Lozada v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. No. 184379-80 April 24, 2012 Sereno, J.)

FACTS: Lozada was issued a subpoena by Senate with regards to the NBN-ZTE scandal. He did not appear during the hearing and instead flew to London on ‘official business’. Upon his return, he was escorted by several men and was told by Sec. Atienza that Atienza was talking to ES and Ma’m, whom Lozada assumed to be ES Recto and the President. Lozada was brought to LSGH where he was purportedly harassed and threatened by the police.His brother filed for a writ of amparo. The court held that the Writ of Amparo was properly denied by the CA because the petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence and that they failed to prove the existence of a continuing threat.

The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify on 30 January 2008.

Lozada did not appear at the Blue Ribbon Committee. DENR Sec. Atienza announced that Lozada was in an official trip to London. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to implement such order and make a return.

Lozada asked Sec. Atienza if he can go back to the Philippines. Upon approval, he informed his family that he would be arriving in Manila,Feb 5 at 4 pm.

In his petition, Lozada claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and took his bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be wiser to go with the men when he heard them say in their handheld radio ‘[H]wag kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.’

Lozada asked to go to the comfort room and while there, called his brother, Arturo and informed him of his situation. He observed that there were several cars tailing their car. Sec. Atienza called him and assured him that he was with government people and that Sec. Atienza would confer with ES and Ma’m. Lozada surmised them to be ES Ermita and the President. He was also told to pacify his wife, Violeta, who was making public statements asking for her husband’s return. Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to security risks. They stopped at Outback restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an affidavit. He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen, purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.

On Feb 6, Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize and sign an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c) Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show responsibility for his alleged abduction.

Lozada alleged that he was made to sign a letter requesting police protection. On 7 February 2008, Lozada decided to hold a press conference and contact the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, who served the warrant of arrest on him. He claimed that after his press conference and testimony in the Senate, he and his family were since then harassed, stalked and threatened.

Respondents contended that Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from the time of his arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was never deprived of his liberty and that since Feb 8, Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.

CA rendered the following decisions:

1. Habeas Corpus case as moot. 2. Denied issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Presentation of Hostile Witnesses and Adverse Parties – irrelevant to Amparo Case, to require them to testify would be a fishing expedition.3. Dropped Pres. Arroyo as a respondent because she enjoys immunity from suit as president. 4. Dismissed Writ of Amparo. – Petitioners unable to prove through substantial evidence that respondents violated Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security.

ISSUE:

Whether circumstances are adequately alleged and proven by petitioner Lozada to entitle him to the protection of the writ of amparo

HELD: No. The writ of amparo is an independent and summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief to protect the people’s right to life, liberty and security. Having been originally intended as a response to the alarming cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in the country, it serves both preventive and curative roles to address the said human rights violations. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.

As it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. Considering that this remedy is aimed at addressing these serious violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty and security, it cannot be issued on amorphous and uncertain grounds, or in cases where the alleged threat has ceased and is no longer imminent or continuing. Instead, it must be granted judiciously so as not to dilute the extraordinary and remedial character of the writ, thus: The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the

quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Writ of Amparo Denied

In cases where the violation of the right to life, liberty or security has already ceased, it is necessary for the petitioner in an amparo action to prove the existence of a continuing threat.

In the present case, the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioners failed to meet the threshold of substantial evidence. Sifting through all the evidence and allegations presented, the crux of the case boils down to assessing the veracity and credibility of the parties’ diverging claims as to what actually transpired on 5-6 February 2008. In this regard, this Court is in agreement with the factual findings of the CA to the extent that Lozada was not illegally deprived of his liberty from the point when he disembarked from the aircraft up to the time he was led to the departure area of the airport, as he voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of respondents and the following other proofs:

He was able to go to the men’s bathroom and call his brother He was avoiding the people from the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms, detour appears to

explain why they did not get out at the arrival area, where [Lozada] could have passed through immigration so that his passport could be properly stamped

No evidence on record that Lozada struggled or made an outcry for help He testified that nobody held, shouted, or was hostile to him He knew and agreed with the plan that he would be fetched at the airport because at that time,

it was his decision not to testify before the Senate it must be emphasized that if Lozada had in fact been illegally restrained, so much so that his

right to liberty and security had been violated, the acts that manifested this restraint had already ceased and has consequently rendered the grant of the privilege of the writ ofamparo moot.

The supposed announcement of General Razon over the radio that [Lozada] was in the custody of the PNP can neither be construed as a threat to [Lozada’s] life, liberty and security. Certainly, no person in his right mind would make that kind of media announcement if his intent was indeed to threaten somebody’s life, liberty and security

Presence of armed men riding in motorcycle passing outside the LSGH premises where he and his family are staying and by alleged threats of armed men around him at places where he went to. Again, these alleged threats were not proven by any evidence at all, as having originated from any of the respondents

Installation of the surveillance camera at the De La Salle and at St. Scholastica as indirect threat to his right to life, liberty and security. He claims that these are spy cameras. However, save for [Lozada’s] self-serving claim, he simply failed to prove that they were installed or ordered installed by the respondents for the purpose of threatening his right to life, liberty and security

No evidence on record that the bomb threats were made by the respondents or done upon their instigation.

He did not ascertain from the Bureau of Immigration whether his name was actually in the official watch list of the Bureau

[Lozada] himself testified that he does not know whether the respondents or any of the respondents ordered the filing of these ‘frivolous’ cases against him. In any event, said purported cases are to be determined based on their own merits and are clearly beyond the realm of the instant amparo petition filed against the respondents

The failure to establish that the public official observed extraordinary diligence in the performance of duty does not result in the automatic grant of the privilege of the amparo writ. It does not relieve the petitioner from establishing his or her claim by substantial evidence (Yano v. Sanchez)

Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an Amparo petition should a criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced.

Sec. 23, on the other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for Amparo, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.

In Rubrico v. Arroyo the Court interprets the above sections as follows: (1) the consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to security. Withal, the OMB should be furnished copies of the investigation reports to aid that body in its own investigation and eventual resolution of OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E. Then, too, the OMB shall be given easy access to all pertinent documents and evidence, if any, adduced before the CA. Necessarily, Lourdes, as complainant in OMB-P-C-O7-0602-E, should be allowed, if so minded, to amend her basic criminal complaint if the consolidation of cases is to be fully effective.

Provided that if the Complaint filed before the DOJ had already progressed into a criminal case, then the latter action can more adequately dispose of the allegations made by petitioners. After all, one of the ultimate objectives of the writ of Amparo as a curative remedy is to facilitate the subsequent punishment of perpetrators. On the other hand, if there is no actual criminal case lodged before the courts, then the denial of the Petition is without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate administrative, civil or criminal case, if applicable, against those individuals whom Lozada deems to have unduly restrained his liberty.

Since the writ of amparo was denied there is no basis for interim reliefs.

In Yano v. Sanchez, the SC declined to grant the prayer for the issuance of a TPO, as well as Inspection and Production Orders, upon a finding that the implicated public officials were not accountable for the

disappearance subject of that case. Analogously, it would be incongruous to grant herein petitioners’ prayer for a TPO and Inspection and Production Orders and at the same time rule that there no longer exists any imminent or continuing threat to Lozada’s right to life, liberty and security. Thus, there is no basis on which a prayer for the issuance of these interim reliefs can be anchored.

Re: Denial of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum proper - for a subpoena to issue, it must first appear that the person or documents sought to be presented are prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy

CA correctly denied petitioners’ Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum on the ground that the testimonies of the witnesses sought to be presented during trial were prima facie irrelevant to the issues of the case.The court has repeatedly reminded the parties, in the course of the proceedings, that the instant Amparo Petition does not involve the investigation of the ZTE-NBN contract.

Additionally,President Arroyo was not proven to be involved in the alleged violation of life, liberty and security of Lozada

President Arroyo’s term as president has ended, therefore she no longer enjoys immunity, but an examination of Petitioner’s evidence reveals their failure to sufficiently establish any unlawful act or omission on her part that violated, or threatened with violation, the right to life, liberty and security of Lozada. Except for the bare claims that: (a) Sec. Atienza mentioned a certain “Ma’[a]m,” whom Lozada speculated to have referred to her, and (b) Sec. Defensor told Lozada that “the President was ‘hurting’ from all the media frenzy,” there is nothing in the records that would sufficiently establish the link of former President Arroyo to the events that transpired on 5-6 February 2010, as well as to the subsequent threats that Lozada and his family purportedly received.

Jamar M. Kulayan et al vs Gov. Abdusakur Tan (G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012 Sereno, J.)

FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, a Swiss national, Eugenio Vagni, an Italian national, and Marie Jean Lacaba, a Filipino engineer, were purportedly inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when inspecting a water and sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf.

The local group, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu, organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities.The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of Understanding" entered into between three parties: the

provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.

Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security.

On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, companions were arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09.

Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army.

On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Proclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. I. Transcendental public Importance warrants a relaxation of the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Doctrine provides that where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the CA or the RTC, it is in either of these courts and not in the Supreme Court, that the specific action for the issuance of such writ must be sought unless special and important laws are clearly and specifically set forth in the petition.

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when [the] constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

Every bad, unusual incident where police officers figure in generates public interest and people watch what will be done or not done to them. Lack of disciplinary steps taken against them erode public confidence in the police institution. As petitioners themselves assert, the restrictive custody of policemen under investigation is an existing practice, hence, the issue is bound to crop up every now and then. The matter is capable of repetition or susceptible of recurrence. It better be resolved now for the education and guidance of all concerned.

Hence, the instant petition is given due course, impressed as it is with transcendental public importance.

II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic

It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.

ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president

One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The President’s Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution:

The Local Government Code does not involve the diminution of central powers inherently vested in the National Government, especially not the prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to the President in matters of security and defense.

The intent behind the powers granted to local government units is fiscal, economic, and administrative in nature. The Code is concerned only with powers that would make the delivery of basic services more effective to the constituents, and should not be unduly stretched to confer calling-out powers on local executives.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted said proclamation and guidelines are hereby declared NULL and VOID.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 185128, 30 January 2012,

(Peralta, J.)

FACTS:

Police Officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon went to serve a search warrant from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to Petitioner Ruben Del Castillo in search of illegal drugs. Upon arrival, somebody

shouted “raid” which prompted the police officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del Castillo’s house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del Castillo’s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu.

An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty. The RTC found Del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable of the charge against him in the information. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.

Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On the contrary, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a violation of Del Castillo’s right against unreasonable searches and seizure

HELD:

Petition GRANTED.

It must be remembered that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness.

In the present case, the search warrant specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the Del Castillo. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of Del Castillo’s constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure.

The OSG argued that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit. It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods. Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the search warrant, the same barangay tanods therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code

defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as “any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.”

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388 of the Local Government Code reads: “For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence.

Manolito Gil Zafra vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No. 176317 July 23, 2014 BERSAMIN, J.:)

In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund!: through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled.

The Case

This appeal by petition for review on certiorari is taken from the judgment promulgated on August 16, 2006,1 whereby the Court of Appeals affirmed the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Cases Nos. 4634 to Nos. 4651, inclusive,2 finding Manolito Gil Z. Zafra, a Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) assigned in Revenue District 3 in San Fernando, La Union guilty of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.3

The CA summarized the factual antecedents as follows:

Appellant was the only Revenue Collection Agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue District 3, in San Fernando, La Union from 1993-1995. Among his duties was to receive tax payments for

which BIR Form 25.24 or the revenue official receipts (ROR) were issued. The original of the ROR was then given to the taxpayer while a copy thereof was retained by the collection officer.

Every month, appellant submitted BIR Form 12.31 of the Monthly Report of Collections (MRC) indicating the numbers of the issued RORs, date of collection, name of taxpayer,the amount collectedand the kind of tax paid. The original copy of the MRC with the attached triplicate copy of the issued RORs was submitted to the Regional Office of the Commission on Audit (COA).

The Assessment Division of the BIR Regional Office, likewise, kept a copy of the duplicate original of the Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) relating to the real property transactions, which contained, among other data, the number of the issued ROR, its date, name of payor, and the amount the capital gains tax and documentary stamp tax paid.

On 06 July 1995, an audit team composed of Revenue Officers Helen D. Rosario, Maria Lourdes G.Morada, Marina B. Magluyan and Norma Duran, all from the central office of the BIR, was tasked to audit the cash and non-cash accountabilities of the appellant.

Appellant denied that he committed the crimes charged. He averred that as Revenue Collection Officer of San Fernando, La Union, he never accepted payments from taxpayers nor issued the corresponding RORs. It was his subordinates, Andrew Aberin and Rebecca Supsupin, who collected the taxes and issued the corresponding RORs. To substantiate his claim, he presented Manuel Meris, who testified that when he paid capital gains tax, at the district office of BIR in Sam Fernando, La Union, it was a female BIR employee who received the payment and issued Receipt No. 2023438. Likewise, Arturo Suyat, messenger of PNB from 1979 to 1994, testified that when he made the payments to the same BIR office, it was not appellant who received the payments nor issued the corresponding receipts but another unidentified BIR employee."

Decision of the RTC

The RTC rendered its consolidated decision convicting the petitioner of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents.

Decision of CA

CA affirmed the ruling of the lower court and found the accused guilty of malversation of public funds

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of malversation of public funds through falsification of public funds at the same time

HELD:

Yes. The petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes charged because such findings of fact by the trial court, being affirmed by the CA as the intermediate reviewing tribunal, are now binding and conclusive on the Court. Accordingly, the Prosecution sufficiently established that the petitioner had

been the forger of the falsified and tampered public documents, and that the falsifications of the public documents had been necessary to commit the malversations of the collected taxes.

Anent the petitioner’s defense that it was his subordinates who had dealt with the taxpayers and who had issued the falsified and tampered receipts, the RTC fittingly ruminated:

x x x If this Court were to believe that the criminal act imputed to the accused were done by the employees blamed by the accused, the presumption of negligence by the accused with respect to his duties as such would attach; and under this presumption, accused would still not avoid liability for the government loss.21 (Italics supplied)

The petitioner relies on this passage of the RTC’s ruling to buttress his contention that he should be found guilty of malversation through negligence. His reliance is grossly misplaced, however, because the RTC did not thereby pronounce that he had been merely negligent. The passage was nothing but a brief forensic discourse on the legal consequence if his defense was favorably considered, and was notthe basis for finding him guilty. To attach any undue significance to such discourse is to divert attention away from the firmness of the finding of guilt. It cannot be denied, indeed, that the RTC did not give any weight to his position.

Initially, the CA’s disquisition regarding malversation through negligence had the same tenor as that of the RTC’s,22 and later on even went to the extent of opining that the petitioner ought to be held guilty of malversation through negligence.23 But such opinion on the part of the CA would not overturn his several convictions for the intentional felonies of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. As can be seen, both lower courts unanimously concluded that the State’s evidence established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. Their unanimity rested on findings of fact that are nowbinding on the Court after he did not bring to our attention any fact or circumstance that either lower court had not properly appreciated and considered and which, if so considered, could alter the outcome in his favor. At any rate, even if it were assumed that the findings by the CA warranted his being guilty only of malversation through negligence, the Court would not be barred from holding him liable for the intentional crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents because his appealing the convictions kept the door ajar for an increase in his liability. It is axiomatic that by appealing he waived the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, leaving him open to being convicted of whatever crimes the Court would ultimately conclude from the records to have been actually committed by him within the terms of the allegations in the informations under which he had been arraigned.

Yet, SC cited the need to correct the penalties imposed on the petitioner. He was duly convicted of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents, all complex crimes. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,24 the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. 25 Prision mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion

temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled, to wit:

Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods

Supreme Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals subject to the modification of the penalties imposed as stated in this decision and the consolidated decision rendered on February 17, 2004 by the Regional Trial Court is hereby amended and the Court finds the accused GUILTY of the crimes charged.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GLORIA JARALVE G.R. No. 175177 : October 24, 2012

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

On October 22, 1996, Gloria Jaralve, ½ll Edgardo Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy, Nimfa Lagnada, Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and Development Corporation, Annie Tan, Teotimo Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma Ramas filed an Applicationll with Branch 20 of the RTC of Cebu City, for the registration in their names of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject property).

In their original and amended applications, respondents declared that they were the co-owners in fee simple of the subject property, a parcel of land with an area of 731,380 square meters, belonging to Cadastral Lot situated in Barangay Quiot, City of Cebu, and all the improvements thereon. They alleged that they occupied the subject property and to the best of their knowledge, there was no mortgage or encumbrance affecting it, and no one was in possession thereof. Respondents further averred that the subject property was not covered by any certificate of title or any pending case before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondents also identified the names and complete postal addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots.

The respondents claimed that they had acquired ownership over the subject property by way of purchase from predecessors-in-interest who had been in continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, or from June 12, 1945.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following:

1. Sepia Plan; ‚2. Blue Print Copy of Survey Plan;3. Technical Description of SGS-07-000307;

4. Geodetic Engineers Certificate (of the survey of the subject property);5. Certificate of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) dated March 20, 1996, signed by CENR and Provincial Environmental and Natural Resources (PENR) Officers (CENRO Certificate) that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of Lot 18590;6. Deeds of Sale; 7. Tax Clearances; and8. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7 Certification that subject property is not covered by any subsisting land application. ‚

This was opposed by the respondents.

The RTC ruled in favor of the applicants for having a registerable title to the parcel of land herein applied for original registration of title, and thereby confirmed the same. The RTC also granted Starglad International and Development Corporations application despite the constitutional prohibition on acquisition of public lands of private corporations or associations, explaining that such prohibition does not apply when the corporations predecessors-in-interest had satisfied the requirements in acquiring ownership over public lands before such land was transferred to the corporation. l

The RTC stated that the private oppositors were not able to present any convincing evidence and/or approved survey plan that clearly identified the portions of the subject property they were claiming.

Finding for the respondents, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision dated June 28, 2006.

The Court of Appeals stated that the private oppositors failed to prove that the parcels of land they were claiming were identical to the respective portions of the subject property the respondents sought to register.

As for the petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTCs findings that the petitioner failed to controvert the fact that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. It added that it was a great blunder that petitioners own witness, for his failure to conduct an actual relocation or verification survey, could not even categorically identify the relative position of the subject property to the timberland area.

ISSUE: whether the grant of respondents application for registration of title to the subject property was proper under the law and jurisprudence.

HELD: Going to the merits of the case, this Court agrees with the petitioner that the respondents failed to prove in accordance with law that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141, until this day, is the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, except for timber and mineral lands. In the case at bar, the subject property has an area of 731,380 square meters or 73.138 hectares. Clearly, under DAO No. 38, series of 1990, the subject property is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.

It is undisputed that while PENR Officer Montejos signature appears on the CENRO Certificate, it was under the CENRO that the survey of the subject property was conducted. The certificate was likewise issued under the CENRO, and not the PENRO. The respondents admit and even emphasize that it was the CENRO that was involved in the conduct of the survey and issuance of the certification with respect to the land classification status of the subject property.

In Republic v. Medida,

This Court x x x holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which the source of any is asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by parties of the rules and requirements on land registration.

Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. The respondents application for registration and issuance of title to the subject property is accordingly dismissed.

Francis Saez vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (680 SCRA 681 September 25,2012 Reyes J .)

Facts:

Petitioner Francis Saez filed for a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. The petitioner expressed his fear of being abducted and killed and so he sought to be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

RTC’s Decision:

The court issued the writ of amparo and referred the case to the CA for hearing and decision

CA’s Decision:

CA denied petition and dropped former President Arroyo as a respondent.

OSG’s Comment:

Petitioner advances no cogent grounds to justify reversal of CA’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the President (GMA) as former commander-in-chief of the military can be held responsible for extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances.

HELD:

Yes. Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules.

The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President’s name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latter’s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the President’s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.

To conclude, compliance with technical rules of procedure is ideal but it cannot be accorded primacy. In the proceedings before the CA, the petitioner himself testified to prove the veracity of his allegations which he stated in the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition. Hence, the defect in the verification attached to the petition was deemed cured. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY.

People of the Philippines vs Gomer S. Climaco (G.R. No. 199403 June 13, 2012 CARPIO, J.:)

FACTS:

This is a consolidated criminal case filed against appellant Gomer S. Climaco (Climaco) for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for illegal possession (Criminal Case No. 4911-SPL) and illegal sale (Criminal Case No. 4912-SPL) of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna dated 20 January 2009 (RTC Decision), found Climaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride (a dangerous drug) and guilty for the illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA), in its Decision dated 29 March 2011 (CA Decision), affirmed the RTC Decision. Climaco appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Climaco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a dangerous drug

HELD:

No. SC resolved to acquit Climaco for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Constitution guarantees the accused presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Section 14(2) of the Bill of Rights (Article III) provides that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.

Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court likewise states that, in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, which produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainly is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the chain of custody over the dangerous drug must be shown to establish the corpus delicti.

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibits level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In that case where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was handled by two police officers prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into the posession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is inadmissible.

SC decided to set aside the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pedro, Laguna. Gomer S. Climaco is acquitted based on reasonable doubt and ordered for his immediate release from detention, unless he is detained for any other lawful cause.

People of the Philippines vs Zafra M. Maraorao (G.R. No. 174369 June 20, 2012 VILLARAMA, JR., J.:)

FACTS:

On November 30, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, without being authorized by law to possess or use regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control one (1) transparent plastic sachet containing 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance known as shabu containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding license or prescription thereof.

PO3 Manuel Vigilla testified that on November 29, 2000, they received reliable information at Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District (WPD) that an undetermined amount of shabu will be delivered inside the Islamic Center in Quiapo in the early morning of the following day. On November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he and PO2 Mamelito Abella, PO1 Joseph dela Cruz, and SPO1 Norman Gamit went to the Islamic Center. While walking along Rawatun Street in Quiapo, they saw two men talking to each other. Upon noticing them, one ran away. PO2 Abella and PO1 Dela Cruz chased the man but failed to apprehend him.

Meanwhile, the man who was left behind dropped a maroon bag on the pavement. He was about to run when PO3 Vigilla held him, while SPO1 Gamit picked up the maroon bag. The man was later identified as appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang. The police examined the contents of the bag and saw a transparent plastic bag containing white crystalline substance, which they suspected to be shabu. At the police station, the investigator marked the plastic sachet ZM-1 in the presence of the police officers.

The specimen was then forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory chemical analysis. When examined by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Miladenia O. Tapan, the 1,280.081 grams of white crystalline substance gave a positive result to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

In his defense, appellant testified that on November 30, 2000, at around 7:00 a.m., he was going to the place of his uncle, Abdul Gani, at the Islamic Center to get a letter from his mother. He went there early because he had to report for work at the Port Area in Manila at 8:00 a.m. On his way, an unidentified man carrying a bag asked him about a house number which he did not know. He stopped walking to talk to the man, who placed his bag down and asked him again. When they turned around, they saw four men in civilian attire walking briskly. He only found out that they were police officers when they chased the man he was talking to. As the man ran away, the man dropped his bag. Appellant averred that he did not run because he was not aware of what was inside the bag.

Appellant further narrated that the police arrested him and asked who the owner of the bag was. He replied that it did not belong to him but to the man who ran away. They made him board a bus-type vehicle and brought him to the police station in Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was referred to a desk sergeant. The desk sergeant asked him whether the bag was recovered from him, and he replied that he had no knowledge about that bag. He was not assisted by counsel during the investigation. He was also incarcerated in a small cell for about ten days before he was brought to Manila City Jail. At the Office of the City Prosecutor, he met his lawyer for the first time.

RTC’s Decision:

Zafra Maraorao was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possession of illegal drugs.

CA’s Decision:

The appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. RTC decision AFFIRMED.

ISSUE:

Whether or not prosecution’s evidence was able to satisfy the presumption of guilt on the accused Maraorao for the illegal possession of shabu

HELD:

No. The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. In this case, the prosecution’s evidence failed to overcome the presumption of innocence, and thus, appellant is entitled to an acquittal.

Indeed, suspicion no matter how strong must never sway judgment. Where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted even though their innocence may not have been established. The Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.

The SC ruled to reverse and set aside CA’s and appellant Zafra Maraorao y Macabalang is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged.

People of the Philippines vs Antonio Baraoil (G.R. No. 194608 July 9, 2012 REYES, J.:)

FACTS:

Antonio Baraoil was charged for the crime of rape allegedly committed on August 8, 2004, inside the comfort room adjacent to the Apo Rice Mill at Brgy. San Maximo of Natividad, Province of Pangasinan, raped his neighbor’s 5-year old daughter (AAA).

For the defense, the accused-appellant denied the charges and proffered an alibi by stating that he was with his friend Renato at the fish pond at the time when the alleged rape took place. He claimed that they were fishing from 7:30 to 10:00 in the morning. They also drank gin at around 3:00 p.m. and went home at 4:00 p.m. He, moreover, claimed that AAA was nice to him before the alleged rape. However,

AAA's family got mad at him after he disconnected their jumper connection from the power source. They even threatened that they will hack him to death. Thus, the accusation of AAA's family was a means of revenge.

RTC’s Decision:

Accused is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of rape.

CA’s Decision :

The CA sustained the conviction of the accused-appellant after finding that the testimony of AAA was credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

ISSUE:

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the accused-appellant’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt vis-a-vis his main defense that the rape charges were merely concocted to get back at him as leverage against his act of disconnecting the jumper owned by AAA's family.

HELD:

Yes. This Court sustains accused-appellant’s conviction.

The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is proven. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left to the trial courts to determine. However, an appeal throws the whole case open for review such that the Court may, and generally does, look into the entire records if only to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court.9

Courts use the following principles in deciding rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) due to the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Due to the nature of this crime, conviction for rape may be solely based on the complainant’s testimony provided it is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

After a meticulous review of the records of the instant case, the Court holds that the totality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses' testimony. Findings of trial court relative to the credibility of the rape victim are

normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, more so, if affirmed by the appellate court. This rule may be brushed aside in exceptional circumstances, such as when the court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts - and when his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.

The accused-appellant’s defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED .

People of the Philippines vs Meriam K. Guru (G.R. No. 189808 October 24, 2012 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:)

FACTS:Accused-appellant Meriam Guru y Kazan was charged for selling to a poseur-buyer 0.012 gram of shabu on September 24, 2004. She denied the charges filed against her. Bhoy Tagadaya, who was fetching his brother-in-law in the vicinity where accused-appellant was arrested, testified that at around 3:00 p.m. on September 24, 2004, he saw six men in civilian clothes alight from a Ford Fiera. Two men went inside the house in front of that of his brother-in-law. Fifteen minutes later, the two men came out of the house with the accused-appellant, who was crying and shouting, and left. Someone had asked his brother-in-law about the incident. Tagadaya’s brother-in-law told that person that it was Tagadaya who saw the incident.

RTC’s Decision:

Meriam Guru y Kazan was found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, she is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

CA’s Decision:

Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for illegal possession of drugs

HELD:

No. In the case at bar, the physical inventory of the subject specimens was made only at the police station and by an unnamed investigator. This, in itself, evokes to a reasonable mind several questions on the safekeeping of the specimens from the time accused-appellant was arrested, up to the time she and the buy-bust team arrived at the police station. The identity of the person who marked the specimens and his or her competence to distinguish between the item sold by accused-appellant and the item recovered from her are likewise relevant points of inquiry.

Finally, the conflicting evidence as regards the persons who had custody of the specimens after the marking casts serious doubts as to whether the identity and integrity of said items had truly been preserved. We find that these are all substantial gaps in the chain of custody which inevitably creates a rational uncertainty in the appreciation of the existence of the corpus delicti. The SC ruled to acquit accused-appellant in both Criminal Case No. 04-230545 and Criminal Case No. 04-230546 on account of reasonable doubt.