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FactSheet

www.AmericanSecurityProject.org 1100 New York Avenue, NW Suite 710W Washington, DC

Contextualizing the DronesDebate

Ashley S. Boyle

August 2012

Over the past several years, the use o Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or drones, in lethalcounterterrorism operations has expanded at an unprecedented rate, generating a discourseprimarily centered on the legality and morality o existing programs. Tis debate has otenstrayed rom the acts, become politicized, and overlooked the strategic considerations o theuse o drone technology.

Te American Security Project has compiled this act sheet to provide basic inormationabout drone programs, technology, and strategic considerations. All o the reerences anddata presented here are expanded upon in our accompanying paper, Te Strategic Contexo Lethal Drones.

Programs and Technology:

Te US currently operates two separate drone programs. Te rst, an overt program, isdirected by the Pentagon and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in declaredcombat theaters o Aghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. A second, covert program is commandedby the CIA and operates in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

Tough no explicit legal justication has been provided by Administration ocials, theseprograms operate within the constraints o Article 51 o the UN Charter.1 A state mayact unilaterally against another state i one o either o the ollowing conditions apply:

Te targeted state permits the use o orce by the targeting state within itsterritory; or

A group within the targeted state, or the targeted state itsel, has committed anact o aggression against the targeting state.2

A variety o UAVs and UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) are employed in operationsHowever, three UAVs in particular are believed to be most widely used in counterterrorismoperations and have garnered signicant attention: the MQ-1B Predator, the MQ-1CGray Eagle, and the MQ-9 Reaper.

Acquisition and Operating Costs:

Critics o US drone programs argue that due to research and development costs as wellas the manpower required or operations and maintenance, drones cost more than theirconventional ghter jet counterparts. According to cost data rom unclassied Departmento Deense Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs),3 most drones have a slight cost advantageover conventional aircrat.

Ashley S. Boyle is an Adjunct Junior Fellow at the American Security Project

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AMERICAN SECURITY PROJECT

Strategic Considerations:

In evaluating the use o drones as part o a broader counterterrorism strategy, there are severalconsiderations:

Location. o date, the US is only known to have operated drones in Aghanistan, Iraq, Libya,Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen. Te nature o the environment in which they are used determin

the role drones play in strategic operations. In normal combat zones like Aghanistan, Iraq, anLibya, U.S. ocials discuss drone operations openly. U.S. ocials do not oten discuss droneoperations in Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia.

Mission. Policymakers like drones because they are considered an ecient, efective way togather intelligence and target suspected terrorists. Teir advantages include:

Can be sent into hostile territory with no risk to the lives o pilotCan loiter or hours without the constraints o shit schedules or human enduranceCan be rapidly reassigned to a diferent targetCan target and strike with precisionHave superior sensor technology that enables the collection o more intelligence than ca

be analyzed on the ground4

Measurement. Despite their ongoing use in both combat and non-combat environments, therehas been no meaningul measurement o the actual ecacy o lethal drone strikes to date.

Among the most pertinent questions, are:Is the manner in which drones are used securing American interests?Are drones contributing to the permanent degradation o local insurgencies and militan

networks?Do the security efects o drone programs justiy the political and social consequences?Are drones part o a broader counterterrorism strategy, or have they simply become the

strategy entirely?

Understanding the ecacy o drone programs as part o a broader counterterrorism strategy can only bachieved through the development o metrics and prudent measurement. In this manner, the US can

ensure that its use o drones in counterterrorism operations are well-advised and do not overreach, or ashort, o strategic objectives.

(Endnotes)

1. Charter o the United Nations, Article 51, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.

2. United Nations Oce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, Report o the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston: Study on targeted killings, 28 May 2010, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pd.

3. Department o Deense, Selected Acquisition Reports, 2010-2011, http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/.

4. Spencer Ackerman, Air Force Chie: Itll Be Years Beore We Catch Up on drone Data, Wireds Danger Room blog, 5 Ap2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/air-orce-drone-data/.

http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtmlhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/air-force-drone-data/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/air-force-drone-data/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/air-force-drone-data/http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdfhttp://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml