contemporary shi'ism as political ideology: the views of...
TRANSCRIPT
Contemporary Shi'ism as Political Ideology:
The Views of Sharî'atmadârî, Tâliqânî, and Khumaynî
by
Kenrick Abbott Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montréal Canada
May 1990
A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
(c) Kenrick Abbott, 1990
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t
ABSTRACf
Islam was drastically altered in Iran as a result of the 1978/79 Revolution. This thesis
looks at the political aspects of contcmporary Imâm; Shi'ism by comparing the ideas of three leading
mujtahids of the day: Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, Âyatullâh Khumaynî, and Âyatullâh Tâliqânî. This study
points out the wide divergences of ideas present within the religious c1ass, ranging in the political
spectrum, from conservative [0 radical. A comparison of these three figures highlights the differences
between "Tradilionalist" Islam, as put forlh by Sharî'atmadârî, and "Fundamentalist" Islam, as proposed
by Khumaynî and Tâliqânî. Further differences within the fundamentalist "camp" are demonstrated
through Tâliqânî's progressive ali-inclusive "Liberation Theology" and Khumaynî's equally aII
encompassing "religion of militant individuals".
RESUME
L'Islam fut dramatiquement modifié en Iran suite à la révolution de 1978/79. Cette
thése porte sur les aspects politiques du Shi'isme Imâmî contemporain et compare les idées des trois
principaux mujtahide d'aujourd'hui: Âyalullâh Sharî'atmadârî, Âyatullâh Khumaynî, et Âyatullâh
Tâliqânî. L'étude fait note du grand degré de divergence des idées présentes au sein de la classe
religieuse, qu'il nous est possible de ranger à l'intérieur du spectre politique, de conservateur à radical.
La comparaison de ces trois personnages souligne les différences entre l'islam "traditionnaliste" mis
l'avant par Sharî'atmadârÎ, et l'islam "fondamentaliste" proposé par Khumaynî et Tâliqânî. D'autres
différences parmi le "camp" des fondamentalistes sont démontrées à partir de la progressive et trés
inclusive "théologie de libération" de Tâliqânî ainsi que par la "religion des militants individuels" toute
aussi absorbante de Khumaynî.
Table of Contents
Preface
Chapter 1) Introduction: The Increasing Political Role of the Imâmî <Ulamâ'
Chapter 2) Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî: A Traditionalist of the Revolution
Chapter 3) Âyatullâh Tâliqânî: Islam as the Third "True" Way
Chapter 4) Âyatullâh Khumaynî: The Rule of the Jurist
Chapter 5) Conclusion: The Diversity of the Fuqahâ'
Bibliography
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Preface
This thesis does not purport to provide a history of the Iranian
Revolution. Rather, it proposes to compare the politieal views of Âyatullâh
Khumaynî, ÂyatuIlâh Tâliqânî, and ÂyatulIâh Sharî'atmadârî. This shaH be do ne by,
fifst, introducing the development of the concept of political authority in Shî'f Islam,
and then by looking at each thinker's ideas separately. Their conceptions of political
Islam will th en be drawn together in the final chapter of the work. These three
thinkers are interesting because they were each influential in developments during
the Revolution and were contemporaries of one another. More important, they
represent widely different understandings of the role of Shi'i Islam in modern Iranian
politics and society - a topie which is relevant as the changes that have occurred in
the Islamic world, and especially in Iran, since the 1970s are undeniable.
For the reader's convenience, as well as my own, 1 have endeavoured
to use a consistent system of transliteration. The system used herein is that of the
McGill Institute of Islamic Studies. However, more cornmon historical terms such
as Abbasid, Safavid, Buyid; as weil as more corn mon place names, such as Tehran,
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will be presented in their recognized forms. Furthermore, in accordance with The
Chicago Manual of Style (13lh ed. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,
1982) quotes have been used without alteration - this also applies to their
transliteration systems.
A major flaw in this work, which 1 deeply regret, is the unfortunate
need to rely on English translations of the writings of these theorists as weil as
English secondary sources. This reliance on English translations is a weakness that
was lamentably unavoidable.
1 would like to thank the staff of the Islamic Studies Library at McGill
University; my colleagues in the Institute of Islamic studies, in both of my years; the
professors who provided me with kind encouragement; and, last, but certainly not
least, my thesis advisor Dr. C. 1. Adams as a source of inspiration and assistance.
AlI of whom helped to make this thesis possible.
1 "
Chapter One Introduction:
The Increaliing Political Role of the Imâmî IUlamâ'
Recent years have seen many radical and unexpected changes in SM't
Islam. Âyatullâh Khllmaynî altered lmâmî political theory; and then orchestrated
the implementation of hb ideas followi ng the Revolu tion of 197H-I <.J7lJ. Y ct
Khumaynî was not the only member of his c1ass tn have a political philosophy. In
fact his beliefs were in marked contrast to those of many of the other senior
mujtalzids of the time. A comparison of the ideas of Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî,
Âyatullâh Tâliqânî and Âyatllllâh Khumaynî demon~trates, in a limited ~tlldy, the
wide variety of ideas in circulation. These men repre~ent, rc~pectively, a
tradhionalistjconservative pm,ition. a "Ieftish" position and a fllndamcntali~t one.
However. before looking at each of them individually, a gcncral ovcrvicw of the
development of It/zllâ 'As/zarÎ Slzt'a concepts of poliîical allthority is nceded to put
the ideas of the se three men into an historical perspective.
The problem of political authority is one that ha~ plagllcd Ir/111ft 'Aslzart
Shi'ism since the beginning of the al-Ghayha al-SlIg/mÎ (Minor Occultation) in the
ninth century. Once the religious, and therefore legal, leader~hip of the community
was settled, following the beginning of the Occultation, the new leaders ~et to work
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to define the scope of their authority. The definition of the correct role for the
'ulamâ' in the leadership of the SIzî'î community is still, and always will be, evolving.
The central thernes have been, and remain, the protection of the purity of the faith,
the protection of the Slzarî'a, and leading the people to the faith. Yet the area!:'l that
these tasks touch upon, ana h0w they do so, have been the suhject of rnuch debate.
ln the present day this debate can be seen in the ideas of the religious figures
involved in the Iranian Revolution of 1978/1979.
Priof to the onset of the Minor Occultation the ImûmÎ community had
come to accept the need for a divinely-inspired interpreter of the revelation to whom
the community had direct access. Initially the Imâms, who were descended From the
family of the Prophet, through 'Alî and Fâtima, acted in this capacity. The person
of the lmâm was the inheritor of aIl aspects of Muhammad's position with the
exception that he did not bring a revelation. Each Imâm designated his successor,
and the "Iight" of his knowledge was passed between them; thus leadership was
constant. Religious and political authority devolved entirely upon the living /l11â11l:
aU other authority was considered to be iIIegitimate. During their early history the
SIzî'a steadfastly refused to recognise any government other than the lmâm 's.
Initially, under the first lmâms, the Slzî'a were both politically and rnilitarily active
in pursuit of their aspirations. However, as time passed, they became increasingly
re-oriented towards theological issues as a result of the consistent failures of their
uprisings against the SUflflÎ Caliphate.
This increasing trend towards quietism was accelerated by the 5th
lmâm, Muhammad al-Bâqir (d. drca 737), and became even more pronounced, and
'"
... ' was institutionalized, under his son Ja'far al-~âdiq (d. 765), the 6th Il1uÎm. 1 There are
two important contributions of these two Imûms that are of intercst here. Firstly,
al-Bâqir introduced the idea of nass (explicit designation) 10 the Imâmll/e; this idea
was universally accepted, among the Shf'a at any rate, during the manife~tation of
al-~âdiq.: More important was the ~wit('h fmm an Imûmale hased on a political
daim to one based on inherited 'ibn (knowledge)~ this meant t!"lat the ImcÎ",":.
authority came to be derived from his position as final arhitcr in ail legal, and
therefore aU religious, matters. Thus while sovereignty was justly the prerogative of
the Imâm, it was not imperative that he actually holt! it in order to carry out his
necessary funetions.3
Thus by the time of the Abbasid seizure of power the Shi'll \Vere
bringing themselves to live under SWlIlf domination. The empha~is of the Shtf
movement cl.anged such that they abandoned their [hcocratic concept of ~tate rulet\
by the infallible Imâm. Rather, they were turning to quieti~m and /(ulÎya
(dissimulation), on the instruction of the Imâm, due to the futility of ri~ing agaill~t
the power of the Cr.1iphate. TaqÎya was introduced partly to exclude the non-SM'a
from knowledge but mostly for self-protection.
Regardless of the complexities in the previous developmenrl, in Imâlllf
politieal theOIY the Lesser Occultation (874-941) created a new situ.ltion which
1 Dates taken from M. G. S. Hodgson, The Vell/ure of 1.\lal1l, vol. 1, nie ClassicalAge of Islam (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1(74),260.
~ M. G. S. H/Jdgson, "How did the Early Shi'a Decorne Sectarian," Journal oI the American Oriental Society, 75 (1955), 10.
3 Ibid., 11.
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forced the community to cope with an unprecedented set of problems. When the
Il th Imâm died leaving no apparent heir, there was a mac;rive split among the Shî'a.
They fragmented into ]4 or 15 sects, a number that would grow to 20 in the following
70 years, prior to the widespread acceptance of the Doctrine of Occultation.4 This
doctrine held that white the Imâm himself was not present his Vakîl (Ambassador)
could contact him. Thus the Hidden Imâm remained accessible and cou Id continue
in his "neces~ary" functiuns by providing his followers with his àivine wisdom in
writing, if not through his immediate presenc~.
There was then a series of four ambassadors who provided contînuity
in leadership to the community. However, on the death of the fourth the community
was again forced 10 adapt to a new, and unique, situation. Suddenly the infallible
source of divine law was completely removed from access. The Lesser Occultation
gave way ta the Greater Occultation (al-Ghayba al-Kuhrâ) which was to last until the
end of time - when the Imâm returned. The last Vakîl received two messages that
shaped ail further developments in theorics of authority subsequent ta his death in
941. The first of these messages made the concealment total: "If they daim that they
have seen and recognized (Him) at that time, they are Iying; and if through daims
of seeing (Him), they daim vice-regency, they are Iying."s The last mec;sage was that
the Imâm would return only at the end of time, as al-Mahdf, to usher in an era of
perfeet peace and justice under his direct rule.
4 S. A. Arjomand, "Hidden God and Visible Cleric," Archives Européenes de Sociologie. 20 #1 (1979),82.
5 Ibid., 86.
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While the idea of a/-Mahdi delayed questions of politieal legitimacy,
new problems continued to arise. With the Greater Occultation the SIzi"a were again
at a 10ss for guidance. As Eliash put it " ... the living Imâm is the living {!ntity of the
infallible divine law, its interpreter-maker and executer. .. "6; deprivation of this source
meant that the Slzi'a had to deal with questions of authority in the absence of a
celestially-inspired guide. The need to do this came sorne 300 years afte r the SUIlIlÎS
had dealt with the same types of questions. The SIzî'î solutions to these prohlems
was, therefore, based on entirely diff~rent precedents including the previou~
acceptance of the need for the provision of the Imâm's guidance. The initial
problem necessarily conc:.!rned the leadership of the community and who wa~
qualified to lead. Although there was no legitimate authority in the absence of the
Imâm, only power,? sorne form of leadership was needed by the community.
The Imâms had done nothing to prepare the way for their falliblc
successors; no hint of the coming Occultation had been given.R Additionally, thi~
problem was complicated as the deJegation of the Imâm's authority had bccn
regarded as dangerous by the jurists.9 Yet, in practice, the Imâl1l,\ had appointed
representatives and sent them to distant SM'; areas in order to extend their authority
6 J. Eliash, "The Ithnâ'AsharÎ-Shî'î Juristie Theory of Political and Legal Authority," Studia lslamica. 29 (1969), 25.
7 H. A1gar, Religion and State in Iran; 1785-1906 (Berkeley and Lm Angclcs: University of California Press, 1969), 4.
8 S. Akhavi, Religion and Polilies in Conlemporary Iran: Clergy-Stale Relations in the Pahlavi Perif)d (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 11.
9 A. A. Sachedina, The Just Ruler in Shî'ite Islam (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988),5.
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over greater distances and to circurnvent political interference from the Sunnî
Governrnent. 'l'he relationship of these men to the Imâm was determined through
the isnâds of the akhbâr (hadîtlz of the Imâms): scholars transmitting hadîtlz directly
being, obviously, closer to the Imâm.10 These men had possessed authority as
transmitters of the guidance of the Imâm and as learned men. Therefore, with the
onset of the Glzayba, they were felt to be reliable as transmitters of the hadîth and
knowledgeable enough to exercise the Imâm's juridical authority.ll In the absence
of the Imàm it was this group who inherited the leadership of the community as the
"General Deputies" of the Imâms.
The 'ulamâ' emerged as the "General Deputies" of the Imâm and
exercised the Imâm's religious/legal authorityP These Jurists, as private individuals,
began to develop responses to the new situation including the definition of their own
authority and its limits.13 There was a rapid advance in the use of reason by the
'ulamâ'. Initially emphasis was placed on the collection of the akhbâr of the Imâms;
Kulaynî (941/2) in his al-Kâfi fi '/lm al-Dîn provided a compilation of ha{lÎtlz with
all relevant isnâds. Muhammad b. 'A1î b. Mûsâ b. Bâbûya (991) compiled ~zadîtlz
but included the personal fatâwâ (legal opinions, judgements) and ijmâ' (consensus)
of other jurists. Barely one hundred years after the Greater Occultation Abû la'far
Muhammad b. al-Hasan al-Tûsî (1067) while outwardly opposing ijtihâd, used it and
10 Ibid., 62.
11 Ibid., 35-36 and 66.
12 Arjomand, "Hidden God and Visible Cleric," 88.
13 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 5.
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brought it into general, if covert, use in Imâmî jurisprudence. This acceptance
launched Shî'î Islâm on a new phase that would have drastic effects in the future. l-1
During this early period the 'u/amâ' saw their task as protecting the
pllrity of the faith and leading the people to a true understanding of Shi'ism.15 This
perception of their task in effect directed their concerns to religious/legal matters
and meant that overtly political issues were not dealt with. Instead they worked out
compromises between Sunnî domination of the Shî'a and the theoretical position of
their community as the followers of the true, but usurped and hidden, leaders.
Initially there was no reason to concern themselves with political issues as the
situation had not markedly changed; priOf to the Occultation the Imâm had not
actually held direct political power, so his concealment altered nothing in this area. I()
Another problem in the development of their authority that the newly
emerged religious élite had to deal with soon after the Occultation, and jll~t as thcy
were coming to grips with problems of fiqh, was the rise of the Buyids (946). This
situation was, again, totally alien: no one had expected there to be a Shî'î government
prior to the return of the Imâm. There was no concept of an ImâmÎ state, much Jess
one that for political reasons chose to leave the 1l0W impotent SUIlI1Î Caliphate intact.
The result of this event was the creation of a doctrine which held that working within
the existing government was acceptable, despite its illegitimacy, if the individual was
14 Ibid., 10, 67-68, and 75.
15 Ibid., 32.
16 Ibid., 62.
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coerced into this work or acting to "cornrnand the good and forbid the evil".17
It was the Safavids who first adopted Itlznâ 'Aslzari Shi'isrn as the
official state religion of Iran. Regardless of the reasons for this act its repercussions
reverberate to the present. Due to the religious orientation of Iran during this
period, Ismâ'îl's chosen state religion had to be imposed by force. Furtherrnore, it
was necessary to import scholars from Syria, Bahrain and other SIzî'î Arab areas.
This lack of an indigenous religious class rneant that the imported thinkers were not
only devoid of local followers but were also dependent on the government for
incorne. Isrnâ'îl had come to power, in 1501, partially on daims to descent from the
Seventh Imâm and, as such, claimed vice-regency. While this daim violated previous
juridical rulings as weIl as the last message of the Hidden Imâm, the 'ulamâ' did
nothing to prote st it. Over tirne the scholars grew increasingly independent in
thought but were held firmly in check so long as the dynasty remained strong. While
the Safavids had established a group of dependent 'ulamâ' as part of the official
bureaucracy, there was another group that was indigenous to Iran and excluded from
the official bureaucracy. This second group remained in close contact with the
people, becoming their representatives against the excesses of the state. In the later
stages of the Safavid Dynasty this group as weil as the "official" one grew in
independence.
With the defeat suffered by Ismâ'îl at the Baule of Châldirân the c1aim
to infallibility previously put forward became entirely untenable. It was then only
17 N. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), 15.
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naturai for the Safavid Shâhs to recognise the separation of Heavenly and Worldly
Kingdoms.18 From the reign of Ismâ'îl's successor, Shâh Tahmâsp, onward control
of Religion, including the Sacred Law, was left to the 'ulal1lâ ,.ll) Sorne of the
mujtahids may have claimed the right to rule as "general deputies", but most
continued to see their inheritance as lying solely in the religious, therefore legat,
fields.2o As a result of the balance of power in favour of the gO\/ernment there wa~
no challenge to the Dynasty until after the death of 'Abbâs 1 and the accession of
weaker Shâhs21• Even whell the confrontation came during the late Safavid period,
it was not manifested as anything but a challenge to the specifie faiIings of the ruling
Shâh. SpecificaIly, when Mullâ Qâsim called for the removal of Shâh 'Abhâs Il, in
1666, for violation of the Shan"'a, he called for the Shâh's replacement by a grandson
of 'Abbâs 1. This demand, while exerting clerical influence, recognised the right of
the Shâhs to rule so long as the Sharta, which was the preserve of the 'ulamâ' and
is binding on ail Muslims, was obeyed.
It was during the mIe of the Safavid Dynasty that a group of scholars
opposed to ijtihâd came to dominate the Shi'î movement. This faction, known as the
Akhbârîs, stressed direct reference to the Akhbâr of the Imâms. This attitude was
in direct opposition to that of the Usûlfs who accepted reason, in the form of ijtilzâd,
18 Arjomand, "Hidden God and Visible Cleric," 95.
19 Ibid., lOO-lOI.
20 Ibid., 104.
21 R. Savory, Iran Under the Safavids (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 238.
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in reaching legal judgements. For the period of Akhbârî domination, the 17lh and
18lh Centuries, Shi'ism was embarked on a very different course as the system, and
therefore the function, of the mujtalzids was denied. Nevertheless, this dispute was
not a new one; it was in many ways a continuation of the dispute regarding the
relationship between revelation and reason.22 While theAklzbârfs have been depicted
as an unprecedented innovation, their position and that of the U~ûlÎs grew from a
corn mon roOt.23
The basis of the conflict between these two groups dates to the time
of the 51h and 6th Imâms. However, the presence of the Imâms deferred the debate
until after the Greater OccuItation.24 Those who favoured strict adherence to the
traditions were overcome by the end of 10th Century by the Usûlfs. This latter party's
dominance was firmly entrenched by al-Mufid (d. 1022), al-Murtadâ (d. 1044) and
al-Tûsî. The Akhbârîs and U~ûIÎS, per se, are first mentioned in the 12th Century
when the Akhbâns were vigorously protesting the use of reason and, instead, placed
a massive emphasis on the Akhbâr.25 The Aklzbârîs, again defeated, then remained
dormant for four centuries.26
22 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 19.
23 N. Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern Iran," in ScllOlars, Saints and Sufis, ed. N. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 223.
24 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 19.
25 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 3, 54. and W. Madelung, "Akhbâriyya". in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition,
Supplement (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), 56 .
26 Ibid., 56.
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This debate was joined again at the height of the Safavid period. The
Akhbâri position was re-stated by Mulla Mu~ammad Amîn b. Muhammad Sharîf al
Astarâbâdî (d. 1624). He (re)created theAkhbârîschool and adopted the na me that
had been first used in the lOth Century.27 AI-Astarâbâdî's major work, Kitâb al-
Fawâ'id al-Madanîyah, was extremely critical of the Usûlf's stance and was
responsible for the rise of the Akhbâns in Safavid Iran.28 The innovations of three
famous Buyid jurists (al-Mufid, al-Murta9â, al-Tûsî) were rejected in favour of the
restoration of earlier Akhbârî ideals.29 This work refuted the use of reason for the
interpretation of revelation; aIl that the believer needed were the literaI Akhhâr.
Yet it must be said that the Akhbârîs were still reliant on reason. Their argument
was rationally constructed: they had to apply logic in the criticism of /-ladÎ//l which
were vital as the central pillar of their theories; and, when possible, differing Akhhûr
had to be reconciled.
The AkhbârÎs held that by strictly adhering to the literaI meaning of
the Aklzbâr sound traditionalism could be maintained. The Akhhâr of the lmâm.\'
were also to take precedence over the apparent meaning of the Qllr'lÎn;3{) this
preeminent status follows from the infallibility of the Imâms as sources of guidance -
27 H. M. Tabâtabâ'î, An Introduction ta ShN Law: A Bibliographical Survey (London: Ithaca Press, 1984), 52.
28 E. Kohlberg, "Astarâbâdî." in Encyclopaedia lranica (London, New York: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1987), 845.
29 S. A. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and tlze Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Social Change in SIzi'ite Iran from tlze Beginning of 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 145.
30 Madelung, 56.
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no man could possibly know better than they the true meaning of the revelation.
Concomitant with these ideas is the belief that ijtihâd, which leads to zann (probable
opinion), and the qiyâs (analogy) of the SunnÎs, as weIl as taqlûl, are prohibited in
the Akhbâri creed. Rather than practice ijtihâd or taqlûl every Muslim was to adhere
rigidly to the Akhbâr of the Imâms. Taqlûl was forbidden, not only because it was
unnecessary if ail believers were to adhere to the literaI meaning of the Akhbâr, but
a)so because it waSt mentioned in only one Hadith, and that Hadith was question able
due to its isnâd. 31
Furthermore, Shaykh Ahmad al-Ahsâ'î (d. 1826), from eastern Arabia,
rejected the UsûlÎ position as an usurpation of the direct authority of the Imâm.32
His argument contested the authority of the mujtalzids as the "General Deputies" of
the Hidden Imâm at a time when the Usûlfs were once again the dominant faction.33
Also, the Akhbâns used the authority verse in the Qur'ân (4: 59) - "Believers, obey
Allâh and the Apostle and those in authority among you." - to show that there was
no place for the authority of the mujtalzids in Shî'f society. Instead of a
mujtahidjmuqallid relationship between the mujtahid and the ignorant believer, ail
31 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 213.
32 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 3, 155. and M. Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent: Socioreligious Tizought zn Qajar Iran
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), 21.
33 Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent, 21. It is noteworthy that if the designation of the 'ulamâ' by the Imâm existed in
the Traditions, as cIaimed by the U.~ûlfs, then the Akhbârf position wouId have been logically impossible as, if such a tradition existed, the Akhbûrfs would have been bound by their emphasis on the Aklzbûr ta accept it.
J. Eliash, "Misconceptions Regarding the luridical Status of the lranian 'Ularnâ'," International Journal of Middle Eastern Swdies. 10 (1979), 12-13.
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were said to be muqallid to the Imâms.34
As no ijtihâd was to be practised, and ail were muqallid, then ail that
was needed for a believer to determine the correct path was an understanding of
Arabie. If the believer could not reconcile two traditions then tawaqquf (abstaining
from a decision) was enjoined.35 Thus, potentially any believer could approach the
divine without an intermediary. The Aklzbâri beliefs, with their devotional nature,
appealed to the ordinary people as they provided clear instructions and at the same
time allowed a personal approach to the Divine. As a result of their temporary
victory in the debate with the Usûlis the AkhbârÎS came to be dominant over ail ShN
are as, including the religious centres, during the 171h and lSlh Centuries. This
dominance was apparent among the 'ulamâ' as weil, especially among the Arah
members of the class. So complete was the success of the AkhbârÎs and so drastic
was ijtihâd's fall from favour that ijtihâd was taught only in outlying areas. Moreover,
there were no major mujtalzids throughout the middle of the lSlh Century.36
Despite the temporary ascendancy of the AkhbârÎs the fortunes of the
Usûlîs were once again on the rise by the end of the lSlh Century. The U\lÎlÎ.\' placet!
stress on constant reference to the sources of the Law as weil as reason. The form
of reason they used was not restricted to qiyâs, which the SUllnÎs had accepted; rather
34 Arjomand, The Slzadaw of Gad, 146.
35 Madelung, 56-57. and Arjomand, The Slzadaw of Gad, 146.
36 Tabâtabâ'î, 53 and 55.
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this limitation was rejected and the focus placed on 'aql (reasoning, inteIle"t).37 The
stress on reason by the Usûlîs should not be taken to indicate a rejection of the
central position accorded to the traditions: lfadîth were referred to in aIl judgements
for vindication.
Following the decline of the Safavids, the conditions in Iran altered to
the advantage of the Usûlîs. The 'ulamâ' increasingly began to exert their power as
that of the Safavids deteriorated.38 The Sunllî takeover in the early 181h Century
forced the 'ulamâ' once again to become self-sufficient. The ruling dynasty no longer
patronized them; instead it persecuted them. Furthermore, the power vacuum
brought about hy the lack of strong central government, eventuaIly, led to an upsurge
in the power of the Usûli movement.39 The UsûlÎs were also sustained by their
collection of the klzums (religious tax comprising 20% of incorne), which the
Aklzbâris had not felt to be their right. Both the klzums and the Friday Prayer had
previously been secn as the sole prerogatives of the Imârn. The right to the
collection of the khums was implicitly recognized by the Qâjâr Shâh when he
accepted the mujtahids' offer to sign over the "Share of the Imâm" for war against
Russia.4o In these two areas the daim to the "General Deputyship" of the Imâm can
37 Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, Vol. 3, 54.
38 Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power," 221.
39 S. A. Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," Govemment and Opposition, 16 (Summer 1981), 295; and
Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power," 213.
40 Arjornand, The Slzadaw of Gad, 230-1. Further, this forced the Shâh's hand in dedaring war with Russia and it
indebted hirn to the mujtalzids for their assistance.
15
be clearly seen. The U~ûlîs by putting these claims forward were extending the basis
of their authority from being knowledg~ble scholars and legal experts to bcing the
inheritors of the authority of the Imâms.
Specifically, the U~ûlîs were returned to dominance in the latter part
of the lSth Century by Muhammad Bâqir al-Bihbihânî (d. 1793-4) who single
handedly reversed Akhbâri dominance. He was the author of many polemical works
attacking the Aklzbâri position. In his writings al-Bihbihânî denounced the AklzhârÎs
as infidels and engaged in a vicious polemic against them. One of his chief
opponents was the Muhaddith Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Nabî al-Nîsâbürî al-Akhbârî
who managed, temporarily, to gain the favour of the Qâjâr Shâh. Fath 'Ali Shâh.
However, he was later exiled to Iraq where, in 1818, he was killed by a l11ob . .J1 AI
Bihbihânî was so successful in his attacks on the AkhhûrÎs that hy the third dccadc
of the 19th Century they had almost entirely purged the Usûlîs.
Due to the knowledge required for the reliahle practice of ijtiluÎd,
mujtahids were required to undergo extensive training. The responsibilities of the
mujtahid's position meant that he had to have mastered Theolo!,ry, Arabie, Grammar,
Logic, and Jurisprudence. He also needed a scholarly reputation and licences from
other mujtahids. Furthermore, it was necessary that the candidate po~~css matllrity
and justice, and be a male of legitimate birth.42 Ultimately, the re-imposition of
ijtihâd on the SIzî'a provided the community with greater tlexihility in legal and
political questions through the ability of the mujtalzicJs to deliver jlldgements that
41 Madelung, 57.
42 Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent, 22.
l
16
were designed to meet the needs of the time.43 This development caused the role,
and power, of the mujtahids to grow as the only living authoritative interpreters of
the Message. The acceptance of ijtihâd in general terms by the community allowed
the 'ulamâ' to increase their daims from being the "General Deputies" of the lmâm
to being the "Special Deputies" of the Imâm - that is to daim vice-regency.44
The mujtahids were left in a much stronger position after their return
to power. The U~ûlis cIaimed for themselves a key role as living examples who
provided the people with continuous leadership direct from the Imâms.4S Prior to
the dispute the ranking of correct ways to deal with religious problems was ijtilzâd;
ilztiyât (precautionary measures - following the safe path); and finally, and least
desirable, taqlîd.46 At their return to power the Usû/is enforced taqlîd for aIl who
were incapable of practising ijtiltâd. Their relationship with the Shf'f community
became mujtahid/muqallid. Furthermore, those who were muqallid were forbidden
to follow the rulings of dead mujtalzids as the proofs of Gad are always present
among the living.47
By the time of the Qâjârs the 'ulamâ', as a result of the Usûlî victory,
were exerting their leadership role in legal issues more strongly and, therefore, came
43 Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power," 224. and Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent, 21.
44 Arjomand, The Slzadow of God, 232.
45 Keddie, "The Roots of the Ulama's Power," 223. and Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent, 21-22.
46 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 213.
47 Arjomand, Tht Slzadow of God, 231.
•
-..
17
to infringe on the previously avoided political sphere .. with increasing freqllency ..
as law touched it.48 The Shâhs had lost the absolute control exercised hy Ismâ'îl tn
a position where they were recognised but were to be subservient to the 'ulal1lû' in
legal issues.49 This situation, understandably, resulted in tension hetween the
temporal authorities and the religious authorities. Yet for the mujtahicls, it followeu
naturally from the Akhbân"-Usûlî Controversy, for the Shâhs - just like any other non-
mujtahid - were muqallid tL' them. The leadership role of the '1llal1lû' in society was
demonstrated in the Tobacco Boycott and the Constitutional Revolution 10 name I:dt
two examples.
As a result of this new emphasis on following the teachings of a
mujtahid the doctrine of Marja'îyah was introduced in the 19th Centllry. The tille of
Marja'-i Taqlfd (source of emulation) was applied to the most learned mcmher of
the 'ulamâ' who was to provide the example for ail of the SM'a. While in theory
only one figure held the post, its informaI nature, and the Jack of a c1ear process for
the selection of the Marja', meant that it was applied to those senior figure~ who
attracted religious followers. The title of Marja'-; Taqlûl was usually applicd only to
one figure when he was, through the deaths of his contemporarics, left as the ~()Ic
senior Mujtahid. This position was, at times, a poJitical one as it could direct it~elf
to political goals at the discretion of the "office" hoJder.
48 Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 22. and Keddie, Roofs of Revolution, 21.
49 Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 22.
., 1
18
Another later idèa that is of interest here is Vilâyat-i Faqîh
(Guardianship of the Jurist). It was applied in three distinct areas that were
accepted by the 191h Century 'ulamâ'. Firstly, this task included protection of those
who may be victimlzed such as widows, orphans, and the sick. Secondly,
guardianship of lands on which the religious life of the community is dependent such
as endowments, mosques, shrines, Slzan"'a courts, and madrasas was incorporated into
the task. Finally, it included guardianship of the community as a whole through
"commanding the good and forbidding the evil" which by extension includes
intervening for the people against the excesses of the ~overnment.50 However, the
latest innovation in political authority put forth by Âyatullâh Khumaynî in the decade
prior to the Iranian Revolution, namely direct rule by the 'ulamâ', was a major shift
in position. The inclusion of political power as a fourth area in the "General
Deputyship" had been suggested in various isolated incidents. However, the general
acceptance and implementation of such an extended concept of Vilâyat embarks ItlznCÎ
'Aslzan" Shi'ism on a new course.
The AklzbânïUsûlî debate was, in hindsight, vital in the development
of the definition of th<:- sphere of authority of the c1ass. Despite a near total reversaI
of the fortunes of the mujtahids during the period of Aklzbârî ascendancy there was
considerable growth in their power, and position, with the eventual victory of the
U~ûlîs. Not only was the function of the mujtalzid more c1early defined, but the
nature of the mujtahid/muqalLid relationship ensured dominance of the former, as
50 G. Rose, "Velayat-e Faqih and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Polilies in Iran, ed. N. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 169.
19
opposed to the limitations Aklzbârîs would have placed Oll the religious élite.51 As
a result of several factors during the 18th Century, including the loss of governmental
patronage under a SunnÎ government and the Usûlî victory, the independence of the
'ulamâ' grew, and was strengthened, among other reasons, by the Usûlî collection of
religious taxes which provided thern with an independent financial basis.52
There have been two interrelated general trends in the development
of the political authority of the Slzrî religious leadership since the Greater
Occultation. First, and forernost, the power of the 'ulamâ' and the prestige of their
position, has continued to grow aimost entirely unabated with the prolongation of
the Occultation. Second, the class has become increasingly hierarchical; specifically,
as a result of the introduction of ijtilzâd, the position of mujtalzid came into existence
as not aIl were qualified to interpret the revelation; this stratification has continued
to the present.
The trend, despite temporary reversaIs, has been for the 'UlllI1lÛ' to
increase their power. While, as Arjomand states, " .. .Imâmate in ahsence of an Imam
remained devoid of direct implication for political rule ... ",53 the 'ulamû' over time
increased their sphere of power to encroach on the political sphere. More recently
sorne members of the class, as exemplified by Âyatullâh Khumaynî, have extcnded
their authority, via an extension of the concept of Vilûyat-i Faqîlz, to include political
control. This growing political authority has been based on their po~ition a~ Icgal
51 Sachedina, The Just Ruler, 20 and 21.
52 Arjomand, "Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran," 296.
53 Idem., "Hidden God and Visible Clerie," 68.
..
20
experts and guardians of true religious belief. The 'ulamâ' functioned to caU rulers
to account for their actions. Yet nothing said that they could not rule. Just as the
U~ûlî position, and its victory, was a natural development given the traditional
emphasis on direct accessibility to guidance; so, too, was it natural that, in the wake
of this victory, daims to rule would be put fOlward given the obligatory nature of
taqlîd by ail non-mujtahids. If the political leadership must follow the mujtalzids,
th en why, logically, should the mujtalzids not assume direct leadership in the name
of the lmâm?
It is on the basis of this evolution that contemporary developments in
Imâmî Shtfpolitical the ory have occurred. The following chapters will look at three
different directions of foeus that were made possible by these historical
developments. First, Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî's traditionalist ideas, with thcir
acceptance of the "medieval synthesis" - which largely removed the 'ulamâ' from
politics - will be considered. Chapter Three discusses the politÎcdl ideas of Âyatullâh
Tâliqânî who, while still a "leftish" moderate, was in many ways a fundamentalist and
favoured a degree of 'ulamâ' involvement in politics. The final thinker to be
considered is ÂyatuIlâh Khumaynî who, by extending the concept of Vilâyat, may be
said to have ta ken the ideas of mujtahid political authority to their natural
conclusion. These figures shall then be compared in order to demonstrate further
their political differences and the reasons for these differences .
Chapter Two Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî:
A Traditionalist of the Revolution
21
At the time of the Revolution most of the senior Iranian religious
figures were traditionalists;l of these men, Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî was the most
important? It is for this reason, among others, to be discussed below, that his view~
are important. First, it is useful to consider the positions of the "Traditionalists", and
the "Fundamentalists", in arder that Sharî'atmadârî can be put into overall
perspective. Previous developments in Islam - that is, the non-implementation of
Shan"'a - have led to, what Pipes terms, the "Medieval Synthesis".3 It is the
acceptance of this synthe sis that is at the centre of the controversy bctween the
traditionalists and the fundamentalists. Despite the fact that Pipes is dealing
primarily with Sunnî Islam his ideas can equally be applied to the SIzi'î case in Iran.
Pipes con tends that the "Medieval Synthesis" balanced divine goals with human
1 D. Pipes, ln tlze Patlz of God: Islam and Political Power (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 125.
2 E. Abrahamian,lranBetween TwoRevolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 474.
3 Pipes, 57.
,,'
<.
t
22
reality; in the Shî'î case, then, it was used to reach an accommodation between
political and religious power while recognising that humans were imperfect and
would remain so until the return of the Imâm. Therefore, in Shî'f Islam, particularly,
the synthesis must be said to inc1ude the mainstream politieal developments from the
Lesser Occultation until the implementation of Khumaynî's ideas.
It is the traditionalists who accept the Medieval Synthesis, and, as a
result, they have tended to shun involvement in poli tics - whenever possible. Islamic
precepts, for the traditionalist, are addressed more to the individual, rather than to
society as a whole. True religion, therefore, becomes an internai matter. As a result
of these factors, traditionalist Islam in general, and traditional Slzî'î Islam in
particular, lack a clear and specific potitieal ideology dealing with the disposition of
wealth and power in society. Commonly, however, the proponents of traditionalism
cali for a state in which the law is supreme.4 The SIzî'f traditionalists have, generally,
insisted on the maintenance of Islamic Iaw for marriage and divorce; have fought
against their loss of control over education; have sought a voice in the legislative
process (through a veto); and have called for the application of the letter of the Law.
While the traditionalists accept practical political patterns as they have developed,
they have, on occasion, entered the political arena. On these occasions rather than
condemn the entire governmental structure the traditionalists have opposed the
government on specifie issues.5
4 Ibid., 125-127.
5 C. Benard and Z. Khalilzad, 'The Govemment of God" - Iran's lslamic Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984),32.
23
On the other hand the fundamentalists, rather than aecepting politieal
developments, assume that the earIier strength of Dar al-Islâm derived from the
correct implementation of Shan"'a. Therefore, they caH for a return to this mythical
past in order to restore the glory of Islam. In their view, it is necessary for the
religiously educated to become politically involved in order that past mistakes, whieh
resulted in the dec1ine of Islam, ean be reversed. Generally, the fundamentalists
reject any compromise with the authorities and will tolerate nothing less than a full
implementation of their conception of Shan"'a. The distinction between these two
groups is blurred as the fundamentalists see themselves as being the followers of the
true traditions - i.e., as traditionalists.6
At the time of the Iranian Revolution, the traditionalist, Âyatullâh
Sayyid Mul:tammad Kâzim Sharî'atmadârî (1905-1986), was the most senior religious
figure in Iran. He is also generally recognised as having been the most learned
member of the 'ulamâ' at this time. His seniority, the faet that he was one of the
better known of the revolutionary leaders7, and his ideas ail make him into a figure
worthy of study. He is also important because he was widely supported within Iran.
Sharî'atmadârî's main basis of support was his own national group; the 14 miIlion
people of Turkish-Âzari origin who were eoncentrated mostly in Âzarbayjân, Gîlân,
6 Pipes, 64 and 125-126.
7 Y. Richard, "Contemporary Shi'i Thought," in Rools of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modem Iran, ed. N. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 208.
(
24
and Zanjân.8 He, also, drew support from the wealthy 'ulamâ', the traditional middle
c1ass of the bazaar, and the rniddle c1ass in general for whom he acted as
spokesman.9 Additionally, many intellectuals and secular politicians from the centrist
groups saw him as an ally as he, among ail the senior 'ulamâ', was closest to their
position. IO Despite Sharî'atmadârî's initial role in the revolution he was later
marginalized by the more radical members of his c1ass and virtually ignored following
the revolution.
Sharî'atmadârî was, in January, 1978, central in the initial mobilization
of the people for the Revolution. To many people at the time it was he, and not
Khumaynî, who was the Revolution's original driving force. ll Sharî'atmadârî was a
rival to Khumaynî during the Revolution; in fact, this rivalry dated back to 1963
when their supporters had foughtY Sharî'atmadârî entered into political action and
allied himself with Khumaynî in 1978 following the violation of his house and the
killing of two of his advisors by government security forces who mistook them for
student protes tors whom they were chasing.13 The gravit y of this event was
8 S. Akhavi, Religion and Polilies in Conlemporary Iran: C/ergy Stale Relations in the Pah/avî Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 168.
9 E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The PoUties of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982),331.
10 D. Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies," Iranian Studies, 13 (1980), 121.
11 S. Zabih, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 43.
12 S. A. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamie Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1988), 96.
13 Ibid., 113, and 117 ~ 118.
.. , . 25
compounded by the violation of bast (sanctuary) traditionally accorded to the homes
of leading religious figures, among other places. Despite this alliance with
Khumaynî, Sharî'atmadârî's involvement in the political events of his day was as a
traditionalist and a moderate.
Sharî'atmadârî, as a traditionalist, was not interested in obtaining
immediate political power for himself or his class. Rather, He desired to establi!lh
an "Islamic Order" in Iran which preserved the principles of Islam. To do this, it was
not necessary to reject past developments and enforce Slzarî'a as the exclusive source
for the solution of Iran's problems.14 Secular government was tolerated by
Sharî'atmadârî as a necessary evil. In his view of Islam the 'ulamâ' were not entirely
cut off from politics; they held ultimate political authority but were to excrcÏse it
oruy in defense of Islam - otherwise poli tics was to be left to the professional
politicians.15
Sharî'atmadârî argued that the highest dut y of the 'ulamâ' was to
proteet Islam and the Sltî'î community.16 This stance did not preclude individual
political action, or inciting the people to political action. In 1963, Sharî'atmadârî
had opposed the Shâh's five point reform package by arguing that, while the 'ulamâ'
were not opposed to general reforms, they wanted, above aH, social justice and the
14 Pipes, 126.
15 Abrahamian, 476. and A. Hussain, Islamic Iran: Revolution and Counter Revolution (London: Francis
Pinter Publishers, 1985), 161.
16 Abrahamian, 476.
26
implementation of the constitution.17 Of the five are as of reform, Sharî'atmadârî did
not oppose land reform but rather his concerns were with other issues; namely
women's suffrage, the deletion of the requirement to be a Muslim to hold the office
of judge, and the replacement of "Holy Qur'ân" with "Holy Book" in the oaths for
government offices. Sharî'atmadârî, in contradistinction to Khumaynî, stressed that
demonstration against the government's "White Revolution" shouid be peaceful.18
While the traditionalists, including Sharî'atmadârî, were opposing this governmentai
policy, they kept their channels of communication to the government open and used
them to try to restrain these policies.19 Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî was also the driving
force behind the recognition of Khumaynî's having attained the Tank of Âyatullâlz al-
'Uzmâ, when the régime was threatening to execute him for his anti-Shâh aetivities;
this elevation forced the government to back down rather than the face the fallout
for killing a mujtahid of this rank.
During the rest of the 1960s, and the 1970s, ÂyatuIlâh Sharî'atmadârî
played the role of the "good shepherd" guiding his flock; he tried to proteet them
while he tacitly negotiated with the government and, at the same time, maintained
his position as a moral eritic of government, and Iranian society.20 ln January, 1978,
Sharî'atmadârî began pubIicIy to eondemn the Shâh as anti-Islamie; yet, he still urged
17 A. Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: KllOmeini and the Islamic Revolution (Bathesda, Md.: Adler and Adler, 1986), 146.
18 Ibid., 143.
19 Abrahamian, 474.
20 M. M. J. Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Understanding," in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. J. L. Esposito (New York: Oxford UniversitYPTess, 1983), 164.
27
peaceful prote st and was attempting to pressure the government to reform itself.21
Sharî'atmadârî remained the most significant of the revolutionary leaders working
within Iran until the return of Khumaynî in early 1979. upon Khumaynî's return
Sharî'atmadârî made hirn, as the junior, come to pay his re!lpects at Sharî'atmadârî's
house.22 Shortly thereafter the revolutÎon outstripped the moderate ideas of
Sharî'atmadârî, and Khumaynî became supreme leader.
During 1978, Sharî'atmadârî did not cali for the removal of the
Monarchy. Instead he demanded the implementation of the 1906 Constitution in
order to establish a genuine constitutional monarchy.23 For Sharî'atmadârî the main
goal of the Revolution was the abolition of dictatorship and the founding of a just,
democratic, government.24 The Revolution was carried out to establish social jU!ltice,
restore the Islarnic order, and result in the application of Qur'ânic regulations.
These objectives were attainable byenforcing the 1906 Constitution, which would
establish constitutional lawand a parliament, resuIting in government by the people
for the people. He argued that:
We want a society in which talents are permitted to develop, and in
21 Ibid., 164.
22 Ibid., 164; At this meeting Sharî'atmadârî warned against Khumaynî's use of tille of
"Imâm" saying it was blasphemous. This had long been a concern of Sharî'atmadârî. In fact when people
acclaimed the return of the "Imâm" Sharî'atmadârî said the he doubted very much if the Imâm would return on a chartered Air France jumbo jet. Khumaynî was, reportedly, not amused. [M. Heikal, The Return of the Ayatollah: The lranian Revolution from Mossadeq to Kizomeini (London: Andre Deutsch, 1981), 177.]
23 Abrahamian, 474.
24 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 124-125.
(
which they can be trained. This is not possible in an environment of suffocation and oppression, but it is possible in a democratic system in which the people rule according to their lights. AlI affairs must be in the hands of the people and be implemented through just laws. (Sharî'atmadârî, March 1979).25
28
Man, when free, cauld improve himself; this progress was possible only In a
democratic system.
It should be lloted that Sharî'atmadârî's definitian of a republic was
much doser ta the western concept th an were the definitions of many other members
of bis cIass. Where Sharî'atmadârî differed from the western model was, quite
naturally, on the place of Gad. In Sharî'atmadârÎ's concept of democracy the people
rule, but God is the supreme lawmaker; and the religious class has the prerogative
of ultimate legal interpretation of God's Law. Yet the people have the central place
in his ideal system; "Government of God is the government of the people by the
people.,,26 When asked if he favoured an Islamic Republic after the Shâh had left
the country, at a time when compromise with the ald régime was impossible;
Sharî'atmadârî responded:
A republic, yeso 1 don't think it makes a great deal of difference whether you cali it Islamic. If the Iranians are good Muslims it will be Islamic anyway. Even under the existing Constitution the laws are supposed to be approved by a committee of five Mujtahids. ft will be good if this is put into practice. (Sharî'atmadârî).27
In Sharî'atmadârî's view an "Islamic Republic" should be like any other democratic
republic; however, as most of its citizens are Muslims, it will naturally have an
25 IIShariat-Madari Dots the 'i's," Middle East, 53 (March 1979), 29.
26 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 125.
27 Mortimer, Faith and Power, 331.
"1
29
Islamic orientation. Further, there was a place in post-revollitionary politics for ail
political groups, provided they cOlild be elected; "1 wOlild prefer not tn see
communist representatives sitting in the Council [of experts to reVlew the
constitution] but iLthey are eleeted, they must be tolerated." (Sharî'atmadârî, May
1979).28
This system was, in a sense, to be a guided democracy. SharÎ'atmadûrÎ
felt that the jurists could protect Islamic society throllgh the application of li Iimited
Vilâyat, if government was democratic - yet, final authority rested with the
mujtahids.29 ÂyatuHéÎh Sharî'atmadârî, in 1980, gave his views on Vilâyat-i FaqÎll
when asked if he thought it fair to compare Vilâyat-i Faqilz with despotic monarchy:
If velayat faglzilz is achieved in the way we have always suggested, and if they aecept our proposed limitations, then there is no sllch problem. The limitation is acceptanee of the sovereignty of the people, then the velayat faglzilz will have its proper place. We have the principle of sovereignty, but whenever the Government and the nation is [sic] in need, the velayat faghih enters the scene. This is my personal view.
If the people's sovereignty is strong, then the velayat faghilz is useful to prote et a cOllntry's independence and Islam. If it is against the peW1e's sovereignty, then it is not lIseful. (Sharî'atmadârÎ, January, 1980).
Thus, popular sovereignty was ta be strengthened by Vilâyat-i FaqÎlz; which ~hOllld
be limited as ta when and how it cOlild aet. This position abo contains an implied
eriticism of Khumaynî's conception of the Vilâyat.
28 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 125-126.
29 Benard and Khalilzad, 32.
30 "Iran's Shariat'Madari," Middle East, 63 (January 1980), 33.
r
30
The 'ulamâ'were to be the guardians of Islam and the political order.JI
They were to rernain aloof from politics but were to supervise the ove rail direction
of national political evolution. Activity against a supreme danger, such as the régime
of the Shâh, was permitted, but once this danger was reT!1oved the 'ulamâ' should,
according to SharÎ'atmadârÎ, withdraw from the political sphere. Sharî'atmadârî,
once the Shâh had been ouste d, urged: "return to your mosques and seminaries and
leave politics to the professional statesmen."J2 While the religious class was to guide,
instruct and supervise the government, they were only to involve themselves directly
under certain circumstances, that is, if laws were enacted that were contrary ta Islam,
against the people, in violation of the constitution, or when no governing authority
existed.33
One of the reasons put forward for the separation of the 'ulamâ' from
routine involvement in politics was that they, and Islam, cou Id be tainted through
direct political participation. The religious authorities were to stay in their own
tradition al sphere for, by entering the political domain, they would diminish their
function and validity as defenders of the people;34 èspecially if they faHed politically.
Furthermore, Sharî'atmadârî's opinion on having an âyatullâh as president was that:
There is no legal bar to this, but an ayatollah's position is above this. In fact one of the shahs of the Qajar dynasty, Fateh Ali Shah, sought the permission of the ayatollah of the time and got it.
One interpretation of the lranian Constitution is that secular
31 Akhavi, Religion and PoUties, 171.
32 Zabih, 77.
33 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 126.
34 Benard and Khalilzad, 38.
<ft>
.-....
power of whatever kind, monarchy or othenvise, should receive confirmation from the religious leaders, so a religious leader's position is higher th an that of a president or minister. (Sharî'atmad<Îrî, March 1979).35
31
AIl regular political involvement was beneath the religious élite of the country who
would merely diminish their position by entering into worldly politics.
While Sharî'atmadârî opposed dictatorial rule, he did not oppose the
modernization of society. He was aware of the changes which had occurred in
Islamic society, and the world. Therefore, he urged the use of ijtihâd to adapt ShN
Islam to the needs of modern society.36 For Sharî'atmadârî, then: "The ideal state
of Medina is still no doubt worthy of imitation in many aspects, but it does not me an
that we ignore aIl the innovations that have come to the world dllring the 1400 years
since the advent ofIslam." (Sharî'atmadârî, 1978).37 Hence, concepts such as popular
sovereignty could be incorporated into societ)'.
Throughout the revolutionary process Sharî'atmadârî consistently
attempted to avoid crisis in, and radicalization of, the revolution.38 He sllpported
peaceful, popular, protests; especially those directed against government hrutality.
In the Summer of 1978, in an attempt to avoid street demonstrations and the
bloodshed that resulted when government forces moved against them, Sharî'atmadârî
35 "Shariat-Madari Dots the 'i's," 29.
36 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 123.
37 Ibid., 124.
38 Benard and Khalilzad, 38.
• t 32
counselled strikers to !!tay at home.39 Sharî'atmadârî's moderation lasted throughout
the Revolution. At the time when Khumaynî was calling for a "River of Blood", in
November, 1978, Sharî'atmadârî said: "We have not made any decision on armed
struggle, but if they (the government) close aH other ehannels we will have to go that
route." (Akhavi's parenthesis).40 In the same month, the people, urged on by
Khumaynî, reacted violently against the interim government set up by the Shâh; the
failure of this civilian government resulted in martial law. From this point onwards,
the radicalization of the revolution far outstripped the moderate policies of Âyatullâh
Sharî'atmadârî.41 He remained unwilling to eondemn monarehy outright; instead
Sharî'atmadârî focused on the implementation of the Constitution, the establishment
of the rule of constitutional law, and, until the Shâh fled, constitutional monarehy.
Sharî'atmadârî's moderatinn can, also, be seen in his ideas on law. He
adhered to the idea that the hudûd (Divine legal punishments) cannot be put into
effeet in an imperfeet world since they assume a perfeet society under the rule of the
Imâm; who, when he returns. will implement them. Until the coming of al·Mahdi
the circumstances of the crime mitigate the punishment; for example, to the question
of amputation of the hand for stealing, Sharî'atmadârî said: "In principle that is the
law. The application of law will depend on the circumstances.,,42 Moreover,
39 M. M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 169.
40 Akhavi, Religion and PoUlies, 169.
41 Fischer, Iran, 202.
42 Mortimer, 330.
.. " 33
Sharî'atmadârî moderated the law by applying aIl of its aspects; therefore, while the
punishment for adultery is death by stoning, this sentence can be carried out only if
four witnesses ta the actual sexual act can be found.43
Through the period of the active campaign against the Shâh,
Sharî'atmadârî had managed ta keep his distance from the ideas of Khumaynî
without causing a major break within the ranks of the 'ulamâ'. Yet, it was only
natural that these differences should surface after the removal of the common
enemy. The main area of dispute centred on the role of the religious class after the
success of the revolution. Khumaynî became the leader of the nation and
Sharî'atmadârî renounced any position in the government..J.J He c1early feIt that the
rest of the religious class should do the same. This sentiment was expre!lsed, in
March, 1979, wh en, about the participation of the religious leaders in government,
he said: "We shaH not participate, but of course we shaH guide the government, [sicl
A provision for the supervision of the government already exists in the constitution
[of 1906]." (Sharî'atmadârî).45
In 1980, the traditionalists, and those 'ulamâ' who were apolitical, still
comprised the majority of the class; this is seen in the membership of Khumaynî's
"Militant Clergy" group; of approximately 500 Imâm Jum 'a 's, in Tehran, only 60 were
signatories of its documents.46 Arnong the traditionalists, Sharî'atmadârî was the
43 Ibid., 331.
44 Richard,209.
45 "Shariat-Madari Dots the 'i's," 29.
46 T. Povey, "Iran's New Constitution," Middle East, 64 (February 1980), 31.
1 i .
34
most consistent and troublesome critie of the government, now led by Khumaynî; he
was also, due his to seniority, the most authoritative figure in opposition. While he
did not fail to express his ideas, Sharî'atmadârî did, at this point, fail to influence the
shaping of post·revolutionary government. Neither did he permit the combined
oppositional forces which opposed the authoritarian style of Khumaynî and the
Islamic Republican Party to coalesce around him.
Both during and after the Revolution, Sharî'atmadârî supported the
three main demands of the non·religious opposition groups, demands that were later
ignored ~)y Khumaynî: constitutionalism; a reformed judicial system which required
open trials, the availability of defense council, and due process; and political
pluralism.47 In the posHevolution period he continued his calls for the
implementation of these and other goals. Prior to the referendum on the future
government of Iran Sharî'atmadârî complained that the referendum question was too
narrow. He felt that instead of a choice between Monarchy and an, as·yet,
undefined Islamic Republic, the question should be, to the effect of, "What kind of
government do you prefer?" He also criticized the revolution's "Islamic justice"
following the collapse of the Shâh's régime; he demanded a haIt of arbitrary arrests
and the institution of due process as weIl as the right to counsel. Furthermore,
Sharî'atmadârî attacked the courts themselves as contrary to Islamic justice.43
Additionally, following the revolution, he defended freedom of speech. When radical
members of the 'ulamâ' attacked a newspaper, Âyandigân, for printing a story
47 Fischer, Iran, 218.
48 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 134.
35
relating the ideas of Furqân, who were a radical Islamic group which violently
opposed religious involvement in politics, Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî interccded in
defense of the press. He admitted that people should not publish material which
was against the spirit of Islam and that the press must adhere to Islamic standards;
however, he said, the people must be free to choose their own "fare", and,
furthermore, the people can simply not read mate rial which they disagrce with . .J'J
Following the flight of the Shâh, Sharî'atmadârî was still in favour of
implementing the 1906 Constitution, minus aIl clauses referring to the monarchy,
rather than drafting a new one which would reflect the hold Khumaynî held in Iran.
Thus, he opposed Khumaynî with respect both to the need to write a ncw
constitution and the manner in which it was to be drafted. Khumaynî wanted a 45
man "Council of Experts" while Sharî'atmadârî called for the democratic election of
a 270 man Constituent Assembly to draft the constitution, and, also, to decide other
issues.50 While, in the end, Khumaynî succeeded in obtaining the type of constitution
he wanted he did have to compromise with Sharî'atmadârî on the structure of the
body that drew up the initial draft; they settled on an elected 75 man body, on
Tâliqânî's suggestion.51 The draft that this assembly initially presented to the public
was, in fact, much more in tune with Sharî'atmadârî's ideas than with Khumaynî's.
49 Akhavi, ReUgion and PoUties, 177-179.
50 Fischer, "Imam Khomeini," 164. and S. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and tlze Islamic Revolution
(London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1986), 75.
51 M. Farhang, "How the Clergy Gained Power in Iran," in Tlze Islamic Impulse, ed. B. F. Stowasser (London: Croom Helm; Washington: Centre for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1987), 168.
36
It was only in the later stages of the constitution's formulation that it was altered to
incorporate Khumaynî's ideas.
Once the new constitution, incorporating Khumaynî's broad concept
of Vilâyat-i Faqîh, was passed, Sharî'atmadârî was immediately critical of it.
Sharî'atmadârî's chief complaint concerned the fact that the clauses declaring
popular sovereignty were contradicted, and overruled, by those declaring the
supremacy of the Vilâyat-i Faqîh. When questioned, following the adoption of the
new constitution, about his support for a general vilâyat of five mujtalzids,
Sharî'atmadârî said:
Now they have set up this "couneil of guardians". It is not velayat faghilz but it is superfIuous and just interferes in the process. What should be considered now is the limitations on the Faglzilz in practice, ...
... The people's sovereignty must not disappear. Imam Khomeini is doing everything, but we must make sure that the people's sovereignty is not trampled on any more. The interference now is not so important, but in the future we must be sure that it is not against popular rule. If so we will have reason to fear the future.
That's why 1 am pushing for a law to be passed. Although 1 am fagltilt myself, these laws will affect me too. 1 want strong long-lasting laws, 1 want the people to be sovereign and 1 want the faglzih to help the nation whenever it is needed. (Sharî'atmadârî, January, 1980).52
Sharî'atmadârÎ's chief concern was the protection of the sovereignty of the people
from an all-embracing Vilâyat-i Faqîlz exercised by his own class; an arrangement
which would uItimately be harmful to the rights of the people it was supposed to
protect. Moreover, there were two specifie criucisms of Khumaynî's concept of
Vilâyat-i Faqflt which could be levelled based on past precedents. These criticisms
were: the mandate of jurists cannot be extended beyond the religio-Iegal sphere;
S2 "Iran's Shariat'Madari," 33.
37
and, in addition, even if it could be so extended, it must apply to the function of the
whole class - not a single member, or a council of 3 or 5 members of the c1ass as
specified in the Constitution.53 Sharî'atmadârî public1y dec1ared his rejection of the
new Constitution.54 He still feIt that politicization of 'ulamâ' would only bring
discredit to the class, and to Islam as a whole.
As a result of his unbending criticism of Khumaynî's régime Âyatullâh
Sharî'atmadârî was purged by the new rulers of the country. His ideas were a threat
to Khumaynî's system of government because of the way in which authority haù
developed among the Shî'i 'ulamâ'. So long as a senior figure opposeù Khumaynî's
ideas they could be easily reversed; also, as shaH be seen later, Sharî'atmadârî was
a representative of a section of the class tbat Khumaynî feIt to have been corrupted.
The government linked Sharî'atmadârî to a plotted coup d'état by the foreign
minister, ~âdiq Qu~bzâdab, and put him under bouse arrest. He was then dcmoteù
in April, 1982, from the rank of Âyatullâh by 17 of 45 professors in the Qum
Seminaries.55 Yet, his status was so great that while his "co-conspirator" was
executed, Sharî'atmadârî was merely detained.
53 S. A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism, ed. S. A. Arjomand (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 196.
54 H. Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982 (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 157.
55 Arjomand, The Turban for tlze Crown, 156.
1
r ,
•
38
The post revolutionary period has seen the rupture of 'ulamâ' unit y,
which had come about as a reaction to the policies of the Pahlavîs.56 This is not
surprising since the 'ulamâ', like any other group, is made up of people with different
desires. Sharî'atmadârî was one of the section of his c1ass whose goal was not so
much to shape national development as to guide it to the correct path. While
specifie aspects of Sharî'atmadârî's "platform" changed, his goal remained the same.
The changing situation in Iran forced him to modify his stance; while he pushed
democratic, constitutional, government, he always did so based upon the minimum
possible change. Initially he conceded that the Shâh could stay. Once this position
proved unworkable, he pushed for an amended version of the 1906 Constitution to
attain his goals. FinaIly, he agreed to a new constitution so long as it was
democraticaUy created and protected the popular sovereignty. His traditionalism,
Iike any moderate platform in times of violent revolution, did not serve him weIl
during the passions of the period. His moderation, his contacts with the Shâh's
government, and the Shâh's preference for him as Marja'-i Taqlfd, in 1970, were not
assets in this period of turbulent upheava1.57 In fact, several times, Sharî'atmadârî
had to defend himself against charges of collaboration with the régime; this problem
was further compounded by his desire to avoid confliet and violence.
It should be no surprise that he failed politically against those members
of his class who would directly involve themselves in the politicai game and who,
56 K. Afrachteh, "Iran," in The Politics of Islamic Reassertion, ed. M. Ayoob (London: Croom Relm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 106.
57 Menashri, "Shi'ite Leadership," 122 .
.", 39
therefore, gained power following the revolution. Furthermore, while he was senior
to, and more learned th an, Khumaynî; Sharî'atmadârî lacked Khumaynî's political
charisma and ruthlessness. He was outflanked by the more political memhen, of the
'ulamâ' and outstripped by the radicalization of the revolution. His refusai to involve
himself in politics continued even after the revolution when he refused direct support
to those arrayed against Khurnaynî's Islamic governrnent as this would have
contradicted everything he had said previously.58
For Sharî'atmadârî Islamic government did not exc\ude monarchy;
rather, it was their injustice and the selling of Iran to foreigners that had removed
the legitirnacy of the Pahlavîs. The 'ulamâ' were to cast off this iIlegitimate
governrnent and then allow the people to mIe. In Islam, as Sharî'atmadârî saw it,
the true goal is the founding of a just society a task that must be carried out by a
democratic governrnent and the mIe of law under the auspices of popular
sovereignty. He reproached Muslim revolutionaries for often mistaking the means
of advancing society (i.e. constitutions, and revolutions) for the ends. Islam itself was
seen as a method of political action; the Prophet, Muhammad, was portrayed as a
revolutionary on sorne issues but on most, such as slavery and usury, he was said to
be a reformer.59 Accordingly Sharî'atmadârî saw reform as preferable to
revolutionary change.
58 Zabih, 79.
59 Richard, 209,
Chapter Three  yatuIlâb 1'âliqânî:
Islam as the Third "'rrue" Way
40
ÂyatulIâh Sayyid Mahmûd Tâliqânî (1911-1979) was one of the leading
political ideologists among the Iranian religious community from his rise to
prominence during the Musaddiq era until his death shortly after the revolution.
Tâliqânî was, from the beginning of his career, an independent-minded member of
his class.1 He was firmly within the "counter-culture" of Islam with his attempts to
reform and revitalize the common understanding of Shî'f Islam. His ideas gained
him a high level of prestige and support among the more educated youth of Iran.
They turned to Tâliqânî's ideology as an alternative to the both ideas of the other
mujtalzids who were considered to be too "dry"2 and as an alternative to Western
ideas.
Tâliqânî was, throughout his life, concerned with, and active in, the
pursuit of economic and social justice. It is this fact that separates him from the
1 E. Abrahamian, Iran Between TwoRevolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 458.
2 M. M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 73.
c 41
bulk of the Iranian tulamâ' who, while concerned with these problems, were much
less vocal and active in their condemnations of the injustices being perpetrated
within Iran du ring the régime of the Shâh. The position taken by Âyatullâh Tâliqânî
earned him a status that was second only to that of Khumaynî and SharÎ'atmadûrÎ at
the time of the revolution. Tâliqânî was, at once, a reformer and a devout belicver;
he saw the answers to the problems of Iran, as weB as the rest of the world, in the
version of reformist Shî'î Islam that he preached. His beliefs reflected the times in
which he lived and his desire to revitalize Islam. These factors make him into a
noteworthy figure.
In order to understand more fully the goals and objectives of Mahmûd
Tâliqânî it is necessary to consider not only what he wrote but also his actions bcfore
and after the revolution of 1978/79. His writings and sayings are best viewed in the
context of his life. This study will commence with a brief consideration of Tâliqânî's
background and will then move on to a consideration of three different expositions
of his ide as. The first of these is the introduction to his 1955 reissue of a 1909 essay
on constitutionalism. The essay itself - entitIed Tanbîlz al-Umma va TanZÎh al-Mil/a,
ya Hokumat az Nazaf-i Islâm - was written by Âyatullâh Nâ'înÎ. The second
expression of beHef to be dealt with herein is a sermon entitled Jihâd va S/wlzâda/
(Struggle and Martyrdom) which was delivered shortly before the riots of 1963. The
final work to be considered is Islam va Malikiyat (Islam and OWllerslzip 3; publishcd
in its final form in 1965). These works present a good picture of what Tâliqânî
believed, on the politicaljeconomic plane.
3 or "Islam and Property", depending on translation.
1
l' ,
42
Ma~mûd Tâliqânî was born, in 1911, the son of a low-ranking member
of the 'ulamâ', in the village of Tâliqân. His father earned his living by fixing
watches, as he refused to live on charity. During the 1930s, Tâliqânî was a student
of theology in Qum. By 1938, having completed his studies, Tâliqânî had become a
teacher in a secondary school. The content of his lectures resulted in his
imprisonment for a period of six months in 1939-40 for anti-government activities.
The forced abdication of Rizâ Shâh in 1941 marked an upswing in TâIiqânî's career.
He remained in Tehran and become a preacher at the Hidayat Mosque, which was
known as a centre for the more radical of the 'ulamâ ,.4
By the end of the decade, Tâliqânî entered into the politieal arena in
earnest with the coming-to-power of Mu~addiq's National Resistance Movement
government in 1949, of which Tâliqânî was a staunch supporter. This government
was based on a coalition of secular and religious groups who were opposed to the
foreign domination of Iran and the Shâh's collaboration with the foreign exploiter
nations. The National Resistance Movement was short Iived. Its components ail
pursued different goals; a factor which ultimately helped to create the conditions
that allowed the return of the Shâh. When the fledgling government was removed
in 1953, Tâliqânî was one of its last remaining supporters among the 'ulamâ'. This
position brought him into the centre of the politieal stage as a "rebel" from the views
of the mainstream religious figures. After the Royalist Coup of 1953, Tâliqânî was
4 Abrahamian, 458. and S. Irfani, Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious
Dictatorslzip (London: Zed Books Ltd, 1983), 139.
43
forced into retirement.s
In the early 1960s, as a result of American pressure, there was a
loosening of police control within Iran.6 This allowed for Tâliqânî's next major
political act, his participation in the formation of the Liberation Movement of Iran
in 1960 with Mahdî Bazargan among others. The goal of this movement was to
provide for the people's religious, social, and national needs. Furthermore, it was
to provide a link between the newly-emergent western-style middle cIass, represented
by the National Front, and the traditional middle c1ass of property owners,
represented by the 'ulamâ,.7 The LiberatilJn Movement was soon joined with the
National Front. However, by 1963 the same problems that ha(! led to the demise
of the National Resistance Movement were evident within the new coalition -
namely, individu al groups pursuing different interests.8
During roughly the same period (i.e. 1959-1962) Tâliqânî grew farther
apart from the rest of the leading religious figures. They, as a group, were opposed
to the agrarian and social reforms of the Shâh. Tâliqânî put himself in direct
opposition to their position by adopting the National Front's stance of supporting the
Shâh's land reforms but condemning royal dictatorship. Tâliqânî attacked the
tradition al land holding system in which the 'ulamâ' participated, and argued that,
S Abrahamian, 459.
6 Ibid., 460.
7 E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The PoUlies of Islam (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), 333.
8 Abrahamian, 460.
44
as no one could daim absolute ownership of the land, "dead (uncultivated) land"
could be reclaimed by anyone who could actually use it. This view was put forward
on the basis that Islamic Law encourages man to develop land for his own benefit.
These views were to be reflected later in Islam va Malikiyat.9
In 1963, after a series of bloody riots, the limited loosening of police
control was reversed. Tâliqânî and Bazargan were jailed for their political activities.
This event paradoxically provided Tâliqânî with the chance to address himself to the
group that was later to become one of his main constituencies - the leftist youth.
Through conversations while in prison Tâliqânî was able to impress many of the
inmates, including the leftists, with his open mindedness and progressiveness.10 He
was able to show himself as a liberal member of the 'ulamâ' who proposed a
revitalized, revolutionary, Islam - this Islam had been and was to continue ta be the
central theme of his Iifework.
Also in the 1960s Tâliqânî was involved in a discussion group that
worked towards a definition of Shî'î political theory with specifie reference to the
institution of Marja'-i Taqlfd. This unofficial office had been (is) the highest rank
in Imâmî Shi'ism, the holder of which emerged from the most learned of the
ÂyatuIIâhs; this figure then provided the source of emulation for ail Shf'as.
Although, in the end, this group did not meet it did publish the papers prepared for
presentation under the name Ba~zth-î dar Bâra Marja'iyyat wa RûhânÎyyat (Tehran,
9 M. Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani and the Iranian Revolution," in SIzi'ism, Resistance and Revolution, ed. M. Kramer (Boulder: Westview Press; London: Mansell Publishing Ltd., 1987), 73.
10 Mortimer, 333.
,
45
1962),u Tâliqânî felt that no one man could attain the status of "most learned" in
aIl facets of religion; he, therefore, proposed that this office be altered su ch that it
was held by a council of senior 'ulamâ'. This council would discuss contemporary
issues and consult with the lesser mujtahids who wou Id, in turn, confer with their
students. This proposaI was designed to strengthen the po~ition of the religious
class, relative to the state, by eliminating the possibility of government meddling in
the designation process. It would also provide more decentralized religious
organization, by setting up provincial councils that would deliberate on aIl issues. 12
This essay also proposed the re-organization of religious finances through the
registration of religious taxes and donations;13 this reform would allow hetter
management of accounts and more effective usage of income.
Tâliqânî was imprisoned again in the mid-1970s for his association with
the Mujâhidîn-i Khalq after he was named by a captured member of the Marxist
Mujâhidîn during interrogation. After his release from prison in 1978, Tâliqânî
became a major participant in the Revolution of 1979. Prior to the flight of the
Shâh, Tâliqânî was involved in the organization of protests and was in contact with
Âyatullâh Khumaynî as an equal. After the revolution, Tâliqânî acted to secure the
revolutionary gains; he was determined that the splits that had occurred in hoth 1953
and 1963, and had ultimately caused the defeat of these movements, would not
11 A. K. S. Lambton, /lA Reconsideration of the Position of the Marja' al- TaqHd and the Religious Institution," Studia Islamica, 20 (1964), 120.
12 Ibid., 125-126.
13 H. Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran, 1962-1982 (London and Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981),64-65.
l'
r
, III
46
reoceur. To this end, he counselled unity above aIl else in the aftermath of the
political takeover because he feared the possible loss of ail gains. He was so
concerned with the potential for the failure of the revolution, even at this late stage,
that he stifled debate and silenced the youths who supported him causing, in part,
the exclusion of their organizations from the government of the Islamic Republic
when it was formed. 14
As stated above, the first work of Tâliqânî that will be considered is
his 1955 introduction and re-issue of an earlier work by ÂyatuIlâh Nâ'înî, based on
U~ûlî rational metheds and written in support of the constitution. The date of
publication is significant as it c10sely follows the demise of Musaddiq's government
as a result of the splintering of its supporters, including the desertion of the 'ulamâ'.
ln his addition to the reissued work, Tâliqânî constructed an argument against
dictatorship. It was asserted that dictatorship is a form of idolatry and, as su ch, is
an offense against taw~IÎd (Divine Unity but with connotatIOns of Divine Creation
and Divine Sovereignty). Despotism is said to be a form of idolatry because
dictators inevitably violate the Islamic injunction against idolatry by making idols of
themselves. Therefore, he argued, true religion was a threat to the position of the
dictator. 15 However, the governmental systems of socialism, democracy, and
constitutionalism were possible pathways towards faw~lfd and were, as such,
acceptable to Tâliqânî if it was realized that they were not ends in themselves and
14 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 85.
15 Y. Richard, "Contemporary Shi'i Thought," in Roofs of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran, ed. N. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 211.
47
that the true goal of humanity lay beyond these concepts.16
The arguments put forth contend that man liberates himself from
slavery, and can submit himself to God, through the struggle against this form of
idolatry. This liberation occurs because for Tâliqânî there are four leveb of
legitimate government within Islam and man must cast off dictatorship in order to
advance to this system. Government is said to belong, first and foremost, to God.
The second level of authority is that of the Divine Law. Third are the Prophets and
Imams who are spiritually and mentally at the service of Divine Law. On a more
earthly and irnmediate plane, the fourth level of government is to be exercised hy
the just 'ulamâ' and the BelieversY Under this system, sovereignty, and thcreforc
decision making for social policy, were ta reside within the members of the fourth
group who were elected from the whole of their society.lg There was in this position
an unflinching beHef that law had been passed to man by God and that God was the
ultimate authority on aIl things. Man could merely strive towards tawhÎd through a
proper institutionalization and concept of divine law.
The work must also be considered for its cal! for the further study of
the se political matters by the Iranian religious community. Nâ'înÎ, acwrding tn
Tâliqânî, had not only tied constitutionalism into Islamic Law but had also providcd
an excellent source for the study of Islamic social and politieal principle510 'l'âliqânÎ
16 Ibid. and Mortimer, 333.
17 Richard, 211.
18 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 71.
48
accused past members of the 'ulamâ' of failing to guide the believers in these areas
which had ultimately caused the youth to turn to western theories for solutions to
these problems, when, in reality, Islam held ail the answers. It was necessary that
the 'ulamâ' not only give increased attention to these fields but that they actually
enter into politics as the righteous guides of the people on religious and social
matters.19
The fact the Tâ!iqâni would choose to re-publish this work should also
be taken as indication that he felt the work to be of importance by its own merit.
Therefore a short consideration of the main points made in Tanbîh al-Umma va
TanzÎh al-Milla is relevant to the present study. Nâ'înî based his arguments on the
central tenet of "commanding the good and forbidding the evil". Thus despotism was
said to result in three "sets" of usurpations and oppressions; despotism usurped God's
authority and was therefore an injustice to him, it usurped the Imâm's authority and
therefore results i11 the oppression of the Imâm, and, finaIly, despotism involves the
oppression of the people by usurping their rights.20 However, a constitutional
system only oppresses the Imâm therefore reducing three oppressions to one.
Furthermore, iflegal sanction is received from the 'ulamâ', as the "General Deputies"
of the Imâm, then the final oppression is also removed.21 This work also specified
the duties of the state and called for the proposed system to conform ta Islamic
19 Ibid., 71-72.
20 A. H. Hairi, "Shî'îsm and Constitutionalism" (Ph.D. diss., McGill, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1973),394.
21 A. Tabari, "Role of the Shi'i Clergy in Modern Iranian Politics," Khamsin #9 (1981),60.
49
principIes; in order to insure the correct implementation of Islam there were to be
mujtahid Representatives in the Majlis.22
In 1963, Tâliqânî delivered a sermon entitled ''Jilzâd va Sizaluîdat"
which continued and expanded upon the ideas that he had expressed in 1955. The
sermon begins with the simple statement that in the Qur'ân, every discussion ahout
society, ethics, and jurisprudence is followed by the command to wage war and carry
out jihâd; but he asks what is the meaning of jilzâd in Islam.23 Man, and ail other
things in God's creation, were given the ability to defend themselves; this is the
reason for :he existence of the emotion of anger. However, there are limits placed
on man's scope of legitimate action by God. Tâliqânî argued that:
... when anger manifests itself in a man, he takes up arms; and so he must, when his rights, honor, and dignity are [endangered]. If anger is not directed and utilized in the cause which God has determined ... it becomes deviant. Then it results in wars of conquest waged for material expansion and the destruction of humanity. First, anger i~ a naturai fact. Second, it must be guided by divine legislation. (Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 49).
This theme was returned to severai times throughout the !Iermon.
Man - by following the ordinances of God - could direct his anger for the
improvement of ail rnankind. Due to its acceptance of the need for military action
and the weaknes~ of man, Islam was, not unnaturally for a devout heliever, !Iccn to
22 H. Algar, "The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century Iran," in Schofars, Saints and Sufis. ed. N. Keddie (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), 239.
23 AyatuIJah M. Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," in Jilzâd and Slzalzâdat: Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam, eds. M. Abedi and G. Legenhausen (Hou~t()n: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986), 47.
Ali further references to, and quotations from, "Jihâd and Shahâdat" are ta ken from this source.
(
50
hold the answer for the Iiberation of the world if only the world would accept its
solutions. Tâliqânî put forth that:
Only a religion which recognizes the geometry of human instincts and makes a plan according ta it can govern the world. Such religion tells man, ''This instinct is within you; but do not use it for murdering, theft, lustful purposes, or military expansionism. Use it in its proper way. Defend yOuf rights. Defend yOuf dignity. Defend your country. Defend your religion. Defend human rights. (Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 53).
The acceptance of the utilization of armed force had Iimits. In the
Qur'ân the ward ''jihâd'' is always foIlowed by "fi saMI Allâh" (in the way of Gad);
therefore it must necessarily aim at the betterment of human society - how could it
aim at anything less?24
The way of God is the very path of the well-being and betterment of human society. It is the way of justice, truth, and human liberty. (It is the building of a world in wbieh) a specifie group or class does not domina te over the destiny of the people, in order to stop human intellectual movement or to stop people from utilizing the naturai resources that God A1mighty has created for the common use of aIl humanity. (Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 50).
Thus Tâliqânî brings his sermon back to the topie of c1ass domination which he had
introduced in 1955. He continued to oppose dictatorship and the exploitation of
natural resources by the few (this topie was returned to and explained in mu ch
greater detail in Islam and Ownerslzip).
Dictatorship was attacked as a form of tâghût (idolatry) whieh was
condemned in the Qur'ân.2S Tâliqânî explained that ~âglzût was mucb more than
idolatry in the strict sense - its connotations for rulership were much more clearly
24 Ibid., 49-50.
2S Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 76.
:
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51
spelled out in light of the fact that the word cornes from a root for the overflowing
of a river and the destruction of a violent storm. It is explained that a ~âghût is more
than a despot or a tyrant since the word can be used for anyone who overf!ows his
rightful sociallimits.26 By implication, this ~âglzût, by exceeding his rightfullimits will
encroach on the sociallimits, or rights, of those who are around him, and in this he
must be stopped.
The function of Islam, it is reiterated, is the liberation of the
oppressed. Social justice is the goal of religion for Tâliqânî. Ali men, of all nations,
have the right to resist their oppressor. This right is in no way limited to the Iranian
Muslims to whom this speech was addressed:
Islam has come to straighten man's stature, to direct his attention tn God, and to establish justice and equality in the world. ... And if anyone asks you how the world can be reformed, can you tell them that the masses of the world should not fight the tyrants of the world, and push away the hands of those who rape the dignity, life, and rights of humanity. (Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 56).
Yet, the message was also directly relevant to the Iranians in their opposition tu the
Shâh.
Tâliqânî enumerates three types of jilzâd traditionally acceptable in
Islam: one against foreigners for the advancement of Islam, another for the dcfense
of Islam and Islamic countries, and a third so that a protected minority doe~ not
threaten Islam. To these Tâliqânî added:
Another type of jihâd is waging war against the despot~, !-IO that no one can reign as a tyrant, as a lâglzût in a Muslim country. ft is the dut y of every Muslim to invite the despots onto the straight path ... if he does not accept, then one must arrange a military stand against him.
26 Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 51.
.. t
52
Cfâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 61).
This statement first recognizes the need to offer the wrong-doer a chance to repent
as was required by earlier Muslim theorists. Only then is military action to be
resorted to, and only then is it legitimate. Thus it is not only permissible for
Muslims to resist tyranny within the government of the nation, it is actually their
dut y to do so.
Another point that is a continuation from the earlier work cited above
concerns the "ownership" of government. He he Id that:
Radica11y speaking, there is no lzukûmat (government) in Islam. In alIzukmû illâ li-Allâlz [sic]. (The rule belongs to no one except God.) Government beIongs to God, the ApostIe, and the Imams. Mter the Imam is the mujtalzid and th en the masses of Muslims who are a11 the executive power of divine law. (Tâliqânî, "Jihâd and Shahâdat," 65-66).
Here Tâliqânî differed greatly with most of the other mujtalzids regarding the roIe
of the common man. EarthIy sovereignty did exist and was resident in the masses
of Muslims under the guidance of the mujtalzids. However, the actual government
could be claimed by no one, as it belonged solely to God. After God the rightful
rulers were the Prophet Muhammad and the Twelve Imâms. Yet, in their absence,
ail men form the executive.
The final, and perhaps most important work of TâIiqânî was Islam and
Ownerslzip. This work was written, and updated, to meet the conditions that were
existent within Iran between the rise of Mu~addiq and the mid 1960s. The author's
nature and motivation, as in his other works, were central to his interpretation of
Islam and his attempts to show its vitaIity to the disaffected youth of Iran. TâIiqânî
first wrote it in 1951 as a fairly short work; he then reworked it and increased its
53
length and focus; it was to be issued three more times in successively expanded
forms until it was published for a fourth time in final form in 1965.27 This work
outlines the development of the capitalist and the collectivist systems, through
Tâliqânî's eyes, and compares them with Islam. It also explains the socio-economic
system of Islam and presents it as the best option for the achievement of a just
society.
In its final form the work consists of eight chapters.28 The first of these
is entitled "The Evolution of Ownership". This chapter deals with the evolution of
property since the earliest times, the development of the division of labour, money
and capital, early economic theorists, and the Industrial Revolution.29 Chapter Two,
"The Emergence of Labor Power", continues from the Industrial revolution and looks
at liberal and more radical poIiticaIfeconomic theorists such as Locke, Rousseau,
and Marx. The consideration of Marx continues in the following chapter.
"Marx's Ideas", Chapter Three, gives a considerable amount of space
to a refutation of Marx and Marxism in their entirety. This effort is indicative of
Tâliqânî's aim of projecting Islam as the ideology for the Iiberation of Iran and, in
fact, the whole of the oppressed world. The arguments in th~~se first three chapters
were designed to bring about the return to the fold of the {ranian youth who had
become attracted to western ideas and, especially, to communism.
27 A. Jabbari, and F. Rajaee, "Translators' Preface," in hlum and Ownerslzip, M. Taliqani, trans. A. J abbari and F. Rajaee (Lexington: Mazda Pu bl ishers, 1983), vii
28 These chapters are of varying interest, for the purposes of this papcr; and therefore will be considered in differing lengths and degrees of detai!.
29 Richard,212.
1
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i 54
The chapter contains a detailed discussion of Marx's views, as
understood by Tâliqânî. The conclusion that Tâliqânî came ta was that Marx and
other thinkers like him were ultimately incorrect due to the environment of
unlimited capitalist acquisition in which they lived and which was said to have
coloured their perception.JO Furtherrnore, the idea that inequality could be
eliminated by granting special privileges to workers' rule was considered to be
naive.31 This was particularly true in the light of past experiences, especially in the
system imposed on the U.S.S.R. Tâliqânî held that:
Although the Russian Revolution shook the world, eliminated sorne. classes, and freed sorne human beings from oppression, it created a new class in the midst of the revolution which enjoys uniimited legal privileges and has taken control of the destiny and the affairs of the rest of the people. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownership, 67)
The next Chapter, "Economy Viewed in the Light of Faith and Belier',
argues that the human will is weak and easily coerced. This weakness means that
only Islam can provide the perfeet legislation which will allow man ta strive for
perfection. Yet the incorporation of laws into Islamic society is a task that the
average man is incapable of carrying out - it must be left to those who are qualified
to do so based on their "special spiritual qualities and profound intelligence".32
Though this sounds like a direct reference to mujtahid rule, as indeed it Îs often
JO Âyatullâh M. Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownership, trans. A. Jabbari and F. Rajaee (Lexington: Mazda Publishers, 1983), 65. "
AlI future references to Islam and Owné;:;ltzip will be from the work unless otherwise noted. ••
31 Richard, 211.
32 Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 84.
l',
.' 55
taken to be33, it does not specifically say as much; its ambiguity leaves the question
open to interpretation. Nevertheless other ideas put forward by Tâliqânî regarding
the ownership of government are in direct contradiction to this interpretation.
"The Foundation of Islamic Economies and the Root of Its Injunctions",
Chapter Five, deals with questions of ownership and control of property. The basis
of ownership is said to be God's ownership of ail things. Yet God created man as
his servant and provided him with a will and authority subservient to his own;
therefore, men may hold land, so long as they can utilize il. The produce of their
labour that is removed from the land, be it food or minerai resources, is considered
to belong to the labourer. However, the freedom of the individual is limited in that
he may not harm the interests of another; by following this logic, the ruler b then
given the right to supelvise the land and tax the proJuce of the land LI ordcr to
provide for the public good. He may also be considered to be the owner in sorne
cases.34 (This matter is dealt with again in Chapter 7.)
Also in the fifth chapter, Tâliqânî provides an added critique of
capitalism and communism. He wrote:
Free ownership causes subjugation, tyranny, centralized wcalth, emergence of privileged capitalists and the deprivation of workcr!l. The negation of private owr.ership limits individual freedom and, in tum, requires the dictatorship of a special c1ass. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 91).
Thus it is clearly seen that his Islamic concept of ownership is in opposition to
capitalism, with ahsolutely free ownership, and also ta collectivi!lm, with the
33 Richard, 212.
34 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 74.
r 1
56
suppression of aIl private property, both of which result in the enslavement of man.
Chapter Six deals with "The Economie Problems Caused by Money".
This is a consideration of the effects of interest (usury) on the developrnent of
capitalism and on the exploitation of the labourer. Islam forbids both hoarding and
usury and encourages trade which has the effect of promoting the distribution of the
wealth of society to ail of its levels. This section also contains ideas very sirnilar ta
that of "from each according to his means to each according to his needs.,,35
The most important chapter of this work is the seventh - "The
Distinctions and Characteristies of Islamic Economies". It reviews the arguments put
forward in the earlier parts of the book and th en closes in on its specifie concerns.
It starts by drawing the dividing line between economics in Islam and the economics
of the western systems. Tâliqânî summarizes mucn of what is said earlier in the
work in one short passage:
... Islamic economics is based on neither unlimited freedom of individual ownership which resuIts in unbridled capitalism nor public ownership whieh leads to total privation of individual freedom. It is also unlike a mixed economy whose boundaries and limits are ambiguous. Moreover, it contains conditions with regard to communal and individual wealth which are compatible with human nature, the order of a just society, and overall rights. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 131).36
It is Tâliqânî's assertion that the economic theories put forward in the West are
faulty due to their effects. Furthermore, the western attempts to organise mixed
35 Richard, 212.
36 For an alternate translation see: ÂyatulIâh M. Tâliqânî, Society and Economies in Islam: Writings and
Declarations of Ayatullalz Sayyid Mahmud Taleghani, trans. R. Campbell (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1982), 25.
.,
57
econOlmes are criticized as merely creating confusion as to the actual rules of
society. UnIike these faulty systems Islam provides c1ear and practical regu lutions
for the administration of parallel priva te and public ownership within one unified
economy that is also capable of meeting the requirement of a perfect !!ociety.
In fact, it is the essential premises of the two western economic systems
that are, in Tâliqânî's view, the very cause of ail the iIIs of western society, as is seen
in the following:
Capitalism is based on the premise that individuals are free and independent, and it supports free (lassez [sic] Faire) economy. But with the growth of a profiteering c1ass, individual freedom and independence will ultimately be destroyed or tied to the interests of this c1ass.
Since Marxism is based on revolutionary ideology of a particular class it is not devoid of class despotism. ... On this basts the state acquires an independent legal status and becomes representative of a special class. Inevitably, the rights of other individuals and classes are ignored and undermined. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 146).37
The western systems then are seen to be self-contradictory. The freedom In
capitalism is the cause of the subjugation of aIl non-"profiteering classes", and
communist government subjugates the non-labouring classes whom they do Ilot
represent. The problem then is inter-twined with the existence of class privilege and
domination in these societies.
Tâliqânî further criticized the western schools of economic!! for the way
in which they approach the whole concept of property. While in the west the
concentration has been on the industrial process, the opposite is true in Islamie
economics. His primary concern is with the right to hold and exploit the natural
37 Alternately see Tâliqânî, Society and Economies, 48.
l' ,
58
resources of the earth. This criticism is c1early expressed within the chapter;
Tâliqânî wrote:
Marxism has assigned the manner of possession of natural resources by man to the evolution of the me ans of production and ta the course of history according ta which the relation of man ta resources is defined. The differences between collectivism and capitalism centre on the issues connected with industrial production whereas those dealing with natural resources are parenthetical in bath schools of thought. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownership, 135).38
Later in the chapter, the concept of the right ta hold and utilize land was expressed.
The first principle of the argument regarding the holding of land is
that the owner of aH the land, and in fact the sovereign and creator of aIl c:::-eatures
including man, is Gad. Allâh as creator of aIl things is naturally the absolute owner
of his creation; man is merely entrusted with the care of the property of his master.39
Tâliqânî put forth the opinion that the three main rules of land holding in Islam
were "categorie and naturaI". These points were summed up as:
First, land and other naturaI resources are in the public domain and come under the supervision of the Imam (or the Islamic ruler), or else may be considered his property ...
Second, The cultivation of land is the basis of limited ownership, the right of priority, or the right of disposaI. In accordance with this principle, the farmer is the rightful holder of the portion of land that he tills, with rights ta dispose of its products as long as the act of cuItivation may continue.
Third, in accordance with the public welfare, and for the sake of agriculturaI development, the Islamic state and ruler may impose taxes (known as klzaraj) on cultivated lands ... They should be expended primarily to make up for any deficiency in the Iivelihoods of the farmers of the locality. (Tâliqânî, Society and Economies, 36).40
38 Alternately see Tâliqânî, Society and Economies, 32.
39 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 74.
40 Alternately see Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 138.
59
Thus aIl land is initially public1y held but, through cultivation and minerai
exploitation, men acquire the right to its produce. However, this right is limited by
governmental supervision which may impose Islamic taxes in order to improve the
lot of the disadvantaged local populace.
The true government is distinctly Islamic in nature and functiol1.
Tâliqânî argued that:
... Society [does not possess] an independent legal character separate and distinct from the totality of individu al rights. Since the government must be representative of individuals and not of a partieular class, and it must .1Ot possess characteristics distinct from those of the individuals, or have any duty but to preserve individual and collective rights, it has no right to limit or deprive the individual or group of freedom or independence in the name of protecting the supreme interest of the government or society. (Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownership, 145).41
Unlike the example of Marxist government, in which the state takes on specifie legal
rights, and the capitalist one that represents the ruling c1ass, the truest and most just
state must exist solely for the service of individuals and the protection of their rights.
The state exists and does have rights, but these are limited; it may supervise property
and impose taxes to further the welfare of the populace in genera1.42 1 n no
circumstances, however, can just government act in its own interest.
Moreover, the classes that have been shown to cause the failure of the
western socio-economic systems by controlling the government for their own ends
have no legitimate bases for such a position in Islam. "In Islamic jurisprudence ... no
general or specifie injunctions can be found that is [sic] in the interest of special
41 Alternately sec Tâliqânî, Society and Economics, 47.
42 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 75.
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individuals or classes and detrimental to others .... 43 Within the Muslim system the
sovereignty over ail is held by Gad. However, man has been endowed with
intelligence and is permitted to rule on earth - aU mankind holds the Caliphate as
ail men are collectively God's representative on earth44 - in the absence of the Imâm.
Yet, in accordance with the U~ûlî School the task of deducing Islamic rights and their
limits falls to the mujtahids.45
The major question that remains is how the just society is to be
brought about. The changes suggested are ta improve not only society, but man as
weil. The fifst necessary step is to bring men to truth and justice - Islam. Only
after this has been accomplished can the basis of society be changed. It was
Tâliqânî's feeling that "To transform the human spirit it is necessary that faith in
justice and truth be recognized and strengthened. It is with such a transformation
that the foundat:on and the features of life and society change" Cfâliqânî, Islam and
Ownerslzip, 149).46 Class struggle is incapable of providing the necessary changes in
mankind. Echoing his earlier ideas that socialism and democracy were merely
possible routes to divine unit y, Tâliqânî insists that the same is true for wealth; it
should be viewed as merely a to01 ta be used, ideally, for noble ends.47
This is the route for copying the example of the society provided by
43 Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 147.
44 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 75.
45 Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownership, 147.
46 Alternately see Tâliqânî, Society and Economics, 52.
47 Idem., Islam and Ownership, 150.
" 61
the Prophet Mu~ammad's administration in Madîna - which in Tâliqânî's writings.
as with other fundamentalist Muslim thinkers, is the "perfect model". This case
provides an example of the redistribution of wealth from those with the mcans to
those in need. Except in the administration of the state there were said to he no
distinctions among the individual Muslims; be they rulers or subjects. There were
no differences in the houses and clothillg of the citizenry. Ail were involved in the
public affairs of the statl!; efforts were collective; and the sharing of ail things was
the mIe. This system was maintained for a while, but aiter the rise of the Caliphs,
who from the Shî'î perspective were usurpers, Islam became tinged with capitalistic
outlookS.48
The final chapter, number eight, is enthled "Class Differences and
Privileges and Their Origins." The first point of note here is that it is not
necessarily money that determines class domination over a society. The example of
a class that has in the past ùominated many societies, and, even today, continues to
exercise control over certain ones, is the military.49 This chapter contains a rejection
of the un-Islamic concept of a privileged monarchy. 80th of these are c1early attacks
on the Shâh. There is, however, a recognition of the belief that ail men are not
created equal.50 Another part of thi:; chapter once again enters into polemk against
western systems with a criticism of the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" and ail
later documents that were based on it, as existing merely as ideas on pdper and
48 Ibid., 153.
49 Ibid., 162.
so Richard, 212.
62
being perpetrated by the dominant c1ass which then ignored them.Sl
Tâliqânî's concept of Islam, like that of many fundamentalists, was one
that stressed the need to strive towards taw~lÎd, through a form of jilzâd against those
guilty of tâghût if need be. Men had to organise their own governments to attain the
ultimate goal of a perfect society that would allow freedom to all while at the same
time protecting its weakest members. The way to achieve this objective was through
Islam and a return to the ideal model provided by the Prophet in Madîna. This
could be done only through man's recognition of the total ascendancy of God in aIl
areas and the incorporation of Islam in the solutions to present problems. These
ideas mark Tâliqânî as one of the fundamentalists, even if also a liberal thinker, a
combination that would surprise many in the West.
The present problems of the world were said to be caused by c1ass
domination in aIl societies, a fault that was inherent in aIl western theories of
government and economics. In order for just government to exist it had to be such
that it worked for the individual. Present governments were faulty due to their
preoccupation with their own advantages - be they cIass or governmental. Only by
perfecting the individual, through Islam, could the necessary changes be effected to
improve society.
\Vith this revolutionary interpretation Âyatullâh Tâliqânî inspired many
young Iranians. He may lJave been isolated from his "c1ass", but bis reputation as
a liberal and progressive ÂyatuIlâh won him the most votes of any candidate in the
51 Tâliqânî, Islam and Ownerslzip, 176-179.
63
elections following the revolution.52 His message was heard by a significant number
of the people. Tâliqânî was also recobnized as the ideological guide of many
members of the Mujâhidîn-i Khalq; in fact his night-time lectures were attcnded by
its leading ideologues.
Tâliqânî's thought throughout his career W'IS coloured by the events of
his day. His works can be put into a framework based on these events. The
introduction to Nâ'îIlî's essay was issueù following the demise of the Musaddiq
government due to factional di.~putes and can be seen, in part, as cl criticism of thi!.
factionaIism in Iranian Society, including that of the 'ulamâ'. His works in the 1960s
must be seen as a reaction to the conservative position of the 'ulamâ'. Tâliqflnî
differed from the rest of the religious establishment with respect to the Shâh's
economic reforms and with resect to their general political stance which he felt
ignored the youth and drove them to western theories.53 The continuing factional
disputes within the Iranian opposition remained a concern for Tâliqânî in the 1960s
when the Liberation Movement was torn by the same dissension that had topplcd
Musaddiq. These same problems weakened the re-emerging opposition.
This concern with the damage that factionalism could cause grcatly
affected Tâliqânî's actions following the 1978/79 revolution. Shortly after the ou!-.ting
of the Shâh, he ceased aIl public statements that were in opposition to thmc of
Khumaynî.54 This was done to ho Id the revolution together and prevent the counler-
52 Richard,210.
53 Bayat, "M::thmud Taleqani," 74.
54 Richard, 211.
•
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64
revolutionary and imperialist elements from subverting the revolution in order to
return the Shâh to power - as had happened in 1953. His overriding concern in the
nV)flths preceding his death was to insure the unit y of the revolutionary factions.55
In so doing Tâliqânî stifled debate among his supporters and remained quiet himself
when debate was most needed to determine the route of the revolution; this silence
allowed Khumaynî's supporters to pilot the revolution in the direction they feIt best.
However, in the spring of 1979, Tâliqânî broke with this poIicy, and, together with
Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, called for the 'u/amâ' to return to the mosques - leaving
politics to the professional statesmen - as a result of the failure of the class to
organize the country properly in the wake of the revolution.56 Furthermore, in his
final statement, just prior to his death, Tâliqânî warned against despotism disguised
as religion and said that true Islam must allow freedom to prote st and criticize the
government. 57
Except for this episode towards the end of his life, in which he
temporarily remained silent in order to achieve what he saw as a higher goal,
Tâliqânî was always an outspoken proponent of Islam as a social, political, and
economic force. He spent his working life attempting to bridge the gap among the
different sectors of Iranian society and to show Islam as a viable modern ideology
that could be used ta oppose despotism. In the first he faHed. The different groups
55 Bayat, "Mahmud Taleqani," 85.
56 S. Akhavi, Religion and PoUlies in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in tlze Pahlavî Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 170 and 174.
57 Mortimer, 334.
1 65
within Iranian society cou Id be brought together at a specific time and for specific
goals and under specifie conditions, but otherwise the task could not he
accomplished. They joined together in 1949, 1960 and 1978 to fight against the royal
government but in all three cases did not maintain their alliances. In 1949 and 1978
they were united for long enough to remove the common enemy, hut once the enemy
was gone, there was very little unit y among the different groups.
ln his second objective he had much more success. His complaint was
best expressed when he wrote that:
Stagnation and rigidity ... have resulted from the general stagnation governing the thinking of the Muslims and the Islamic community in recent centuries. That has stagnated Islamic Jurisprudence just as it has other intelleetual and natural sources of the Muslims. Often it has ... blocked the way for adaptation.(Tâliqânî, Islam and Owner.\/zip, 84).
Tâliqânî's Isiam was a vital one; it was to wipe away the failing of the past centuries
and provide the answers that were required by modern societies. His was an Islam
concerned with social justice and the rights of man. Man was seen as living by
definite rules and having what in the west would he termed "inalienahle right!o."
granted to him by God so that he could live in a just society. Property wa~ neither
free nor held in common; rather it was available to anyone who could u~e il without
disadvantaging others. Yet, the state, which was to be ba~ed on the participation of
ail men, existed to proteet the individual and could, therefore, levy taxes or ~upervise
land for the public good. Furthermore, man had the right to defend his freedom,
nation, religion, dignity, and human rights against any tâglzûlÎ who threatened them.
{ Chapter Four
Âyatullâh Khumayni: The Rule of the Jurists
66
The lfiost influential - due to the visible effects of his ideas - and the
most famous member of the Itlznâ 'Aslzari sJzn 'ulamâ' in this century was Rû~ullâh
MûsavÎ Khumaynî (1902-1989). Âyatullâh Khumaynî's rise to international fame,
which began in the early 19605, rests not 50 much on his religious learning as a
mujtalzid as it does on his effective politicization of Islam and his success in shaping
Iran following the Revolution. In order to look at Khumaynî's politieal ideas this
chapter will li mit itself, primarily, to a consideration of Khumaynî's two main works;
KasIzI-; Asrâr (Revealing the Secrets) and Vilâyat-i Faqfh (The Guardianship of the
Jurist; also published in Arabie as al-Hukûma al-Islâmfya or Islamic Government).
The relevant clauses of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which
incorporate Khumaynî's ideas from the latter book, will a]so be discussed as they
provide a practical example of his ideas in application rather than theory.
In the 1940s, Iranian modernist writers started to publish works that
opposed the nature and structure of the Shtî religious hie:-archy; that is, of the
mujtalzids. Khumaynî took up the challenge of the anti-'ulamâ' modernists in 1943
67
and publishedKashf-iAsrâr. "Revealing the Secrets" was written as a direct response
to Asrâr-i Hazâr Sâllzâ' (Secrets of a Thousand Years), by 'Alî Akbar HakamÎzadih.
By extension, it was also a criticism of Ahmad KasravÎ (killed by the Fada't)'cÎll-i
Islâm in 1946) and Sharî'at-Sangilajî (d. 1943), bath of whom had been influential in
the modernist movement and bath ofwhom had influenced Hakamîzadih.\ This first
major political work, by Khumaynî, was virtually ignored until over thirty years luter.
In this book, Khumaynî defends the SIzN traditions, the hierarchy
within the 'ulamâ', and the need for taqlîd. Furthermore, he attacks the reformer~
for blindly wanting ta imitate the Walzlzabfs - who were called the savages of the
Najd and the Camel Herders of Riyadh.2 When it was appropriate to the flow of
the book Khumaynî expanded the scope of his attacks to inc\ude Rizâ Shâh, whom
he steadfastly referred to as Rizâ Khân? These reference~ were not actuaIly an
attack on the ruling Shâh as Rizâ Shâh had been forced, following the 1941 British
and Soviet invasion, ta abdicate in favour of his son, and ta leave the country.
Khumaynî was especially critical of the ex-Shâh for his government's religious
policies and his treatment of the 'ulamâ'.
Khumaynî linked the honour of Islam, therefore the honour of the
'ulamâ', to that of the people; thus any attack on Islam or the 'ulamâ' was said to
1 S. A. Arjomand "Traditionalism in Twentieth Century Iran," in FrO/1l
Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. S. A. Arjomand (Alhany: State University of New York Press, 1984), 204-205.
2 Ibid., 205.
3 M. M. J. Fischer, "Imam Khomeini: Four Levels of Under~tanding." in Voicc\' of Resurgent Islam, ed. J. L. Esposito (New York: Oxford Univer~ity Press, 19M3), 152.
l
68
be an attack on the people (and visé versa).4 The work contained an attack on
westernization and its ill effects on the people of Iran. These effects were caused
even by European dress: "the unveiling of women has been the ruin of female
honour, the destruction of the family, and the cause of untold corruption and
prostitution."s Not only western clothing - for both sexes - but also mixed schools,
wine shops, liquor manufacturers, and music were ail specified as causes of
corruption, moral decay, and the decline in the strength of Islamic society in general
and Iran in particular. Moreover, aH, Khumaynî pointed out, are forbidden under
Islamic Law.
The solution provided for the resoJution of these problems was, not
surprisingly, a return ta the pristine Islam of the time of the Prophet, a time when
the Hudûd (divine legal punishments) were enforced in their entirety, the thiefs
hand was eut off, anarchistic and seditious elements were executed, and things
foreign and alien to Islam were rejected outright.6 In this area the criticism was
extended to Rizâ Shâh's government which ignored the perfeet Jaws given to man
by God - the only legitimate legislator - and turned instead to alien western legal
codes which were man made - and, therefore, necessarily faulty.
As yet, Khumaynî had not come to his later position that monarchy
was inherently anti-Islamic. In fact there was actually a mild defense of the Pahlavî
4 Arjomand, "Traditionalisrn," 206.
5 Khumaynî, Kashf-iAsrâr, 292-5. Quote taken from Arjomand, "Traditionalism," 206.
6 Arjomand "Traditionalism," 207.
69
monarchy based on the argument that bad government is better than no government
and the anarchy that results from this situation.7 Furthermore, in this book
Khumaynî wrote "We have not said that the king should be afaqÎ/!; the king should
be a military officer, but should not violate the principles of Islamie jurisprudence
(fiqh) which are the officiallaws of the country."S There is, accordingly, no blueprint
for Islamic government, an idea that was put fm'Ward later. Rather he called for the
implementation of Clause Two of the Supplementary Fundamental Law ( 19(7) which
had in theory established a council of five mujtahids to review aIllegblation in order
to guarantee its compatibility with Islam.9
We do not say that government must be in the hands of the faqih; rather we say that government must be run in accordance with God's law, for the welfare of the country and the people demand this, and it is not feasible except with the supervision of the religious leaders. In fact this principle has been approved and ratified in the Constitution ... (Khumaynî, Kashf al-Asrâr).10
This demand, though it is not a calI for the abolition of the Monarchy, b a very
clear calI for greater involvement in, and control over, the polities of the nation by
the 'ulamâ '.
7 S. Akhavi, Religion and PoUlies ill Contemporary Iran: Clcrgy State Relatiolls in the PalzlavÎ Period (Albany: State University of New York Pre~s, 19XO), 163.
S From: F. Rajaee, Islamic Values and Wor/d View, Vol. 8, Khol1/eyni 011 Alan, tlze State and International Politics (Lanham, New York, and London: Univer~ity Press of America, 1983), 58.
9 E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (L()ndon: Faher and Faber, 1982), 325.
10 From a short section of Kashf al-Asrâr in: Âyatullâh R. Khumaynî, Islam and Revolution: Writings a/U' Dt'c/aralio/l.\ of
Imam KllOmeini, trans. and ed. H. Algar (Berkeley: M izan Prelo\ l ':Je) 1; 169-173), page 170.
1
l
70
Wh en, in 1947, Âyatullâh Burûjirdî achieved the rank of sole Marja'
i Taqlîd, he urged disengagement from poIitics for ail members of the 'ulamâ '.
Consequently, Khumaynî removed himself from the politieal arena, if he can, in fact,
be said ever to have entered it with his limited criticism of the government. This
policy was in effect until Burûjirdî's death in 1961. Following the dictates of the
Marja', Khumaynî shunned politics for 15 years, over a period of time that included
the Musaddiq period. There are three possible reasons for Khumaynî's withdrawal
from poli tics which taken together may be said to explain his motives. These reasons
are first, and foremost, the influence of Âyatullâh Burûjirdî; second, the Musaddiq
government's disdain of clerical issues; and, finally, fear of communism. 1I Yet,
despite the apolitical stand of Burûjirdî, he had criticized sorne of Muhammad Rizâ
Shâh's policies and was responsible for the re-organization of the religious apparatus.
The re-organized infrastructure was later a factor of fundamental importance for
concerted political action against the Shâh.12
Burûjirdî's death heralded Khumaynî's re-entry into the politieal field
and his frank criticism of the government. His first round with the government, in
1962, concerned the proposed Local Council Elections Law. The concerns voiced
by Khurnaynî, and many other rnembers of the 'ulamâ', specifically deaIt with the
suggested enfranchisement of women and the replacement of the term "Holy Qur'an"
with "Holy Book". Both of these ideas were seen as attacks on Islam itself.
Il E. Abrahamian, Iran between TwoRevolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982),425.
12 A. Tabari, "The Role of the Shi'i Clergy in Modern Iranian Poli tics," Khamsin, 9 (1981), 67.
.. 71
Khumaynî expressed his concerns in a telegram to Prime Minister 'Alâm, a copy of
which was also sent to the Shâh. ft read, in part: "The ulama made it puhlic that
women's franchise and the abrogations of the conditions to he a Mllslim to be
allowed to elect or to be elected is contrary to Islam and the constitution."n There
was to t}lis point still no implied criticism of the Shâh for these policies; rather his
Prime Minister was held publicly accountable for the government's policies. 14
In 1963, The Shâh put his five point "White Revolution" to popular
referendum. Khumaynî's outspoken eriticism of the reforms again thrust him
forward as a spokesman for Bazaar and 'ulamâ' against the Shâh. 15 Rather than
coneentrating on land reform and female suffrage Khumaynî di ffered from 1110st of
his c1ass by foeusing on issues that generated mass support. He denollnced the
régime for living on the profits of corruption; rigging eleetions; controlling the pre~~;
suppressing political parties; negleeting the eeonomic needs of the worker~,
merchants, and peasants; undermining Islam; expansion of the bureaucraey;
encouraging unlimited "west-toxication"; dependence on the United States;
"capitulations" to the V.S. - for $200 Million Dollars in military aid; and relations
with Israel.16 While, Âyatullâh Khumaynî had, by this time, broadened the scope of
13 W. M. Floor, "The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality," International Journal of Middle Ea.\tern Studies, 12 (19HO), 510.
14 S. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and tlze Islamic Revolutioll, New edition. (London: George, Allen and Unwin, 1986), 25.
15 H. Bashiriyeh, The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962-1982 (London: Croom Helm; New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 59.
16 Abrahamian, 425.
72
his criticism to include the Shâh, he was still relatively moderate. Khumaynî still
said that the government could make itself acceptable by implementing the
Constitution.17
Khumaynî's vehement attacks on the government led to his arrest in
1963, he was then released on the government's understanding that he would refrain
from political criticism. However, he resumed his forthright assault on the Shâh's
régime which led to another arrest. It was only extensive protest by the 'ulamâ', !ed
by Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, that prevented the régime from executing him. Instead,
in 1964, Khumaynî was exiled - first to Turkey, then to Iraq, and finally to France -
an exile from which he would not return until 1978. It was during this exile, when
he enjoyed free speech, that Khumaynî became truly radical in his protest and
attained even greater popularity. Furthermore, it was during this period that he
rethought his ideas on the relationship between poli tics and religion and arrived at
the position espoused in Vilâyat-i Faqîh. 18
Âyatullâh Khumaynî first put forth these ideas on Islamic government
in a series of lectures given in Najaf, in the late 1960s. The books (Vilâyat-i Faqih
and al-Hukûma al-Islâmiya) were published later. The concept was based on a
significant extension of the concept of vilâyat, through U.,ûlf methods, to eliminate
the acceptance of dual (i.e. political and religious) authority in Society.19 Previously,
I7 Bakhash, The Reign of tlze Ayatollahs, 32.
18 Bashiriyeh, 61.
19 S. A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution in Shi'ism," in AutllOrity and Political Culture in Slzi'ism, ed. S. A. Arjomand (New York: State University of New York, 1988), 190 and 194.
73
there had been three accepted areas of vilâyat. These areas were gllardianship over
those unable to prote ct themselves; guardianship over lands on which the religiolls
life of the community depended; and guardianship of the Muslim community's
general welfare, by propagating Islamic values.20 Khumaynî added a fourth area that,
while mentioned before, had never been widely accepted. This idea was that the
vilâyat of the 'ulamâ' extended to control over all the politicai affairs of the Muslims.
It has been argued that, in Vilâyat-i Faqfh, or "Islamic Government",
Âyatullâh Khumaynî took the concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist to its logical
conclusion.21 ln order to do this Khumaynî - based on his reason and hadîth -
created a complex argument for just government led by legal experts. In the
Introduction to the work Khumaynî started by discussing his fundamentalist view of
what true Islam is. He says: "Islam is the religion of militant individuals who are
committed to truth and justice. It is the religion of those who desire freedom and
independence. It is the school of those who struggle against imperialism."
(Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 28).22 This is also how Khumaynî sees the Irnâm!'
- aU were soldiers; even if "[t]he later Imams did not have the opportunity to go into
baUle, even though Imam Baqir ... was also a warrior by nature." (Khumaynî, "Islamic
Government," 35).
20 G. Rose, "Velayat-e Faqilz and the Recovery of Islamic Identity in the Thought of Ayatollah Khomeini," in Religion and Polilies in Iran: Slzi'ism fram Quieti.\11l to Revolution, ed. N. Keddie (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 169.
21 Abrahamian, 476.
22 This quote, and aIl further references, to this source are taken from: Âyatullâh R. Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," in Islam and Revolution:
Writings and Declarations of Imam KJlOmeini, transe and ed. H. Aigar, 25-166.
(
(
74
Furthermore, he talks about the political nature of Islam as he sees it.
When discussing this aspect, Khumaynî argues that the political nature of Islam is
c1early evident in the sheer weight of political, economic, legal, and social injunctions
it contains as cornpared with its dictates for ritual observance. Islam must inc1ude
more than ritual as:
The ratio of Qur'anic verses concerned with the affairs of society to those concerned with ritual worship is greater th an a hundred to one. Of the approximately fifty sections of the corpus of the hadith containing aH the ordinances of Islam, not more than three or four sections relate to matters of ritual worship and the duties of man towards his Creator and Sustainer. A few more are concerned with questions of ethics, and aIl the rest are concerned with social, economic, legal, and political questions - in short the questions of society. (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 29).
Moreover, for Khumaynî, as for many other Muslim fundamentalist writers, Islam
is a complete system of life since it has laws regarding man's life from "even before
the embryo is formed" until "he is placed in the tomb".23
These laws make the Islamic nations morally and spiritually superior
to the West, with ils man made laws. The West despite technological advancement
"will still be deprived of true happiness, moral virtue, and spiritual advancement and
be unable ta solve their own social problems". Khumaynî argues that the West
might be able to go to the Moon, or even to Mars, but the people of the western
nations will still be spiritually deprived, and unable ta solve their social problems,
as Islam is the only source of these answers with its provisions for faith and
rnorality.24 Later in the work Khumaynî says that "Law exists to be irnplemented for
23 Ibid., 30.
24 Ibid., 36.
75
the sake of establishing a just society that will morally and spiritually nourish refiœd
human beings." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 80). These quotes also
demonstrate his cflncern with the metaphysics rather than the mundane aspects of
man's existence.
The second chapter of the work is entitled "The Necessity for Islamic
Government". Not surprisingly this section deals with the need for Islamic
Government, both for upholding Divine Law and for protecting mankind. It is
contended that divine law was not meant to be ignored after the Prophet's death,
or the beginning of the Occultation, but it was alwaj's to be enforced. Divine Law
must, then, be brought back into effect. Khumaynî asks:
From the time of the Lesser Occultation down to the present (a p'eriod of more than twelve centuries that may continue for hundre:ds of millennia if it is not appropriate for the Occulted Imam ta manifest himself), is it proper that the Iaws of Islam be cast aside ... Did God limit the validity of His laws to two hundmd years? (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 42).
Khumaynî again asserted that the Qur'ân and Sunna contain ail laws needed for
man's happiness and the establishment of a perfect state.25
Having shown th(~ need for astate to impk~ment Law, Khurnaynî then
moves on to argue that monarchy is an anti-IsJamic forrn of government. This
position is a break with his pre-exile ide a that the Shâh cou Id rernain as rnonarch
if he implemented the Com,titution. Khumaynî now argUo'~d that:
The form of government of the Umayyads and the AbbasiJ~" and the politieal and administrative policies they pursl.led were anti-Islarnic. The form of government was thoroughly per ... erted by being transformed into a monarchy, like those of the kings of Iran, the emperors of Rome, and the pharaohs of Egypt. (Khumaynî, "Islarnic
25 Ibid., 44.
76
Government," 47-48).
Monarchyas a form of government is no longer acceptable; it is, rather, anti-Islamic
and perverted.
There follows a discussion as to why men need to be governed by an
individual or power that can e,lsure the laws which permit men to live in a civil
society. This government is portrayed as a protective one that guarantees the rights,
and moral correctness of the people. Government is needed as:
... men would not be able to keep ta their ordained path and to enact God's laws unless a trustworthy and protective individual (or power) were appointed over them with responsibility for this matter, to prevent them from stcpping outside the sphere of the licit and transgressing against the right of others. If no such restraining individual or power were appointed, nobody would voluntarily abandon any pleasure or interest of his own that might resuIt in harm or corruption to others ... (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 52).
Khumaynî echoed the Sunnî notion of the need for government, but gave it a Shf'i
character by emphasising man's need for guidance. For Khumaynî, "It is not
permissible, therefore, according to divine wisdom, that God should leave men, His
creatures, without a leader and a guide, for He knows well that they depend on the
existence of su ch a person for their own survival and perpetuation." (Khumaynî,
"Islamic Government," 52).
The Trustee and Protector of the people has duties other than merely
providing for the public welfare.
Today and always, therefore, the existence of a holder of authority, a ruler who acts as a trustee and main tains the institutions and laws of Islam, is a necessity - a ruler who prevents cruelty, oppression, and violation of the rights of others; who is a trustworthy and vigilant guardian of God's Creatures; who guides men to the teachings, doctrines, laws and institutions of Islam; and who prevents the undesirable changes that atheists and the enemies of religion wish to introduce in the laws and institutions of Islam. (Khumaynî, "Islamic
J
77
Government," 53).
He must maintain and spread religion, and its laws. As weil as pcrpetuating truc
religion, he must proteet it from its "enemies". Here, Khumaynî touches on a theme
that pervaded his work, and that of many other fundamentalists, from the hcginning
of his political career until his death - the corrupting influence of the \Ve~t on Dû,
al-lslâm. ft was the lack of proper leadership, he argued, that allowed thc western
Imperialists to penetrate the area and pallu te Islam. This penetration is prcsentcd
as part of an overall scheme by the imperialists to further their own "cvil pllrposcs".2r1
Having shawn that government is needed, Khumaynî then movcs on,
in his third and longest chapter, to discllss "The Form of Islamic Govcrnmcnt".
lslamic government is, ta Khumaynî, not tyrannical nor is il ahsollltbt. Im.tead, il
is constitutional. However, Khumaynî points out that it is not comtitutional in the
sense that westerners understand the ward but in the sense that the rulers arc ~lIhject
to a higher law, this Higher Law being the Qur'ân and the Haditlz. 27 This idea, too,
seems to be a change from his earlier work in which he called for tbe
implementation of the 1906/1907 Constitution. Yet, there is con~i~tcncy as the
emphasis is still on the implementation of God's Law. Islamic government,
therefore, is the rule of Divine Law over men.2B Ali members of society are to bc
equal before the Law and aIl are ta be free within the Iimits prescribcd hy the Law.
26 Ibid., 54.
27 This alteration of the generally accepted meanings of modern political terminology is common not only ta Khumaynî hut to Islamic fundamcntalists in general.
28 Khumaynî, "ls1amic Government," 55.
«
78
Indeed: "Law is actually the ruIer: the security of aH is guaranteed by the Iaw, and
law is their refuge." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 79).
ln a continuation of his ideas from the 1940s it is restated that there
is no need for legislation in Islam as " . ..1egislative power and competence to establish
laws belongs exclusively to God Almighty." Thus " .. .in an Islamic government, a
simple planning body takes the place of the legisIative assembly... This body draws
up programs for the different ministries in the light of the ordinances of Islam ... "
(Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 55-56). The SharÎ'a is the only legitimate Law;
aIl humans can do is to contrive to implement it.
If lslamic government is one in which Divine Law is to be applied,
then it follows that:
The qualifications essential for the ruler derive directly from the nature and form of Islamic government. In addition to general qualifications like intelligence and administrative ability, there are two other essential qualifications: knowiedge of the law and justice. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 59).
It is not sufficient merely to have a Iegally knowledgeable ruler; he must be the most
learned, and - by Khumaynî's definition - just, of the legal experts. "Since Islamic
Government is a government of law, knowledge of the law is necessary for the
ruIer... The ruler. .. must surpass ail otheTs in knowledge." (Khumaynî, "Islamic
Government," 59).29
Having established the need for the leader to be learned in the law,
Khumaynî adds to the strength of his argument by a consideration of the principle
that rulers not learned in law should defer Iegal questions to the jurists. Thus he
29 This is not dissimilar from the ZaydÎ Shî'a position on just political authority.
says:
It is an established principle that "the faqilz has authority over the ruler." If the ruler adheres to Islam, he must necessarily !o.ubmit to the faqih, asking him about the laws and ordinances of Islam in order to implement them. This being the case, the true rulers are the fuqaha themselves, and rulership ought officially to be theirs ... (1-:!1Umaynî, "Islamic Government," 60)
79
While, the fuqahâ' should rule, it is not necessary that ail officiaIs in an hlamic state
be of the fuqahâ'. Government officiaIs need know only the law pertaining to thcir
functions and duties in order to be employable;30 yet they must still have !>omc
knowledge of the law.
Khumaynî held that the ruler will have the sa me right!o. to authority
and loyalty as the Prophet and the bnâms. "If a worthy individual pmsessing the!>e
two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will posses!o. the sa me authority
as the Most Noble Messenger ... and it will be the dut Y of aIl people to ohey him."
(Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 62). This view means that the po~!>ihility exi!o.t!o. -
indeed, it is the preferred circumstance - of one specially qualified leader emcrging
and creating an Islamic government. This idea breaks entirely with the cJa!>!o.ÎCal
tradition by rejecting the idea of the ilIegitimacy of ail government other than that
of the Imâm. Instead it proposes the selection of the leader from among the
mujtalzids.31
The fuqahâ', then, are the heirs of the Imâms, with the exception of
the Imâms' infallibility; just as the Imâms were the heirs of the prophet with the
30 Khumaynî, "Islamic Government", 60.
31 S. Akhavi, "Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taliqani and Ali Shariati," Middle Eastern Studies, 24 #4 (19HO), 414.
exception of the bringing of revelation.
When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqih has the same authority that the most noble messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that the status of the faqih is identical with that of the Imams and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking of status but rather of function. By authority we mean government, the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the shari'a. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Governrnent," 62).
80
Since the beginning of the Lesser Occultation the jurist, who has the special qualities
needed, has had the right to rule?2 Thus, a single member of the fuqahâ' • who are
collectively the heirs of the lmâms - has the task of implementing the government,
administering it, and executing the Law.
However, the fuqahâ' do not hold aIl of the authority of the lmâms.
For although:
The authority that the Prophet and the Imam had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering affairs exists also for the faqih. But the fuqaha do not have absolute authority over aIl other fuqaha of their own time... There is no hierarchy ranking one faqih higher th an another and endowing one with more authority than another. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government." 64).
Thus, while, politicalleadership of the people is the prerogative of the fuqahâ', they
are to have no authority over one another; an idea that is not elaborated bl' which
contradicts the idea pf a supreme leader. The prerogative of government, Khumaynî
makes a point of stating, is an onerous dut y and nothing but "pain and trouble" for
the just FaqÜ1.33 Furthermore, to ensure honest rule the political authority must be
32 H. Enayat, "Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist," in Islam and the Political Process, ed. J. P. Piscatori (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 165.
33 Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 66.
.f"
Hl
separated from economic power as this linkage is at the root of corruption. Any
member of the 'ulamâ' who wishes ta accurnulate wealth is corrupted and cannot,
therefore, be a trustee of the Prophet.34 Moreover, anyone who wishes to "assume
such a weighty responsibility" as just rulership must be an ascetic a~:
... sU\ch a person must be totally disinterested in the world and devoid ofwnrldlyambition. Anyone whose efforts are oriented to this world -even in matters that are inherently legitimate - cannot be the trustee
of God and is not worthy of our trust. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 143.)
The just Faqflz who mIes must, according to this point of view, live humbly, piously,
and austerely.
In this chapter, Khumaynî included a criticism of his own c1ass. He
enjoined them to be active in the defense of religion and denied any excuse for not
taking action.
The meaning of the statement of the Imam that the fllqalw are the fortresses of Islam is that they have a dut y to prote ct Islam and that they must do whatever is necessary to fulfill that duty. It is one of their most important duties and, moreover, an absolu te dut y not a conditional one. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 74).
The fa ct that the fuqahâ' "must do whatever" is necessary is a theme tl1at will be
returned to later in the work, but it must obviou~ly include direct action; and it
specifically excludes inaction, and, worse, collaboration with the nOIl-blamic forces.
As an extension of the need for leaders who are per~onally just,
Khumaynî held that they must SUbOl nate themselves and other~, possihly even
whole groups, to the greater good of the Ml'slim community. Based on the cxample
of the Prophet's treatment of the Jewish Bani Qurayza, at Madîna, Khumaynî ~ays:
34 Ibid., 78.
Anyone who rules over the Muslims, or over human society in general, must always take into consideration the public welfare and interest, and ignore personal feelings and interests. For this reason, Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interests of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society. (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 89).
82
ft is the needs of the 'umrna as a whole that are of primary importance; ail else is
subordinate to these needs.
After Khumaynî has proved the mujtalzid's right to authority. he says
that: "The traditions are perfectly clear... No one can doubt that the Imam ...
designated the fuqaha 10 exercise the functions of both government and judgeship."
(Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 96). He says this despite candid admissions as
to the weakness of the isnâds in the traditions cited; however these traditions, his
view of Islam and his reason are enough to create, and sustain, his arguments.35
Having demonstrated the authority of the /utfahâ', Khumaynî then moves on to
describe their role in "true" Islamic society.
Theirs are the tasks of "establishing belief in the face of external
opposition"; promoting the rights of the oppressed; fighting the oppre!:l!:lors; ensuring
correct distribution of public wealth; and ensuring correct collection and expenditure
of religious taxes.36 In addition, their dut Y encompasses:
... the expression of opposition and the expounding of God's teachings and ordinanccs that stand in contradiction to innovatior, oppression, and sin are also useful in themselves for they make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrong doing of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then fise up in revoIt and refuse to cooperate any longer with the tyrants or to ohey corrupt and
35 Fischer, "Imam Khomeini," 157.
36 Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 109.
HJ
treacherous ruling powers. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Govcrnment," 114).
To achieve the se goals. the religious class must create a means to cOllnteract
government propaganda against them, organize a coherent alternative program, and
develop a means to disseminate it.37 By speaking out the fuqahâ' can mise public
awareness and lead the people to resist tyrants and corrupt governments which
impose anti-Islamic laws. It is then incumbent on the unjust ruler to hced the wi!o>hcs
of this popular opposition and return ta the straight path. If the ruler faib to reform
himself, and attempts to control the people by force, the people may wage dcfen!o>ive
jihâd against the government as it will have become an active enemy of Islam.1!!
There is no systematic plan given for the removal of illegitimatc
tyrannical government, but there are hints that this change, whcn it COI11CS, will he
abrupt and violent.39 Khumaynî came to this conclu~ion ha!o>cd 011 a tradition of
~usayn. Khumaynî inferred that: " ... the fuqaha, by means of jihad and enjoining
the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow tyrannical ruler~ and
rouse the people so that the universal movement of ail alert Muslim~ can establi~h
Islamic government..." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 108·109). This lIpri~ing,
whell it cornes, is ta be one of mass proportions instigated by those who have the
right, and the ability, to rule justly.
37 Ibid., 115.
38 Ibid., 114-115.
39 J. Ismael and Y. L. Ismael, Government and PoUlies in I.\/anz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 90.
..
84
Khumaynî places great faith in the ordinances of Shî'î Islam to provide
aIl the solutions to Iran's problems. If only Islam was properly implemented by the
appropriately qualified class, ail of Iran's problems would be solved. The failings of
modern Iran are, therefore, laid squarely at the feet of the non-lslamic government.
Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it at the very top of the program: "Sadaqat is for the poor," Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the pOOf must be remedied, the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. But they do not allow the plans of Islam to be implemented. (Khumaynî, "ls1amic Government," 120).
It would seem, based on this quote, that the solutiol1 tù vwerty is seen a~; charity and
the redistribution of wealth rather than the creation of work and other social
programs.
If the 'ulama, who are the trustees of God's decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden and who possess the two characteristics of knowledge and justice ... were to implement Gad's ordinances, ta execute the penal provisions of the law, and generally to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would no longer be hungry and wretched ... (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 123).
The final chapter of Vilâyat-i Faqfh, entitled "Program for the
Establishment of an Islamic Government", contains a plea to the other members of
the religiolls c1ass ta join Khumaynî's campaign for the establishment of Islamic
Government. He charges that:
We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, ta take shape as an organised Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 127) .
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85
Popular rebeIIion, though possible. needs the leadership that only the 'li/lImâ' can
provide.40 Just as there are no detailed specifies for revolutionary activity, neithcr
does Khumaynî lay down a time-table for the overthrow of corrupt govcrnment.
Indeed, he says that the ove raIl plan will take time and may not come to fruition for
several generations.41
What is made clear is that Khumaynî desired a re-ncwcd and
renovdted infrastructure for Imâmf Shi'ism that would allow the propagation of his
revolutionary brand of Tl:\lam. As far as he was concerned, Islam had a structure that
was designed for political involvement and that could be llsed to :-.pread Islamic
revolution.42 It was necessary that religious ceremonies take on political ovcrtonc~
to inùuet the people into revolutionary Islam.43 Foreign influcnce had to hc
eradicated, and the "court affiliated aklzunds" had to be purged from the religiou~
class and reIigious teaehing institutions to meet Khumaynî's nccd~.44 Abo to he
purged were the foreign influenced members of the 'u/alllâ' who were accll~ed of
removing Islam from the political sphere as a result of their acccptanee of the
imperialist's propaganda.
Khumaynî follows with a Iist of four specific actions for the overthrow
of the monarehy. These were: "(1) severing aIl relations with governmental
40 Ibid., 90.
41 Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 128.
42 Ibid., 130.
43 Ismael and Ismael, 90.
44 Khumaynî, "Islamie Government," 136.
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86
institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that
might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic,
cultural and political institutions." (Khumaynî, "lsIamic Government," 146). While
in keeping with the Traditions cited regarding the forbidding of cooperation with
iIIegitimate government, there is no real plan for the overthrow of illegitimate
government other th an the creation of parallel structures. There follows a short
discourse on the revolutionary activities of the Imâms and the threat they have
always posed to the ruling power. These four lectures ended with an appeal to God
for assistance in the struggle against the oppressors.
During the revolutionary upheavals in Iran Khumaynî, as the
consummate politician, soft pedalled his opinions as put forth in Vilâyat-i FaqÎlI and
instead attacked the régime at its weak points. He did this by focusing on popular
issues, avoiding mention of rule exclusively by the 'ulamâ', and talking publicly in
general terms. He spoke in favour of the eviction of the irnperialists and ushering
in a period of Islamic Justice. Furthermore, he was consistent in his uncompromising
attacks on the Shâh and his supporters; while others among the upper echelons of
the religious hierarchy, su ch as Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, approved of negotiations
with the authorities, Khumaynî remained dogmatic in his opposition. This hardline
stance only added to his popularity during the extremism of t/Je revolutionary
period.45 He further raised his appeal by borrowing from the platforms und
rhetorical terminology of other populistS.46
45 Bashiriyeh, 114 .
46 Abrahamian, 428-429.
87
However, in an interview granted to S. A. Arjomand, on January 2nd
1979, shortly before Khumaynî's return to Iran, he did expand on the role of
temporal officiaIs in post-revolutionary Iran. To the question of the administration
of the country Khumaynî said, much to the surprise of the Iranian civilian politician
present: " ... There are certain matters which are executive affairs sllch as urhan
planning and traffic legislations. These are not related to [sacred] law, and it is
beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with them .. .'t47. Only those details of
national administration as trivial as the se, which are beneath the 'ulamâ', fall to the
laymen in the government. Khumaynî did not falter in his conviction of the necessity
of Islamic government, nor did he hesitate to orchestrate the implementation of his
ideas in Iran as quickly as possible.
Khumaynî's concept of Islamic government was stamped onto Iran
following the Revolution by its inclusion in the Constitution. This document not
only incorporates the extended notion of Vilâyat-i Faqîh but also mentions Khumaynî
himself, by name or titIe, no less than nine times as leader of the revolutionary
movement. Seven of these references are in the "Introduction"; the other two are
in the body of the constitution itself.48 The Constitution recognises that:
Jne plan of Islamic government, based upon the governance of the
47 S. A. Arjomand, "The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order," lraniall Studies. 13 (1980), 156.
Khumaynî, and other fundamentdlbts, fall into a hole in their own argumenb on issues such as these. This statement, is in fact, in contradiction to the ide a that Islâm has laws for every aspect of life from conception to the grave.
48 H. Algar (trans.), Constitutiofl of the Is{amic Repuhlic of Iran (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1980)
see: "Introduction" pages U (three times), 15, 16 (twice), and 18; Chapter 1, Article 1 page 26; and Chapter 8, Article 107, page 66.
aIl further reference to the Constitution are taken from this source.
.-------------------------------------------------
faqih, as set forth by Imam Khomeini ... created a new, distinct, and consistent motive for the people, opening up before them the authentic path of Islamic ideological struggle. ("Introduction", Constitution of tlze Islamie Republie of Jran, page 16.)
88
He is, furthermore, promoted to the rank of Marja'-i Taqlîd by this document, an
advancement that guaranteed his ascendancy in post-Revolutionary politics.
Article 5 of the Constitution directIy borrows from Vilâyat·j Faqflz and
paraphrases Khumaynî's qualification for the leader. It states, in part:
... the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people. (Constitution oftlze Islamie Republic of Jran, Article 5, page 29)
This is also a good description of Khumaynî, making his position as Leader assured
as the Constitution was, evidentially, written to enshrine it.
There is a further reference to the mIe of one faqîh in Article 107.
This reference actually specifies that Khumaynî is to be the first such ruler of the
Islamic Republic. It states that:
Whenever one of the fuqalza possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 of the Constitution is Recognized and accepted as marja' and leader by a decisive majority of the people - as has been the case with... (Khumaynî)... - he is to exercise governance and ail the responsibilities arising therefrom. (Constitution of the IslanlÏe Republic of Iran, Article 107, page 6(,.)
There follows the provision for the Council of Experts to select either a leader or
a leadership council, consisting of three or five mujtahids, in the event that a
charismatic leader of undoubted qualifications and mas,; appeal cannot be found.
The final article of the Constitution of interest helc is number 110.
This is the section that specifies the duties of the leader. These duties are extensive
89
and in effect give The Faqih control over aIl aspects of government; either through
direct involvement or, more usuaIly, through the right of appointment to various
areas of the governmental apparatus. He is charged with appointing six of the twelve
members of the Council of Guardians which has veto power over a11 legislation; he
also appoints the !mpreme judicial authority in Iran. Moreover, he must initially
approve aIl presidential candidates and then sign a decree making the election
results formaI. Further, he has the right to dismiss the president following a decision
of the Supreme Court or a vote of the National Consultative Assembly that such an
action is in the national interest. He may also grant pardons and reduce sentences
in accordance with Slzan"'a and on the recommendation of the Supreme Court.49
As supreme commander of the Armed Forces the Faqîll has the duties
of appointing the Chief of the General Staff and of appointing the Commander-in-
Chief of the Revolutionary Guards. He is responsible for the formation of the
seven-man National Defense Council which includes the President, the Prime
Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff, the Commander-in-
Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, and two others appointed by the leader; thus,
four of the seven are his direct appointments. He has the dut y to appoint the head~
of each of the threr- branches of the Armed Forces, based on the recommendation
of the National Defense Couneil. Finally, again based on the recommendation of
the National Defense Couneil, he has the right to dec1are bath war and peace, and
49 Constitution o/the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 110, clauses a, b, d, e, and f; 67-68.
... 90
to mobilise the Armed Forces.so
Âyatullâh Khumayni in the course of his political career rose to the
position of absolute theocratic leader of Iran. His criticism of the government
started in 1943 when he was among the first to see the cumulative threat to Islam
from numerous small changes imposed by the government.51 He grew more
politically significant from 1963 onward, wh en he again attacked the government's
policies; but on this occasion his tirade was directly aimed at the Shâh. Âyatullâh
Khumayni came to dominate Iranian poli tics by using his charisma and political
acumen to !'Ipread his ideas. Together these two factors elevated him !o the position
of spokesman for the poor and down trodden with whom he aligned himself.52
Khurnaynî's success can be explained by five factors, given by Fischer.
When taken together these factors add up to explain Khumaynî's charismatic aura.
First, he combined the tensions between Iranian nationalism and Islamic
internationalism in his ideas and resolved these in the favour of universal (albeit
Shrî) Islam. Second, there is a legend of distress and suffering surrounding his
personal history; this includes the murder of his father shortly after Khumaynî's
birth, the death of his mother and aunt when he was 16, his exile, the death of his
infant daughter and eldest son (rumoured to have been killed by SAVAK). His
constant pursuit of justice in the face of these personal tragedies only added to the
50 Ibid., Article 110, clause c; 67-68.
SI A. Najmabadi, "Iran's Turn to Islam: From Modernization to Moral Order," Middle East Journal, 41 (1987),210.
52 Akhavi, Religion and Polities, 101.
[ ,
91
legend. Third, his involvement in mysticism, an area shunned by the orthodox.
Fourth, Khumaynî's refusai to submit to material concerns, his simple lifestyle, and
his rejection of humour in his attacks on the régime combined to show his
uncompromising differences with the government and their corruption. FinaIly,
Khumaynî, unlike other mujtahids, used the language of the ordinary people to make
his appeal more direct; added to this he placed his trust in the people.53
There are, also, many other components in Khumaynî's suc\:ess. One
main factor that contributed to his triumph was the continuous efforts of his ex-
students who were, as a whole, loyal to him throughout the period. This factor was
added to by the entire system of religious networks which were made aIl the more
important as a political force by the Shâh's destruction of the secular opposition.
Even more significant, however, must have been the willingness of the lranians to
hear and accept his message; or rather what they felt his messa~e to be. Khumaynî's
ideas appealed to a widespread sense of "alienation, frustration and rage" among the
populace which resulted from rapid soCÎo-economic change during the 1970s as weil
as imperialist aggressions.54 This popular discontent with the régime was heightened
by economic slow downs in the mid-1970s. Thus in 1978 the people were willing to
follow Khumaynî, while they had not been willing to go to such lengths in 1963. The
situation had ripened since the formulation of his concept of the mandate of the
Jurist.
S3 Fischer, "Imam Khomeini," 160-162.
54 M. Zonis and D. Brumberg, "Shi'ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: an Ideology of Revolutionary Violence," in Shnsm, Resistance and Revolution, ed. M. Kramer (Boulder: Westview Press; London: Mansell Publishing Ltd. 1987),48.
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The political theory and religiously inspired populist strategy of
Khumaynî made him into one of the major innovators in Shî'î thought.55 Yet his
message was in numerous ways similar to that of many other fundamentalists; the
main differenee between Khumaynî and these thinkers was in the former's political
success. While Vilâyat-i Faqîh did not put forward any specifies for the structure of
Islamic Government, it did extend the idea of the mandate of the jurists; indeed, the
work even states that this is aIl it was intended to do. It does, however, deal with
the fuuction of the just government, which belongs to the mujtalzids, and is the
formation of a just society in which aIl individuals can grow to their full (spiritual)
potential. The government of the Jurists is to act as the trustee of society anù, as
such, prevent eruelty, oppression, and the violation of the rights of aH people in
society; guide men to true Islam (a task that in itself perfects men); and en!lures
economic justice through the implementation of the provisions of Islam for the
redistribution of wealth. In short, Khumaynî wanted an Islamic government; which
is, by definition, perfeet; under which " ... aIl will live under the protection of the law,
and no ruler will have the right to take any step contrary to the provisions anù laws
of the immaculate slzari'a."S6
Another clear change from previous ShN thinkers resuIts from
Khumaynî's rejection of taqîya when Islam itself is threatened, as by the imperialists
and the Shâh. Rather, he attempted to make action obligatory for ail members of
the religious class, though taqîya was to be permitted for those who are muqallid.
55 Abrahamian, 429.
S6 Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 80.
1
{
f, ..
93
This factor, according to Bayat, has put an end to Ja'farî Shi'ism which had used
taqîya as a central part of its beHef system to allow accommodation with the
temporal state.57 While this idea may be an overstatement, Khumaynî has certainly
added a new dimension to the question of taqîya and its use in essential political
matters.
What is beyond doubt is that while a "doctrine of potential resistance
is not a doctrine of revolution,,58; Khumaynî has been largely, if not solely,
responsible for making the potential resistance of the /mâmî Shî'a into a very
militant and popular revoJutionary doctrine. While the concept of Shi'ism as
revolutionary doctrine has precedents, most notably in Dr. 'Alî Sharî'atî's and
Âyatullâh Tâliqânî's works, its widespread acceptance is unprecedcnted. These ideas
have changed Shî'î Islam for aB time.
57 M. Bayat, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?" Middle East Journal, 37 (1983), 41.
58 N. Calder, "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical tradition," Middle Eastern Studies, 18 #1 (1982), 3.
Chapter Five Conclusion:
The Diversity of the Fuqahâ'
94
The above chapters have, in part, demonstrated that "[i]n religion, as
in poli tics, aU men are a party of one."t This statement is doubly true when the two
spheres overlap. The political ideas of the three members of the fuqahâ' considered
within c1early show, even in such a limited study, the widely varied notions prevalent
among their class during the period in question. These men lived at the same time,
being born with in ten years of one another and dying over a like period; yet, despite
they came to radically different conclusions. While there is sorne common ground
among them there are many more differences. It is their work as theorbts that b of
the greatest interest for comparison for they did not deal with the actual structure
of government. Even Khumaynî's ideas on the structure of the state can he seen
only in their institutionalization in the wake of the revolution; Tâliqânî and
Sharî'atmadârî never broached the topie. Rather, ail three of the~e men were
interested in the nature and function of government.
1 C.1. Adams, in lecture for "Islamic Religious Tradition," McGiII University, 1989.
(
(
95
Their political theorizing is interrelated with, and may be said to have
sprung from, their views of the nature of Islam. Islam for Sharî'atmadârî, as a
traditionalist, was a personal thing through which the individual could reach
salvation. He felt that men could be helped towarès this goal through the
implementation of an Islamic order built on the traditional values by the use of
ijtihâd. Alternately, true to the fundamentalist mold, both Tâliqânî and Khumaynî
saw Islam as an aIl encompassing system of beliefs and practices which contained ail
of the solutions for man's and society's problems . if only man would impIe ment its
solutions. However, the similarity diminishes with deeper consideration. For
Tâliqânî Islam holds aIl of the answers for the entire world; and its function is to
Iiberate the oppressed, by providing a middle road between capitalism and
communism. Comparably, Khumaynî's conception of Islam was, again, that of an aIl
inclusive system; furthermore, this system is to liberate the oppressed of the world.
Yet, when Khumaynî launched a polemic against the Non·Islamic political systems
and the imperialists - wh Dm he held responsible for aIl problems in the modern
Middle East - he ignored the apologetics of other fundamentalists and - instead of
comparing Islam to western ideas . portrayed Islamic society as something distinct
and perfect.
In order to understand more fully the nature of the po1itical systems
proposed by the Âyatullâhs in question it is necessary to look first at their ideas on
the nature of man. This then leads to the method by which man can (must) live in
civil society so as to perfect himself - as much as possible in the absence of the
Imâm. While the Imâmî Shî'î belicf has historically been that man is weak and in
~ ! ,
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96
need of divine guidance, various adaptations of this theme are evident in the idem,
of Sharî'atmadârî, Tâliqânî, and Khumaynî. The traditionalist view was most closely
held by Sharî'atmadârî; just as religion is a personal matter so too is man's effort tn
improve himself. For Tâliqânî the human will is weak and easily coerced, and only
Islam can allow man to strive for perfection. Yet Tâliqânî concerned himself with
economic systems as, he argued, they are responsible for the corruption and
enslavement of man. Khumaynî, however, saw man as entirely self-interested ~uch
that he will place his own interests above those of ail others. Khumaynî displays
the "optimistic" belief that men are, nonetheless, capable of being perfected through
Islam by following the true 'ulamâ' who, as a result of their learning, are ju~t.2
However, men will remain in a state of moral poverty without this external guidance.
If, as shawn, man is imperfect then the concern is, natm ally, with how
to bring him to his best possible state. Here, too, there is disagreement. Tâliqânî
held that men must be brought to truth and justice in arder for wciety tn change.
Furthermore, Tâliqânî said, it is faulty economic systems which have corrupted and
enslaved man. Islam, then, provides an alternative to these defective man made
economic systems. Th" order of these changes is reversed for Khumaynî. Kllll maynî
argued that for men to be brought to perfection and to hlam their society must first
be perfected. He felt that men had to be pushed to goodness by the 'ulamâ's
creation of a just society which would then allow men to attain perfection. The
resolution to the problem of man's need ta improve himself, for Sharî'atmadârî, was
2 F. Rajaee, Islamie Values and World View, Vol. 8, Khomeyni on Mail, the State and International Polities (Lanham, New York, London: University of America Press, 1983), 37-42.
r l
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97
a free democratic political system with just, Islamic, laws. Oniy in such a system,
with the guidance of the lulamâ', can man develop himself to his full potential.
There was also common ground in the political aspirations of
Sharî'atmadârî, Khumaynî, and Tâliqânî. They, as well as aIl other members of the
lulamâ', he Id that alllaw pclSsed from God to man. This role as supreme lawmaker
gave AlIâh ultimate authority; furthermore, the fuqahâ', as legal experts, retained a
position as supreme and final earthly interpreters of divine legislation. They, Iike
an others involved in the revolution, also opposed the monarchy. Although
Sharî'atmadârî initially wanted the enforcement of the 1906 Constitution - and,
therefore, of constitutional monarchY - he came to adopt a stance favouring
republican democracy once the former stance became untenable. Khumaynî and
Tâliqânî had opposed the monarchy as an institution for many years prior to the
revolution. They ail agreed that astate was needed for men to live in civil society.
It is their conception of this state that truly sets them apart from one another for the
purposes of this paper.
Here again Tâliqânî and Khumaynî held positions that were more
c10sely related to the views each other th an to those of Sharî'atmadârî. The two
fundamentalists, while differing on many points, held that Islam was cIosely
intertwined with aIl aspects of life. One of Tâliqânî's goals had becn to provide for
the religious, political, and social needs of people. For Khumaynî there could be no
division between religious and political authority. Islam was, to him, a perfeet system
for ail aspects of. However, Sharî'atmadârî was disinterested in politics, and opposed
political involvement by the lulamâ', which was an activity that he considered to be
.1
98
beneath the dignity and rank of the religious cIass. Government was a necessary evil
that was, therefore, better left to the professional statesmen.
Another are:! in which Tâliqânî and Khumaynî were in sorne respects
in agreement was their view on the influence of the West. Both ultimately turned
their backs on things western but they did so in different manners. Tâliqânî saw
things from an economic perspective; based on this viewpoint he rejected both
communism and capitalism as each leads to the enslavement of man; due to the
contradictions inherent with in them. Instead Tâliqânî proposed the middle way of
Islam; yet, democracy and socialism were both seen as acceptable plths toward the
ultimate goal of divine unity. Islam was for TâIiqânî a superior economic system due
to its clear regulations for ownership. Man is permitted to own what he can use,
cultivate, and dispose of; so long as aH members of society are provided for. While
Tâliqânî engages in apologetics in order to portray Islam as the he~t option,
Khumaynî does not debate this issue; he simply rejected ail things western as inferior
to the solutions of Islam. Politically, Khumaynî rejected communism and western
democracy for the entirely separate path of Islam. Sharî'atmadârî accepted western
political developments as the surest path to Divine Unit y, concurring with Tâliqânî
that democracy and socialism are merely means to an end.
The most glaring difference in the ideas of these revolutionary lcadcr~
1S seen in their concept of how the state is to be governed and by whom.
Khumaynî's ideal state - in the absence of the Imâm - is one in which the fuqaluî'
hold ail authority and preferably one in which a single faqîlz assumes rulership. Thi~
type of government, he argued, was necessary as the fuqahâ' are, by Khumaynî's
99
definition of the cJass, just and Iegally knowledgable - or they are not true members
of the 'u/amâ'. They are, therefore, the only ones who can effectively proteet and
propagate Islamic society. Since the revolution, the role of the class has expanded
until it has permeated aIl aspects of life in modern Iran. Within Khumaynî's system
it was said to be preferable that one faqih assame the supreme positiun in the state
and exercise Khumaynî's expanded notion of Vilâyat-i Faqih. Furthermore, it was
specified that the Faqîh must be an ascetic; in the Platonic tradition, it was held that
in order for government to be good the leader(s) must be separated from the wealth
in society. He (they) must, aIso, see the task of rulership as a burden and a
necessary duty; otherwis(' the position may be abused.
At the opposite end of the spectrum from Khumaynî was
Sharî'atmadârî. As a traditionalist Sharî'atmadârî saw the primary role of the
'u/amâ' as protecting Islam, its Iaws, and the community. The religious class was to
become politically involved only when Islam itself was threatened; hcnce, he urged
disengagement and a return to the mosques after the removal of the anti-Islamic
Pahlavî régime. Another reason that Sharî'atmadârî opposed politieal control by the
'u/amâ' was that their failure would, possibly, damage Islam in the eyes of the
people, perhaps irreparably. When the time came for political involvement
Sharî'atmadârî opposed dictatorship and worked for the revolution; however he later
opposed what he saw as a dictatorship by his own class - and Khumaynî - in the
guise of Vi/âyat-i Faqîh. The political structure favoured by Sharî'atmadârî was,
consistently, sorne form of democracy, be it constitution al monarchy or republican,
so long as it was based on popular sovereignty. The 1906 Constitution with its
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100
civilian democratic government guided by the 'ulamâ' was the model he cited; even
after the flight of the Shâh he pressed for this system with the deletion of ail clauses
referring to the monarchy. What Sharî'atmadârî wanted then was the closest of
the~e three to a western style democracy, with participation for aIl. There were two
significant additions, however; the recognition of Allâh as supreme I~lwmaker, and
the acceptance of guidance from the 'u/amâ' who are the ultimate earthly
interpreters of the laws. In effect this system would be a guided democracy, and not
dissimilar from the western style democracy in whirh laws must be in accordance
with a constitution or be struck down by the courts.
The middle ground was occupied by Tâliqânî. Under his preferred
system, earthly government was said to reside with both the just 'ulamâ' and the
believers. Actual political sovereignty was to be exercised by those mehlbers of these
groups who were elected the from society at large. It was Tâliqânî's opinion that, in
the absence of the Imâm, aIl men form the executive of the government. This
government must, moreover, represent aIl individu aIs in the society not just a single
class. It is rule by a single class, or in the name of a single c1ass, that is the failing
of aIl Western governmental systems. Ultimately, in capitalism the government -
despite egalitarian beginnings - has come to represent the vested interests of the
owners of the means of production; whereas, in communist systems the group that
leads in the name of the proletariat naturally exclu des members of ail other groups.
Furthermore, in Tâliqânî's system, unlike Khumaynî's, the government has no right
to deprive individuals - much Jess whole groups - of their rights in the name of the
good of society. Before he died Tâliqânî formed a loose alliance with Sharî'atmadârî
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101
and called for the 'ulamâ' to return to their mosques and seminaries. He did this as
a result of what he perceived to be the failure of the religious c1ass in the poJitics of
government.
The traditionalist Shall'atmadârî and the fundamentalist Tâliqânî were
also doser to one another's positions regarding the rights of men in society. Man,
for Tâliqânî, has natural inalienable rights grar.ted by Gad, which the è)overnment
has no right to denv. Sharî'atmadârî showf'c! his eoncern with men's rights in the
wake of the revolution when he opposed the erosion of popular sovereignty,
defended the freedom of the press, and demanded fair and open trials. Antagonistic
to both of these positions was Khumaynî's belief that man has no natural or
inalienable rights as he is entirely dependent God for his existence and any rights
he Id by man would "infringe" on God's omnipotence.3 Furthermore, in Khumaynî's
state the individual is wholly subjugated to the needs of society.
There were, however, sorne fundamentalist are as in whieh Tâliqânî and
Khumaynî agreed with one another. One of these areas of mutual agreement was
in their regard for MadÎna as the model of a perfeet society and the need to st rive
towards the duplication of this society. Notwithstanding their agreement on the
perfection of Madîna, they seem to have had very different notions of what the early
Muslim society at Madîna entailed. For Tâliqânî it was a society of perfect equality
in ail areas except administration which was carried out by the Prophet. In this
society ail were involved in the affairs of the state and goods were equitably
distributed. On the other hand, Khumayni's model of Madîna while still held to be
3 Ibid., 43.
102
perfect - because Mu~ammad ruled - was very different. Khumaynî used the
example of the destruction of the Bani Qura~a to show that the needs of the many,
indeed the dictates of true religion, outweigh the desires of the few; there was no
room for such ideas in Tâliqânî's version. Conversely, Sharî'atmadârî eoneeded that
Madîna was a good example of a perfeet community but thought it not tntally
relevant to the modern world. He argued that modern developments required the
use of ijtihâd to reconeile Islam and these developments. The Muslim community
cannot, therefore, return to Madîna; rather the paradigm of Madîna must be adapted
to modern developments.
Another area in which Khumaynî and Tâliqânî agreed \Vas in the way
in whic'\ change could be attajned. While Sharî'atmadârî shied away from arme(!
struggle, reserving it for a last option, the other two supported armed struggle. Eve.n
in late 1973 Sharî'atmadârî was calling for negotiations with the régime. After the
Revolution, he would not let those who opposed Khumaynî coalesce around him,
again in an attempt to avoid violence. Both Tâliqânî and Khumaynî had also
reserved armed struggle for a last option, a path to be taken if ail el se failed; the
difference lies in where they drew the Hne. Khumaynî called for violent revolution -
which coulè only occur with the leadership of the 'ulamâ' - after the régime w~s
give a chance to repent, a condition that had been met as early as 1963. Tâliqânî,
too, called for armed struggle from an early period. In faet Tâliqânî argued that the
duty of stopping tâghûtfs was a fourth form of jihâd to be engaged in, fi saMl A/Wh,
if the ~âghûtî could not be urged baek within his limits. This stance in effeet made
militancy into a religious dut y for his followers. It is interesting to note that Tâliqânî
l
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103
and Khumaynî used different methods to justify a jillâd against the régime; for
Khumayni this was defensive jihâd against an enemy of Islam while for Tâliqânî it
was jihâd to restrain a tâghûtî.
AlI of these thinkers betray a certain amount of utopianism in their
thoughts. This fact is, perhaps, to be expected as their first principles are drawn
from religion which stresses the possibility of man's salvation and therefore, to sorne
extent, his ability to improve his condition. Neither is it unexpected, as most
philosophers have an essentially unrealistic faith in uncorrupted man and are
concerned with theories and perfect systems rather than realpolitiks. Tâliqânî's
argument for the improvement of man through the improvement of society was
based on the belief that in a perfect society aIl class tensions and other sources of
eonfliet between groups will vanish. While in his ideal system this may be true, it
requires an acceptance of ail his ideas for one to accept this notion and to ignore the
c1ass differences between the mujtahid and muqallid. For bis part, Sharî'atrnadârî
failed to recognise the socio-political developrnents of Iran. It is unlikely that his
concept of a perfeet democracy eould be instituted in a society that has never known
anything but autoeracy. Moreover, his expectation that his class would turn their
back on poli tics after leading the move to topple the monarehy, and discovering the
amount of power they could exert, is nothing short of naive. The faHure of
Khumaynî's ideas in practiee can be seen in the current state of Iran, the problems
of which cannot be entirely blamed on the war with Iraq or the years of the Pahlavî
dynasty. Enforcing "right" religion has failed tü produee a perfected men in a perfeet
society.
104
The first, and most general, observation that one can draw from the
above discussion relates to the view that ImâmÎ SIzî'î thought sees ail worldly
government as illegitimate and therefore something to be resisted. Obviously this
cannot be the case. Even Sharî'atmadârî, who rejected involvement in government,
regarded it as necessary. The other two discussed ways to perfect government in the
absence of the Imâm; obviously then they accepted both the need for government
and the possibility of good government during the Occultation. The differences
among these three are extensive; this is seen in Sharî'atmadârî's opposition to
Khumaynî after the latter came to power. Tâliqânî also moved into direct
confrontation with Khumaynî before he died; their dispute is reflected in the belief
among Tâliqânî's followers that their Marja' was killed by Khumaynî's government.
Alliances among these three thinkers were based on political necessity rather than
common belief.
Despite aIl of their differences there is a common thread that
ultimately ties these thinkers together. This link, however tenuous it may seem, ties
aIl SIzî'î religious thinkers together. Ali, including Tâliqânî, Khumaynî, and
Sharî'atmadârî, aim at the protection of true religion, the purity of the faith, and
Shan ..... a. These concerns have consistently been the motivator of the c1ass since the
time of the Occultation. They are separated by their dcfinition of the scope of the
solution to this problem. Among the three considered herein Khumaynî regarded
the resolution as being extended to the farthest possible limits. Sharî'atmadârî fclt
the traditional extent of the solution was sufficient.
l
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\
l
1 0,
r
105
Though it is recognised that fundamentalist movement are shaped by
national considerations and are, therefore, different;4 a comparison of Khumaynî and
Tâliqânî shows the possibility of difference between fundamentalists of the same
nation who live at the same time. Both Khumaynî and Tâliqânî fit the mold of
fundamentalisrn, but the differences between them were, by 1979, so great that the
fundamentalist Tâliqâni was politically doser to the traditionalist Sharî'atmadârî
than he was to the fundamentalist Khumayni. Tâliqânî strikes one as a liberal and,
at the same time, a fundamentalist. This combination identifies him as what might
be called an Islamic Liberation Theologian, based on the example of Latin
American, Christian, Liberation Theology. This marriage of convenience, between
Sharî'atmadârî and Tâliqânî, also points to a close relationship among sorne of the
more moderate fundamentalists and the traditionalists.
4 H. Enayat, Modem Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 83.
..
106
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