constitutional law case digest j1. 14-22

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De Guzman v. Comelec

G.R. No. 129118 (July 19, 2000)

FACTS: The Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to Section 44 of the

Voters Registration Act. The Act prohibits election officers from holding office in a particular city

or municipality for more than four years. Petitioners claim that the act violated the equal

protection clause because not all election officials were covered by the prohibition.

HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the

impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of

their place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried

out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in

a city or municipality.

Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals

Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the president, he cannot invoke the Presidentsimmunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the

President but merely those of a department secretary. Moreover, presidential decisions may be

questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction.

Indefinite reassignment is definitely violative of the security of tenure.

Facts:

Private respondent Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed Schools Division Superintendent

of Quezon City in 1989. Upon recommendation of DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria,

Icasiano was reassigned as Superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and

Technology (MIST) to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement of its Superintendent in

1994.

Icasiano filed a TRO and preliminary mandatory injuction enjoining the implementation of

his reassignment. The Court of Appeals granted the petition holding that the indefinite

reassignment is violative of Icasianos right to security of tenure.

The DECS Secretary argued that the filing of the case is improper because the same attacks

an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the filing of the case violates the presidential immunity from suit.

2. Whether or not private respondent's reassignment is violative of his security of tenure.
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Held:

1. Petitioners contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed

against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of

petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned

before the courts where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted

without or in excess of jurisdiction.

2. After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the

reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite". The same can be inferred

from the Memorandum of Secretary Gloria for President Fidel V. Ramos to the effect that

the reassignment of private respondent will "best fit his qualifications and experience" being

"an expert in vocational and technical education." It can thus be gleaned that subject

reassignment is more than temporary as the private respondent has been described as fit

for the (reassigned) job, being an expert in the field. Besides, there is nothing in the saidMemorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would

only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which

fact evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no

definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment in question is definitely

violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent. As held in Bentain vs. Court of

Appeals (209 SCRA 644):

"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil

service. The mantle of its protection extends not only to employees removed without cause

but also to cases of unconsented transfers which are tantamount to illegal removals(Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 555; Ibanez

vs. COMELEC, 19 SCRA 1002; Brillantes vs. Guevarra, 27 SCRA 138).

While a temporary transfer or assignment of personnel is permissible even without the

employees prior consent, it cannot be done when the transfer is a preliminary step toward

his removal, or is a scheme to lure him away from his permanent position, or designed to

indirectly terminate his service, or force his resignation. Such a transfer would in effect

circumvent the provision which safeguards the tenure of office of those who are in the Civil

Service (Sta. Maria vs. Lopez, 31 SCRA 651; Garcia vs. Lejano, 109 Phil. 116)."

Having found the reassignment of private respondent to the MIST to be violative of his

security of tenure, the order for his reassignment to the MIST cannot be

countenanced.(Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903. August 15, 2000)


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Dario vs. Mison (1989)

Facts:When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the government, upon

which Mison,the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 394 Customs officials. Some

sought reinstatementfrom the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went directly

to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA 6656 was

passed, providing that all officers andemployees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have

been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed. The

validity of this law is also put into question.

Held: All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature

and extent.Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They

are dictated by theneed to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the "fetters"

of due process and securityof tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising

from abolition of office (not by virtueof the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason

of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to provegood faith. In case of removals undertaken tocomply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the

Government is not obliged to prove anything becausethe Constitution allows it.

Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987Constitution is a grant of a

license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have validly doneunder an

"automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.Simply, the provision benefits

career civil service employees separated from the service. And the separationcontemplated must be due

to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,1986, (2) the

reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in line withthe

existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly andprimarilyexclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other

words, in order to beentitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of

1987, two requisites, onenegative and the other positive , must concur, to wit:1. The separation must not

be for cause, and2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.By its

terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February 25,

1987,advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever

reorganization is takingplace is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the

mantle of its provisions andsafeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are merely

continuing what the revolutionaryConstitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are

through with reorganization under the FreedomConstitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage -

that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of ArticleXVIII of the permanent basic document.

What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immenserevolution ary powers, the

President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from ExecutiveOrder No. 17,

which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that

accompaniesreorganizations - notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for


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cause," and in spite of thefact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Noteworthy

is the injunction embodied in theExecutive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings

of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness torender public service. Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows

removals "not for cause" in a manner thatwould have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as

Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that theCommissioner would have been powerless, in

any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right.Lastly, reorganizations must be

carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the reorganizationwas indeed made in

good faith because he hired more people to replace those that he fired and no legitimatestructural

changes have been made. To sum up, the President could have validly removed officials before

theeffectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a revolutionarygovernment.

However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose its right to

reorganizeresulting to removals but such reorganization must be made in good faith.

G.R. No. 87211, March 5, 1991

JOVENCIO L. MAYOR , petitioner, VS.HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON.

RIZALINACAJUCOM, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.LOURDES A. SALES and RICARDO OLAIREZ,

petitioners-intervenors.

FACTS: Five special civic actions are jointly decided because they involve one common, fundamental

issue, the constitutionality of RA No. 6715 in so far as it declares vacant all positions of the

Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National labor Relations

Commission, and operates to remove the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their

successors. The old positions were declared vacant because of the need to professionalize their higher

levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions and to upgrade their

qualifications, ranks, salaries or emoluments.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6715 has worked such an abolition of the petitioners' offices, expressly or

impliedly

HELD: It is immediately apparent that there is NO express abolition in RA 6715 of the petitioners'

positions. Implied abolition means that there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between the nature,

duties and functions of the petitioners' offices under the old rules and those corresponding thereto

under the new law. An examination of the relevant provisions of RA 6715, with a view of discovering the

changes thereby effected on the nature, composition, powers, duties and functions of the Commission

and the Commissioners, the Executive Director, the deputy Executive Director, and the Labor Arbitersunder the prior legislation, fails to disclose such essential inconsistencies.

REASONS: Republic Act No. 6715 did not abolish the NLRC, or change its essential character as a

supervisory and adjudicatory body. Under said Act, as under the former law, the NLRC continue to act

collegially, whether it performs administrative or rule-making functions or exercise appellate jurisdiction

to review decisions and final orders of the Labor Arbiters. None of the provisions can be said to work so

essential or radical a revision of the nature, powers and duties of the NLRC as to justify a conclusion that


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the Actin truth did not merely declare vacant but actually abolished the offices of commissioners and

others in their place. Similar considerations yield the same conclusion as far as the positions of Labor

Arbiters are concerned, there being no essential inconsistency on that score between Republic Act No.

6715 and the old law. The position titles of Executive Clerk and Deputy Executive Clerk(s) provided

for in RA 6715 are obviously not those of newly-created offices, but new appellations or designations

given to the existing positions of Executive Director and Deputy Executive Director. There is no essential

change from the prescribed and basically administrative duties of these positions and, at the same time,

no menytion in the Act of the former titles, from which the logical conclusion is that what was intended

was merely a change in nomenclature, not an express or implied abolition.

Canonizado, et al. vs. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2000)

FACTS: Petitioners were incumbent commissioners of the National Police Commission whenRepublic Act

No. 8851, otherwise known as the PNP Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998, took effect. Section 8 of

R.A. No. 8851 provided that the terms of office of theincumbent petitioners were deemed expired and

thus assailed by petitioners for being

unconstitutional for it violates the petitioners security of tenure. In defense of the law,

the Solicitor General argues that the law intended to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOMby means of

reorganization by changing the functions and composition of the same.

ISSUE: WON there was a valid abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

HELD: NONE. R.A. 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. In order to determine whether

there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the

new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. The powers and duties of the

NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. The NAPOLCOM continues to exercise

substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions.

Reorganization takes place when there is alteration of the existing structure of the government offices

or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. In involves a

reduction in personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or

redundancy of functions. Naturally,

it may result in the loss of ones position through removal or abolition of an office.

However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith. No bona fide

reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8851, insofar as it declaresthe terms of office of the incumbent commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their

removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore

be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office.

It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched

principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never becomes


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vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in

order to replace petitioners are not valid.

Canonizado, et al. vs. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 (2001)

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