connectionism as metaphor: toward an integrated, unified conception of self-system and individual...

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This article was downloaded by: [Monash University Library] On: 06 October 2014, At: 15:30 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20 Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated, Unified Conception of Self-System and Individual Differences Carolyn C. Morf a & Stephan Horvath a a Institute of Psychology, University of Bern , Switzerland Published online: 05 Dec 2007. To cite this article: Carolyn C. Morf & Stephan Horvath (2007) Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated, Unified Conception of Self-System and Individual Differences, Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory, 18:2, 108-113, DOI: 10.1080/10478400701416202 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10478400701416202 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated, Unified Conception of Self-System and Individual Differences

This article was downloaded by: [Monash University Library]On: 06 October 2014, At: 15:30Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for theAdvancement of Psychological TheoryPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20

Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated,Unified Conception of Self-System and IndividualDifferencesCarolyn C. Morf a & Stephan Horvath aa Institute of Psychology, University of Bern , SwitzerlandPublished online: 05 Dec 2007.

To cite this article: Carolyn C. Morf & Stephan Horvath (2007) Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated, UnifiedConception of Self-System and Individual Differences, Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the Advancement ofPsychological Theory, 18:2, 108-113, DOI: 10.1080/10478400701416202

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10478400701416202

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of theContent. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon andshould be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable forany losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use ofthe Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Connectionism as Metaphor: Toward an Integrated, Unified Conceptionof Self-System and Individual Differences

Carolyn C. Morf and Stephan HorvathInstitute of Psychology, University of Bern, Switzerland

In their target article Kashima and colleagues try toshow how a connectionist model conceptualization ofthe self is best suited to capture the self’s temporal andsocio-culturally contextualized nature. They proposea new model and to support this model, the authorsconduct computer simulations of psychological phe-nomena whose importance for the self has long beenclear, even if not formally modeled, such as imita-tion, and learning of sequence and narrative. As ex-plicated when we advocated connectionist models asa metaphor for self in Mischel and Morf (2003), wefully endorse the utility of such a metaphor, as thesemodels have some of the processing characteristicsnecessary for capturing key aspects and functions ofa dynamic cognitive-affective self-system. As elabo-rated in that chapter, we see as their principal strengththat connectionist models can take account of multiplesimultaneous processes without invoking a single cen-tral control. All outputs reflect a distributed pattern ofactivation across a large number of simple processingunits, the nature of which depends on (and changeswith) the connection weights between the links and thesatisfaction of mutual constraints across these links(Rummelhart & McClelland, 1986). This allows asimple account for why certain input features will attimes predominate, while others take over on otheroccasions.

For example, a self-system that is predisposed (dueto past frequent activation) to detect potential threatsto self-esteem, will in the face of ambiguous feedback,activate a pattern that reflects this potential threat, andrespond in ways to counteract it. On the other hand,this same system will also predictably respond to per-ceived opportunities for self-enhancement and try touse them to confirm the self’s grandiosity. A processsuch as this was formally modeled, for example, in acomputer simulation by Shoda and colleagues, show-ing that outputs were dependent on personality (repre-sented through different sets of connection weights),and which situational features (input units) were tem-porarily activated (Shoda, LeeTiernan, & Mischel,2002).

Connectionist models can capture not only the “bi-ased” self-system with its current network, but alsohow it changes subtly over time as connection weightsget “updated” and modified each time activation flowsthrough the system. Therefore learning is inherent andexplicitly modeled in connectionist systems (Smith,

1996). In the target article by Kashima and colleagues,for example, they demonstrated that a system couldlearn a narrative sequence (see simulation #2). Then,once the narrative had been learned, the protagonistcould be replaced by the pronoun I, and the systemstill reliably could reproduce the story. In real life, theself-system becomes biased, because it has in the pastlearned certain patterns of activation in response to par-ticular stimuli. This system then guides and constrainsthe reactions to future stimuli—the self is constructedand regulated, as people accommodate to familiar in-formation and assimilate new and changing features.For example, if new situational features resemble pre-viously encountered self-enhancement opportunities,they will be responded to with the individual’s usualcharacteristic self-enhancement attempts. This is simi-lar as what was observed in the Shoda et al. (2002) sim-ulation described above, where, although a large num-ber of different input combinations were used, eachsystem only arrived at small cluster of end states. Inactual fact, new features also gradually become inte-grated into the self-system, making learning a continualprocess. Strictly speaking, however, neither the Shodaet al. (2002), nor the simulations in the target articledirectly demonstrate this integration of new featuresinto the system.

Moreover, connectionist models are useful for con-ceptualizations of the self-system because they ana-lyze and integrate multiple simultaneous interactionsamong processes at many different levels (e.g., cog-nitive vs. affective, conscious vs. unconscious) op-erating concurrently. Understanding such interactionsis fundamental for a comprehensive view of the selfas both a knowledge structure and a dynamic ac-tion system (Mischel & Morf, 2003). Because con-nectionist models facilitate the analysis of exceedinglycomplex higher-order information processing phenom-ena that result from juxtaposed outputs or process-ing at different levels, they can also help make senseof the individual’s seemingly contradictory, or para-doxical responses and behaviors (Morf & Rhodewalt,2001b). For example it becomes possible to under-stand how a person interested in self-promotion canbe exceedingly charming when all is going well, yetperhaps aggressive and derogatory of others, whenconfronted with obstacles in their self-promotion at-tempts. On the face, the latter behaviors are paradox-ical, because they obviously defy the self-promotion

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goal; however, if latent fear of worthlessness is oper-ating simultaneously as is the desire to demonstrategrandiosity (perhaps at different levels), the behav-ioral output begins to make sense and the paradoxdissolves.

A particularly important feature of connection-ist models is that no distinction is made betweenself-structure and process. Rather everything is pro-cess. Organization and structure are simply the re-sult of relatively stable links, and associated connec-tion strengths, between units that place constraintsupon possible patterns of activation. Although thecognitions and affects activated at a given time inthe self-system are expected to change as the situa-tion does, how they change, and the relations amongthem, are a function of the relatively stable struc-ture and organization of the self-system (Mischel& Morf, 2003). This was demonstrated in a com-puter simulation by Mischel and Shoda (1995), inwhich they created many hypothetical individuals, allwith the same mediating units (i.e., the same self-components). The only things that varied were theactivation weights of the units reflecting differentialsensitivity to situational features. Individual systems(representing different persons) produced different butstable output profiles in response to different inputfeatures. Thus when a person meets someone witha particular configuration of features relevant to theself, this may activate a cascade of thoughts andfeelings that follow a distinctive predictable pattern.The phenomenological self then, experiences the so-cial world through the stream of thoughts and feel-ings generated by this organized system in relationto different situations. Again, it does so without anyneed to assume a homunculus-like central processor.Agency is solely in the organization and activationof the emergent network (Mischel & Morf, 2003;Mischel & Shoda, 1995).

It is these distinct advantages in processing charac-teristics that have led us and others, like Kashima etal., to adopt connectionist models as a metaphor forthinking about the self-system. That said, we will firstflesh out a subject matter that is left out of the Kashimaet al. model, namely how trait-like individual differ-ences arise from systematic processing differences inthe self-system. Then, in the next section, despite ourappreciation of connectionist models as a metaphor, weaddress some limitations of studying the self throughcomputer simulations of the sort illustrated. We alsoprovide Kashima et al. with the challenge to explicatethe incremental value of their model above and be-yond earlier work. To the extent that already existingmodels or approaches can explain the phenomena ofconcern in the target, it is unclear that a new model isneeded.

Self-Signatures and Individual Differences

As discussed above, all self-systems are inherentlybiased due to their individual learning history. It isalmost a truism to say that any individual’s current selfdepends on his or her unique experiences, which inturn reflect interactions between their biological makeup (e.g., temperament, affectivity), the situations theyencountered or sought out, their idiosyncratic reac-tions to these, and the subsequent re-integration ofthese experiences into the self-system. Thus, the self-system is neither static nor given, but emerges and ismodified through continual reciprocal interaction be-tween the dynamics of the system and the demandsand affordances of particular contexts (e.g., Athay &Darley, 1981). The more developed the system, how-ever, the more the biases become engraved, and perpet-uate the system. The system thus becomes more andmore constrained by the connections and weights al-ready formed; change therefore is generally subtle andslow, and it becomes harder to break or redirect theself-structure.

Importantly, the system that develops reflects a mo-tivated meaning making process, through which self-relevant meanings and values develop and change inthe life trajectory. As individuals thus gradually con-struct and regulate their desired self-views, they de-velop stable and distinctive if . . . then patterns, or self-signatures (for a more detailed account, see Mischel& Morf, 2003). That is, they come to respond to par-ticular types of trigger conditions that are perceived asrelevant to their self-goals with characteristic thought,emotion, and behavior patterns. In this view, individualdifferences derive from a distinctive constellation anddynamic organization (i.e., magnitude of connectionweights and directionality of linkages) of processingunits that become activated in relation to self-relevantthoughts and feelings, as well as external stimuli (seealso Mischel & Shoda, 1995). We refer once more tothe Shoda et al. simulation (2002), where a limitednumber of attractor states resulted from many situa-tional inputs. This can be restated to mean that foreach individual there is only a limited set of if . . . thenlinkages: different feature constellations are groupedfor an individual into distinct IFs, which subsequentlyactivate distinct but predictable THEN-responses. Fur-thermore, the activation of a subset of feature detectorsmodels the idea that certain people respond only tocertain aspects of situations.

From this perspective, individuals with similar self-signatures, reflecting similar underlying informationprocessing dispositions and self-construction systems,may be grouped together as constituting a broader per-sonality type or category. They are grouped on the basisof two characteristics: first, by their shared construals

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and interpretations of psychological situations as af-fordances for the pursuit of chronic self-constructiongoals. This is akin to the idea that certain people re-spond only to certain aspects of situations. And second,they are grouped by their distinctive similar reactionsto these perceived affordances—the idea that individu-als have only a limited set of if . . . then linkages. Thus,while all self-systems are biased, trait-like individualdifferences and personality types can be thought of asbiased information-processing dispositions, in whichpeople share particular biases (see Graziano & Tobin,2001).

To illustrate briefly from our own research, we findthat narcissists share their assessments of situationalaffordances for self-promotion and then respond in dis-tinctive and characteristic ways. These biases in pro-cessing dispositions come to be shared, as a result oftheir common distinctive identity goals, and similarstrategies for moving towards these goals. For narcis-sists the overarching self-goal appears to be the desireto demonstrate superiority over others, and it is thisgoal that organizes and directs the narcissist’s self-system (see Morf, 2006). As a result, narcissists sharethe bias to be highly attuned to potential threats to theirself-esteem, and then to react distinctively. For exam-ple, in a recent study, we showed that when sublimi-nally primed by failure, narcissists were much quickerto recognize worthlessness targets in a lexical decisiontask (Horvath & Morf, 2006). This outcome was spe-cific to worthlessness targets, and did not apply to neu-tral or generally negative targets, thus revealing a men-tal association between failure and worthlessness, dis-tinctive for high narcissists. Equally distinctive, whennarcissists were outperformed by another person on animportant task, they subsequently derogated the other,even to his face, not only in private (Morf & Rhodewalt,1993). This makes the social comparison less threaten-ing, as one is comparing the self to a less worthy other.

While narcissists are biased to detect and respondto potential self-esteem threat and worthlessness cues,they simultaneously also are biased towards opportu-nities for self-enhancement. For example, in an exper-imental condition where narcissistic males expected tobe assessed by an interviewer, for an important abilitythey had no reason to believe they were lacking, theypresented themselves much more positively when ex-pecting to be interviewed by a layperson than whenanticipating an expert interviewer. Presumably, theysaw this as an opportunity to shine, likely expectingit might be easy to dazzle an amateur and convincehim of their brilliance, whereas they were being some-what more cautious with the expert (Morf, Davidov,& Ansara, under review). Other research provides ev-idence that narcissists are likely to gravitate towardtasks that support their desire to demonstrate superior-ity over others. Narcissists were found to persist longerand enjoy a task more, if it was framed as involving in-

terpersonal competition and doing better than others,as opposed to when framed as a self-referent game,done just for fun (Morf, Weir, & Davidov, 2000).

As these few examples suggest, the narcissist’sself-promotion goals and desires for demonstratingsuperiority, combined with the hyper-sensitivity to po-tential self-esteem threats, illustrates the self’s centralguiding role in their personality system. It organizes thecognitive-affective mediating units, and is reflected inthe distinctive if . . . then self-signatures that emerge(for a more detailed review of this research, see Morf& Rhodewalt, 2001a). Like Kashima and colleaguessay of culture, so it is with personality dispositions:they entail both meaning systems and meaning mak-ing processes. Indeed, in Kashima et al.’s expositionon culture, one could almost invariably replace theword culture with personality and the statements wouldremain equally true. Except, we disagree with theirassertion that global coherence results from aggrega-tion of context-specific variation across a number ofcontexts and numerous specific actions. Rather, whatis needed is aggregation across similar psychologicalsituations and similar if . . . then contingencies. Afterall, even in their own simulation study #4, Kashimaet al. found no average self-other differentiation be-tween the two types of cultures, but rather predictablecontext-variability of self-other differentiation. More-over, their simulation #4 could easily be converted tomodel aspects of personality or trait-like individual dif-ferences, instead of culture. That is, instead of testingan input feature that varies across cultures (in theircase pronoun-drop), one could simply test a featurethat is known to vary across a personality disposition(e.g., “threat of failure” for narcissism). Their simu-lation thus may not as they purport necessarily be asimulation of culture—at least not uniquely, but rathercould be more broadly conceived as a simulation ofindividual differences (in response to contextual vari-ations and trigger conditions). Therefore, while theydid not address personality or individual differences intheir model, it could easily be expanded to do so.

Limitations of Studying the Self ThroughComputer Simulations

The discussion about how to extend the model tothink about individual differences, while clearly sup-porting connectionist models as a useful metaphor forthe self, simultaneously also brings to light some ofthe limitations of working with computer simulations.First, while the connectionist model metaphor is con-ceptually “big,” any one computer simulation derivedfrom it, is highly simplistic and can only model an ex-tremely small and confined subset of the self-systemthat generates people’s reactions and behaviors. Asthe authors themselves also note, these simulationslack ecological validity. For example, Kashima and

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colleagues modeled the temporality aspect of the selffirst by way of sequence and imitative learning. A prob-lem of course is that learning as applied to self andself-knowledge is not all about sequence and imita-tion, but rather that new behavior also often emergesspontaneously. The latter could perhaps be modeledby adding a random factor to simulate unpredictabilityand chance events, as was done in the simulations byMischel and Shoda (1995). Furthermore, as Kashimaand colleagues discuss, it is often beneficial to inhibitimitative learning, and to carry out complementary andcoordinated action instead.

Subsequently, in their simulation #2, Kashima andcolleagues wanted to model the acquisition of narra-tive as an approximation of self-regulation processesand goal pursuit in people’s attempts to construct them-selves. What they did is interesting, in that they showedthat a self-system, once trained to produce a story usingthe available input components, will reliably reproducethe narrative when the “subject” input is replaced with“I” input, especially in the transported condition inwhich activation of the “I” was inserted into the streamof outputs produced by the network. It is as if, the Iappropriates the story, as a person does in his or hermeaning making and self-construction attempts acrossthe life-course. Moreover, the initial training of the sys-tem resembles a person’s social learning history, evenif only a tiny fraction of it. While a clever and in-teresting demonstration in its own right, one wondersjust how it helps us to better understand how peopledevelop their unique personal constructs and how situ-ational features come to have their acquired meaningsfor them.

That is, one can—at least symbolically—simulateprior knowledge in a system, which could be consid-ered a stand-in for existing mental representations ofgoals. This can be done by activating different partic-ular subsets of interconnected units for different indi-viduals (i.e., systems), thereby approximating the ideathat different aspects of situations matter for differentpeople (as was done in Mischel & Shoda, 1995), orby setting differential prior activation levels. Narra-tive then goes beyond that, because as suggested byKashima et al., it can be thought of as learning of goal-directed event sequencing. However, this only roughlyemulates goal-directed interpretations of situations andsubsequent behaviors that derive from a lifetime learn-ing process. It is hard to see, how simple narrativelearning can approximate the guidance provided forself-regulation by “suggesting which goals to pursueand how” (Kashima et al., p. 84). While conceptuallyappealing, this goes far beyond their actual simulation.To be fair, this problem is not specific to the work byKashima and colleagues, but to connectionist model-ing simulations more broadly, they do not capture theways in which people not only impose active inter-pretations on features (not all dragons and princesses

have the same meaning for all people), but in whichthey also select particular situational contexts for them-selves. Thus, intentionality and control of behavior, asalso commented on by the authors, is missing fromthese models.

Furthermore, in real-life, sequences once initiated,do not always simply carry through to completionundisturbed, as was the case in the present simulations.Often, they are interrupted, and/or possibly redirectedby additional inputs that come in along the way. There-fore, while it may seem like a narcissist once threatenedalways carries through on a given trajectory and to aparticular endpoint, this stream may nevertheless beinterrupted by other major intervening events. In partthis occurs, because individual systems do not operatein isolation, but rather interact with other systems. Touse an example by Shoda and associates (2002), suchas when a couple is fighting (see p. 321). These au-thors modeled an interaction between two systems andshowed that, when activating two connected systemswith the same input features, the individual systemsarrived at different endstates, compared to when acti-vating one system alone. Thus, although certain impor-tant features or processes were left out of the currentKashima et al. simulations, no one simulation can in-clude everything and many of these missing featurescould in theory be modeled also.

Nevertheless, in general, it is our view that the mainutility of computer modeling is to confirm, or discon-firm, that processes can indeed play out in the way, wehypothesize they should. This can be extremely useful,as if we cannot model a process the way we think itshould transpire, we are clearly mistaken about it, ormissing, some crucial assumptions. After all, every out-put depends on the inputs provided by the researcher interms of the algorithmic rules, the activation of units,the connection weight that are set, what is fixed, andwhat is left free to vary, and so on. In short, one canprimarily mostly confirm what is already known. How-ever, to our knowledge it is rare that highly novel pre-dictions are generated via computer simulations. Andeven when they sometimes are, as for example occurredin Smith and DeCoster (1998), this new prediction,then has next to be tested empirically. In addition, asthese authors noted, the practical, as well as theoreticalimplications of these new predictions also depend onsubsequent empirical validation.

What Does the Model Add, and theComputer Simulations Conductedin its Support?

While we find the Kashima et al. computer sim-ulations intriguing and thought-provoking, a questionwe are left with is: just what is new in the I-SELFmodel, as compared to earlier theoretical conceptionsof the self and simulation work? The authors’ claim

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is that others have inadequately dealt with temporal-ity and socio-cultural aspects of the self. They cite theMischel and Morf model (2003) as one such example,among others. As far as theory goes, we do not agree.Clearly our conceptualization of the self, as a motivatedself-construction system and our theorizing about thedevelopment of such a meaning making system is allabout temporality, even if the momentary state of anyone connectionist or CAPS-like self-model can alwaysonly be a current instantiation of a ever-continuallydeveloping model. And we are not alone in such the-orizing (e.g., Harter, 1999; McAdams, Josselson, &Lieblich, 2006; Sedikides & Skowronski, 2003). Like-wise, the socio-cultural aspects too have been concep-tualized by us and many others as well (e.g., Brewer& Hewstone, 2004; Cross & Gore, 2003; Hannover &Kuhnen; 2004; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In citingthe preceding references, in no case do we pretend tobe comprehensive, exhaustive, or even truly represen-tative of these areas, but rather selective and limited inreferring simply to what readily came to mind.

That said, Kashima et al. nevertheless offer someinteresting simulations of temporality, first by way ofsequence and imitative learning and second throughnarrative learning. While we are not aware of othersimulations that have tried to capture the temporalitydimension in the context of self, one recurrent issuethough is: how is the learning demonstrated here dif-ferent or unique to the self? To our knowledge, therehave been similar demonstrations of learning in thecontext of language acquisition, or other learning morebroadly (see for example in McLeod, Plunkett, & Rolls,1998). Further, as already discussed above, narrativealthough very interesting, is only a fairly rudimentaryapproximation of the goal-directed self-constructionand self-regulation process. Parenthetically, we wouldlike to note that the chosen term for the model, I-SELF, seems a bit unfortunate, in that the “I” compo-nent meant to refer to imitation, instead can easily bemisunderstood to imply agency, or goal-directed be-havior, which as all agree is not a component of thecurrent model. Additionally, as discussed previously,the simulation of culture, we thought could equallymore broadly be conceived as a simulation of individ-ual differences in response to contextual features. Thus,the particular (pronoun-drop) simulation adds an inter-esting new demonstration to this existing knowledge;or alternatively, it extends previous work, by showingthat cultural aspects of individual differences operatesimilarly to other factors that influence individual dif-ferences. Arguably it does not offer a new insight perse, however, nor does it illuminate new phenomena.

Conclusion

The connectionist metaphor continues to have ap-peal, because it allows the integration of many dis-

parate phenomena within one common theoreticalframework. Moreover it is ideally suited to theoreti-cally capture the high complexity, as well as the dy-namic characteristics of self, including its temporal-ity and situational contextualization. And it does sowithout invoking a homunculus-like central proces-sor (Mischel & Morf, 2003). We also see value insupplementing such theorizing by formal computermodeling—when and if it adds to that integrative con-ception. Kashima et al. make a serious effort to movethat enterprise forward, and illustrate with some in-teresting simulations. The needed caveat with regardto those simulations is to recognize that what comesout, depends on what goes in, and the hazard is toover-interpret the meaning of the results and the inter-ferences they allow.

The Kashima at al. contribution, finally, does leaveus with a nagging question: just how does their pro-posed I-SELF model provide an incremental advanceover directly relevant earlier work? To resolve thatdoubt, one would like to see the authors spell out ex-actly what is new and useful in their contribution, whiletaking into account the long history of earlier efforts.Exciting progress in self-research has soared in recentyears, as attested to by the many stimulating chaptersin a recent Handbook (see Leary & Tangney, 2003). Itseems now at a stage where research and theory on theself deserves and is well-positioned to build an increas-ingly cumulative and integrative model of the self, onethat builds on what has been learned, to move forwardtoward a unified conception of the self-system and theself-construction process.

Notes

Carolyn C. Morf, Institute of Psychology, Univer-sity of Bern, Switzerland; Stephan Horvath, Instituteof Psychology, University of Bern, Switzerland.

Preparation of this article was supported in part byGrant PP001-68722 from the Swiss National ScienceFoundation. The authors wish to thank Walter Mischelfor thoughtful and constructive commentary on earlierdrafts of this paper.

Address correspondence to Carolyn C. Morf, orStephan Horvath, Institute of Psychology, Universityof Bern, Unitobler/Muesmattstrasse 45, 3000 Bern 9,Switzerland.

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Where is the Self in Connectionism?

Frank Van OverwalleVrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium

Kashima and colleagues (2007) made a bold at-tempt to model the self in a connectionist framework.Following the footsteps of Mead (1934) and James(1890), they argued that a significant proportion of thedynamic self can be viewed as a narrative knowledgestructure unfolding in the stream of consciousness, andthat this knowledge emerges from on-going social in-teractions with others and imitating the behaviors ofothers. Although interesting, I was not very thrilled bytheir approach. Probably most, if not all psychologistswould agree that the self develops not in social isola-tion but rather in interaction with others. However, themanner in which some aspects of the self were broughtto the foreground and applied in a connectionist frame-work seems debatable. Perhaps most importantly, theirconnectionist I-SELF model is not convincing in itsattempt to model the self as a unique or special func-

tional entity. In my opinion, it misses the point that theself is very motivational, whose cognitive function isto preserve and enhance self’s well-being even at theexpense of others.

What is (Special about) the Self?

Most humans intuitively grasp the idea that knowl-edge about the self is special, and different from otherpeople. This does not implies that the self occupiesa different place or structure in the brain, but ratherthat there are functional differences in the manner weperceive, represent and cognize ourselves in compar-ison with other persons, even if they are familiar tous. Information about other social agents is initiallyfiltered and processed in reference of the self. From an

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