Political Law 1 Case Digest

Article 6- Legislative Department

Macias vs. Comelec (1)

Facts:

Petitioners are three members of the HOR from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental and Bulacan, and the provincial Governor of Negros Oriental. They are requesting that the respondent officials be prevented to implement RA 3040, an act that apportions representative districts in the country. They alleged that their respective provinces were discriminated because they were given less representation. Furthermore, they allege that RA 3040 is unconstitutional and void because:

It was passed without printed final copies which must be furnished to the members of the HOR at least 3 calendar days prior to passage. It was approved more than 3 years after the return of the last census of the population. It apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces.

Respondents Comelec and Vicente Gella (National Treasurer) contend that they were merely complying with their duties under the statute which they presume and allege to be constitutional and petitioners have no personality to bring such action.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners have the personality to bring such action; Whether or not the act conformed to the printed form and 3 day requirement; Whether or not the act of apportionment is within the 3 year requirement; Whether or not the apportionment of members of the HOR is valid.

Ruling:

The petitioners as voters and as congressmen and governor of the aggrieved provinces have the personality to sue. The passage of the act did not conform to the printed-form and the 3 day requirement, and that there is no certificate of urgency from the President was received by the HO. The requirement that the apportionment must be done within 3 year following the last census is complied with. The apportionment of members of the HOR is not valid because it is not based on the number of inhabitants a province has. Some provinces were given more representation despite the inferior in number of inhabitants. The Court held that RA 3040 infringed the provisions of the Constitution and is therefore void.

Tobias vs. Abalos (2)

Facts:

Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged only to one district. RA 7675 was enacted which in effect converted the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city and divided the legislative district of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RA contending it is contrary Art. 6 Section 5(1 and 4), Section 26(1 and 2) of the constitution.

Issues:

a. Is the RA contrary to Art 6 Sec. 5(1)?b. Is it contrary to Sec. 5(4) of the same?c. Is it contrary to Sec. 26(1)?d. Is it contrary to Sec 26(2)?

Ruling:

a. No. Petitioners contended that the RA resulted in an increase in the composition of the HOR beyond what is provided. Same article provides that the number of HOR may be increased through legislative enactment.

b. No. Petitioners contended that the RA preempts the right of congress to reapportion legislative districts. Congress drafted deliberated and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

c. No. Petitioners contended that it did not embrace one subject in enacting the said RA. The creation of a separate district of Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It is only a logical consequence thereof.

d. No. Petitioners contended that there is no mention in the RA about reaching the 250k census requirement for the separation. The RA enjoys the presumption of having passed through regular congressional processes.

Marcos vs. COMELEC(3)

Facts:

Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, ran for congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her on the ground that she did not satisfy the 1 year residency requirement that is provided for in Article 6 Sec. 6 of the constitution as she in fact wrote in her COC that she resided in the place where she sought to be re- elected for only 7 months but she later claimed that it’s a “honest mistake.” and assesrted that it is her domicile since childhood. COMELEC ruled in favor of Montejo. It conteded that Imelda’s domicile is in San Juan, Malacanang, San Miguel, Manila.

Issue:

Is Tacloban, Leyte the domicile of Imelda Marcos?

Ruling:

Yes. It is a settled rule that when the constitution speaks of residence, it only means domicile. It was held that Tacloban is the domicile of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her parents. COMELEC mentioned of the actual residence and not the legal residence. She has always chosen to return in her domicile of origin which is in Tacloban, Leyte even at the height of the Marcos regime .

Coquilla vs. Comelec(4) Facts:

Teodulo Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and resided until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was naturalized as a U.S. citizen and resided there.

In October 15, 1998, he came to the Philippines and took a residence certificate. He applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 and was approved on November 7, 2000. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter in Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved on January 2001. On February 2001 he filed his COC for the position of mayor of Oras, Eastern Samar. In his COC he stated that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Neil M. Alvarez, who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he had made material misrepresentation in it by stating he had been a resident of Oras for 2 years when the truth is that he had resided therein for only 6 months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case immediately. Coquilla won the elections, was proclaimed mayor of Oras and subsequently took office. On July 2001, COMELEC granted the petition of Alvarez and ordered for the cancellation of Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy due to his deficiency of days as a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar.

Issue: Whether or not Teodulo Coquilla has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year before the

elections as required by the Local Government Code. Held:

The SC held that Teodulo Coquilla had not been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year before the elections.

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his

permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile.

Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. Citizen. From then on and until he reacquired his Philippine citizenship, he was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.

Ruling: The petition is dismissed and the resolution of the Second Division of COMELEC to cancel certificate is affirmed.

Principles: The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,”

but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain.

Naturalization in a foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.

Veterans Federation Party vs. Comelec (5)

- PL system was devised to replace the reserve seat system; representation by election; PL representatives, by being voted, can rise up to the same dignity as those elected by the people

- Sec 5(2) of Art VI: PL representatives to constitute 20% of total number of representatives- Requisites laid down by LG code: (a) 20% allocation; (b) 2% threshold (meaningful representation; prevent proliferation of

small parties); (c) 3-seat maximum (to ensure entry of various parties; no single-group dominance); (d) proportional representation (additional seat in proportion to number of votes).

- Facts: In May 1998, the first PL election was held simultaneously with the general elections. In June the Comelec en banc proclaimed 12 parties. In July PL PAG-ASA filed a petition to proclaim the full number of PL representatives as provided in the constitution, i.e. 20%, which they allege as mandatory.

- Issues: WON 20% is a mere ceiling, not mandatory; WON Comelec gravely abused its discretion in issuing resolution proclaiming as winners several PL groups who lacked the 2% vote requirement, only to fill up the allocated PL seats

- Held: Yes, a ceiling; Yes, said resolution nullified

- Panganiban’s Formula (b): may be replaced by the legislature via a statutea. No. of district representatives x 0.20 = No. of party list

.80 representatives

b. No. of votes of concerned party x No. of additional seats = Additional

No. votes for first party allocated to first party seats

Ang Bagong Bayani vs. Comelec(6)

Facts:

The Comelec approved the Manifestations of 154 parties and organizations in its Ominubus Resolution. It included mainstream political parties as well as major organizations.

Petitioner Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, among with several others, seek the disqualification of mainstream political parties, non-marginalized and overrepresented organizations in the 2001 party-list elections.

Issue: Whether or not political parties may not participate in the party-list elections and whether or not the system is

exclusive to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. Held:

Under the Constitution and the R.A. 7941, respondents may not be disqualified merely on the ground they are political parties because they allow “national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” Even major political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

However, the requisite character of the parties and organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party list system, which is to provide proportional representation.

This aim for proportional representation may be achieved by the election of citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, who lack well-defined constituencies, but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

The purpose of the party-list provision is to open up the system. It would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been within it, those sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.

While political parties and organizations are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show that they represent the interests of the marginalized and the underrepresented. (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals but not the religious sector)

The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our people who have less in life, but also enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them.

Allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veener for traditional politics. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.

Ruling: The case is remanded to the Comelec, which is directed to immediately conduct summary evidentiary hearings on

the qualifications of the party-list participants. The resolution directing Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any winner shall remain in force until the Comelec itself reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.

Principles: Party-list system: to give genuine power to the people. It is reserved for the marginalized and underrepresented.

Ligot vs. Mathay(7)

Facts: Petitioner Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives for 3 consecutive terms During his 2nd term of office (1961-1965), R.A. No. 4134 “fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and other

officials of the government” was enacted into law and took effect July 1, 1964. The salaries of the members of the Congress were increased in the said Act from P7,200 to P32,000 per annum.

But, the Act expressly provided that said increases “shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”

Petitioner Ligot lost in the 1969 elections, he filed a claim for retirement under C.A. No. 186 which provided the computation to be “based on the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law.”

The House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in petitioner’s favor as his retirement gratuity using the increased salary of P32,000 per annum.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, and formally requested petitioner Ligot to return the warrant and its supporting papers for re-computation of his retirement claim, enclosing a copy of the Auditor General’s adverse decision on a similar claim from ex-Congressman Melanio Singson.

Issue: Whether or not former Congressman Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on the increased salary of

P32,000 for members of the Congress which he never received. Held:

The salary increase to P32,000 per annum under R.A. 4134 will be operative only after December 30, 1969 for incoming members of Congress, when the full term of all the members that approved the increase will have expired. The salary of a member of Congress as of the time of retirement is basis for computation of retirement pay.

To allow petitioner Ligot a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Petition is dismissed.

Principles: Section 10 Article VI: The salaries of Senators and members of the House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House or Representatives approving such increase.

People v. Jalosjos(8)

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of the House of Representatives. At this time, he has been convicted by the lower court for two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of lasciviousness, but said judgment is pending appeal in the Supreme Court. Jalosjos now files a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge his duties as Congressing, including attendance of Congressional sessions and committee meeting, despite being convicted of a non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ Arguments:

1. “Mandate of sovereign will” – The sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Thus, he has a duty to perform the functions of a Congressman and adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

2. A member of Congress’ function is to attend sessions – This is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which provides that “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner...”

3. Ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos – The SC held that “the Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct...”

4. On several occasions, the Makati RTC granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell for official and medical reasons; likewise, upon his transfer to New Bilibid Prisons, he was granted to leave prison premises for correctional programs and medical reasons

5. The constituents in the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard6. He is a bona fide member of the House of Representative – In effect, the SC, as a co-equal of Congress, should respect

Jalosjos’ mandate and concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate

Issue/Held/Ratio:

WON membership in Congress exempts an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

No. SC’s responses to Jalosjos arguments:

1. Section 11, Art. VI, Constitution: “A Senator or Member of the House of the Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session...” – Jalosjos is convicted of a felony under the PRC punishable by reclusion perpetua; thus, he could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest

2. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend session if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations

3. Aguinaldo case is inapplicable because it is an administrative case. On the other hand, Jalosjos is convicted of a criminal offense

4. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. Moreover, allowing Jalosjos to attend sessions five days a week will virtually make him a free man.

5. Jalosjos admits that (a) he is provided with a congressional office in Batasan and an office in Bilibid where he attends to his constituents, (b) under detention, he has filed resolutions and motions and (c) he receives his salaries and benefits as Congressman. In effect, he can still represent his constituents. Furthermore, when his constituents voted for him, they did it with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom.

6. As seen in no.5, even under detention accompanied with valid restraints, Jalosjos has been discharging his mandate.

In the end, “the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.”

Trillianes vs. Pimentel(9)

Facts:

Petitioner Antonio Trillanes IV along with his comrades, were charged with coup d’etat for storming into the Oakwood. In 2007, petitioner Trillanes won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007.

Before the commencement of his term, he filed an “Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests” to the Makati City RTC.

He petitioned to be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official function and also be allowed to setup a working area at his place of detention in Fort Bonifacio.

He contends that the fact that the people, in their sovereign capacity, elected him to the position of senator of the republic provides the proper legal justification to allow him to work and serve his mandate as a senator. He contends that unlike the Jalosjos case, he has not been convicted yet. Therefore, he still enjoys the presumption of innocence.

Issue: Whether or not Senator Trillanes may be allowed to attend Senate sessions and perform his official duties as

Senator. Held:

The Constitution provides that “All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable be reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.”

The rationale of public self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners or convicted prisoners alike. All prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor

engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.

Petitioner Trillanes electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action, with knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence.

The mandate of the people, when it elected Senator Trillanes to the Senate, must yield to the Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.

Ruling: Petition to attend Senate sessions and other petitions by Senator Trillanes are dismissed

Principles: Parliamentary Immunities, Privilege from Arrest. Sec. 11 Art. VI: A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not

more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.

Osmena vs. Pendatun (10)

Facts:

Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the house, made serious imputations of bribery against the President. The house then created a special committee to investigate the truth of the charges against the latter. When asked to produce evidence, the former refused. Having made said charges but failing to produce evidence to support the allegation, he was suspended from office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior. He contended that it is an infringement of his privilege of speech and debate.

Issues:

a. Does the house resolution infringe his privilege of speech and debate?b. Can the house punish its members for disorderly behavior?

Ruling:

a. No. Privilege of speech and debate grants the legislator from criminal and civil actions before the court and any other forum outside the congressional hall but it does not render immunity before the house itself.

b. Yes. Members of congress could be censured, committed to prison or expel by the votes of their colleagues.

Adaza v. Pacana(11)

March 18, 1985, Escolin, J

Facts:

The petitioner Homobono Adaza and the respondent Fernando Pacana were elected respectively as governor and vice-governor of Misamis Oriental. Both subsequently ran for the Batasang Pambansa but unfortunately only Adaza won. Adaza then qualified as a member of the lawmaking body, whereas Pacana proceeded to assume the governorship as a statutory successor to Adaza.

Petitioner’s Arguments:

1. That he was an elected governor for a term of six years, and is presently still a governor until the expiration of his term on March 3, 1986 as provided by law. Within the context of the parliamentary system in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of parliament.

2. That Pacana, as a mere private citizen upon filing his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections, he could no longer serve as vice-governor, much less assume governorship as statutory successor to Adaza.

Respondent’s Arguments:

1. That incompatibility of office is one created by the Philippine Constitution.

2. That he reassumed the position as vice-governor in accordance to Sec. 204 [2] [a] of the Local Government Code, where the vice is allowed to assume the office for the unexpired term if the governor is permanently incapacitated to discharge functions of his office.

Issues/Held/Ratio:

(1) WON a provincial governor who was elected and qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.

No. The constitutional prohibition on the incompatibility of offices is clear and unambiguous in Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Adaza has taken his oath of office as an elected MP and has been discharging his duties as such, thus vacating his former post as governor and he now cannot continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.

(2) WON a vice-governor who ran for the position of MP, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of the governor if said office was vacated.

Yes. Pacana falls under the provision Sec. 13 [2] of BP Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the Batasan, which states “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing of candidacy, be considered on a forced leave of absence from office.” Vice-governors are covered by the provision on members of the sanggunian.

Petition dismissed.

Puyat vs. De Guzman(12)

Facts:

Assemblyman Fernandez filed a motion to intervene for Acero in a case before the SEC involving a dispute with Puyat regarding the election of the directors of International Pipe Industries. Puyat objected that it is a violation of Art. 8 Sec. 11(now Art.6 Sec. 14) of the constitution. Fernandez contended that he has legal interest in the litigation because he is a stockholder in the said firm. SEC granted the motion. He acquired 10 shares after manifesting his intention to appear as counsel for Acero and Co.

Issue:

Is Fernandez’s intervention valid notwithstanding his membership of the BP?

Ruling:

No. By virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel but theoretically for the protection of his ownership of shares in respect on the matter of litigation. However, under the facts and circumstances that he bought 10 shares after he manifested his intention to intervene constitutes indirect appearance as counsel before an administrative body.

NOTE: Art. 6 Sec. 14- Members of the congress may not personally appear as counsel in any court, administrative body, electoral tribunal and quasi- judicial agency directly or indirectly.

Avelino vs. Cuenco(13)

Facts:

Senators Tanada and Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges against the Petitioner and ordering an investigation thereof. During the session day when Senator Tanada was supposed to have his privileged speech, 22 senators were present and 2 were absent (Sen. Sotto- Hospital, Sen. Confesor – U.S). When the session was call to order, Senator Tanada stood up and claim his right to deliver his one hour speech but the petitioner kept on ignoring him and announced he would order the arrest of anyone who would speak without being previously recognized. A commotion broke out but a move for adjournment was opposed. Petitioner walked out followed by 10 senators. The 12 senators who remained went on with the session( “rump session”) and voted to declare vacant the position of Senate President and designated Respondent as acting Senate President.

Issues:

a. Whether the rump session was a continuation of the morning session?b. Supposing it was not a continuation, was there a quorum when Petitioner was ousted and Respondent was elected as

Senate President?

Ruling:

a. Yes. A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving a hall, prevent the other 12 from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.

b. Yes. In view of the absence of Sen. Confesor, Since there are 23 senators, 12 senators musters a quorum.

NOTE: Majority of “all members” means absolute majority. A majority of each house means simple majority, 50%+1- Art. 6 Sec.16(2)

Arroyo vs. De Venecia (14)

Facts:

House Bill 7198 was transmitted by the HOR to the Senate and was thereafter approved with amendments. Upon being sent back to the HOR, Congressman Albano moved to ratify the bicameral conference committee report which was declared approved be Deputy Speaker Daza after apparently hearing no objection to the motion although Congressman Arroyo stood up and asked “ What is that Mr. Speaker?” at that instant the latter did not request to be recognized in accordance to the House Rules. Deputy Speaker Daza called the session adjourned notwithstanding the pending query of Congressman Arroyo. Petitioners aver that violation of the house rules is violation of the constitution itself.

Issue:

Is RA 8240 unconstitutional because it was passed in violation of the house rules?

Ruling:

No. Petitioner did not have the floor when he stood up without being recognized, as a result, he was not heard. Even if petitioners’ allegations are true, violation of internal rules of procedure in the house would not be tantamount to violation of the constitutional requirements or the constitution itself.

PACETE V SECRETARY OF COMMISSION(15)

FERNANDO; July 23, 1971

FACTS

Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 31, 1964 as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 11, 1964 and discharged his duties as such. As his

appointment was made during recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments at its next session in 1965. Appointment was unanimously confirmed on May 20, 1965 (with Senate President and Chairman of Commission on Appointments Ferdinand Marcos even sending him a congratulatory telegram). Nine months after his confirmation, on February 7, 1966, the then Secretary of Justice advised petitioner to vacate his position as municipal judge. Petitioner was informed that on May 21, 1965, Senator Rodolfo Ganzon (a member of the Commission on Appointments) wrote to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for reconsideration of the appointment in view of derogatory information which he had received.

ISSUES

1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments (CA), without being acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.

2. WON the issue is a justiciable question, with the CA being an independent organ of the Constitution.

HELD

1. As per Altarejos v. Molo, the confirmation stands; it must be given force and effect.Ratio Petitioner buttresses his plea for prohibition on the ground that the letter of then Senator Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a motion to reconsider an appointment duly confirmed, was without force and effect as it was not approved by the body as a whole.

Reasoning

a. The controlling principle is supplied by Altarejos v. Molo, which interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which reads: “Resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one (1) day after their approval. If a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment may be laid on the table, this shall be a final disposition of such a motion.” Holding of the Court was that the mere filing of a reconsideration did not have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. In the case, Aldeguer’s (respondent in Altarejos case) theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the motion approved, and hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. This is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission.

In case of an adjournment sine die the period for filing the motion for reconsideration having expired, under Section 22, then the motion for reconsideration not having been acted upon is not approved and therefore, has no effect whatsoever.

What is decisive is that a confirmation duly made is not nullified simply by a motion of reconsideration being filed, without its being voted upon and approved.

b. “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment of Congress.”

- A distinction is made between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the CA when Congress is in session and when it is in recess. In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the CA may the person assume office. As with ad interim appointments, the appointment takes effect at once. The appointment is effective until disapproval by the CA or until the next adjournment in Congress. There must either be a rejection by the CA or nonaction on its part.

2. The insistence of respondent that the question involved is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court is untenable. It would extend the boundaries of the political question doctrine beyond its legitimate limits. The courts are called upon to see to it that private rights are not invaded.

- Although the CA is not a power in our tripartite system of government, it is to all intents and purposes, like the Electoral Tribunals, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. Its actuation in the exercise of its power to approve appointment submitted to it by the President of the Philippines is exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the powers as will constitute a denial of due process.

Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan(16)

Apr. 18, 2001; Vitug, J: (JV La Chica)

Facts:

In 1991, a case was filed against Miriam Defensor-Santiago for purported violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, in 1988, when Miriam was still the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID), she illegally legalized the stay of several disqualified aliens1. The Sandiganbayan, under Presiding Justice Garchitorena, ordered her arrest fixing a bail at P15K. Miriam posted bail and moved for the cancellation of charges. Five years and several legal actions later2, pursuant to their powers given by sec. 13 of RA 3019, the Sandiganbayan suspended Miriam from the Senate for 90 days.

RA 3019 - Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.

Issue/Held/Ratio:

(1) WON the Sandiganbayan’s sec 13 powers can suspend a Senator, in this case Sen. Santiago even if such is within the purview of the Senate itself

The Sandiganbayan’s issuance of an order of suspension upon the validity of the information field before it, as was in this case, was a ministerial duty of such tribunal. To bolster this view, the court reiterated their ruling in Segovia v. Sandiganbayan where they stated not only that the validity of Sec. 13 of RA3019 may not be questioned anymore after they had ruled on its validity countless times already, but also that such applies to appointive and elected officials. The suspensions that the Sandiganbayan

1 all with Chinese sounding names such as Ting Siok Hun or Lu Shing Qing

2 although not really important to the issue and decision, you may want to scan pages 641 to 643 of the case to see these legal actions which involved certioraris and TROs among others

shall issue on these instances were not penalties per se, since they were part of judicial proceedings. Thus in granting so, the tribunal was only adhering to the clear and unequivocal mandate provided to it by law and the jurisprudence of the Court.

Sec. 13 of RA3019 also didn’t state that the public officer must be suspended only from the office where he/she allegedly committed the crime he/she was charged of. It merely stated that he/she shall be suspended from office, where office here denoted any office that the suspect may currently be holding.

The suspension, of course, was not intended to be automatic. The law envisioned that the validity of the information must first be determined before such public official must be suspended. The validity of an information did not equate to the guilt of the accused, however, and as such must be challenged only through a proceeding that was akin to a motion to quash. The pre-suspension proceeding, therefore, does not equate to a proceeding of deciding on the charges against such public official.

Now it may be contended that the power to suspend a member of Congress was within the purview of the Legislative House where such member belonged to, pursuant to Sec 16(3), Art VI of the Constitution. The suspension contemplated therein, however, was a punitive measure, a penalty, imposed by the members of the chamber to its own members. Such was quite distinct from that of Sec. 13 of RA3019 which was not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure. It was not a consequence imposed due to misbehavior as a Member of the legislature.

Finally, RA 3019 did not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress. Even w/ the doctrine of separation of powers, there may be times when the judicial branch can step in on the other branches, if such was in fulfillment of their duty given to them by the Constitution and by the law.

Astorga v. Villegas(17)

April 30, 1974, Makalintal, C.J.

Nature:

Action for Mandamus, Injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction.

Facts:

On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. The bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas. When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, Senator Arturo Tolentino introduced substantial amendments. The Senate approved those amendments. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate.

The House of Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065 .

Upon knowing about this, Senator Tolentino, issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the Senate President, addressed a letter to the President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter made the further clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment. The president also officially withdrew his signature on House Bill No. 9266 adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.

Issue/Held/Ratio:

WON the RA 4065 was valid or not. (Whether to follow the “enrolled bill doctrine” or the “journal entry rule”)

RA4095 is not valid. It was NOT duly enacted and thus it never became law to begin with. Journal entry doctrine was followed here. It was held that it was the approval by congress which was essential to the validity of the law and not the signatures of the presiding officers. In examining the journals (a requirement found in the constitution) of the legislative chambers, it was seen how Tolentino’s amendments were approved but were not incorporated in the law. (In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065… is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent.)

Bondoc vs. Pineda (18)

Facts:

In the 1987 elections, Pineda(LDP) was proclaimed winner over rival Bondoc(NP) for the position of the 4th representative of Pampanga. Bondoc filed as protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda after re-examination of ballots Among those who voted for Bondoc as the winner is Congressman Casamura(LDP). Declaring Casamura to have committed a betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled from the party and upon request of the LDP, was rescinded from his election to the HRET. The promulgation of Bondoc as winner was then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the required concurrence of 5 members of the tribunal.

Issue:

May the HOR, at the request of a political party, change that party’s representation in the HRET?

Ruling:

No. The HRET is a non-partisan court, non-political body and completely independent. They must discharge their duties with complete independence even from their respective political party. Disloyalty and Breach of Party Discipline are not valid grounds for expulsion at the HRET. Hence, the HOR committed grave abuse of discretion.

Abbas vs. SET(19)

Facts:

In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with SET an election contest against the 22 senators-elect of LABAN. All members of the SET happened to be included in the senators assailed. Petitioners then filed a motion for inhibition on the ground that they are all interested parties in the said contest. SET denied the motion. Petitioners contended that on the ground of public policy require the mass disqualification sought and propose to amend the SET’s Rules as to permit the contest being decided by only 3 members of the tribunal.

Issue:

Must the SET continue to take cognizance of the case with its current members?

Ruling:

Petition dismissed. The SET should not be prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance being imposed by the Constitution. The “legislative component” of SET cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution without doing violence to the spirit of the Constitution.

Pimentel vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(20)

Facts: On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held and proclaimed 14

party-list representatives winners from 13 organizations. The House constituted its House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission on Appointments

(CA) contingent by electing its representatives to these two constitutional bodies. On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas

F. Ople, as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Petitioners filed their petitions contending that, under the Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, 14 and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitioners also charge that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel.

At the time petitioners filed the instant petitions the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%), 36 belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM, Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1 representative was an independent.

They contend that the LP is overrepresented in the HRET and CA with 1 member each. They assert that those members should be ousted and replaced by party-list representatives.

Issue: Whether or not the present composition of the HRET and CA violate the constitutional requirement of proportional

representation. Held:

The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA.

Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chamber’s respective electoral tribunal.

In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From the available records, it does not appear that the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA.

Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the HOR and not with this Court. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the HOR that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review.

Ruling: The consolidated petitions are dismissed.

Principles: The right to nominate to the legislative seats in the Electoral Tribunals belonged to the majority and minority

parties in the chamber, not in the chamber itself or to the majority party therein if the minority did not make its own nomination.

The parties entitled to representation in the Electoral Tribunals are entitled to nominate their own representatives although the provision does not expressly say so.

Aquino vs. COMELEC(21)

Facts:

Butz Aquino ran for a congressional seat representing the 2nd district of Makati in the 1995 elections. Aquino stated in his COC he has resided the domicile where he sought to be elected for only 10 months. He had just transferred to a leased condo in Makati from his 52 years in Tarlac. Private respondents filed a petition to disqualify him on the ground that he lacked the residency requirement that is contemplated in Art.6 Sec.6 of the constitution. The following day, he amended his COC and stated that he has been a resident in said place for 1 year and 13 days. Meanwhile, elections were held and he garnered the highest number of votes. COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspended his proclamation permanently.

Issue:

Did Aquino satisfy what is contemplated in Art. 6 Sec. 6 of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No. The essence of representation is to place through assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district. In his COC on 1992 it was shown that he has been a resident of Tarlac for 52 years and his birth certificate

and of his parents also places Concepcion, Tarlac. Hence, his domicile of origin is Concepcion, Tarlac and not Makati. The purpose of his leasing a condo in Makati was effected to belie his claim of residency for the period required by the constitution.

Pena vs. HRET(22)

Facts: Petitioner Teodoro Pena lost to private respondent Alfredo Abueg Jr. for the Congressional seat of the Second

District of Palawan. Pena filed a petition to the HRET asserting that the elections in the precincts of the Second District of Palawan

were tainted with massive fraud, widespread vote-buying, intimidation and terrorism and other serious irregularities committed before, during and after the voting, and during the counting of votes and the preparation of election returns and certificates of canvass which affected the results of the election.

Respondent Abueg filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that the HRET has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition, the same being insufficient in form and substance. The petitioner failed to allege the precincts where the massive fraud occurred and how many votes would be gained as a result.

The HRET ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case, being the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House. However, the petition was dismissed because it failed to state a cause of action, in addition to the aforementioned failure to allege the precincts and the number of votes to be gained, making the petition insufficient in form and substance.

Issue: Whether the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing

the case. Held:

The petition is insufficient in form and substance because it is necessary to make a precise indication of the precincts protested and a specification of the claimed offenses to have been committed by the parties. This is a fatal omission, as it goes into the very substance of the protest.

The prescription that the petition must be sufficient in form and substance means that the petition must be more than merely rhetorical. If the allegations contained therein are unsupported by even the faintest whisper of authority in fact and law, then there is no other course than to dismiss the petition, otherwise, the assumption of an elected public official may, and will always be held up by petitions of this sort by the losing candidate. The more serious inadequacy is the failure of the petitioner to state the number of votes to be gained for it is crucial for the determination if the massive fraud which allegedly occurred swayed the election in the respondents favor. Mere allegations cannot be the basis for annulling an election. The rule is well-established that the power to annul an election should be exercised with the greatest care as it involves the free and fair expression of the popular will. It is only in extreme cases of fraud and under circumstances which demonstrate to the fullest degree a fundamental and wanton disregard of the law that elections are annulled.

Ruling: The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The original dismissal of the HRET is affirmed.

Principles: The Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the

members of the House of Representatives. Judicial review may only be sought if the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction.

Daza vs. Singson(23)

Facts:

Congressman Daza(LP) represents the said party in the Commission on Appointments. When Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino(LDP) was reorganized, the political realignment resulted in the swelling of the number of LDP members to 159 and diminishing that of LP to 17. As a result, the house gave Daza’s seat to Singson as additional member from the LDP. Petitioner contended that LDP is not the political party contemplated in the constitution because it has not been registered. However, when LDP was subsequently registered, he contended that it must pass the test of time to prove its permanence.

Issue:

Is the replacement of Daza in the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the proportional representation that is contemplated in Art. 6 Sec. 18 of the Constitution?

Ruling:

Yes. Under the petitioners’ theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of seats in the house would still not be entitled to representation in the COA as long as it was organized recently and has not yet “aged”. LP would also fall in such a category. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the COA by virtue of its status as the majority party at the time when it was 4 months old. It is true that there have been some internal disagreements among the members of the LDP but these are to be expected and it surely cannot be considered temporary because of such discord. Petition Denied.

Coseteng vs. Mitra Jr. (24)

Facts:

When LDP was organized forming the new majority in the HOR, the house representation in the COA had to be reorganized. COA was composed of 11-LDP, 1-LP, 1-KBL. Representative Coseteng, lone member of Kababaihan para sa Inang Bayan(KAIBA) party in the house, contested the validity of the election of COA. Petitioner contended that the election was violative of Proportional Representation. She also assailed that the members representing political parties must be nominated and elected by their respective political parties. Lastly she alleges that she is qualified to sit in the COA having support of 9 other representatives of the minority.

Issue:

Was the election to the COA violative of Art. 6 Sec. 18 of the Constitution?

Ruling:

No. The validity of the said election to the COA is unassailable. LDP represented 80% of the HOR and thus was entitled to 80% of the 12 members or 10/12 members. The remaining 2 seats were given to the next largest party and the KBL as the principal opposition party. Art. 6 Sec. 18 provides that they be elected by the house and not by their parties. And presuming that KAIBA be considered as an opposition party, being its lone member, she represents less than 1% of the HOR. Hence, petitioner cannot be entitled to a seat in COA. Petition denied.