart completely (Minkin 1992); and, whether unions-‐party relationships
vary in meaningful, and predictable, ways between countries (Valenzuela 1992).
Later scholars (Ludlam, Bodah and Coates 2002) have modified the Valenzuela
(1992) typology to examine the impact of neo-‐liberalism and union decline on
unions-‐party relationships.
Relationship benefits
Lewis Minkin (1992) argued in his comprehensive examination of the history of
the relationship between trade unions and the British Labour Party (BLP): “this is
a relationship which, contrary to much mythology, is becoming more not less
integrated” (1992:658). Using a cost benefit approach to analyse the relationship,
Minkin emphasised its resilience and argued that we shouldn’t focus on current
tensions, but rather look at how the inevitable stresses and strains have been
managed successfully in the past, even at times when the disputes seemed much
more disruptive than contemporary problems. Simply put, the benefits continue
to outweigh the costs for both sides of the relationship. This is a useful way of
thinking about these relationships; it highlights the historical reality that unions
established labour parties to secure particular benefits, notably legislative
protections for employee organisations and to establish a right to collective
bargaining. In return, the BLP was heavily dependent on unions for funding and
other support during election campaigns. Despite the controversies and fraternal
37
battles that seem endemic in unions-‐party relationships, this exchange of benefits
creates an underlying rationale that was powerful enough to hold the relationship
together. Writing before the electoral triumph of New Labour, Minkin gave little
indication that he could conceive of a time when the costs might outweigh the
benefits for either side. In addition, a cost benefit analysis that focuses on the
outcomes for each side separately misses the impact on a unions-‐party
relationship of a growing imbalance in the importance of those benefits and costs.
That is where both sides still derive a net benefit from the relationship, but the
net benefit becomes much less important for one side. In Chapter 8, I argue that
growing asymmetry in the value of benefits from the relationship is the problem
rather than a simple calculation of net benefit.
Relationship structure
Costs and benefits are important context and heavily influence the resilience and
longevity of unions-‐party relationships, but it is the relationship structure that
provides the crucial causal link between relationship type and union political
behaviour. The structure of the relationship is similar to the institutionalisation
described by Panebianco (1988), and covers the rules, processes and culture that
govern the party, but in labour parties this institutionalisation develops from a
relationship created by union affiliation. Understanding the structure of a unions-‐
party relationship requires a fairly granular understanding of affiliation. It also
requires some way of categorising the important components or dimensions
unions-‐party relationships. Three notable contributions to this task are reviewed
here: Ludlam, Bodah and Coates 2002, Minkin 1992, Valenzuela 1992.
Minkin (1992) used four criteria to analyse the unions-‐party relationship:
ideology, interests, social affinity and strategic convergence. Minkin interprets
ideology broadly, pointing out that the labour movement has always been
factionalised and has embraced a wide spectrum of ideological perspectives. At
the outset, the minimum position was that labour should be represented
independently of capital or employer interests in parliament (1992: 9) and that
there would be a pursuit of trade union principles and ideals, which primarily
38
meant an equitable distribution of income, by Labour’s parliamentary
representatives (1992:10). The interests criterion covers the unions’ basic
interest in ensuring that legislation affords a degree of protection for union
activity, particularly for the principle of collective bargaining (1992:11-‐13). By
social affinity, Minkin means that union leaders and labour parliamentarians
share similar social backgrounds and life experiences (1992:13-‐15), he notes that
differences between blue collar union leaders and Oxbridge parliamentary
representatives has often been a source of friction8. The last criterion, strategic
convergence (1992:15), refers to the fact that unions and the Labour Party have
different institutional roles to play and different strategic choices to make.
Unions, according to Minkin, can use their industrial strength to press their claims
or they can negotiate political outcomes; on the other hand, with electoral success
in mind, the Party can emphasise its class character and its links with unions or it
can distance itself and pursue a broader appeal (1992: 15, 16). Interestingly, in
the context of the discussion about party type in the previous section, this
suggests that the Labour Party can switch between mass and catch-‐all party types
according to prevailing electoral circumstances. Minkin’s analysis suggests a
robustness and flexibility in the relationship that has probably dissipated under
the influence of union decline and neo-‐liberalism. For instance, no one today
would argue that the ALP or the BLP represents the labour interest independently
of the employer interest. As one ALP MP interviewee (Current federal MP 19) put
it in a typical expression of the contemporary political approach of ALP
politicians: “you can’t ignore the union movement. Same as you can’t ignore
business”, see McIlroy (1998:544) for parallel comments by the BLP leadership.
Working at the same time as Minkin, Valenzuela (1992) was concerned to
understand why different unions-‐party relationships are associated with different
national political cultures. Valenzuela’s interest in the connection between
8 I tested the possibility of a similar divide in the Australian context with some interviewees, but found no evidence of a contemporary parallel. One union interviewee pointed out that just about every senior Australian union official has a university degree, the main exception being Paul Howes (AWU). Hawke (1994) recalled how his university education was a mark against him in the ACTU in the 1970s. 9 An explanation of interviewees and these descriptors is included in the next chapter.
39
relationship type and political behaviour made his typology useful to later
scholars seeking to understand transitions to New Labour and New Democrat
(Ludlam, Bodah and Coates 2002, McIlroy 1998, 2008). Valenzuela (1992), a
Chilean scholar working at the University of Notre Dame in the USA, was one of a
group of scholars who were concerned with national transitions into and out of
democracy (Fukuyama 2011). Their interest was sparked by transitions to
democracy in South America and Europe (Greece, Portugal) in the 1980s and
1990s. Valenzuela’s interest was the primary impact on national union
movements of these transitions, and the impact those union movements might
have on the character and stability of these new democracies.
Duverger (1964) argued that the origins of parties were pervasive and
explanatory. According to Duverger (1964:xxxv): “the whole life of the party …
bears the mark of its origin”; and, while differences between parties cannot be
wholly “explained by dissimilar origins” nevertheless “their influence is
incontestable” (1964”xxxvi). Valenzuela (1992) argued that the circumstances of
their creation have an enormous and lasting impact on the character of unions-‐
party relationships. Valenzuela used a typology with five forms: social
democratic, pressure group, contestatory, confrontationist, and state-‐sponsored.
The contestatory category refers to countries where the labour movement is split
along ideological, religious, or other, lines. The confrontationist and state-‐
sponsored types are found in countries where there are authoritarian regimes.
The first two of these types are, however, relevant to this discussion; the social
democratic type in which “unions link up to form basically one national
organisation that in turn connects itself with a single, relatively strong party”
(1992:55) and the pressure group form in which “unions link themselves with a
pre-‐existing party or fragments of it” (1992:55). Pressure group type links are
much looser and less formal than they are in the social democratic type.
Valenzuela (1992) argued that because unions in countries with social democratic
type unions-‐party relationships were able to achieve a high-‐level of consolidation
early in their histories, through direct employer negotiations, their leaders, and
those of the parties they aligned with, adopted “a moderate socialist viewpoint
40
with an incremental and reformist style of political action” (1992: 69). Valenzuela
also argued that the close links between unions and parties in the social
democratic type, together with this moderate and reformist style, lends itself to
the development of corporatism in democratic societies (1992:69), although
these corporatist projects are unstable where unions are decentralised, as they
are in Great Britain (1992: 70).
Valenzuela (1992) didn’t consider Australia or New Zealand. The importance of
arbitration to unions and to unions-‐party relationships in these countries, up until
the 1990s, has been used by scholars to distinguish ‘Antipodean corporatism’
from its UK and Scandinavian counterparts (Gentile and Tarrow 2009:481).
Arbitration was also important to the development of a labourist ideology in
Australia (Bowden 2011:60), and in this context we can see labourism (Manning
1992:14, Markey 2008:82-‐83, Schulman 2009:11) as a form of the corporatism
Valenzuela anticipated in social democratic type relationships. Valenzuela’s focus
on the political and other circumstances of the formation of unions and party
relationships causes him to distinguish the weaker forms of corporatism in
Australia, New Zealand and the UK where pre-‐existing unions created a labour
party and the stronger forms found in Scandinavia where the party was involved
in developing a union movement and Germany where the modern unions-‐party
relationship was complicated by the re-‐creation of the West German state
following the end of the Second World War.
Valenzuela’s pressure group type is based on the experience of the USA (1992:
77). Valenzuela argued that during the 1960s the relationship between American
unions and the Democratic Party came to resemble the relationship between the
BLP and unions during the same period. Nevertheless, he argues, the lack of a
formal, organisational link remains an important and distinguishing difference.
This link is formed by the affiliation of unions to the party, which results in the
direct representation of unions inside key party forums dealing with policy
development and the selection of candidates for parliamentary office. American
unions must always “exchange electoral support for individual candidates for
their promises of support for union causes at the legislative and governmental
41
level” (1992:78). In Britain, Valenzuela argues, unions can pretty much take it for
granted that Labour members of parliament will vote for the option most
favourable for unions amongst those options under consideration (1992:78).
American unions are more involved in the election process through campaigning,
while British unions are more reliant on their internal influence and more
dependent on the BLP to deliver political outcomes. The organisational link, or its
absence, therefore, is highly significant in shaping the political behaviour of
unions.
Scholars in Britain largely ignored the specific nature and internal dynamics of
relationships between social democratic parties and unions until the rise of New
Labour and its embrace of neo-‐liberalism (Ludlam, Bodah and Coates 2002). Up
until the 1980s, these relationships, although often controversial and contentious
(Minkin 1992), were nevertheless seen to be unremarkable, or natural, and
requiring little theoretical explanation.
Although useful, Valenzuela’s typology and his insistence on the permanent
influence of original relationship arrangements made his analysis problematic in
the context of growing asymmetry in benefit exchanges between unions and
parties as those parties increasingly adopted neo-‐liberal policy stances that
undermined, or accompanied a decline in, union power in the workplace.
Valenzuela’s framework does not easily encompass a situation where unions stay
in a social democratic relationship even though their influence inside the party
has declined sharply and, there is little prospect of a reversal. McIlroy (1998)
argued that Valenzuela’s analysis (1992) pays little attention to the dynamics of
contemporary economic re-‐structuring and its impact on unions-‐party
relationships (1998:538). McIlroy’s argument is that Valenzuela’s typological
approach is not fully applicable in a neo-‐liberal era. Using Valenzuela’s typology,
McIlroy (1998:559) argued that the relationship between the BLP and British
unions under Tony Blair and New Labour was pushed from social democratic to
pressure group, from “unique intimacy to arms-‐length organisational
relationships” (1998:559) although the essential structure of the relationship
remained the same. McIlroy (1998:559) argued that unions-‐party relationships
42
can change type from social democratic to pressure group without actually
severing the institutional link. In practice, this means that affiliation, or
institutionalisation in Panebianco’s usage, is no longer sufficient. Under neo-‐
liberalism, unions can no longer rely on the party’s parliamentary representatives
to choose the most union-‐friendly of available options. Affiliation remains but has
lost much of its capacity to deliver symmetrical political exchanges between
unions and parties.
Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) built upon the work of Valenzuela (1992) and
McIlroy (1998) to compare unions-‐party linkages in the UK and USA and provide
an explanation of the transitions to New Labour and New Democrat in those
countries. Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) argued that New Labour is a
relationship form characterised by retained formal organisational links with
diminished policy influence. They sought to adapt the Valenzuela typology to
make it more useful in understanding the longitudinal nature of unions-‐party
relationships. Their typology is based around what they see as the two universal
dimensions of the unions-‐party relationship: organisational integration and
policy-‐making influence. Their typology has four forms: an external lobbying
model, where unions and parties have no formal organisational integration of any
kind, and unions have little or no policy-‐making influence; an internal lobbying
model, where there is little or no formal organisational integration, but unions
enjoy special status or bring special expertise into party policy-‐making; a union–
party bonding model, where the special status of unions results in important and
guaranteed governmental positions within the party’s organisational structure,
but not in domination of party policy-‐making; and a union dominance model,
where unions occupy governmental positions within party decision-‐making
structures, and also are able to dominate the direction of party policy-‐making.
Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) used three categories (organisation, program
and personal) to organise the data they used to compare unions-‐party
relationships.
Using their typology, Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) provided accounts of how
unions-‐party relationships in the UK and USA have moved though various forms
43
of this typology. Overall, they argued that New Labour is a form characterised by
retained constitutional links with diminished policy influence, that is as an
example of the unions-‐party bonding model. Moreover, they argued that unions-‐
party linkages on both sides of the Atlantic are in decline.
This Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) model has been used in Australia (Griffin,
Nyland and O’Rourke 2004:93) to argue that by the early 1990s, the ALP, while
keeping the relationship intact, had pushed the unions from a unions-‐party
bonding model to a lobbying model. Leigh (2006) points to a widely-‐ held view
that unions came to be treated as a pressure group by Labor during the Accord
period (1983-‐96) rather than as an “integral part of the organisation”. This is said
to have reduced the influence of unions within the ALP (Griffin, Nyland and
O’Rourke. 2004: 90; Howell 2000). This is perhaps a surprising conclusion about
a period that is often also seen as a high point of social democracy in the national
unions-‐party relationship in Australia. It makes more sense when we understand
the relationship between the ACTU and the ALP as more like the relationship
between the AFL-‐CIO and the Democratic administrations of Roosevelt and
Johnson than the social democratic relationships in the UK and Scandinavia,
which were more firmly anchored in union affiliation at the national level. It is
possible for unions and parties to appear closer than they really are when they
share common ideologies and policy frameworks.
As useful as these analyses are, they do not take full account of the impact of the
decline of blue-‐collar unionism and the relative rise of white-‐collar and
professional unionism. This changing pattern of unionism is in contrast with the
stable pattern of affiliation between unions and the ALP. Nor do these analyses
fully comprehend the impact of sharp declines in union densities. The results of
these trends, discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, mean that affiliated
unions are far less representative of the total population of employees or union
members than they were twenty years ago. The implications of these trends for
the typologies discussed above are a key concern of this thesis.
44
Organisational integration and fragmentation
Following the analysis of Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002), this thesis uses two
principles to describe changes in the unions-‐ALP relationship. I have retained
their first principle, organisational integration, but changed the second principle
from policy-‐making influence to policy confluence. Policy confluence emphasises
the idea that unions-‐party relationships were more closely integrated, in both
examples of social democratic and pressure group types, during the Keynesian
period (particularly from the Great Depression of the early 1930s to the
stagflation crisis of the mid 1970s). Policy confluence emphasises the importance
of the external economic policy making environment at the expense of other
factors that are internal, or intrinsic, to unions-‐party relationships. In short, the
differences between social democratic and pressure group types were largely
hidden during the Keynesian period because parties and union movements
pursued similar policy agendas. Keynesianism is far more consistent with the
collectivist spirit of unionism than the neo-‐liberalism that has replaced it.
The common theme running through any consideration of both organisational
integration and policy confluence is the idea of fragmentation. Fragmentation is
used here as an expression of the degree to which integration is absent. Or put
another way, fragmentation has an opposite effect to that of Panebianco’s notion
of institutionalisation (1988), it reduces rather than increases the value of the
relationship to both sides. Fragmentation declines as a unions-‐party relationship
becomes closer and conversely increases as the relationship becomes more
distant. Integration means the extent to which unions and parties can work
together to achieve common political objectives. As integration declines, and the
relationship becomes more fragmented, we would expect to see union
movements relying less on parties to deliver outcomes and, instead, pursuing
those objectives through political strategies and tactics that are closer to the
external lobbying that characterises pressure group type relationships. As the
Keynesian era has receded to be replaced by neo-‐liberalism, the degree of
fragmentation in unions-‐party relationships has increased, and become more
meaningful, prompting union movements to re-‐consider their political strategies
45
and behaviours.
Mass parties can be seen as attempts to minimise fragmentation through their
focus on promoting a shared ideology and through rules and strategies designed
to limit the autonomy of parliamentary representatives. In this sense, catch-‐all
parties are more fragmented than mass parties because they provide
parliamentary representatives with more autonomy and they de-‐emphasise
ideology. The weaker vertical links that are a key feature of the electoral
professional type increase the extent of fragmentation. Similarly, strong social
democratic relationships are closer, more integrated, more homogenous than
their weaker cousins. Weak social democratic relationships are fragmented
through the more dispersed power structures of their union movements, which
diminishes the capacity for national leadership elites in union movements and
political parties to negotiate and enforce political deals. Social democratic
relationships are more integrated than contestatory relationships, where the
fragmentation takes place along sectarian and ideological lines. Social democratic
parties are more integrated than pressure group parties, except where the force
of policy confluence is strong, as it was in the Keynesian era.
Policy confluence and Keynesianism
Keynesianism encouraged greater organisational integration in unions-‐party
relationships across the western world because the economic policies pursued
under Keynesianism are more congruent with union policy objectives than the
economic policies that prevailed before the Keynesian period and again now. The
emphasis of Keynesianism on maintaining full employment to maintain
consumption levels that are consistent with high levels of business investment
and economic growth, also underpins the key union objective of achieving
relatively high wage levels in comparison to levels that might be realized in
labour markets without government stimulus. In order to achieve full
employment without high inflation, Western governments during the Keynesian
period often sought wages deals along the lines of the Accord in Australia
(Patmore and Coates 2005). Keynesianism in these ways favours close policy co-‐
operation between unions and labour, and social democratic, governments.
46
5. Union revitalisation and strategic choice
Faced with weakening vertical links unions can make strategic choices (Gentile
and Tarrow 2009:473) about the extent to which they continue to rely on the
internal lobbying of a social democratic type relationship or move towards a
greater reliance on the external lobbying more typical of a pressure group type
relationship, and which also features in union revitalisation strategies. External
and internal lobbying strategies, however, are not always easily reconcilable and
the long-‐term sustainability of a mixed internal and external approach is
problematic.
Some types, and national variations within types, of unions-‐party relationships
are more conducive to new strategic directions by union movements than others.
For instance, Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick (2010:327) have argued: “most
union movements in Western Europe remain locked into old identities derived
largely from their traditional political identities”. Rainnie and Ellem (2006,
quoted in Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009:520) have argued that union
movements have to face extreme crises before old rigidities in structures,
processes and activities can be opened up to new ways of doing things. Upchurch,
Taylor and Mathers (2009:521) argued that a weakening unions-‐party
relationship could open up possibilities for reconfigurations of unions-‐party
relationships outside the traditional social democratic model (Upchurch, Taylor
and Mathers 2009:537). A central argument in this thesis is that distinctive
features of the national unions-‐ALP relationship allowed more space for union
movement adaptation in response to neo-‐liberalism and union density decline
than in many other Western countries. In particular, the national unions-‐ALP
relationship, because of the nature of its response to federalism and the
consequent union affiliation patterns allowed, perhaps encouraged, the Australian
union movement to adopt new revitalisation strategies “with alacrity” (Gentile
and Tarrow 2009:480). Without formal ties, affiliation, directly between the
ACTU and the ALP at the national level, the ACTU was always more politically
separate than peak union organisations in other social democratic type
47
relationships. The inclusion of unions not affiliated to the ALP through mergers
with professional and public service peak union organisations in the 1970s and
early 1980s, and the relatively faster rates of decline in blue-‐collar unionism in
the 1990s, accentuated this separate identity.
The ACTU followed US unions, but was ahead of many Western European union
movements, in changing political strategies to deal with the more hostile
environment for unions under neo-‐liberalism. The Australian union movement
has favoured strategies centred on political independence. These union
revitalisation strategies drew upon the experience of some particularly successful
unions in the USA where political independence, rather than dependence on a
party, had long been consistent with the union movement’s embrace of
‘voluntarism’ (Archer 2007, Greenstone 1969) and to which it reverted when the
cosy insider bargaining between unions and Democrats declined rapidly with the
advent of the Reagan era, that is, with the end of the policy confluence of the
Keynesian era. Faced with plummeting union densities in the 1990s, Australian
unions went looking for strategies and tactics that had proved successful in
recruiting and retaining members in a hostile environment. Those strategies are
not value-‐free, embedded in those strategies and tactics is a very different idea of
unions-‐party relationships.
Central to the US experience is that union movements can make a strategic choice
(Gentile and Tarrow 2009:467). They can continue to use industrial action where
possible, and rely on their traditional associations with political parties to provide
some level of legislative and policy protection. Alternatively, they can adopt
strategies and tactics that seek to influence political agendas independently of
those political parties. Additionally, they can replace repertoires of contention
that rely on labour rights (e.g. strikes) with a greater emphasis on repertoires that
draw upon citizen rights (political campaigning techniques). American unions
rely heavily on citizen rights because they are more deeply embedded, and
therefore protected, than labour rights (Gentile and Tarrow 2009:467,8). Dark
pointed out that declining union density, which reduces the capacity of unions to
48
conduct industrial action, could lead unions to invest more of their resources in
political campaigning (Dark 2001). In recognition of this choice available to
unions, Dark argued that there is “no causal force requiring that declining union
density should inevitably translate into declining union political power” (Dark
2001:21).
Making the switch from a labour rights (backed by political party association) to a
citizen rights strategy is increasingly viewed by scholars, commentators and
unionists as essential if unions are to survive and remain politically relevant in an
era of neo-‐liberalism and low union densities (Simmons and Harding 2009). For
instance, Gentile and Tarrow (2009:489) argued: “those union movements that
survive the transition from a corporatist to a neo-‐liberal regime will do so by
adapting their strategies to the citizen rights domain; those that fail to shift to a
citizen rights repertoire will fail and weaken”. Hyman and Grumbell (2010:328)
argued that: “In a period of union weakness, seeking complementarities with
radical social movements which unions traditionally viewed with suspicion has to
be part of the search for enhanced power resources”.
The Australian union movement was not alone in learning from the USA in the
1990s (Bowden 2011:72, Muir 2008:14–15, Peetz and Pocock 2009:628). The
organising model was adopted by the ACTU in 1994 and by the mid-‐1990s it had
become a cornerstone of union revival strategies throughout the Anglo-‐Saxon
world. (Bowden 2011:72, Peetz and Pocock 2009:624). Strategies that sought to
build coalitions (Tattersall 2010:2,9) with community organisations and social
movements (Baines 2010), that shared similar policy goals and ideological
perspectives with unions, supplemented the internal focus of the organising
model, with its emphasis on member recruitment and engagement through union
democratisation and workplace activism (Peetz and Pocock 2009:624). Partly,
these new strategies were seen as a response to the perceived problem of
member disengagement during the Accord (Muir 2008:38, Tattersall 2010:36)
and partly they grew out of recognition that ‘arbitration unionism’ was viable in
49
an era of higher union densities but had lost its efficacy (Tattersall 2010:6). The
organising approach and coalition building were efforts to rebuild union power
resources in the wake of density declines (Tattersall 2010:8). Coalitions and
community campaigns became a default union solution for long-‐term political
problems (Tattersall 2010:10). Gentile and Tarrow (2009:490) argued that
domestic structures influence the strategic choices unions and union movements
can and do make under threat from neo-‐liberalism. Gentile and Tarrow
(2009:480-‐488) compared the Maritime Dispute in Australia with a similar
dispute in Liverpool (UK) at the same time, finding that the ACTU adapted “with
alacrity” but the British union leadership did not. Gentile and Tarrow (2009) do
not offer a compelling reason for this difference in response.
The prospect of augmenting declining power resources through greater member
activism and coalitions with other groups is appealing to union movements under
threat from density decline, withdrawal of labour rights and neo-‐liberal economic
and social policies. Yet, social movement unionism, as understood in Western
countries, emphasises a rejection of the ‘failed’ labour movement practices of the
past, particularly unionism that focuses narrowly on the employment relationship
and involves a close relationship with a political party. These old strategies are
often rejected as disempowering (of members), centralist, elitist and bureaucratic
(Seidman 2011, Shantz 2009, Simmons and Harding 2009). Devinatz (2009:144)
provided a typical statement of the transformative purpose of social movement
unionism: “unions of the present must be transformed into democratic, rank-‐and-‐
file oriented unions that engage in alliances with a wide range of community
organisations in order to thrive in a globalised economy”. Another writer (Miller
M. 2010:49) positioned the choice and transformation facing labor in adopting
community campaigning in these terms: “For labor, it implies a step back from the
first name, insider, often-‐too-‐cozy relationship with Democratic Party politicians”.
Other writers have also argued that union revitalisation requires a rejection of the
complacent, ‘business unionism’ of the past with its narrow focus on wage
agreements and the adoption in its stead of a broader involvement in coalitions to
re-‐build communities through campaigns based on the use of citizenship rights
50
(Simmons and Harding 2009). The extent to which such transformations are
possible within Australia’s existing unions-‐party relationships is deeply
problematic.
As we shall see later in this thesis, this conundrum is evident in the efforts by
many interviewees to position the YR@W campaign as a ‘one-‐off’ or ‘a moment in
time’, rather than as a milestone in a broader transformation of the Australian
union movement. Borrowing some effective tactics and strategies for an
occasional campaign is a long way short of a more permanent transformation. In
addition, social movement unionism comes with a promise of engagement and
democratisation that cannot easily be delivered in the context of more traditional
union structures and political relationships.
6. Political independence and dependence
The balance and interplay between independence and dependence in the
relationship between unions and the ALP is the crucial idea in this thesis. As used
in this thesis, the concepts of independence and dependence are embedded in the
differences between social democratic and pressure group types of unions-‐party
relationships. The key difference is that independence is associated with weakly
institutionalised arrangements and dependence is associated with strongly
institutionalised arrangements. In examining unions-‐party relationships over
time we would expect to see a greater degree of independence associated with
weaker institutionalisation. That is, where unions cannot depend upon their
relationship with a political party to secure their political objectives they are
more likely to pursue those objectives independently of those political parties,
and use different repertoires of contention.
Political independence has two major characteristics, which are important in the
context of this thesis; they are predictability of union support for political parties
and choice of political activities. Independence suggests a greater capacity to act
as a separate political entity or actor, and, therefore, a lower level of predictability
of support than in highly dependent relationships. Unions involved in strongly
51
institutionalised unions-‐party relationships will find it far more difficult, if not
impossible, to act independently, and potentially in conflict with, the aligned
political party. The idea that political independence and strongly institutionalised
unions-‐party relationships are incompatible is central to the doctrine of
‘voluntarism’ that led American unions to decide to neither create their own
political party nor align themselves with an existing party (Archer 2008,
Greenstone 1969). In addition, political independence is associated with short-‐
term political benefit exchanges, and a willingness to campaign for or against
more than one major political party depending on an assessment of each party’s
policies and performance. Although, from the 1930s onwards, American unions
have been closely aligned with the Democratic Party their independence allows
them to support those candidates that are most likely to support union objectives.
Union support is always, in theory, contestable. The Democratic Party,
particularly its more liberal candidates, is overwhelmingly the beneficiary of
union political support (Masters and Delaney 1987), but American unions do
provide support for both sides of politics:
In the 2000 election the average Democratic incumbent received
$130,646, while the average sum of labor donations that went to
political opponents was $10,285.50; the average Republican incumbent
received $16,144.08, while their rivals received an average of
$52,702.64. Overall, the pattern indicates that labor is rewarding its
“friends” and seeking to unseat its “enemies.” Yet the nontrivial
donations to Republicans... also indicate political voluntarism. Clearly,
some union leaders believe they gain by directing resources toward
candidates that affiliate with the Republican Party. (Zullo 2007:227)
The second important characteristic of political independence is the choice of
political activities by unions to advance their political objectives. In both social
democratic (Australia, NZ, UK) and pressure group (USA) type unions-‐party
relationships, unions employ a mix of political activities that range from elite
bargaining between union and party leaderships (Dark 2001), to fully
52
independent grass-‐roots political campaigns (Simmons and Harding 2009). Weak
institutionalisation in the pressure group model is associated with a strong
reliance on political campaigning, whereas the strong institutionalisation in the
social democratic type produces a relatively greater reliance on elite bargaining.
The table bellow illustrates the association of relationship types and repertoires
of contention. The table indicates that the social democratic and pressure group
types are opposed on key characteristics. The second and third columns show the
inverse relationship between institutionalisation in the relationship type and
independence; the more institutionalised the relationship the less independence
will be displayed by unions and the party. The fourth and fifth columns show the
trade-‐off between elite bargaining and political campaigning and their
relationship to the degree of independence in the relationship. Independence is
the key characteristic of the pressure group type relationship and it is strongly
associated with political campaigning and weakly associated with elite
bargaining. Dependence is the key characteristic of the social democratic type
and it is strongly associated with elite bargaining and weakly associated with
political campaigning.
Table 1: Relationship type and political activities
Type Institution Independence Elite bargaining Political campaigning
Social democratic
Strong Weak Strong Weak
Pressure group
Weak Strong Weak Strong
Dependence is intrinsic to the nature of the political exchange bargaining
involved in social democratic unions-‐party relationships. Dependence arises from
a long-‐term relationship between unions and parties. Quinn (2010:360) argues
that these institutionalised relationships provide a solution to the problems of
non-‐simultaneous political exchanges. Dependence is two-‐way, with parties
relying on unions for electoral support and general funding. In creating labour
53
and social democratic parties, union movements drastically reduced their reliance
on independent activities as political actors, or social movements, relying instead
on ‘their’ political parties to pursue political objectives on their behalf.
Dependent relationships have generally provided more benefits for unions in
terms of policy influence and access to candidate selection processes (Ludlam,
Bodah and Coates 2002). Scholars responding to the emergence of New Labour,
and its equivalents in other Western countries, have generally seen a move from
social democratic to pressure group as a step backwards, particularly for unions.
Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) argued that unions-‐party linkages on both
sides of the Atlantic are moving towards the “original impotence of the external
lobbying model characteristic of early labour movements” (2002). Indeed, a
move towards independence, in the sense in which independence is used here, is
a good indicator that unions can no longer rely on their aligned political parties to
the same extent for assistance in achieving union political objectives. Therefore,
independence can be seen as a sign of union weakness, not strength.
While the strategies of independence (political campaigning) and dependence
(elite bargaining) are present in all unions-‐party relationships, there is a tension
and a trade-‐off between them. As Tattersall (2010:176) has noted, after her
analysis of three case studies of coalition unionism in Australia and North
America, a strategy of public agitation, as we might see in a political environment
where unions exhibit a high degree of political independence, “sits in stark
contrast to the restraint and reliance on quiet influence associated with union
relationships with political parties”. McIlroy is less delicate, attributing union
restraint in the face of the BLP’s promise to be tough on strikes and public sector
wage growth in the 1997 election, that saw New Labour under Blair come to
power, to pressure on union leaders to remain silent (McIlroy 1998:553). In a
detailed study of 32 case studies of union renewal in the US and UK, Hickey,
Kuruvilla, and Lakhani (2010:21) found that “the generally adversarial nature of
member activism” was at odds with efforts to build partnerships with employers.
The same is likely to be true in the case of co-‐operative relationships with
governments and political parties. Tattersall (2010:175) raised the issue: “if and
54
how insider union relationships with political parties can affect coalition
strategies and coalition success”. Tattersall suggested that this emerging
contradiction was an area that warranted further research (2010:176). It is this
contradiction that makes the tendency of using independent campaigning to
augment (declining) internal party influence problematic.
7. Conclusion
Union decline has been a persistent problem for union movements throughout
the Western world over recent decades. De-‐linking of parties from unions, either
decisively or by a weakening of union influence inside parties, has also been a
common phenomenon. There has also been a weakening of the unions-‐ALP
relationship at the level of ideology with the ALP shifting away from collectivism
towards individualism. A shift from collectivism to individualism can be seen also
as a shift from the language of social democratic ideology, focused on promoting
the labour interest, to a broader and more inclusive pressure group type rhetoric.
The use of individualist rhetoric opens the way for a broader engagement with
social groupings, beyond a traditional blue-‐collar union base. Union decline, and
the withdrawal of labour rights through legislative changes, has drawn Western
union movements towards the strategies of social movement unionism,
particularly as practiced in the USA, to augment union power resources. The
ACTU was an early adopter of these strategies, at least partly because the national
unions-‐ALP relationship is more fragmented, less institutionalised, than is typical
of mass parties and social democratic unions-‐party relationships. Yet, a key
feature of social movement unionism is independence from political parties, and
the prospects for that independence to be reconciled with a continuing, although
diminished, relationship of dependence on the ALP are uncertain.
55
CHAPTER 3: APPROACH AND METHODS
1. Introduction
This thesis adopts a post-‐positivist approach. I accept that the views, background,
knowledge etc. of the researcher cannot be separated from the phenomena being
researched. I also believe that research can be objective, but this requires an
open, transparent and conscious acknowledgement of the relationship between
the researcher and the researched. In addition, underlying the research in this
thesis is the proposition that the nature of unions-‐party relationships has broadly
predictable consequences for the political behaviour of both parties. However,
this predictability does not suggest the existence of immutable laws, but rather
conjectures that can, and must, be modified by further research (McNabb
2010:15-‐27, Robson 2002:624).
This thesis employs a case study approach. The case study focuses on the unions-‐
ALP relationship during a critical period in its long history, from the end of the
Accord era to the 2010 election. Previous scholars in the general area of unions-‐
party relationships, discussed later in this chapter, have made extensive use of the
case study approach (Greenstone 1969, Minkin 1992, Tattersall 2010, Valenzuela
1992). I use data from two principal sources: a set of 24 interviews with senior
participants in the contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship and previously-‐
published documentary evidence; principally, ALP and ACTU reports,
parliamentary and other political speeches, MP biographies and media reports.
In developing this thesis, I have stuck as closely as I can to the requirements made
of a researcher and a scholar. Nevertheless, it would be foolish to claim that I can
easily separate these new roles from my previous involvement as a minor
participant in various guises, and as a close observer and sometime critic. My
father was a full-‐time official with a NSW union (later amalgamated with other
state unions to form the Health Services Union, HSU), affiliated with the ALP (until
56
recently10) for nearly 30 years. In addition, many of my friends and family
members have also been, some continue to be, active participants in unions and
the ALP.
Close proximity to the subject under study can be a major benefit for the social
science researcher. This proximity can be advantageous in case study research,
which is context-‐dependent (Flyvbjerg 2006:223). Minkin (1991), who wrote on
the British unions-‐party relationship, said that he based much of his work on
informal and confidential conversations with many participants over many years:
“a lot of information came from this private discussion” (Minkin 1992:x). I have
drawn on my own store of discussions over several decades to shape my
interpretations of events and trends11. Any store of such informal information is
useful but limited. I have sought to add considerably to this informal dimension,
through a set of semi-‐structured interviews, and through verification from
publicly available materials.
During the Accord era, I worked in a tripartite Accord body, the Trade
Development Council Secretariat (TDCS) from 1984 to 1987. During that time, I
helped to organise seminars and forums for trade union officials and worked on
the drafting of Australia Reconstructed, the report of an ACTU mission to Europe
in 1987 (ACTU/TDC 1987) that sought to advance the cause of greater
corporatism in the relationship between the ACTU and the ALP (Dow and Lafferty
2007:554, Frankel 1997:12, Manning 1992, Peetz and Bailey 2010:7-‐8). From
1987 to 1991, I worked in the office of the Hon. John Dawkins, the then federal
Minister for Employment, Education and Training, where I had responsibility for
training policy (including the introduction of the Training Guarantee), among
other things, which again required close contact with senior union officials. I first
10 The HSU disaffiliated from the ALP in 2011 during a high-‐profile, internal brawl involving claims of corruption and its former National Secretary Craig Thomson, who was elected ALP member for Dobell at the 2007 and 2010 elections. 11 For instance, I remember a friend in the late 1980s, at the time a senior official of an affiliated blue collar union, drawing to my attention that the Accord was a problem for union officials; to paraphrase “members think their wage rises come from the Government now, and they say what are you blokes (union officials) doing?”
57
joined the ALP in 1975, but I have not been a member since 2004, and my
membership in the 1990s was episodic and non-‐active. From 1991 to 1996, I
managed workplace reform and best practice programs for the federal
Department of Industrial Relations. Again, this role brought me into close contact
with many union officials, including organising and participating in a tripartite
mission to look at best practices in management and union co-‐operation in
selected workplaces in the USA. The mission was undertaken at the invitation of
then House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D, Mo.) and many of the site visits
were organised with assistance from his office. The itinerary included meetings
with senior officials from the AFL-‐CIO12 and the United Mineworkers of America
(UMWA).
My experience of the YR@W campaign was very different. Between 1996 and
2007, I worked for a public relations company, Jackson Wells Morris, where,
among other things, I helped to develop employee communication strategies for
many organisations, including Telstra, Qantas, NSW Railcorp, National Rail, South
Pacific Tyres, Lend Lease and MLC. These strategies were principally undertaken
to support major corporate change programs including mergers, ownership
changes and re-‐structuring. I also developed broader public communication
strategies for key industrial relations institutions: the Office of the Employment
Advocate (OEA), the Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) and the Australian
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC). The preparation of these strategies
involved interviews and discussions with many senior officials and statutory
officeholders. In July 2005, after the ACTU’s highly successful television
advertisements featuring “Tracy” first went to air, Jackson Wells Morris was
contracted by the Australian Government to provide public relations support for
the introduction of WorkChoices. This project caused me to become interested in
the possibility that YR@W was more than a brilliantly conducted political
campaign. The success of the YR@W campaign prompted questions about the
12 Another anecdote on the way to this thesis; a senior AFL-‐CIO figure told the Australian delegation that the AFL-‐CIO was still the most powerful interest group in America even though union membership was declining significantly. After the meeting one of the Australian union officials told me “we don’t want to be just another pressure group”.
58
validity of a popular narrative that unions had become politically irrelevant since
the Accord finally came to end with the defeat of the Keating ALP Government in
1996. How, for instance, could a politically irrelevant organisation conduct what
was arguably the most successful non-‐party political campaign in Australian
history, against a seasoned and politically clever Prime Minister recently returned
to office with a rare majority in the Senate? Did it mean that the union movement
had successfully re-‐invented itself? Was YR@W a turning point, or a one-‐off?
2. Research questions
A key purpose of this thesis is to locate the current debate about the ALP’s
continuing links to the trade union movement within a more robust theoretical
framework. The thesis proceeds from the observation that the national unions-‐
ALP relationship is complex, multi-‐dimensional and evolving. In particular, there
is an apparent contradiction between the ALP’s traditional relationship with the
(mostly) blue-‐collar unions that created the party at a state level and a more
recent relationship with the ACTU that includes non-‐affiliated unions and
emphasises the union movement’s independence of the ALP. Two other
preliminary observations were important for shaping the research questions for
this thesis. First, the ACTU-‐ALP relationship during the Accord and YR@W
episodes was more important in policy development for the union movement
than the affiliated unions-‐ALP relationship. Dow and Lafferty (2007:554) have
argued that the original Accord contained a form of political unionism wherein
the ACTU claimed to speak on behalf of the collective interests of labour not just
union members. In effect, there has been some form of political displacement
caused by the growing importance of the ACTU as the peak organisation for
Australian unions and a simultaneous decline in the importance of affiliated blue-‐
collar unions, as the political voice of Australian employees. Second, the YR@W
campaign was, at least partially, inspired by US-‐style union revitalisation
strategies that reflect the relative weakness of American unions in their
relationship with the Democratic Party and emphasise the political independence
of unions.
59
With these preliminary observations in mind, this thesis seeks to answer three
questions. The first question explores the possibility of a consequential
contradiction between two types of unions-‐ALP relationships at the national level.
The second question examines the impact this contradiction has had on the
contemporary relationship. The third question examines the relationship
contradiction (or paradox) in the context of theoretical work, which posits that
vertical relationships with unions (and other party organisational components)
are weakened as mass parties transition into the electoral professional type
(Panebianco 1988).
The research questions are:
1. Is there a politically important contradiction between the ALP’s
relationship with its affiliated unions and the party’s relationship with
the ACTU?
2. How does the contradiction affect the contemporary dynamic of the
national unions-‐ALP relationship?
3. Has the independence of union revitalisation been reconciled with
the dependence of affiliation?
3. Previous studies
There continues to be a paucity of detailed studies of unions-‐party relationships:
“we lack detailed studies of relations between social democratic parties and
unions which articulate developments in both wings to understand change in the
alliance” (McIllroy 1998:538). In Australia, at least, this was not always the case.
Many major studies in Australian politics have covered the unions-‐ALP
relationship in some considerable depth. Australian scholars and commentators
like Childe (1923), Denning (1982), Nairn (1989), Rawson (1954), and Turner
(1979) all wrote from the premise that a detailed understanding of the unions-‐
ALP relationship was critical to understanding Australian politics more broadly.
60
The decline of unions, and the consequent phenomenon of the separation, or
weakening, of unions-‐party relationships in Western and Northern Europe and
Australasia has lead to a variety of scholarly research (McIllroy 1998, Ludlam,
Bodah and Coates 2002, Howell 2001, Dark 2001, Hyman and Gumbrell-‐
McCormick 2010, Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009) some of it building on, and
re-‐interpreting, earlier work, including that of Minkin (1992) and Valenzuela
(1992). Recently, scholars have also been incorporating considerations of union
revitalisation strategies into analyses of the decline of unions and of unions-‐party
relationships (Gentile and Tarrow 2009, Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010).
In Australia, the Accord period and the Hawke and Keating era prompted
considerable scholarly consideration of the unions-‐ALP relationship (Dow and
Lafferty 2007, Griffin, Nyland and O’Rourke 2004, Lavelle 2010, Manning 1992,
Manning 2000, Parkin and Warhurst 2000). Similarly, the YR@W campaign (Muir
2008, Muir and Peetz 2010) and the growth of union revitalisation strategies
(Muir and Peetz 2010, Tattersall 2010) have also begun to draw scholarly
attention.
The research methodology in this thesis is similar to that used in past studies of
unions-‐party relationships. Scholarly analyses of unions-‐party relationships
usually have a strong historical dimension. They look at the dynamics of these
relationships through time and in response to changing economic, social and
political forces and environments. Valenzuela (1992) used a multi-‐country
historical research approach to populate a typology. Minkin (1991) looked at the
long history of the relationship between the BLP and trade unions based around
themes that focus on what he argues are the key components of the unions-‐BLP
relationship. Dark (2001) used a case study approach to look at the influence of
American unions on successive Democrat presidential administrations from
Johnson to Clinton. McIllroy (1998) augmented existing scholarly work with an
examination of party and trade union policy documents (from the peak body and
from individual unions), media reports and public opinion research.
61
I have identified six (6) research methodologies (see table next page) used in
seven (7) previous studies focused specifically on the internal dynamics of
unions-‐party relationships (Greenstone 1969, Minkin 1992, Valenzuela 1992,
Dark 2001, McIllroy 1998, Ludlam, Bodah and Coates 2002, Piazza 2001). In the
first of three following tables, I briefly describe the research methods used by
previous scholars. In the next table, I set out the use made of these research
methods in these studies. Usage is ranked against a five-‐point scale where 0
means the research method was not used at all and 5 means it was the sole
method used in that particular study. A rating of 3 indicates that considerable
weight was given to two or more of the research methods. A rating of 4 means
that two or more methods were used but this method was the principal method;
and 2 means it was the lesser of two or more methods. This table illustrates the
heavy emphasis on re-‐interpreting historical material, and the prevalent tendency
for researchers to rely on a combination of two research methods. In the third of
this group of tables, I summarise the strengths and weaknesses of these research
methods. These strengths and weaknesses are identified with a view to my own
research project, and are also a reflection of my reading of the previous studies
identified in this section.
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Table 2: Methodology: descriptions
Description
1. Historical data from previous studies
Secondary research involving a re-‐interpretation of existing studies. Typically, this involves the use of previously established facts and interpretations to make a fresh argument, based on a theoretical model, to provide new understandings or insights. Historical research commonly focuses on four key areas of interest: formal relationships between unions and parties (including constitutions), leadership elite biographies and ideological leanings, funding of party and party activities by unions and policy outcomes.
2. Documents Primary research based on party and union documents, particularly policy documents and reports, as well as speeches, media releases. Often provides new insights into existing historical analysis.
3. Statistical analyses Primary and secondary research based on indicators like union density, electoral outcomes, economic results, biographies of leaders.
4. International comparisons
Mostly secondary research. Two types. Piazza (2001, 2005) uses readily available indicators to draw comparisons across a large number of countries. Others use a mix of historical and case study evidence. The latter provides a richer understanding of relationship patterns and dynamics, but is difficult to undertake on a significant scale, in terms of range of countries, variables and time periods.
5. Case studies Mostly secondary research. Provides a more manageable approach to historical research by providing some valid boundaries and a sharper focus.
6. Qualitative interviews Primary research. Semi-‐structured interviews with key participants. Used to understand participant perceptions, which can then frame analytical work using other data sources.
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Table 3: Methodology: scholarly usage
1. Hist. 2. Docs 3. Stats 4. Int’l 5. Cases 6. Intervs
Greenstone (1969) 3 0 0 1 3 3
Valenzuela (1992) 3 0 0 3 0 0
Minkin (1991) 3 3 0 0 0 0
Dark (2001) 3 0 0 0 3 0
Coates et al (2002) 3 0 0 3 0 0
McIllroy (1998) 3 2 0 1 0 0
Piazza (2001) 0 0 3 3 0 0
Table 4: Methodology: strengths and weaknesses
Strengths Weaknesses
1. Historical Data relatively accessible. Useful in comparing changes in various aspects of relationships over time.
Data has already been selected and interpreted, resulting in limitations and methodological contradictions.
2. Documents Provides fresh, first-‐hand evidence, particularly useful for supplementing other data.
Meaningful public information on unions-‐party relationship is rare.
3. Statistical analyses
Makes cross country and multi time period studies more manageable.
Available data can only ever be quantitative and usually available as proxies for key relationship components.
4. International comparisons
Provides a strong context for assessing relationship changes in a particular country.
Cross-‐country comparisons are difficult to make given the complexity of relationships and political contexts.
5. Case studies Provide a more structured approach to assessing changes in relationships across time periods.
Comparisons can be too contrived and de-‐contextualised.
6. Qualitative interviews
Provide insights into how participants view relationship that are not easily discernible from other sources.
Not statistically valid, cannot stand alone as conclusive evidence.
64
Given the strengths and weaknesses of each research method, it is not surprising
that scholars mostly choose to combine at least two methods. There are some
obvious combinations, and these can be readily identified from the second table
above. Most studies combine use of existing historical research supplemented by
one or more of documentary research, qualitative participant interviews,
international comparisons and case studies.
4. Case study research
I think the ways industrial relations is played out within the world are
very different and so you have to be able to use the contextual factors
that are there in front of your eyes at the time. If you can’t do that well
you’re not going to get the outcome you want. You have to be
constantly flexible. It’s hard to say. You’d have to have a case study
approach to make sense of it all. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
The research questions for this thesis suggest the need for a case study approach.
Addressing these research questions will give rise to hypotheses that can be
tested again using studies of other cases, in Australia and elsewhere, which,
depending on their validity, might give rise to a broadly applicable theory of
weakening links between unions and parties in transition away from the mass
party to the electoral professional, catch-‐all and cartel types (Gunther and
Diamond 2001, Katz and Mair 1995, Panebianco 1988). In addition, it is possible
to draw some general conclusions from a single case (Flyvbjerg 2006:225). The
prospects for generalisation depend on the selection of the case study (Flyvbjerg
2006:225). In this thesis, the case to be studied is the only one available in
Australia because the thesis focuses on a particular strategic choice (the adoption
of union revitalisation strategies) by a key actor (the ACTU) and the impact of this
decision on the unions-‐ALP relationship. As such, the prospect for generalisation
in the sense of decontextualised knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2006:223) must be
considered limited. Nevertheless, the contextualised knowledge provided by this
65
case study can make substantial contributions to the store of contextualised
knowledge about contemporary unions-‐party relationships in Australia and
internationally.
I use the most common definition of case study research, which is the detailed
study of a single unit over time (Flyvbjerg 2006:220, Gerring 2004). Following
Gerring (2004), I take the national unions-‐ALP relationship to be a unit in a larger
class of unions-‐party relationships. I have identified the case to be studied as the
national unions-‐ALP relationship from the end of the Accord period (1996) until
the 2010 election.
The limits of generalisability inherent in case study methodology do, however,
provide opportunities for exploratory research (generating rather than testing
hypotheses) and to depth rather than breadth in the focus of research. The choice
between depth and breadth in research design is well known:
Research designs invariably face a choice between knowing more about
less and knowing less about more. The case study method may be
defended, as well as criticized, along these lines. (The) looseness of
case study research is a boon to new conceptualizations just as it is a
bane to falsification (Gerring 2004).
There are long-‐standing unions-‐party relationships, of one type or another, in all
Western democracies. Some of these are similar to the national unions-‐ALP
relationship in one or more important characteristics. Some useful studies have
been undertaken that focus on the relationship between key variables in these
unions-‐party relationships across a wide range of countries. The studies by
Piazza (2001, 2005) are a key example. Piazza’s studies are highly suggestive in
pointing to a strong correlation between globalisation and party dependence on
unions for electoral success. Nevertheless, there are very few variables in unions-‐
party relationships that lend themselves to this type of statistical analysis. There
are also studies that compare two or more national relationships using case study
methodology. Ludlam, Bodah and Coates (2002) compared the UK and USA.
Ellem and Franks (2008) and Markey (2008) compared Australia and NZ. Other
66
studies, perhaps the most common, are focused on a single national relationship.
Examples include a study of the British relationship (Minkin 1992) and the US
relationship (Greenstone 1969, Dark 2001).
The relationship between unions and the ALP is too large a subject for a single
thesis. The principal areas in which choices had to be made about what to include
in this study have to do with relationship level, time period and international
comparisons. I have opted to look principally, but not exclusively, at the national
level; and, to use international comparisons where they can illuminate points, but
not to embark on a full country comparison study. Perhaps, the boundaries in this
study will provide ample scope for further case study and comparative research.
Even with these boundaries, the subject of this thesis is still large.
The unions-‐ALP relationship takes place at national, state and local levels. These
levels are, of course, interwoven and difficult to delineate without drawing
artificial distinctions. Nevertheless, the differences between national and state
unions-‐party relationships are sufficiently meaningful to permit a valid research
choice. My focus is the relationship at the national level. My initial research
interest was the differences between those two national episodes: the Accord and
the YR@W campaign. I also wanted to focus on the distinctive nature of the
national relationship to address a common tendency to treat the national
relationship as a simple aggregation, or replication, of state-‐based unions-‐party
relationships. Moreover, Australia is a federation and no study of the national
unions-‐ALP relationship can completely ignore state-‐based relationships. For
reasons of time and space, I have included state-‐based relationships to the extent
they can shed light on the national relationship.
International comparisons are another useful dimension. Indeed, my theoretical
framework borrows heavily from Valenzuela’s cross-‐country analysis (1992) and
a later comparison of unions-‐party relationships in the USA and UK (Ludlam,
Bodah and Coates 2002). Although I have drawn on international comparisons to
illustrate particular points, a full international comparison of contemporary
unions-‐party relationships proved to be beyond the scope of this thesis. The main
67
relevance of international comparisons is to establish a continuum along which
we might locate unions-‐party relationships in different countries, and, perhaps
more importantly in different time periods. Some understanding of these
differences and similarities is important to a theoretical understanding of the
unions-‐ALP relationship, but their complexity limits the value of a full-‐blown
cross-‐country analysis.
Yin (1994) identifies two general approaches to analysing evidence in case study
research: theoretical and case descriptive. In the first of these approaches,
theoretical propositions guide the design of the case study and also guide the
analytical process by focusing attention on some data. In the second approach, a
descriptive (or methodological), rather than theoretical, framework is used with
analysis based on the description of key phenomena and the relationships
between them. The analysis of the case study research in this thesis is focused
around the conclusions drawn from the literature review in the previous chapter.
These conclusions shaped the design of the main source of data, qualitative
interviews. Chapter 4 examines the historical dimension concerned with the
proposition that the greater degree of fragmentation present in the Australian
relationship created the space for the emergence of a more independent ACTU.
Chapter 5 looks at the possible co-‐existence of two relationship types in the
national unions-‐ALP relationship. Chapters 6 and 7 look at the interplay of
independence and dependence in each of the two wings of the relationship, the
ACTU and the ALP. Chapter 8 considers the question of growing asymmetry in
the political exchange between unions and the ALP. Chapter 9 seeks to bring
together the various ideas in these chapters to consider the YR@W campaign and
what followed during the ALP’s first term of office after the campaign (2007 –
2010).
The interviews were focused on eliciting participant perceptions about the
contemporary nature of the relationships; union status within the relationships;
the symmetry and predictability of the benefit exchange between unions and the
ALP; and, the continuing relevance of the YR@W campaign. This design then
flows through to the analytical process, and the structure of this thesis, and
68
inevitably the findings and conclusions. Conceivably, the selection of a different
set of theoretical propositions would have resulted in significantly different
insights and conclusions. Several strategies were adopted to mitigate this
tendency, found in all case study research, towards the verification of existing
biases (Flyvbjerg 2006:223). First, the interviewee selection was designed to
ensure as wide as possible range of participant perspectives. Second, the
interviews were semi-‐structured and conducted in a way that allowed
interviewees to discuss the broad topics in their own terms. Third, other data
sources were used to confirm or verify the analysis of interview data.
Case study research is not without its problems, but in the context of this thesis it
is the obvious research methodology, and one that provided a rich source of
evidence not available elsewhere.
5. Qualitative interviews
The decision to use interviews to gather evidence for a case study of a
contemporary phenomenon is far from unusual. Pierce (2002) notes that up to
90 per cent of investigations in the social sciences involve interviews. Ellem,
Oxenbridge and Gahan (2008) used this approach in their evaluation report of the
YR@W campaign for UnionsNSW (2008:7), as did Muir (2008) in her study of the
YR@W campaign. Tattersall (2010) also used interviews in her case studies on
coalition unionism. My interviews, of course, had a different focus, being
concerned with the national-‐unions relationship rather than the YR@W campaign
itself.
The focus of this thesis is the strategic choice the union movement made to adopt
union revitalisation strategies and the consequences of that choice for the
national unions-‐ALP relationship. Consequently, I sought views from both sides
of the relationship, and from people with experience of the relationship both
before and after the adoption of union revitalisation strategies by the ACTU. The
nature of the relationship means that many senior participants have had high-‐
69
level involvement in both the ALP and the union movement; this is particularly
true of current officials from peak and affiliated unions, as well as current and
former MPs.
I conducted interviews with 24 senior participants in the unions-‐ALP relationship
between November 2009 and February 2010. For time and cost reasons, I sought
interviews in Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra. This is not a particularly
important limitation because the national peak union organisation, the ACTU, is
located in Melbourne, and the most important state peak union organisation,
UnionsNSW, and still to some extent a rival power centre in the union movement,
is located in Sydney. In addition, the national offices of Australia’s major unions
are located in either Melbourne or Sydney, and many senior national officials
travel frequently between Australia’s two largest cities. Three-‐quarters (18) of
the interviews were conducted in Sydney. Two of these 18 were with Melbourne
based union officials when they were visiting Sydney. Three interviews were
conducted in each of Melbourne and Canberra.
I also selected interviewees in a way that ensured representation in my sample of
interviewees from the left and right factions of the labour movement; unions
affiliated and not affiliated with the ALP; officials from blue collar, white collar
and professional unions; senior state and national officials of unions; and, the
parliamentary and organisational wings of the ALP. In addition, I sought
participation from former union officials whose experience at a senior level
predated the adoption of union revitalisation strategies. Despite the complexity
involved in trying to create a sample capable of reflecting all these various
permutations, the task was somewhat simplified because my main focus was on
seeking the participation of senior current officials from Australia’s two most
important peak union organisations (ACTU and UnionsNSW) and from the dozen
or so unions that together represent well over half of Australia’s union members.
In the event, 9 of the 24 participants interviewed fitted into this current peak and
major union official category. Of these nine interviewees, three were from peak
union organisations, four were from unions affiliated with the ALP and two were
from unions not affiliated with the ALP. A further five interviewees were current
70
officials from smaller unions; two of these interviewees were from unions
affiliated with the ALP. In addition, four other interviewees had previously held
senior union roles; one with a peak union organisation, two with large, affiliated
unions and one with a smaller affiliated union. Three of these interviewees were
current members of the FPLP.
In an effort to improve my chances of securing interviews, I also included in my
target list people with whom I had had a pre-‐existing relationship. Nine of the
twenty-‐four participants were people that were, or may have been, influenced to
participate because of this prior relationship. This includes two of the
participants in the core group of current senior officials of peak and major unions.
Overall, these personal relationships were not significant in shaping the
composition of the current union official component of the interviewee list. Only
one union official refused, several others referred me to colleagues in their
organisation and several did not respond. I did not follow-‐up these latter
potential interviewees because the overall response rate was sufficient to provide
a large, and representative, enough sample. Prior personal relationships were far
more important in securing interviews with current MPs. Five of the seven
current federal MPs that I interviewed were, or may have been, influenced in their
decision to participate by the existing relationship. While participation by some
of Australia’s most senior officials was readily forthcoming, securing the
participation of senior MPs was much more difficult. Three of the four current
cabinet ministers that were invited to participate declined, mostly citing time
pressure. The fourth agreed, but repeated efforts to schedule an interview time
were ultimately unproductive. Efforts to interview junior members of the
ministry were more successful. Two of the interviewees were current members
of the outer ministry, and three were former members of the outer ministry. A
third current member of the outer ministry agreed to an interview, but again
efforts to schedule an interview were unproductive. The two remaining
interviewees were prominent members of caucus factions (and regularly
described in the media as faction leaders), both with senior level backgrounds in
the union movement.
71
The discrepancy between union and political response rates may simply be due to
time pressures. My request was for an interview of sixty minutes duration, and
this may have been just too a great a commitment of time for no, or very marginal,
benefit for the interviewee. One adviser to a Cabinet Minister that I sought an
interview with said that his employer only rarely had meetings of this duration
with anyone. The workloads of Cabinet Ministers in the Rudd Government at the
time were notoriously heavy. In fact, one interviewee (Current non-‐affiliated
union official 1) remarked that:
None of them, the Cabinet Ministers, are sleeping as much as they
should, or the staff working for them, I know some of the people who
are close to the prime minister and that’s what they all say they can’t
keep like Julia can’t keep staff, Kevin can’t keep staff. That’s because
they’ve all got like 12 issues, and they’re trying to do so much, which is
fantastic but…. It’s also a very Cabinet driven Labor Party now.
Perhaps, the discrepancy in response rates also points to the greater importance
of the relationship to unions than to the ALP. Gender is another potential
weakness in the interview sample. Only 3 of the 24 interviewees were female.
Tables 5 and 6 below provide as much detail about the interviewees as possible,
consistent with the guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality given to all
interviewees. Interviewees have been given generic descriptors (e.g. current
federal MP 1, current peak union official 1) to provide some more context for the
quotes used in this thesis. This replicates the approach used by Ellem,
Oxenbridge and Gahan (2008) in their evaluation of the YR@W campaign for
UnionsNSW. Table 5 gives information about current and former full-‐time union
and party positions, as well as pointing to any other (i.e. part-‐time or honorary)
senior ALP and ACTU positions held currently or in the past. Table 6 gives more
information on the core interviewee group (current peak and major union
official) sample in relation to the union movement overall.
Given the nature of the unions-‐ALP relationship, many interviewees had held
senior roles in both unions and the ALP. Nineteen interviewees were currently,
72
or had been, senior elected union officials. Of these, eleven held, or had held,
positions with ALP-‐affiliated unions, four with unions not affiliated with the ALP,
and four with peak organisations (three of which had previously held positions
with individual unions). Twelve of the nineteen union interviewees held, or had
held, national union positions, while seven, held or had held, state, but not
national, positions.
In addition, twelve of these nineteen union interviewees had served on the ACTU
executive. Eight of the interviewees were, or had been, parliamentarians (seven
national and one state). Two other interviewees had been unsuccessful
parliamentary candidates. Ten of the interviewees had held a range of other
relevant political roles. Four of the ten had held senior positions with the
National ALP, three had held senior state ALP positions (but not national), two
had been senior Ministerial advisers federally and one had worked for several
unions over a long period in campaigning roles.
The interviews were based on a set of questions that I asked of every interviewee
(see appendix 1) and, as with the YR@W evaluation: “the questions were also
open-‐ended, this allowed – as this technique is designed to do – the interviewees
to speak for themselves and to introduce new content or new aspects of the
analysis” (Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan 2008:7). Conducting semi-‐structured
qualitative interviews can make it more difficult to draw simple, direct
comparisons between responses by interviewees on particular points. On the
other hand, it does allow the research to be shaped by the participants. I found
that this approach created a framework for my analysis and a reference point for
assessing other evidence. Qualitative interviews also gave a far greater sense of
what the relationship ‘feels’ like from the inside. For the participants I
interviewed, the unions-‐ALP relationship is a daily-‐lived reality. I wanted to
capture some of that sense of lived reality. Beyond the formal interviews, I have
also had many private discussions with other participants in the relationship
during the course of my research from which I have also derived much of interest
and value.
73
The interviews were conducted with the prior approval of the Human Ethics
Research Committee at the University of Sydney. All interviews were audio-‐
recorded and subsequently transcribed. All interviews were conducted on the
basis of confidentiality. Most interviews were conducted in the interviewee’s
office or an adjacent room. In order, to meet the requirements of the interviewee,
three interviews were conducted in a restaurant or café. I believe that the
guarantee of confidentiality increases the likelihood of frankness on what is, or
can be, a highly contentious subject. Some form of confidentiality is common in
this type of research, Tattersall (2010) used a mix of identified and unidentified
interviewees, while Manning (2000) went further and neither recorded the
interviews nor took notes during them. Perhaps, the maximum informality of
Manning’s approach leads to even more frankness in interviewee responses, but I
have found the capacity to analyse transcripts repeatedly over a long period
invaluable as my thesis took shape. The more I returned to the transcripts, the
clearer the picture became.
A further important qualification is that the interviews were conducted at a
particular moment in time and may reflect those circumstances to an extent that
can mask or distort underlying trends. For instance, none of the interviewees
anticipated anything other than a second term for Kevin Rudd. Given recent
political events, the tone and content of these interviews might be somewhat
different if re-‐conducted now. On the other hand, the relationship trends
discussed in this thesis are only partially driven by personalities; and, in fact, the
relationship between unions and the Gillard government does not yet appear to
be significantly different to the relationships between unions and the previous
Rudd government.
74
Table 5: Interviewee characteristics
Key current / former position
Previous / other full-time relevant positions
Senior ALP organisational
roles
Senior ACTU organisational
roles
Current federal MP 1 Former affiliated union official
No Yes
Current federal MP 2 Former affiliated union official
No Yes
Current federal MP 3 Former peak union official
Yes Yes
Current federal MP 4 Former party official Yes No
Current federal MP 5 Former affiliated union official
Yes Yes
Current federal MP 6 -‐ Yes No
Current federal MP 7 Former party official Yes No
Former State MP 1 Former party official Yes No
Former federal political adviser 1
-‐ No No
Current peak union official 1
Former non-‐affiliated union official
No Yes
Current peak union official 2
Former affiliated union official
Yes Yes
Current peak union official 3
-‐ No Yes
Current peak union official 4
-‐ No No
Current affiliated union official 1
-‐ No No
Current affiliated union official 2
-‐ Yes Yes
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Key current / former position
Previous other / former full-time relevant positions
Senior ALP organisational
roles
Senior ACTU organisational
roles
Current affiliated union official 3
-‐ No No
Current affiliated union official 4
-‐ No Yes
Current affiliated union official 5
-‐ No Yes
Former affiliated union official 1
-‐ No Yes
Current affiliated union official 6
-‐ Yes No
Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
-‐ No Yes
Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
-‐ No No
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
-‐ No No
Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
-‐ Yes No
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Table 6: Unions and interviewees
Union Membership (‘000)
ALP Affiliated
Faction Interviewed Past / current
Peak 1,900 N/A N/A Yes (4) Current (3) & past (1)
AWU 135 Yes Right Yes Current
LHMU 120 Yes Left Yes (3) Current & past (2)
AEU 165 No Left Yes (2) Current & past
AMWU 130 Yes Left Yes Past
ANF 200 No Yes Current
TWU 90 Yes Right Yes (2) Current & past
SDA 230 Yes Right Yes Past
NUW Unknown Yes Right No13 N/A
CFMEU 120 Yes Left Yes Current
Other -‐ Yes (2) / No (3)
Both Yes (5) Current (3) & past (2)
Abbreviations and sources of membership statistics
Peak – ACTU / TLC – membership data is for ACTU – accessed 6 December 2011 http://www.worksite.actu.org.au/fact-‐sheets/trends-‐union-‐future.aspx.
AWU – Australian Workers Union -‐ http://www.awu.net.au/about.html -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
LHMU – Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union (name changed to United Voice in March 2011), http://unitedvoice.org.au/about accessed on 4 October 2011
AEU – Australian Education Union http://www.aeufederal.org.au/About/index2.html -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
AMWU – Australian Manufacturing Workers Union -‐ http://www.amwu.org.au/the-‐union/1// -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
13 No official from the NUW was interviewed because sufficient interviewees from similar (ie blue collar, ALP-‐affiliated) unions were included in the sample.
77
ANF -‐ Australian Nursing Federation -‐ http://www.anf.org.au/pdf/Fact_Sheet_Snap_Shot_About_ANF.pdf -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
TWU – Transport Workers Union -‐ http://www.twu.com.au/about/ -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
SDA – Shop, Distributive and Allied Industries -‐ http://www.sda.org.au/about.php?p=about_us -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011.
NUW – National Union of Workers – information on membership not found.
CFMEU – Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union -‐ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Construction,_Forestry,_Mining_and_Energy_Union -‐
6. Other data sources
The uses made of the main forms of primary research, other than qualitative
interviews, are set out in the table below.
Table 7: Other data sources
Source Description
First speeches New MPs make a first (formerly maiden) speech usually they include material about their backgrounds, views, influencers, supporters etc.
In Chapter 7, I compare the speeches of 1983 and 2007 to draw some conclusions about changes in federal caucus.
Biographical data I have collected data from a range of sources (mainly parliamentary websites) to examine links between ALP MPs and unions. See chapter 7.
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Source Description
National ALP reviews
The 2002 and 2010 National reviews are used especially in relation to ALP attitudes to union affiliation and links. See chapter 7.
ACTU reports, policy papers, executive minutes
This material is used to explain the ACTU’s strategic change in Chapter 6 and 9.
Speeches Some speeches by senior ALP and ACTU figures are referred to in Chapters 6, 7 and 9.
7. Conclusion
The research questions for this thesis are exploratory; they seek to understand
the consequences of the ACTU’s adoption of union revitalisation strategies for the
national unions-‐ALP relationship in some depth. The research questions lend
themselves to a case study research methodology, centred in qualitative
interviews and designed around a set of theoretical understandings drawn from
previous work by other scholars. The design of the case study and the analysis of
the data collected have been shaped by the theories reviewed in the previous
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: FRAGMENTATION
1. Introduction
This chapter presents the historical context that forms the essential background
for a case study of the contemporary national unions-‐ALP relationship. Path
dependency, or historical trajectory, involving a balance between structure and
agency is important in shaping national variations in unions-‐party relationships
(Gentile and Tarrow 2009:470, Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick 2010:321,
Upchurch, Taylor and Mathers 2009:520). The import of this proposition can be
found in two recent observations made by scholars examining the responses of
union movements to the challenge of neo-‐liberalism. First, Hyman and Gumbrell-‐
McCormick (2009:327) observed that some union movements are locked into
their traditional political identities to a greater extent than others, and that being
locked into a traditional political identity made it more difficult to adopt new
political strategies, such as those inspired by social movement unionism. Second,
Gentile and Tarrow (2009:480-‐488) in a case study comparison of the Australian
Maritime dispute in 1998 and the Liverpool Dock dispute in 1995 noted that the
ACTU had responded ‘with alacrity’ in comparison to its British counterparts in
replacing labor rights based repertoires of contention with those based on citizen
rights. This suggests that something in the Australian historical trajectory has
contributed to a different response to neo-‐liberalism.
This chapter draws upon the literature concerned with unions-‐party relationship
types reviewed in Chapter 2 to argue that a probable cause for the ACTU’s
capacity to change political strategies faster than many other union movements in
social democratic relationships lies in the history of the national unions-‐ALP
relationship. That history suggests that the national unions-‐ALP relationship has
always been more fragmented than is typical of social democratic type
relationships. Fragmentation is associated with independence in unions-‐party
relationships. During the Accord period, the ACTU-‐ALP relationship was close,
closer than other such relationships in the UK and NZ, but the point is that the
80
ACTU was acting in its negotiations with the ALP as if it was a separate entity to
the ALP. Affiliation took a back seat, and today the ACTU treats affiliation as a
matter of choice for individual unions and as a matter of little consequence to the
union movement as a whole in terms of its political strategies (see media release
at ACTU 2011 for a typical expression of the attitude to union affiliation with the
ALP).
There have been three key sources of fragmentation in the national unions-‐ALP
relationship. They are federalism, a fragmented union structure and a high level
of sectarian and ideological conflict. In Australia, unions created the ALP in the
various states (then colonies), but the federal ALP was created by these state ALP
organisations without direct union participation in the federal organisation. In
addition, the national union movement was slow to develop. There was no
national peak union organisation until the creation of the ACTU in 1927, and it
remained a relatively weak body for the next 50 years (Briggs 2002). When the
ACTU did emerge as an effective national body, in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
it was an organisation that covered unions that were affiliated with the ALP and
those that were not. It remained independent of the ALP with no formal links, but
a close interaction of leadership elites. Australia’s fragmented union structure
was institutionalised with the establishment of state and federal arbitration
systems and remained so until the amalgamation process of the 1990s (Buchanan
2003). A further source of fragmentation was intense sectarian and ideological
conflict (Ellem and Franks 2008), which resulted in rigid factionalism across the
labour movement. At times, this factionalism was so intense that the Australian
labour movement more closely resembled the fracturing along catholic and
communist (and socialist) lines that occurred in Western Europe after the Second
World War (Judt 2005). Sectarian and ideological conflict has been receding since
the 1960s (Rimmer 2004) and there are a growing number of instances of left-‐
right co-‐operation by affiliated unions inside the ALP, as well as among unions
more generally inside the ACTU, most notably the cross-‐factional unity that
underpinned the YR@W campaign.
81
The consequence of these developments has been a reduction in the
fragmentation in the national unions-‐ALP relationship resulting from union
structure and from high levels of sectarian and ideological conflict, but a retention
of the fragmentation resulting from the ALP’s federal structure. It was the use of
this structural fragmentation by the ACTU during the Accord and YR@W episodes
that makes it significant.
2. Australian exceptionalism
A few interviewees expressed a strong sense of exceptionalism14 about the
national unions-‐ALP relationship. They tended to see the Australian relationship
as more successful or superior to similar relationships in the UK, NZ and the USA,
without being too precise about the nature or source of this uniqueness, even in
response to subsequent questioning. Nevertheless, the superiority of the
Australian relationship for many interviewees seems to lie in its capacity to
continue to deliver benefits to both unions and the ALP:
I love our model; I hold onto it and cherish it deeply because it works
for us (unions and the ALP) so well. – Current affiliated union official 2
The appeal of the national unions-‐ALP relationship for this interviewee was that
unions continued to have political influence through the relationship without
harming the ALP’s chances of electoral success. He argued that only Canadian
unions had more influence inside a contemporary unions-‐party relationship, but
that this was of little consequence because the New Democratic Party (NDP) has
never held office nationally in Canada.
One interviewee suggested that the difference lies in the way the Australian
14 In an interesting parallel, Briggs (2001) discusses Australian exceptionalism in relation to the ACTU’s role in the introduction of enterprise bargaining.
82
relationship has ‘evolved’:
There are no other labour movements that have evolved to our level of
internal sophistication, at the same time there are no other labour
movements that operate like ours does. – Current MP 4
It seems likely that this sense of the capacity of the Australian relationship to
evolve relates to its ability to move from the closeness and corporatism of the
Accord to the greater distance of the contemporary relationship without coming
apart or producing too much damaging internal conflict. The same interviewee
saw the unions-‐ALP relationship as a legacy of a different time, but one that the
ALP and unions had managed to adapt to contemporary circumstances, his
description of the national unions-‐ALP as a ‘successful dinosaur’ suggests that the
Australian relationship is remarkable because it has retained its political salience
when other national unions-‐party relationships have not:
In global terms, in terms of labour parties around the world, our
relationship with trade unions is unique. A dinosaur in many ways but
it is a dinosaur that has worked effectively in Australia. – Current MP 4
If these claims to Australian exceptionalism have validity we would expect to see
evidence for them in the historical development of the national unions-‐ALP
relationship. I suggest that there are two important indicators of difference in the
historical development of the Australian relationship; they are, affiliation patterns
and electoral performance. The table below compares the national unions-‐ALP
relationship against those in the Australian states, the USA, NZ and UK against
three criteria that are central to the distinction Valenzuela (1992), and others,
draw between the pressure group and social democratic types. Canada and
Ireland are not included because of the far lower levels of electoral success of
union-‐aligned parties in those countries.
83
Table 8: Relationship comparisons
Political systems Affiliation Peak union created
Australia Federal No After
Aust States Unitary Yes Before
USA Federal No Before
New Zealand Unitary Yes Before
UK Unitary Yes Before
The national unions-‐ALP relationship is similar to the USA on two criteria
(political systems and affiliation) and unique on the third (whether a peak union
body preceded the creation of the aligned political party). Both of these criteria
favour independence (fragmentation) over dependence (close integration). On
the other hand, the pre-‐existing state-‐based unions-‐ALP relationships that
underpin the national relationship are similar to the relationships in the UK and
NZ. In NSW, for instance, the largest state and arguably the most important in
shaping the ALP nationally (Markey 1988, 2004), the Labor Council of NSW
(LCNSW)15, as a peak union organisation, was instrumental in the creation of the
ALP in that state.
A second important indicator of a separate Australian model might be said to exist
in the comparative electoral performances of the parties concerned. The electoral
performance of the ALP at a national level reveals a different pattern to that of the
USA, NZ and the UK. In Australia, remarkable early electoral success was followed
by a long period of poor electoral outcomes, and then more recently a return to a
success level more closely aligned with outcomes in similar countries. The table
on the next page shows the ALP’s electoral performance in comparison with
comparable social democratic (NZ, UK) and pressure group (USA) examples.
15 The name was changed to UnionsNSW in 2003.
84
During the pre-‐Keynesian period (1900–1935), union-‐aligned parties secured
majority national government in only Australia and the USA, although the US
Democrats were scarcely union-‐aligned until the end of this period, when the
AFL-‐CIO supported Roosevelt’s re-‐election (Greenstone 1969). The ALP was in
office for 9 years and the US Democrats held the presidency for 10 years.
Australia and the USA moved sharply apart in their electoral performance during
the Keynesian period (1935–1975), with Australia’s performance (11 years) the
worst of the four countries, which held majority national government during this
period, and the USA’s being the best (27 years). In the post-‐Keynesian period all
four countries enjoyed similar levels of electoral success. If Australia’s
performance during the Keynesian period had been closer to that of NZ or the
USA as it has been since (and in the case of the USA before Keynesianism), the
ALP would have been the best performing national union-‐aligned party in the
Anglophone world in electoral terms in the period 1900-‐2011.
Table 9: An international timeline comparison16
Formation of national union-aligned party
First majority govt
Years in office 1900 - 1935
Years in office 1935 - 1975
Years in office 1975 - 2010
Years in office Total
1900 - 2010
Aust 1900 (ALP) 1910 9 (26%)17 11 (28%)18 16 (46%) 36 (33%)
NZ 1916 (NZLP)
1935 0 20 (50%) 15 (43%)19 35 (32%)
UK 1900 (BLP) 1945 020 14 (35%) 17 (49%) 31 (28%)
USA21 1828 (DEM) 1913 10 (29%) 27(68%)22 14 (40%) 51 (46%)
16 All parties, except US Democrats, have formal links with unions (though the linkage patterns vary significantly) 17 Three majority governments, 1910-‐1913, 1914-‐1916 & 1929-‐1932, the last two ended with Labor splits 18 Includes 27 year period, 1949-‐72, out of office 19 Includes Labour led coalition government from 1999-‐2008, change in electoral system has made a majority government far less likely 20 Minority governments in 1924 and 1929-‐31, and wartime coalition 1940-‐45 not included 21 In this context, Office means the presidency
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3. Federalism
Federalism is a crucial difference between Australia and NZ, which otherwise
share so much in common (Markey 2008:71). Federalism inhibited the
development of a social democratic unions-‐party relationship at the national
level. Valenzuela (1992) argued that unions-‐party relationships are at their most
integrated when a single national union movement, under the leadership of an
effective peak organisation, is linked to a single national party. The decision made
by the various colonial labor parties, at the time of federation, to create a national
organisation along federal lines, and based on the structure of the new Senate23,
with no direct links between the FPLP and the national union movement
(virtually non-‐existent at the time) has effectively precluded the development of a
more typical social democratic relationship between unions and the ALP at the
national level.
At the time of Federation, Australia’s state (then colonial) labour parties chose a
federal rather than national structure; efforts to reverse this decision continue to
this day with only modest success. There are three important points about
federalism and the ALP that are relevant to this discussion. Together, they
provided the ALP’s federal politicians with a degree of autonomy far greater than
that enjoyed by ALP politicians in the Australian states, or by BLP
parliamentarians. First, the structure of party federalism excluded unions from
an affiliated link at the national level. Second, the absence of a federal
organisation weakened the capacity of the organisational party (and through it
affiliated unions) from utilising typical mass party rules and strategies, although
the caucus system and the pledge were adopted from the NSW party. There was
effectively no federal organisation until 1915, and it slowly developed over the
next 50 years. Cyril Wyndham was appointed as the ALP’s first full-‐time federal
secretary in 1963. Third, the federalist structure preserved the state branches as
22 Includes 12 years of FDR and 8 years of Kennedy / Johnson, the two periods when Democrats most resembled the social democratic model 23 This included six representatives from each state, hence 36 ‘faceless’ men. When the Chifley Government raised state representation from 6 to 10, the ALP did not follow suit.
86
centres of power in the national ALP (Markey 2008), adding a further dimension
of fragmentation, and hindering the development of a formal relationship
between unions and the ALP at a national level. Australian federalism is less
fragmentary than in the USA, where Levi (2004) has argued it prevented the
emergence of a genuine social democratic party. Australia’s political system
however is more complex and fragmented than the unitary UK system and the
unitary and unicameral NZ system, (Ellem and Franks 2008, James and Markey
2006:27). Earlier scholars often dwelt on the implications of these unique
organisational arrangements. Crisp (1978), for instance, in his study of the ALP
during the first half of the twentieth century, devoted a chapter to the lack of a
direct relationship between the ALP and the union movement at a national level.
Crisp24 argued that this situation gave political labour a degree of freedom
without parallel in Great Britain (Crisp 1978:182, 188). In his 1954 doctoral
thesis on the organisational development of the ALP between the conscription
crisis and the Curtin government, Rawson also reflected on the “relative freedom
from control enjoyed by the federal (ALP) politicians” (1954:380) and noted
sardonically that “it was obvious that though the Labor Party stood for unification
in the field of government, its own organisation was a looser form of federation
than that by which Australia was governed” (1954:376).
The federal ALP was established by a conference called by NSW Labor in January
1900, without representation from Western Australia (not part of the federation
move at the time) and Tasmania (couldn’t afford to send a representative), which
agreed to establish a federal Labor Party but did not set up a distinct federal
organisation (McMullin 2004: 59). Attempts to establish a federal executive were
unsuccessful until 1915, and the original federal bodies within the Labor Party
were triennial interstate conferences whose decisions needed ratification by the
state bodies (Rydon 1988:164). Remarkably, the federal ALP had already
produced two prime ministers, Watson and Fisher, before it had agreed to a
24 Crisp maintained an active interest in reforming the structure of the federal ALP. In the 1960s, Crisp helped Wyndham, then ALP federal secretary, develop proposals to have direct representation of local branches and unions at the federal conference (Botsman 2011). The National ALP Conference in 2011 failed again to make any real progress on this issue.
87
federal organisation. Even after the split of 1916, the remaining ALP MPs paid
little attention to the federal organisation (Rawson 1954:39). In practice, the
federal organisation played little role in shaping the nascent federal party.
Macintyre (2001:17) has argued that the 24 members of the first FPLP were “in
fact creating the ALP as a national organisation”, an unusual process for a mass
party, 12 of the original 24 FPLP members ended up on the other side of politics,
mainly because of the conscription split (Macintyre 2001:28).
The state-‐based focus of the ALP has been slow to change. Six decades after its
creation, Gough Whitlam described the national ALP as “a coming together of
State organisations …thinking by States, speaking by States and voting by States.”
(quoted in Rydon 1988:160). Until 1967, and the reforms undertaken under
Whitlam’s leadership, the Federal Conference comprised six delegates from each
of the six states, the ‘thirty-‐six faceless men’ that Menzies derided so effectively in
1963 (Fitzgerald and Holt 2010). Reforms since then have seen ‘national’ replace
‘federal’ in descriptors of the ALP’s Conference and Executive, these bodies have
been greatly expanded, the role of parliamentarians has been increased, and the
national ALP now exerts greater influence over state bodies. Even today,
however, when the National Conference has been expanded to its current size of
400 delegates, the national ALP still reflects its formation: delegations are elected
by State Branches and there is no direct union representation at the national
level. The reform process has tended to coincide with electoral disasters and
changes in the national ALP leadership. Whitlam led a major reform process after
he replaced Calwell as party leader in 1967 and there were inquiries and major
changes after the disastrous elections of 1977 and 2001, and again after the
disappointing 2010 election outcome (Lavelle 2010, ALP 2002, 2010). These
reviews have frequently addressed the federal nature of the ALP, without
significant change. Sometimes, these proposals have failed because a national
structure would require some form of union affiliation at the national level. A
NSW proposal in 1940 for a national conference, which included direct union
representation, was not adopted. This proposal, however, envisaged
representation by national unions rather than a peak organisation (Rydon
88
1988:164). The affiliation of national unions would have replicated the situation
at state level where affiliation is by individual unions. Cyril Wyndam, the ALP’s
first full-‐time federal secretary (1963-‐69) famously proposed a national structure
in the 1960s (Wyndham 2011), but it too was rejected25.
Moreover, one interviewee, suggested that a move to national affiliation of unions
would not necessarily change the national-‐state power balance:
They could go to a national affiliation model which would be rational
and consistent with the Rudd Government’s preference for national
rather than state arrangements and it is more logical given the real
power of national offices compared to state offices in the union
movement. They could do that but all it would mean would be that the
state union warlords would be replaced by national union warlords and
whoever else the national union warlords decided to include on their
delegations. The major union state warlords would still end up on the
delegations and it would be the warlords from the smaller states that
would miss out. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Protecting the ‘warlords’ from the smaller states has always been the classic
motivation for a federal structure, one that still seems to resonate. One reason
why national affiliation might not change much is that many unions are still not
genuine national organisations. One interviewee suggested that real power still
lies in the state branches of many unions, and that the national union structures
have less relevance than might be thought, given the union amalgamation process
of the 1990s:
What has happened in unions is that you’ve got 20 unions by and large,
you’ve probably got 4 or 5 that are basically national structures where
there are no state structures or there are vestigial state structures like
the CPSU, FSU, APPESMA, MUA, even the CFMEU to a certain extent.
25 Thanks to Peter Botsman, Wyndam’s proposal is now available online at http://www.workingpapers.com.au/publishedpapers/2895.html.
89
The miners don’t really (have state branches). NTEU is another
example. Then you have unions, which are still federations of state
unions. HSU, a federation of a lot of people who previously didn’t talk to
each other and often still don’t. There are a couple of unions in the
middle like the Miscos26 the metal workers. -‐ Current affiliated union
official 5
One former official of an affiliated union pointed to the difficulties that could arise
for national officials in unions with state-‐based power centres, combined with
rigid state-‐based factionalism:
I wouldn’t join a faction27. I didn’t join the right or the left not because I
was an incredibly clever independent who wanted to voice my own
views it was because my NSW branch was right wing and my Victorian
branch was left-‐wing and I knew I had to get on with both of them and
if I joined either faction I was stuffed in terms of being able to run the
bloody show so I chose to stay out -‐ Former affiliated union official 1
Persistent differences between state labor movements reflect economics, history
and culture. At the time of Federation, the political development and electoral
success of the State Labor parties varied greatly (Archer 2007:86). In addition,
Rawson (1954:40) has argued that there was no formal contact between the
labour parties in the various colonies prior to Federation. Political labour leagues,
forerunners of the ALP, were well established in some states. Although,
Bongiorno (Bongiorno 2001:14) has argued that with the exception of NSW,
“party organisation was decidedly loose” until late in the 1890s, and Markey
(1988:2) has argued that only NSW and Queensland had produced independent
labour parties prior to 1900. Party development could depend on specific
economic factors. For instance, Bongiorno (2008:3) has argued that the
26 LHMU (the Miscos) is now called UnitedVoice 27 Interviewee is referring to the 1990s
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development of a labour party in Victoria was hindered by the absence of a large
shearing workforce during the 1890s.
In Queensland, 16 endorsed Labor candidates were elected in 1893, a surprisingly
good outcome but well short of a majority. Even more startling, the newly formed
NSW ALP won 35 seats, and the balance of power, in the lower house in 1891. In
Victoria, on the other hand, as in New Zealand, efforts to establish a durable Labor
presence in politics had been less successful, partly because of the existence of a
liberal alternative, which competed successfully for the working class vote (Ellem
and Franks 2008). It was only in 1902 that the Victorian Labor Party established
an identity completely separate from the liberal party (Rickard 1984:124).
Differences in economic structures in the various states, and a tendency for
federal ALP MPs to promote state, rather than national, economic interests in the
federal caucus contributed to the ALP’s major split over economic policy during
the Great Depression in 1931 (Denning 1982).
The table at Appendix 2 is an updated and extended version of a figure included in
Warhurst and Parkin (2000:23 figure 2.1). It shows distinctive patterns, i.e.
significant and sustained variations from the overall national vote, in the
performance in different states in federal elections for the House of
Representatives. While too much shouldn’t be made of these variations, it does
point to the persistence of state-‐based political cultures in Australia. For instance,
the splits in the Victorian and Queensland branches of the ALP, compared to the
situation in NSW, during the 1950s, had a lasting impact on the ALP’s vote in
those states in Federal elections.
When the FPLP met for the first time (May 1901), there was no national union
movement. The union movement lacked a national peak organisation until the
creation of the ACTU in 1927. Markey (2008) has argued that the LCNSW was the
“single most important force” in establishing the ACTU, and that the significance
of the LCNSW owes much to the special relationship between it and the NSW ALP,
Labor’s most electorally successful state branch. Even after the creation of the
ACTU, most unions remained state-‐based with many national unions exhibiting
91
the same loose federal structures as the ALP itself (Ellem and Franks 2008).
Originally established as a compromise alternative to the One Big Union (OBU)
push by the AWU (Bowden 2011:62, 64) and the LCNSW (Markey 2004:64), the
ACTU itself was narrowly based for the first four decades. The AWU, Australia’s
most important union in political terms during the first quarter of the 20th
century, didn’t join the ACTU until 1967 (Bramble 2008:53). The AWU had its
own relationship with the ALP. Even today, the AWU can be seen as a bit apart
from the rest of the union movement, one interviewee described the AWU as
being “as much a faction as it is a union” (Current affiliated union official 3)28. The
AWU’s early prominence outside the major cities was of great significance for the
ALP (Ellem and Franks 2008). For instance, many of the seats won by Labor in
1891 in NSW were outside Sydney (Markey 1988). The AWU, however, was far
more important in Queensland than in NSW (Markey 2008). In the ALP’s early
years, the AWU virtually controlled it in regional areas (Bowden 2011:61). When
Curtin moved to WA in 1917, the AWU had virtual control of the WA ALP, due to a
soaring regional population (Day 2006:309). In addition, the ACTU was focused
on blue-‐collar workers until the Council of Australian Government Employees
Organisation (CAGEO) and the Australian Council of Salaried and Professional
Associations (ACSPA) were brought into the fold during the ACTU presidency of
Bob Hawke, 1969 – 81 (Bramble 2008:57, Markey 2004:68).
Crisp (1978) discussed the repeated efforts by sections of the labour movement
during the 1920s to find a way to create formal relationships between the
national ALP and national union movement; first, by fusing ALP and union
organisations at the national level (replicating an existing situation in WA) and
second through a committee of federal MPs and union officials. All these efforts
met with disinterest and opposition from the state parties, particularly NSW,
which resolutely resisted any diminution in its power (Rawson 1954:53).
28 In 2010, Michael Borowick became the first AWU official elected to a full-‐time position at the ACTU, as Assistant Secretary (Lawrence 2011).
92
Eventually, in the 1930s a forerunner of the Australian Labor Advisory Committee
(ALAC) was established29. It was largely ignored during the Curtin and Chifley
Governments. ALAC was used extensively as a formal consultative body during
the Accord period and included senior representation from the FPLP, ALP
organisation and the ACTU. ALAC was in place during the Whitlam Government,
but was no more effective than during the subsequent Rudd Government. Two
recent ALP National Reviews (2002, 2010) have called for better use to be made
of ALAC as a mechanism for communication and consultation between the ACTU
and the ALP.
To some extent, personal relationships between federal ALP MPs and unions filled
the gap left by the absence of formal unions-‐party links at the national level. For
instance, with the exception of Higgins, a non-‐ALP member, all but two members
of Watson’s ministry in 1904, Labor’s first at the national level, had been a trade
union official (McMullin 2004:27). Most of the early leaders of the federal ALP
(Watson, Fisher, Tudor, Charlton, Scullin, Chifley30) followed this traditional path
of shop floor to elected trade union official to Labor parliamentarian. Hughes led
the Waterside Workers Federation (WWF) while he was in parliament. In fact in
1914, Hughes was both president of the WWF and the Commonwealth Attorney-‐
General. He was later expelled from the union for his support for conscription in
1916 (Rimmer 2004: 281 -‐ 3). Chifley, like future NSW Premier J. J. Cahill, had
been involved in the 1917 rail strike, one of the most bitter in Australia’s history.
Some combined union and (small scale) business backgrounds, so it would be a
mistake to suggest that their life experience was confined to manual (blue collar)
labour and trade unionism. Fisher was a mining union official (in his native
Ayshire, Scotland as later in Queensland) but had also been a mine owner, albeit
on a small scale (Day 2008), and similarly Scullin was a small shopkeeper, and
later a newspaper editor, as well as an organiser with the AWU (Robertson 1974).
29 ALAC was originally known as the Federal Labor Advisory Committee (FLAC). 30 Curtin was a proud member of the Australian Journalists Association (AJA) who worked on union newspapers, notably for the AWU in WA (Day 2008)
93
Nor did they all come to parliament after long first careers ‘on the tools’, Curtin
spent his whole life in the labour movement, finding continuous employment in it
from the age of 26 and repeatedly seeking entry into federal parliament (Edwards
2005:14).
The role of personal relationships in filling the gap left by the absence of a more
direct, institutional link at the national level reached its apotheosis during his
career of R.J.L. Hawke, who built strong relations between the national union
movement and the national ALP centred on himself. Hawke was both ACTU and
national ALP president from 1973 to 1978, the first person to hold both positions
simultaneously (or at all). During the Accord period, this personal basis for the
ALP-‐ACTU relationship also rested heavily on the involvement of Ralph Willis, an
ACTU researcher and later Industrial Relations minister and Treasurer during the
Hawke-‐Keating period, Bill Kelty (ACTU secretary), Simon Crean (ACTU president
and later a minister in the Hawke and Keating governments) and Paul Keating
(Treasurer and then Prime Minister), among others (Manning 2000).
The personal closeness of the ACTU-‐ALP relationship did not outlast Hawke’s
prime ministership for long. Although then ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty and new
Prime Minister Paul Keating had a close relationship, the Keating Government’s
industrial relations reforms were greeted by the ACTU with great hostility.
Keating’s industrial relations Minister, Laurie Brereton was heckled at the 1993
ACTU Congress, despite Kelty’s efforts to mute the response (Bramble 2008: 172).
When he became prime minister, Keating considered industrial relations reform
as the weak link in his overall project of restructuring and modernising the
Australian economy (Edwards 1996).
Weakly institutionalised political parties find it difficult to constrain the
autonomy of their parliamentary representation and the federal ALP was notable
for the degree of autonomy of its federal parliamentarians. As Rawson
(1954:383) argued, the most important group of Labor politicians in Australia
continued to be “the least subject to party control”.
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4. Union movement structure
Structure has been a lasting challenge for the Australian union movement.
Federalism added to the complexity of this challenge. The ACTU was created in
1927 to give a national voice to the union movement and to help co-‐ordinate it.
Although the ACTU’s origins owed much to the One Big Union (OBU) movement,
and its constitution favoured a move to industrial unionism, the union
movement’s structure remained highly fragmented until recently. Like the ALP
itself, it’s structure mirrored federalism, with state peak union councils becoming
state branches of the ACTU with power of veto over ACTU congress decisions
until 1947 and majority representation on the ACTU executive until 1957
(Markey 1995). At the same time, the union movement in Australia was
characterised by a large number of small craft-‐based unions, frequently state-‐
based, although power in the union movement has increasingly resided with a far
smaller number of larger national unions (Briggs 2002). Unionism in Australia
emerged quickly and consolidated early into a structure characterised by high
numbers of craft and occupational unions (Briggs 2002:81), not unlike the British
unions on which they were modeled, and often institutionally-‐linked as colonial
branch offices. After federation, power tended to remain with pre-‐existing state
unions (Ellem and Frank 2008), rather than in national unions. Markey (1995)
notes that the NSW industrial arbitration system replicated the federal system in
many ways (basic wage cases, test cases on working conditions) and covered
more NSW workers up until the 1990s.
A long period of gradual development of the national union body followed its
belated formation in 1927. Some scholars have argued that the ACTU did not
exercise significant authority over the national trade union movement until the
Accord period (Briggs 2002:78, Muir and Peetz, 2010). Before the Accord,
comparative studies of union centralisation usually ranked Australia in the
bottom-‐third of advanced capitalist economies (Briggs 2002:79). Even during the
Accord period, the ACTU still did not acquire mechanisms of internal authority
such as control over strike funds and the advanced constitutional powers found in
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a few West European movements. The LCNSW, on the other hand, had much
greater control over industrial disputes (Markey 1995). As Briggs (2002:78) has
argued, the internal weakness of the ACTU and the long periods of non-‐Labor
Commonwealth governments translated into low levels of political influence for
the peak union organisation. Markey (1995) also points out that the special
nature of the relationship between the LCNSW and the NSW ALP was significant
in shaping the importance of the LCNSW, including in comparison to the ACTU.
The Australian constitution gave the federal government the power to undertake
“conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial
disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State” (Section 51 xxxv.) This
power underpinned the creation of the Conciliation and Arbitration system in
1904. In 1913, the Fisher ALP Government sought to extend that power to enable
the federal government to make laws in respect of industrial matters (Day 2008,
Patmore and Coates 2005). The referendum was defeated by a small margin
nationally, and by larger margins in NSW and Victoria. Queensland was the state
that most favoured the proposition (54 per cent in favour). More recently, these
limited constitutional powers forced the Howard Government to use the
corporations’ power as the basis for its WorkChoices legislation31. Both sides of
national politics now favour a national system32 and have pursued it through the
mechanism of states referring their industrial relations powers to the
Commonwealth. In 1996, Victoria referred its power to the Commonwealth under
the Kennett Liberal Government (1992 – 99), and it was not reversed during the
subsequent Bracks and Brumby ALP Governments (1999 – 2011). Western
Australia remains opposed to referral. All other states had referred their powers
prior to the commencement of the Fair Work Act on 1 January 2010.
The introduction of the Conciliation and Arbitration system in 1905, following
passing of legislation by the Deakin Government with ALP support in the previous
year, was followed by a strong growth in union membership. In 1901, by one
31 WorkChoices was the name given to legislation introduced by the Howard Government in 2005, the corporations power allowed the legislation to cover workplaces and not just the resolution of industrial disputes over more than one state. 32 A national system has been called the lasting legacy of Workchoices (Wilkinson et. al. 2009:367).
96
account, there were just 100,000 trade union members in a workforce of 1.5
million, a density of less than 10 per cent (Turner 1979: 7). By another account,
union density went from 6.1 per cent in 1901 to 51.6 per cent in 1921, due in no
small part to the advantages that arbitration conferred on trade unions (Rimmer
2004: 278). The causes for this rapid growth in union membership are still a
matter of dispute. In the past, arbitration itself was commonly seen as the cause
(Rimmer 2004: 278). More recent research has pointed to the impact of a sharp
upswing in employment opportunities and the organising efforts of revitalised
peak union bodies as probable causes (Bowden 2011:59).
One impact of the federal and state arbitration systems, along with the continuing
power of state peak union bodies, may have been to discourage moves towards
industrial unionism and to preserve the craft union structure. This fragmentation
remained until the amalgamation (or union rationalisation) process of the 1990s
(Buchanan 2003). The union amalgamation process was driven by the ACTU33
and encouraged by the federal Labor government, including through legislation
and a funding program (Buchanan 2003:55-‐56). It changed union structures
substantially. The number of national unions fell from 134 to 52 in the first half of
the 1990s. By the middle of that decade, 98 per cent of the members of ACTU
affiliates were members of the largest twenty unions (Buchanan 2003, Ellem and
Franks 2008: 47). More dramatically, power in the ACTU is now concentrated in
an even smaller number of unions. One interviewee outlined the concentration of
power in the contemporary ACTU, it is an account that emphasises the role of a
small group of large unions, many the product of amalgamation, and downplays
the role of smaller unions, omitting altogether any reference to state peak union
organisations. It also points to a continuing awareness of factional allegiances
and the preservation of a factional balance:
Within the movement there are two layers. There is basically a
leadership group, essentially nine people, the four big right wing
unions, the four big left-‐wing unions and Jeff (Lawrence, ACTU
33 In key ACTU documents like “Future Strategies” and “Australia Reconstructed” included the message that unions must amalgamate to survive and thrive (Buchanan 2003:55).
97
Secretary). The union movement today is highly centralised in about 8
unions back in the Accord days there was a plethora of unions who
were all quite powerful and influential. The 8 key unions today are in
the right: the AWU, the SDA, the TWU and the NUW. In the left it is the
AEU, CFMEU, the AMWU and the Miscos. The other unions are mostly
small and don’t matter as much. – Current affiliated union official 2
Over the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, the ACTU became more
representative of the national trade union movement. The AWU joined the ACTU
in 1967. New ACTU President, Bob Hawke, drove a process, which saw peak
bodies representing professional and public sector unions merged with the ACTU
in the 1970s and early 1980s (Ellem and Franks 2008: 57). The ACTU executive
was restructured in the 1950s to create equal representation between officials
elected from the state peak union bodies (TLCs) and the industry groupings
dominated by the big national unions (Hagan 1981:244-‐50), in an effort to
overcome long-‐standing tensions between craft (often focused on state peak
bodies) and general unions (often with a national focus), and balance the power
of state peak union bodies with the entry of representatives from large national
general unions
Nevertheless, the TLCs continued to exert influence, and the LCNSW (now
UnionsNSW) in particular was at times an important source of resistance to ACTU
authority (Markey 1994). UnionsNSW also ran a semi-‐separate YR@W campaign
to the ACTU (Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan 2008). In the 1970s, the powerful
metals unions also continued to resist the ACTU’s expanding role. Even during
the Accord period the state union organisations in NSW (1991, 1993) and Victoria
(1988) made (failed) efforts to exert their authority against the ACTU (Briggs
2002: 83). One interviewee recalled these tensions:
There was always this tension between Kelty and the (NSW) Labor
Council, because they could see that the national focus would not be
good for them. Mind you I’ve always felt that the difference between
NSW and Victoria is that in Victoria the extreme left Trotskyists and
Greens have always been seen as a legitimate part of the trade union
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movement whereas in NSW no one has ever considered them to be a
legitimate part of the trade union movement. -‐ Current affiliated union
official 5
Notwithstanding some ongoing and episodic tensions, the ACTU by the early
1980s had become, given its far from propitious start, a far more cohesive and
authorative organisation. Despite important changes in union structure, and the
growing importance of the national peak union organisation, ALP affiliation
remained a matter for state branches of unions. The growth of the ACTU
provided a platform for a stronger relationship, though a weakly institutionalised
one, between the national union movement and the FPLP, but it did little to
disturb the traditional relationships between unions and the ALP inside the party
organisation.
5. Sectarianism, ideological conflict and factionalism
Among social democratic unions-‐party relationships, Australia is notable for the
intensity and regularity of its sectarian and ideological conflicts (Ellem and
Franks 2008:46). Through the formation of a rigid factional system, intense
sectarianism and ideological conflict gave a distinct shape and form to the internal
organisation of the Australian labour movement. It can be seen as something
close to an internalised version of the contestatory type identified by Valenzuela
(1992) where unions and parties form relationships along sectarian and
ideological lines. Sectarian and ideological conflict was fundamental in the
Australian labour movement, and solidified as a contest for the very nature of the
ALP: was it to be a socialist party or a catholic social justice party? The contest,
especially in the 1950s, threatened the viability of the ALP and shaped the
relationship of individual unions with the party.
Several interviewees made the point that this rigid factionalism of the past, based
on sharp sectarian and ideological differences, was important to understanding
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the relationship between unions and the ALP:
Sectarianism was a huge thing in the trade union movement but it gets
completely written out of the histories. – Current affiliated union
official 5
When you talk to overseas parliamentary delegations about this
country I talk about the importance of religion historically, which a lot
of people in Europe don’t understand, the Catholic, protestant element.
– Current federal MP 2
Australia never had a full-‐blown contestatory model, although in the immediate
post war period with the creation of the Democratic Labour Party (DLP) there
were according to Bob Hawke (1994) some moves to establish a right-‐wing
Catholic peak union organisation to rival the ACTU, Hawke also says that the long-‐
term Secretary at the ACTU, Harold Souter34, fought off a number of attempts to
split from right and left wing unions (Hawke 1994). Nevertheless, many of the
battles fought out internally in the labour movement from the 1920s to the 1960s
replicated the ideological and religious struggles that split labour movements in
many European countries. Until recently, then, the ALP could be viewed as a
federation of two parties. The Left was largely protestant and socialist in
orientation. The right was largely catholic and conservative in economic and
social policy orientation. According to one interviewee (Current affiliated union
official 5): “Even up until the 1980s the Left was more protestant than catholic,
that’s changed. The Left is now as likely to be catholic as protestant.” The factions
shared a belief in collective action in the workplace, but often little else.
Moreover, the organisational structures of factions became formalised to an
unusual extent. One interviewee outlined the well-‐known ‘parties within a party’
structure produced by rigid factionalism:
The Left and the Right of the ALP have identical structures. They are
structures that people I have met from the Canadian New Democratic
Party, and also the British Labour Party, when I describe our structures
34 Harold Souter was ACTU Secretary 1957-‐1977.
100
they say that is a party within a party in their terms. New Zealand
Labour Party people have the same response when I describe it to
them. So you have a left faction and a right faction with exactly the
same structure they have a left executive and a right executive of their
faction. The ratio of union nominated people to SEA (branch) people is
the same and those unions are institutionally represented in not only
the formal structures of the party but in the factional structures of the
party. And that extends to the national left meeting and the national
right meeting. – Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Sectarianism was a factor in the ALP’s early splits. Some protestants, but by no
means all (Smith 2010), were less likely to accept the collective discipline of
caucus and the pledge favoured by unions as effective methods for controlling
ALP MPs. While Presbyterian Andrew Fisher stayed to lead the ALP to one of its
best ever electoral wins in 2010, Joseph Cook left the ALP in 1891, soon after his
election to the NSW Parliament, because he viewed the amended pledge as too
constricting. Cook went on to represent the Free Trade group in federal
parliament, before leading it into the Fusion and becoming the Australian Liberal
Party’s Prime Minister in 1913. Australian Catholics were overwhelmingly of Irish
descent and sectarianism became embroiled in the Irish Question (i.e. Home Rule
and the 1916 Easter uprising). Sectarianism became a dispute between the Irish
and the British in the ALP. Again, Protestants were more likely to leave. About
half of the ALP’s first FPLP ended up on the conservative side of politics, almost all
of them protestants, including the legendary W. G. Spence founder of the
Australian Shearers Union (ASU) and the AWU. ALP Prime Minister William
Hughes, who left the FPLP and was subsequently expelled by the NSW ALP,
apparently believed at the time that he could win the second referendum on
conscription for overseas service if the English could resolve the “Irish Question”
(O’Malley 2002). These early splits changed the composition of the ALP. Labor
became a disproportionately catholic party. In 1913, the number of catholics in
the NSW Labor caucus, for instance, roughly corresponded to their numbers in
the working classes, after the conscription split, half the NSW caucus was catholic,
by 1921 it had risen to 61 per cent (Kingston 2006:133).
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Ideological disputes inside the ALP intensified after the conscription split. They
posed a challenge to the early autonomy of the FPLP and its policy moderation. A
serious challenge to the position of the ALP, as the working class party, emerged,
particularly in the union movement, with the greater radicalization inside unions
after the first world war, which included the creation of the Communist Party of
Australia in 1921 (Day 2006:299), and fostered the ALP’s adoption of the
socialisation objective (Day 2006:299-‐300). The first world war, the rail strike of
1917 and the departure of many of the ALP’s best parliamentary leaders all
helped to generate a more radical union movement, unimpressed by the
achievements of early federal and state governments and eager to try and use the
various parliaments to legislate for socialism (Hagan 1991 and Turner 1979). In
NSW, the Labor Council was led by a prominent communist, Jock Garden, (Markey
2004:64-‐65) who hoped to convert NSW to ‘the socialisation of industry with
workers’ control’ (Kingston 2006:126-‐7). The NSW ALP, in the 1920s and 30s,
was also left wing dominated, allegedly with communist influence. Until they
were banned from doing so, communists were active in the ALP during the 1920s.
Many CPA members and members of other militant groups believed they had a
duty to get inside the ALP and expose the failings of its ‘reactionary leadership’
(Fred Patterson in 1924 quoted by Fitzgerald 1997:37). Although of little
electoral significance, the communists and their support grew to a point where
they almost won control of the ACTU in the late 1940s (Bowden 2011:65, Bramble
2008). After the Second World War, the CPA, like communist parties elsewhere,
saw social democratic parties like the ALP as “bitter enemies” (Bramble 2008:11).
The New South Wales Labor Party was split from the ALP from 1931 to 1936
(Rydon 1988:163) because the state party attempted to control members of the
federal parliament and force them to abide by state party policy (Rydon
1988:160). Left-‐wing control was ended by federal intervention in 1940 (Rydon
1988:164). The defeat of the left in NSW led to the moderation and pragmatism
of the McKell leadership (1939 – 47), still held by many in the NSW party to be the
template for electoral success (Cavalier 2010), and built on a close relationship
between the LCNSW and the ALP organisation and its parliamentary party
(Patmore and Coates 2005). The template involves a compromise between
parliamentarians and the organisational party (Rawson 1954:393).
102
The rise of both Catholicism and communism, during the inter-‐war period, as
sources of alternate ideological visions for the ALP, became combustible in the
Cold War and resulted in the Great Split federally, as well as related splits in
Victoria and Queensland, which led to the creation of a Democratic Labor Party
(Rydon 1988:164), commonly believed to have kept the national ALP out of office
for a generation (Maddox 2011), at a time when social democratic parties were
enjoying unparalleled success across the Western world. A catholic organisation
led by B. A. Santamaria, apparently, prompted by the anti-‐clericalism of the
republican side in the Spanish Civil War (Costar and Strangio 2004:262) sought to
rid the Australian labour movement of communist influence and promote ideas of
catholic social justice (Costar, Love, Strangio 2005:5-‐6), by using the Stalinist
tactics of their opponents. Meanwhile, the Left believed that Santamaria wanted
to turn the ALP into a “right-‐wing Christian farmer-‐worker party” (Bowden
2011:65, Bramble 2008:13).
The 1955 Split35 not only kept the ALP out of office federally for a long period, it
also solidified a factional pattern that reflected the ongoing sectarian and
ideological conflict inside the labour movement. The catholic right was in control
of the NSW branch and in Victoria, as Hawke recalled (1994), the right departed
leaving the left in control. In the 1980s, the NSW faction became the core of the
ALP’s national right faction and the Victorian branch became the core of the
party’s left faction (Jones 2011).
The sectarian and ideological battles have moderated to a significant extent, but
they are not without their contemporary relevance. One interviewee, who saw
the contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship in highly positive terms, because of its
ideological moderation and the capacity of unions and the party to pursue joint
political objectives, argued that success in the ideological battles of the 1940s and
1950s was critical:
I think it (the closeness of the unions-‐ALP relationship) is because we
beat the comms. If the comms had won in the unions then it would be a
35 Warhurst (1979) pointed to evidence that suggests that catholic voters had started to leave the ALP before the Split, particularly at the 1949 election
103
very different thing. It would be just like the UK. I think the reality is
those guys in the 40s and 50s that fought so hard against the comms
are essentially the only reason that we have this relationship. If the
comms had got the majority I think it would be a very different
relationship today. I think that’s the kind of key ingredient. -‐ Current
affiliated union official 2
A quirk of the decline of the blue-‐collar unions affiliated to the ALP was that the
catholic conservative led SDA, mainly covering retail workers, quickly became the
largest affiliated union (Catley 2005:103), although relatively large with 230,000
members (according to the SDA website36) its coverage of the retail workforce is
low. Bowden (2011:70) said that the retailing workforce was one million
employees, and the unionisation density is just 15 per cent, a large discrepancy
but the point is the same; the SDA is large because it’s industry is large, not
because it is doing a lot better at recruiting and retaining members. Its leadership
has remained constant for over 30 years, and it has more former officials in the
federal caucus than any other union, and twice as many as the ACTU.
6. Conclusion
Three critical factors shaped the development of the national unions-‐ALP
relationship. These factors fragmented the relationship to an extent that was
unusual in comparison to other social democratic type relationships and
particularly in relation to Valenzuela’s ideal social democratic type of a national
relationship between a national party and a national union movement. In terms
of Panebianco’s party institutionalisation much of this can be said to have
occurred at the factional level. Elements of the Australian relationship,
particularly federalism, and affiliation patterns at the federal level, are more in
keeping with Valenzuela’s pressure group type. When it did emerge as an
effective national body, the ACTU had an historic and institutional independence
from the national ALP, which was also unusual in a social democratic relationship.
36 SDA – Shop, Distributive and Allied Industries -‐ http://www.sda.org.au/about.php?p=about_us -‐ accessed on 4 October 2011
CHAPTER 5: TWO RELATIONSHIPS
1. Introduction
Does a paradox between dependence and independence now shape the national
unions-‐ALP relationship? Significant fragmentation in the relationship, in
particular from federalism, created sufficient space for the simultaneous existence
of two forms of the relationship. The next chapter examines union revitalisation,
which is the major reason for the emergence of a second form of the national
unions-‐ALP relationship. This chapter examines opinions found in the interviews
that might point to the existence of two forms of the relationship. The first form
of the relationship is the traditional social democratic type based on affiliation in
which unions are largely dependent on the ALP, and the exercise of labour rights,
for achieving political objectives. The second form of the relationship emphasises
the political independence of the ACTU and its affiliates; and, a far greater reliance
on political activities that utilise citizen rights, particularly campaigning. The co-‐
existence of these two relationship types, reliant on different repertoires of
contention, has become more problematic as the first relationship type recedes in
efficacy, because of the decline in the ALP’s blue-‐collar union base, and the second
grows in importance as unions employ revitalisation strategies to stabilise and
rebuild their membership bases. In addition, both unions and the ALP have
recognised that the old, dependent form of the relationship is increasingly out of
favour with union members and voters. In response, both sides are stressing their
political independence in public .
This chapter begins the case study of the contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship
with an analysis of general interviewee attitudes to the relationship using the
independence and dependence dichotomy; the differences between affiliated and
non-‐affiliated unions; and, differences between union officials and their members.
105
2. A question of balance
The need for a balance between independence and dependence in the unions-‐ALP
relationship was a key theme in the interviews conducted for this study. The
balance is between a public portrayal of independence and a private recognition
of dependence. This concern with balance is revealed in the use of phrases like
“close, but not too close”. The balance problem is manifested in public distancing
strategies (particularly by the ALP); concerns about over-‐reliance of the union
movement on the ALP in Government; decisions by unions to support the ALP at
election time; concerns about unions campaigning against the ALP; and, the
attitudes of union members to the political alignment of affiliated unions.
Officials from affiliated unions reported more concern with the question of
balance than officials from non-‐affiliated unions. There are also differences
between union officials and union members, with members generally placing a far
greater emphasis on the need for independence than officials, again especially in
the case of affiliated unions. Indeed, the comments made by union officials in
these interviews about the attitudes of their members towards the ALP, and its
relationship with unions, suggest that apathy, ambivalence or hostility are the
main attitudes of many union members towards ALP affiliation. From this we
might infer that this question of balance is primarily a concern of officials from
affiliated unions, though it has implications for the unions-‐ALP relationship more
broadly.
Interviewees used a variety of terms to capture the sense of balance. One
interviewee (Current federal MP 1) referred to this mutuality as “distant
dependence”, an intriguing phase and perhaps another way of suggesting “close,
but not too close”, while conveying a sense of the decline in the integration and
intimacy of the relationship between unions and the ALP. One official from an
affiliated union talked about achieving this balance between independence and
dependence through the “maturity” of the elite leadership involved:
We talk, we get on, we deal, but we have independence and I think
that’s crucial. – Current affiliated union official 2
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At one level, achieving the right balance between independence and dependence
is seen as a marketing, or brand positioning, issue, at a time when there is
considerable scepticism among key audiences about the continuing value of a
dependency relationship. As one interviewee put it:
The key is that there is a mutual self-‐interest in maintaining ties but
also a mutual self-‐interest in downplaying those ties publicly. -‐ Current
peak union official 4.
Even occasional public conflict between unions and the ALP can be seen to have a
positive side in terms of highlighting, or marketing, the extent of independence in
the relationship: “It probably doesn’t do either side any harm to be seen to
disagree” (Current federal MP 5). Although some interviewees viewed this idea
as a bit too cynical, because public disagreements are hard to manufacture and
difficult to control, and others believed that tensions were good for the
relationship in their own right, regardless of how they might influence union
member and voter perceptions: “There’s always going to be tensions and I think
the differences are part of the strength of the Labor Party not a weakness”
(Current federal MP 1).
One characteristic of a dependent relationship in an era of considerable
scepticism is that affiliated unions not only have an incentive to market their own
independence, they also have an interest in encouraging the perception that the
ALP in fact enjoys a significant degree of independence from its affiliated unions.
This opinion is, of course, a concession that a dependent relationship is an
electoral problem for the ALP:
It (the union’s relationship with the ALP) is never as strong as you want
it. And sometimes you don’t want it as strong as you actually want it.
Because otherwise you don’t remain in government, you have to have a
balance. – Current affiliated union official 4
Public distancing is a key strategy used by ALP leaders to emphasise the party’s
independence from unions. Some union interviewees were cynical, or realistic,
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about the difference in the ALP leadership’s attitudes to unions in public and in
private. Again, there is a strong sense in which the issue of an appropriate
balance between independence and dependence is seen in marketing terms by
both sides of the relationship:
I think Gillard and Rudd have run very careful lines, when they speak
privately to the unions they are all very effusive and thankful but when
they are in public they don’t even want to use the word union. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
Rudd’s been nervous about being seen to be too close to unions. I know
that there are some people (from the union movement) who have said
to Kevin at various times it’s OK to use the U-‐word sometimes, it’s not a
bad thing. And I think he has been advised that way, I don’t think it is
something that he arrived at naturally or deliberately. More recently,
people have said to him it’s OK to publicly say that it is good to be in a
union. That’s not going to lead to the re-‐establishment of the Berlin
wall. – Current affiliated union official 1
Unsurprisingly, creating an appropriate environment, which allows both sides to
position themselves as largely independent of the other to their various
constituencies and from within which both sides can secure the full benefits of a
dependent relationship brings risks with it. These risks go beyond public
perceptions and extend into the roles of unions, and the risks of excessive
dependence on the ALP to deliver union objectives. One interviewee from the
parliamentary side of the relationship argued that the Hawke and Keating
Governments had done too much for unions, and that unions had become too
dependent on the ALP:
The relationship is a genuine double-‐edged sword and of genuine
advantage and possible disadvantage to both sides. When Labor is in
Government it can legislate a union agenda. But as we found in the
dying days of the Keating Government, we had legislated and we had
ALACed so much of the agenda that pretty soon unions weren’t fighting
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for themselves and pretty soon the role of government had taken over
roles that unions ought better have done and I think that weakened
unions. Maximising the advantages and minimising the risks requires
careful management of the relationship. -‐ Current federal MP 4
A major indicator of the relationship paradox, the difficulty involved in being
dependent and independent at the same time, can be seen in attitudes to the issue
of public campaigning by unions, a key part of social movement (including
community and coalition) unionism, when that campaigning is at odds with the
interests of the ALP. This problem is not so much in evidence when the ALP is out
of office, but when it is in government it is a different matter. Although some
interviewees saw some conflict as beneficial in terms of positioning both sides as
independent, it is clear that the ALP can be very hostile to union criticism of it
when the party is in government. Given that many senior officials of affiliated
unions are involved in the ALP at senior levels it can be difficult to even envisage
where the line between union stops and party starts:
The unions and the (party) organisation are for just about all intents
and purposes, one and the same. I actually don’t see much
differentiation between the (party) organisation and the unions. -‐
Current affiliated union official 2.
Consequently, this interviewee (current affiliated union official 2) viewed the
prospect of campaigning against an ALP Government as a bridge too far: “I
couldn’t even contemplate doing that (campaigning against a Labor
Government)”. It should be pointed out that this official, who has been openly
critical of some actions of ALP Governments, was referring specifically to
campaigning, particularly in an election context, rather than voicing criticisms of
particular ALP government decisions. Nevertheless, this attitude suggests that
union dependence constrains the extent of union independence.
The occasions when affiliated unions do campaign against the ALP are rare, and
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usually notorious, the CFMEU’s support for John Howard’s Tasmanian forestry
policy in the last week of the 2004 election37 being a notable example. One
interviewee, an MP, used this example to stress that despite the dependence in
the relationship, unions will ultimately support their members’ interests rather
than further the ALP’s electoral prospects if there is a conflict between the two:
The Timberworkers supported Howard in 2004 because Latham didn’t
offer a good deal for their members; you can’t blame them for that. And
I’ve heard that Latham was warned at the (ALP) National Executive that
that would happen -‐ Current federal MP 6.
Although affiliated unions are likely to support the ALP, in all but exceptional
circumstances, several interviewees argued that the level of support would
fluctuate. One interviewee put it in overall terms suggesting that levels of union
support would fluctuate from election to election depending on the state of the
relationship between unions and the ALP at the time:
I don’t believe you will ever see in the foreseeable future a situation
where the unions in Australia would campaign against the Labor Party,
what you might however see is various degrees of enthusiasm with
which they campaign for the Labor Party – Current peak union official 1
Another interviewee, however, suggested that union support for the ALP might
also become more candidate specific, a development that would bring the
national unions-‐ALP relationship more in line with the approach of unions to
electoral politics in Valenzuela’s pressure group model:
That’s going to be a real challenge for the union movement in the
future. If the separation (between unions and the ALP) kind of
solidifies then you maybe will see in the future rather than the union
movement holus bolus supporting the ALP maybe channeling their
37 see for instance news report at http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1214506.htm
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efforts into those candidates who actually do have a genuine
commitment (to unions and their policy objectives) -‐ Current federal
MP 3
The tentative, and highly qualified, nature of these comments points us to the
conclusion that the idea of the union movement not supporting the ALP, either by
being less enthusiastic or by targeting individual candidates, in future elections is
still pretty much ‘unthinkable’.
Interviewees from affiliated unions were generally of the view that the benefits
from internal influence through affiliation outweighed any restraint on their
capacity to campaign independently of the ALP. Interviewees from non-‐affiliated
unions, however, were often more sceptical of the value of “restraint and reliance
on quiet influence”, to use Tattersall’s description (2010:176). One interviewee
from a non-‐affiliated union suggested that affiliation did not always provide the
benefits that the ALP claims:
It is put to us that if we were affiliated we’d get much more done, we’d
be able to make those same phone calls ourselves and get things fixed
up. But, I don’t think that’s necessarily true. In NSW, unions that aren’t
affiliated have, I suspect, done better out of the Labor Government –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Officials from non-‐affiliated unions tended to be more critical of the performance
of the Rudd Government on industrial relations, expressing a greater
disappointment that specific commitments were not met. One interviewee
related with some bitterness the way in which he believed that a deal between
unions and the then ALP Opposition had not been honoured after the 2007
election:
Gillard says they will implement everything they promised but I was
certainly at meetings where we were told by various senior ALP
officials in the federal parliamentary labor party that they couldn’t
disclose all they were going to do in the lead up to the election because
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it would be used against them and just provide comfort to Howard and
so on, but rest assured it’ll all be fixed up and that of course hasn’t
happened, hasn’t happened at all and now we’re treated to Julia Gillard
saying when she is attacked over Fair Work Australia that they must
have it right because both employers and unions are complaining. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Another official from a different non-‐affiliated union also suggested that the ALP
was more responsive to unions in Opposition:
I think you get better access when they’re in Opposition. They listen
when they’re looking for friends. When they’re in government it is a
little bit different, as you’d expect they have then got resources and
they’ve got different advisers and different levels of responsibility but
clearly they’re much more friendly when they are in opposition. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
Although, interviewees from non-‐affiliated unions reported a greater willingness
to engage in public campaigning even when it has a negative electoral impact on
the ALP, their lack of affiliation with the ALP did not mean that they were exempt
from pressure to behave as if they were affiliated and avoid campaigning that
might help Labor’s opponents:
It’s harder for someone to ring us up and say don’t do it (campaign).
Though it happens I must say. We get phone calls from politicians
saying how could you do that you’re going to provide comfort to the
coalition. I had one of those towards the end of last year. But you’re not
compromised by those personal relationships (involved in affiliation). –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
As well as campaigning, officials from non-‐affiliated unions were more likely to
stress the need to engage with both sides of politics. Partly, this is because the big
non-‐affiliated unions tend to consist of professional workers in publicly funded
organisations, much more directly affected by government policies and decisions
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than traditional blue-‐collar unionists in the private sector:
I think it would be harder for affiliated unions to front up and run
campaigns as we do or to have discussions with the Liberals certainly
before the election outcome is known. Labor people would see it as
betrayal. Labor has this absolute expectation that unions will fall in line
when it comes to the polling booth and that they will get out there. But
you’ve got to work with whoever is in government. If you don’t engage,
if you don’t put your point of view forward then the Liberal Party will
just go ahead and believe what they get told by some others. So you
have got to engage with both sides. – Current non-‐affiliated union
official 2
The interviews suggest that union members are far less supportive of the ALP,
and the unions-‐ALP relationship, than their officials38. All unions appear to have a
substantial number of members, including delegates, who are not committed ALP
voters, and, indeed, may even be activists in non-‐ALP parties. This is hardly
surprising given the weakening of party loyalties in recent decades, which
contributed to the ALP’s loss of office in 1996 when “less than half of blue collar
workers voted Labor” (Smith 2010:505), apparently for the first time since the
1930s (Catley 2005:101). Judging from the interviews, most unions contain
active members, including delegates and officials, who are members of all other
major parties: Liberals, Nationals and Greens. This leads union officials in
affiliated unions to play down the institutional link with the ALP or to try and
position it as yet another opportunity to influence political outcomes. It also
makes the nature of the unions-‐ALP link problematic and perhaps only viable as a
link between union officials who are committed Labor supporters and the ALP:
One of the issues the Labor Party has needed to face up to for a long-‐
time is that we really don’t have trade unionists affiliated to the Labor
Party; we have trade union officials affiliated to the Labor Party. It
38 Though, of course, this is based on the views of officials about their membership and their understandings may not always be accurate.
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makes no difference to the life of any member that their union is
affiliated and they get no say what their union does inside the ALP. No
matter what the pretence is, the (ALP conference) delegation is made
up of anyone the Secretary says and they all vote the same way. As if
the members have only one view. Not all shop assistants are against
abortion. Not all metalworkers are against privatisation, I went to a
well-‐organised metal workers shop floor in Hobart and the delegate
told me he was opposed to the gun laws and said “I’m not going to vote
for that John Howard again”. He obviously voted for him in 1996. –
Current federal MP 7
The interview transcripts reveal a great deal of awareness and sensitivity on the
part of senior union officials to the diverse party allegiances of their
memberships:
We know that a majority of our members voted for John Howard in
2004. – Current affiliated union official 1
Fifty per cent of our members including delegates and whatever are
Liberals. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
Our members in regional areas often support the National Party. –
Current affiliated union official 5
Several interviewees commented on the misunderstandings widely held about
union membership and voting patterns, and the political misjudgments that can
result:
Howard and co, particularly Minchin39, were on a course. They
attached union membership to ALP support. But as you know there are
a lot of militant unionists who don’t vote labor and never will. Truck
drivers, I know heaps of them, they were in an income bracket where
39 A Liberal Senator for SA, Minchin was Finance Minister and Senate Government Leader in the Howard Government during the WorkChoices era, he is widely believed in the union movement to have been a hard-‐liner on industrial relations.
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they liked having the Liberals in power because the taxes were lower.
But it never stopped them going on strike when they thought their
interests were threatened. – Current federal MP 5
(Howard) made those Liberals who are unionists make a choice about
something really close to home, their job, what they were going to take
home to feed the family with. When it comes down to whose interest
are we playing in, you can be an idealist about entrepreneurship and
individuality and so forth but if someone is going to take the bread off
your table then they’re the enemy. – Current non-‐affiliated official 2
While the ALP remains the most important political party for unions, there has
always been competition from minor parties. The position of the Greens today is
seen by some as a corollary to the parties on the left of the ALP that have always
operated within unions:
We forget that traditionally just because you’re union doesn’t mean
you’re pro-‐Labor. Like in the sixties and the fifties you had the
socialists, the communists a whole lot of people. – Current federal MP 6
Faced with this diversity of party allegiances among their memberships, affiliated
union officials appear to adopt one of two strategies. One strategy involves
treating affiliation as a fact of life that the union membership does not care about.
One current senior official reported that his members did not care about his
union’s relationship with the ALP. This interviewee advanced three reasons for
this disinterest. First, there are different attitudes to politics in unions that are
affiliated with the ALP and those that are not affiliated. The interviewee
suggested that affiliation is just seen as a fact of life in blue-‐collar unions, an
historical reality. Whereas in professional and white collar unions there has been
a long tradition of political independence. Second, most people are members of
unions in order to secure job-‐related benefits not because of broader political
concerns and objectives. Third, a large minority of union members is capable of
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reconciling their union membership with their support for the Liberal party:
I don’t think members really give a fuck. I don’t think my members
would care either way but it’s about the culture of unions. In other
unions it might be different. In professional unions, it is a very clear
issue in public service unions and in professional unions. Blue-‐collar
unions like mine, a lot of the political work we do they just don’t care.
They like it, but they are not engaged with it. They care about job
security, wages, superannuation, and overtime allowances. They’re in
the union for these reasons. They’re not in the union for politics; we’ve
always had a high proportion of the membership that votes Liberal, to
me that’s the evidence that the members actually don’t care that much
about our political objectives, there certainly is a pocket that does. But
the fact is that we’ve always had 30 to 40 percent of our members that
vote Liberal but are still members. They know that we are part of the
ALP, we helped to found the ALP, but that they’re still members is
testament to the fact that they think oh well who cares. – Current
affiliated union official 2
The second strategy that can be adopted is to try and educate union members
about the benefits of affiliation and to position it as just another way of securing
desired political outcomes:
We make it clear, that whichever way you vote this (ALP affiliation) is
another leverage point for what you stand for, especially in terms of
your employment which is pretty fundamental to you. -‐ Current
affiliated union official 4
This educative approach relies on positioning the union as politically
independent, even if it is ALP affiliated:
They (the members) also know that we deal with conservative
politicians as well. They know that we won’t not make a deal with a
conservative government because they are conservative. We’re not
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worried about giving them a leg up because the ALP won’t like it. It is a
political question about how you deliver an outcome. – Current
affiliated union official 4
One union official, however, argued that when an ALP government is deeply
unpopular, unions do not even try to sell the benefits of affiliation to their
members:
One senior official of a right-‐wing union, also in the ALP, says he just
mutters when members ask him whether the union is affiliated to the
ALP and tries to change the subject. Recently, the NSW Treasurer,40
who wanted a wage freeze agreement, told a meeting of union officials
down here that when they got re-‐elected next year they would look
after us, people were rolling around on the floor of course. He was left
in no doubt that the ALP government was so on the nose that even if we
wanted to we couldn’t go out there and sell it. You couldn’t sell an
Accord idea the relationship was such that it would just cause damage,
it wasn’t just the left-‐wing unions, the right-‐wing unions were also
saying that they couldn’t sell it to their members. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 3
Union interviewees from non-‐affiliated unions were more likely to report that
their members expected them to be independent of the ALP, and consequently
non-‐partisan and non-‐active in electoral politics. The members’ desire for
independence resulted in clear distancing strategies by the officials of non-‐
affiliated unions:
You have to be careful because we don’t want people to think we are
just an ALP union -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
The members are very tough when the union is seen to be backing
Labor in. – Current peak union official 4
40 The interviewee is referring to Eric Roozendaal who was Treasurer in the NSW Rees and Keneally Governments from 2008 to 2011.
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Officials from non-‐affiliated unions also had to justify political campaigns to a
sceptical membership. One official from a non-‐affiliated union spoke of the initial
resistance to political activity among his union membership, and of their eventual
politicisation by a significant anti-‐WorkChoices campaign:
That criticism was strong when we were running that campaign
because people couldn’t see the absolute necessity for us to get
involved in politics in order to preserve their rights so we had to do a
lot of education of members around why it was critical to be politically
active. A lot of members and a lot of people in the community are not
sophisticated in how they reason through why you might want to run a
campaign that is going to be seen as supporting one party against
another. I think that since the rights at work campaign though there is
a better understanding that you do need to engage in politics otherwise
you get left with decisions made by politicians who you’ve brushed
over and allowed to be elected when they’ve got an agenda that is going
to hurt you individually so I think YR@W politicised people and
members in particular our members. – Current non-‐affiliated union
official 2
Despite the apparently widespread concern with demonstrating independence
publicly, some interviewees still saw the link as an electoral positive for the ALP:
I think it influences a lot of working people to support the Labor Party.
If you look at new Labor, and the position new Labor is in in the UK,
where they can’t mobilise their base and they are seen to have not
delivered on many things, I don’t think the New Labor approach has
delivered for Labor and we shouldn’t adopt the New Labor approach
(in Australia) -‐ Current federal MP 1
These interviews are characterised by a confidence that any contradiction
between independence and dependence can be managed by getting the balance
right, and through a range of tactics to deal with union member scepticism about
the value of a close relationship with the ALP. Yet, they also demonstrate that the
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relationship between unions and the ALP has become more complex, and that
beyond officials from affiliated unions there is little confidence in the value of
being close to the ALP or that the benefits of the relationship are worth
relinquishing independence.
3. Three perspectives
This section continues to explore the growing complexity of attitudes in the
labour movement towards the national unions-‐ALP relationship. In particular it
explores the ways in which reactions to the perceived problems of the Accord
(essentially, the negative impacts of being ‘too close’) and the ACTU’s adoption of
revitalisation strategies and tactics are re-‐shaping attitudes and expectations
around the unions-‐ALP relationship.
Three broad perspectives about the national unions-‐ALP relationship are
identified and analysed in the table below. The interviews were semi-‐structured
so the questions did not follow a uniform script. The first question (see Appendix
1) sought general thoughts about the state of the relationship today. Most
interviewees gave extended responses to this first question, and many returned,
or were guided back to it, later in the interviews. Consequently, the database for
classifying interviewees as positive, negative or ‘about the same’ was more than
adequate. Interviewees with the first perspective, ‘positive’, believed, sometimes
strongly, that the right balance between independence and dependence had been
achieved or would be achieved in the near future. Interviewees with the second
perspective, negative, argued that the Accord period was the highpoint in the
unions-‐ALP relationship and they argued that the relationship was being
devalued and coming apart rather than modernising or evolving. The third group
‘about the same’ hold that the relationship has always been characterised by
tension and conflict, which ebbs and flows depending on the issues of the day and
the personalities involved at the time.
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Table 10: Overall attitudes to relationship
Number of interviewees
Indicative comments
Positive 16 Not too close, both sides can act independently
Relationship has adapted to new political circumstances
Unions have helped the ALP to modernise
Negative 4 Accord was high point in relationship
ACTU had a place at the Cabinet table during Accord, now they have to lobby like other interest groups
Often viewed as a separation or divorce
Party sees unions as a problem to be managed
About the same
4 Ebb and flow, ups and downs
Tensions are normal, they have always been there
Tensions often due to personality issues
MPs and unions have different issues and different constituencies
The quotes set out below provide more detailed examples of the typical views in
each grouping:
From the positive grouping: We actually have a far closer relationship
than most people give us credit for. Unions provide the stability in
Australia to have serious party reform. Unions ironically are the block
of modernising right-‐wingers that ensure the party can transform and
modernise. In the UK the unions are the block to that. If I had been in
the UK I would have supported what Tony Blair did, in terms of
weakening union influence in the party, because unions made the party
unelectable generally. That is not the case in Australia. – Current
affiliated union official 2
From the negative grouping: It’s like the divorce is starting to happen.
The separation is occurring it is not a marriage of the industrial and
political wings anymore. – Current federal MP 3
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It does seem to be on a moving footway to further separation. The
Labor Party is now led by people who are largely not former trade
union officials. So within the government there isn’t the sense of a
place the trade union movement could occupy in a reformist
government. – Former affiliated union official 1
From the ‘about the same’ grouping: I think the relationship at the
present time is as distant as I have seen it in my 25 years as a union
official. Some of the key players don’t have a lot of union history … the
prime minister (Rudd) doesn’t understand the union culture and
doesn’t understand the labor culture and the union culture within the
labor movement. That’s part of the issue. You could argue that that has
been the case from time to time over the last 100 years. – Current peak
union official 3.
Should the ‘about the same’ grouping be considered, on the whole, to be positive
or negative about the relationship? The four interviewees in the ‘about the same’
group pointed to a continuity of conflict and tension in the relationship between
unions and the ALP throughout its history. This meant that they saw the current
level of fragmentation as neither new nor necessarily permanent. These
interviewees recognised that there were considerable tensions in the
relationship, but tended to see these in an historical context of a relationship that
has always had tensions. Some of these interviewees also saw the tensions as
contributing to a healthy relationship. Interviewees in this group also tended to
stress the role of personality in the relationship as an, at least partial, explanation
of these ups and downs. Some pointed to the then Prime Minister Rudd as being
uninterested, or even hostile to unions. Implied, however, in the view of the
‘about same’ group is a sense of return to a closer relationship in the medium to
longer term.
The interviewees in the ‘about the same’ grouping do not fit automatically with
the positive grouping because they tend to see the relationship as going through
one of its low points with more than the usual degree of tension. On the other
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hand, they do not fit automatically with the negative grouping either because
their emphasis on the ebb and flow that has always, in their view, characterised
the relationship suggests that they expect that it will get better. In addition, they
do not voice the sense of adaptation in the relationship that underpins the views
of the positive grouping, nor do they subscribe to the idea that the relationship is
coming apart which motivates much of the sentiment of interviewees in the
negative grouping.
On balance, I suggest that the ‘about the same’ grouping is closer to the positive
grouping than the negative grouping because both groupings see the unions-‐ALP
relationship continuing and, indeed, improving in the future. They accept a higher
degree of distance in the contemporary relationship as an acceptable, temporary
or, even, positive development in the relationship.
Therefore, just 4 of the 24 interviewees could be said to be pessimistic about the
future of the relationship. This group saw greater distance, or fragmentation, in
negative, even hostile, terms. The ‘negative’ group commonly believed that the
Accord period was the pinnacle for the national unions-‐ALP relations and were
more likely to believe that the ALP would prefer not to have formal links with
unions because senior figures in the party perceived the links with unions as
being either neutral or negative in electoral terms. Current peak union official 1,
for instance, said that the ALP takes a ‘damage control’ approach to its links with
unions. Several interviewees in this category also believed that unions were not
making a significant contribution in policy terms and tended to be seen by the
ALP as narrowly focused advocates for their members as employees. Former
affiliated union official 1 described this as the ‘defender’ role, forced upon the
union movement by rapid membership decline and the hostile environment of the
Howard years. These interviewees see the greater level of fragmentation in the
contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship as a source of decline and as a threat to its
sustainability. There is no sense of a positive adaptation to new circumstances in
this group.
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4. Current and former union officials
There were sharp differences in attitudes to the contemporary unions-‐ALP
relationship between interviewees who were current union officials and those
who were former officials, or who had never been union officials. This difference
suggests that the contemporary relationship is meeting the expectations of
current officials, and that those expectations have changed, probably significantly,
since the Accord era.
The table on the next page (‘Relationship outcomes for unions’) looks at the three
groupings (positive, negative and same), identified in the previous section, in
terms of the biographical backgrounds of the interviewees concerned. The most
important biographical distinction is between current union officials and those
who were either former union officials or who had never been union officials.
Contemporary involvement in the relationship as a senior union official is
strongly correlated with overall satisfaction with the unions-‐ALP relationship.
The most likely cause of this sharp difference in attitude is change in union
leadership and agenda since the Accord period. That is, current officials view the
contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship, with its balance between independence
and dependence, as more consistent with the ACTU’s promotion of union
revitalisation strategies than the previous social democratic style relationship
under the Accord. The evolution in the thinking of the union leadership and its
impact on how it has affected attitudes towards the unions-‐ALP relationship was
put succinctly by a current national union official with several decades of
experience at senior levels in the union movement and the ALP:
There are people who went into parliament including former ACTU
officials, at the 1996 election or before, and a number who went in
between 1996 and 2004 who might have risen to senior positions as
union officials. They don’t really have much of an understanding of the
union agenda as it is now. Their mentality about how they think we
should do things is a bit like the mentality of the Accord, and they don’t
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really understand how unions have changed and this whole
campaigning and organising agenda stuff that really came to the
forefront from 2000 on. – Current peak union official 2
This distinction between current and former union officials was a better predictor
of attitudes about the relationship than whether or not the official was from an
affiliated or non-‐affiliated union. This suggests that both affiliated and non-‐
affiliated unions have embraced the ACTU’s revitalisation agenda and that the
experience of being a union official during the union density declines of the 1990s
and the Howard Government’s hostile reforms has reshaped union attitudes and
expectations about the unions-‐ALP relationship.
Overall, interviewees saw the contemporary relationship as positive for unions,
especially by current officials. Former officials, on the other hand, viewed the
relationship as either negative or about the same. The negativity flows from a
belief that the Accord was the high point in the union movement’s relationship
with the ALP.
Table 11: Relationship outcomes for unions
Positive Negative Same
Current union 11 1 2
Former union 0 3 2
Never union 2 0 3
TOTAL 13 4 7
The next table reports on the views of current officials. All six officials with
affiliated unions were positive about the relationship outcomes for unions, and 3
of 4 officials with peak union organisations were positive, the fourth was neutral.
Just one official, from a non-‐affiliated union, was negative about the capacity of
the relationship to deliver for unions.
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Table 12: Union satisfaction: current officials
Positive Negative Same
Affiliated 6 0 0
Non-affiliated 2 1 1
Peak 3 0 1
TOTAL 11 1 2
The interviews strongly suggest that the expectations of current union officials
about outcomes from the relationship are being met. Part of the reason for that
result is that current officials have a more modest, or circumscribed, view about
what the relationship can deliver. Former officials have higher expectations,
especially around union participation in, and influence on, government policy-‐
making processes. These higher expectations result from their experience of the
Accord or, some in today’s union leadership would say, their nostalgia about it.
5. Social partner versus pressure group
In essence, we’re another pressure group, a large and influential one,
but another pressure group. We never would have been described as
that a generation ago. -‐ Current peak union official 1
Social partner status is associated with social democratic types (strong and weak)
of unions-‐party relationships, and, therefore relatively low levels of fragmentation
in the relationship and higher levels of dependence. Pressure group status is
exemplified by the relationship between unions and the Democratic Party in the
USA, and therefore relatively higher levels of fragmentation, and higher levels of
independence. If the unions-‐ALP relationship has been transitioning away from
the social democratic type to the pressure group type, we would expect to find
perceptions of union status that reflect this greater degree of perceived
fragmentation.
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The next table classifies interviewees according to whether they perceive unions
as social partners with the ALP, as pressure groups, or as a mixture of both. With
only a few exceptions, interviewees did not use terminology like ‘social partner’
or ‘pressure group’ unless prompted to do so by the question. Interviewees were
capable, and willing, to frame answers using those terms when prompted to do so.
In addition, interviewees often responded by using arguments and language that
clearly placed them in the ‘social partner’ or ‘pressure group’ category. Social
partner responses emphasised the party identity the ALP draws from its union
affiliates and the connection with ‘working people and their issues’ that affiliation
provides. Social partner responses also emphasised party traditions and tended
to perceive deep organisational links between the ALP and affiliated unions.
Pressure group responses tended to emphasise the size and resources of unions,
their capacity to mobilise and other attributes of interest groups. Pressure group
responses also tended to position unions as similar to other important interest
groups particularly those representing business interests. Pressure group
responses suggest a greater sense that the organisational links between the ALP
and affiliated unions, at an FPLP level, are relatively thin. Eight interviewees gave
answers that suggested they held to some amalgam of the social partner or
pressure group types, or that they did not distinguish sharply between the two. A
typical response in the ‘both’ category was to emphasise that affiliated unions
provided the ALP with its identity as a party concerned with ‘working people and
their issues’, but also to stress the importance of the union movement as
Australia’s largest and best organised interest group. Their responses suggested
that these attributes were of equal importance and that neither attribute on its
own would be enough to justify an affiliated relationship with unions. Nearly half,
ten, of the interviewees clearly saw unions as social partners. Six interviewees
saw the unions as pressure groups in their relationships with the ALP. Current
union officials were evenly distributed between social partner (5), pressure group
(4) and both (5), an outcome that might suggest some transition in the way
unions themselves view their relationships with the ALP.
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Table 13: Relationship status and union connection
Social partner Pressure Group Both
Current union 5 4 5
Former union 1 2 2
Never union 4 0 1
TOTAL 10 6 8
Unfortunately, I do not have any earlier data from which a trend might be
inferred. The results are, however, consistent with the high levels of satisfaction
with the contemporary unions-‐ALP expressed by many interviewees. They are
also consistent with the results reported in section 2 above which found that
current union officials are the most likely to be satisfied with the contemporary
relationship. The fact that more than half of the interviewees viewed unions as
pressure groups, or part pressure groups and part social partner, is also
suggestive of greater fragmentation in the relationship. On the other hand, the
fact that nearly half the interviewees still see unions as social partners with the
ALP suggests that the relationship is still widely perceived as retaining its social
democratic closeness, another indication of the belief that the balance between
dependence and independence, between internal and external lobbying, is and
can work.
Interviewees who saw unions as social partners argued that affiliation raised the
status of unions and privileged them against non-‐affiliated unions and other like-‐
minded community organisations. One interviewee said:
Affiliation is still important for a number of reasons and I just think
that affiliation and credibility go hand in hand. Affiliation means that
unions are more than just a pressure group. – Current federal MP 5
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At the same time, some interviewees saw affiliation as fundamental to the identity
of the ALP:
The important thing is that we still know ourselves as a labour
movement and I think we must keep the unique and defining
characteristic of having unions affiliated to the Labor Party and
therefore having a direct say in our affairs and I don’t think we should
be afraid of that relationship. – Current federal MP 4
Interviewees who viewed unions as pressure groups in the relationship did so for
either positive or negative reasons. On the positive side, some interviewees
emphasised the size and effectiveness of unions as pressure groups. As well as
nearly 2 million members, the union movement can also draw on 2,000 full-‐time
officials and over 100,000 workplace delegates (Davis 2009a), making it the
largest advocacy group in Australia (Muir 2008). Descriptors like pressure group
and interest group carry pejorative connotations inside the labour movement.
While interviewees rarely described the union movement as a pressure group,
many spoke of it in terms of its size, resources and campaigning capacities. That
is, as if unions were pressure groups. These interviewees still wanted to maintain
the internal role of unions in the ALP, or at least not challenge it further, on the
basis of the size and power of unions, not their status as a social partner. For
instance, (emphasis added):
The union movement is still the dominant non-‐government
organisation in Australia. Close to 2 million members, people making a
deliberate decision to make a financial commitment to a collective
organisation. It cannot be ignored. – Current federal MP 1
They are still the biggest interest group in the country. I suppose you
could say that if they had 4 million of them, twice as many, they’d have
twice as much money and twice as many people to mobilise but it’s
certainly not proportional, it’s marginal. Of the big groups there is
probably no-one who can mobilise their membership as effectively
as the unions. – Current federal MP 7
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On the negative side, some interviewees pointed to the decline in union
membership and density as an indicator that unions could no longer claim to
speak on behalf of a broader working class. For instance (emphasis added):
Penetration rates in the private sector are so low that you could
probably put forward a supposition that sometimes unions aren’t
representative of the working class. The brutal reality is that when I
first started out in this game I think union density was 53 per cent,
sorry 57 per cent. It is now less than 20 per cent. So the union
movement doesn’t have the same capacity to speak on behalf of
working Australians. Current peak union official 1
Now we’re dealing with a very different situation as regards to their
membership even if they aspire to have those kinds of (Accord)
relationships. – Current federal MP 2
I think the overall decline in density in the private sector feeds into the
argument about why should they (unions) have a special place in
terms of influencing policy outcomes when they’re in decline. I get
a sense that the prime minister (Rudd) would see the ACTU no
differently to say the AIG or the BCA41 as another group that he has to
interface with and listen to and respond to but they’re not central to the
project as they were a decade or two ago. – Current federal MP 3
It is interesting to note the emphasis on union density in the private sector in
these comments. Of course, density has declined more sharply in the private
sector so it is a starker statistic, but the ALP’s union affiliates are also
concentrated in the private sector making the density declines in that sector a
bigger issue for party affiliation than it is in terms of a relationship with a broader
union movement.
41 The two most important business groups, Business Council Australia (BCA) represents Australia’s 100 biggest companies, it was established during the Accord period as a counter to the influence of the ACTU. The Australian Industry Group (AIG) is a peak organisation for many business organisations representing small to medium enterprises. It claims on its website (http://www.aigroup.com.au/aboutus accessed 6 June 2012) to represent 60,000 businesses that employ a total of more than one million people across much of the private sector economy.
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While the overall picture to emerge is one of continuity when it comes to the
status of unions in the relationship with the ALP, there are also clear signs of
fluidity and a relationship in transition. There is also a strong, if smaller, theme of
negativity that emphasises the status of unions as having diminished from social
partners to pressure groups.
6. Union status and attitudes
For a decade or more, the ACTU has been promoting an agenda of union
revitalisation designed to re-‐invigorate unions and rebuild membership through a
process of union democratisation and a greater focus on campaigning. The table
below identifies interviewees as being positive, negative or ambivalent about this
agenda. There is a strong positive correlation between interviewees who
supported this contemporary ACTU agenda and those who held positive views
about the unions-‐ALP relationship. Current union officials are overwhelmingly
positive about the contemporary union agenda. Only one of the 14 current union
officials interviewed for this project was negative. That interviewee was one of
two interviewees who had held a senior union position during the Accord period,
the other was strongly positive about the contemporary ACTU agenda. Two
interviewees in the current union official category were generally more sceptical
about the applicability of US-‐inspired strategies than their colleagues, but
nevertheless supportive of the ACTU’s agenda. In a mirror image, only one of the
“former and never” union official grouping held a positive attitude to the
contemporary ACTU agenda. Some of these were not closely familiar with it;
others saw it as inferior to the Accord approach.
Five, of fourteen, current union officials, however, saw no conflict between their
endorsement of the contemporary union agenda and the idea of unions as a social
partner with the ALP. This suggests that they do not see the far greater use of
external lobbying by unions as either a result of a diminished union status in the
unions-‐ALP relationship or necessarily inconsistent with the maintenance of a
social partner status more usually associated with social democratic
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relationships. In addition, current union officials who did see unions in terms of
pressure groups did not view this development as negative, they simply saw a
greater need for unions to be independent of the ALP. On the other hand, use of
the term pressure group (or more commonly interest group) by interviewees in
the “former and never” category almost always carried a negative connotation.
Table 14: Current officials: status and satisfaction
Positive Negative Neutral
Social democratic 5 0 0
Pressure group 3 1 1
Mixed 3 0 1
Totals 11 1 2
The existence of a strong correlation between support for the ACTU’s
contemporary agenda and satisfaction with the unions-‐ALP relationship suggests
that the union leadership believes that the unions-‐ALP relationship has been able
to adapt, or accommodate, a changed ACTU political agenda without causing
disruption to the smooth functioning of the unions-‐ALP relationship.
7. Conclusion
The interviews conducted for this thesis provide some evidence that the broader
unions-‐ALP relationship has become a mix of traditional social democratic and
emerging pressure group type relationships. Current union officials are generally
positive about this mix; they believe that it is possible to maintain a balance
between the dependence and independence that characterise these two types of
unions-‐party relationships. This balance also reflects a belief that the ACTU’s
union revitalisation strategies can be smoothly incorporated into the traditional
unions-‐ALP relationship.
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CHAPTER 6: UNION REVITALISATION
1. Introduction
We want unions to continue to talk to their members about politics and
to have a political engagement and have an activist political strategy. –
Current peak union official 2
An unusual degree of fragmentation in the national unions-‐ALP relationship
created the relationship space for the emergence of a second, more independent,
form of the relationship. Union revitalisation provided the proximate cause for
the emergence of that second form of the relationship. A focus on increasing
membership was seen by the ACTU as the way to boost the union movement’s
revenue and its political resources. Union revitalisation is aimed at stablising
union membership and reversing a long period of decline in union densities.
Revitalisation is important for the unions-‐ALP relationship because it requires the
emergence of a more activist style of unionism; it means a more politically
independent unionism that is capable of winning public support for its policy
positions and using that support to secure government, and other political,
support for its policy objectives. Union revitalisation, consequently, involves a
diminished reliance on two traditional major support structures of the past, that
is, arbitration and internal influence on the ALP.
The ACTU made a fundamental change in its political engagement strategy while
the national ALP was in opposition, 1996 – 2007, resulting in a far greater
emphasis on external lobbying. The ACTU was motivated initially, in the late
1990s, to adopt the organising (or campaigning) model as a means to recruiting
and retaining members, rather than improving its influence with the ALP. The
ACTU’s new strategy was influenced, in particular, by the success of the Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) (McNeil 2007, Nissen 2009, Simmons and
Harding 2009) in the US. The SEIU, and six other unions that broke away from the
AFL-‐CIO in 2005 to form the Change to win (CTW) grouping had spent more than
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$US1 billion on organising in the decade after 1996, and the SEIU alone is
currently budgeting to spend $US250 million a year, far more than any other
union in the USA (McNeil 2007:75). The SEIU recruited a million new members
during that period (McNeil 2007:72). There are many versions of what union
renewal and revitalisation might mean (Hickey, Kuruvilla, and Lakhani 2010), but
the ACTU had one over-‐riding goal: membership increases. The ACTU framed the
problem in terms of the precipitous decline in membership in the 1990s, and
envisaged union renewal strategies as a means to the end of improving
membership numbers, rather than as an end in itself.
The ACTU drew on the ideas that inform the theories of social, coalition and
community unionism; ideas that were popular in third world countries where
unionism lacked the support of at least one major political party, but had become
increasingly relevant to union movements throughout the Western world during
the neo-‐liberal era (Simmons and Harding 2010, Tattersall 2010). These theories
of social, community and coalition unionism are linked to Valenzuela’s pressure
group model through their common reliance on campaigning. External lobbying
(including campaigning) is the tactic used by a union movement in a pressure
group relationship with an aligned political party, or by a union movement in a
social democratic relationship that has been weakened and unions believe they
can no longer rely on internal party influence to secure political objectives.
After the 2004 election, when the Howard Government secured control of the
Senate, the ACTU used its YR@W campaign against WorkChoices to secure better
policy outcomes from the ALP by demonstrating the extent of public support for a
rejection of key elements of the Howard Government’s industrial relations
reforms. The campaigning approach at the centre of YR@W was also seen, by
some in the union movement, as a way of re-‐engaging with union members and
addressing the widespread belief in the union movement that membership
decline was hastened in the 1990s by a perception that the union movement,
through the Accord, was too close to an ALP government, particularly one that
had become electorally unpopular following the onset of a deep recession in the
early 1990s, and too ‘tops down’ in its internal processes.
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The YR@W campaign was strongly supported across the union movement. There
is evidence, however, that large sections of the union leadership remain sceptical
about the longer-‐term applicability of these US-‐inspired models of unionism to
Australian conditions. This scepticism raises doubts about the ACTU’s capacity to
maintain its independent political strategy. Scepticism about union revitalisation
and YR@W echoes views about the Accord period, with some interviewees
already positioning YR@W as a ‘one-‐off’. Moreover, interviewees had a strong
tendency toward opportunistic views of the unions-‐ALP relationship. The
relationship is often treated as if it offers a range of options, with some options
more suited to some political situations than others. In addition, interviewees
expressed views that suggested they were comfortable with a mix and match
approach, to the relationship, switching between social democratic and pressure
group types as the situation demands.
2. Revitalisation
Starting in the 1990s, stemming and reversing the decline in union membership
became a strategic priority for the ACTU and its affiliates. Two major papers
Unions@Work (ACTU 1999) and Future Strategies (ACTU 2003) placed member
recruitment at the centre of efforts to respond to a political and economic context
that discouraged unionism. In the past, Australian unions had tended to rely
heavily on arbitration and the ALP to ensure their status and power (Rimmer
2004). Legal provisions that favoured union membership, and industrial action,
had been swept away by the Howard Government’s Workplace Relations Act in
1996. The Act also set out to encourage individual bargaining, prohibit pattern
bargaining and enforce the Liberal Party’s version of “freedom of association”
(effectively a measure to discourage union preference).
Many union workplaces were unprepared for the move to enterprise bargaining
that started under the Keating Government, and was given even greater emphasis
by the Howard Government. Consequently, the membership losses of the 1990s
were concentrated in the workplaces with inactive union presences (Muir and
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Peetz 2010:217). By the end of the twentieth century, the scale of the task facing
the Australian union movement on membership was daunting: “in order to
maintain current membership levels unions must collectively recruit 285,000
members each year. In order to sustain union density at the current level of 28 per
cent, unions must collectively recruit 348,000 members each year. And in order
to achieve an increase of only 1 per cent in density, to 29 per cent, at least 420,000
new members are needed. That is, to grow, our recruitment must be doubled”
(italics in the original, ACTU 1999:26).
The main response42 of the ACTU to the decline in membership was to champion
the organising model43 (Muir and Peetz 2010:218-‐219, Peetz, Pocock and
Houghton 2007:153-‐155). This model requires unions to focus on recruitment,
including through the dedication of a far greater share of their resources to the
task. It also involves the use of techniques that improve the experience of
membership through engagement in policy-‐development and campaigns. As one
interviewee (Current affiliated union official 5) put it: “members, paradoxically,
are more committed to the union when they feel they have helped us than the
other way around”.
The organising model was a move away from a previous emphasis on providing
services to members; the servicing model, introduced by the ACTU following the
collapse of centralised wage-‐fixing, was thought to have failed to attract and
engage members (Briggs 2004:252); according to the Unions@Work document
(ACTU 1999):
Campaigns based on the issues of concern to workers are the
mechanism for recruiting, organising and generating membership
involvement in unions. People become involved in unions because of
the industrial, political and social issues that unions promote, making
campaigns about issues that are relevant to employees the essential
tool in workplace recruiting and organising.
42 Union amalgamation was adopted before the organising model and their implementation overlapped see pp 96-‐97 above. 43 The success or otherwise of the organising model is outside of the scope of this thesis and is difficult to assess, see for instance Bowden 2011:72.
135
One interviewee with considerable experience in union campaigning pointed to
the way it is transforming some unions, turning them from traditional trade
unions into modern unions with a strong political campaigning capacity, and
providing additional incentives for members and potential members:
At a time when there is a much more of a contest to get union members
it actually gives union members an instrumental reason to join the
union. It’s almost like unions are becoming a model of political action
committees as well as being traditional trade unions. So you find a lot
of the unions now have a defined campaign fund for political
campaigning. The Victorian teachers have it, the NSW Nurses have it. -‐
Current peak union official 4
The ACTU argued that this approach was now common among successful unions
in a range of countries including Canada, the US and UK. Yet, it is the SEIU in the
USA that shines through ACTU documentation of the period as a particularly
important exemplar. For instance, in Future Strategies (2003: 46) the ACTU
reported:
The (SEIU) in the US has 1.5 million members and has grown by
535,000 new members since 1996. It is now the largest union in the US
and the fastest growing union in the world. (It) committs 50% of its
recurrent budget to new member organisinig initiatives. President
Andrew Stern nominates this hard-‐headed commitment to new
member organising as the single most important factor in the union’s
growth and success.
A senior union official, who has been directly involved in the process of learning
from the SEIU experience, argued that the appeal of the US, and the SEIU, to
Australian unions was the success that some American unions have had in
growing membership in a hostile environment. Some unions in the US had been
successful in recruiting and retaining members with far less access to labour
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rights, and far less support from an aligned political party, than their Australian
counterparts:
I looked at the area where it’s the hardest for a union to thrive, the US44.
If a union can survive and prosper in the US and I think the best unions
in the US have been and I think they have done a whole range of good
things. – Current peak union official 2
A major part of the SEIU’s success is said to be the engagement of members
directly in political campaigns, something that was of particular interest to many
senior Australian union officials, and became a feature of the grassroots
component of the YR@W campaign:
Prior to the 2004 (Australian) election I was part of an ACTU delegation
to the US during the presidential election. I spent two weeks in the USA
and among the things that I saw there was the way some American
unions including the SEIU engaged their members in politics from some
direct action on some issues through to forming a relationship around
attitudes and opinions that could lead to an informed conversation with
members well prior to ballot day. – Current affiliated union official 1
From the start of this revitalisation effort, the ACTU has tried to locate the
political independence of union revitalisation inside a continuing relationship
with the ALP. Greg Combet’s arrival at the top of the ACTU leadership was
accompanied by a concerted push towards revitalisation (Peetz and Bailey
2010:9). Combet used his first speech to an ACTU Congress as Secretary (Combet
2000) to position union revitalisation as the next phase of the relationship, one
that succeeded the corporatism of the Accord. In his analysis, Combet argued that
the unions-‐ALP relationship had been through many phases over the past
century, the Accord period was just one of them. In the quote below, Combet
44 Interestingly, closer to home in NZ, where the use of labour rights has also been curtailed, the UNITE union has had considerable success in recruiting members with imaginative campaigns (Dow and Lafferty 2007:567 fn45).
137
suggests that the Accord relationship was only a small part of the long national
unions-‐ALP relationship, and by implication, perhaps something of an exceptional
period and not typical of the relationship overall:
Too often the (unions-‐ALP) relationship is seen in the narrow terms of
the Accord. That period is over.
Combet then went onto point to a new relationship, one better suited “for the
times” (Combet 2000). The Future Strategies document (ACTU 2003:12) also
portrayed the Accord as good for the times, but now that the (political, economic
and social) times had changed so must the unions’ approach to exercising political
influence:
The Accord enabled direct union input into policy issues confronting
the nation – it was a vehicle for wider social, political and economic
activity of unions. But times have changed. Unions have had to rethink
their approach as a result of economic, political and major industrial
relations changes.
Combet, like other ACTU leaders in recent years (Kearney 2011, Lawrence 2011)
put independence at the top of the unions’ list of priorities for the next phase of
the relationship:
First and foremost, unions will be a strong, independent voice for
working people. This may lead to some differences with Labor at times.
Combet, in effect, envisaged a fairly limited form of independence for the union
movement. Combet’s version of independence was constrained because the
union movement needs the ALP in government.
This quote from Combet neatly sums up the tension between the two types of
unions-‐ALP relationship. Combet (2000) argues for independence, but also
emphasises the union movement’s continuing dependence on the ALP for
securing union political objectives:
Our relationship with Labor will also involve many shared
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commitments to improve living standards and the quality of working
life. For those commitments to be fully activated Labor must be in
government. We must not lose sight of this.
Combet (2001) underscored this continuing dependence by championing the
social democratic type of the relationship. Despite the need for an independent
union movement, and the declining blue-‐collar component of the union
movement, Combet continued to position affiliation between some unions and the
ALP as a strength, and advantage, for the union movement overall:
Those in the labour movement who argue that the Labor-‐union
relationship should be jettisoned altogether should consider the issues
very carefully indeed. They should look to build on the strengths of the
relationship, rather than condemn it for its weaknesses.
The current ACTU president, Ged Kearney, has continued with the task of locating
the union movement’s formal links with the ALP in the context of a more
independent union movement. In an opinion piece she wrote titled “An
independent union voice”, Kearney (2010) highlighted the continuing tension
between the dependency of the ALP relationship and the union movement’s
broader desire to be politically independent. Kearney sought to resolve this
tension by arguing that it is not important to union members and by relying on
the familiar notion of a balance between dependence and independence:
Traditionally, the main vehicle for promoting workers’ rights in the
political sphere has been through influencing the processes and
structures of the ALP. … It is the right course for an independent union
movement to take a mature approach to its relationship with the party
it founded. But at the end of the day, … it is really a second order issue
to our members. After all, some unions have always steadfastly refused
to affiliate to any political party. Others have formed alliances with
parties other than Labor over their history. What matters to workers
and what they want is strong representation by unions and good
outcomes, and that will only be achieved by balancing political
relationships with a strong independent voice.
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Consistent with the expansionary and inclusive approach contained in union
revitalisation strategies, Combet (2003) also sought to establish the union
movement’s independence on a basis of values that could be shared with political
parties other than the ALP and with other social groupings:
ACTU secretary Greg Combet told a meeting of more than 700 trade
union organisers in Sydney that a clearly articulated set of values, that
transcends industrial relations, is needed to rebuild union power.
Combet was launching 'Future Strategies -‐ Unions Working for a Fairer
Australia', a document reviewing and building upon the 1999
Unions@Work. That report calls on unions to maintain a relationship
with the ALP but also look beyond Labor to build relationships with
community groups and other political parties based on a clearly
defined set of values.
The ACTU’s approach to revitalisation was centred in fostering a more
independent, empowering culture that would re-‐energise unions and help them
re-‐build their memberships. In the ACTU’s new approach, independence was at
the heart of the survival of a viable union movement in Australia. Despite its
efforts to portray this independence as fully consistent with the affiliated
relationship some unions have with the ALP, the ACTU had effectively opted to
graft a new strategic choice on an existing relationship structure; it had decided to
make a switch from a predominant reliance on a social democratic relationship to
a greater reliance on pressure group relationship type without changing anything
of structural consequence in the national unions-‐ALP relationship.
3. Generational change
The unions that are growing are the ones that have reformed radically,
had a lot of leadership changes, had a lot of youth come in. – Current
affiliated union official 2
This quote conveys the strong sense in the interviews that radical reform of
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unions is the key to their survival and prospects for growth. The leadership of the
Australian trade union movement has changed significantly since the end of the
Accord period. Only one leader of a major union, Joe De Bruyn (National
Secretary, SDA), has held his position since before the Accord. Whereas a
previous generation had been attracted by the potential for union influence in a
close corporatist relationship with an ALP government, built on high union
densities and bi-‐partisan political support for arbitration, today’s leaders are
influenced by the harsh realities of sharp union density declines, and increased
government and employer hostility:
Most of the generation that is around now has had their perception
formed by the collapse of union membership, which really happened in
the 90s. – Current affiliated union official 5
Some, at least, of the new generation of union leaders see themselves as more
modern in their approach and more able to appeal to a modern electorate, they
see themselves as leaders capable of shedding the pejorative tag of ‘union bosses’,
and the legacy of union leaders of the past who relied too much on electorally
unpopular industrial action, and the political power they derived from high union
densities:
We are having a generational change in the movement. So that the
people that punters out there associate as union bosses are going and
people like Jeff Lawrence, Paul Howes and Dave Oliver, thinking,
respectable people, not lunatics, are taking their place. – Current
affiliated union official 2
This interviewee also argued that the picture on generational change and
organisational revival was mixed:
So the movement is kind of half-‐half. You have some really positive
stories (about organisational reform and revitalisation) and some
really negative stories – Current affiliated union official 2
The table below shows clear differences in attitudes to the ACTU’s revitalisation
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agenda between former union leaders, whose experience of the Accord was
positive, and current union leaders, who view the Accord as part of the problem.
Former union leaders tend to see the contemporary union movement as
‘defensive’; while contemporary union officials argue that the Accord was part of
the problem and that the more independent approach taken by the ACTU is the
right solution for the challenges facing a modern Australian union movement.
Not everyone accepts that the ACTU’s agenda has changed noticeably. The
neutral category has been renamed ‘same’ because interviewees tended to deny
that much has changed in the union movement. Again, the interviewees who held
to the ‘nothing much has changed’ position were more strongly represented in the
former and never categories (six of eight interviewees) than in the ‘current’
category (two of fourteen interviewees).
Table 15: Attitudes to new union agenda
Positive Negative / sceptical Same
Current union 7 5 2
Former union 0 3 2
Never union 0 1 4
TOTAL 7 9 8
Despite the union revitalisation agenda, and generational change at the leadership
level, there is a continuing debate inside the union movement about whether
unions should push for a stronger and closer policy role with the current federal
ALP government. This debate can be interpreted, partly, as a debate about the
appropriateness of US-‐style union campaigning when the ALP is in government.
Should the union movement change its political engagement strategies and tactics
when the ALP is in government? Should unions campaign against ALP
governments, or should they revert to a milder form of corporatism, with its elite
negotiation political style? The debate opens up the question of whether, and to
what extent, the unions-‐ALP relationship can change character as political
circumstances change.
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One interviewee recalled a conversation with then ACTU Secretary Combet to
argue the case for adjusting strategies according to whether the ALP is in
Government. The implication of the view attributed to Combet in this quote is
that the union movement could, and should, seek a greater public policy
development role when there was a change of government:
Combet was only there under a conservative government so his
achievements are different (to Kelty’s45). I remember talking to him
once about whether the union movement should have something new it
was trying to achieve like superannuation or whatever and he said the
time is just not right, you just can’t do that under this sort of
conservative government you need to basically be in a defensive mode.
-‐ Current affiliated union official 5
The same interviewee was sharply critical of what he perceived to have been a
failure of the union movement to move back to engagement with this broader
agenda and move beyond the role of opposing a hostile conservative government:
I think there are a number of unions who want to go back to
Opposition. They were comfortable in Opposition. They don’t want
Labor to go into Opposition. But they want to go into Opposition.
There is a bit of Green influence in a lot of unions which I think is quite
destructive. A lot of that Green influence is going into the ACTU, which
I think is destructive. -‐ Current affiliated union official 5
Another interviewee with high-‐level experience during the Accord era was critical
of the new ACTU leadership as being insufficiently interested in public policy
development across a broad front, of being defensive rather than positive and
assertive when it comes to policy development:
I think the trade union movement has not moved on in its thinking
about its roles. So largely, with some exceptions, perhaps Paul Howes
at the AWU, there is a defender model that was entrenched during the
45 W. J. (Bill) Kelty, ACTU Secretary during the Accord period.
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WorkChoices era. I don’t see them seeking to engage with the economy
with the drivers of the economy, the business community, I don’t see
them even in a very coherent way engaging with the third sector46. I
see them as actually having retreated to that defender role. – Former
affiliated union official 1
Overall, though, there was a strong sense in the interviews that the union
movement is still very much in recovery mode, and still necessarily focused on
membership rather than public policy development, and that the job is far from
done just because the ALP is back in office.
4. Re-‐thinking the Accord
A key characteristic of revitalisation suggests that switching back to a closer
policy involvement with Labor in government is unlikely. The ACTU’s adoption of
independence and external lobbying involves a direct rejection of the dependence
and internal lobbying approach involved in the social democratic style Accord
arrangement. The adoption of union revitalisation strategies is based in critiques
of the impact of these social democratic arrangements on union vitality and
membership engagement. In fact, for the critics inside today’s union movement,
the Accord is viewed through the lens of a contemporary focus on re-‐building
membership. The Accord was good for working people, but it was, they say, bad
for unions.
Formulated when Hayden was ALP Opposition leader, but not finalized until
Hawke replaced Hayden, the Accord was a feature of the subsequent Hawke and
Keating Governments, it gave “ an unprecedented level of influence” for trade
union officials at the federal level (Patmore and Coates 2005). Mainly an
agreement on wage restraint, in return for important social wage improvements
(notably through Medicare and superannuation), the union movement sought to
invest the Accord with more meaning and to use it as a framework for exercising
union influence across a broad range of government policies. Leading union
46 The ‘third sector’ refers to community organisations and Non-‐government organisations generally.
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officials also sought to make tripartitism a more permanent and important
feature of the relationship between the ALP in government and the broader trade
union movement. Nevertheless, the Accord arrangement was of little
consequence in many areas of economic policy where the Hawke and Keating
Governments pursued a neo-‐liberal agenda (Bowden 2011:69)47, though arguably
with less adverse consequences for union members than similar policy programs
elsewhere (Frankel 1997:15, 20, Peetz 1998:161 – 164, Quiggin 1998:82 & 88,
Schulman 2009:2,5,11). The Accord has also been credited with influencing the
Hawke and Keating Governments to pursue more actively Keynesian and welfare
state programs in Australia than was the case in similar countries at that time
(Frankel 1997:15, 20, Gentile and Tarrow 2009:481); for instance the Accord was
important to the development of compulsory superannuation and the restoration
of a universal health care system. The Accord went through eight iterations
(called Marks), but, like many similar incomes deals between social democratic
partners in other countries, it eventually collapsed. By the time the Keating
Government was defeated in 1996, the Accord had become a source of
controversy inside the union movement, where opinions remain sharply divided
to this day.
While a few interviewees, like Combet (see section above), found merit in both
the Accord and the organising model, seeing them as appropriate responses to the
circumstances of their times, most leaned one way or the other. Current union
officials were evenly split on the merits of the Accord, while former officials were
either supportive of the Accord, often seeing it as a high point for the union
movement, or offered no definitive opinion. It must be stressed, however, that the
sample sizes are small, and the distribution of opinions is such that it is hazardous
to draw strong conclusions about the relationship between the period in which
interviewees held senior union positions and their attitudes to the Accord and its
impact on union membership size. Nevertheless, the interviews contained much
47 Peetz (1988:162) points to a speech by John Dawkins, a senior economic Minister in the Hawke and Keating Governments, in which he claimed that the ALP Government had “used the ACTU and the business community to help implement its reform policies”.
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commentary and analysis that was suggestive of a generational shift in thinking
on these issues.
The first table below describes interviewee attitudes to the impact of the Accord
on unions and relates those attitudes to their current relationship to the union
movement. Overall, interviewees were far more likely to see the Accord as good
(11) than bad (5) for unions. Current union officials, however, were more evenly
divided: good (5), bad (4) and neither (3). Three of the five former union officials
interviewed believed the Accord was good for unions, the other two did not offer
a definitive opinion.
Table 16: Union attitudes to the Accord
Good Bad Neither
Current 5 4 5
Former 3 0 2
Never 3 1 1
TOTAL 11 5 8
Unsurprisingly, union officials with differing perspectives on the merits of the
Accord tend to emphasise different aspects of the Accord experience. Supporters
of the Accord tend to emphasise its policy successes, while detractors tend to see
it as having adverse consequences for the union movement, in particular
perceptions of unions being ‘too close’ to government and the impact these
perceptions may have had on union membership numbers.
One interviewee, for example, argued that the problems with the Accord were
outweighed by these lasting policy achievements:
Everybody knew whatever the criticisms were of the Accord and we’ve
got plenty but there was an institutional position for unions within that,
there was a seat at the table, unions were not just asked to exercise
wage restraint but there was actually a negotiation which saw things
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like superannuation and Medicare, these sort of social benefits were
part of the deal. – Current affiliated union official 3
Another interviewee, however, argued that the ‘well-‐known’ negatives of the
Accord tend to be forgotten by an older generation of union officials who remain
nostalgic about the Accord era:
There’s always a perception that the old guys in this group (smaller
unions) do want an Accord. I think a few of them hark back to it, look
back with fond memories. A very fuzzy memory as well, they
remember all the positive aspects and they don’t remember the
negatives. – Current affiliated union official 2
Other interviewees argued that it is the positives of the Accord that have been
forgotten and that history has been re-‐written by the union movement’s new
leadership. An interesting part of this perspective is that it rejects the
(apparently) widely held belief among contemporary union officials that the
Accord was an era characterised by low levels of member involvement and
mobilisation, and, consequently, declining union membership:
The Accord was the high point for the trade union movement both in
terms of what it was able to achieve and how it was able to mobilise
workers around it. I think the re-‐writing of history bagging the Accord
has been mainly by people who weren’t there. The collapse in union
membership and all that post dates the Accord. Union membership
pretty much held up during the Accord. It flattened in the 80s but
didn’t start to decline until the 1991 recession. – Current affiliated
union official 5
The contrary idea, however, that the Accord did involve a reduction in member
mobilisation, was the more popular among interviewees. This idea that unions
stopped doing all the member-‐engaging activities they used to do before the
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Accord is also evident in the interpretation many interviews placed on the
meaning of union revitalisation. For instance:
It (the Accord) served the government better than the unions, quite
frankly I think there is a whole range of things we stopped doing in that
period. – Current affiliated union official 6
Some interviewees also attributed much of the success of the Accord to Hawke
and his special, or unique, relationship with the trade union movement. Again,
this line of reasoning is strongly supportive of the view that the Accord was a one-‐
off, almost a temporary diversion for Australian unionism:
Hawke wanted that relationship to work, he wanted that relationship,
and clearly he saw benefits both for his own government and for the
union movement through the Accord. As I say, I think at the time it
worked well. -‐ Current affiliated union official 6
For interviewees that are strongly critical of the Accord, the link between
membership disengagement and membership decline is almost an article of faith,
and clear evidence that the corporatism of the Accord, while good in policy terms,
was bad for unions in organisational terms. For these interviewees, an obvious
causal relationship exists:
I can only compare and contrast the union density numbers in Australia
with the UK during the Thatcher period. We actually went down faster.
Whatever else the Accord delivered it didn’t deliver sustainable union
density. -‐ Current affiliated union official 1
The link between member disengagement and elite negotiations between the
ACTU leadership and the leadership of the FPLP is also taken as axiomatic by
many interviewees. In this view, the Accord excluded not just members, but also
the most senior levels in union hierarchies; it is as if a whole generation of lower
and middle union leaders was disenfranchised by the Accord:
The Accord was a dismal failure. A combination of Kelty, Keating, the
Metals, the NUW under Sword, made some very fundamental strategic
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mistakes. Rather than trying to capture the opinion of the workforce
and lead it and develop it they came up with a model they said was
going to improve the country and there was very little ownership
amongst the union secretaries, union officials, all democratically
elected, and more accountable than most politicians in many regards. –
Current affiliated union official 4
The Accord processes, with their emphasis on top-‐down management of the
union movement, were seen as even less useful during the tough years of the
Howard Government; several union interviewees suggested that union officials
had to re-‐learn the basics of unionism:
The structure of the Accord process almost relegated union members
to the position of observers. What we have learnt through the Howard
years was that workers have to be more than observers they need to be
participants. Because the Accord was negotiated at a peak level
between the leaders of the ACTU and the prime minister and treasurer
of the day it wasn’t as inclusive and consultative and engaging as we
need it to be in the new millennium. – Current affiliated union official 1
An interviewee with direct experience of the Accord era, denied that it was the
Accord itself that was the problem, rather the fault was with union leaders that
failed to use the opportunities created by the Accord structures and processes:
It’s crap; if your members weren’t involved you weren’t trying hard
enough because the Accord provided a framework for really significant
campaigns. Superannuation came because there had been a 4 or 5-‐year
union campaign. The structural efficiency principle – great opportunity
for unions to get not just real pay rises but also give workers real
control over the working environment. It’s true a lot of unions just
treated the Accord as ‘every six months I turn up and I get a pay rise’.
But the more effective unions actually used it as an opportunity and
won quite historical breakthroughs. – Current affiliated union official 5
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Perhaps the strongest criticism of the Accord by today’s union leadership,
however, was that unions had become too close to government and therefore too
dependent on the ALP. This criticism is related to the argument about
membership disengagement by over-‐reliance on elite leadership negotiation, but
it goes further and points to emerging expectations that union members have for
independence in the unions-‐ALP relationship. The concern was expressed by one
interviewee as a reversal of the belief that the ALP wants independence in the
relationship more than unions do:
The Accord was a fundamental error, not because it did bad things for
working people, but because it was bad for the unions, it tied us and
made us a government agency. Too close. Which is an interesting thing
because there is always this view that the unions want to be closer and
the party doesn’t. Often that’s not the case. Being too close hurts us as
well. – Current affiliated union official 2
Another interviewee, this time from a non-‐affiliated union, suggested that the
problem of closeness was particularly acute for unions with substantial public
sector memberships:
Some unions were seen as almost captive of the Accord process with
members seeing themselves as ultimately paying a fairly high price for
being involved in that process. Especially public service unions like
ours. At first it was embraced, the Accord process, it was seen as
something useful and helpful and so on, but eventually it came to be
seen as something negative, where unions were captured and
constrained. – Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Modern union officials, the new post-‐Accord generation, tend to believe that
whatever the policy successes of the Accord process, it was bad for unions in
terms of recruiting and retaining members. They believe that union members,
and potential recruits, want engagement in campaigns, and activism more
broadly, rather than a union movement that pursues its policy goals through elite
negotiation and public support for an ALP government. Whatever the policy
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achievements of the national unions-‐ALP relationship, it must be conducted,
many contemporary union leaders think, in a way that supports the union
movement’s priority on membership growth, and that means that unions must be
perceived to be capable of acting independently, or separately, from the ALP,
especially when the party is in office.
5. Unity
It’s interesting to watch Paul Howes (AWU – right-‐wing) and Dave
Oliver (AMWU – left-‐wing) say exactly the same thing at an ACTU
executive meeting for example. And there’s lots of that now. – Current
non-‐affiliated union official 1
In Chapter 4 it was argued that ideological and sectarian factionalism had long
served as an organisational principle across the labour movement. There were
effectively two parties within the ALP, a right-‐wing party and a left-‐wing party.
These factions had formal organisational structures that replicated the
organisational structure of the party. This meant that unions were, and still are,
affiliated to factions as well as to the ALP. One consequence of the two
relationships phenomenon is that factionalism has become steadily less relevant
in the union movement, especially following sharp declines in union density and
during the YR@W campaign; but, at the same time, union involvement in
factionalism in the ALP can be seen as a legacy of an ideological and sectarian
past.
One interviewee, an MP, lamented the persistence of factionalism in the ALP even
as it seemed to be diminishing in the union movement:
Some of the modern (union) leadership seem to have a little bit more
sophisticated view but we are still plagued with some senior people in
the parliamentary party who have a Neanderthal view of all this
(factionalism) and the hangover from some who have recently left who
lost sight of the balance between faction and party. – Current federal
MP 7
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While unions might be more unified in the ACTU, inside the ALP, factionalism still
plays the major role in shaping internal alignments at the expense of a more
unified union position:
Institutionally the relations (in the party) are still very heavily
governed by unions’ factional allegiances so there is no one union
position. – Current affiliated union official 3
Another interviewee, from the political rather than the union side of the
relationship, was highly critical of unions as the continuing source of factional
conflict inside the ALP, suggesting that factionalism persists in the ALP mainly to
further the ambitions of individual union leaders:
The rigidity of factionalism in the Labor Party flows from senior union
people using factions as a union power base inside the Labor Party. I
think it might be good for them but on balance its not good for the
party. – Current federal MP 7
The ACTU leadership has been seeking to minimise the negative consequences of
factionalism inside the union movement for at least forty years:
Before Hawke was elected President in the 1960s the ACTU executive
was much smaller and all the votes were decided on factional lines. A
proposal to buy a new photocopier would provoke a left-‐right split.
Hawke attempted to work more of a consensus model and when Kelty
became secretary they changed the rules to make the secretary a sort of
chief executive officer. Combet pursued the agenda to de-‐factionalise
the ACTU and the current leadership is also pursuing it. – Current peak
union official 2
Several interviewees emphasised the high degree of factional unity that was
achieved during the YR@W campaign. One interviewee with over twenty-‐five
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years of full-‐time experience in the labour movement was struck by just how
united the union movement was during the YR@W campaign:
Extraordinary internal unity, this united all factions and philosophical
strains within the trade union movement -‐ Current peak union official 1
One interviewee argued that while some ideological divisions remain, the union
leadership was now able to put them aside in order to pursue common union
objectives. According to this interviewee, today’s differences in the union
movement are differences of interest rather than ideology:
The end of the cold war, I think it has had an effect. The SDA for
example, Joe De Bruyn is a senior vice-‐president, and the ACTU doesn’t
talk about social, right to life type issues, so once you put that over to
one side, Joe is very supportive and has always been supportive of the
ACTU as an institution and he’s got a senior position so the differences
you see now are really the differences that flow from people’s
memberships. Some things are going to be more important to a union
that has shop assistant members than one that has teachers. – Current
peak union official 2
From the perspective of greater unity inside the union movement, the continuing
rigidity of the factional system inside the ALP can seem redundant. One current
union interviewee expressed surprise that factions inside the ALP had out-‐lasted
the end of the Cold War and the decline of sectarianism for so long:
In fact, why there are still right and left factions is a bit of a mystery to
me. And if you’d asked me 15 years ago I would have said no the
factions won’t exist but actually they are inflexible. – Current affiliated
union official 5
There are, however, some signs that factionalism inside the ALP is changing
character. Some long-‐term insiders had trouble in comprehending the new
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factional structure in the ALP, especially in recalling labels to identify them:
You get this dazzling array of sub-‐factions -‐ Current federal MP 7
Ian Jones (AMWU Victorian state secretary) runs one of the factions in
Victoria, it’s all so byzantine that I can’t tell you the name of it48 –
Political adviser 1
An instructive example of this fracturing of factionalism, and its persistent
importance inside the ALP, was the account one interviewee gave of the factional
provenance of then Deputy Prime Minister, Julia Gillard:
(Gillard) mentioned the other day in an article I read how she had a
couple of cracks at pre-‐selection. Well, the left really blocked her she
was part of the socialist group, she was part of that tendency which was
very much a minority in the Left and her first couple of attempts to get
pre-‐selection she didn’t get up and it wasn’t until there was a split and
that small group of the left cut a deal with the right and that’s what got
her, Martin Ferguson49 and a few others preselected and so her
approach into the left really came through student politics out of the
socialist forum and she’s much more of a centrist and probably more
about getting Julia up there. She is a very talented and ambitious
person but not deeply wedded to left ideology in my view. – Current
affiliated union official 3
With rigid factionalism on the wane in the union movement, unions are
continuing to use this unity to lobby the ALP, internally and externally, on union
issues. This cross-‐factional co-‐operation has continued after YR@W and
significantly in the context of a campaign focused on a federal ALP Government,
48 Some of these sub-‐factions have acquired colourful nicknames, the ‘hard’ right in Victoria is apparently known inside the ALP as ‘the taliban’. 49 Martin Ferguson, ACTU President (1990-‐1996) and a senior Cabinet Minister in the Rudd and Gillard governments.
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around its decision not to abolish the Australian Building and Construction
Commission (ABCC):
That’s a cross-‐factional campaign the AWU are a part of that campaign
too and that is focused around the ABCC – Current affiliated union
official 3
Previously, there had been a probably unprecedented degree of cross-‐factional
unity in the LCNSW with an ALP government in NSW, and later with an ALP
federal government:
There seems to be a degree of defactionalisation. The leadership of the
NSW Labor Council did seem to say let’s put union issues first when
they were dealing with the state government and even with the federal
government. So what I said earlier is a long-‐term problem but there
has been a little bit of an indication of Robertson (then UnionsNSW
Secretary50) and co bringing the unions under the same tent and seeing
unions as an identity viz a viz the Labor party and Labor government. –
Current federal MP 2
There was a similar development at the 2009 National ALP Conference where the
ACTU played a significant role, again, apparently for the first time:
The last national ALP Conference (2009) was the first time that people
decided that the ACTU should co-‐ordinate policy areas. In the past the
ACTU had a role in a few policy areas but not actually co-‐coordinating
everything. In the past this co-‐ordination tended to be left to the
factions and various union officials. What happened was a positive
thing and it meant people worked together. – Current peak union
official 2
At the 2009 ALP national conference the union people who were
50 Robertson entered the NSW Parliament after the YR@W campaign and became Opposition leader after the 2011 NSW election.
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delegates co-‐operated remarkably together regardless of what
particular faction they represented at that national conference. –
Current peak union official 1
Factionalism is another pointer to the paradox involved in the co-‐existence of two
relationship types. In the union movement, there is a high degree of unity around
union issues, in some ways perhaps an unprecedented level of unity. This unity
has been used to buttress diminished union power resources including through
lobbying the ALP internally and externally on union issues, most notably the
YR@W campaign. At the same time, factionalism inside the ALP, although
fracturing, continues to reflect the rigidity of left-‐right differences, which plagued
the ALP, fragmenting its relationship with the union movement and undermining
its electoral success, for half of the last century.
6. Scepticism
Scepticism about the extent to which US-‐style revitalisation strategies are capable
of being used in Australia provides insights into the difficulties Australian unions
face in making a sustainable transition from a dependent to a more independent
relationship. Faced with those difficulties, many unions prefer to cherry-‐pick
useable tactics rather than embrace a more fundamental transformation.
In late 2010, the retiring National Secretary of the CFMEU, John Sutton, took the
opportunity of an opening address (Sutton 2010) to his union’s national
conference to criticise the ACTU for its promotion of the organising model,
according to Sutton it was an ineffective response to a well-‐known and growing
crisis in the political representation of the working class. Sutton’s attack covered
many of the criticisms offered by interviewees for this thesis, and conveyed them
in a similar tone:
One complaint I continue to register is the enormous amount of time
spent by the ACTU on lecturing affiliates about the so-‐called ‘organising
model’ or ‘union growth model’. I couldn’t begin to calculate the
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amount of time and the amount of repetition that I have had to endure
at ACTU meetings in recent years where a certain group of union
leaders preach a mantra – actually its mainly glitzy marketing talk
woven in with traditional left activist notions – that we’re all supposed
to worship. The disciples have borrowed it from the controversial US
union. It’s getting to the stage at the ACTU that unless you mouth this
new gospel ‘growthspeak’ then you are looked down on. Active
campaigning unionism – building an effective delegates structure –
signing up new members. It’s not new to us. It’s hardly a revelation or
rocket science.
Three general points can be made before looking at the more specific criticisms of
union revitalisation. First, some interviewees expressed a strong dislike of the
‘glitzy’ style, as Sutton put it, in the SEIU approach. This may owe something to a
cultural difference between the US and Australia. One interviewee recounted a
story of attending a SEIU meeting in the US, and finding it to be too ‘evangelical’ in
tone. The use of words like ‘gospel’, ‘worship’ and ‘disciples’ by Sutton are
instructive in this regard. Criticism of the American style was not necessarily a
rejection of union revitalisation altogether. Many interviewees, like Sutton,
sought to re-‐claim, or re-‐interpret, union revitalisation as being consistent with a
more traditional, pre-‐Accord style of Australian unionism. These traditional
Australian approaches are different to American union revitalisation that draws
heavily on citizen rights and community organising and coalition building.
Traditional Australian approaches to member activism are, of course, more
consistent with the social democratic type of unions-‐party relationship; and, we
might anticipate that many Australian union officials feel more comfortable with
the idea of a return to a recognisable past. The second general point, also evident
in Sutton’s remarks, is the sense in which, paradoxically, many interviewees
believe that the union revitalisation approach is being driven from the ACTU,
from the top of the union movement, so much so that it is causing division in the
union movement. The third, and final, general point relates to the apparent
failure of the union revitalisation strategies to reach much beyond a handful of
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unions. Critics use the apparent limited uptake of union revitalisation as evidence
that it has only limited applicability in Australia. These three general points
constitute an argument for maintaining a social democratic unions-‐party type
relationship with some more active involvement by union members. It is an
argument that was common in many of the interviews.
On the first general point about the American ‘evangelical’ style, it was not
uncommon for interviewees to ridicule this aspect of the SEIU approach, and to
display a visceral hostility towards it, as we can see in the first two quotes below
where interviewees use physical reactions, and analogies, to emphasise the
strength of their reactions. In the third quote, there is an interpretation of the
campaigning style employed as part of the union revitalisation strategy as a less
serious form of politics:
Sometimes, honestly, I think I just need to go outside. I can’t cope with
all that SEIU stuff. I just can’t. I’m sure it works in the US. – Current
non-‐affiliated union official 1
We’ve had the model shoved down our throat by some we call the
happy clappers. It’s seen as this panacea as if every step the SEIU took
with its organising model has to be replicated. I don’t accept that. But
we can learn some lessons and will. -‐ Current affiliated union official 3
You’ve got the situation where the union dresses up in silly shirts at the
ACTU congress when Gillard comes to address it. And really would that
have happened under Ferguson or Crean? That’s your bloody middle
class you know people like Sharan Burrow51 it’s bullshit politics mate.
It’s not real politics. – Current federal MP 6
In addition to this dislike of the American style of union revitalisation advocated
by the ACTU and some unions, many interviewees were equally passionate about
their preference for a union revitalisation approach based on Australian unionism
prior to the Accord, and before sharp union density declines. Yet, these
51 Sharan Burrow was ACTU President from 2000 to 2010.
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descriptions of Australian style union revitalisation approaches can be very
different to the full transformations of unions and union movements envisaged by
social movement unionism (Schenk 2003, Simmons and Harding 2009).
Nevertheless, scholars have recognised that there are many interpretations of
union revitalisation (Hickey, Kuruvilla, and Lakhani 2010) and the development
of a viable Australian version cannot be dismissed. Interviewees, who saw union
revitalisation as a return to the past, also saw the Accord as a time when the union
movement lost its way, temporarily:
I think we are just going back to our traditional way of doing things. I
think the trade union movement got caught up with the bureaucracy of
the decision-‐making rather than the community value of it. Trade
union leaders sanitised their message to such a point that it became
just an insiders’ argument. We have looked back at what actually
drives politics and what drives politics is a community value or
community view. It’s about going back to representing the community
view. – Current affiliated union official 4
For a period of time in the 80s the movement lost its way a little bit and
my view is that some of that campaign work and the way we organise is
no different to the 40s 50s and 60s. I think we’ve gone back to what
served our purposes best, particularly that sort of grass roots activism
and that engagement with workers and activists and delegates, that’s
more turning the clock back – Current affiliated union official 6
The last two quotes were from national officials of affiliated unions, and can be
understood as a justification for current union political strategies rather than a
dispassionate assessment of the Accord period itself. Interestingly, interviewees
from non-‐affiliated unions were sometimes sceptical of the supposed ‘newness’ of
union revitalisation for a very different reason because they see themselves as
doing something very similar for many years:
Q. The campaigns in YR@W are the sort of stuff your union has been
doing for decades? A. Very much so and that’s why I think they relied
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upon us in many areas we were certainly involved in discussions about
planning and so on (of the YR@W campaign). It is something that we
have done for decades and we’ve done it around a number of issues.
We have a history of community campaigning. It is new for a lot of
unions that haven’t engaged in that at all. It’s always been easier for us
(non-‐affiliated unions) to do. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Far from being a new direction, one peak union official suggested that union
revitalisation in this sense may have run its course already:
Some unions have been involved in US style campaigning prior to
YR@W that’s been around for 10 to 15 years. I think it’s probably
reached its peak. We’ve pulled most of the good ideas we can from the
US. -‐ Current peak union official 3
On the third point, the different levels of enthusiasm with which unions have
adopted union revitalisation, and its active promotion by the ACTU, have caused
some tensions. Some unions have embraced the organising model, and union
revitalisation strategies more broadly, with greater enthusiasm than others.
Leaders in the adoption of these strategies include the LHMU, ASU and CPSU
(Peetz and Pocock 2009:630). In the previous section, the declining importance
of left-‐right factionalism in the union movement was discussed. Surprisingly, a
new divide may be emerging. Never a left-‐right issue, the organising model was,
nevertheless not universally welcomed (Peetz and Bailey 2010:9). One
interviewee suggested that the organising model (a key form of union
revitalisation strategies) was the source of considerable on-‐going division inside
the contemporary union movement:
Within the trade union movement there are different and very
significant divides currently. There is a big divide over whether you
consider yourself an organising union or not. – Current affiliated union
official 5
Some of these differences reflect similar differences in the USA, which led to a
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split in the union movement there in 2005. Some union officials in Australia may
be influenced in their views on the ACTU’s policies by their connections with US
unions. Many Australian unions have links with either the established AFL-‐CIO,
or the Change to Win (CTW) Group (including the SEIU) that broke away in 2005
in a dispute over organising tactics and other issues (McNeil 2007, Mitchell
2008:200):
I’m a big fan of campaigning and organising and hands-‐on management
of staff. But I think the model is a particular American model. I think
there are things you can learn from it but I think there is often a
mindless application of it. My view might be driven a bit by the fact
that our friends in America are in the AFL-‐CIO side, rather than change
to win; or the change-‐to-‐change group. – Current affiliated union official
5
One interviewee related the ACTU’s efforts to promote the adoption of union
revitalisation across the union movement and argued that it had met with very
limited success:
It’s true to say that after the YR@W campaign and after the change of
government, the ACTU was spruiking to its affiliates – you should be
boosting your research capacity, you should be centralising as much as
possible rather than operating as a series of state based fiefdoms. You
should be looking at your campaigning resources and orientation you
should be looking at developing your own version of an industry plan
for the sector of the workforce you’re recruiting in and trying to
organise. That’s the message that went out from the ACTU in the wake
of the change of government. Which is another way of saying OK these
things delivered this and we need a more sophisticated, campaign-‐
oriented approach at the level of the affiliates. Some of them have acted
on it. The Miscos has acted on it to a significant degree. I reckon a lot
haven’t as well. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Several interviewees supported this view that the adoption of union revitalisation
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had been slow and limited:
The ACTU have a thing about the grass roots approach that has come
out of the SEIU. The LHMU have done it well with Clean Start52 and so
on but not a lot of other people are doing it that well. – Former affiliated
union official 1
Further evidence of the limited spread of union revitalisation can be found in the
way that the LHMU was cited so frequently that it could seem like the sole
exemplar of a fuller embrace of the American model:
There is the massive connection between the miscellaneous workers
union now and its American affiliate. At the opening of the federal
office recently there were American union officials. Louise Tarrant the
new national secretary is very US oriented. When Jeff Lawrence left the
union as national secretary to go to the ACTU they had the function
they had messages from a number of US officials beamed through.
They’ve been to America often; American officials have been out here.
So the miscellaneous workers union is very US influenced. – Current
federal MP 2
As well as these broad areas of scepticism about union revitalisation, there were
also a number of more specific concerns expressed in the interviews. The table
below summarises some of the more specific concerns interviewees raised about
the union revitalisation model. These concerns are organised in category and
specific issues are identified. The third column presents indicative quotes from
interviewees identifying reasons why the US model may not be relevant, or fully
relevant, to Australian unions. In the first category of concerns, ‘political system’,
interviewees suggested that the Australian political system meant that the full
American union revitalisation approach was either unnecessary (compulsory
52 Clean Start is a successful Australian union campaign aimed at improving pay and conditions for cleaners, see http://www.cleanstart.org.au/, modeled on the SEIU’s Justice for Janitors campaign, see http://www.seiu.org/division/property-‐services/justice-‐for-‐janitors/
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voting), or wouldn’t work (caucus discipline). In the second category of concerns,
‘rights’, interviewees argued against the greater reliance on citizen rights in the
American model. In the third category, ‘institutionalisation’, interviewees were
concerned that the close leadership integration between the ALP and unions be
maintained. In the final category, ‘services’, interviewees were concerned that
members still expected a high level of service delivery from their unions and that
no amount of campaigning could overcome poor performance in what most
members still as the union movement’s core business (Current peak union official
3).
Table 17: Limited applicability of the US model
Category Specific issue Impact
Political system Compulsory voting Much of US style campaigning is aimed at ‘getting out the vote’, not necessary in Australia, and many of these techniques are not applicable to Australia -‐ Current federal MP 1
Caucus discipline Tight caucus system and party discipline makes it difficult for pressure group type tactics to be used in Australia, candidates are less open to lobbying on an individual basis -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Rights Over-‐reliance on citizen rights
Some interviewees were concerned that unions must always retain the right to take industrial action, it is fundamental to what it means to be a union – Current federal MP1
Collective bargaining Several interviewees stressed the importance of collective bargaining for building union membership, this can be linked to campaigning but it is centred in labour rather than citizen rights -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 1, Current peak union official 2
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Category Specific issue Impact
Institutionalisation Elite leadership overlap Weak relationship between unions and the Democratic party is seen as a shortcoming of the US model -‐ Current affiliated union official 1, Current peak union official 2
Services Member expectations Some interviewees argued that while the organising model was important, many members were focused on what they still viewed as the union’s core business -‐ Current affiliated union official 6
These interviewee comments suggest that most of the Australian union
leadership is attracted to a form of ‘lite’ social movement unionism, focused on
cherry-‐picking some good ideas rather than a full-‐blown transformation to a new
form of unionism. There is little indication of broad or deep support for some of
the more radical forms of union revitalisation, which focus on community
campaigns and coalition-‐building53. Instead, there is a strong desire to return to
what is perceived as a better past of Australian unionism before the Accord, and
to rely on collective bargaining around a narrow agenda of employment issues,
often derided in the US as part of the complacent past of business unionism
(Simmons and Harding 2010).
7. Conclusion
The ACTU argues that independence is central to the task of union revitalisation.
Independence is required for unions, and the ACTU, to be seen as genuine
campaigning organisations by their core constituencies, particularly members,
potential members and community supporters. It continues to try and locate that
independence within a dependent social democratic type relationship. The ACTU,
53 One early counter-‐example to this point might be seen in the recently launched Sydney Alliance http://www.sydneyalliance.org.au/, which seeks to build alliances between UnionsNSW and community organisations.
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and the leadership of individual unions have managed the contradiction between
dependence and independence, by adopting a tactical, or opportunistic, approach
to the unions-‐ALP relationship and the use of cherry-‐picked tactics from the
American pressure group type. This approach embraces both a view that the
relationship can be changed to suit political circumstances, and a view that tactics
used successfully in other unions-‐party relationships can be incorporated without
changing the structural fundamentals of the existing relationship. This approach
is intended to provide the flexibility to maintain affiliation with the ALP, while
campaigning independently and ‘reaching-‐out’ to like-‐minded community
organisations and other political parties, principally The Greens.
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CHAPTER 7: ALP AFFILIATION
1. Introduction
Affiliation tends to be the love that doesn’t speak its name -‐ Current
peak union official 4
Affiliation is indeed a topic that many union officials and ALP leaders prefer to
avoid in public. In December 2010, however, Wikileaks54 released US diplomatic
cables that quoted senior Australian union officials making remarkable claims
about the degree of political power that affiliation confers on them (Dorling and
McKenzie 2010). According to media coverage of the leaked cables, the national
secretary of the HSU, Kathy Jackson, was quoted in a cable as saying that ''she and
other union secretaries wield at least as much influence as junior state ministers
by controlling who is elected to parliament”; while a Victorian AWU official was
said to have described how his union worked hard to place its own officials in
state and federal parliaments (Dorling and McKenzie 2010). The evidence in this
chapter confirms that affiliated unions continue to exercise considerable influence
over ALP pre-‐selections; it casts doubts, however, on the extent to which this
influence is translated into influence over policy outcomes.
An examination of affiliation trends is important because it is the key
distinguishing feature between the social democratic and pressure group
relationship types (Valenzuela 1992). The retention of organisational links with
diminished policy influence was the relationship type identified by McIlroy
(1998) for the unions-‐BLP relationship under New Labour. In this thesis, I argue
that the emergence of a fully independent relationship between unions and the
ALP would require a change in the patterns and salience of affiliation. Minimal
changes in affiliation patterns would signify a potential imbalance in a
relationship that is otherwise exhibiting strong pressure group tendencies in its
54 See http://wikileaks.org/
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ACTU-‐ALP manifestation. Hyman and Gumbrell-‐McCormick (2010:319), for
instance, have argued that growing asymmetry produces instability in unions-‐
party relationships.
While the broader union movement, through the ACTU, has adopted a more
flexible approach to its relationship with the ALP, emphasising the capacity for
the relationship to change to reflect changing political circumstances, very little
evidence of change is to be found in the structure of the relationship type that
exists between affiliated unions and the ALP. Affiliation provides two key benefits
to unions. First, affiliation provides access to parliamentary pre-‐selections and
access to parliamentarians for lobbying purposes. Second, affiliation enables
unions to influence policy development from inside the party. These two benefits
are recognisable traits of the mass party type and the social democratic unions-‐
party relationship type. They are methods of enforcement, which give unions a
greater capacity to control the party’s parliamentary representatives and ensure
unions achieve their political objectives (Quinn 2010:370).
If the ALP is moving away from the mass party type and towards the electoral
professional type, and from a social democratic to a pressure group type unions-‐
party relationship, we would expect to see a weakening of the effectiveness of
these enforcement benefits of affiliation. Instead, we see considerable ambiguity.
In terms of policy, affiliated unions have been displaced largely by the ACTU,
which led the negotiations during the Accord period and more recently during the
development of the Fair Work Act after the 2007 election. At the same time, the
presence of former union officials, especially senior officials, in the FPLP is at or
near an all time high. Despite the connections that their presence creates
between unions and the FPLP, the absence of a significant change in affiliation
patterns has meant that union representation in the FPLP has become more
narrowly based. Affiliation is no longer the chief connection between the union
movement and the ALP; but it remains an important benefit for unions that are
affiliated, or at least for their senior officials.
In the first part of this chapter, the ALP’s two recent national reviews, conducted
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in 2002 and 2010 (ALP 2002, 2010), are discussed to determine their portrayals
and positioning of the links between unions and the ALP. In the second part of
this chapter, the biographical details of the current FPLP are examined to
determine; the proportion of the caucus with union backgrounds; the extent to
which affiliated and non-‐affiliated unions are represented; and, the extent to
which non-‐industrial organisations are represented. In the third part of this
chapter, I contrast this union presence in the caucus with the attitudes of caucus
members, in particular new members of the House of Representatives at the 2007
election, towards trade unions and the ALP’s links with trade unionism. This
analysis confirms that access to parliamentary positions is very heavily skewed in
favour of affiliated unions, with no indication that the inclusion of people from
non-‐affiliated unions and non-‐industrial organisations is increasing. In effect, the
ALP’s links with external organisations is a legacy of its social democratic type
relationship. There is little indication that the national ALP has been able to take
the same flexible approach to the unions-‐ALP relationship that has become a
feature of the ACTU’s rhetoric and, to a more limited extent, its behaviour.
2. Re-‐defining the relationship
Two National Reviews of the ALP were conducted during the first decade of the
twenty-‐first century (ALP 2002, 2010). Just eight years apart, their treatments of
the unions-‐ALP relationship are markedly different in analysis, tone and
prescription. These Reports provide useful insights into the way the ALP seeks to
present itself, and therefore to the challenges it perceives as its most important.
They were conducted by senior, and popular, ALP figures. Former Prime
Minister, Bob Hawke, and former NSW Premier, Neville Wran, in 2002 and
Senator John Faulkner, former NSW Premier, Bob Carr, and former Victorian
Premier, Steve Bracks in 2010. They both included extensive consultation
processes. The 2010 Review Panel spoke to hundreds of ALP members, senior
figures in the ALP and the union movement, and ALP supporters in the
community. It received 800 submissions plus 3500 short online submissions.
The 2002 Review Panel received 669 submissions and held forums around the
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country in its extensive consultations with ALP members and interested groups.
The next table highlights some key differences in the areas of ideology, party
identity, union affiliation and relationships with non-‐union organisations.
Between 2002 and 2010, there was a significant shift in emphasis away from
unions and towards community and community organisations. One indication of
this shift is the amount of space devoted to each. Community is used 54 times in
2010 in a 32-‐page report, whereas ‘unions’ was used 18 times. In 2002, ‘unions’
was used 28 times in a 32-‐page report and ‘community’ was used 30 times. A
more significant indicator is that the 2010 report, in Recommendation 31, opens
the door to affiliation to the party of organisations “in addition to industrial
unions”. The 2002 report was focused on better consultation with communities
and community organisations; in the 2010 report this has been upgraded to a
desire for engagement. Moreover, there has been a significant shift in the
interpretation of the relationship between unions and the ALP. The 2002 report
refers to a partnership (14 times) between the ALP and unions. It is variously
described as an “enduring partnership” and an “equal partnership”. The word
partnership was not used at all in 2010. Instead, the report speaks more vaguely
in terms of ‘connections’ and ‘links’ with unions. The 2010 Review also speaks of
‘connections’ with community organisations. A use of language which tends to
place unions and community organisations on a more equal footing in terms of
their relationships with the ALP. Unions in 2010 are also called the ‘bedrock’ of
the ALP, a word that is consistent with the Report’s ambitions to extend affiliation
to organisations other than unions. The positioning of unions as ‘bedrock’ was
welcomed by the ACTU, though it could also be interpreted as a further
diminution of the status of unions within the ALP and to reflect a desire the extent
to which affiliated unions are privileged in comparison to other community
organisations.
In 2010, the ALP is no longer self-‐described as a social democratic, or even labor,
party, but as a progressive party. Progressive is used 29 times in the 2010 Report,
compared with 5 times in 2002. Bongiorno (2011) argues that ‘progressive’, after
being used briefly at the end of the nineteenth century, “might not have been
169
widely applied to the Labor Party again until it was picked up by Australian
admirers of Tony Blair and the Third Way in the late 1990s.” In 2010, the ALP is
presented as a community-‐based movement established by working people
(rather than unions) to ensure a fair go for working people. These marked
changes suggest the ALP is attempting to move further away from its origins as
the political wing of the labour movement by extending its formal connections
with groups outside the union movement, and by de-‐emphasising the importance
of affiliation. Despite these changes, the 2010 Review does not contain any
proposals to reduce directly55 the significance of union representation within the
party.
Table 18: ALP national reviews; attitudes to unions, community
Issue 2002 2010
Unions-party relationship
Partnership
Described as an “enduring partnership” between “two wings of the labour movement”.
Downgraded to ‘connections’
Partnership not mentioned.
Union affiliation Renew and reinvigorate
“The way ahead is not to sever the union connection but to renew and reinvigorate the partnership.” To be reduced to uniform 50 per cent union representation at state conferences
Make more meaningful
Report concerned to find ways to make affiliation “meaningful”
Unique “capacity for generating, and maintaining, public support. “
“It is unlikely that further unions will affiliate into the future. This was confirmed in evidence provided to the Review by senior affiliated and non-‐affiliated union leaders.”
55 Depending on the details of implementation, some proposals, like primaries, might have the effect of reducing union influence, though given the resources at the disposal of many unions this is far from a certain outcome.
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Issue 2002 2010
Party identity Unions essential
“It is possible to have a party of social democracy without the unions; it is not possible to have a Labor Party without the unions.”
Downgraded to “a key characteristic”
Affiliation described as “a key characteristic that makes Labor different”
New union affiliations Seek affiliation by more unions
“It is an ongoing problem for the ALP that many white collar and service sector unions—those representing areas of growth— remain unaffiliated. This is despite strong relationships at an informal level with such unions. A broader range of affiliated unions should be encouraged. “
Recognised further affiliations unlikely
Noted that several recent affiliations had helped stablise union affiliation number
Non-union affiliation Not considered
Opens the door
“That the Party’s National Principles of Organisation be amended to allow the affiliation of like-‐minded organisations, in addition to industrial unions.”
ACTU Consultation
“The Party-‐union relationship is most effective when there are open channels for consultation between the political and industrial wings of the labour movement.”
Explore organising model
Speaks highly of ACTU’s adoption of organising model recommends a “new Campaigns and Growth Forum based on the ACTU model “
ALAC Consultation
Said to have been under-‐utilised during the past decade. ALAC should be “revitalised as the key consultative mechanism in the open and constructive relationship needed between the union movement and the Party.”
Meaningful dialogue
“ALAC and state based Labor Advisory Committees be expanded to include a new Campaigns and Growth Forum based on the ACTU model.”
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Issue 2002 2010
Community coalition-building
Consultation
“If we are to maximise community confidence in the Labor Party, we must present ourselves as an open, inclusive, community-‐based organisation, and build meaningful relationships with local communities and interest groups.“
“While the dialogue between Labor and the trade union movement is vital, it is only one of the relationships the Party must maintain. Other groups that must be heard include business, social and welfare organisations. “
Upgraded to Engagement
New focus on ‘engaging the community’, seeks to “deepen connection with the community” and “For Labor to effectively develop and articulate a modern reform agenda, it must stay closely connected to the broader progressive community”
3. Affiliation patterns
The two National Reviews conducted by the ALP over the past decade show an
awareness and concern about the problem caused by the shrinking of its blue-‐
collar union base. The first Review sought to address the problem by encouraging
additional unions to affiliate with the party. The second Review has opened the
door for affiliation with like-‐minded community organisations “in addition to
industrial unions” (ALP 2010:24, recommendation 29). This problem is best
understood as a question of party identity. In an era when the blue-‐collar
workforce has declined and union densities have fallen sharply, particularly
among some of the ALP’s traditional affiliated unions, a party identity centred
principally on blue-‐collar unionism is no longer electorally sustainable. Over a
long period, the ALP has not been able to change its essential structure to reflect
significant economic, social and workforce changes.
Cyril Wyndham, the ALP’s first full-‐time federal secretary raised the issue of the
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rise of white collar and professional unions, and the decline of blue-‐collar unions,
in his 1966 recommendation paper on reform of the federal ALP. Wyndham
(2011:19) recommended that state ALP branches “be encouraged to seek the
closest possible contact with professional associations”. One interviewee recalled
that the ALP was still considering this problem internally during the Hawke -‐
Keating period:
When I was on the (ALP) National Executive during the Hawke -‐
Keating era, Bob Hogg, the ALP National Secretary, was constantly
arguing that as the proportion of the workforce represented by ALP-‐
affiliated unions was declining, he was highlighting the lack of white
collar affiliation, his argument was that either you end up with major
white collar unions affiliating or we should be diminishing the unions’
institutional weight within the ALP. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union
official 4
Overall affiliation patterns have been remarkably stable. Some white-‐collar
unions have affiliated in recent years, notably the Financial Services Union (FSU)
in some states and the Community and Public Sector Union (CPSU) in the ACT
Nevertheless, the two largest professional unions; Australian Education Union
(AEU) and the Australian Nursing Federation (ANF) remain unaffiliated to the
ALP. One state branch of the ANF, the Queensland Nurses Union, which was
affiliated, left the ALP in 2010 (Caldwell and Miles 2010). The growing
significance of these unions within the broader union movement is indicated by
the fact that the last three ACTU Presidents have been drawn from these two
unions: Jennie George (AEU), Sharan Burrow (AEU) and the current President,
Ged Kearney (ANF). Over the course of the past 30 years, the balance between
ALP-‐affiliated and non ALP-‐affiliated unions has shifted in favour of the latter, to
the extent that about one in two Australian union members now belong to an
organisation that is not affiliated with the ALP (ALP 2010:11). The stability in
affiliation patterns owes much to the internal cultures of unions and the attitudes
of their members to ‘politicisation’, with professional unions in particular being
highly resistant to the idea of affiliation.
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While the interviews suggested some dissatisfaction about the benefits of
affiliation, there was little indication that affiliated unions would contemplate
disaffiliating. In particular, affiliation continues to be highly regarded by officials
of unions affiliated with the ALP. Australian unions have adopted some positive
lessons from US unions when it comes to campaigning. They have also learnt that
maintaining institutional links gives them some advantages that their American
cousins do not enjoy. One important advantage is access to parliamentary offices
through party pre-‐selection processes, both a personal advantage for the
individuals involved and, where strong relationships can be maintained, for the
unions they came from:
I went to a SEIU convention and they put up on the screen a list of
public officials who had a link to the union that were either ex-‐union
officials or had some sort of link and it was a long list but fairly minor
people and if we (Australian union) had done the same thing at a
National Council and put up the MPs federal and state who had been
officials or had an identifiable link it would have been a much more
powerful list. -‐ Current peak union official 2
A second key advantage is the continuing influence that affiliation can confer on
senior union officials through their participation in party structures:
US unions are relevant if they are lucky once every four years. US
unions will not be relevant again in the US political system for another
8 years. When there is a primary on for the US presidency they have
enormous clout, it’s quite impressive. But after that, after the
primaries, the power’s gone. It’s solely around one outcome and they
don’t have the institutional linkages. – Current affiliated union official 2
Non-‐affiliated unions face similar challenges in Australia in their efforts to be
relevant to the ALP, and therefore to be able to maximise their influence:
We don’t have that institutionalised presence. That means that we
have to punch, or influence, above our weight in the absence of that
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presence which is fine. I think that’s a fairly significant difference
(between affiliated and non-‐affiliated unions). – Current non-‐affiliated
union official 4
If you’re not an affiliated union you have to have other strategies to
work with the party and be able to deliver to the party and you
normally only get those opportunities around an election. -‐ Current
non-‐affiliated union official 1
One interviewee clearly saw this stability in affiliation patterns as a sign of health
in the unions-‐ALP relationship, and of the benefits it continues to deliver to
affiliated unions. That is, he argued, if the relationship between unions and the
ALP really was as bad for unions as is sometimes suggested than we would expect
to see many more disaffiliations:
The other indicator of the health of the relationship is that only one
state branch of one union is playing footsie with the Greens and that is
the ETU in Victoria. – Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Nevertheless, affiliation is a well-‐known source of controversy inside the ALP
with some arguing for severe reductions in the extent of union affiliation and their
direct representation at State Conferences (Button 2002, Cavalier 2010, Hawker
2011). Cavalier (2010) argued for a reduction of union representation to 20 per
cent, a level sufficiently low, he argues, as to break union dominance of the party
completely. The call to reduce union representation was recently supported by
Bruce Hawker, a long-‐term ALP staffer, political campaign strategist and public
affairs consultant, who remarked favourably on the Canadian NDP rule that
restricts union votes at party conferences to 25 per cent (Hawker 2011).
None of the interviewees for this study, however, expressed support for pursuing
further reductions in union representation at state conferences. Interviewees
thought the level of union representation was a non-‐issue, not worth pursuing, or
that further change was not politically possible.
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There was, unsurprisingly, no support, and some considerable hostility, for
reductions in union representation among the union officials interviewed for this
thesis:
It has really stabilised at 50:50 to argue for any further reductions
would be insane, you would be saying that unions are only a minor
group within the ALP. – Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Every now and then you will have some whack job like (names two
senior ALP figures) say that the union link is what damages us. That is
an intellectually lazy way of analysing Labor’s electoral defeats. –
Current affiliated union official 2
Several interviewees suggested that Simon Crean’s leadership of the ALP56was
damaged by his successful efforts to reduce union representation at state
conferences to a consistent 50 per cent:
Crean got conned into pursuing it, it was a good reform but he paid
such a high price -‐ Current federal MP 7
After Crean’s experience, where I thought he got sidetracked on form
over substance, it didn’t do him any good; I think that lesson might
have been learnt. – Current federal MP 1
Some interviewees rejected the proposition that union influence inside the ALP
should be linked to union densities, a suggestion made by Cavalier (2010) and
other critics:
I think that the commentariat spends a lot more time focusing on this
issue (union affiliation to the ALP) than people inside the movement
who are also busy on other things. They have a superficial view, why
should unions control 50 per cent of the conference when they’ve only
got 20 per cent of the workforce? – Current peak union official 4
56 Crean has the unfortunate distinction of being the only federal ALP leader not to lead the party in an election campaign, apart from Frank Forde who was leader for a week after John Curtin died in office.
176
Some people say unions shouldn’t have as much influence in the party
because we only have 20 percent membership but when we started in
the 1890s we only had about that. -‐ Current peak union official 3
The ACTU’s official approach is that affiliation is a matter for individual unions: “it
will always be a decision for individual unions and their members how close a
relationship they will form with the Labor Party. Some will choose to affiliate,
others will not” (ACTU 2011). The structure of the ALP makes that a decision for
individual state-‐based union branches. The union amalgamation process in the
1990s made the pattern of affiliation in some unions even more complex with
some divisions, and not others, of some unions affiliated in particular states.
Some national unions are comprised of state branches that are affiliated in some
states and not in others:
Well obviously it’s a state decision, some of our branches do and some
don’t but most do. -‐ Current affiliated union official 3
We’re affiliated only in NSW, Queensland and SA, in NSW for a longer
period. – Current affiliated union official 1
The next table sets out the components, or dimensions, of the national unions-‐ALP
relationship as a reflection of the patterns of affiliation. It shows that the overall
relationship is a conglomerate of relationships that reflect both the social
democratic and pressure group types. Affiliated unions are in a social democratic
relationship with the ALP; non-‐affiliated unions are in a pressure group type
relationship with the party.
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Table 19: Relationship dimensions
Direct links Elite overlap Lobbying type
Relationship type
1. ACTU-ALP
ALAC during Accord, but generally more informal and ad hoc.
There are many former senior union officials in FPLP, including former senior officers of the ACTU (Crean, Ferguson, Combet, Marles).
External Pressure group model, but with a much higher degree of leadership overlap.
2. Affiliated unions-ALP
No direct representation at national level. Unions play direct role in Senate pre-‐selections, and through state branch interventions in some lower house pre-‐selections.
Many MPs have backgrounds with affiliated unions.
Internal Social democratic, with additional fragmentation due to federal ALP structure.
3. Non-affiliated unions-ALP
None. Officials are sometimes active in ALP, but many avoid high profile roles in ALP in deference to member attitudes.
Very few officials from non-‐affiliated unions win pre-‐selection.
External Pressure group.
178
4. Affiliation exclusivity
A decline in the proportion of union members linked to the ALP through
affiliation, and the ALP’s consequent ambitions for a deeper connection with non-‐
affiliated unions and other like-‐minded community organisations, has not been
reflected in ALP representation in the federal parliament. Unions affiliated to the
party continue to enjoy almost exclusive access to parliamentary positions when
compared with non-‐affiliated unions and community organisations. This
exclusivity suggests that the ALP considers a position with an affiliated union to
be good training for politics, but not similar experience in non-‐affiliated unions
and community organisations. In addition, a recent upsurge in the numbers of
senior mid-‐career union officials moving into federal parliament points to a
significant shift in perceptions inside the labour movement about the power and
relevance of the contemporary union movement. That is, senior officials in
today’s union movement are more likely to use their positions as a stepping-‐stone
to a larger career in politics than their predecessors did a generation or two ago.
In contemporary Australia, employment with an affiliated union has become a
familiar training ground for aspiring ALP parliamentarians (Cavalier 2010,
Miragliotta and Errington 2008). Interviewees from affiliated unions stressed the
benefits for the ALP of this training ground effect and often claimed that it was a
key advantage that Labor had over its political opponents. One interviewee
argued that unionism is one of the few occupations that prepares people for the
role of parliamentary representative:
The Liberals always make a big deal about it, but what’s the closest
thing to being in politics? If a politician’s job is to represent people
then there are two employment categories: lawyers and unions. Our
life is about representing people and representing the good of all in
your constituency so its not surprising that unions produce labor
politicians – Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
179
Another interviewee argued that the political engagement of union officials often
gave them a broader perspective than non-‐union MPs in the FPLP:
You’re always going to get people coming through the union movement
that have had experience in negotiation, in political issues, social
understanding and international perspectives, to be honest. I think a lot
of the union people who come in have more international analysis to
their politics than a lot of the local MPs. – Current federal MP 1
Affiliation was also seen as providing a mechanism, not available to the Coalition
parties, for grooming up-‐and-‐coming political talent:
I think that most unionists that go into parliament end up being very
good. The reason why there are so many unionists in the cabinet is that
they are good. The Liberal Party can’t ring up the NFF and say listen
this guy is good give him a job and train him up and that’s what we
have and we have been a good factory for political leaders. – Current
affiliated union official 2
Some interviewees suggested that there were now too many union-‐trained MPs
and that this had become a problem for the FPLP in terms of reducing the
diversity of work and life experience contained within the caucus:
That’s not healthy for the Labor Party … the white bread politician
argument and what it does to entrench factionalism. -‐ Current federal
MP 7.
The main argument advanced by interviewees, however, against unions being a
training ground for future MPs is the impact it could have on unions themselves.
It was seen as a poor use of the resources of the unions concerned:
I think there are people who go into the trade union movement and all
they do is organise inside the Labor party and they use it as a stepping
stone. That is bad for the trade union movement in terms of the
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intelligent use of its resources in the interests of its members and the
standing of the union in the eyes of its members. – Current federal MP
7.
Another perceived problem is that the ‘trainees’ are often from outside the
industry that the union they work for represents. An associated, or consequent,
lack of a long-‐term commitment to the union movement was identified as a
problem:
You often find people in the union movement who have an eye on their
seat in parliament rather than necessarily doing what is in the best
interests of their members at a particular time – Current non-‐affiliated
union official 3
There was also some concern that the pathway from union to parliament was
becoming just too frequent, and it was suggested that after the recent career
moves by senior union officials that there might be a reaction inside the union
movement against it:
I think the path was well-‐worn of people going from leadership
positions in the ACTU to the parliamentary Labor party particularly
federally, that path is now starting to get some weeds. -‐ Current peak
union official 1
The labour movement is subject to a lot of status differentiation. This status
differentiation is important for understanding the strength of continuing
connections between former union officials in parliament and their union
colleagues. Three forms of differentiation are of interest in the context of this
chapter. First, interviewees often drew a distinction between the holders of
junior (particularly non-‐elected) positions in unions and senior union officials.
The former are often regarded as political trainees and they are not expected to
stay in the movement long-‐term. The second important distinction is between
affiliated and non-‐affiliated unions and unionists, with the former often
considering the latter as not ‘real’ unionists. The third important distinction
181
relates to the currency of union experience. Former officials who have been in
political careers for sometime are often considered to be out-‐of-‐touch with
contemporary union realities by current union officials.
The third distinction is particularly relevant in terms of the generational change
at the top of the union movement discussed in the last chapter, but it also relates
to the simple passing of time, and the adoption of subsequent career roles with
different and broader responsibilities:
Chris Evans57 comes from the Miscos but he has been gone a long time
he was party secretary in WA and so on. – Current peak union official 2
Interviewees frequently drew a distinction between people who worked for a
union (as researchers, industrial officers and unelected or junior level organisers)
and elected officials, and only considered the latter group to be unionists in a real
sense. One interviewee (Current peak union official 1) referred to those who held
only non-‐elected positions in unions as: “journeymen, or journeywomen, who
worked in unions on the way through.” Other interviewees made the point that
just working for a union, especially at a low level, doesn’t make you a union
official:
Chris Bowen58 for example you wouldn’t say he was a career union
official though he did actually work for a union. – Current peak union
official 2
Some of them are like Keating59 was, party activists, who get planted in
a union while you get your seat then you go in – Current affiliated union
official 5
57 Government leader in the Senate (November 2011) 58 Cabinet minister in the Gillard Government who was an industrial officer with the Finance Sector Union from 1995 – 2000. 59 Prime Minister Keating worked for Municipal Employees Union before winning pre-‐selection at age 25
182
Although employment with a law firm with union clients is also a well-‐trodden
pathway to ALP pre-‐selection60, several interviewees, for instance, discounted
Gillard’s relationship with the union movement prior to entering parliament on
the basis that working with unions is not the same as being a trade union official:
Gillard worked as a lawyer61 for the unions but I’m not sure that she’s
at heart a unionist, being a union lawyer is different to being a unionist.
-‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
She never worked for a union. She worked for a labour law firm that is
a different thing. I reckon working as a solicitor on an hourly rate
briefing and being a partner in a major firm is very different to doing
the day-‐to-‐day work of a trade union official. -‐ Current affiliated union
official 3
Another dimension of the real unionist question relates to unions covering
professional and public sector employees, most of which are not affiliated to the
ALP:
There is a tendency in the ALP and perhaps in the union movement
generally for some time to see public sector unionists as not real
unionists. They don’t have that blue-‐collar background, that tradition
and that history. I think there has been lots of suspicion of people in
public sector unions that they are not ALP voters or supporters. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Populist white-‐collar unions don’t have the same priorities as blue-‐
collar unions. They like getting up there and rabbiting off but they go
missing on hard issues. They dominate the priorities of the unions;
they are into issues that have nothing to do with (employment)
conditions. – Current federal MP 6
60 Former NSW Premier (1976-‐1986), Neville Wran, is perhaps the most illustrious example 61 Gillard was a partner with Slater and Gordon
183
The reasons why senior union officials, as opposed to the ‘journeymen and
journey women’ on political career tracks, seek to enter parliament are varied,
and apparently changing. For some time, parliament had been a useful retirement
spot, or a consolation prize for the losers in internal union battles, particularly
during the union restructuring and amalgamation phase of the 1990s:
A lot of these people got parachuted into parliament as retirement
packages to get them out of the union movement. – Current federal MP
6
Parliament was always a bit of a retirement job for (senior union
officials). Parliament has always been a way of you know ‘what are we
going to do with this bloke he’s too important to just knife but he’s
hopeless at the job so we’ll put him in parliament’. – Current affiliated
union official 5
Dow and Lafferty (2007:555) have suggested that the career trajectories of union
officials are a useful indication of the relative balance in the relationship between
unions and the ALP, a prevalent desire by senior officials to enter parliament
suggests that unions are very much the junior partners. The apparently greater
desire for senior union officials to enter parliament in recent years may reflect the
decline in union size, status and power:
I was talking to (senior Rudd Cabinet Minister) about this before the
last election, we were joking about it, Bill Shorten is probably the first
federal secretary of the AWU who thought going into parliament was a
move up. (Cabinet Minister) said that when he went in he was a state
union secretary but at that stage there were very few people at his level
in the trade union movement who saw parliament as a step up. People
of my generation thought that being a union secretary was much more
important. All of a sudden in the 1990s you got this thing that the
union movement was a stepping-‐stone into parliament. His theory, it’s
my theory too, is that because these jobs are just too hard for a lot of
people. Being a federal secretary is a job I love, but it’s a lot harder than
it was. Everything is different. – Current affiliated union official 5
184
Nevertheless, most of the senior union officials who go into parliament do so with
the purpose of pursuing a significant political career. Just as the presence of too
many political trainees in the union movement was viewed as a possible problem
for unions, the departure of too many senior union officials to parliament was
seen as a damaging loss of scarce leadership talent:
I’ve seen the trade union movement weakened by the trade union
officials going into parliament. – Former state MP 1
I think Combet leaving the union movement to go into parliament at the
time he did was a great blow for the union movement. It was an act of
great selfishness. I think he should have stayed with the union
movement. But having got in he’s now in the Ministry and he’s a good
voice so you are caught. – Current federal MP 6
A review of biographical information available on individual web pages for
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives on the parliament of
Australia website62 indicates that 51 members of the current 103 member FPLP
have previously worked as full-‐time union officials. Sometimes the information
provided on the biographical pages for individual MPs has been supplemented by
information from their first speeches, which are linked to from their individual
web pages, and from their own web pages, maintained separately to the
Australian Parliament site, but linked from that site. The table below provides a
summary. It shows that, overwhelmingly, affiliated unions are the main source
for union officials entering the FPLP, by a ratio of about 12 to 1. Second, former
union officials are about twice as prevalent in the Senate as they are in the House
of Representatives.
62 Parliament of Australia website http://www.aph.gov.au/
185
Table 20: Caucus: union officials, affiliated and not affiliated
House Senate Totals
Affiliated 25 22 47
Not-affiliated 2 2 4
TOTALS 27 24 51
FPLP 72 31 103
In terms of union backgrounds there is a significant difference between the House
of Representatives and the Senate. The current (November 2011) Senate ALP
group has a far higher percentage of union officials, and a far higher percentage
with senior roles, although these are concentrated at the state level. This
concentration of state officials probably reflects two key factors; the continuing
power of state branches in many unions and the affiliation of unions at a state
level, perhaps to the disadvantage of federal officials. Senior federal union
officials were more likely to enter parliament through the House of
Representatives than the Senate. For instance, all the senior ACTU officials in the
FPLP since the arrival of Bob Hawke in 1980 have held seats in the lower house
(Crean, Ferguson, George, Combet and Marles).
An analysis of the biographical backgrounds of ALP senators in the Senate that
commenced on the 1 July 2011, see table below, shows the continuing significance
of the domination of affiliated unions in this part of the FPLP. The biographical
information was sourced from the Australian Senate webpage63 in October 2011,
and supplemented with information from the personal websites of some Senators.
Of 31 ALP Senators, 21 had previously held a full-‐time position with an affiliated
union. I n addition, one Senator, whose Senate term started in 2002, was from the
CPSU, which affiliated to the ALP in 2009; and two other Senators had previously
held a full-‐time position with a non-‐affiliated union (AEU, NTEU). Fourteen of
these twenty-‐one Senators joined the Senate after 2000, making them nominally
at least part of the new generation of union leaders, discussed in the last chapter.
63 Australian Senate http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/
186
Only seven Senators, or fewer than 25 per cent, hadn’t had any experience as full
time union officials; of these one had been a state party official (Faulkner), four
had been political advisers (Brown, Carr, McLucas, Polley) and one had been a
state politician (Pratt). Only one ALP senator (Stephens, NSW) appeared to have
not held a full-‐time position in the labour movement prior to joining the Senate.
The biographical data points to the continuing relevance of state affiliation.
Although it is sometimes difficult to determine from the information supplied
whether the positions held were national or state, nearly half (eleven) of the 24
senators with full-‐time experience in the union movement, were state secretaries
or presidents of their unions prior to winning pre-‐selection for the Senate.
Almost all the Senators with union backgrounds were from Australia’s largest
unions. And all of Australia’s biggest affiliated unions have at least one person in
the Senate with a background in their organisations. Some unions were more
represented than others TWU (5 senators), SDA (4), ASU (2), CFMEU (2), AWU
(3), LHMU (1), CPSU (1), NUW (1), AMWU (2). There were just two
representatives from smaller unions: ETU (1), UFU (1). Men are much more likely
to have union backgrounds than female Senators. Thirteen of the ALP’s Senators
are female; five of these do not have a full-‐time union background. Only two of
the eighteen male Senators had not held a full-‐time union official (Carr, Faulkner).
In addition, the two Senators with backgrounds in non-‐affiliated unions were both
female, as was the Senator (Moore) from the CPSU, which was not affiliated when
she was elected to the Senate.
Table 21: Senators: union backgrounds
Name State Start Union Affiliated Position
Arbib, Mark NSW 2008 TWU Yes Official
Bilyk, Catryna Tas 2008 ASU Yes Industrial Officer
Bishop, Mark WA 1996 SDA Yes State secretary
Brown, Carol Tas 2005 No N/A N/A
Cameron, Doug NSW 2008 AMWU Yes National Secretary
187
Name State Start Union Affiliated Position
Carr, Kim Vic 1993 No N/A N/A
Collins, Jacinta Vic 1995 SDA Yes National Industrial officer
Conroy, Stephen
Vic 1996 TWU Yes Superannuation officer
Crossin, Trish NT 1998 NTEU No Branch Secretary
Evans, Chris WA 1993 LHMU Yes State Secretary, UFU
Farrell, Don SA 2008 SDA Yes State secretary
Faulkner, John NSW 1989 No N/A N/A
Feeney, David Vic 2008 TWU Yes Federal industrial officer
Furner, Mark Qld 2007 NUW Yes Branch Secretary
Gallacher, Alex SA 2011 TWU Yes State president
Hogg, John Qld 1996 SDA Yes State president
Ludwig, Joe Qld 1998 AWU Yes Senior industrial officer
Lundy, Kate ACT 1996 CFMEU Yes Organiser, Vice-‐President ACT branch
McEwen, Anne SA 2005 ASU Yes State Secretary
McLucas, Jan Qld 1999 No N/A N/A
Marshall, Gavin Vic 2002 ETU Yes Official
Moore, Claire Qld 2002 CPSU No / yes State Secretary
Polley, Helen Tas 2005 No N/A N/A
Pratt, Louise WA 2008 No N/A N/A
Sherry, Nick Tas 1990 LHMU Yes State secretary
Singh, Lisa Tas 2011 AEU No Organiser
Stephens, Ursula
NSW 2002 No N/A N/A
Sterle, Glenn WA 2005 TWU Yes Organiser
Thistlethwaite, Matt
NSW 2011 AWU Yes Organiser, later Deputy Secretary Unions NSW
188
Name State Start Union Affiliated Position
Urquart, Anne Tas 2011 AWU Yes State secretary
Wong, Penny SA 2002 CFMEU Yes Industrial Officer
Former union officials are a far smaller proportion of the ALP’s contingent in the
House of Representatives than in the Senate, 77 per cent in the Senate and 37.5
per cent in the House of Representatives. The next table provides a summary of
the ALP’s representation in the House of Representatives; a detailed list is at
Appendix 3. There are a total of 27 former union officials among Labor’s 72 MPs
in the lower house. Outside of former union officials many ALP MPs had
backgrounds in other ‘political class’ occupations (i.e. political staffers and party
officials), as well as the law and other professional occupations (Miragliotta and
Errington 2008). There are four union officials from each of the ACTU, SDA, and
LHMU; three each from the CPSU and the AWU; eight unions contributed the
remaining nine positions. Only 2 of the 27 are former officials from non-‐affiliated
unions. As with the Senate, male House of Representatives (HoR) members are
more likely to have union official backgrounds than female members. Five of the
twenty-‐seven former full-‐time union officials were female (just under twenty per
cent), while twenty-‐three of the seventy-‐two HoR ALP MPs are female (or thirty-‐
two per cent); or, in other words, twenty-‐two of the forty-‐nine male HoR ALP MPs
(nearly half) were former full-‐time officials.
Table 22: Caucus: unions represented
House Senate Totals
ACTU 4 0 4
AEU 0 1 1
AWU 3 3 6
AMWU 0 1 1
ASU 1 2 3
CEPU 1 0 1
CFMEU 0 2 2
189
House Senate Totals
CPSU 3 1 4
ETU 1 1 2
FSU 2 0 2
HSU 1 0 1
IEU 1 0 1
LHMU 4 2 6
NTEU 0 1 1
NUW 1 1 2
SDA 4 4 8
SPSF 1 0 1
TWU 0 5 5
TOTALS 27 24 51
FPLP 72 31 103
There are three times as many male former union officials in the FPLP as there
are female former union officials. Despite the ALP’s commitment to affirmative
action, it is still much less common for women to enter parliament from full-‐time
union positions than it is for men.
Table 23: Union backgrounds: by gender
Male Female
House 22 5
Senate 16 8
TOTALS 38 13
190
The next table summarises the Ministry appointed after the 2010 federal election
according to the election at which they were first elected to parliament. The
Second Gillard Ministry has 42 members, including parliamentary secretaries.
Eleven of these are Senators, ten of whom have backgrounds, which include full-‐
time union positions. As with the caucus overall nearly half of the Ministry have
backgrounds that include a full-‐time position with a trade union, all of them
affiliated to the ALP.
Table 24: Ministry: union representation
House Senate Total
ACTU 4 0 4
AWU 1 1 2
ASU 1 0 1
CFMEU 0 2 2
FSU 1 0 1
LHMU 1 2 3
NUW 1 0 1
SDA 1 2 3
TWU 0 3 3
TOTALS 10 10 20
Ministry 31 11 42
The next table lists the members of the current FPLP with significant experience
(i.e. full-‐time paid employment) in the third sectors (i.e. non-‐government
organisations). Only 8 of the ALP’s 72 members in the lower house can be said to
have significant third sector experience. This is a fairly generous classification,
which may actually over-‐estimate the extent of NGO backgrounds in the FPLP.
Garrett was recruited by the ALP before the 2004 election; Gray is better known
191
as a former ALP National Secretary and executive with Woodside, a large oil and
gas company; and, Dreyfus and Parke could also be classified as lawyers with NGO
experience.
Table 25: Federal caucus NGO experience
Name Electorate Experience
Byrne Holt Chief Executive Officer, Anxiety Disorders Foundation of Australia 1994-‐1996
Cheeseman Corangamite Fundraiser, Association for the Blind 1999 -‐ 2002
Dreyfus Isaacs Field officer for the Northern Land Council, Darwin (1979 – 1981) and a research fellow at the National Research Institute of Gerontology and Geriatric Medicine in 1982
Garrett Kingsford-‐Smith
President, Australian Conservation Foundation 1989-‐93 and 1999-‐2004
Gray Brand Executive Director, Medical Research Foundation 2000-‐2001
Neumann Blair Spent a decade as a health community councilor and 14 years as a Queensland Baptist Care board member
Parke Fremantle Senior international lawyer with the United Nations (Kosovo, Gaza, Lebanon, Cyprus, New York), 1999 – 2007
Snowdon Northern Territory
Senior Project Officer, Central Land Council, Alice Springs 1983-‐1987
In terms of union representation in the FPLP, access to parliamentary office
continues to result in a strong connection between affiliated unions and the
parliamentary wing of the ALP. Although affiliated unions represent fewer union
members than ever before, there has been little evidence that officials from non-‐
affiliated unions are gaining greater access to parliament through the ALP. In
addition, like-‐minded community organisations (including environmental,
community health and welfare groups) are also largely absent from the ALP’s
parliamentary ranks. Consequently, there is a continuing strong connection with
a narrow section of the overall union movement and the community organisation
192
sector. This narrowness represents a form of weakening links between the union
movement and the ALP. It is a weakening of links by inertia and omission. It also
suggests that despite the ambitions of the ALP expressed in the 2010 National
Review to position itself as a progressive party with a broad community
engagement its pre-‐selection processes reveal a continuing large and rigid bias in
favour of a small number of affiliated unions and the ACTU.
5. Connections
The fact that someone’s an ex union official doesn’t mean that you can
rely on them behaving in a particular way – Current peak union official
2
The growing autonomy of the parliamentary party from the organisational party
marks a party in transition from the mass party type to the catch-‐all, electoral
professional and cartel types (Katz and Mair 1995, Panebianco 1988). In the
discussion on the impact of federalism on the national unions-‐ALP relationship in
Chapter 4, it was observed that the relative autonomy of the FPLP in the early
decades of its history was a matter of some considerable interest to earlier
scholars (Rawson 1954, Crisp 1978). More recently, Cavalier (2010) has argued
that all of the splits that characterised the federal ALP during its first six decades
were a result of conflicts between the parliamentary party and the organisational
party. As the ALP transitions away from the social democratic type of unions-‐
party relationship and towards the pressure group type we would expect to see a
greater degree of parliamentary autonomy, and a greater acceptance of it by the
union movement, even if this acquiescence is reluctant.
The importance for the union movement of the presence of its former officials in
the FPLP depends on the extent to which it translates into the type of automatic
support for union policy positions described by Minkin (1992) and Valenzuela
(1992). Personal relationships between former union officials in the FPLP and
current union officials are particularly important in the absence of formal
affiliation, or an institutionalised relationship, at the national level between
193
unions and the ALP. Many interviewees stressed the individual nature of these
relationships, and the importance of the individual MPs’ attitudes to the union
movement after they enter parliament. There was overall satisfaction with the
performance of former union officials in parliament; twelve of the fourteen
current union officials interviewed were either positive or neutral in their overall
attitudes towards the usefulness of MPs with union backgrounds to the union
movement. Nevertheless, there was also evident discontent and concern, about
the attitudes and behaviours of some individuals. The next table reports that nine
of the fourteen current union officials were negative (two) or neutral (seven).
Some in the neutral category emphasised that some MPs maintained good
relations with unions, while others did not.
Table 26: Current union officials: Attitudes to ALP MPs
Positive Negative Neutral
Affiliated 1 0 5
Non-affiliated 2 1 1
Peak 2 1 1
Totals 5 2 7
Interviewees frequently discussed the unions-‐ALP relationship in terms of
individual relationships between specific unions and individual MPs; they tended
to see the relationship as an agglomeration of many such specific relationships,
rather than a general, or generalisable, unions-‐ALP relationship:
There are key pollies in the federal caucus that we’ve got a relationship
with, we’ve got an ex branch secretary in there now, and a Senator and
there are other people we know and can work with but again that’s
working those relationships. People like (Minister), the relationship
will always be there. We might have our differences on some stuff but
you know -‐ Current affiliated union official 6
194
Look at de Bruyn at the SDA he has a cell of about half a dozen in the
caucus. But he’s not able to influence a lot of policies because a lot of
his stuff is on the conservative extreme of social policy it’s as if it is a
blast from the past. Santamaria lite and it doesn’t go down well. –
Current federal MP 6
I know that with the metalworkers there is a level of frustration
because they have a number of people in the caucus who are not
necessarily doing anything which is why Doug (Cameron)64 is in the
caucus. – Current federal MP 6
If anything, the trend is likely to be towards more individualisation in the
relationship between unions and the ALP. The individualisation trend is a logical
outcome of the union movement’s marginal seat activity, where relationships can
be built on political campaigning as well as the union backgrounds of some MPs:
Labor had to win so many seats and the unions made a lot of
connections at local levels. Julie Owen (Parramatta) is a good example
she comes out of the management of theatres, the music sector, but she
is very close to the CFMEU and they have helped her very strongly, not
just in that campaign, she has a strong connection. – Current federal MP
2
Some of the union concern and discontent about continuing relationships with
former colleagues might simply be due, or at least needs to be seen in the context
of, a different approach to governing and the impact that has on the relationship
between the FPLP and unions. One MP argued that the Rudd Government was
very different to past ALP Governments:
It is just a reality if you’re going to deal with us as a union movement
we’re a very different animal than Labor Governments that you have
64 Senator Cameron joined the Senate in July 2008, elected 2007, as a Senator for NSW; he was previously National Secretary of the AMWU. Cameron is now a high-‐profile leader of the left faction in the FPLP.
195
seen in the past. It’s genuinely generational change in the leadership, it
is times have changed and it is that society has changed so there are a
whole bunch of factors that conspire to make it a very different
environment -‐ Current federal MP 4
Nevertheless, a common concern is the extent to which some union officials
change when they enter parliament. Some interviewees were generally confident
that union officials mostly do not change their pro-‐worker ideology when they
become MPs:
I don’t think any of my union colleagues who have gone in there (to
parliament) have lost their respect or stopped fighting for working
people, it’s just a question of how you do that – Current peak union
official 3
Most Labor MPs would still see themselves as having a pro-‐worker
orientation. – Current peak union official 4
Despite this overall satisfaction, there was criticism of some specific individuals,
with many interviewees recalling the behaviour and attitudes of some MPs with
disdain, bitterness and cynicism:
A lot of them do change; a lot of them definitely become different
people. Very disappointingly. – Current affiliated union official 2
I won’t name names but even people who occupied some very senior
positions in the union movement seem to go through this
metamorphosis that, not all of them, but a number of them, they now
have a different role. -‐ Current peak union official 1
Nevertheless, some sign of the acceptance of the autonomy of the parliamentary
party can be found in interviewee comments that acknowledge the different
pressures and responsibilities faced by parliamentarians. Interviewees argued,
for instance, that the behaviour of individual MPs was shaped by the political
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realities of parliament, rather than mere individual failings. For example, one
interviewee recognised the importance of caucus and cabinet discipline, seeing
them as similar to union values of solidarity:
I think they mainly become parliamentarians. I’m not totally dismissive
of them obviously they bring some values and some beliefs and all that.
I’m not taking that view that they are all shit because they went into
politics because I think that is a bit harsh but look I mean the reality is
that people join up they sign up to be in caucus they sign up to the
discipline of caucus and even more so when they go to Cabinet we all
know that and they know it when they are going in. That’s the way it is.
– Current affiliated union official 3
Another interviewee acknowledged the political realities that provided MPs with
incentives to distance themselves from the union movement, especially as they
assumed senior roles:
The more senior the portfolio the more difficult it would be to be
portrayed, or allow yourself to be portrayed, as highly sympathetic to a
union movement that you came from. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union
official 4
Other interviewees saw a need for union officials who became MPs to change
their approach given the different demands on MPs:
I think a lot of people have their hearts with the union movement but
parliament is a different place it’s like playing on a different court in
tennis, grass court or hard court.” – Current federal MP 6
Sometimes politicians get up there and they sort of get mugged by
reality. In the modern world there are lots of competing interests
banging on the doors of government and you’ve got to try and deal with
it -‐ Current peak union official 3
Most union interviewees did not have high expectations about their capacities to
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influence parliamentarians. In fact, few participants could point to examples of
substantive union influence on policy outcomes during the Rudd Government
outside industrial relations, where the ACTU negotiated directly with the ALP
leadership. Some interviewees expressed disappointment with the level of union
influence on the Rudd Government caucus:
The thing that amazes me, well it doesn’t amaze me I understand why it
happens is that so many of the marginal seats that we picked up people
will say that they got there on the back of the efforts that unionists
made as part of the YR@W campaign but as soon as they get into the
caucus room. I know some of my marginal colleagues particularly in
Queensland say we wouldn’t be here if it wasn’t for the teachers they
did all the work but when it comes to issues nationally where the
teachers federation has a different view it’s still Julia’s view that
prevails. -‐ Current federal MP 3
One MP recounted a particular episode to highlight the lack of union influence on
the caucus, it also points to the vast difference between the union composition of
the House of Representatives and Senate components of the FPLP:
Jeff Lawrence, secretary of the ACTU, and Mark Lennon, the head of
NSW Labor Council, asked for a meeting with all federal labor MPs. It
was to be held in the caucus room at 5pm on a Wednesday. It was to
discuss their opposition to proposed health and safety changes65 put
forward by the federal government, Julia. I counted them there were
10 senators there, now there are 32 Labor senators, 10 of them are
ministers, parliamentary secretaries or presidents so there are 22. So
10 out of 22 attended which is pretty good. There were 4 House of
Reps people there. They didn’t turn up because they don’t think the
unions are relevant. There wasn’t one NSW MP there. Since the caucus
changes where the Leader picks the frontbench again a number of us
65 The ACTU campaigned against the proposal by the Rudd and Gillard Governments to harmonise, and make other changes, to Australia’s federal system of occupational health and safety laws see http://www.actu.org.au/Campaigns/HealthSafety/default.aspx
198
opposed it there is no protection for people to get up and query the
executive there is no group you can go back to and give you a bit of
sustenance because in the end it doesn’t matter what they think it
matters what Kevin thinks. So the next day the Government was well
aware of how little agitation there was from its own backbench and
sent us a letter saying they weren’t changing their mind about
whatever the ACTU and NSW Labor Council wanted on health and
safety. -‐ Current federal MP 5
The relationship between unions and the caucus has, according to some
interviewees, been severely weakened by Rudd’s decision to reverse a century of
ALP tradition and select his own Ministry66, a main means by which the FPLP
could exercise influence over the parliamentary leadership. Gillard has retained
the new practice as Prime Minister. As we have already noted, MPs with union
backgrounds tend to become more removed from (narrow) union concerns as
they move into frontbench and then Cabinet roles, this makes the diminution of
the role of caucus even more adverse for unions as they rely on their relationships
with individual caucus members, particularly those that have entered parliament
more recently:
Now you’ve got a situation where you’ve got caucus solidarity so you
can’t break out of that but you’ve also got a situation where in order to
get advanced there’s only one bloke who is going to advance you. Now
the faction leaders of course still have a big role in that but he is
immensely more powerful than any previous labor leader -‐ Current
affiliated union official 3
It took a lot of courage for the seven people (in caucus) who spoke
against the ABCC proposal -‐ Current federal MP 3
66 Even though the early FPLP was relatively more autonomous than many other parliamentary Labour parties, its early leaders (Watson and Fisher) were unable to establish the principle that the Leaders should be able to select the frontbench team.
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Dissidents in the caucus, of which there are very few and usually people
on the way out, cop a hiding and in my experience quieten down pretty
quickly. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
One interviewee recounted an incident that suggested that many MPs now feel
less empowered, including by the sidelining of caucus, than the union officials
seeking to lobby them:
We had a meeting last year with ALP backbenchers and when it was
announced that we had a meeting lined up with Julia Gillard and we
were trying to lobby the backbenchers as we were about to bring the
meeting to a close one of the backbenchers said I’m sure I speak on
behalf of everyone here, about 15 of them in the room, look if you’re
going to see Julia could you ask her to listen to us a bit more too. It’s a
bit sad when ALP backbenchers are asking us to put in a good word for
them. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Although there has been increasing unity between unions inside the ALP,
especially at the 2009 National Conference, the range of issues on which this unity
has been exercised has been very limited, indicating a narrow union influence on
policy issues inside the party. Procurement67 was one of the issues unions made a
strong push for at the 2009 National Conference, but even here one interviewee
commented on the contrast between winning support at the ALP conference and
getting Ministers to deliver:
There was an agreement to have model employers being able to win
contracts, now we’ve run across a half billion-‐dollar contract that
doesn’t have model employer status in it. We’re now being told that it’s
supposed to happen in a few months, you’d think you’d wait before
issuing a half billion-‐dollar contract and that makes you wonder about
the government’s commitment. And then there are issues about
67 Unions, particularly the AWU and AMWU with significant memberships in manufacturing, campaigned to get the government to favour local producers in its procurement policies.
200
removalist contracts and cleaning contracts. Julia Gillard agreed with a
very effective campaign run by the LHMU (Clean Start) but a contract
then gets issued worth several million dollars to an employer who isn’t
a member of Clean Start68. There is general commitment but delivery is
always another thing. But when a half-‐billion dollar contract goes out.
A minister knows it goes out. There is no minister who hasn’t been
lobbied about procurement for the last 2 years. -‐ Current affiliated
union official 4
The obvious conclusion from these comments is that affiliation has considerable
influence on who gets into parliament, but much less influence on how they
behave once they are there. The general acceptance that parliament is different
and that people often change when they leave the union movement and enter
parliament is an indicator of a growing acceptance of weakening links and the
growing autonomy of the parliamentary party. In addition, the weakening of
caucus has reduced the value unions can derive from their continuing
relationships with individual members of the FPLP. Except for the fact that the
FPLP carries a disproportionately large contingent of former officials of affiliated
unions, the relationship between unions and the FPLP is consistent with theories
about the transition of parties away from the mass party type (Katz and Mair
1995, Panebianco 1988); it is also consistent with the arguments of McIlroy
(1988) who suggested the co-‐existence of strong organisational connections with
declining policy influence under the New Labour model.
6. Non-‐affiliation
The unions that built the party from the beginning have stature. It
wouldn’t matter how fabulous the (non-‐affiliated union) was, it just
wouldn’t. It’s almost like a historical cult. – Current non-‐affiliated union
official 1
68 Clean Start encourages purchasers of cleaning services to use employers who are committed to certain standards in pay and conditions.
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There is some evidence that the pattern of union affiliation with the ALP creates a
distinction between insiders (from affiliated unions) and outsiders (from non
affiliated unions). Most interviewees tended to play down the distinction, though
some interviewees from affiliated unions were sharply critical of non-‐affiliated
unions. In addition, some MPs were critical of non-‐affiliated unions for, in their
view, wanting the benefits of affiliation with the ALP without embracing the
discipline of refraining from campaigning against the ALP:
The teachers are probably one of the biggest lobbyers in parliament.
They are constantly there in parliament. So other than not paying
money to the party they play a big role. – Current federal MP 1
They (non-‐affiliated unions) are outside the tent but they get far more
outraged when they are not getting the outcomes they want than
affiliated unions do. – Current federal MP 5
Some Labor Party ministers particularly feel aggravated by unions that
haven’t got a symbiotic relationship with the party but which go out
there as they see it undermining the government, it’s often standing up
for the members’ conditions. I think there is a very different way that
you deal with the railway workers over their problems and with some
other public sector unions that aren’t affiliated. – Current federal MP 6
One possible explanation for the perception that non-‐affiliated unions are more
demanding is that professional unions represent members in publicly funded
sectors and are therefore more likely to be in direct conflict with ALP
Governments:
We’re also seen as more demanding of ALP governments than a lot of
other unions. That has to do with the role of the public sector. -‐ Current
non-‐affiliated union official 3
Nevertheless, some interviewees from non-‐affiliated unions were just as adamant
about the benefits of not being ‘inside the tent’, the primary benefit of non-‐
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affiliation being the capacity to act independently of the ALP:
I think we walk both sides. I think it would be harder for affiliated
unions to front up and run campaigns as we do or to have discussions
with the Liberals certainly before the election outcome is known. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
Once Howard came in we had to be able to talk to the Coalition as well
as all the other parties and I had to be able to say that I am not a
member of any political party, that as the President of the union my job
is to do the best for the union and for our members. That helped a lot. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
The independence of non-‐affiliated unions, or their outsider status, sometimes
sees officials from these unions excluded from discussions with ALP Ministers
that might have party political significance. Generally, however, affiliated and
non-‐affiliated unions work together in their efforts to influence ALP
Governments:
There might be some issues about discussions about election tactics
with the Government that we might be wary about having non-‐
affiliated unions involved with but on policy things it’s a bit hard to
separate the two really. – Current peak union official 2
When it comes to crunch time and distinctions are made and it is well
this is really one for the ALP affiliated unions. By crunch time I mean
going to the ALP conference and arguing against electricity
privatisation. – Current peak union official 3
While there are some differences between affiliated and non-‐affiliated unions in
policy concerns and their preferred modes of contention, these seem insufficient
to explain the huge disparity between the access the two groups have to ALP pre-‐
selections. The combination of a stable affiliation pattern, and a huge imbalance
between the representation of affiliated unions and not-‐affiliated unions in the
FPLP, suggests that the composition of the FPLP reflects the party’s history,
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particularly the first half of the twentieth century when Australia had a blue-‐
collar workforce, rather than the political realties of the first half of the twenty-‐
first century.
7. Caucus attitudes
How have the attitudes of Caucus members changed since the Accord period? Do
MPs view unions as partners in a social democratic relationship, or as interest
groups with a similar status to other like-‐minded community organisations? One
way of approaching these questions is through the first speeches of new
members. In 1998, ANU historian Paul Pickering published a comparison of the
intakes of new members from the Liberal National Party coalition after its two big
election wins in 1975 and 1996, including a detailed examination of the first
speeches of incoming government MPs (Pickering 1998). Pickering (1998)
argued that these first speeches were valuable because they showed us how these
members chose to reveal themselves to the world. How they chose to reveal
themselves provided, in turn, valuable insights into the changing face and
composition of the Liberal and National parties. These new members represented
the seats won with the help of the “Howard battlers”, outer suburban blue-‐collar
workers who deserted the ALP, much like the Reagan Democrat phenomenon in
the USA a decade and a half earlier. The new Liberal National Party (LNP)
members were far more likely to have attended government-‐run schools than
their predecessors and they were loud champions of small business and family
values.
After winning the election in 2007, 32 ALP members sat, and spoke, in the House
of Representatives, for the first time, 39 per cent of Labor’s representation in the
lower house. The last time Labor had been returned to office, in 1983, 27 new
ALP members (36 per cent of Labor’s lower house contingent) entered the House
for the first time. Comparing these two cohorts of new members provides some
interesting insights into the evolution of the FPLP. In making the comparison, I
used biographical data from the parliamentary website and from the 59 first (still
204
called ‘maiden’ in 1983) speeches made by these two groups of new MPs.
The ALP’s intake of new members in 2007 joined what is still a fairly exclusive
club; by that time only 1059 people had been elected to the House since
Federation. Their fates are also politically important. Labor’s new members held
22 of the ALP’s 25 most marginal seats – they are the difference between
Government and Opposition. Equally, their tenure can be short. Eleven (11) of
the new members were not returned at the 2010 election. Nine (one-‐third) of the
new members in 1983 went onto ministerial positions during the period of the
Hawke-‐Keating governments (1983 – 1996).
Of the 32 new members who entered parliament in 2007, for the first time, and
the 21 that survived beyond the 2010 election, ten were appointed to the Second
Gillard Ministry after the 2010 election. They included one Cabinet Minister
(Combet), four members of the outer ministry (Butler, Clare, Gray, Shorten) and
four parliamentary secretaries (Bradbury, Julie Collins, Dreyfus, Kelly, Marles). Of
these ten, four had been senior union officials prior to their election (Butler,
Combet, Marles, Shorten). The table below sets out the details of the ALP’s 21
surviving new members from 2007. Of the 21, 11 had held full-‐time union official
positions at some time prior to entering parliament. Of these, 10 had been
officials with affiliated unions. They comprised two former senior officials from
the ACTU (one previously with the MUA, and one with the TWU), two from the
AWU, two from the SDA, one from the LHMU, one from the ETU, one from the
LHMU, one from the CPSU, one from the HSU, and one from the (non-‐affiliated)
IEU. As with ALP MPs in the House of Representatives and the Senate more
generally, the former union officials among these new MPs are also more likely to
be male. Five of the twenty-‐one new MPs in 2007, who survived the 2010
election, are female. Two of these five had full-‐time union backgrounds. The
other seven of the nine former union officials are male.
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Table 27: Class of 2007: after 2010 election
Name Electorate State Union official
Affiliated 2nd Gillard Ministry
1 Butler, Mark Port Adelaide SA Yes Yes (LHMU) Yes
2 Bradbury, David
Lindsay NSW No N/A Yes
3 Champion, Nick
Wakefield SA Yes Yes (SDA) No
4 Cheeseman, Darren
Corangamite Vic Yes Yes (CPSU) No
5 Clare, Jason Blaxland NSW No N/A Yes
6 Collins, Julie Franklin Tas No N/A Yes
7 Combet, Greg
Charlton NSW Yes Yes (ACTU / MUA)
Yes
8 D’Ath, Yvette
Petrie Qld Yes Yes (AWU) No
9 Dreyfus, Mark
Isaacs Vic No N/A No
10 Gray, Gary Brand WA No N/A Yes
11 Kelly, Mike Eden-‐Monaro NSW No N/A Yes
12 Marles, Richard
Corio Vic Yes Yes (ACTU / TWU)
Yes
13 Neumann, Shayne
Blair Qld No N/A No
14 Parke, Melissa
Fremantle WA No N/A No
15 Perrett, Graham
Moreton Qld Yes No (IEU) No
16 Rishworth, Amanda
Kingston SA Yes Yes (SDA) No
17 Saffin, Janelle
Page NSW No N/A No
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Name Electorate State Union official
Affiliated 2nd Gillard Ministry
18 Symon, Mike
Deakin Vic Yes Yes (ETU) No
19 Shorten, Bill Maribyrnong Vic Yes Yes (AWU) Yes
20 Thomson, Craig
Dobell NSW Yes Yes (HSU) No
21 Zappia, Tony
Makin SA No N/A No
A distinctive feature of the 32 first speeches made by ALP members after the
2007 election is the lavish praise and expressions of gratitude they contain for the
campaign efforts of the trade union movement, and for many individual unions
and unionists. This praise and gratitude is often supplemented with rhetorical
efforts to position trade unions as community-‐based organisations defending the
rights of ordinary workers and protecting key Australian values like the “fair go”,
the same expression of the ALP’s ideology that appears in the 2010 ALP National
Review (ALP 2010). The praise and gratitude is not surprising given the large
investment in marginal seat campaigning made by unions in the 2007 campaign
(Muir 2008), but it is a marked departure from the first speeches of ALP members
in 1983 when there was little attention paid to unions, even though the formal
ALP-‐ACTU accord was an important part of the ALP’s election strategy and of the
Hawke Government (1983 – 1991).
All but three of the 32 of the class of 2007 mention unions in their first speeches,
and 23 (72 per cent) mention specific unions and union peak bodies. Altogether,
29 separate unions and peak organisations were mentioned by at least one MP.
Australia’s trade unions got far less attention in the 1983 ALP first speeches. Only
eight of the 27 (30 per cent) mentioned unions at all, only one of these mentioned
an individual union.
The next table provides some examples of the comments about unions made by
union officials joining the FPLP for the first time. There are some recurrent
207
themes suggesting that even at this early stage of their transitions they are
already using the rhetoric and ideology of the pressure group type. Greg Combet
(former ACTU secretary) made the most substantive remarks about unionism, but
even here he used the language of individual rights in proposing a human rights
charter (a key citizen rights tactic) to enshrine the right to collective bargaining
and freedom of association. Others spoke in terms of a balance between the
interests of unions and business (Combet, D’Ath, Shorten). Shorten
(Maribyrnong, former federal secretary, AWU) was particularly strong on this
point: “the old class war conflicts should be finally pronounced dead”. Another
MP (Rishworth, Kingston) spoke of the value of unions as training grounds for a
parliamentary career. Several spoke in fond terms of their time as trade union
officials without saying how this might affect their views as parliamentarians.
And, of course, the idea of unions as champions of the ‘fair go’ also got a mention.
Cheeseman (Corangamite) argued that this iconic Australian value originated in
the “union workplace campaigns of 100 years ago”.
Table 28: Union role: comments of former officials
Former official Substantive quotes
Butler69 (Port Adelaide) – State Secretary, LHMU
None
Champion70 (Wakefield), SDA
My experience as a trade union official taught me that the most important prerequisite for public office is empathy for others.
Cheeseman71 (Corangamite) – organiser, CPSU
The fair go now has broader application but, originally, it was born out of union workplace campaigns from over 100 years ago
69 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HWK 70 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HW9 71 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HW7
208
Former official Substantive quotes
Combet72 (Charlton) – Secretary, ACTU
Basic rights such as freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain should, ultimately, in my view, join other fundamental democratic freedoms in a codified set of human rights in Australia. I believe the absence of such a code, perhaps in the form of a human rights act, to be a weakness of our democracy
In my role as a union leader, I learnt the importance of considering and balancing competing views and to respect the legitimate interests and concerns of business.
D’Ath73 (Petrie) – Senior Industrial Advocate, AWU
The AWU has always sought to balance obligations to job security and improved wages with the sometimes conflicting need to see that businesses and the economy remain strong.
Marles74 (Corio) – Assistant Secretary, ACTU
The union movement will always hold a very special place in my heart
Perrett75 -‐ Organiser (IEU) The importance of health and safety on worksites—everybody in this chamber must recognise the important role our unions play in saving lives every single day all around Australia
Rishworth76 (Kingston) – Official, SDA
I make no apologies for having been a union official. I am extremely proud of the fact that I have helped thousands of people get a better deal at work and protect their interests in the workplace. Only those who have no genuine conception of real workplaces can think being a unionist is anything less than a fine and admirable preparation for parliamentary service
72 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=YW6 73 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HVN 74 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HWQ 75 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HVP 76 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HW
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Former official Substantive quotes
Shorten77 (Maribyrnong) – Federal Secretary, AWU
The old class war conflicts should finally be pronounced dead. The real conflict today, I suggest, cuts across the old divides. It is reflected within business, unions, the community and politics. The real conflict is between those who are stuck in a business-‐as-‐usual routine and those that pursue innovation, knowledge and creativity.
Symon78 (Deakin) – organiser and sop steward ETU
None.
Thomson79 (Dobell) –National Secretary HSU
I am a unionist, a former trade union official of the Health Services Union. Can I say that I am immensely proud of that fact? This election showed everybody that ‘union’ is not a dirty word
The 2007 speeches contain an almost universal belief, explicit and implicit, that
the ideological struggles of earlier years are over. In 2007, much more than in
1983, the language of class, and of conflict, has disappeared from the first
speeches of Labor MPs. Nor is there any talk of socialism or democratic socialism.
In 1983, Gerry Hand, a leader of the left, future Cabinet minister and new member
for the safe ALP seat of Melbourne, used his first speech to tell the parliament that
capitalism was an “immoral” and “corrupt” system. Several new MPs in 1983 also
opined that Australians had voted for “socialism”, “social democracy”, “democratic
socialism” or “socialist solutions” at the 1983 election. Similar pronouncements
in 2007 are simply unimaginable80.
77 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=ATG 78 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HW8 79 House of Representatives website accessed 7 December 2011 http://www.aph.gov.au/house/members/firstspeech.asp?id=HVZ 80 The 2007 first speeches were made before the global financial crisis; since then Kevin Rudd and other ALP figures have criticised alleged market excesses but have not launched anything like a full-‐scale critique of capitalism of the sort that lay behind Hand’s pronouncement.
210
Instead, the first speeches of the class of 2007 are populated with hopes for
greater social justice in the sense of a ‘fair go’ and of government helping to
remove barriers and create opportunities for individuals and communities. Labor
is positioned in these speeches as the party of traditional Australian values (the
‘fair go’, mateship and family life) and, above all, social cohesion. The 1983 intake
was often savage about the events of 1975 and the divisive role of Malcolm Fraser
in Whitlam’s dismissal and the policies pursued during Fraser’s term in office.
The 2007 intake has been just as savage on the perceived divisiveness of the
Howard Government, and even more eloquent in seeking to position the ALP as
the true protector and preserver of genuine Australian values.
In recent years, there has been growing public comment and criticism about the
declining diversity in the social backgrounds of Australian MPs, including those
from the ALP (Catley 2005:106, Miragliotta and Errington 2008). Arguments
about lack of diversity have two main components. First, the MPs are seen as
being overwhelmingly from middle class backgrounds because of their education
levels and choice of occupation; and, second, it has been noted that MPs are
increasingly being drawn from a newly emergent professional political class, with
a growing number of ALP MPs having worked as political advisers, union officials
and party officials before entering parliament.
In this study, five occupations were used as indicators of membership of a
political class. Those occupations are paid employment as a political staffer, party
official or union official; or previous experience as a political representative in
local or state government, and, in one case, the Senate (Neal). Some of the new
MPs had filled a number of these roles. The four MPs with no professional
political class experience had pursued notable careers outside politics: Kelly
(army), McKew (journalism), Neumann (law) and Parke (university lecturer, UN
lawyer). On the other hand, only five of the new MPs (15 per cent) can claim to
have had genuine blue-‐collar experience (i.e. not just a student job): Bidgood
(printer and platemaker), D’Ath (various low-‐skilled occupations), Hale
(Australian Apprentice of the year, 1991), Raguse (compositor) and Symon
(electrician).
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Table 29: New members: political class
Prior occupation MPs (32)
Union officials 12
Political staffers 9
Local Government 8
Parliamentary experience 4
Party officials 2
None 4
In terms of education, the most notable characteristic is the preference for legal
qualifications and the choice of the law as a pre-‐parliament occupation. Fully 15,
virtually half, of the new members had an LLB qualification. By way of contrast, a
total of five had qualifications covering science, medicine, engineering and
agriculture. A total of seven had a business, commerce or economics qualification.
The new cohort of ALP members, especially those that survived the 2010 election,
continues the domination of the ALP caucus by MPs from affiliated unions. The
cohort is more likely to use the language of the pressure group type of unions-‐
party relationships, where unions are like-‐minded organisations sharing similar
values, rather than the language of class and a purposive social democratic
ideology centred on representing the labour interest in parliament. Nevertheless,
the benefits of affiliation, in terms of access to parliamentary pre-‐selections,
continues to be narrowly focused on affiliated unions, and non-‐affiliated unions
and community organisations continue to be absent from this key form of party
engagement with social groupings.
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8. Conclusion
In contrast to the flexibility with which the ACTU, and the union leadership more
generally, tend to view the unions-‐ALP relationship, the structural relationship
between affiliated unions and the ALP has changed very little. The ALP privileges
affiliated unions through a legacy form of the social democratic relationship. In
doing so, the ALP has made more difficult its realisation of the vision of a broadly-‐
based progressive party contained in its 2010 Review. The social democratic
legacy when it comes to pre-‐selections is a contrast to the greater preference for
pressure group type rhetoric. It is a matter of social democratic form with
pressure group content.
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CHAPTER 8: BENEFIT EXCHANGES
1. Introduction
Should unions remain affiliated, that big question, is that good for the
party, is it good for unions? I think its benign for unions, I think in the
end it is good for the party, if the unionism is good unionism – Former
affiliated union official 1
In the previous two chapters, it was argued that unions and the ALP are publicly
moving away from the closeness and dependence of the social democratic type by
emphasising their independence and pursuing strategies aimed at broadening
their engagement with outside bodies. Unions are seeking to interact with other
‘like-‐minded’ political parties and community organisations; the ALP is seeking
stronger relationships with ‘progressive’ community organisations. Despite these
efforts the traditional social democratic relationship type remains as a potent
constraint. The reason why the dependence of the social democratic relationship
type retains its salience lies in the superiority of the political benefit exchange
that results from the social democratic type, particularly for unions.
Unions-‐party relationships are political exchanges. In his study of the
relationship between the BLP and the Trades Union Congress (TUC), Minkin
(1991:654) argued that a “hard-‐headed appraisal of its benefits” by both sides
held that relationship together. This chapter argues that understanding the
dynamics of the political exchange in a time of transition requires a more
sophisticated analysis of the benefit exchange, by considering two important
characteristics of the political exchange of benefits inside the unions-‐ALP
relationship which are central to the ways in which those benefits are interpreted
and valued. I refer to those aspects as symmetry and predictability. This analysis
of benefit exchanges helps to explain why both sides of the relationship are
seeking to move apart, become more independent, while seeming to be unable, or
unwilling, to do so decisively.
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2. Benefit exchanges and relationship types
Unions and parties are ultimately separate political actors with different political
objectives. This separateness and difference was minimised in the past by a
number of factors: by policy confluence during the Keynesian era and by a certain
degree of political bi-‐partisanship around the arbitration system and an
institutional role for unions in it. These factors had the effect of reducing the
electoral cost to the ALP of its close connection with unions; while high union
density levels and a predominantly blue-‐collar workforce, maximised the
electoral benefit unions were able to deliver to the ALP. The ALP’s primary vote
in House of Representatives elections hardly fell below 40 per cent until 1990
even during periods of internal conflict (see Table at Appendix 2).
Subsequent social and political changes in recent decades have made the political
exchange between unions and the ALP more problematic. The symmetry and
predictability of the benefit exchange have been brought into question. Symmetry
has two dimensions. First, it describes a sense of overall equivalence between the
benefits received by both sides. That is, the benefits received by the ALP are as
important to the ALP as the benefits received by unions are to unions. A situation
in which one side feels the other is getting a lot more out of the relationship is
likely to be characterised by tension and, therefore, instability. I refer to this
dimension as external symmetry. Second, there is the question of symmetry
within the basket of benefits received by both sides. For instance, it might be
argued that the internal balance of benefits received by the ALP has shifted, with
the benefit of funding and human resources received by unions remaining
important (though less so), but the electoral benefit of a strong connection with a
unionised blue-‐collar workforce having diminished significantly. I refer to this
dimension as internal symmetry. The de-‐linking of resources from identity is an
important step in the weakening of links between unions and the ALP; without
the ‘identity’ benefit, the relationship becomes closer to the more independent
character of a pressure group relationship.
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Predictability is also critical to the interpretation and value placed on benefit
exchanges. Quinn (201:360) has argued that party organisation is a solution to
the problem of asymmetrical political exchanges, where unions, for instance,
deliver short-‐term electoral benefits in return for medium or long-‐term legislative
and policy benefits. Asymmetry is a result of time in this instance rather than
value. Valenzuela (1992) made a similar point when he drew a distinction
between the social democratic and the pressure group type based on the presence
of affiliation in the first and its absence in the second. Affiliation, the direct
representation of unions in internal party forums and processes, Minkin (1992)
and Valenzuela (1992) argued, means that unions can rely on the party’s political
representatives to support union policy objectives wherever that is possible; that
is, where such support does not pose a significant electoral threat. In a pressure
group type, the party’s political representatives are not so favourably, or so
automatically, disposed. This predisposition is always problematic in practice
and, from the party’s earliest days, unions affiliated to the ALP have used
enforcement rules and strategies (particularly the pledge, the authority of party
conferences and the caucus system) to improve predictability of benefit
reciprocation. The importance of these rules and strategies underscores the
significance of predictability for unions in social democratic relationships.
Cavalier (2010) argued that all the major internal conflicts in the ALP have come
down to a struggle between party organisation and parliamentary party over the
autonomy of the parliamentary party. Put another way, they have been struggles
by the party organisation (particularly affiliated unions) to maintain an
acceptable degree of predictability of benefit exchange in the unions-‐ALP
relationship.
Finally, predictability and symmetry are directly related to notions of dependence
and independence in the unions-‐ALP relationship. The more dependence there is
in a unions-‐party relationship, the more symmetrical and predictable will be the
benefit exchange. Conversely, an independent relationship will be characterised
by asymmetry and unpredictability. A relationship that is characterised by
diminishing symmetry and predictability can be said to be transitioning from the
social democratic to the pressure group relationship type.
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The table below sets out the relationship between the key characteristics of
benefit exchange and unions-‐party relationship types.
Table 30: Benefits, dependency and relationship trends
Benefit characteristic
Description Impact on dependency
Impact on relationship
Impact of trends towards asymmetry / unpredictability
External symmetry
Benefits for unions and ALP are of similar value to each
High level of symmetry indicates high level of dependence
High level of symmetry promotes resilience
Greater asymmetry is a move away from social democracy
Internal symmetry
Benefits for each side are in balance i.e. resources match identity
High level of symmetry suggests social democratic type relationship
High levels of symmetry associated with coherence as a workers’ party
Less emphasis on ‘worker’ identity suggests move to pressure group type
Predictability Short-‐term benefits provided by unions result in longer term benefits for unions
High levels of predictability associated with social democratic type
Provides strong rationale for affiliation
Lower levels of predictability are associated with pressure group relationship type
3. External symmetry
You draw the curtain, you open the curtain. The parliamentary party
believes it can get anything it wants without the unions, but they are
consistently confounded when they find they have to rely on the
unions. Then the love fest starts again, it’s a rollercoaster ride. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
There is a trend towards external asymmetry that heavily favours the ALP. The
trend is not new. Mule (2002:270), for instance, argued that growing asymmetry,
resulting from falling union densities, influenced the ACTU to accept Government
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policy proposals during the Accord period that were less than optimal for the
union movement. Unions remain exclusively dependent on the ALP for legislative
protection. This dependency was highlighted by the hostility of the Howard
Government. The ALP, on the other hand, has been more successful in finding
replacements for its reliance on unions for campaigning resources through public
funding and business donations. Within this larger trend, there was also a view
among many interviewees that unions weren’t getting the policy benefits they
might have expected from their large investment in the YR@W campaign.
Nevertheless, all interviewees believed that the benefits of the relationship for
both sides continued to justify participation.
In essence, the exchange of benefits in the contemporary unions-‐ALP relationship
involves unions securing legislative protections in return for providing election
campaigning resources for the ALP. Minkin argued that a key dimension of the
relationship was the unions’ basic interest in ensuring that legislation affords a
degree of protection for union activity, particularly for the principle of collective
bargaining (1992:11-‐13). Unions in Australia, as elsewhere, formed political
parties in several colonies to promote legislation that was favourable, or at least
less unfavourable, to unionism (Turner 1979) and unions have been able to gain
favourable legislation when the ALP has been in office (Bowden 2011:63, Muir
and Peetz 2010:216, Schulman 2009:13, Wilkinson, Bailey and Mourell
2009:360). The interviews for this study show that this legislative protection
remains the unions’ basic interest, particularly in the light of the union
movement’s experience with the conservative Howard Government, which
culminated with the 2005 WorkChoices legislation81.
The next table provides a summary of interviewee perceptions of the current
external symmetry of benefits in the unions-‐ALP relationship. The interviewees
were roughly split in half on whether there was a trend towards external
asymmetry favouring the ALP or not. Interviewees were asked who they thought
81 Australian unions also faced adverse legislative changes by conservative state governments during the 1990s, particularly the Kennett Government in Victoria (1992-‐1999) and the Court Government in Western Australia (1993-‐2001).
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benefited the most from the relations: unions, the ALP, or were the benefits about
equal?
Table 31: External symmetry – who benefits most?
ALP Unions Equal
Current official 6 0 8
Former official 4 0 2
Never official 0 0 4
Total 10 0 14
In interviews for this study, there was a strong belief among officials from
affiliated unions, and many ALP MPs, particularly those with union backgrounds,
that dependence delivers real benefits for both sides above and beyond what
might be achieved in an independent, pressure group type relationship. In fact,
dependence, in the sense of a highly valued benefit exchange, continues to be seen
as the source of the long-‐term resilience of the relationship. One interviewee
neatly summed up the historical dimension of this attitude towards dependence:
The Labor Party knows that the union movement is important to their
electoral prospects, the union movement knows through bitter
experience that you cannot have decent employment rights without
legislative rights. – Former affiliated union official 1
In this perspective, there is a sense that nothing fundamental has changed in the
unions-‐ALP relationship over recent decades. Echoing this historical dimension,
another interviewee argued that any benefits from ending the relationship would
be illusory and temporary:
Labor, I think, can survive without the union movement for some time
because of the dynamics but in the crunch it will be found short. The
support of the union movement is what makes Labor different and the
union movement needs Labor to get their stuff (i.e. favourable
legislation and policies) up. -‐ Current federal MP 6
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Inertia, and history, are major barriers to change, as one interviewee put it, the
union movement’s significant, long-‐term investment in the ALP makes the
prospect of a change in political alignments difficult to justify:
From the union movement there is recognition that you’ve established
a political force, it’s yours, your responsibility to keep hold of it in some
way. Why would you say we’re going to walk away and set up a new
force when you’ve got the structure already? – Current peak union
official 4
Nevertheless, nearly half the interviewees saw a trend towards external
asymmetry, as revealed by their reference to a change recently or in recent times,
for example:
I think recently the ALP has got more benefit out of it than the unions. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
I think the party has got more benefit in recent times. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 3
Asymmetry is also seen as particularly evident at election times, when the ALP
draws upon the union movement’s political resources:
You can nearly argue that the party does better out of the relationship
than we do, particularly come election time. -‐ Current affiliated union
official 6
The heavy dependence of the union movement on the ALP for legislative
protection was a prominent theme, undoubtedly influenced by the Howard
period, which was still a strong influence on the thinking of many interviewees.
Without the legislative protection that ALP Governments can provide some
interviewees suggested a bleak future for the Australian union movement:
It (the cost of the YR@W campaign) hurt my union; I’m still recovering
a bit from the amount of money we spent in those three years. We
spent enormous amounts of money, like horrifying amounts. My hand
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used to shake signing those cheques with lots of zeroes on them. But
Greg (Combet, then ACTU Secretary) said to us all at a leadership
meeting, we are going to spend a lot of money because if we don’t win
this its all over red rover, we (unions) have very little hope of survival.
– Current affiliated union official 2
Had Howard been re-‐elected then to all intents and purposes, organised
labour in this country through the trade union movement, if it had not
been put out of business would have been rendered ineffective for a
generation. – Current peak union official 1
Unions would have survived, unions have survived in the US, but
WorkChoices was worse than the US legislation, unions survive its how
well and how effectively. – Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
These three quotes represent a cross-‐section of opinion in the union movement:
peak, national and state union officials; blue collar and professional memberships,
right wing and left wing factional alignments. There may be a temptation to
discount their extremity as hyperbole had it not been for the resources the union
movement poured into the YR@W campaign. It is generally believed that unions
spent between $20 million and $30 million to ensure the election of an ALP
Government in 2007 (Muir 2008), compared with just $17 million the ALP
received in public funding for the 2004 election (Mayer 2006). This degree of
perceived threat from the LNP coalition and the consequent level of union
movement reliance on the ALP for legislative protection suggests that the union
movement would accept a high degree of external asymmetry before it moved to
sever or diminish the unions-‐ALP relationship. The views may also reflect the
sense of crisis that was deliberately created within the union movement during
the YR@W campaign (Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan 2008), but certainly my
impression as the interviewer was that these views were still deeply felt, even
two years after the defeat of the Howard Government.
The exclusive reliance of unions on the ALP for legislative protection, because the
Coalition is hostile and the Greens are not (yet) a prospective future government,
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is a major source of asymmetry. When faced with criticism from the union
movement, the Rudd Government has also found the lack of an alternative
political alignment for unions a strong argument. For instance, then Deputy
Prime Minister Julia Gillard who received a hostile and confronting reception at
the 2009 ACTU Congress, especially over the ABCC issue,82 “reminded delegates of
their lot under the Liberal Government and asked what hazards they might now
be facing if the Liberals had won again in 2007” (Davis 2009b). Gillard’s approach
is a demonstration that the ALP’s political leadership is as aware as the union
leadership of the continuing dependence of the union movement on the existence
of an ALP Government.
Non-‐affiliated unions are also affected by this lack of a political alternative. While
in theory non-‐affiliated unions, like American unions, are free to negotiate with
both sides, and sometimes do, for the most part the ALP is still the only viable
alternative, as these comments from current officials of non-‐affiliated unions
indicate:
The problem has always been that the alternative (to the ALP) is always
worse. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 2.
At various times we were considered to be one of the most powerful
collective bargaining unions and therefore they (the Howard
Government) hated us and would never speak to us. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 1.
Support for the Greens by some in the union movement has led to speculation of a
broader alliance between unions and the Greens. Interviewees suggested,
however, that the Greens have not emerged as a serious alternative for unions
disappointed with the performance of the ALP in Government:
The overwhelming majority of union officials will continue to support
the Labor Party. You will have some at the edges who will be attracted
by the Greens. -‐ Current peak union official 1
82 The CFMEU led a protest at the Congress against the Government’s decision to retain the Australian Building and Construction Commission (ABCC)
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Greens influence in unions seems to be strongest in unions not affiliated with the
ALP, unions associated with the left of the ALP and with the CFMEU, because of
the ABCC issue. Interestingly, this MP suggested that non-‐affiliation was a reason
for some unions being more associated with the Greens:
The Green element is particularly in non-‐affiliated unions except for the
CFMEU. Because these unions don’t feel the same attachment
historically they often feel that they have got to have a two-‐way bet by
having a bit of Green support around some issues. You see unions, on
the left of course, developing a little bit more of a connection with the
Greens. -‐ Current federal MP 2
The other important cause for the appeal of the Greens to some in the union
movement was their support for what are seen as traditional ALP policy
positions:
Privatisation that’s an example you can count on the Greens more than
the labor party. And I guess the left is still more interested in foreign
policy and human rights. -‐ Current federal MP 2
The CFMEU has people who would never have dreamed of voting Green
but will vote Green because they are the only party that has taken a
decent position on the ABCC as far as their members are concerned. –
Current peak union official 2
The Greens, on the other hand, despite receiving donations from some unions
disaffected with the ALP and the presence of some Green members in full-‐time
union jobs, are not a social democratic alternative to the ALP. Jackson (2011:160)
found that two-‐thirds of activists in The Greens were opposed to any greater role
for unions in the party.
The main benefit the ALP receives from its links with the union movement is the
provision of campaign resources. The 2007 federal election was unusual because
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industrial relations is rarely an agenda-‐leading issue in Australian politics at the
national level:
There were elections that we have won in the last 15 years that would
not have been won without the union relationship, 1993 and 2007.
Lots of questions about any others but the two election campaigns in
the last 30 years in fact quite possibly the only 2 elections in modern
times, that is post 72, where that relationship was a real winning
partnership were 93 and 2007. – Current federal MP 4
Nevertheless, in an environment where the ALP’s own membership has collapsed,
most interviewees, saw that the big advantage for the ALP from the relationship
came from the union movement’s resources, particularly, people. This is a key
pointer to internal asymmetry with resources remaining important while party
identity as a workers’ party has declined:
It’s not just the money, it’s the troops on the ground on election day and
in the lead up to elections. – Current federal MP 3
As a young union official I was a campaign director at each election.
That’s important. Labor always has more people on the ground, they
(Liberal Party) spend a lot of money on basic things that we (unions) do
for free. – Current affiliated union official 2
I was told the Liberals were pissed off in the last NSW election (2007)
because we (interviewee’s union) spent 1.2 million dollars on
advertising and they couldn’t raise 1.2 million dollars, they didn’t have
it -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 2
The contribution of resources is important in both social democratic and pressure
group type relationships; arguably in a pressure group relationship the size of the
contribution is more closely related to the importance of the issue to the group(s)
involved:
Throwing in of resources, that’s the crucial thing. We were talking
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about Putnam earlier; we live in a society where people don’t join
aren’t involved, party membership is rock bottom. When you can get a
whole lot of people motivated around an issue working for you going
around letter-‐boxing going down the streets putting up signs which you
haven’t got otherwise in these marginal seats. That army’s crucial. –
Current federal MP 2
Despite this recognition of the importance of union resources to the ALP, many
union interviewees felt their contribution was not fully appreciated:
I think they get more than they acknowledge and I think there is a lack
of awareness particularly among that political class. I’m not saying
everyone I mean I’m sure that blokes like Karl Bitar (former ALP
National Secretary) those guys know what’s going on they know what
unions do in terms of money and logistics. – Current affiliated union
official 3
One union interviewee suggested that the union movement had not been fully
effective in securing policy benefits in return for the resources it provides to the
ALP and had allowed the ALP to benefit from the relationship in an unequal way:
I think the annoying part for some of us is that come election time they
(ALP) just take us for granted. We’re going to turn up with the cash and
we’re going to turn up with foot soldiers and until we get really serious
about that then those dynamics don’t change. – Current affiliated union
official 6
Even with the trend towards external asymmetry, and the balance of benefits
increasingly favouring the ALP that might not be enough to outweigh the electoral
disadvantages of close union links that some in the party perceive:
The Labor Party gets more benefit than the unions but some of them
are also probably questioning what it does for them image wise -‐
Current federal MP 2
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Apart from the exceptional circumstances of the 2007 federal election, the
proportion of the ALP’s funding that comes from unions has declined significantly
in recent decades. Schulman (2009:14) said that only between 9 and 15 per cent
of the ALP’s total income now comes from unions. Quoting figures from Senator
Robert Ray, Bramble and Kuhn (2009) say it has fallen from 80 per cent to 15 per
cent. This sharp decline was seen as having a negative impact on the unions-‐ALP
relationship:
There is less dependence now on unions in terms of the electoral
process, of income, public funding, access to public funds means the
Labor Party no longer has to rely on unions to the same extent. Not just
donations at election time but fundraising at branches and so on. Local
members became far less reliant on that with access to federal funds. –
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Several interviewees also saw prospective changes to public funding of parties as
a further challenge to the unions-‐ALP relationship:
The more interesting question is do they exclude union affiliation fees
from the so-‐called crackdown on donations, if they don’t then you are
headed towards a more significant weakening of the institutional link
with the ALP -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
Other external and internal changes to the electoral process were seen as
favouring the ALP over unions:
The access to changes to balloting procedures which meant that parties
were identified on ballot papers it wasn’t so critical to have someone
standing outside polling booths where unions had had a big role to play
especially in marginal electorates. Less significance and reliance on
unions for that sort of activity all accelerated that breakdown or
breaking down of the relationship with the ALP. They weren’t seen as
being as vital as they were once – Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
Finally, one interviewee suggested that the ALP derived a benefit in terms of
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organisational strength from having affiliated unions, this interviewee used the
same phraseology, ‘bedrock’, to describe the relationship as the National Review
(ALP 2010) did, though this interview was conducted many months prior to the
release of that review. This quote, and the ‘bedrock’ analogy, neatly encapsulates
the idea that there is external asymmetry favouring the ALP in the contemporary
relationship, but it does not exclude an important role for unions:
The ALP institutionally has a strong foundation by just having the
unions there; unions are the foundation of the party. It is a very sound
bedrock for the party because you’ve got these unions with their
resources, they’re institutions, they are able to come together when
they are needed to assist, to help run the party effectively, some would
say they’re an impediment to running the party effectively, but in the
main I think unions give the party as an institution a fair bit of strength.
– Current peak union official 3
The national unions-‐ALP relationship has become characterised by a high degree
of external asymmetry. In some ways, the degree of asymmetry is more
characteristic of the pressure group relationship type where unions provide
support in response to issues that are felt to be urgent and significant, and where
that support remains important to the party but the identification as a workers’
party has declined in value. Nevertheless, the importance of legislative
protections to the union movement, the hostility of coalition parties and the lack
of a viable political alternative are factors that make higher levels of external
asymmetry acceptable to unions.
4. Internal symmetry
Internal symmetry, the relative balance between the types of benefits that accrue
to each side, has also changed in recent decades. In essence, it is a question of
whether resources and party identity are commensurate. We would expect
resources and identity to be roughly commensurate in a social democratic
relationship, but to be far less relevant to a pressure group relationship. In recent
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times, the value of the ALP’s affiliated unions as a source of working class identity
and as a connection with voters and communities has declined faster than the
value of financial and other resources that unions can still provide to the ALP in
significant quantities. Conversely, the union movement, through the ACTU, is
willing to support the ALP electorally, particularly during the YR@W campaign
and the 2007 election, but seeks at the same time to be regarded as independent
of the ALP, with a clearly separate identity and agenda of its own (Combet 2000,
Kearney 2011, Lawrence 2011).
Archer (2007:4) defined Labor parties as parties that attribute a uniquely
privileged position in their ideologies to workers and make the pursuit of
workers’ interests their prime objective, as well as embracing the symbolism of
the workers’ party as their self-‐identity. With the dramatic decline in union
densities, in particular during the 1990s, and the changes in the workforce that
have reduced the importance of blue-‐collar unionism, we might expect to see a
significant change in the ALP’s self-‐identification as a workers’ party. Indeed, the
most recent ALP National Review (ALP 2010) does make important steps to
redefine the party’s identity as that of a progressive, community-‐based
organisation and Gillard’s two major speeches (Gillard 2011a, Gillard 2011b) as
Prime Minister in which she has sought to define and position the contemporary
ALP convey a strong endorsement of individualism and use the language of
individual rights and opportunities. Gillard’s intention is to reconcile the
individualism of contemporary ALP ideology with its collective past. It is a view
of the ALP in which affiliated links with unions are far from essential.
Some interviewees, however, argued that the ALP’s links with trade unions still
help to make it a genuine Labor Party, i.e. provide it with an identity as a workers’
party, and give the party a strong foundation:
It wouldn’t be a Labor Party if the relationship with the unions wasn’t
there. I still believe that the Labor Party should be a voice for working
people and if you’re a voice for working people I don’t think you can
walk away from the linkage. The Labor Party needs a working class
base, and the unions provide that. – Current federal MP 1
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One interviewee also argued that unions still provide the ALP with vital links into
workplaces and the concerns of workers; something not always appreciated by
the ALP parliamentary leadership:
What the unions offer Labor is an early warning system to frame the
economic debate in ways that affect people because that is still their
point of connection into the workplace and I think that particularly
centrist administrations don’t always appreciate that or get that. –
Current peak union official 4
In addition, some interviewees also saw the union linkage as a continuing
connection with the broader community:
I do to some extent think that clearly the connection with the unions
enables the ALP to be in closer contact with the community. – Current
peak union official 3
On the negative side, some union interviewees claimed that unions keep the ALP
‘relevant’ to a broader electorate by protecting it from the idiosyncrasies of the
party’s rapidly declining branch membership. These views assert that unions,
and their memberships, are the real Labor Party, not the dwindling branches
which some senior union officials seem to think of as people that, for some
reason, have not yet joined the exodus to The Greens:
If you talk to some of the key decision-‐makers in the Labor Party there
is a bit of mythology around that the Labor Party would like to rid itself
of the union influence but they will actually tell you if you took the
union delegations out of the national and state conferences then the
maddies would be running the place. – Current peak union official 1
Mate, I went to a branch the other week. They’re mad, the rank and file
of our party, apart from the people who are careerists looking to run
for parliament, are crazy. If they were determining … so you look at the
rank and file membership of the party. You’ve got at least a third
nationally are stacks, so a third aren’t real members, a third are just
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people who have serious … like the party is kind of their social security
and a third are people like me, that are part of the party but they are
not going to be active and all that. So, if you basically just had the rank
and file determining things it would be crazy. – Current affiliated union
official 2
Some interviewees clearly saw the branch membership as either atrophied to the
point of irrelevance or closer in character to The Greens than the traditional blue-‐
collar trade union movement (Current federal MP 5). One interviewee argued
that parties don’t really exist anymore (Current affiliated union official 5), another
argued that debate within the ALP had declined dramatically with membership
decline, and that a lot of the people who used to drive debate in the ALP had left,
often for The Greens. (Current federal MP 2)
The ALP is struggling to find a modern party self-‐identity. An older identity as a
workers’, working class, or trade union party is seen as far too limiting by the ALP
national leadership and the preferred replacement, in the form of a progressive
community-‐based party, at least as far as the 2010 National Review Panel (ALP
2010) was concerned, has not emerged with any substance or clarity. The
separation of resources from identity can be seen as a necessary step in the
process of weakening existing vertical links so that the party’s new links with
non-‐industrial organisations can be established. Parties in pressure group type
relationships do not privilege particular social groupings over others and are
therefore able to admit new organisations without displacing the existing
linkages. The process of creating space in the national unions-‐ALP relationship is
not far advanced.
5. Predictability
Predictability is the consequence of the enforcement strategies and rules that are
used in mass parties to limit the autonomy of the party’s parliamentary
representatives. In terms of benefit exchange, these rules and strategies are
important for ensuring that unions can secure favourable legislation and policy
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outcomes in return for the significant contribution they make to the ALP’s
campaigning resources, as well as (in the past) its legitimation as a workers’
party.
There are two indicators that predictability has been diminished in the unions-‐
ALP relationship, especially in its affiliated form. The first indicator is a
consequence of the relative independence of the ACTU and its lead role in
negotiating policy with the leadership of the FPLP. During the Accord period, the
ACTU, and the policy engagement framework established by the Accord
processes, became the main means by which the union movement pursued
predictability in the national unions-‐ALP relationship. Predictability during the
Accord period was an exchange for wage restraint, rather than electoral support
(in the sense of contributed financial and human resources). Without the Accord,
this method of promoting predictability has vanished. The second indicator is the
increased use of external lobbying techniques by unions, including affiliated
unions, to secure policy outcomes from ALP governments. This greater use of
external lobbying can be seen as a (partial) replacement of the Accord processes
for achieving predictability. The greater use of external lobbying by affiliated
unions suggests that affiliation has also lost much of its salience as a predictability
mechanism, although affiliated union officials still claim that, overall, affiliation is
an advantage when it comes to pursuing policy objectives with an ALP
Government.
When asked about union policy influence over the ALP, all interviewees
responded by commenting on the role of the ACTU. This is unsurprising given the
changes in the labour market discussed in Chapter 2. At the same time, the policy
engagement of unions with the ALP has narrowed since the Accord era, with the
primary emphasis on industrial relations; perhaps, an unsurprising outcome
given the policies pursued by the Howard Government in this area. Nevertheless,
some union respondents with Accord era experience lamented the reduced policy
role of today’s unions, but today’s union officials on the whole did not. There
were also indications that the narrower policy engagement of unions with the
ALP might be a more lasting phenomenon. For instance, current union officials
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explicitly recognised that parliamentarians had a broader role than union
officials, often this was expressed as a rationale for the different approaches some
union officials take when they enter parliament, but it also acknowledges the
status of unions as advocates for fairly narrow sectional interests.
Starting with the Accord period the principal policy relationship between the
national union movement and the FPLP leadership has been mediated through
the ACTU, not affiliated unions:
During the Accord years we had an impeccably bright and well-‐placed
union leadership in the senior ranks of the peak body of the union
movement. The debates were at ACTU congresses not between the
Government and individual unions. – Current federal MP 5
The next table summarises interviewee views on the most basic of predictability
mechanisms: access. General satisfaction with access afforded to union officials
by ALP Ministers and other key decision-‐makers was high. Even though the
formal consultation structures of the Accord are no longer present, union officials
reported little difficulty in getting meetings and that personal rapport remained
high.
Table 32: Predictability: access and overall satisfaction
Category Specific issue Comments
Overall General satisfaction. Union officials generally satisfied with policy relationships – Current affiliated union official 6.
Conducted at peak levels and by individual unions.
The ACTU conducts negotiations on issues that affect the whole union movement (e.g. industrial relations policy), but individual unions lobby in their own areas of policy interest.
Structure Consultation frameworks not much used.
ALAC little used; Accord frameworks not replicated – Former affiliated union official 1.
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Category Specific issue Comments
Access Much better than under conservative governments.
Unions can see anyone anytime whereas they had been shut out during Howard Government – Current affiliated union official 1, Current peak union official 4.
Affiliation General agreement, though not strong, that affiliation improves access and influence – Current affiliated union official 6.
Personal relations
Closeness is a key indicator of strength of relationship.
Relationships are much stronger at senior levels than in the US or UK -‐ Current affiliated union official 2
The next table looks at the next level in predictability mechanisms after access,
structure and personal rapport; these are influence and lobbying. Interviewees
uniformly argued that influence was no longer automatic and that extensive
lobbying techniques were now required to achieve policy objectives from ALP
governments and Ministers. These techniques include re-‐enforcing personal
relationships between individuals in union and party leadership elites; and, the
external lobbying techniques required to build public support for union policy
positions.
Table 33: Predictability: Influence and lobbying
Category Specific issue Comments
Influence Affiliation results in better access, credibility and influence, but it is mediated through personal relationships between individual unions and officials and individual MPs.
Affiliation delivers ‘real power’, but it no longer delivers automatic outcomes -‐ Current affiliated union official 2, Current peak union official 3
Representation at conferences enables unions to block proposals, rather than initiate them.
Unions can stop things happening, but it is very hard to make things happen – Current federal MP 7
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Category Specific issue Comments
Greater emphasis on policy content, quality of proposals, consistency with Government policy agenda.
Some interviewees reported that policies were more likely to be judged on their merits (as judged by ALP Ministers) than the degree of union support. – Current peak union official 1
Lobbying Internal lobbying takes the form of building personal relationships.
Relationships between unions and ALP MPs have to be ‘worked at’, otherwise unions get treated as just another interest group – Current union official 6
External – several interviewees stressed the need to win public debates.
Campaigning is required to ensure influence on political outcomes; affiliation and personal relationships are no longer enough -‐ Current peak union official 1, Current peak union official 2, Current peak union official 3
ALP politicians more likely to support union policy objectives if public supports them first -‐ Current affiliated union official 1
All unions have far better access to ALP, than Coalition, Governments. This is far
more than a matter of a degree. The ALP is willing to engage constructively with
unions; the Coalition, for the most part, is not. Affiliated unions reported that
affiliation provides them with better access and a more sympathetic hearing,
though many interviewees were tentative about the extent of this additional
advantage. Beyond that affiliation seems to have only limited effectiveness as a
predictability mechanism. Without the formal structures for policy engagement
provided by the Accord processes, unions are increasingly using external lobbying
to secure desired policy outcomes. In other words, they are supplementing, or
buttressing, the pre-‐existing social democratic type relationship with some tactics
more associated with a pressure group type relationship.
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6. Conclusion
Although both unions and the ALP continue to derive benefits from their
relationship, there have been significant trends affecting the symmetry and
predictability around the political exchange of those benefits. The external
balance of the benefits has become increasingly asymmetrical with unions
arguably needing the ALP more than the ALP needs unions. The internal balance
has also become more asymmetrical with the benefit of resources provided by
unions to the ALP becoming more important than the electoral value of its
legitimation as a workers party provided by the link with trade unions. In
addition, unions are turning to external lobbying to maintain predictability in the
benefit exchange. In the next Chapter, the extent of the capacity to use external
lobbying to improve predictability will be examined through the experience of the
YR@W campaign and its aftermath.
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CHAPTER 9: YOUR RIGHTS AT WORK AND BEYOND
1. Introduction
The structure of chapters 6-‐9 of this thesis were inspired by the suggestion made
by McIlroy (1998) that each side of unions-‐party relationships should be looked
at separately, and then the interaction between them. So far this thesis has
explored the two wings of the national unions-‐ALP relationship separately (the
ACTU in chapter 6 and the ALP in chapter 7) to understand the changes each side
has, or has not, made in recent years. The last chapter looked at the interaction of
the two wings through the theoretical understanding provided by Minkin (1992)
that an exchange of benefits is the key to the resilience of unions-‐party
relationships. This chapter looks also at the interaction of the two sides of the
relationship, but this time the concern is whether the ALP’s electoral fortunes
affect that interaction. Do the changes made by the ALP and the ACTU affect the
relationship differently when the ALP is in Government and Opposition?
This chapter reviews the Your Rights at Work (YR@W) campaign in the context of
the paradox that results from the co-‐existence of relationship types. In this
campaign, and what followed, we see evidence of the tension resulting from the
co-‐existence of two forms of the national unions-‐ALP relationship. For many
interviewees, YR@W was a highly successful interest group campaign that
delivered its main, or even single, objective of defeating the Howard Government
and returning the ALP to Government where it could deliver on its agreement
with the union movement to replace WorkChoices with new legislation more
favourable to unions. For other interviewees, there was a sense in which YR@W
was to be the start of a new direction for the union movement, a direction that
embraced the key elements of social movement, community and coalition
movement unionism. The ACTU, itself, proclaimed its intention to see unions
become permanent campaigning organisations capable of attracting and retaining
new members through union democratisation, coalition-‐building and greater
political independence.
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Two years on, as we saw in Chapter 6, many interviewees for this thesis,
expressed considerable scepticism about the new, largely US-‐inspired, approach
to union political campaigning. This scepticism is also evident in perceptions of
the YR@W campaign, which many now see as a ‘one-‐off’ and ‘a moment in time’.
By the end of 2010, the ACTU itself was lamenting a loss of momentum since the
end of the YR@W campaign and the disappointing nature of the union campaign
during the 2010 election campaign. Despite these disappointments, the ACTU
leadership committed itself once again to the goal of independence, and continues
to urge campaigning, the organising model and union revitalisation on its,
sometimes unwilling, affiliates. Beyond the problem of scepticism, a more basic
problem has emerged since the triumph of the 2007 election. To what extent is
the political independence of unions, and the union movement, sustainable when
the ALP holds office? Faced with widespread union criticism of the policies of the
Rudd and Gillard Governments, the ACTU favoured elite bargaining, supported by
limited public campaigning, and it provided significant electoral support for the
ALP’s re-‐election campaign. Finally, this raises the question of whether a mix, or
balance, of dependence and independence, and of social democratic and pressure
group relationships form a viable, long-‐term strategy for augmenting union
political resources during a neo-‐liberal age?
2. 2007 election
Scholars and commentators have written extensively about the YR@W campaign
(Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan 2008, Muir 2008, Muir and Peetz 2010) and the
2007 election (Jackman 2008, Watson and Browne 2008, Williams 2008). The
general outlines are well known. I summarise some of the evidence here as
background and context for the discussion in the rest of this chapter. These
accounts point to the differing perspectives that were also evident in the
interviews conducted for this thesis.
Between 2005 and 2007 the ACTU ran the most expensive and sophisticated
campaign ever undertaken by a non-‐party political group in Australian history
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(Muir 2008: 36). The ACTU, not unreasonably, claimed considerable credit for the
downfall of the Howard Government (Muir 2008), although the ‘victory on a plate’
many in the union movement claim to have delivered to the ALP (Muir 2008) is
almost certainly an exaggeration. The 2007 Australian federal election was
remarkable because industrial relations was a high profile issue (Buchanan et. al.
2008, Cooper 2008, Hall 2008, Muir and Peetz 2010, Watson and Browne 2008,
Williams 2008), which happens infrequently, and because the YR@W campaign
may have influenced the outcome significantly (Cooper and Ellem 2008, Kelly
2008, Lewis 2009, Spies Butcher and Wilson 2008). The Howard Government’s
earlier workplace relations efforts, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 and the
subsequent Maritime Dispute, although highly controversial, and the subject of
high profile union political campaigns, seemed to have had no impact on elections
in 1998, when tax, health and Medicare dominated – not Australian Workplace
Agreements (AWAs)83 and the maritime dispute (Goot and Watson 2007: 267),
and no impact in 2001 and 2004 when industrial relations again was not a major
issue (Goot and Watson 2007, Hall 2008, Muir 2008). In fact, individualisation,
particularly through the 1996 introduction of AWAs, was strongly opposed by
unions for a decade with little electoral impact and only equivocal ALP support
for this opposition. So much so that the ALP actually reversed its opposition to
AWAs after the disastrous, for Labor, 2004 election (Bramble 2005: 257).
Exit polls, political party analysis and analyses of electoral figures confirmed that
industrial relations had been the decisive issue and that YR@W had been vital in
changing voting patterns (Ellem 2011). Spies Butcher and Wilson (2008) point to
“significant circumstantial evidence” from opinion polls before and after the ACTU
began its advertising campaign and exit polls after the 2007 NSW election (Spies
Butcher and Wilson 2007). Spies Butcher and Wilson (2008) point to the ALP’s
adoption of key elements of the YR@W campaign such as the term “working
families”, as a further indicator of the significance of the YR@W campaign. Spies
Butcher and Wilson (2008) and Muir (2008) also point out that most of the seats
targeted by the ACTU in its marginal seats campaign were won by the ALP.
83 AWAs were formal individual employment contracts introduced into the federal system for the first time by the Howard Government’s 1996 Workplace Relations Act
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Further, using an analysis of swings in individual seats, Spies-‐Butcher and Wilson
(2008) found that seats with ACTU-‐led YR@W organisers and campaigns
delivered a 1.3 – 2 per cent additional swing to the ALP.
Similar circumstantial evidence has been used to argue that the election of Kevin
Rudd to the ALP leadership, with his weak alignment with unions in comparison
to his immediate predecessor (Kim Beazley), was the real turning point in Labor’s
electoral fortunes (Jackman 2008, Williams 2008). Hall (2008) draws on
Newspoll data to suggest that industrial relations was dipping as an issue, and
Labor’s advantage on this issue was evaporating, before Rudd took over.
According to this interpretation, Rudd’s ability to be anti-‐WorkChoices without
appearing beholden to the union movement may have been integral to his greater
appeal and to the failure of the Coalition’s anti-‐union fear campaigns during the
election period (Williams 2008). In addition, Rudd’s appeal might have also
stemmed from his image as fresh and untainted by Labor’s debilitating leadership
battles of the past decade (Fraser 2008: 565). In an interview with the Australian
newspaper in May 2007, former Labor pollster Rod Cameron said: “unions are
very unpopular … the majority of voters are anti-‐union and they don’t want
unions back in their lives” (Kelly 2007). Cameron also said that John Howard had
made a mistake with WorkChoices, but that it was worth a 1 per cent swing to the
ALP, not 5 per cent as some ALP insiders were apparently claiming. Watson and
Browne (2008: 5) analysed exit poll data and found that industrial relations was
the biggest issue for Labor voters, and that voters who regarded industrial
relations as very important were eleven times more likely to vote for the ALP than
for the Coalition. On the other hand, Watson and Browne (2008: 5) also found
that among vote-‐changers climate change was decisive and a long way ahead of
industrial relations. Jackman (2008) quotes ALP leaders to suggest that the ACTU
campaign was a good interest group effort, but insufficient of itself to defeat the
Howard Government.
Cooper and Ellem (2008), like Jackman (2008) and Muir (2008), suggest that the
Howard Government “over-‐reached” with WorkChoices, provoking voter concern
that was easily exploited by the ALP and the union movement. Although many
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commentators were “staggered” by the scale of the changes in WorkChoices
(Cooper 2008), others believed there was a good chance that the “pragmatic”
Australian electorate would accept them (Norton 2005). The Government sought
to portray WorkChoices as a policy evolution, not a radical departure, and asked
the electorate to believe the reforms would deliver better economic outcomes. In
addition, Cooper and Ellem (2008) have suggested that a striking feature of the
public debate was its focus on the impact on “low-‐paid, often non-‐union, jobs”.
Cooper (2008) also argues that evidence provided by scholars about the impact of
WorkChoices on “employees, particularly ‘vulnerable’ workers, was damning”
when released during the public debate. Fraser (2008: 564), typical of much
commentary, said that because of YR@W, WorkChoices “became entrenched in
the electorate’s mind as one (policy) that … would hurt vulnerable workers”.
Some interviewees clearly thought that the Howard Government had over-‐
reached:
I think it was a classic case of a bridge too far when they fell over the
line with a chance majority in the Senate. -‐ Current peak union official 1
According to interviewees, the political flaws in the WorkChoices legislation
offered the union movement an opportunity to influence the votes of union
members who might otherwise vote for a Howard-‐led conservative coalition.
These employees were often in secure, well-‐paid jobs but had a general sympathy
with unionism and saw it as important for maintaining protections for young
people entering the workforce:
What they were saying was that they didn’t expect it to impact on them,
but they were really concerned about what it meant for the sort of
society their kids would grow up in. The Liberal support among those
people just absolutely collapsed. According to our polling, about half
went to the Labor Party and half went to Independents and undecided.
-‐ Current peak union official 1
YR@W shifted people who a few elections ago were voting for John
Howard. I found a very big thing about your kids and grandkids. There
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seemed to be a very big element that people thought that they could
handle it but it would get worse once you surrender this kind of say in
the labour market and kids and grandkids going into the labour market
they would have difficulties. -‐ Current federal MP 2
Given these problems with WorkChoices itself, and a range of other political
factors discussed above, some interviewees suggested that it is not possible to
know whether or not Rudd would have won the 2007 election without the
success of the YR@W campaign:
Who knows whether Rudd would have been elected anyway? But I
don’t think anyone denies that WorkChoices was a huge influence on
defeating the Howard Government. -‐ Current federal MP 1
YR@W campaign was successful in the sense that it brought down the
Howard Government and if you look at any reasonable analysis of the
last election campaign and took out the YR@W campaign it would be
interesting to speculate on whether Rudd would have been elected. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 3
The next table illustrates the strength of support for the view that YR@W either
delivered victory to the ALP, or made a very significant contribution to it. Only
one current official did not hold the view that the YR@W campaign was
significant or decisive in the 2007 election outcome. One former official and one
interviewee who had never been an official also did not share the dominant view,
both were MPs.
Table 34: Attitudes: YR@W and 2007 election outcome
Yes No
Current official 13 1
Former official 4 1
Never official 4 1
Totals 21 3
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When these interviews were conducted approximately 2 years after the 2007
election, there was still a strong view across the union movement from
interviewees in affiliated, non-‐affiliated and peak union organisations that the
YR@W campaign was decisive in delivering victory to the ALP:
So we (the unions) got them elected not the Labor Party. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 1
All the polls show that WorkChoices and those issues were decisive.
That wouldn’t have happened without YR@W. -‐ Current peak union
official 2
That was reflected again on polling day. I was on a polling booth all day
and people were coming up and walking past all the established parties
and picking up the YR@W vote cards saying that’s the one I want. It
was quite, quite noticeable. -‐ Current peak union official 1
Two interviewees reported that the tracking and exit polling undertaken by their
own organisations as part of the YR@W marginal seat and individual targeting
exercises confirmed the evidence of published opinion polls and analyses of
trends in seats targeted by the union movement:
We tracked it and we know it happened. By the time we finished the
campaign there was a collapse in the Liberal-‐National party vote among
our members of very significant dimensions, something like 40 percent
of the people we talked to. We targeted particular members in
particular seats and tracked their voting intentions based on what we
knew from 2004 and we saw a 40 percent swing among those members
in those seats. -‐ Current affiliated union official 1
The YR@W advertising, the focus of the movement and the resources
and the personnel in a broad sense won that election. We did exit
polling. It was massive. -‐ Current affiliated union official 4
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Only one union interviewee admitted to subscribing to the view that the ALP, not
the union campaign, ultimately gets the credit for the defeat of John Howard:
I am one of the few (union) leaders who don’t think we won the
election. I think the ALP won the election. I think we were an
important component. Who knows whether they would have won
without it? I think it was a very effective campaign but we (unions) are
kidding ourselves if we think we won the election. -‐ Current affiliated
union official 2
The next table summarises interviewee attitudes to the question of the impact of
the YR@W campaign on the 2007 election, essentially the reasons why the vast
majority of interviewees (see table above) believe that YR@W was significant in
determining the election outcome.
Table 35: Impact of YR@W on election
General impact Specific Interviewee comments
Agenda-setting Top election issue Unions made it the most important issue – Current affiliated union official 6.
Framed public discussion of the WorkChoices legislation
Howard Government was always on the back foot, unions were crucial in turning the issue. -‐ Current affiliated union official 2.
Focal point for discontent YR@W crystallised other voter concerns and reinforced the idea that the government was past its use-‐by dates -‐ Current peak union official 3.
Momentum YR@W built and sustained momentum against the Government -‐ Current federal MP 5.
Framing issue “Howard’s battlers” We pointed out the impact on Howard’s battlers and I think they saw WorkChoices as Howard going too far -‐ Current peak union official 3
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Although some MP interviewees acknowledged the importance of the YR@W
campaign at both national and electorate levels, there was also support for the
view reported by Jackman (2008) that YR@W was a good interest group
campaign but not sufficient of itself to win an election. These explanations list
WorkChoices and the YR@W campaign as just one of a number of issues and
factors that influenced voters. One ALP MP offered an account that plays down
the role of the union movement, and gives most of the credit for the election
victory to the leadership of Rudd and Gillard. T his explanation is exclusively
reliant on the interplay of parliamentary party tactics, offering no role for the
YR@W campaign:
I think we would have won anyway. One of the things you have to
remember is that in 1996, there was a lot of myths about the Howard
Battlers but there was some truth. He carved off a disaffected part of
our working class base and played the wedge politics between our
middle class base and our working class base effectively for a decade.
Security, refugees. All social democratic parties around the world have
to balance those groups. Howard separated them for a decade but
WorkChoices united them. The only other thing that did that was the
GST in 98. The GST delivered our working class and Pauline Hanson
delivered our middle class. The security and immigration issues of
2001 blew it apart again and then Mark Latham blew it apart again.
Then it had to be put back together and most of the credit for that goes
to Kevin and Julia I think. -‐ Current federal MP 7
Another MP also gave a detailed account that strongly downplayed the role of the
YR@W campaign:
The key issues in my mind were that governments lose elections
oppositions don’t win, so there is a sense in which John (Howard) had
served his use by date. I think WorkChoices was important, I think
their reticence to do anything on the climate change issue was
important for young people but I think the It’s Time factor it’s hard to
quantify and Kevin appearing to be a very safe pair of hands and of
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course he played the politics of that well there was almost a paper thin
difference between John Howard and Kevin Rudd. I mean I think he
acknowledges that too “I’m an economic conservative”. You can trust
me I’m a safe pair of hands. So to say it was WorkChoices alone is
gilding the lily. I think the It’s time factor was the key. -‐ Current federal
MP 3
It is interesting to note that in both these accounts the interviewees refer to
WorkChoices not to the YR@W campaign. This suggests that the electoral damage
to the Howard Government resulted from policy overreach rather than the way in
which the union movement was able to exploit voter concerns about the Howard
Government’s policies. Union leaders saw the political and technical flaws in
WorkChoices legislation as significant, but not of themselves sufficient to win the
argument. Union interviewees who believed that the Howard Government had
over-‐reached with WorkChoices generally went on to argue that YR@W was
highly effective in exploiting that political mistake:
The 1996 Act was bad for us (unions) but it was hard to argue about
the unfairness, but I remember when WorkChoices was announced.
Reith negotiated with us but they wouldn’t even have a meeting with
us. But when we saw it we thought my god they don’t know what they
are doing. It is crazy legislation it’s like someone got five different
lawyers and wrote five different acts and then stapled them together.
We found provisions that directly contradicted each other. The NDT,
award modernisation, unfair dismissal it was just wonderful it was a
gift, it was just what we needed. I think the real aim of WorkChoices
was to destroy us. -‐ Current affiliated union official 2
The scope for competing interpretations of the 2007 election and its outcome was
greatly expanded because the ALP and the union movement’s campaigns ran
along separately. It is possible that union leaders, activists and members saw the
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campaign through the lens of the YR@W campaign, while on the ALP side the lens
was the “Kevin 07” campaign:
The other thing that was notable was that there were two parallel
campaigns run in the last federal election (2007), the unions ran the
negative campaign on IR but Rudd did not buy into that campaign at all.
Rudd tried to set himself above and beyond that and spent a lot of time
hitting union leaders over the head to show that he wasn’t a captive of
the union movement. -‐ Current peak union official 4
One union interviewee provided a sophisticated account of how these two
campaigns related to each other both strategically and operationally. This
account gives credit to both the YR@W and Kevin 07 campaigns and argues
compellingly that they were two halves of a more complex whole:
You need to look at that in a tiered way. What I think YR@W did was
that it convinced a broader electorate who weren’t trade unionists, or
convinced labor voters, that there was something extremely serious,
and wrong, about the Howard legislation. There was therefore a very
strong argument for a change of government in order to deal with that.
The platform for a change was established by YR@W. You’ve then got
to look at the extent to which the Labor Party and Rudd, in particular,
handled the campaign in a way that either re-‐enforced or strengthened
the need for a change of government. It’s fair to say that without
YR@W there probably wouldn’t have been a change of government but
it set the imperative for a change of government, it set a climate
favouring a change of government. But without the campaign actions
of the parliamentary leadership in the lead-‐up to the election campaign
and during it, you could still have ended up with the re-‐election of the
Howard Government. If they’d badly played their campaign or badly
played the re-‐positioning of the new leader after Beazley got knocked
off. If you look at the margin, the margin in terms of percentage rather
than seats, it was still a very contestable election. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 4
246
Writing at the end of 2010, Brian Boyd, Secretary, Victorian Trades Hall Council
(VTHC) complained: “Yet very quickly after the result the Federal ALP leadership
re-‐cast the narrative to claim the campaign was all about “Kevin 07” and very
little about the anti-‐WorkChoices’ anti-‐Howard theme” (Boyd 2010). Boyd’s
complaint was not a new one. From the time of Rudd’s election night victory
speech (Rudd 2007), when he chose not to refer to the union movement84 or the
YR@W campaign (Muir 2008), there has been a theme of disappointment in
sections of the union movement about the ALP’s alleged efforts to diminish the
importance of the YR@W campaign:
Q. Some unions feel that they might have got a bit more credit from
Rudd and he didn’t mention unions in his victory speech?
A. Absolutely. He mentioned Mark Arbib (the then Secretary of the
NSW ALP) not unions. -‐ Current peak union official 4
3. Campaign elements
The nature of the YR@W campaign, like its electoral contribution, remains open
to interpretation. Did YR@W owe its success to good strategy and great television
advertisements, or was grassroots mobilisation and activism the key to success?
If mobilisation was important, should we see this as a return to a pre-‐Accord style
of unionism or a radical new direction in Australian unionism, owing much to
successful US models?
There were some specific Australian precedents for the YR@W campaign on
which planners could draw. These included the UnionsNSW campaign around
workers compensation in 2001 and the NSW Teachers campaign between 2001
and 2004 for increased in education funding and wages (Ellem, Oxenbridge and
Gahan 2008, Tattersall 2006). In a more general sense, the Australian union
movement had been engaged in a long-‐term change in its use of repertoires of
84 Rudd, in fact, made one reference to unions: “I want to put aside the old battles of the past, the old battles between business and unions” (Rudd 2007).
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contention. There had been a steady decline in the use of labour rights until the
cavalcade to Canberra then a sharp drop off, together with a concomitant trend in
the other direction in the use of citizen rights. The Maritime dispute can be seen
as a significant turning point.
The Whitlam Government was unable to arrange co-‐operation with the union
movement, and union claims for catch-‐up wage movements in a centralised wage
system adversely affected the Whitlam Government’s fortunes (Hawke 1994,
Whitlam 1985). During the Whitlam Government, unions insisted on using their
labour rights under the existing Arbitration system to the full extent possible. The
Accord was a reaction to the problems encountered by the Whitlam Government,
and was designed to implement economic change without a wages breakout. The
Accord used the social wage concept to offset wage restraint, an idea Whitlam had
proposed but had not been able to win union support for (Hawke 1994, Whitlam
1985). The Accord was a key part of Hawke’s pitch at the 1983 election, but
unions played little role in the campaign, unlike the 2007 election (see Chapter 6
discussion on first speeches after the 1983 and 2007 elections which reveal
differences in union involvement). The Canberra Cavalcade in 1996 was
organised by the ACTU as a protest against the incoming Howard Government’s
workplace relations reforms, it became rowdy (or a riot) and was considered a
public relations disaster for both the union movement and the ALP Opposition85.
The Cavalcade seems to have been premised on the idea that a massive show of
union strength would influence the Howard Government. The reverse was true.
The Cavalcade was a tactic left-‐over from the days of high union density and
‘antipodean corporatism’. It was a reprise of the famous 1969 Clarrie O’Shea case,
sometimes still cited as an example of the power of unions to mobilise the
working class (Bramble 2005, 2008). The approach adopted by the ACTU in the
1998 Maritime dispute (Trinca and Davies 2000) was shaped by the Canberra
85 ALP Senator Faulkner: “Let me say on behalf of the opposition that the Labor Party, too, condemns the appalling violence that occurred at the doors of Parliament House yesterday” -‐ http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/dailys/ds200896.pdf p.2673. The ACTU president at the time, Jennie George, later described it as a low-‐point of her presidency (George 2009).
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Cavalcade fiasco and the withdrawal of labour rights in the Howard Government’s
1996 Workplace Relations Act (Gentile and Tarrow 2009). The YR@W campaign
reflected a further restriction of labour rights in the WorkChoices legislation and
the adoption of union revitalisation techniques, based on citizen rights, during the
decade before the 2004 federal election. The next table outlines the transition
from the use of labour rights to the use of citizen rights.
Table 36: Repertoires of contention
Whitlam Accord Cavalcade Maritime YR@W
Labour rights High Medium Medium Medium Low
Citizen rights Low Low Low Medium High
Ellem, Oxenbridge and Gahan (2008) have characterised the YR@W campaign as
a combination of marketing and mobilisation. This combination, they argued,
gave rise to a number of paradoxes:
Union leaders (and media) described the campaign as a ‘grassroots’
one, but the importance of leadership in strategy development was
quite clear. YR@W was described as a community campaign, but it was
also a highly complex marketing campaign.
These paradoxes are evident in the responses of interviewees and they allow for a
number of interpretations. One interpretation emphasises the strategic speed
and skill of the ACTU campaign, which surprised both sides of politics, allowed the
ACTU to frame the debate and generally gave it an advantage that it maintained
throughout. A second interpretation, usually seen as complementing the first,
argues that the real success of the campaign came from the grassroots
mobilisation component because ultimately it was the many one-‐on-‐one
conversations through everything from bus tours and street booths to telephone
canvassing and marginal seat campaigns that changed votes. Both of these
interpretations owe something to the pressure group type tactics that the ACTU
adopted during the decade before in its efforts at union revitalisation. The first
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interpretation is more suited to the augmentation process discussed in this thesis,
which involves cherry-‐picking pressure group tactics to augment a social
democratic type relationship that is declining in its capacity to deliver predictable
benefit exchanges. The second interpretation includes a more radical embrace of
the union revitalisation model, and it includes the elements that appear far more
difficult to sustain and build on.
The YR@W campaign started early catching both the Howard Government and its
ALP Opposition by surprise. The YR@W campaign may have had its genesis on
the first working day after the 2004 federal election (Muir 2008: 8–9) and by
March 2005, the ACTU had formulated a national, research-‐based media strategy
and announced that it would work against the government (Muir 2008: 46–7, 53–
5). This early start gave the union movement the initiative and allowed it to
frame the debate on its terms; that is, as an issue about vulnerable workers and
working families, rather than the Government’s preferred ground of economic
benefits for the country as a whole (Ellem 2011, Lewis 2009). This strategic
advantage was significantly increased by the success of the Tracy television ads,
which first went to air in June 2005 (Lewis 2009, Muir 2008).
The strategic, tactical and operational sophistication of the YR@W campaign also
took both sides of politics by surprise. Union interviewees believed that the
Howard Government was expecting, and hoping for, some industrial action and
rowdy demonstrations to use in its effort to demonise union bosses, while the
ALP fearing the same thing was hoping to distance itself from such conflict:
The government was expecting us to do the usual thing national strikes
big rallies storming parliament. Greg (Combet) was so strategic,
George Wright86 and Greg. -‐ Current affiliated union official 2
Extraordinary discipline and extraordinary restraint. We didn’t fall for
the sucker punch of having a massive industrial response, which I think,
86 George Wright was Director of Policy and Communications at the ACTU during the YR@W campaign. In 2011, he was appointed ALP National Secretary.
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is what the previous government thought we would do. -‐ Current peak
union official 1
Reacting to pictures of lots of unionists demonstrating in the streets is
one thing, in terms of Labor Party reaction, but reacting to a
sophisticated, successful ad campaign is another thing altogether. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
The ALP was also caught out initially, but unlike the Government its surprise was
ultimately a pleasant one. One interviewee described the problems the ALP was
encountering at the time the YR@W campaign was getting into full swing:
I remember all those marches in Melbourne, they (the FPLP leadership)
were very late coming in Macklin87 didn’t come until like the third
march or whatever it was. A lot of politicians did not trust what was
happening originally. I’m only reflecting on Melbourne. Partly that’s
because Labor was still in disarray, still wondering where they were
going and how they were going to get there and they were still doing
that when we started the YR@W campaign. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated
union official 1
The union movement, YR@W, breathed life into it (opposition to
Howard’s IR policies). The Labor Party had given up. – Current federal
MP 6
The ‘surprising’ sophistication of the union campaign was also found in its
decision to focus on vulnerable workers and working families rather than unions.
The YR@W campaign was designed to frame the public debate around the impact
of WorkChoices on people rather than unions:
In 1998 our slogan was “Mr. Howard, unchain my union”88. We were so
stupid, so dumb back then we always made it about us about unions.
This time we never mentioned unions; we didn’t want Australian
Council of Trade Unions or unions in anything. We realised if we make
87 A senior ALP federal frontbencher. 88 An ironic reference to the expensive pro-‐GST advertising by the Howard Government.
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this about ordinary people we win, if we make it about unions he
(Howard) wins. -‐ Current affiliated union official 2
The ACTU’s first television advertisements were seen by interviewees as a turning
point in the YR@W campaign and contributed enormously to its success in setting
the agenda. Lewis (2009) reported that the ads were put to air early in order to
frame the debate, on a ‘first to market’ principle. Interviewees from affiliated,
non-‐affiliated and peak union organisations offered remarkably consistent views
about the TV advertisements:
I think those couple of ads that were put out were important initially in
helping to set the agenda. They focused on the things that did resonate,
AWAs and unfair dismissals, even though unfair dismissals don’t really
do that much for unions but in terms of people’s whole perception of
job security I think it was an important thing. -‐ Current peak union
official 2
Once we got Tracy out there. I tell you what it took a big, big argument
at the ACTU executive to get it. To actually use TV advertising and use
the money. It was the principle of it, but Greg (Combet) just kept at it.
It won the award for the best workplace campaign in the world. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
And the ads were so effective. Andrew Robb told me it just blew them
out of the water, it was not expected, and they didn’t know how to
respond. -‐ Current affiliated union official 2
Andrew Robb is a former Federal Director of the Liberal Party, and at the time of
writing was the Opposition spokesperson on Finance. During the WorkChoices
period he was appointed by John Howard to help the then Minister for Workplace
Relations, Kevin Andrews, promote WorkChoices through the media.
The second interpretation sees the whole campaign as important but argues that
the grassroots mobilisation components were decisive, particularly the capacity
to talk with potential swinging voters, rather than conducting a marketing
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campaign:
So the change with YR@W and the engagement strategy there was
moving away from telling people how to vote to asking them how they
think they should vote given what they have said about particular
issues and having an informed discussion respecting the fact that they
are going to make a choice on polling day and while we have got a role
to play its largely a role based on an obligation to inform them about
things that we’re in a position to engage them rather than arrogantly
assume that you can send a form letter out and they will do as their told
because they don’t. -‐ Current affiliated union official 1
When you could actually talk to people and they could listen to
someone they trusted (that’s what made the difference). What the
unions were doing, and this was run through the ACTU, is that they
managed to target their members in the marginal seats and they
managed to target it down to who were the swingers and they managed
to focus on calling and contacting them and that’s something that was
unimaginable 20 years ago and that’s the degree of sophistication of the
campaign. -‐ Current peak union official 3
Talking to people in regional locations was quite effective. -‐ Current
peak union official 1
Some interviewees saw all the components as vital to an integrated and
comprehensive campaign:
There was a legal strategy to help unions survive; there was a political
strategy to engage with the Labor opposition to try and make sure we
could defeat the Howard Government. There was an industrial strategy
that was extremely important because those mass rallies, I think there
were four of them, included the biggest ever rally in western Sydney
and huge rallies all over the country. Millions of workers mobilised. So
it was a multi-‐faceted campaign and then on top of that they grafted
quite a sophisticated media campaign. -‐ Current federal MP 1
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Nevertheless, some interviewees were cynical about the ‘real’ role of the
grassroots campaign. One interviewee suggested that the ACTU leadership,
correctly, played lip service to alternate views about the shape of the campaign
and ignored internal debates about the importance of various activities:
Actually there are different views about what the YR@W campaign
means. Some people think the key part was the on-‐the-‐ground door
knocking in the electorates. There’s no doubt that where the YR@W
campaign was active, there were bigger swings in those electorates.
Correlation is not causation but there is some evidence to suggest a
positive impact. Some other people think the big rallies had an impact.
And it’s true that the Labor vote tracked by Newspoll would always go
up after those big rallies89. But there were also advertising blitzes
around those rallies so you don’t know but everyone has their own
explanation. The great skill of Combet was to listen to those
interpretations and then go off and do whatever he was going to do
anyway. -‐ Current affiliated union official 5
Another interviewee was more cynical and suggested that some activities were
purposely designed to keep people occupied and away from causing problems:
We knew we had to have rallies because the Victorians and all the mad
people always want a rally. But we were determined to do it different,
its got to have music be positive we’re going to have workers, we’re
going to stage manage it, we’re going to make it look like an election
rally so instead of the usual flags on the back of a truck with a
megaphone. We spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on staging. -‐
Current affiliated union official 2
The existence of a range of interpretations of such a large campaign is not
surprising, but it does allow sceptics of union revitalisation to downplay the
ongoing importance of mobilisation and community campaigns.
89 See Bramble (2008:260): “In the days following the rallies, Coalition support, on a two party preferred basis, fell from 51 to 46 per cent in AC Nielsen polling”.
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4. Policy benefits
Just as the role of the YR@W campaign in shaping the 2007 federal election
contest, and contributing to the outcome, is contestable, so too is any assessment
of the policy benefits the union movement derived from the incoming Rudd
Government and its Fair Work Australia Act.
All union interviewees, unsurprisingly, viewed the Fair Work policy as a major
improvement. Nevertheless, all union interviewees found at least some aspects of
the new legislation ‘disappointing’90. There was, however, a sharp divergence on
the way those disappointments were interpreted, of the glass half-‐full or half-‐
empty variety. The table below summarises interviewee attitudes to the Fair
Work Australia Act.
Table 37: Attitudes: FWA outcomes
Good OK Bad None
Current official 7 6 1 0
Former official 2 1 1 1
Never official 3 0 0 2
Totals 12 7 2 3
Interviewees who took a glass half-‐full approach focused on the defeat of the
Howard Government when asked about whether the union movement got the
policy outcomes it expected from the YR@W campaign and the election of the
Rudd Government:
Well not having the Howard Government is a huge benefit. Can never
be forgotten and we (unionists) have got very short memories. Not
90 Many union officials were in fact angered by the decision of Rudd and Gillard to retain some of Howard’s “anti-‐union measures” in the Fair Work Act (Wilkinson et. al. 2009:366).
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having a government that’s absolutely committed to destroying unions
is in itself a benefit. -‐ Current peak union official 2
The glass half-‐empty responses tended to focus more on the specifics of the
legislation:
The prime example (of unions getting fewer benefits from the
relationship) is the YR@W campaign where unions I believe delivered
victory to the ALP around that issue and have got not much in return.
Fair Work is certainly an improvement on WorkChoices, there’s no
argument about that. But I think it’s been disappointing. -‐ Current non-‐
affiliated union official 3
Several interviewees described the first type of response as a sign of political
maturity in the relationship, a capacity to accept defeat in negotiations between
unions and the ALP without “blowing up”. One interviewee (Current affiliated
union official 2) identified this maturity with affiliated unions and contrasted it
with both the approach of non-‐affiliated unions in Australia, and the more
militant approach adopted by unions in the UK.
Some interviewees believed that the success of the YR@W campaign resulted in
gains for the union movement from the ALP on industrial relations policy, over
and beyond what the ALP would have done anyway. Prior to YR@W, the union
movement had been struggling to get the ALP to adopt some of its policy
positions:
The Labor Party’s position wouldn’t have been the same (without
YR@W), not that there hadn’t been a range of things happening before
that like they were locked into a position that was the abolition of
AWAs91 after a struggle that had gone on for 5 or 6 years before that. -‐
Current peak union official 2
91 The ALP Opposition under Latham, in particular, showed little willingness to fight against the Howard Government’s reforms (Johnson 2004:546).
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The policy achievements of the YR@W campaign, according to one interviewee,
resulted from the way in which it demonstrated to the ALP leadership the
strength of support for union policy positions:
Q. Would the Fair Work Act have been as good without the YR@W
campaign? A. No it wouldn’t have been. I think (YR@W) was one of the
most successful mobilisations of the union movement in Australian
history. It was a very good community campaign. People were
mobilised because it was a genuine issue and people understood the
importance of it. That had a huge influence on the Labor Party. -‐
Current federal MP 1
Nevertheless, there were clear limits to what the ALP was prepared to deliver in
its efforts to balance union policy concerns and ambitions with those of other
groups, particularly employers:
I think they (ALP) recognise the YR@W campaign was helpful in
defeating the Howard Government but I don’t think that they were
prepared to introduce all the changes that unions, certainly ours,
believed should have been introduced – Current non-‐affiliated union
official 3
Another interviewee suggested that the union movement faced even greater
difficulties in winning policy concessions in other policy areas, particularly in
economic areas where the ideology underpinning union policy objectives was at
odds with the economic conservatism championed by the Rudd Government:
The metalworkers before the YR@W campaign were doing quite a bit
of research about the impact of tariff policy and would commission,
they had a research policy unit, they commissioned people like Peter
Brain to write elaborate micro-‐economic scenarios about the car
industry etc etc etc. Did it achieve anything in terms of Rudd
Government attitudes to tariff policy? No. So you’ve still got the
problem, no matter how much research or how effective you are at
putting your case if you’re up against a solid ideological or otherwise
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refusal to contemplate change in that particular area then that’s not
going to work. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union official 4
The YR@W campaign may have helped the union movement win greater
concessions on industrial relations from an incoming ALP Government, but the
limitations on what it could achieve were significant, particularly because the
incoming Government did not want to be seen to be indebted to the union
movement, and stressed that it treated unions and business groups equally.
5. A moment in time
Some interviewees saw YR@W as a one-‐off or a moment in time. This view may
owe something at least to the sense of crisis fostered by the union leadership
during the YR@W campaign (Ellem, Oxenbridge, S., and Gahan, B. 2008). The
effort and unity produced by a sense of crisis is hard to maintain when the
immediate threat has been removed:
We spent a lot of time with Greg Combet, it was all happening. It was
all we thought about for awhile. It dominated and that’s the thing that
makes a difference. But they are only moments, they come, they go. I’m
a realist, pragmatic, they are just moments. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated
union official 1
I suspect it was a moment in time. It was a fundamental defensive
strategy. I t didn’t have much of a positive outcome beyond defeat of
the government and to get rid of WorkChoices. -‐ Current affiliated
union official 5
YR@W was an exception, not something that could be easily repeated. -‐
Current federal MP 7
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Since the YR@W campaign the union movement has run many smaller campaigns
but struggled to get the same traction:
That was a powerful thing, but I’d have to say because I sit on the ACTU
executive, that they’re finding it really hard to replicate that now.
You’ve got to have something that really, really, really get’s people
annoyed and get’s people worried and get’s people concerned. -‐
Current non-‐affiliated union official 1
Nevertheless, some interviewees also saw the loss of momentum as a result of a
deliberate choice made by many unions:
It was a fantastic campaign and had the grassroots enlisted but I think
the lesson out of that is that we need to continue that work. There are
parts of that campaign that involved the community we didn’t continue
that on we went back to our traditional way and that was sitting around
a table and negotiating. -‐ Current affiliated union official 6
Moreover, the campaign focus on a single political objective tended to encourage
the view that it was over after the 2007 election. The result was that YR@W did
not become the union revitalisation campaign that some in the union movement
had hoped. Some interviewees were clearly disappointed that the campaign
ended with the election and did not result in boosts in membership:
Well, the first failure of YR@W was that in all the conversations I had
with Robbo92 and with Greg Combet, Robbo was about him and Greg
was just about the next election. I kept saying what happens if we lose
and what happens if we win. It’s not just about getting Labor elected its
about getting a stronger movement which actually entrenches Labor
for the future. Their focus was definitely just the next election. -‐
Current affiliated union official 4
92 John Robertson, Secretary of UnionsNSW during YR@W campaign and later ALP Opposition leader in NSW Parliament.
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If the goal of the campaign was to defeat the government than it was
successful. If the goal of the campaign was to re-‐build the trade union
movement then you’d have to say it was a failure. The ACTU leadership
said we’ve just got to get through this and everything will be fine. -‐
Current affiliated union official 5
The YR@W campaign didn’t make how to protect your rights by joining
a union the issue. It said vote for Kevin and he’ll look after you. Well,
has he? – Current federal MP 5
A possible explanation for the discounting of the continuing relevance of YR@W is
the perceived narrowness of its objectives. A broad set of objectives related to
union revitalisation became, fairly quickly, focused on the single political
objective of defeating the Howard Government at the 2007 election. The YR@W
campaign has been seen as a major success for the union movement because it
achieved its primary goal, which came to be seen as the defeat of the Howard
Government (Ellem 2011). YR@W was less successful in achieving some other
goals that were canvassed at the outset and during the three-‐year campaign.
These included coalition building and membership growth (Ellem, Oxenbridge,
and Gahan, 2008). Moreover, the positioning of the YR@W campaign as a ‘one-‐off’
that was suited to its times, not unlike the Accord is now regarded, allowed the
union movement to slip back into reliance on the ALP, now that it was back in
Government and Howard’s WorkChoices had been defeated. In the next section,
evidence is highlighted that the union movement was ‘disappointed’ with the
ALP’s performance on union issues in its first term after the election victory. This
disappointment indicates that there was a view in union circles that the new
federal ALP Government would deliver because the union movement got it
elected. That is, there was an expectation that the old social democratic rules
about symmetrical political exchanges would apply once again.
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6. A second act?
I think that the challenge for us is to continue to be independent and
campaigning and so on while having a communication with the
government and having input into policy – Current peak union official 2
After the 2007 election triumph, unions and their peak organisations, particularly
UnionsNSW and the ACTU, seemed to have neglected their new political strategy
of mobilisation and returned to a more traditional approach of political exchange
with the state mediated through the ALP. The neglect of mobilisation, in favour of
elite negotiated political exchanges, and widespread union disappointment with
the Rudd Government’s Fair Work Act, resulted in a lack lustre performance by
the union movement in 2010.
The continuing relevance of the union movement’s dependent relationship with
the ALP was highlighted when the two main architects and high profile leaders of
the YR@W campaign left the union movement to embark on parliamentary
careers with the ALP. The UnionsNSW Secretary, John Robertson, entered the
NSW Legislative Council in late 2008 and became the Opposition Leader after the
ALP’s crushing electoral defeat in March 2011. The ACTU Secretary, Greg Combet,
left the union movement just prior to the 2007 election and quickly rose through
the ranks to become Prime Minister Gillard’s climate change minister after the
2010 election. These departures were not always welcomed. It can be seen as a
sign of the union movement’s ongoing struggle to make the shift to a future based
on mobilisation:
We got so insider focused and for many unions it still is insider work.
That’s a real danger. There’s always a capacity for people to slip back
into that. John Robertson is a good example when his ACTU bid failed
we spoke to him about the future but he decided to just not enter into a
dialogue about the new legislation. He then was also getting offered the
premiership by some and the opposition leadership by some. He
decided to go quiet on the IR stuff, a quid pro quo, during the most
critical period of debating the new legislation. This is a guy who was on
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the front page of the SMH saying I was the one who delivered Kevin
Rudd the leadership of the ALP against Kim Beazley; and also the guy
who played a big financial role, not necessarily intellectual role, and
deserves congratulations for the YR@W campaign, which did help even
though it was a shortsighted campaign. He could have had a lot of
influence on Kevin Rudd but he decided not to use it because he had a
political career he wanted to pursue and that just exemplifies the worst
aspects of some labor leaders. -‐ Current affiliated union official 4
The insider problem was further highlighted by the attitudes of some senior ALP
leaders during the YR@W campaign once they were in the FPLP at a time when
the Rudd Government was negotiating the Fair Work Act and dealing with union
hostility to some aspects of the new legislation:
When the laws were presented to caucus a number of us objected to
various aspects of it and when Gillard presented the Bill to caucus the
first two to jump up and support the Government’s, what I would see as
not strong enough legislation, was Greg Combet then (during the
YR@W campaign) the ACTU secretary who had negotiated this with
Kevin and Bill Shorten who was then a member of the ACTU executive.
When (Senator) Doug Cameron (former National Secretary AMWU) got
up and spoke against it and I’ll never forget him saying I know I’m going
to get rolled. So there certainly has been a very big shift -‐ Current
federal MP 5
One interviewee pointed to the dilemma of mobilisation versus elite negotiation
when the ALP is in government and argued that perhaps the YR@W campaign
wasn’t after all the ultimate test of whether the Australian union movement is
capable of adopting an independent political position:
There is always a bit of nostalgia after a successful campaign when
you’re back in the humdrum of lobbying, I suppose, with occasional
media interventions to say the government is up the creek when it
comes to government procurement among other things. But I don’t
think anyone seriously believes they can re-‐create the momentum of
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YR@W. The real question I think is more is if there was a serious
falling out between the Labor Government and the ACTU with the
unions generally supportive across the Left – Right factional divide
which is what made the YR@W campaign successful, the extent to
which the unions would go back to the sort of tactics they used and the
extent of mobilisation of their activist base. That remains to be seen.
We haven’t got anything of that kind. -‐ Current non-‐affiliated union
official 4
The ACTU, having reviewed the disappointing campaign role of the ACTU and
unions in the ensuing 2010 election, has renewed its commitment to the
mobilisation agenda, and to its key feature of political independence. The ACTU
President, Ged Kearney, told a conference in August 2011 (Kearney 2011):
The most valuable lesson that was reinforced by our review of 2010
was that the union movement must always have an energetic and
independent agenda that speaks for the needs and concerns of our
members, not what suits any political party. And it must be a positive
agenda that moves our issues forward, not simply defends old ground.
After the disappointments of the Rudd and Gillard Governments and the union
campaign in the lead up to the 2010 election the ACTU is now looking towards
“re-‐establishing sustainable community campaign activist networks and
developing a positive independent policy agenda for the trade union movement”
(UnionsNSW 2010:17). The ACTU has also attributed some of the blame to
frictions between unions and the federal ALP government between 2007–2010
“which saw much of the energy and goodwill from the YR@W campaign dissipate
and made it difficult for unions to mobilise their membership and the community
in support of the Labor Government at the 2010 election” (Boyd 2010).
Although not publicly available the ACTU’s review of its election campaign,
“Report of the Review Panel – On the ACTU Election Campaign 2010” (Boyd
2010), has been discussed on union websites, in annual reports and in speeches
by the ACTU leadership.
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ACTU President, Ged Kearney (2011) said that the ACTU’s 2010 campaign had
“failed to generate the massive enthusiasm or engagement from our membership
base of 2007; it did not reconnect with the community, and the importance of our
union issues in shifting votes slid down the scale.” Kearney attributed these
failures to disappointment with the performance of the ALP Government on some
significant union issues and in the union movement the Government was
perceived to have “failed to deliver on the investment working Australians made
in Labor” through the YR@W campaign. This disappointment caused some
unions to feel that they had lost “credibility in the eyes of their members by
pushing for an involvement” in the campaign to re-‐elect the ALP in 2010 (Boyd
2010). Boyd (2010) reports that the Review found that:
Blue collar unions expressed anger and deep disappointment over the
Fair Work Act as failing to deliver promised changes expected from
Labor, whilst all other unions talked about the cynicism from members,
which manifested in their inability to run strong pro Labor campaigns.
According to VTHC Secretary, Brian Boyd, the review also points to the failure to
maintain the “campaign infrastructure and activist base” that was created during
the YR@W campaign beyond the 2007 election. Boyd (2010) quotes the report as
finding that: “as a movement we failed to find a role for this network when the
focus shifted to the new Fair Work laws. This led to the demobilisation of our
activists who were politically organised.” When it came to the 2010 election
campaign, the union movement was unable to use these structures effectively and
“it is clear that these networks have not been contacted since the 2007 campaign”.
In addition, without the threat of WorkChoices the unity of the union movement
seems to have dissipated: “a situation evolved whereby individual unions largely
coordinated their own election activities, and these varied immensely”. In
addition, affiliates believed that without its own agenda, the ACTU’s campaign
was seen as “too close” to the ALP by union members and community supporters.
Boyd (2010) also reported that the Review criticises many union officials for
getting caught up with the “three year electoral cycle and the machinations in the
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national parliament e.g. leadership changes”. This return to politics as usual may
also have led to “a level of complacency across the union movement and this
complacency followed through to organisers, activists and members. Last minute
planning, and little or no engagement with members and officials, reflected a lack
of interest or commitment to the ACTU campaign” (Boyd 2010).
Commenting on the Review in a speech, ACTU Secretary, Jeff Lawrence,
anticipated further debates in the union movement “about how we engage in
politics” (Lawrence 2011). Lawrence argued that there was a need for a “longer-‐
term political strategy not just campaigning for survival in election years: but
rather unions that are campaigning for a positive agenda about issues that will
change workers’ lives” (Lawrence 2011).
7. Conclusion
For many people in the Australian union movement, the YR@W campaign was an
unusual period of intense engagement and political triumph. It was a shining
example of what a newly revitalised union movement could achieve. For many
members of the union leadership group it was a grim political fight with a hostile
government, a fight that was unprecedented in its scale and cost and, probably,
unrepeatable. Once the fight was over, the momentum slipped away.
Campaigning proved more difficult when the threats were less dire. The union
leadership group returned to its comfort zone of elite bargaining with an ALP
government. Some put their faith in collective bargaining rather than political
campaigning to boost membership. Activist networks built up to support the
YR@W campaign were allowed to atrophy. There was widespread
disappointment across the union movement with the Rudd and Gillard
governments. The ACTU’s 2010 election campaign did not provoke much
enthusiasm among union members, and many officials found it difficult to urge
their members to campaign for the ALP Government, much harder than
encouraging opposition against the previous Howard government. For many in
the union leadership, YR@W had become, like the Accord before it, a good idea for
the time, but times had changed once again. Nevertheless, as it did a decade ago
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when proposing union revitalisation strategies, the ACTU leadership spoke of the
need for the union movement to be independent of the ALP and to reach-‐out to
other like-‐minded political parties and community organisations. Independence
remains the key to revitalisation.
Yet, convinced that the union movement was a significant contributor to the 2007
ALP election victory, many in the union movement became ‘complacent’ and ‘pre-‐
occupied with the machinations of electoral politics’, similar criticisms to those
that the ACTU’s new leadership generation make about the Accord era. YR@W
became a ‘one-‐off‘ and the union movement tended to revert to business-‐as-‐usual
rather than push ahead with building the infrastructure (campaigning capacity,
activist networks, community coalitions) that are vital to successful union
revitalisation strategies.
This experience points to three important conclusions. First, it is difficult for
union movements to campaign against aligned parties in Government, especially
where affiliation delivers many senior union leaders continuing, and senior, roles
in the party organisation, and almost half of the new Ministry, and almost half the
new Caucus are former union officials, mainly from affiliated unions. The
temptation to revert to elite negotiations (the insider game) is powerful. Second,
emulation of the politically independent campaigning borrowed from the
pressure group type by affiliated unions is feasible in Opposition, but much less so
in Government. Third, it is difficult to switch between the different repertoires of
contention involved in social democratic and pressure group type unions-‐party
relationships. As Tattersall (2010:176) has noted, after her analysis of three case
studies of coalition unionism in Australia and North America, a strategy of public
agitation “sits in stark contrast to the restraint and reliance on quiet influence
associated with union relationships with political parties”.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION
Faced with declines in union densities and the adoption of neo-‐liberal policy
frameworks by union-‐aligned political parties, union movements in Western
countries are choosing to augment the internal lobbying of the social democratic
type relationship with the external lobbying associated more strongly with the
pressure group type of unions-‐party relationships (Hyman and Gumbrell-‐
McCormick 2010, Ludlam, Coates and Bodah 2002, Valenzuela 1992). A move
from reliance on internal lobbying to a greater reliance on external lobbying,
involves a switch from repertoires of contention based on labour rights to those
based on citizenship rights (Gentile and Tarrow 2009). These changes are
consistent with arguments about weakening vertical links between parties and
associated groups during the transition away from mass party types to the
electoral professional, catch-‐all and cartel party types that place a greater
emphasis on parliamentary autonomy and show a preference for milder forms of
ideology that are more electorally popular and less likely to be divisive (Duverger
1964, Gunther and Diamond 2001, Katz and Mair 1995, Panebianco 1988). This
thesis examined the Australian case study of the national unions-‐ALP relationship
between the Accord period and the 2010 federal election to explore three
questions:
1. Relationship types. Is there a politically important contradiction
between the ALP’s relationship with its affiliated unions and the party’s
relationship with the ACTU?
2. Consequences. How does the contradiction of two co-‐existent
relationship types affect the contemporary dynamic of the national
unions-‐ALP relationship?
3. Reconciliation. Has the independence of union revitalisation been
reconciled with the dependence of affiliation?
The case study in this thesis offers the following answers to these three questions.
267
Relationship types. There are two types of unions-‐party relationship co-‐existing
at the national level in Australia. There is a receding social democratic type
relationship between affiliated unions and the ALP, which is characterised by the
dependence of unions on the ALP; and, there is also an emerging pressure group
type relationship between the ACTU and the ALP, which is premised the
independence of the union movement and the capacity to broaden its
engagements with like-‐minded community organisations and, in the case of the
ACTU, other political parties. Federalism, in particular, fragmented the national-‐
unions ALP relationship to a degree that was unusual for an otherwise social
democratic type relationship. Fragmentation allowed the ACTU to engage with
the FPLP as if it were a separate organisation; first during the Accord and later
during the YR@W-‐Fair Work episode. The ACTU’s adoption of US-‐style union
revitalisation strategies was facilitated by this fragmentation, and served to
extend it. A politically important contradiction has resulted from this co-‐
existence of two relationship types because the social democratic relationship is
characterised by restraint and quiet influence (Tattersall 2010) and the pressure
group type is characterised by the generally adversarial nature of membership
activism (Hickey, Kuruvilla and Lakhani, 2010).
Consequences. The unions and the ALP seek to manage this contradiction by
maintaining a balance between dependence and independence. Many
interviewees spoke of the need to ‘get the balance right’ and to be able to position
the relationship as neither too close nor too distant. This balance is also
identified by terms like ‘maturity’, and by claims that the national unions-‐ALP
relationship has evolved in ways, and to an extent, not found elsewhere. Accord-‐
type relationships are no longer seen as appropriate for ‘the times’ by many
interviewees on either side. In addition, affiliated unions can no longer rely
solely, or principally, on the benefits of affiliation to secure policy objectives and
they are now augmenting internal lobbying with external lobbying. This is a
cherry-‐picking approach that is premised on a belief that useable bits of the
American pressure group type approach can be plugged into an existing social
democratic type relationship. The contradiction between independence and
dependence was not obvious during the YR@W campaign when the ALP was in
268
Opposition, but the ACTU has had considerable difficulty in maintaining the
momentum for its union revitalisation campaigns; and, the perception prevalent
among union members that the ACTU was running a pro-‐ALP campaign during
the 2010 federal election contributed to the failure of the union movement to
have a significant impact in the 2010 election campaign.
Reconciliation. Links between unions and the ALP have remained strong in
terms of pre-‐selection outcomes. There is little evidence that this benefit of
affiliation is likely to decline without significant structural reform of the
relationship. This is despite the ALP’s desire to engage more broadly with unions
and community organisations, beyond its blue-‐collar base, and to re-‐cast itself as
a progressive community-‐based party. The ALP retains an affiliation model that
privileges a small number of traditional unions at the expense of other unions and
social groupings. The ALP’s largest affiliated union, the SDA, has just 230,000
members (less than the number of voters in two federal electorates) and 8 of its
former officials sit in the 103 member federal caucus; twice as many as the ACTU
contingent. The ANF has more members than the SDA and none of its former
officials are in the FPLP. Nearly half (49 of 103) of the federal caucus have full-‐
time union official backgrounds, the number with full-‐time experience in the
community organisations the ALP would like to engage with can be easily counted
on the fingers of two hands.
At the same time, unions, and the ACTU, have found it difficult to forgo the
benefits of internal lobbying in favour of a more robust embrace of the
independence of the external lobbying approach. This evidenced by the
widespread and multi-‐faceted scepticism in the union movement about the long-‐
term applicability of US-‐style union revitalisation strategies to Australia. Many
interviewees are already thinking of the YR@W campaign along similar lines to
the contemporary understanding of the Accord in the union movement as a
strategy that was right for the times, but not as a permanent basis for the unions-‐
ALP relationship.
Unions and the ALP also use ideology and rhetoric as devices for reconciling
independence and dependence in the national unions-‐ALP relationship. The ALP
269
has adopted the language of individualism and citizen rights to respond to the
socially dominant neo-‐liberal ideology, but also to broaden its appeal and
connections with social groupings beyond blue-‐collar, industrial unions. The
ACTU has adopted a values-‐based approach, which moves away from more rigid
ideological constraints and opens the way for a broader engagement with like-‐
minded community organisations and political parties other than the ALP. So far
these ideological and rhetorical changes have had little impact on the unions-‐ALP
relationship.
A key purpose of the case study undertaken in this thesis has been to identify
hypotheses that can be tested by further research. That is, the research
undertaken has been exploratory rather than validating. Based on the outcomes
of this research, the following hypotheses are proposed:
1. Social democratic type unions-‐party relationships place constraints on the
ability of union movements to augment declining political resources with
strategies, and repertoires of contention, borrowed from social movement
unionism. These constraints are emphasised when union-‐aligned parties are in
office.
2. Parties are limited in their capacity to weaken links with unions through
ideological and rhetorical changes while more traditional links (i.e. affiliation)
remains in place.
3. Labour parties are constrained in their capacity to change their self-‐
identification while affiliation remains in place.
These hypotheses lend themselves to further case study research and to country
comparative analyses. Australian case studies could focus on:
1. The national relationship after the 2010 election, to test the extent to
which the ALP and the ACTU are successful in building a relationship
that is based on independence and reconciles this with a continuing
level of dependence;
270
2. Unions-‐ALP relationships at the state level, to identify differences and
similarities with the national level and to further clarify the impact of
federalism at the national level;
3. Relationships between individual unions and the ALP at both the state
and national level, to assess the impact of particular features of unions
on the balance between independence and dependence at a
disaggregated level, this could include comparisons between affiliated
and non-‐affiliated unions and between unions that follow the SEIU
model more closely and those that emphasise a reversion to an earlier
form of Australian union membership activism.
Cross-‐country analyses would be particularly important to compare the
divergence or convergence of relationship types with countries with similar
political and industrial relations systems, notably NZ and the UK. These analyses
could look at whether the national unions-‐ALP relationship is facing the
challenges of union power augmentation strategies earlier than other national
unions-‐party relationships; or is diverging to an extent that it really is unique as
several interviewees claimed.
I conclude with a few further observations. First, unlike much of the
contemporary discussion about the relationship between unions and the ALP, this
thesis has neither vilified nor glorified unions and their leadership. Unions
continue to make a major contribution to the lives of millions of Australians; a
contribution that was recognised during the YR@W campaign and in the ballot
boxes of the 2007 federal election. Second, times change and unions-‐party
relationships must also change, a point that has been emphasised repeatedly by
ACTU leaders over the last decade and which featured prominently in the
interviews I conducted. Unfortunately, the ALP has never been quick or adept at
changing its internal structures in response to changing times. This slowness,
bordering on paralysis, has been a feature of ALP history. It attracted the
attention of earlier scholars like Rawson (1954) and Crisp (1978); and it is also
evident in the many failed attempts to transform the federal ALP structure into a
genuine national structure over the past century. Nevertheless, to paraphrase
271
Edmund Burke93, a political party without the means of change is without the
means necessary for its own survival. Third, just as unions remain important to
millions of Australians so does the presence of an effective centre-‐left party,
especially in an era of growing inequality. A viable centre-‐left party in the twenty-‐
first century must be able to build and maintain strong linkages with many
organisations beyond its traditional union base. It is unlikely that this broader
range of linkages can be achieved while one group of unions, representing just
over half the nation’s union members, is privileged so markedly by the current
affiliation arrangements. I hope that this thesis has made a compelling case that
change, in the end, must mean structural change to the national unions-‐ALP
relationship as well as ideological and rhetorical change. So, finally, I finish with
the famous words of Tancredi: “If we want things to stay as they are, things will
have to change”94.
93 Edmund Burke (1969), Reflections on the Revolution in France, Penguin. 94 Giuseppe Di Lampedusa (1960), trans. Colquhoun, A., The Leopard, London: Collins and Harvill Press, 31.
272
Appendices
Appendix 1: Interview questions
The questions were designed to be open-‐ended and to prompt discussion. Not all
questions were asked in all interviews.
How would you describe the current relationship between the ALP and unions?
How would you compare the relationship today to when the ALP was last in
opposition federally?
How would you compare the relationship today to the Accord years under Prime
ministers Hawke and Keating?
Is the relationship more important to unions or the ALP?
What are the key benefits for each side?
How important is the relationship to the ALP in electoral terms?
How much influence do the unions have over ALP policy?
Is that influence more or less than it was in the Accord years?
Is that influence more or less than it was in the period the ALP was in opposition?
Do unions affiliated with the ALP exercise more or less influence than the ACTU?
How significant was the YR@W campaign on ALP policy?
Did the popularity of the ACTU campaign influence the ALP to meet ACTU policy
objectives?
Appendix 2: ALP vote share (1901 - 2010): federal and major states95
ELECTION FED NSW Vic Qld
1 1901 15.76 18.4 8.7 39.7
2 1903 30.95 21.3 27.1 56.7
3 1906 36.64 38.5 30.4 43.0
4 1910 49.97 51.1 48.1 47.6
5 1913 48.47 46.9 46.8 54.8
6 1914 50.89 52.2 45.8 55.7
7 1917 43.94 41.7 46.6 48.7
8 1919 42.49 46.0 38.1 46.8
9 1922 42.30 42.6 42.2 41.4
10 1925 45.04 46.3 44.8 42.4
11 1928 44.64 52.1 39.7 47.4
12 1929 48.84 51.5 48.9 39.8
13 1931 27.10 16.4 34.2 39.3
14 1934 26.81 9.4 36.4 46.8
15 1937 43.17 45.3 39.3 43.0
16 1940 40.16 35.3 43.5 46.1
17 1943 49.94 53.8 43.4 47.8
18 1946 49.71 51.4 47.9 43.1
19 1949 45.98 46.9 46.8 39.5
20 1951 47.63 49.1 49.1 41.0
21 1954 50.03 52.3 50.3 42.5
22 1955 44.63 49.6 37.1 42.1
95 This is an expanded and updated version of a chart that appeared in Warhurst and Parkin (2001)
274
ELECTION FED NSW Vic Qld
23 1958 42.81 47.1 39.5 37.5
24 1961 47.90 52.2 41.6 48.1
25 1963 45.47 47.5 40.4 46.3
26 1966 39.98 40.7 35.1 42.1
27 1969 46.95 47.7 41.3 48.2
28 1972 49.59 51.9 47.3 47.2
29 1974 49.30 52.7 47.9 44.0
30 1975 42.84 45.5 42.1 38.8
31 1977 39.65 42.4 37.2 37.7
32 1980 45.15 46.4 45.5 42.8
33 1983 49.48 50.1 50.5 46.1
34 1984 47.55 48.3 48.9 44.1
35 1987 45.83 45.1 46.9 45.0
36 1990 39.44 41.2 37.1 41.6
37 1993 44.92 48.3 46.4 40.5
38 1996 38.75 39.6 42.9 33.2
39 1998 40.10 40.1 44.4 36.1
40 2001 37.84 36.4 41.7 34.7
41 2004 37.64 36.7 40.4 34.8
42 2007 43.38 44.1 44.7 42.9
43 2010 37.99 37.3 42.8 33.6
275
Appendix 3: ALP MPs, House of Representatives 2011: union backgrounds
Note: Senior role means a substantive elected role.
Name Electorate Union Senior Affiliated 1sr elected
Adams, Dick Lyons LHMU Yes Yes 1993
Albanese, Anthony
Grayndler No N/A N/a 1996
Bird, Sharon Cunningham No N/A N/A 2004
Bowen, Chris McMahon FSU No Yes 2004
Bradbury, David
Lindsay No N/A N/A 2007
Brodtmann, Gai Canberra No N/A N/A 2010
Burke, Anna Chisholm FSU No Yes 1998
Burke, Tony Watson SDA Yes Yes 2004
Butler, Mark Pt Adelaide LHMU Yes Yes 2007
Byrne, Anthony Holt No N/A N/A 1999
Champion, Mark
Wakefield SDA No Yes 2007
Cheeseman, Darren
Corangamite CPSU No CPSU Vic 2007
Clare, Jason Blaxland No N/A N/A 2007
Collins, Julie Franklin No N/A N/A 2007
Combet, Greg Charlton ACTU Yes Peak 2007
Crean, Simon Hotham ACTU Yes Peak 1990
Danby, Michael Melb Ports SDA No Yes 1998
276
Name Electorate Union Senior Affiliated 1sr elected
D’ath, Yvette Petrie AWU Yes Yes 2007
Dreyfus, Mark Isaacs No No No 2007
Eliot, Justine Richmond No No No 2007
Ellis, Kate Adelaide No No No 2004
Emerson, Craig Rankin No No No 1998
Ferguson, Laurie
Werriwa LHMU No Yes 1990
Ferguson, Martin
Batman ACTU Yes Peak 1996
Fitzgibbon, Joel Hunter No No No 1996
Garrett, Peter Kingsford-‐Smith
No N/A N/A 2004
Georganas, Steve
Hindmarsh No N/A N/A 2004
Gibbons, Steve Bendigo LHMU No Yes 1996
Gillard, Julia Lalor No N/A N/A 1998
Gray, Gary Brand No N/A N/A 2007
Grierson, Sharon
Newcastle No N/A N/A 2001
Griffin, Alan Bruce No N/A N/A 1993
Hall, Jill Shortland No N/A N/A 1998
Hayes, Chris Fowler AWU Yes Yes 2005
Husic, Ed Chifley CEPU Yes Yes 2010
277
Name Electorate Union Senior Affiliated 1sr elected
Jenkins, Harry Scullin No N/A N/A 1986
Jones, Stephen Throsby CPSU Yes Yes 2010
Kelly, Mike Eden-‐Monaro No N/A N/A 2007
King, Catherine Ballarat No N/A N/A 2001
Leigh, Andrew Fraser No N/A N/A 2011
Livermore, Kirsten
Capricornia CPSU No Yes 1998
Lyons, Geoff Bass No N/A N/A 2010
Macklin, Jenny Jagajaga No N/A N/A 1996
Marles, Richard Corio ACTU Yes Yes 2007
McClelland, Rob
Barton No N/A N/A 1996
Melham, Darryl Banks No N/A N/A 1990
Mitchell, Rob McEwen No N/A N/A 2010
Murphy, John Reid No N/A N/A 1998
Neumann, Shayne
Blair No N/A N/A 2007
O’Connor, Brendan
Gorton ASU Yes Yes 2001
O’Neill, Deb Robertson No N/A N/A 2010
Owens, Julie Parramatta No N/A N/A 2004
Parke, Melissa Fremantle No N/A N/A 2007
278
Name Electorate Union Senior Affiliated 1sr elected
Perrett, Graham
Moreton IEU No No 2007
Plibersek, Tanya
Sydney No N/A N/A 1998
Ripoli, Bernie Oxley SPSF No No 1998
Rishworth, Amanda
Kingston SDA No Yes 2007
Rowland, Michelle
Greenway No N/A N/A 2010
Roxon, Nicola Gellibrand NUW No Yes 1998
Rudd, Kevin Griffith No N/A N/A 1998
Saffin, Janelle Page No N/A N/A 2007
Shorten, Bill Maribyrnong AWU Yes Yes 2007
Sidebottom, Sid Braddon No N/A N/A 1998
Smith, Stephen Perth No N/A N/A 1993
Smyth, Laura La Trobe No N/A N/A 2010
Snowdon, Warren
NT No N/A N/A 1987
Swan, Wayne Lilley No N/A N/A 1993
Symon, Mike Deakin ETU No Yes 2007
Thomson, Craig Dobell HSU Yes Yes 2007
279
Name Electorate Union Senior Affiliated 1sr elected
Thomson, Kelvin
Wills No N/A N/A 1996
Vamvakinou, Maria
Calwell No N/A N/A 2001
Zappia, Tony Makin No N/A N/A 2007
280
Appendix 4: Second Gillard Ministry: union backgrounds
Name Chamber Started Union Affiliated Position
Albanese, Anthony
House 1996 No N/A N/A
Arbib, Mark Senate 2008 TWU Yes Official
Bowen, Chris House 2004 FSU Yes Industrial officer
Bradbury, David
House 2007 No N/A N/A
Butler, Mark House 2007 LHMU Yes State Secretary
Burke, Tony House 2004 SDA Yes Organiser,
Carr, Kim Senate 1993 No N/A N/A
Clare, Jason House 2007 No N/A N/A
Collins, Jacinta Senate 1995 SDA Yes National Industrial Officer
Collins, Julie House 2007 No N/A N/A
Combet, Greg House 2007 ACTU (from MUA)
Yes Secretary
Conroy, Stephen
Senate 1996 TWU Yes Industrial Officer
Crean, Simon House 1991 ACTU (from NUW)
Yes President
Dreyfus, Mark House 2007 No N/A N/A
Eliot, Justine House 2004 No N/A N/A
Ellis, Kate House 2004 No N/A N/A
Emerson, Craig House 2008 No N/A N/A
Evans, Chris Senate 1993 Firefighters (LHMU)
Yes State secretary
Farrell, Don Senator 2008 SDA Yes State secretary
281
Name Chamber Started Union Affiliated Position
Feeney, David Senator 2008 TWU Yes Federal Industrial Officer
Ferguson, Martin
House 1996 ACTU (from LHMU)
Yes President
Kelly, Mike House 2007 No N/A N/A
King, Catherine House 2001 No N/A N/A
Garrett, Peter House 2004 No N/A N/A
Gillard, Julia House 1998 No N/A N/A
Gray, Gary House 2007 No N/A N/A
Ludwig, Joe Senate 1998 AWU Yes Industrial Advocate
Lundy, Kate Senate 1996 CFMEU Yes Organiser
McClelland, Rob
House 1996 No N/A N/A
McLucas, Jan Senate 1999 No N/A N/A
Macklin, Jenny House 1996 No N/A N/A
Marles, Richard
House 2007 ACTU (from TWU)
Yes Assistant Secretary
O’Connor, Brendan
House 2001 ASU Yes Assistant National Secretary
Plibersek, Tanya
House 1998 No N/A N/A
Roxon, Nicola House 1998 NUW Yes Organiser
Rudd, Kevin House 1998 No N/A N/A
Sherry, Nick Senate 1990 LHMU Yes State Secretary
Shorten, Bill House 2007 AWU Yes Federal secretary
Smith, Stephen House 1993 No N/A N/A
282
Name Chamber Started Union Affiliated Position
Snowdon, Warren
House 1987 No N/A N/A
Swan, Wayne House 1993 No N/A N/A
Wong, Penny Senate 2005 CFMEU Yes Organiser
283
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