contents · gianfranco pasquino 12 luxembourg 244 patrick dumont, raphaël kies and philippe...

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v Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures xi Acknowledgments xii Notes on Contributors xiii List of Abbreviations xv Part I Introduction 1 The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 3 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele Part II Western Europe 2 Austria 33 Anton Pelinka 3 Belgium 51 Pascal Delwit 4 Cyprus 69 Hayriye Kahveci 5 Denmark 88 Jacob Christensen 6 Finland 107 Michel Hastings 7 France 127 Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira 8 Germany 163 Amandine Crespy 9 Greece 185 Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos 10 Ireland 206 Michael Holmes 11 Italy 222 Gianfranco Pasquino 12 Luxembourg 244 Patrick Dumont, Raphaël Kies and Philippe Poirier PROOF

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v

Contents

List of Tables vii

List of Figures xi

Acknowledgments xii

Notes on Contributors xiii

List of Abbreviations xv

Part I Introduction

1 The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 3 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

Part II Western Europe

2 Austria 33 Anton Pelinka

3 Belgium 51 Pascal Delwit

4 Cyprus 69 Hayriye Kahveci

5 Denmark 88 Jacob Christensen

6 Finland 107 Michel Hastings

7 France 127 Fabien Escalona and Mathieu Vieira

8 Germany 163 Amandine Crespy

9 Greece 185 Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos

10 Ireland 206 Michael Holmes

11 Italy 222 Gianfranco Pasquino

12 Luxembourg 244 Patrick Dumont, Raphaël Kies and Philippe Poirier

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vi Contents

13 Malta 269 Michael Briguglio and Roderick Pace

14 Netherlands 287 Frans Becker, Gerrit Voerman and Joop van Holsteyn

15 Portugal 309 Marco Lisi

16 Spain 331 Paul Kennedy

17 Sweden 347 Dimitris Tsarouhas

18 United Kingdom 372 Florence Faucher

Part III Central and Eastern Europe

19 Bulgaria 401 Antony Todorov

20 Czech Republic 416 Michel Perottino and Martin Polášek

21 Estonia 434 Vello Pettai and Juhan Saharov

22 Hungary 452 Andràs Bíró-Nagy

23 Latvia 470 Jànis Ikstens

24 Lithuania 488 Algis Krupavičius

25 Poland 506 Anna Pacześniak

26 Romania 526 Sorina Soare

27 Slovakia 550 Darina Malová

28 Slovenia 575 Alenka Krašovec

Part IV Conclusion

29 Social Democrats Today: Tribe, Extended Family, or Club? 593 George Ross

Index 605

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Part I

Introduction

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3

In this introductory chapter we first present the rationale for systematically culling the latest data available on contemporary social democratic parties. We then review at length the historical trajectory of social democracy and its constituent principles. Thereby, our readers will be able to contextualize the pan-European panorama of social democratic parties offered in this Handbook , which is focused on the period of 2000–12. We finally describe the four dilemmas faced by European social democracy at the beginning of the 21st century. These represent different ways of understanding the crisis running through this political family.

1.1 The book and its goals

Two principal motivations lay behind the project of this Handbook . First, the segmented character of the literature on social democracy in the first decade of this millennium, with its privileging of six themes: the historical trajectory of social democracy (Berman, 2006; Callaghan, 2000; Eley, 2002; Sassoon, 2006), the ‘Third Way’ current (Giddens, 2000; Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002; Marlière, 2008; Tournadre-Plancq, 2006; Ryner, 2010), the ‘necessary’ adaptation of social democracy to the external pressure exerted by global-ization and social change (Clift, 2002; Martell et al. , 2001), the Europeanization of the family and the national parties (Dimitrakopoulos, 2011; Kulähci, 2008; Ladrech, 2000; Lightfoot, 2005; Lightfoot and Holmes, 2010), the public pol-icies initiated by social democratic governments (Bonoli and Powell, 2004; Merkel et al. , 2008) and the political economy of contemporary social dem-ocracy (Andersson, 2009; Bailey, 2009a, 2009b). The objective of this Handbook of Social Democracy in the European Union is to describe the general state of social democracy at the end of the last decade and, more broadly, to provide a quantity of hitherto unpublished information on these parties not only to scholars but also to students, activists and enlightened citizens. Rather than

1 The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family Fabien Escalona , Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

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4 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

supplying syntheses on the large regional areas or only selecting some case studies, we thought it would be useful to establish the carte d’identité of each of the social democratic parties involved in the European Community (EC) framework. If this principle is not completely new (Lazar, 1996; Ladrech and Marlière, 1999) it is still the first time that a project of this sort has covered the whole of the European Union (EU). Moreover, all the authors conformed to the common framework we established, to the extent that the specifics of the cases studied permitted it. As a consequence, the book benefitted from a strongly comparative dimension. The interest behind such a panoramic view of Europe’s social democratic parties is to encourage the pursuit of old and new research projects on this political family.

The second reason that persuaded us to coordinate this Handbook is our con-viction that there is an urgent need to improve the state of knowledge concerning parties facing particularly important challenges in recent years. This requires a renewed interest in social democracy as a family. Four of these challenges need to be briefly addressed. First, the integration into the EU of the 10 countries of central and eastern Europe has crucially raised the question of the boundaries and nature of the social democratic family, which the social democratic parties of Western Europe within the Party of European Socialists (PES) and within the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) in the European Parliament have had to confront. Second, all the parties that had engaged in the reconstruction of their social democratic identity (Moschonas, 2002) and embraced the neo-revisionist theses of the 1990s (Sassoon, 2010) had to deal with the rapid exhaustion of these doctrinal and strategic turns. Numerous electoral defeats seem to have sanctioned this general mutation since the beginning of the last decade. This mutation has, furthermore, been strongly put to the test since the explosion of capitalism’s structural crisis (Kotz, 2009; Bailey et al. , forthcoming). Third, if the sociological, cultural and technological transforma-tions connected to the ‘post-industrial age’ are not new phenomena, they have nevertheless continued to disrupt western societies from within, without the social democratic parties seeming to possess a pertinent framework in which to read these changes or profit from them (Browne et al. , 2009). Fourth, the ecological challenge has become increasingly central in recent years due to the numerous alarms sounded by the United Nations, the scientific community and civil society. This new issue goes to the very core of the social democratic project, very largely built on a productivist concept of the economy.

1.2 Framework of the chapters on the parties studied

The organizational framework underlying the chapters rests on eight themes which enable a very broad coverage of the many facets of the cases studied:

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 5

the history of the party; • its organization and members; • its electoral performance; • its alliances and relationships within the party system and with the social • movements; its relation to power and to national political institutions; • its ideological and programmatic identity through its positioning on • the socio-economic, cultural, ecological, European and international questions; its intra-party life; • the challenges ahead in the 2010s. •

We also provide a chronology of the key events that have marked the paths of the parties, so that the reader will have some historical context in reading the analyzes put forward.

We have left the choice of criteria for selecting cases to specialists in spe-cific countries. The parties studied and their national contexts can be seen in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Parties studied, February 2013

Countries Parties

Last general

elec-tion

result

Rank in the party

systemGovernment participation

At the head of

governmentParty leader

PES status

Western Europe

Austria SPÖ Social Democratic Party of Austria

29.3 1 + – Werner Faymann

Member

Belgium PS Socialist Party (Wallonia) sp.a Flemish Social Democrats (Flanders)

37.7 15.3

2 5

+ +

+ –

Paul Magnette Bruno Tobback

Members

Cyprus EDEK Movement of Social Democrats

8.9 4 – – Yiannakis Omirou

Member

Denmark SD Danish Social Democratic Party

24.8 2 + + Helle Thorning-Schmidt

Member

Continued

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6 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

Countries Parties

Last general

elec-tion

result

Rank in the party

systemGovernment participation

At the head of

governmentParty leader

PES status

Finland SDP Social Democratic Party of Finland

19.2 2 – – Jutta Urpilainen

Member

France PS Socialist Party

29.4 1 + + Harlem Désir

Member

Germany SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany

23 2 – – Sigmar Gabriel

Member

Greece PASOK Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement

12.3 3 + – Evangelos Venizelos

Member

Ireland LP Labor Party

19.4 2 + – Eamon Gilmore

Member

Italy PD Democratic Party

33.1 2 + – Pier Luigi Bersani

Luxembourg LSAP Luxembourgian Socialist Worker’s Party

21.6 2 + – Alex Bodry Member

Malta LP Labor Party

48.8 2 – – Joseph Muscat

Member

Netherlands PvdA Dutch Labor Party

24.8 2 + – Diederik M. Samsom

Member

Portugal PS Socialist Party

28.1 2 – – António José Seguro

Member

Spain PSOE Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party

28.7 2 – – Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba

Member

Sweden SAP The Swedish Social Democratic Party

30.7 1 – – Stefan Löfven

Member

United Kingdom

LP Labor Party

29 2 – – Ed Miliband

Member

Central and Eastern Europe

Bulgaria BSP Bulgarian Socialist Party

17.7 2 – – Sergey Stanishev

Member

Table 1.1 Continued

Continued

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 7

1.3 The historical path of the social democratic family: origins and components

At the outset we should distinguish the existence of social democracy in its party form from the socialist idea which predates it 1 . If the oldest expres-sions of the latter can be located in antiquity, it was only developed under the name ‘socialism’ starting in the first half of the 19th century. This new ideology, though an adversary of classical liberalism, radicalized and extended

Countries Parties

Last general

elec-tion

result

Rank in the party

systemGovernment participation

At the head of

governmentParty leader

PES status

Czech Republic

ČSSD Czech Social Democratic Party

22 1 – – Bohuslav Sobotka

Member

Estonia SDE Estonian Social Democratic Party

17.1 4 – – Sven Mikser

Member

Hungary MSZP Hungarian Social Democratic Party

19.3 2 – – Attila Mesterházy

Member

Latvia LSDSP Latvian Social Democratic Worker’s Party

0.28 13 – – Aivars Timofejevs

Observer

Lithuania LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

18.4 2 + – Algiras Butkevicius

Member

Poland SLD Democratic Left Alliance

8.2 5 – – Leszek Miller

Member

Romania PSD Social Democratic Party

58.6 1 + + Victor Ponta

Member

Slovakia SMER Social Democracy

44.4 1 + + Robert Fico Member

Slovenia SD Social Democrats

10.5 3 – – Igor Lukšič Member

Source: the editors.

Table 1.1 Continued

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8 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

the latter’s emancipatory principles. It was constructed in reaction to the shift from merchant to industrial capitalism and particularly in reaction to its social consequences for the working classes. Compared for this reason to a ‘cry of pain’ (Durkheim, 1992, p. 37), it was expressed in very diverse forms by intel-lectuals or free spirits having in fact little connection to the masses but who increased general awareness of the importance of the ‘social question’ at the core of society and within the ruling elites. A turning point occurred, however, in the second half of the 19th century, which consisted in the meeting of socialist theoretical constructions and those organizations of the working class which claimed to give concrete expression to the theory.

Under the combined impact of the 1848 revolutions, the progressive liber-alization of political regimes starting in the 1860s and above all the rise of industrialization, the labor movement developed in the form of associations, unions and actual political parties. Beyond the short-term amelioration of their conditions, the goal pursued by the majority of these organized workers was the overcoming of the capitalist system. While ‘conceptual socialism’ never ceased promoting this horizon intellectually, its epoch had ended. Henceforth, Marxism claimed to ground socialism on a scientific basis. After the sharp decline of anarchism’s influence, it was the reformist tendencies which replaced anarchism as an alternative conception of socialism. But this reformism was not distinguished so much by the goal pursued – the advent of a socialist society – as by the means deployed to reach it (Droz, 1997).

1.3.1 Origins

Several authors and schools of social science have attempted to explain the emergence and rise of the partisan family called ‘socialist’ or ‘social demo-cratic.’ Unsurprisingly, comparative work in historical sociology has proven most relevant for us. With their understanding of social democracy as the political expression and mediating agent of a ‘class cleavage,’ the historical-sociology studies are characterized by their ability to articulate a large-scale argument taking into consideration national specificities. In this, they do not contradict the interpretations put forward by scholars whose studies do not directly treat the party phenomenon in Europe but instead treat the economic and social systems in which the latter developed.

Starting from an analysis inspired by Polyani, we could view social demo-cratic organizations as stakeholders in the ‘counter-movements’ generated by the disembeddedness of the economy within social relations, which character-izes the development of industrial capitalism throughout the 19th century. Denying to this process the natural and universal character attributed to it by liberal thought, Polanyi argued that it amounted to a project of making western societies conform to the model of the self-regulating market, in which all spheres of social life are governed by market rationality and behavior. He

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 9

maintained that this project was in fact utopian to the extent that its implemen-tation would require treating as commodities things which have never existed as commodities nor were intended to be such: human labor power, land and money. Doing so meant a material and cultural debasement of such breadth that this transformation finally provoked different forms of social resistance, organized by movements for the ‘self-protection of society’ (Maucourant and Plociniczak, 2011; Polanyi, 1944). From this point of view, the social democratic parties and the labor movement in general can be analyzed as agents for the protection of human labor, from which derives their support for social legis-lation and every measure tending to the socialization of the labor market. They were, however, not the only ones to have benefitted from the violent institu-tionalization of liberal society. In fact, the ‘great transformation’ generated by the latter led either to authoritarian reactions incarnated in the phenomenon of fascism (Polanyi, 1935), or the fitting of the economy into democratic insti-tutions, as seen in the accomplishments of the New Deal in the United States or of the social democratic post-war era in Europe.

The merit of this interpretation lies in its interrelating the two dynamics that historians have identified as common to all members of the social democratic family: engagement in the democratic struggles and in the social struggles (Bergounioux, 2002; Eley, 2002). In fact, the accent here is put simultaneously on the connection between the birth of social democracy and the singular development of industrial capitalism, on the one hand, and, on the other, the democratic nature of the project social democracy represents. However, the role played by social democracy in the framework of Polanyi’s account consists more in the preservation of the non-economic nature of man than in the expression of class interests. And yet this says little about the social base underlying the struggles for democracy and the defense of wage workers. It also tells us nothing about the way in which these struggles were concretely organ-ized by means of the party phenomenon.

The analysis of social democracy by world-systems theorist Wallerstein provides better answers to these questions. Using a term which emphasizes the reactive dimension of the rise of social democratic parties, he categorizes the latter under the label ‘anti-systemic movements’ (socialist and/or nationalist) generated by the historical development of capitalism (Wallerstein, 1983). Their structuring flowed, according to him, from the conjunction of two contradictory dynamics: while the development of capitalist practices involved the increasing exploitation of the masses of wage workers, it at the same time destroyed the modes of life and traditional solidarities characteristic of the pre-capitalist organization of European societies. A new type of organization was needed to transmit the growing demands and revolts which up to then had no basis of support. From this need arose permanent and hierarchical organiza-tions, charged with the defense of the interest of the ‘urban, landless, wage

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earners’ (Wallerstein, 1983, p. 67). There is an obvious parallel with the social cleavage theory of political science, which situates the social democratic family on the second side of the ‘owners/workers’ divide. This divide is described as the translation of the class conflicts generated by the industrial revolution, just as the ‘rural/urban’ cleavage is supposed to express the conflicts that it provoked between the primary and secondary sector. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967), the particularity of the ‘owners/workers’ cleavage was its con-tribution to the homogenization of the party systems of Western Europe while the interactions around the other lines of conflict tend rather to explain the differences between each party constellation. Here it is the logic of a project (Seiler, 2003) – defense of the interests of the working class – that explains the birth of social democratic parties and characterizes them throughout the vicis-situdes of their history.

1.3.2 Diversity and components of the family

Thirty years after these important conceptual advances, Bartolini (2000) extended Lipset and Rokkan’s model by analyzing the ways in which class cleavage was concretely structured in Western Europe in terms of the electoral pattern, ideological orientation and organizational cohesion. His work confirms that industrialization and urbanization are at the origin of the social base of the working class, which the social democratic parties tried to mobilize. On the other hand, other factors have to be taken into account to understand the differences between each national class-cleavage pattern, which relates to the ‘institutional and organizational environment of the socialist movement’ (Bartolini, 2000, p. 562). Thus the extent to which pol-itical liberalism developed early and the nature of religious, peasant and nationalist mobilizations have in each country delimited the specific spaces of opportunity and constraint for the political labor movement. Bartolini has, for example, been able to distinguish four varieties of class-cleavage patterns: (1) strongly distinctive and inclusive 2 and ideologically moderate in the nations where continuous alliances with the liberals and the agrarian parties were possible and beneficial and where religious and ethno-linguistic conflicts were only residues; (2) weakly distinctive and inclusive and ideo-logically divided in nations where Catholicism was politically organized early on and where the social structure of the agrarian world was character-ized by its polarization; (3) strongly distinctive, moderately inclusive and ideologically orthodox in the nations where the possibilities for alliances with the liberals were closed and where the Catholic movement already organized part of the agrarian world; (4) very weakly inclusive in the nations where the electoral market was easily accessible but already partly saturated by the competition between liberals, conservatives and religious move-ments (Bartolini, 2000, pp. 496–501). Thereafter, the division of the political

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 11

labor movement into a social democratic and a communist wing further complicated the picture.

If it is impossible here to convey all the richness of Bartolini’s study, the principal lesson that we can at least draw from it is that heterogeneity has characterized the social democratic family from its inception. Its internal diversity can be reduced to a model by identifying its ‘constituents.’ The most current typology distinguishes three branches: a laborist, a social democratic and a socialist one. The first essentially comprises the organizations of the British world. It is characterized by a very strong tie to worker syndicalism, of which the Labor Party is the emanation, and by a weak coating of Marxist ideology. These identitarian features can be explained in particular by the Chartist 3 filiation of the English labor movement (Seiler, 2003, pp. 123–5). The second constituent may essentially be found in Central and northern Europe. Its symbol was the powerful SPD in Germany, which appeared as the ‘model party’ of the Second International. If the existence of a privileged connection to the trade unions may also be observed here, it is found within a vast network of organizations (cooperatives, schools, associations) given life by the party, which resembles a veritable ‘workers’ counter-society’ (Winock, 1992, pp. 108–11). The doctrinal weight of Marxism is very strong here in com-parison with the laborist branch, even if this is less true of the Scandinavian parties. In addition, other influences were felt here, such as that of Social Christianity. Finally, the third constituent is that of Southern European socialism, also described as ‘socialist democratic’ (Seiler, 2003, pp. 125–30). It is characterized by a great degree of ideological pluralism and an exacerbated tendency to doctrinal conflicts and splits. The absence of a trade-union tie and the domination by the educated strata in the party partially explain these characteristics, to which should be added the absence of hegemony within the left part of the party spectrum, which translates into the strong competition they face in representing the world of work (notably as regards the continuing power of communist parties).

Given the diversity of the social democratic family, one may be surprised that Berger despairs at not finding a single common trait for the contemporary social democratic family other than a flat and consensual ‘commitment to democracy and to social solidarity’ (2012, p. 26). In the end, do not the constit-uents we have just identified fit the whole historical picture? On the one side, it is clear that the ideological homogeneity and intra-familial solidarity of the original social democracy should not be exaggerated. On the other side, we have to admit that a formerly existing kind of coherence has certainly been lost by the contemporary heirs of social democracy. Even when social demo-crats broke with anti-capitalist positions and defended democracy in its more liberal rather than radical version, this still implied the subordination of eco-nomic organization to the principles of human dignity and social justice, as

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12 Fabien Escalona, Mathieu Vieira and Jean-Michel De Waele

well as clear limits to mercantile practices. This no longer seemed to be the case with the social democracy that survived the post-industrial and ‘post-Cold War world’ (Berger, 2012, p. 22). To understand this new situation and why Berger rightly wonders about the reality of the social democratic family, we have to come back to its historical trajectory.

1.4 The historical path of the social democratic family: phases and long-term tendencies

Throughout its by now old history social democracy has lived through critical junctures during which it was transformed by following the path of an increasingly more pronounced dependency. At each ‘crossroad of the possible’ represented by the general crises of the social democratic family, the roads taken were all essentially in the same direction: an increasing integration into the democratic-liberal regime and the capitalist economic system, a net loss of substance and internationalist engagement, and a progressive accept-ance of European integration in the way it has concretely occurred (Escalona, 2011). Rather than one being added to the other, these options are mutually reinforcing and by now form a coherent whole whose founding moment was the choice of a ‘reformist’ strategy. In our opinion, this choice characterizes the whole of the social democratic family and not only its most moderate elements. Even the maximalist rhetoric of the orthodox in reality masked a ‘quietist’ politics that accommodated itself very well to parliamentarism (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p. 30).

1.4.1 From the beginnings to the inter-war years

The doctrine of the Second International, founded in 1889, moreover expli-citly recommended taking hold of the political rights conquered within each political regime so as to put them at the service of the workers and turn them against the bourgeois state when the moment came. The exclusion of anar-chists from the organization is largely explained by this positive appreciation of the legitimacy of parliamentary action. This said, destiny and the tactical choices of the social democratic parties depended little on the International. If this organization was at least an important place for encounters, debates and symbolic influence, it never succeeded in becoming a real center of stra-tegic coordination. The memory of the failure of the preceding international workers association clearly underlay the concern that the autonomy of each party be respected and preserved (Kriegel, 1997).

From their beginnings, the social democratic party organizations were quite influenced by the national context of their birth, in which they evolved in order to wrest immediate advantages for the workers from the state. If the question of government participation was still taboo, the wish to participate in national

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 13

electoral life and to get socialist deputies elected clearly emerged. In no case were the glosses dedicated to the final conflict between workers and capitalists accompanied by concrete preparation for insurrectional acts. Certainly, the ‘counter-society,’ of which the Germany party was the model, had the func-tion of preparing the advent of a socialist society, but the moment of the final confrontation was continuously put off to an indeterminate future. From this point of view, Bernstein’s revisionist theses merely drew the conclusions of the parliamentarist logic pursued by social democracy. According to him, this logic and the real evolution of capitalism called for the jettisoning of the dire idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and for concentrating on the demo-cratic and socialist reforms benefitting all of the ‘non-privileged.’ Although his ideas were condemned by the guardians of the Marxist orthodox temple, they opened up the quest for votes beyond those of the industrial workers, a quest which social democracy was later to adopt. To the extent that the proletariat never represented an absolute majority of the population and where the extra-parliamentary means of coming to power were neither privileged nor prepared, this actually represented a logical outcome (Przeworski, 1980). In the face of the reformism of the majority, which united revisionists and the orthodox beyond their quarrels, the ‘left’ oppositionists were themselves incapable of proposing an alternative strategy, being victims as they were of their dispersion and their divergences (Droz, 1997). The explosion of the First World War marked their defeat and radicalized the already-existing tendencies.

The carnage that began in 1914 in fact showed what the international soli-darity of workers was in the face of capital: a fiction. The International paid the price of its incapacity to think of the relations between class and nation as between groups of belonging. Above all, its failure arose from its strategic unpreparedness in the face of a situation in which war could not be averted but was already declared by the warring parties. Barring rare exceptions, all of the parties involved voted war credits, and a fraction among them even participated in the bourgeois governments. This triumph of the Union Sacrée , however, gradually cracked as the war went on: the resistance of the ‘revolu-tionaries’ and of the more moderate who wanted to revive the flame of inter-nationalism grew in intensity (Rebérioux, 1997). One of the consequences of the world conflict which inaugurated the ‘short 20th century’ was thus the enduring division of the labor movement, which was translated into a communist international confronting the social democrats that rejected the rules decreed by the victors of the October Revolution. Two other conse-quences may be underlined, particularly important in terms of the path dependency that we have mentioned. First, the government participations opened social democracy to the party systems. The competition with the communist parties reinforced all the more the social democratic parties’ inte-gration into the representative liberal democracies, since these parties were

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distinguished by their respect for political alternation just as much as by their gradualism, that is, their refusal to rush into a collectivization of the economy, even having the legal means to do so (Bergounioux and Manin, 1989, p. 35). This choice seemed to pay off since social democracy’s average electoral performance improved during the decade that followed the First World War, just as did its capacity to get more protective social legislation passed. Second, social democrats experimented in government management within a capitalist framework. Having done so, they also began to see the possibilities of transforming this framework to the extent that war and its requirements led governments to put in place a certain amount of economic planning, so much so that ‘the idea of managing the capitalist economy was firmly installed on the agenda of liberals, conservatives and socialists alike’ (Sassoon, 2006, p. 27).

Social democracy’s adherence to political liberalism and its accommodation to the capitalist system were further reinforced by the second major crisis that struck in the 1930s. At first, it failed to prevent the rise of fascism and offer a credible response when the Great Depression rained down on Europe, supporting or even implementing deflationary policies worthy of the most intransigent of liberals 4 . This double failure – shared with the other demo-cratic families – was, however, followed by an evolution of social democracy which was rewarded after the Second World War with an unprecedented intel-lectual hegemony. On the one hand, the experience of totalitarianism and of the war broke down the last resistance to the model of liberal democracy. This became an end in itself rather than a means (Berger, 2002, pp. 26–9). On the other hand, managing governments without calling into question the capitalist framework appeared all the more attractive as a new economic paradigm emerged starting in the 1930s, one apparently capable of reconciling the system’s imperative to accumulate and the attempts at progress and social justice brought by social democracy.

1.4.2 The rise and fall of post-war social democracy

If this paradigm was best known under the term ‘Keynesianism,’ its diffu-sion and success after 1945 are inseparable from the ideological and program-matic mutations put forward by the minority socialists and by economists and trade-unionists throughout the preceding decade. What was termed the ‘European New Deal’ (Telò, 1988) was particularly embodied in the current known as ‘planist,’ which advocated a truly ‘mixed economy,’ policies of wage reflation and large-scale public works. If these ideas could only be imple-mented after the war, this was not the case in the Scandinavian countries where macro-economic policies avoiding both laissez-faire and collectivism were implemented already by the 1930s. The progressive institutionalization of negotiations and compromises between social groups was also characteristic

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The Unfinished History of the Social Democratic Family 15

of this model, symbolized by the famous Saltsjöbaden agreements in Sweden. As Paterson and Thomas wrote, ‘the Scandinavian experience of the 1930s and 1940s was crucial to the modern conception of social democracy. It involved a reduction of class conflict and an accommodation between capital and labor on the basis of a profound extension of social citizenship (and) a shared commitment to full employment’ (1986, p. 2).

For Berman (2006, 2009) this was the only and true social democratic ideology, one which defended the primacy of the political in a framework at once communitarian and democratic. Having triumphed over orthodox Marxism and classical liberalism, both of which defended the primacy of the economic, but also over fascism which embodied the anti-democratic rejection of the first two, social democracy was perhaps itself the most successful pol-itical project of the 20th century. After an expansive phase lasting until 1914 and a phase of significant mutations during the inter-war years, it is true that the post-war period represents the apogee of social democracy. It reached the highest electoral levels of its history and above all became nearly everywhere one of the principal political forces constituting government alternation. Its accomplishments in government were particularly important in terms of cre-ating social rights, the reduction of inequities and the improvement of the quality of life. In addition, conservative governments did not try to dismantle these accomplishments and were even at times forgers of social compromises inspired by the ideas of their competitors. As a result, even if the holding of government power was geographically and temporally unevenly distrib-uted, social democracy did have an incontestable ideological hegemony. The coherence of the post-war social democratic configuration was, moreover, great to the extent that Keynesianism, neo-corporatism and the organizational model of the parties were well matched to the nature of their electoral and activist bases (Moschonas, 2002, pp. 63–72). This coherence was just as much external as it was internal: the post-1945 world system, the Fordist productive model, the historically high growth rates and the mentality of a generation of workers who had known war: all of this constituted a favorable environment, which permitted and reinforced the effectiveness of social democratic policies (Callaghan, 2000, pp. 1–25; Sassoon, 2010, pp. 189–208; Wolfe, 1978).

If, from this time on, there can be no doubt about the connection between social democrats and democracy (in its representative and liberal form), the relationship to capitalism, on the other hand, remains ambiguous. On the one hand, it is undeniable that the social democratic consensus established strong limits to capitalist activities and that state intervention in the economy was generally favorable to the popular classes. If one did not know what followed in history, one could have thought that at this stage social democracy trans-formed capitalism just as much as capitalism transformed it. However, we cannot help but note the absence of radical transformation of the structures

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of production and consumption, in the sense of an authentic economic dem-ocracy and the deconstruction of commodified social relations. To under-stand this absence, it seems relevant to analyze post-war social democracy more cool-headedly through the lens of the social demands it mediated rather than only in the light of its accomplishments (Bailey, 2009a, p. 31). As far as its traditional electoral base is concerned, what was involved was a demand for de-commodification, which the traditional elites transmitted to the heart of the political system. However, they also ‘regulated’ and ‘contained’ this de-commodification, so that it would not alter either the liberal democratic structures or the accumulation needs and profitability requirements of the owners of capital (Bailey, 2009a, pp. 39–40). Consequently, what appeared retrospectively as a Golden Age of social democracy could be interpreted as a weak conflict between the social interests historically privileged by social democracy and the government constraints flowing from its integration into the representative and capitalist systems (Crouch, 2009, pp. 384–8). Hence the abandonment of Marxism as a doctrine and of internationalism as a strategy, since both supposed a subordination of the activities of the political labor movement to the merciless struggle between capital and labor, which was manifestly no longer the case.

This relatively prosperous phase of the social democratic family, however, came to an end during the 1970s. The compatibility of interests between the holders of capital and those of the social majority ceased to exist due to the crisis of the Fordist mode of production. The rise of workplace conflicts, the fall in productivity, the increasing transnationalization of production and the end of the Bretton Woods system – everything that had promoted the post-war boom – was reversed within a few years (Dockès, 2003). The inflation of the welfare state, which had helped sustain growth, became a problem, increasingly weighing down on profit rates. The exhaustion of the long wave of expansion, exceptional in the history of capitalism (Mandel, 1995), coin-cided with the advent of what the post-Keynesian economist Kalecki (1943) prophesized when he proposed that sustained full employment within a capitalist regime made inevitable a conflict over the distribution of the social surplus and economic power. At the same time, the social democrats had to face the consequences of qualitative changes in the social structure. The number of skilled wage workers occupying ‘contradictory class loca-tions’ (Wright, 1976) rose, and the working class underwent a process of fragmentation. As a result, the logic of work has been diversified and has delineated universes of socialization quite different from those character-istic of large-scale industry. Furthermore, gender, generational and ethno-cultural antagonisms have competed ever more strongly with class cleavage. The issues called ‘cultural,’ centered on values or quality of life, have been the object of growing social and political mobilizations (Melucci, 1980).

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Finally, social democratic organizations have had to manage the influx of activists coming from these new wage-earner strata with preoccupations and resources different from those of the activists coming from the popular classes (Hine, 1986). The rise of the power of audiovisual mass media has also become a constantly greater challenge to traditional party modes of expression and communication.

1.4.3 The emergence of a ‘new social democracy’

All these combined elements, of which the most disruptive was the brutal and sustained fall in growth rates (Lavelle, 2008), not only precipitated a serious crisis of the social democratic family in the 1980s but also led to the emergence of a ‘ new social democracy ’ in the 1990s. Due to the mutations of historical capitalism and also to the path dependency of this new social democracy, it increasingly repressed the demands for de-commodification coming from its traditional social base (Bailey, 2009b). In doing so it was assimilated into the framework of neoliberal capitalism much more than it transformed it, at the price of a break with its most disillusioned bases of popular support. However, the end of the 1990s could lead one to believe in the rebirth of the social demo-cratic phoenix, since it returned to, or remained in, power in three-quarters of the EU 15 member countries (Cupérus and Kandel, 1998). This is partly explained by a window of opportunity represented by the discontent accu-mulated in the electorates in the face of the ‘market fundamentalism’ prac-ticed by the conservatives, in which the social democrats, who had maintained their dominant status on the left side of the political stage, were able to seize the moment to concretize an alternative, despite their notably restrained pro-grammatic conceptions (Moschonas, 2002, pp. 170–3). However, their ‘new’ identity also played a role: despite, or because of, its substantive thinness, it gave the social democratic parties access to an accumulated strategic flexi-bility, imparting to them a great capacity for adaptation. Thus, the adoption of a part of neoliberal doctrine did not prevent them either from developing post-materialist concepts or a rhetoric stressing social justice. Furthermore, the much weaker ideology at the heart of this identity gave rise to a moderate and cross-class image, consistent with the sociology and government practice of fin-de-siècle social democracy (Moschonas, 2002, pp. 228–39).

There have been numerous labels designating this new social democracy. The term ‘Third Way’ was much used, at the risk of confusion. Too rapidly assimilated at times to the experience of Tony Blair’s New Labour , it also served to indicate the doctrinal mutation of all European social democracy, at the risk of an excessive generalization of British characteristics. A more rigorous def-inition of the Third Way led rather to its description as a ‘non-homogeneous space of theorization,’ whose actors have tried to formulate a center-left project adapted to western societies and to the process of individualization which

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was seen as their last major evolution (Tournadre-Plancq, 2006). According to some, this project included the substituting of equality of opportunity for equality of results, which marks a true break with the conception defended by post-war social democratic theorists (Hickson, 2009). Others hold that it is the notion of ‘inclusion’ that was substituted: midway between the two concep-tions mentioned, ‘inclusion’ symbolizes the attempt to strike a balance, which is the third way between, on the one hand, the language, values, aims and political means of the ‘old’ social democracy, and, on the other, those of neo-liberalism (Powell, 2004, pp. 14–15).

The term ‘neo-revisionism’ has met with less success. The historian Donald Sassoon defends the term, pointing to the fact that like its predecessors it shares the same skepticism vis-à-vis the collapse of capitalism or overcoming it through revolutionary means or the extension of public property (Sassoon, 2010, pp. 733–55). The problem with this label is that it supposes the existence of an orthodoxy; but if there is none, then there can be no heresy. Now, one can ask what the common doctrinal point of reference was for the social demo-cratic family. Keynesianism as neo-corporatism was more a matter of tech-niques and methods of government than of a world vision. Berman (2006, 2009) more convincingly saw the ‘primacy of politics’ and communitarianism as the two pillars that distinguish social democratic ideology. These pillars have been considerably eroded as social democracy, since the end of the 1970s, increased its concessions to neoliberalism and to multiculturalism. It is still important to note that even if what was involved was a kind of break, there was also a form of continuity in respect to the historical trajectory we have identified. In fact, the acceptance of the primacy of the economy was inscribed in an ongoing submission to the logic of capital, while the attachment to dem-ocracy founded on a liberal philosophy is compatible with the recognition of rights based on cultural criteria.

Despite these elements of continuity, the ‘new social democracy’ presents a genuine novelty: the acceptance of the existing European integration. It is an understatement to say that the relationship of social democrats to the EU has been not only differentiated within its own family but was, in the beginning, of critical importance on the global level. The first important ‘thaw’ in the more recalcitrant positions was brought about by the beginning of the crisis of the post-war social democratic model. Aust (2004) used the term ‘Euro-Keynesianism’ for this strategy pursued up to the 1990s, which corresponded to voice in the well-known options of Hirschman: exit , voice or loyalty . According to Aust, the doctrinal success of the Third Way and the triumph of the most right-wing neo-social democrats over the more timorous led, however, to the choosing of the loyalty option, that is, to the subordin-ation of social democratic policies to the institutional framework stemming from the series of European treaties. In reality, a form of continuity exists

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between these two options, which Aust recognized, speaking of ‘gradual tran-sition’ (2004, p. 182).

1.5 The four dilemmas of contemporary social democracy

The picture we have just presented makes it possible to better understand the present state of social democracy, as a family facing at once its own crisis and the crisis of the capitalist world-system. The first is multi-dimensional and can be summed up in four dilemmas: the dilemma of family unity (how to inte-grate the ‘Eastern’ component?), of its electorate (what majoritarian and stable electoral coalition?), of its project (what credible alternative to neoliberalism?) and of integration (how to implement a social democratic project in a conser-vative institutional system?). The crisis of capitalism is just as crucial to the extent that it sharpens the contradictions of the social democratic project and makes its renewal difficult.

1.5.1 The family dilemma

Starting in the 1980s, social democracy in the West seems to have gone through a process of rapprochement between its historic components. On the one hand, the parties of the ‘laborist’ and ‘social democratic’ varieties gradually lost their most distinctive characteristics. The dilution of their ideological and program-matic special features was accompanied by the erosion of their status as the uncontested representatives of the working class. The ‘de-proletarianization’ of their activist bases and their electorates was part of an ensemble of far-reaching mutations in classic social democratic organization – the end of the ‘party-community,’ the loss of activist density, the increasing weight of leaders and experts, the dilution of the party-union link – which have been summarized by Moschonas (2002) under the term ‘de-social democratization.’

On the other side, the socialist parties of France and Southern Europe had a different history. Owing to the weight of their communist competitors, and in certain cases the context of ‘democratic transition’ and economic back-wardness in which they operated, their ways of conquering and exercising power contrasted sharply with the post-war social democratic model. The ‘Mediterranean Golden Age,’ which we see from the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s, on the other hand, heralds the new social demo-cratic identity that was to be theorized and identified in the course of the next decade. From the point of view of party organization, the influence and autonomy of action that socialist leaders enjoyed was one of the most salient characteristics. Everybody had adroitly mastered the new audiovisual means of communication and could successfully institute a strategy of ‘oligopolistic competition’ – to ensure left supremacy in order then to ‘re-center’ themselves without losses and to become the principal competitor of the conservative

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camp (Kitschelt, 1994). Once in power, they implemented pro-market policies, oriented to the quest for competitiveness, balanced budgets, low inflation and debt reduction. Not only did the absence of neo-corporatist structures and a mass organization not incapacitate them, it benefitted their autonomy from their own party (Grunberg, 1996). Thus, strategic flexibility, ideological thinness and the acceptance of the neoliberal paradigm characterized the experience of the 1980s.

Finally, at the same time as what could be seen on the level of national expe-riences, this rapprochement between the family components was accompanied by permanent efforts toward an authentic Europeanization of the party and of the parliamentary group gathering together social democrats at the European level. However modest the results, it is nevertheless true that there is a real tendency to integration, in some respects stronger than in other party families (Lightfoot, 2005).

It is in this context that the question arises of the significance and conse-quences of the bursting onto the scene of a new component, which we will call ‘Eastern.’ Is this a matter of the incorporation into a transnational federation of parties which are genetically foreign? To this one could object that from its inception party-organized socialism developed elsewhere than in Western Europe. This was the case in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the Balkan states where, however, the national question arose with more intensity than elsewhere. Even in Bulgaria and Romania, where industrialization was particu-larly late and limited, small socialist organizations formed, progressed in the urban centers and developed considerable activism. In the inter-war period, they proved to be less effective than the communist parties in clandestine life, which was necessary due to these countries’ domination by authoritarian, if not proto-fascist, regimes. Above all, the Second World War and its conse-quences cut the cord of social democratic history, which never ceased on the western side of the ‘iron curtain.’ The national liberation of these countries by the Red Army was an asset of the Soviet regime in controlling their political evolution. After some years of hesitation from 1944 to 1947, one-party rule and the despotism of the Soviet bureaucracy quickly annihilated all demo-cratic political life. However, the first years of the occupation of these terri-tories were also marked by structural reforms (reconstruction, agrarian reforms and nationalizations) which altered the social structures and provided a real national and popular base for communism (Gallissot, 1997).

This particular history has weighed considerably on the structuring of party systems of the CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries) after the fall of the USSR. Though still incipient and unstable, this structuring can be explained by cleavage lines that are quite different from those which prevailed in Western Europe (De Waele, 2004; Kitschelt et al. , 1999). The attitude toward European integration and the economic and social role of the state thus defined

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the antagonistic poles reflecting the interests and values of distinct social groups. In this situation, the social democratic parties of the CEECs were char-acterized by a social-liberal positioning and by their commitment to European integration, though with less fervor than the neoliberal parties. Since they are located within cleavages different from those of the West, can one speak of the same family? Or, on the contrary, should one take into consideration the diffi-culty of constructing an autonomous family in the East, where aligning with a western cousin only corresponds to opportunist motivations (De Waele and Soare, 2011)?

The temptation to give a negative response can be curbed by two series of considerations. On the one hand, an organizational rapprochement well and truly exists on the European level, both in the Parliament and within the PES. The socialization effects of this situation (Bardi, 2004) are likely to reinforce the apprenticeship processes of the eastern parties via the transfer of ideas, public policies and information from the western parties (Sloam, 2005). On the other hand, the latter’s evolution makes the eastern component of social dem-ocracy appear less ‘foreign,’ for even if the new eastern social democracy has the peculiarity of not being born of the ‘labor/capital’ cleavage, western social democracy is continually losing its profile as the natural representative of sub-altern labor. This is one less obstacle to the unification of all these parties in the same family. However, this still tells us nothing about the concrete features they are supposed to share. Should it be sought in European social democra-cy’s taking responsibility for the new cleavages tied to a new ‘critical juncture’ based on neoliberal globalization, the rise of a post-industrial economy and the expansion of cultural liberalism? If we still do not have sufficiently substantial comparative studies to answer this question, we hope that this volume will provide the primary material indispensable for this task.

1.5.2 The electoral dilemma

Social democracy is travelling along an inexorably downward electoral slope. Its brief moment of success at the end of the 1990s was deceptive, and it masked the decrease of social democracy’s electoral base since the 1970s, which is tending to accelerate. As Moschonas emphasizes, ‘all parties, without exception, were electorally less successful in the 1990s and 2000s than they had been in the past ( ... ), each decade being less good electorally than the previous one (−1.5 percent in the 1970s; −0.6 percent in the 1980s; −1.9 percent in the 1990s; and −2.6 percent in the 2000s)’ (Moschonas, 2011, p. 52). This record is not offset by their performance in the European elec-tions. The June 2009 vote was thus a symbol of general decline, even though the election was held in the context of the crisis of the neoliberal model, from which European socialists in no way benefited electorally. The PES group lost 16 seats in relation to the preceding legislative term, the most troubling

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setbacks occurring in the countries where the social democrats were in power. In fact, since 1989, and following the example of national legislative elec-tions, European social democracy’s performance in the European elections has constantly deteriorated. The reduction of its share of representatives in the European Parliament shows this, since it went from 34.7 percent of dep-uties in 1989 to 25 percent in 2009 (De Waele and Vieira, 2012, p. 78), which means a decline of nearly 10 points in 20 years.

A sociological explanation of this Europe-wide electoral erosion has been proposed by some scholars. Confronted with a shrinking of their worker elect-orate due to the constriction and redefinition of the boundaries of the working class, the social democratic parties had to cope with a genuine ‘electoral dilemma’ (Przeworski, 1985; Przeworski and Sprague, 1986): enlarge their electoral base to include the middle classes, at the risk of losing their traditional electorate. Becoming evident in the mid-1980s, this dilemma has persisted to the extent that the social democratic parties have not always succeeded in halting the dynamic of disalignment on the part of the workers. Indeed, since the 1980s the social democratic parties have managed to capture the new middle classes more than they have won the support of workers (Kriesi, 1998).

Kitschelt (1994) explains this difficult cohabitation by the heterogeneity of the economic and cultural expectations within this new electoral coalition. In positing the formation of a cultural ‘second dimension’ of political com-petition based on values, which crosses the traditional ‘left-right’ dimension based on the socio-economic divide and class interests, Kitschelt attempts to provide a more explicit content to the trade-off theorized by Przeworski and Sprague. In crossing the ‘interventionism-liberalism’ and the ‘libertarianism-authoritarianism’ dichotomies, Kitschelt puts forward the hypothesis that the workers position themselves on the left in respect to economic questions but are closer to the authoritarian pole on cultural questions. Conversely, the new middle classes are characterized by centrist attitudes on the economic level and libertarian ones on the cultural level. Working from a situation of the division of the left electorate in Switzerland, Oesch and Rennwald (2010) contradict the hypothesis according to which the left parties are coping with a dilemma regarding their positioning on the economic dividing line. The economic attitudes of the different classes within the left electorate, in the Swiss case, seem relatively similar. On the other hand, the left parties, and particularly the Socialist party, are dealing with a genuine dilemma in respect to their posi-tioning on the cultural issues. When cultural questions, such as immigration or security, are put on the agenda, the Socialist party is forced, according to Oesch and Rennwald, to deal with a big discrepancy between the libertarian preferences of the new middle classes and the more traditional attitudes of the working class. If the study’s conclusions cannot be generalized to the whole of Europe, it nevertheless has the merit of raising the problem of the difficult

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assimilation by social democracy of the new divides inherent in the cultural revolution, globalization and European integration.

1.5.3 The project dilemma

Social democracy’s electoral crisis is tied to the crisis of its project. It is striking that at the moment capitalism’s structural crisis burst onto the horizon in 2007–8 social democracy found itself without a voice, at least at the beginning. This was not the case with the conservatives when the Keynesian paradigm exhausted itself at the end of the 1970s: having appropriated the neoliberal theses, they were ready with a diagnosis and solutions to offer in the face of the left’s failures. By contrast, Southern Europe’s socialist governments, which were under pressure of the international capital markets, aligned themselves with the most orthodox economic policies, including the calling into question of a great number of social gains, the reduction of the public sector and the abandonment of major aspects of their sovereignty. Several representatives of heterodox political economy empha-sized that far from being only of regional significance, these crises concentrated in the southern part of the continent cannot be unconnected to neo-revisionist social democracy’s commitment to the contemporary configuration of capitalism (Husson, 2012; Panayotakis, 2010). Put another way, it is difficult to imagine them providing solutions to a problem they contributed to create, notably by thinking it possible to replicate the American growth model (Ryner, 2010).

In this connection, the apparent dependence of social democracy on cap-italist growth should be noted. Even if its apogee was reached at the time of the exceptional post-war expansive long wave, its ‘magical return,’ in the end very brief, at the end of the 1990s corresponds to the bubble of the e-economy and the mini-boom associated with it, before the early 2000s put an end to this passing euphoria. Trying to define a strategy in the face of the current great crisis, the European social democrats are defending a concerted recovery of productive investment on a European level, thus offering a sort of revival of Euro-Keynesianism. If the expected consequent return of growth seems indeed a much better way of reducing debt than through austerity, this would be to forget rather too quickly that the present crisis is also an ecological one. Keynesianism remains productivism. Even extended to all of ‘Continental’ Europe and to ecological activities, Keynesianism would be unable to deal with two great problems: (1) it is probable that green growth is a myth; (2) in the long term, the return of growth in advanced capitalist economies seems improbable. The credibility of ‘green growth’ has been indeed shaken since economist Tim Jackson (2009) questioned the idea of a possible decoupling of GDP growth, resource consumption and CO 2 emissions. Considering the extent of the reduction that needs to be achieved, returning to growth rates beyond 2 percent even seems suicidal (Li, 2010). Moreover, the crisis is sometimes accurately interpreted as the impossibility of sustainably halting the tendency

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to stagnation of the advanced capitalist countries (Foster and Magdoff, 2009). According to this framework, the debt is only a doping substance based on arti-ficial profit opportunities, promised in the financial sphere but not realized in the productive sphere (Harvey, 2011). In any case, even the boom of the new information and communication technologies did not reverse the tendency to decline of the ten-year averages of world growth, which, on the contrary, the recent crisis exacerbated (Durand, 2009).

Under these conditions, is it possible to build a ‘decent capitalism’ (Dullien et al. , 2011)? Whatever the other challenges of social democracy are, its destiny probably depends on this conundrum. If it does not manage to resolve it, even its most commonplace commitments to more social justice and democracy will be impossible to maintain, and we will then be able to speak of a true change in the nature of this political force.

1.5.4 The European integration dilemma

Even if it succeeds in resolving these three dilemmas, social democracy would still have to face another one: how to realize a renewed social democratic project within a European institutional system that is intrinsically conser-vative, which does not favor a party logic (Moschonas, 2009; Vieira, 2011)? As Ross very aptly notes, the social democrats have to face the fact that the EU is ‘a tricky place for center-lefts to work’ (2011, p. 332).

The dilemma of European integration is an old one. Actually, the conversion of social democrats to the communitarian project in the beginning of the 1980s was never accompanied by a reflection on the nature of European insti-tutions. The social democratic parties were not always Euro-enthusiasts, and their involvement in the first phase of European integration was minor. During the two decades following the Treaty of Rome, the majority of the elites of the social democratic parties remained wary of a project which seemed to threaten the social compromise forged after the Second World War. Even if some person-alities, such as Belgium’s Paul-Henri Spaak, participated in the construction of the communitarian project, the latter was still mainly the result of an alliance between Christian democrats and liberals. One has to await the beginning of the 1980s for the attitude of social democracy to constructing Europe to change from ambivalence to promotion (Holmes and Lightfoot, 2010). This major stra-tegic evolution should be seen in relation to the experience of the socialist government in France in 1982–3. The austerity turn which was then initiated confirmed the failure of Keynesianism in the context of the nation-state. From that time on, social democrats were to formulate a ‘Euro-Keynesian’ project (Aust, 2004): it involved the projection onto the European level of an economic paradigm that had become inoperative on the national level. This change of scale was intended to confront globalization more successfully. The deepening

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of European integration thus appeared as the palliative for the defeat of social democracy in the face of a capitalism that had entered its neoliberal phase.

This strategy was essentially a ‘Faustian pact’ (Escalona and Vieira, forth-coming): in attempting to regain spaces for maneuver through the constructing of Europe, the social democrats legitimized an institutional framework built by other political forces, which was not favorable to their traditional policies. The constitutionalization of the right of competition and of negative integration over positive integration in fact undermined the possibilities of gaining control of capitalism, including on the continental level (Scharpf, 1999). This contra-diction remains to be resolved.

In this introduction we have traced the historical trajectory of European social democracy and described the dilemmas which this family is confronting. The case studies to follow will make it possible to situate the position of each party within this overall picture.

Notes

1 . While in reality a social democratic ideology properly so called does not have general consensus, its specialists locate its genesis at the beginning of the 20th century and date its triumph in the 1930s (for northern Europe) or at the end of the Second World War (for all of Europe) (Berman, 2006). Even if one grants the existence of this ideology, it would have arisen after the birth of the social democratic parties themselves.

2 . The cleavage is all the more distinctive, the more the social democratic electorate is working class; all the more inclusive, the more workers vote social democratic.

3 . Although it did not have a socialist character, Chartism was a social movement which made inroads among the young English working class around democratic demands, including universal male suffrage.

4 . If the doctrinal rigidity of orthodox Marxism was blamed it should nevertheless be realized that the much more ‘pragmatic’ laborist parties were not able to for-mulate responses to the crisis any faster than the others. Furthermore, it is also true that social democrats analyzed the phenomenon of fascism just as poorly as the communists did.

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605

Index

Bersani, P. L., 6, 228, 238–40Bodry, A., 6BSP, 6, 51–2, 56, 59, 62, 67, 401–14Butkevicius, A., 7

ČSSD, 7, 416–32, 550–1

Désir, H., 6, 132, 156, 159

EDEK, 5, 69–85electoral results

Austria, 37–8Belgium, 59, 76–9Bulgaria, 407–9Cyprus, 76–9Czech Republic, 422–4Denmark, 93–5Estonia, 440–4Finland, 112–15France, 137–42Germany, 167–9Greece, 189–92Hungary, 458–60Ireland, 209–11Italy, 231–4Latvia, 475–9Lithuania, 494–7Luxembourg, 252–6Malta, 275–7Netherlands, 292–7Poland, 513–15Portugal, 316–20Romania, 534–6Slovakia, 558–62Slovenia, 579–81Spain, 335–6Sweden, 354–6United Kingdom, 383–5

electorate (sociology of)Austria, 39Belgium, 57, 60Bulgaria, 409Cyprus, 79Czech Republic, 424Denmark, 95

Estonia, 442–4Finland, 114–15France, 140–2Germany, 168–9Greece, 191–2Hungary, 460Ireland, 210–11Italy, 234Latvia, 478–9Lithuania, 496–7Luxembourg, 254–6Malta, 276–7Netherlands, 295–7Poland, 515Portugal, 319–20Romania, 536Slovakia, 562Slovenia, 581Spain, 339–42Sweden, 354United Kingdom, 385

European central bank (ECB), 178–9, 185, 196, 210, 215, 317, 323, 326

EC (European commission), 4, 38, 44–5, 196–7, 215, 237, 317, 323, 326, 341, 429, 599

Europeanization, 3, 20, 99, 150–1, 363, 393, 601

Faymann, W., 5, 34, 45, 47Fico, R., 7, 553, 556, 558–64,

567–72

Gabriel, S., 6, 151, 173–4, 180–1Gilmore, E., 6, 208, 213, 215–16Globalization, 21, 23–4

historyAustria, 33–4Belgium, 51–3Bulgaria, 401–2Cyprus, 70–1Czech Republic, 416–17Denmark, 88Estonia, 434–7

PROOF

606 Index

history – continuedFinland, 107–8France, 127–9Germany, 163–4Greece, 185–6Hungary, 452–5Ireland, 206–7Italy, 222–5Latvia, 470–2Lithuania, 488–9Luxembourg, 244–6Malta, 269–71Netherlands, 287–8Poland, 506–9Portugal, 309–10Romania, 526–8Slovakia, 550–3Slovenia, 575–6Spain, 331–2Sweden, 347–51United Kingdom, 372–3

International monetary fund (IMF), 155, 185, 196, 210, 215–16, 317, 323, 326, 373, 390

intra-party lifeAustria, 46–7Belgium, 65–6Bulgaria, 412–13Cyprus, 82–4Czech Republic, 429–31Denmark, 101–2Estonia, 448–9Finland, 121–4France, 151–7Germany, 180–1Greece, 197–201Hungary, 464–5Ireland, 216–17Italy, 238–40Latvia, 482–4Lithuania, 502Luxembourg, 264–5Malta, 282–3Netherlands, 304–5Poland, 521–2Portugal, 324–6Romania, 541–3Slovakia, 570Slovenia, 585–7

Spain, 342–3Sweden, 365–6United Kingdom, 393–4

Keynesianism, 14–15, 18, 23–4, 43, 596

Labour Party (Irish), 206–9, 211, 213–19Labour Party (Maltese), 269–72, 274–5,

277–8, 280–4Labour Party (UK), 372–4, 387, 389, 391,

393–4, 396Löfven, S., 6, 353Luxembourg Socialist Worker Party

(LSAP), 6, 244–7, 249–67Lithuanian Social Democratic Party

(LSDP), 7, 488–504Latvian Social Democratic Workers’ Party

(LSDSP), 7, 470–86Lukšič, I., 7, 586–8

Magnette, P., 5Mesterházy, A., 7, 455–6, 462–5Mikser, S., 7, 437, 439, 444, 448–9, 450Miliband, Ed, 6, 376, 379, 389, 392–6, 594Miller, L., 7, 509–10, 514–15, 519, 521–4Hungarian Social Democratic Party

(MSZP), 7, 452–68, 550Muscat, J., 6, 272, 278–80, 283–4

NATO, 120, 151, 170, 179, 197, 239, 281–2, 284, 324, 346, 403, 412, 429, 448, 482, 492, 501–2, 521, 540, 552, 569, 584

Neoliberalism, 18–19, 148, 463

Omirou, Y., 5, 72–3, 75, 77–8, 81–4organization

Austria, 34–7Belgium, 53–9Bulgaria, 403–7Cyprus, 71–5Czech Republic, 417–22Denmark, 89–93Estonia, 437–40Finland, 108–12France, 130–7Germany, 164–7Greece, 186–9Hungary, 455–7Ireland, 207–9

PROOF

Index 607

Italy, 225–31Latvia, 472–5Lithuania, 489–94Luxembourg, 246–52Malta, 271–4Netherlands, 288–92Poland, 509–13Portugal, 310–16Romania, 528–33Slovakia, 553–8Slovenia, 576–9Spain, 332–5Sweden, 351–4United Kingdom, 373–83

Party of European Socialists (PES), 4–7, 21, 53, 73, 85, 130, 151, 282, 402, 412–13, 477–8, 482, 519, 527, 537, 552–3, 560, 563, 572, 581–2, 588

Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), 6, 71, 76, 185–203

Partito Democratico (PD) party, 6, 222, 224–8, 230–42, 527, 531, 534, 537, 543–6

Ponta, V., 7, 529–30, 535, 542programmatic positions

Austria, 42–6Belgium, 63–5Bulgaria, 411–12Cyprus, 81–2Czech Republic, 428–9Denmark, 98–101Estonia, 445–8Finland, 119–21France, 147–51Germany, 175–80Greece, 194–7Hungary, 462–4Ireland, 213–16Italy, 237–8Latvia, 481–2Lithuania, 500–2Luxembourg, 261–4Malta, 279–82Netherlands, 300–4Poland, 519–21Portugal, 322–4Romania, 539–41Slovakia, 565–70Slovenia, 583–5

Spain, 340–2Sweden, 360–5United Kingdom, 391–3

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 4

PS (Belgian), 51–67PS (French), 127, 129–59PS (Portuguese), 309–12, 314–28PSD (Social Democratic Party), 7,

222, 264, 309–10, 320, 322, 324, 527–46

PSOE (Spanish Socialist Worker’s party), 6, 331–46

PvdA (Dutch Labour party), 6, 287–307

Relationships with other partiesAustria, 39–41Belgium, 60–3Bulgaria, 409–10Cyprus, 80Czech Republic, 425–7Denmark, 95–6Estonia, 444–5Finland, 115–18France, 142–5Germany, 169–74Greece, 192–3Hungary, 460–2Ireland, 211–12Italy, 234–5Latvia, 479–80Lithuania, 497–9Luxembourg, 256–61Malta, 277–9Netherlands, 297–9Poland, 516–17Portugal, 320–1Romania, 536–8Slovakia, 563–4Slovenia, 581–2Spain, 336–9Sweden, 356–9United Kingdom, 385–9

Relationships with trade unions/social movements

Austria, 41Belgium, 62–3Bulgaria, 409–10Cyprus, 80Czech Republic, 426–7

PROOF

608 Index

Relationships with trade unions/social movements – continued

Denmark, 96Estonia, 444–5Finland, 117–18France, 142–5Germany, 169–74Greece, 192–3Hungary, 460–2Ireland, 212Italy, 235Latvia, 479–80Lithuania, 497–9Luxembourg, 256–61Malta, 277–9Netherlands, 297–9Poland, 516–17Portugal, 320–1Romania, 536–8Slovakia, 563–4Slovenia, 583Spain, 338–9Sweden, 357–9United Kingdom, 387–9

Rubalcaba, A. P., 6, 339, 343–4, 346

Samsom, D. M., 6, 290, 294, 298, 301, 307SAP (The Swedish Social Democratic

Party), 6, 110, 163, 182, 347–68SD (Danish Social Democratic Party), 5,

88–105SD (Slovenian), 575–88

SDE (Estonian Social Democratic Party), 7, 434–51

SDP (Social Democratic Party of Finland), 6, 107–25

Seguro, A. J., 6, 310–11, 314, 320, 325–6, 328

SLD (Democratic Left Alliance), 7, 508–24SMER (Slovakia Social Democracy), 7,

550–72Sobotka, B., 7, 423, 427, 430, 432Socialist International, 69, 71, 85, 130,

197, 214, 219, 222, 401–2, 413, 434, 471, 500, 503–4, 527, 552–3, 571, 588

SP.a (Flemish Social Democrats (Flanders)), 5, 51–3, 55–7, 59–66

SPD (Social Democratic Party of Germany), 6, 11, 151, 163–83

SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria), 5, 33–49

Stanishev, S., 6, 402–3, 410–11, 413

Third Way, 3, 17–18, 46, 66, 98, 119, 164, 174–5, 278, 288, 301, 322, 350, 360, 366, 436, 461, 558, 565, 571, 580, 583

Timofejevs, A., 7, 474–5, 484Tobback, B., 5, 56Thorning-Schmidt, H., 91, 96–7, 101,

103–5

Urpilainen, J., 6, 111–12, 119, 122, 125

Venizelos, E., 6, 186–8, 197, 199–201, 203

PROOF