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Conflict Prevention:Toward More Effective MultilateralStrategies

DECEMBER 2011Christoph Mikulaschek and Paul Romita, rapporteurs

I N T E R N AT I O N A L P E AC E I N S T I T U T E

Cover Photo: Sudanese in Mukjar,

West Darfur, await the arrival of

Ibrahim Gambari, Joint Special

Representative for the African Union-

United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darfur (UNAMID). Mr. Gambari and

his team visited Mukjar following the

Fourth Special Envoys Retreat, El

Geneina, West Darfur. October 20,

2011. ©UN Photo/Olivier Chassot.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in

this paper represent those of the

rapporteurs and not necessarily thoseof IPI or seminar participants. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit

of a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Editor and Senior FellowMarie O’Reilly, Publications Officer

Suggested Citation

Christoph Mikulaschek and Paul

Romita, rapporteurs, “ConflictPrevention: Toward More Effective

Multilateral Strategies,” New York:

International Peace Institute,

December 2011.

© by International Peace Institute,

2011

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE RAPPORTEURS

CHRISTOPH MIKULASCHEK was a Senior Policy Analyst at

IPI at the time of the seminar. He is currently a Ph.D.

student at Princeton University’s Department of Politics.

PAUL ROMITA was a Policy Analyst at IPI at the time of the

seminar. He is currently a Research Analyst at Security

Council Report.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IPI owes a debt of thanks to its many donors, whose

support makes publications like this one possible. In partic-

ular, IPI would like to thank the governments of Finland,

Norway, and Sweden for their generous contributions to

the 2011 New York Seminar.

CONTENTS

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction: Multilateral Conflict Prevention . . . . . . 2

Early Warning and Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Preventive Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

AN EVOLVING DIVISION OF LABOR

OBSTACLES TO TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE ACTION

Structural Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

ROOT CAUSES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMEDCONFLICT

ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES

Coherence and Coordination inConflict Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

INSTRUMENTS FOR COORDINATION BETWEENTHIRD PARTIES

INSTRUMENTS FOR COORDINATION WITHINSTATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Annex: Case Studies in Conflict Prevention . . . . . . . 19

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

KENYA

KYRGYZSTAN

Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

1

Executive Summary

Ten years ago the United Nations Secretary-General reasoned that “the time has come tointensify our efforts to move from a culture ofreaction to a culture of prevention.”1 In 2005, headsof state and government at the United NationsWorld Summit “solemnly renew[ed] [their]commitment to promote a culture of prevention ofarmed conflict.”2 To what extent have the UnitedNations (UN) and the international communitymore broadly, turned their aspiration for a cultureof prevention into a reality? How well do multilat-eral instruments for conflict prevention performtoday? What challenges exist in tapping into theirfull potential, and how can these challenges beaddressed?

These questions were discussed at theInternational Peace Institute’s (IPI) sixteenth NewYork Seminar between May 4 and 6, 2011. For thisseminar, IPI brought together representatives offifty-seven states and international organizations,as well as independent experts and academics, onthe grounds of the US Military Academy at WestPoint, New York. The goal of the meeting was toengage diplomats, UN officials, and independentexperts in an informal and stimulating discussionon ways to enhance the effectiveness of multilateralconflict-prevention strategies. The seminarfeatured an address by Ambassador Vijay Nambiar,the chef de cabinet of the UN Secretary-General.

This meeting report presents a synthesis of thediscussions at the seminar and summarizes keyrecommendations made by participants at themeeting.3 It finds:

• Multilateral conflict prevention has undergonesignificant change in recent years.

• Capabilities, working methods, and thenormative framework for multilateral conflictprevention have evolved considerably in responseto greater receptiveness by many states facingconflict risks and increasing preparedness bythird parties to engage in preventive diplomacyand structural prevention.

• This trend has been accompanied by a prolifera-tion of the number of third states, internationalorganizations and nongovernmental organiza-tions undertaking preventive action.

• Achieving coordination and coherence amongthese numerous third parties in their pursuit ofpreventive goals constitutes a critical challenge.Following an overview of the concept and politics

of multilateral conflict prevention, the reportidentifies timely and accurate early warning andassessment as a precondition for successful earlyaction, and analyzes recent developments,shortcomings, and potential paths for two sets oftools for multilateral conflict prevention, namelypreventive diplomacy and structural prevention. Itthen addresses coherence and coordination incontemporary conflict-prevention efforts. Finally,an annex presents three case studies of recent andongoing efforts to prevent conflict in Côte d’Ivoire,Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan. This report does not aim toprovide an exhaustive survey of multilateralconflict-prevention efforts around the world. Itfocuses on conflict prevention at the UN, but alsoexplores the evolving role of other actors in thisfield, including individual states, regional organiza-tions, and nonstate actors.

1 United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/55/985–S/2001/574, June 7, 2001, para. 169.2 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (October 24, 2005), 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 74.3 In accordance with the Chatham House rule under which the seminar was conducted, no identification is provided of the speakers who presented particular ideas.

2 CONFLICT PREVENTION

Introduction: MultilateralConflict Prevention

Conflict prevention has been among the corefunctions of the UN since its inception. Article 1(1)of the UN Charter states that the first purpose of theUN is to “maintain international peace and security,and to that end: to take effective collective measuresfor the prevention and removal of threats to thepeace, and for the suppression of acts of aggressionor other breaches of the peace, and to bring about bypeaceful means, and in conformity with the princi-ples of justice and international law, adjustment orsettlement of international disputes or situationswhich might lead to a breach of the peace.”

The theory and practice of multilateral conflictprevention has gradually evolved in response toevolving conflict trends and changing geopoliticalconstellations. During the Cold War, the main goalof conflict prevention by the UN was to “keep newlyarising conflicts outside the sphere of bloc differ-ences.”4 The removal of the shackles of the Cold Warled to a significant increase in multilateral efforts tomitigate the risk of future conflict, avoid the escala-tion of ongoing conflict, and forestall relapse intoconflict during the volatile period after massviolence. Gradually, a broader and more coherentconflict-prevention agenda emerged. The 1997report of the Carnegie Commission on PreventingDeadly Conflict5 and the UN Secretary-General’sreport on conflict prevention of 20016 describe twodistinct modes of conflict prevention: operationalprevention, which refers to relatively short-termefforts to forestall incipient or escalating violence,and structural prevention, which refers to measuresto address the root causes of conflict. Thisdichotomy is called into question by contemporarypreventive action that increasingly seeks to createsynergies between short-term political engagement(such as official negotiation and mediation efforts)

and more long-term efforts to strengthen national,local, and regional conflict-prevention capacities.This follows the realization that success inconfronting acute crises (operational prevention)typically requires sustained engagement with theconflicting parties, and that efforts to address theroot causes of conflict (structural prevention)should be designed to have an observable positiveimpact already in the medium term. In recent years,the concept of systemic prevention was coined asthe third component of a comprehensive preventionagenda. It refers to measures to address global riskfactors, which stem from transnational actions thatadversely affect conflict risks in multiple worldregions.7

IPI’s sixteenth New York Seminar took placeagainst the backdrop of renewed interest inmultilateral conflict prevention among UN entitiesand member states, regional and subregionalorganizations, and civil society over the past fewyears. In 2009, the UN General Assembly signifi-cantly enhanced the resources available to theDepartment of Political Affairs, which serves as afocal point for conflict prevention across the UNsystem. In July 2010, under Nigeria’s presidency, theUN Security Council held a thematic debate onpreventive diplomacy. Subsequently, it has alsobegun to hold regular conflict-prevention briefingswith the Department of Political Affairs. In July2011, the government of Turkey, supported by IPI,hosted a retreat for the Security Council in Istanbulon preventive diplomacy and mediation.8 DuringLebanon's presidency of the Security Council inSeptember, the council held a meeting thataddressed conflict prevention, mediation, and thepeaceful settlement of conflicts. The councildiscussed a new report of the Secretary-General,titled Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results, atministerial level, and issued a presidentialstatement on this issue.9 In February of this year, the

4 United Nations Secretary-General, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 16 June 1959-15 June 1960, Addendum 1, UN Doc.A/4390/Add.1, cited in Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Knopf, 1972), p. 256. In this report, UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold observed that“preventive action [in newly arising conflict] must in the first place aim at filling the vacuum so that it will not provoke action from any of the major parties, theinitiative for which might be taken for preventive purposes but might in turn lead to counter-action from the other side.”

5 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997).6 United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict. 7 United Nations Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, UN Doc. A/60/891, July 18, 2006. Systemic prevention includes, for instance,

global initiatives to reduce the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, to stem the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and to tackle environ-mental degradation; action against HIV/AIDS and against narcotics cultivation, trafficking, and addiction; and international efforts to regulate trade in naturalresources that often fuel conflict.

8 Arthur Boutellis, Edward C. Luck, and Christoph Mikulaschek, “Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation,” New York: International Peace Institute, July 2011.9 United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2011/18, September 22, 2011; United Nations Secretary-General, PreventiveDiplomacy: Delivering Results, UN Doc. S/2011/552, August 26, 2011.

Peacebuilding Commission placed Guinea on itsagenda and thus expanded the scope of preventiveefforts beyond postconflict environments toinclude, for the first time, a country that did notrecently experience armed conflict. The AfricanUnion (AU) and the African regional economiccommunities are playing an increasingly significantrole in conflict prevention in Africa, particularlythrough the Continental Early Warning System, thePanel of the Wise, and subregional mechanisms. Inother regions, intergovernmental organizations asdiverse as the Pacific Islands Forum and theEuropean Union increasingly develop means forsettling disputes before they lead to the outbreak ofhostilities.

These developments occur with good reason. Thehuman toll of armed conflict in the past twodecades, particularly in Africa and Asia, has beenenormous. Moreover, resource constraints continueto be a major challenge for multilateral peaceoperations, particularly at a time when the worldfaces a prolonged economic and financial crisis andthe cost of UN peacekeeping amounts to $8 billionper year. There is broad consensus that conflictprevention can help avoid the loss of lives and thedestruction of livelihoods and prosperity, and thatit is less cost intensive and less intrusive thanmultilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping duringand after armed conflict.

Some seminar participants observed thattraditional obstacles to effective multilateralconflict prevention are becoming increasinglysurmountable. Over the past decade, the practice ofmultilateral conflict prevention has been affectedby political evolutions that have led to normativeand institutional innovations. First, the vitalimportance of prevention to the maintenance ofinternational peace and security, which is one of thecore tasks of the UN, is increasingly accepted by allstates.10 Second, there is a trend among states thatface conflict risks toward greater acceptance ofpreventive diplomacy. This development issomewhat uneven across regions, with mostgovernments in Africa and Europe at the forefrontof accepting a greater role for multilateral preven-

tive diplomacy.At the normative level, the vision of a culture of

prevention formulated by the UN Secretary-General and its subsequent endorsement by theGeneral Assembly, as well as the move from astance of non-interference in internal affairs to thedoctrine of non-indifference during the transitionfrom the Organization for African Unity to theAfrican Union, has created new entry points forpreventive diplomacy. The adoption of the respon-sibility to protect by the General Assembly and itsgrowing acceptance across different regions hasalso improved the normative background againstwhich conflict prevention is conducted. Thisnormative evolution has coincided with changes inthe institutional setting for multilateral conflictprevention, which was improved through a signifi-cant increase in and recalibration of the capabilitiesfor the pursuit of early warning, facilitation, goodoffices, and root-cause prevention.

Early Warning andAssessment

Preventive diplomacy holds the best promise ofsuccess when it is conducted at an early stage in adispute, before an incipient crisis has turned into aviolent struggle—when issues are less complicated,parties fewer, positions less hardened, relationshipsless damaged, and emotions more contained.11Sound, timely decision making on conflict preven-tion requires early warning of situations that havethe potential to escalate into armed conflict. Earlywarning comprises accurate and timely reports onimpending crises and balanced assessments of theavailable information on these situations.

The UN Charter authorizes the Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the SecurityCouncil any matter that, in his opinion, maythreaten international peace and security.12 Sincethe late 1940s, the Secretary-General has arguedthat he has the authority to conduct inquiries andinvestigation of situations of concern in order todetermine whether they threaten the peace.13 Over

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10 See, for example, United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict; UN General Assembly Resolution 57/337 (July 18, 2003), UN Doc.1/RES/57/337; UN Security Council Resolution 1625 (September 14, 2005), UN Doc. S/RES/1625; UN General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 74.

11 United Nations Secretary-General, Enhancing Mediation and Its Support Activities, UN Doc. S/2009/189, April 8, 2009, para. 10.12 Charter of the United Nations (1945), Article 99; A. Walter Dorn, “Early and Late Warning by the UN Secretary-General of Threats to the Peace: Article 99

Revisited,” in Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality, edited by Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment (New York: Lexington Books, 2004).13 Bertrand Ramcharan, Preventive Diplomacy at the UN (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), pp. 20-22.

the past twenty years, access to timely informationand reliable assessments has greatly improved forpractitioners of conflict prevention. Today, a varietyof UN departments and agencies, regional organi-zations, nongovernmental organizations, and someindividual states continuously assess risks of armedconflict around the globe.

Acting within their respective mandates, sevenUN bodies currently maintain early-warningsystems related to armed conflict and mass atroci-ties: the Department of Political Affairs, the UNDevelopment Programme, the Department ofPeacekeeping Operations, the Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the WorldFood Programme, the Office of the HighCommissioner for Refugees, and the Office of theSpecial Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.14Unfortunately, there is insufficient informationsharing between these different units.15 In the late1980s and in the early 2000s, two initiatives soughtto consolidate early warning at the UN through theestablishment of a single early-warning office incharge of information gathering and analysisrelated to international peace and security.16However, both attempts ultimately did not succeeddue to considerable resistance from a number ofmember states.17

Early-warning assessments presented to decisionmakers need to take into account political, military,economic, social, and legal factors determining acountry’s underlying susceptibility to descent intoarmed conflict, potential triggers of mass violence,as well as institutional coping mechanisms in theat-risk country, such as credible judicialmechanisms, participatory government, nonstateconflict-resolution fora, and an active civil society.18One of the greatest challenges to assessing the riskof future conflict is the difficulty of predicting itstiming. This observation is illustrated by the failureof many of the most seasoned experts on the Arab

World to foresee the uprisings, revolutions, andcivil conflicts of the 2011 Arab Spring. The timespan between the articulation of a grievance and itstranslation into armed violence greatly varies acrosstime and space, both between and within countries.

Early-warning providers are confronted with abasic dilemma. On the one hand, an opportunityfor preventive diplomacy is missed when nowarning is provided by the time armed conflict isabout to break out. On the other hand, erroneouslyalerting actors of the need to address a putativeconflict risk also has negative repercussions. Iterodes trust in the early-warning system and breedsresentment of undue interference in the internalaffairs of states that successfully resolve crises evenwithout third-party intervention.

Translating early warning into timely preventiveaction constitutes an additional major challenge.The following two sections address two specifictypes of preventive action: preventive diplomacyand root-cause prevention.

Preventive Diplomacy

The 1992 Agenda for Peace defines preventivediplomacy as “action to prevent disputes fromarising between parties, to prevent existing disputesfrom escalating into conflicts and to limit thespread of the latter when they occur.”19 The firstobjective of preventive diplomacy is to facilitatecooperative problem solving among the partiesthrough the pursuit of mediation, facilitation, orgood offices. Second, preventive diplomacy canseek to alter the disputing factions’ incentivestructure. Conditional incentives, threats ofsanctions and of the use of force, and publicdiplomacy all change the parties’ calculations of thebenefits of seeking confrontation or cooperationwith the other side. Third, preventive diplomacymay include actions that seek to strengthen


14 Micah Zenko and Rebecca Friedman, “UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict,” International Peacekeeping 18, No. 1 (2011). 15 See United Nations Secretary-General, Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect, UN Doc. A/64/864, July 14, 2010, para. 10.16 In 1987, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar established the Office for Research and the Collection of Information. See, United Nations, The Office for

Research and the Collection of Information, UN Doc. ST/SGB/SB/223, March 1, 1987. In 2000, the “Brahimi report” recommended that the Executive Committee onPeace and Security establish an Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat. See, United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UNDoc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, paras. 65-75.

17 The Office for Research and the Collection of Information was dissolved in 1992, when some of its functions were taken over by the new Department of PoliticalAffairs. The creation of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat was twice proposed by the Secretary-General, but never approved by the GeneralAssembly.

18 Christoph Mikulaschek, “The UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect: Policy, Process, and Practice,” Favorita Papers 1 (2010): 32.19 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, UN Doc. A/47/277–S/24111, June 17, 1992, paras.

20, 23.

moderates and manage spoilers within each side’sleadership, through assistance, threats, andsanctions. Fourth, by imposing arms embargoesand targeted sanctions, and by employing preven-tive peacekeeping, third-parties can also restrict theparties’ capacity and willingness to wage war.

Preventive diplomacy has traditionally been acentral component of conflict prevention. Article33 of the UN Charter lists mediation, conciliation,enquiry, and resort to regional agencies andarrangements alongside negotiation, arbitration,and judicial settlement as means by which theparties shall peacefully settle their dispute if itscontinuation is likely to endanger the maintenanceof international peace and security. AN EVOLVING DIVISION OF LABOR

In recent years, the practice of multilateral preven-tive diplomacy has evolved significantly. Theemergence of new actors who regularly pursuemediation and preventive diplomacy, as well asadjustments to existing capabilities and operatingprocedures, has altered the roles of differentmultilateral institutions and decision-making forain this field.The United Nations Security Council

The UN Charter provides the Security Council witha broad mandate for conducting preventivediplomacy. Under Article 34, the council mayinvestigate any dispute or any situation that mightlead to international friction or give rise to adispute. At any stage in such a dispute, it mayrecommend terms of settlement or conflict-resolu-tion fora to the parties concerned.20 One way for theSecurity Council to engage in preventive diplomacyis to convey signals about its collective will to theparties—formally or informally. The council maydo so by adding a situation to its agenda, adoptinga resolution, issuing a presidential statement,conducting an interactive dialogue with an at-riskstate, or undertaking a mission to the conflicttheater. The council can also establish commissionsof inquiry or panels of experts to investigate asituation more closely. The council may request

that the Secretary-General conducts preventivediplomacy or appoints a special envoy or represen-tative. Moreover, it can assign good-offices tasks topeace operations or special political missions. If adispute has deteriorated to the point where itconstitutes a threat to international peace andsecurity, the Security Council may impose targetedsanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter inorder to prevent a further escalation of thesituation.

The question of whether a specific dispute shouldbe added to the Security Council’s agenda is oftenhighly controversial among council members, theparties to the dispute, interested third states, andother states that are concerned about the kind ofprecedent such an action might set. Sometimes,discreet preventive action may be less contentiousand more likely to enjoy the backing of all SecurityCouncil members. For instance, Security Councilmissions provide opportunities for discreet preven-tive diplomacy since they allow council members tohave confidential conversations with governmentaland nongovernmental actors in the dispute theaterand its region. While on mission, the SecurityCouncil can convey threats, offer positiveincentives, and signal its commitment topreventing an escalation of the dispute.21

The Security Council’s Working Group onConflict Prevention and Resolution in Africaprovides another potential tool for engaging indiscreet operational prevention. In contrast to theoriginal proposal by the Secretary-General in 1999to establish a subsidiary organ to discuss preven-tion cases on a more continuing basis, the workinggroup has so far focused on thematic rather thancountry-specific issues.22

Since November 2010, a new type of briefing tothe Security Council by the UN Department ofPolitical Affairs has provided a forum for informalconsultations in the council on emerging securityissues. Since then, monthly “horizon scanning”briefings have allowed for proactive discussions onspecific country situations on and off the council’sformal agenda as well as on thematic issues such as

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20 Charter of the United Nations, Articles 36 and 37.21 For instance, during its mission to West Africa in 2004, the council visited Guinea, which was not on its formal agenda, to discuss how instability in neighboring

Sierra Leone had affected the Guinean province of Guinea-Forestière, and how the UN could work with the Guinean government to prevent conflict fromspreading across the border. Christoph Mikulaschek, “The UN Security Council and the Responsibility to Protect.”

22 International Peace Institute, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” IPI Blue Paper No. 7, Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral SecurityCapacity, New York, 2009, p. 35.

that of election-related conflicts in Africa.23 TheDepartment of Political Affairs has to keep thebriefings as factual as possible in order to respectthe Security Council’s prerogative to determinewhether a situation constitutes a threat to interna-tional peace and security, and to nurture councilmembers’ trust in the balanced nature of thesebriefings. At this point, it is still too early to tellwhether this innovation in the council’s workingmethods can help council members to get to gripswith emerging security issues. Regular horizon-scanning briefings should continue, as long as theybenefit the timely use of preventive diplomacy bythe Security Council.The United Nations Secretary-General

By his own account, the UN Secretary-General hasincreased his use of good offices and mediation asinstruments for conflict prevention in recentyears.24 The Secretary-General can get involved inpreventive diplomacy in three ways. First, anintergovernmental organ, primarily the SecurityCouncil or the General Assembly, may give him amandate for using his good offices in a specificcrisis. Second, the parties themselves can ask him toprovide good offices. Third, the Secretary-Generalcan act on his own initiative on the basis of hisauthority under Article 99 of the UN Charter,which states that “[t]he Secretary-General maybring to the attention of the Security Council anymatter which in his opinion may threaten themaintenance of international peace and security.”The third option is the most politically delicate onefor the Secretary-General, and it involves a difficultjudgment call. Should the Secretary-General onlyintervene when success is relatively likely, or shouldhe also offer his good offices when hostilities areimminent and the prospects for successful conflictprevention are dim? Arguably, it is in the lattersituations that the Secretary-General’s ability todirectly speak to heads of state and ask other worldleaders to intervene will be most urgently needed.At the same time, frequent failures of preventive

diplomacy will weaken the Secretary-General’sauthority, and by introducing sensible proposals fordispute resolution at the wrong moment, he risksdiscrediting them. In taking this difficult decision,the Secretary-General should apply judgment andprinciple. He should not be expected to offer goodoffices under all circumstances.

When the Secretary-General engages in preven-tive diplomacy on his own initiative, he has to winthe confidence of the Security Council and ofinterested third states not represented on thecouncil. When he succeeds in gaining the trust ofthese states, he may have considerable latitude. TheSecretary-General’s relationship with the SecurityCouncil will be most constructive when theSecurity Council understands that the Secretary-General is more than just the Secretariat’s chiefadministrative officer, and when the Secretary-General keeps in mind that, within the UnitedNations, the primary responsibility for the mainte-nance of international peace and security lies withthe Security Council. When Security Councilmembers are deeply divided on how to avert anescalating crisis, the resulting deadlock provides theSecretary-General with opportunities for takinginitiatives in the absence of strictly circumscribedmandates. At the same time, his preventive effortsrisk meeting stiff opposition from parties to theconflict and third states that view his strategy, or hismere involvement in preventive diplomacy, ascontrary to their interests.

As early as in the 1960s, then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld envisaged a ring ofspecial representatives in different parts of theworld at risk of conflict.25 In recent years, his visionhas gradually turned into a reality. At present, theUN and regional organizations maintain severaldozen good-offices missions in or in proximity tocountries faced with significant risks of conflict.26These missions have not only increased in number,many of them also perform more complexmandates than in the past.27 The UN established


23 See, Security Council Report, “Conflict Prevention Briefings,” New York, January 2011.24 United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1625 (2005) on Conflict Prevention,

Particularly in Africa, UN Doc. S/2008/18, January 14, 2008, para. 5. 25 Ramcharan, Preventive Diplomacy at the UN, p. 31.26 For UN and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) missions, see Richard Gowan, ed., 2010 Review of Political Missions (New York: Center

on International Cooperation, 2010).27 The mandates of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) are particu-

larly complex. See UN Security Council Resolution 1974 (March 22, 2011), UN Doc. S/RES/1974; UN Security Council Resolution 1770 (August 10, 2007), UNDoc. S/RES/1770.

three political missions with subregional mandatesin West Africa, Central Asia, and most recently inCentral Africa. These regional offices are staffedwith pre-deployed high-level envoys and politicalofficers supporting them. Their location in theregion allows them to “keep their ears to theground.” Since they are at a greater distance fromthe conflict theater than missions directly deployedto the location of the crisis, preventive diplomacyconducted from regional offices is typicallyperceived as less intrusive than similar effortspursued in the at-risk country. When facilitationand good offices are made available from a regionaloffice, the UN country team and its resident coordi-nator can refrain from conducting preventivediplomacy, which often risks jeopardizing the goodrelations with national actors they require for theirhumanitarian, developmental, and other work.28

At UN headquarters, the General Assemblyapproved a significant increase in the capabilities ofthe Department of Political Affairs in 2009.29 A yearearlier, the Department of Political Affairs hadestablished a Mediation Support Unit to provideoperational support to mediators and envoys in thefield, to strengthen the capacity of regional andsubregional organizations, and to serve as a reposi-tory of best practices and lessons learned onmediation and preventive action. The unit’s activi-ties also include maintaining rosters of mediatorsand improving the training for envoys andmediation experts on their team. In 2008, theStandby Team of Mediation Experts at theMediation Support Unit became operational as asix-person roster of thematic experts who canprovide advice to UN and non-UN mediators in thefield. While team members deployed seventy-seventimes to almost thirty countries between 2008 andOctober 2010 to support mediation efforts, theyhave rarely been called upon for preventive action,with a few notable exceptions, including a conflict-analysis mission to Kyrgyzstan.30 A recent evalua-tion of the standby team has found that it could also“add value and contribute to early fact finding,

conflict analysis and facilitation at an early stage inorder to prevent crises from breaking out.”31

Regional Organizations

Regional organizations in many parts of the worldare increasingly active in the pursuit of preventivediplomacy. One recent study even concluded thatsince the 1990s the majority of conflict-preventioninitiatives have been launched at the regional level.32Today, regional organizations tasked with engagingin preventive diplomacy include the African Union,African subregional organizations, the Associationof Southeast Asian Nations, the European Union,the Organization for Security and Cooperation inEurope, the Organization of American States, theOrganization of the Islamic Conference, the PacificIslands Forum, and others. Consequently, observershave noted that there is a growing expectation thatregional organizations should offer good officesand facilitation to their members, and that statesshould submit deteriorating disputes to regional aswell as international institutions.

The increase in capabilities for early action at theUN described above was mirrored by the creationand enhancement of similar capacities in manyregions. The African Union, for instance, isoperationalizing the African Peace and SecurityArchitecture and a Continental Early WarningSystem. It has also formed the Panel of the Wise,whose work focuses on conflict prevention.

Regional organizations are frequently betterpositioned than their international counterparts forthe early detection of simmering crises, since theytend to have networks of contacts in each memberstate. Through frequent interactions with theirmembers, regional organizations develop anintricate knowledge of the historical background ofdisputes in their region and build trust in regionalcapitals. Preventive diplomacy by regional organi-zations is often more acceptable to nationalsensitivities than similar efforts carried out by theUN. In addition, regional organizations frequentlyhave a comparative advantage in shaping compre-

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28 Theresa Whitfield, “Political Missions, Mediation and Good Offices,” in Gowan, 2010 Review of Political Missions, pp. 31-32.29 It created forty-nine new posts for staff devoted to mediation, good offices, and conflict prevention. UN General Assembly Resolution 63/261 (March 5, 2009),

Strengthening of the Department of Political Affairs, UN Doc. A/RES/63/261.30 Oliver Wils and Antje Herrberg, “Evaluation of the Mediation Support Unit Standby Team of Mediation Experts: Final Report,” Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council,

January 2011, pp. 14, 16.31 Ibid., p. 16.32 Alex Bellamy, “Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect,” Global Governance 14, No. 2 (2008): 147.

hensive regional approaches to transnationaldimensions of conflicts.33

Not all regional organizations are created equal,and in some regions, such as Northeast Asia, theyare lacking. In Africa and other parts of the world,the capabilities for implementing ambitiousconflict-prevention mandates among regional andsubregional organizations are only slowly material-izing. Sometimes, conflict parties that want to avoidor delay peaceful dispute settlement seek to exploitregional organizations’ institutional weaknesses byinsisting on regional, rather than international,leadership in preventive diplomacy and conflictresolution. When a dispute involves the perceivedvital interests of great powers from outside theregion, or when the members of a regional organi-zation are deeply divided on how to address thecrisis, the UN typically has a comparativeadvantage over regional organizations inconducting preventive diplomacy.

The UN Secretariat displays increasing eagernessto collaborate with regional organizations in thepursuit of preventive diplomacy. The Secretary-General convened meetings with the chief officersof regional organizations, who also briefed theSecurity Council last year. Annual meetingsbetween the Security Council and the AfricanUnion’s Peace and Security Council constitute aforum for dialogue between these bodies, and theAfrican Union’s peace and security commissionerbriefs the Security Council several times per year.

Most seminar participants agreed that the firstthird-party effort to address a deteriorating crisisshould ideally come from the affected region.When the Security Council subsequently takesaction to maintain international peace and security,regional organizations and their members shouldpush for unbiased and timely preventive action bythe UN. In accordance with Chapter VIII of the UNCharter, regional organizations often take the leadin contemporary preventive diplomacy.Increasingly, the UN provides mediation support toregional organizations rather than being at thehelm of these initiatives itself. Sometimes, the

question of leadership in preventive diplomacy isdeeply controversial. For instance, many membersof the African Union felt that the organization wasmarginalized in the multilateral response to theconflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Libya in 2010 and2011. States and Nongovernmental Actors

Individual states have traditionally played a criticalrole in preventive diplomacy and remain vitallyimportant in this endeavor. In recent years Brazil,Qatar, Turkey, and other states have joined Norway,Switzerland, and the United States in the group ofcountries that frequently engage in preventivediplomacy and mediation.

Over the past two decades, the number andcapacity of nongovernmental institutions thatconduct preventive diplomacy and mediation hasgreatly increased as well.34 Governments confrontedwith a deteriorating dispute tend to regard preven-tive diplomacy conducted by nonstate mediationorganizations as a lesser interference in theirinternal affairs than similar actions pursued by aninternational organization or third state.Nongovernmental entities face fewer political andbureaucratic constraints than most internationalorganizations and states in quickly deployingexperts to the field. Therefore, they have alsobecome increasingly active in providing expertsupport to states and international organizationsengaged in preventive diplomacy. In somesituations, they have been instrumental in familiar-izing nonstate armed groups with the conduct ofnegotiations. Local, national, and internationalnongovernmental institutions also increasingly playa critical role in early warning and advocacy to raiseawareness of impending crises.OBSTACLES TO TIMELY ANDEFFECTIVE ACTION

Preventive diplomacy faces several perennialchallenges, including the conflict parties’ resent-ment of outsiders’ interference, third parties’ lack ofwill to invest political capital in facilitation andearly mediation, and financial and operationalconstraints.


33 For instance, the Economic Community of West African States has launched a small arms program to address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons asa destabilizing factor in member states at risk of armed conflict.

34 See, for example, Crisis Management Initiative, “The Private Diplomacy Survey 2008: Mapping of 14 Private Diplomacy Actors in Europe and America,” Helsinki:Crisis Management Initiative, 2008.

Consent of Conflicting Parties

The consent of the parties to a dispute is a prereq-uisite for preventive diplomacy, which cannotsucceed unless the factions understand the risksassociated with crisis escalation and attemptcooperative problem solving. Governments facedwith the likely outbreak of hostilities are frequentlyin denial of the crisis.35 They tend to admit having aproblem only when it is too late for them to managethe dispute by offering concessions. Governmentstypically fear that third-party facilitators’ discus-sions with both sides will bestow legitimacy uponopposition groups by treating them as parties,rather than granting the government a monopolyon legitimate representation, and by redefiningcertain events as acts of war rather than crimes.36Thus, governments are concerned that preventivediplomacy levels the playing field in which thegovernment and the opposition conduct theircontest over political power. Finally, governmentsoften fear that preventive diplomacy by the UN willinevitably lead to more intrusive forms of multilat-eral conflict management, such as the imposition ofsanctions or the establishment of a peace operation.

The UN increasingly builds on the parties’ greaterpreparedness to accommodate developmentassistance rather than political engagement bypursuing joint programs between the Departmentof Political Affairs and the UN DevelopmentProgramme, which combine political process facili-tation and help to address the root causes ofgrievances. Moreover, the establishment ofpermanent regional offices in Central and WestAfrica and in Central Asia has helped theDepartment of Political Affairs to nurture the trustof regional actors through routine interaction.Political Will and Consensus AmongPotential Sponsors

Observers and activists frequently bemoan the“lack of political will” of UN intergovernmentalorgans and their regional counterparts to sponsorand support timely conflict-prevention efforts. In

part, this can be explained by the difficulty ofmobilizing attention and political capital for aresponse to a situation that has not yet escalated. Attimes, it follows from an “excess of political wills,”37meaning that third states capable of engaging inpreventive diplomacy also pursue other policyobjectives, such as the maintenance of political andtrade relationships with at-risk states. These othernational foreign-policy goals often trump thepursuit of conflict prevention. In international andregional organizations, a lack of consensus amonggreat powers and other interested states on astrategy for early response to a deteriorating crisiscan be a third reason for the absence of political willto pursue preventive diplomacy. Internationalorganizations’ inaction may result from some states’suspicions that multilateral preventive diplomacyin a given crisis will pursue the hidden agendas ofgreat powers.

International norms and principles such as theresponsibility to protect, which establish objectivecriteria for preventive engagement by internationalorganizations and other third parties, may providea rallying point for civil society organizations,which can help generate political will for preventivediplomacy. When these norms and principles areimpartially applied, they may also help nurtureconsensus among states on the timely pursuit ofpreventive diplomacy by international organiza-tions.Financial and Bureaucratic Constraints

The significant increase in the capabilities of theDepartment of Political Affairs in 2009 has reversedthe trend of under-resourcing preventivediplomacy at the UN. However, special politicalmissions continue to be funded through the regularbiennial budget, in contrast to UN peaceoperations. This funding mechanism hampers theability of the UN Secretariat to react swiftly to newcrises through preventive diplomacy.38 So far, theSecretariat has mitigated the problem by seekingextra-budgetary voluntary contributions, which are

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35 Francis Deng, “Idealism and Realism – Negotiating Sovereignty in Divided Nations,” Development Dialogue 55 (March 2011): 95.36 Barnett Rubin and Bruce Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict: Tasks and Challenges for the United Nations,” Global Governance 13 (2007): 396.37 Michael Lund, “Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice,” in The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution, edited by Jacob Bercovitch et al.

(London: Sage, 2009), p. 296. For a case study discussing this problem in the context of preventive diplomacy in Kenya during the 1990s and early 2000s, seeStephen Brown, “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring ‘Ethnic Clashes’ in Kenya,” in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of ViolentConflict, edited by Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 84-86.

38 For a description of the negative implications of this funding mechanism on mediation in Nepal, see Ian Martin, “All Peace Operations Are Political: A Case forDesigner Missions and the Next UN Reform,” in Gowan, 2010 Review of Political Missions, pp. 5-6.

less forthcoming in times of fiscal austerity andeconomic malaise across many regions. The TrustFund for Preventive Action is the only source of“surge funding” for UN preventive diplomacy, butapproval of disbursements from the fund takesconsiderable time to comply with internal regula-tions on the management of trust funds.39

Even in the absence of financial constraints, turfbattles within international organizations canhamper the prospects of success for preventivediplomacy. Development agencies, humanitarianactors, and political officers who work on themitigation of a deteriorating crisis on a daily basismay resent the arrival of a new actor for focusedcrisis diplomacy, since the latter’s engagement canreduce their own authority and may signal thattheir own preventive efforts have failed. Theseactors may also fear that conflict parties’ potentialresentment of a third party’s preventive diplomacywill adversely affect their own relationship with thegovernment and the opposition, thus making itharder for them to deliver on their own mandate inthe short term. Concrete Costs for Uncertain Benefits

Last but not least, the lack of political will andfunding for multilateral preventive diplomacy mayin part stem from the difficulty of proving that anypreventive diplomacy effort was causal in averting aconflict, which arguably may not have broken outeven in the absence of third-party engagement.Missions carrying out good offices are often taskedto “advise,” “assist,” “encourage,” or “support”national actors, and thus their achievements may beintangible. While success may be difficult to proveand intangible, cases of preventive diplomacy’sfailure, such as in Georgia in 2008 and Kyrgyzstanin 2010, are well documented. The relativelymodest cost of conducting preventive diplomacyand the massive human toll of not successfullypreventing armed conflict should make it easier toaccept the dilemma that the benefits of preventionare uncertain and realized in the future, while thecosts are quantifiable in the present.

Structural Prevention

Even before greed and grievances translate intodisputes, national, regional, and internationalactors can engage in root-cause prevention topredict and forestall future conflicts. Root-cause orstructural prevention addresses factors that canraise the risk of the outbreak of armed conflict inthe medium or long term. Today’s practitioners ofstructural prevention not only seek to mitigate riskfactors, they also aim to transform the institutionalenvironment in the at-risk society to build local andnational resources for peaceful dispute resolution.Since the vast majority of today’s armed conflictstake place within one country rather than betweenstates, this section focuses on the structural preven-tion of civil conflict.40

ROOT CAUSES OF CONTEMPORARYARMED CONFLICT

The 2001 report of the UN Secretary-General onconflict prevention identifies four structuralfactors associated with conflict risks: inequity(disparities among identity groups), inequality(policies and practices that institutionalize discrim-ination), injustice (lack of rule of law, effective andfair law enforcement and administration of justice,and equitable representation in government), andinsecurity (lack of human security and accountableand transparent security-sector governance).41However, none of these root causes invariably leadsto armed conflict. Rather, these factors generallyprovide a fertile setting for accumulatinggrievances, gathering combatants, and launchingarmed confrontation.

One of the most robust findings in the economicresearch on civil conflict is that low national percapita income is associated with higher conflictrisk.42 Alleviating the plight of the “bottom billion”would make a major contribution to the structuralprevention of armed conflict. However, not everyincrease in the per capita Gross Domestic Product(GDP) improves prospects for peace. Economicgrowth can widen disparities when its benefits are


39 Rubin and Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict,” p. 405.40 Of all seventy-one armed conflicts between 2000 and 2010, only four were interstate armed conflicts. No extrastate conflicts were recorded during that period. See,

Uppsala Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo, Armed Conflict Dataset v.4, 2011. 41 United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 100.42 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, No. 1 (2003); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed

and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, No. 4 (2004).

concentrated in the hands of some identity groupswhile others are marginalized. When a country’seconomy significantly depends on natural-resourceexploitation, it is vulnerable to armed conflict, sincephysical control of mines and wells can make itpossible to finance a rebellion and incites rent-seeking behavior by armed groups.

High unemployment, particularly youthunemployment, is also associated with a high riskof conflict, even though econometric research hasfailed to find statistically significant correlations.43The problem of political instability linked tounemployment can be particularly acute incountries with a “youth bulge,” a populationcomprised of a large number of youth compared toother age groups.44

Horizontal inequality, which occurs whendifferent regional, ethnic, or religious identitygroups have unequal access to political, economic,and social resources, also constitutes a risk factorthat can lead to political violence.45 The social,economic, cultural, and political status of indige-nous peoples in many countries in the Americasprovides an example of long-standing andpersistent horizontal discrimination. Today, itconstitutes an increasingly salient problem, partic-ularly since many of the unexploited naturalresources in the Western Hemisphere are located inareas claimed by marginalized indigenouscommunities.

Economic shocks, such as food- and energy-priceshocks, can trigger armed conflicts in states whoseconsumers or exporters are unable to absorbsudden losses resulting from fluctuations of theprice of critical commodities. In fragile, low-income countries, average households spend 57percent of their expenditure on food, making foodsecurity and relative food-price stability criticalpreconditions for maintaining broader stability andpeace.46

These and other risk factors are most likely tolead to armed conflicts in states with weak institu-tions for mediating and controlling violence.47

Weak government institutions are characterized bya low degree of institutional capacity, accounta-bility, and/or inclusiveness. They may be the legacyof long-standing horizontal inequality involvingdiscrimination in political participation and accessto public services, or of an elite pact ending anearlier conflict by dividing government rentsamong small leadership groups. To a limited extent,civil society can step into the void left by weakgovernment institutions to help prevent armed-conflict risk factors from translating into actualpolitical violence.ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES

One seminar participant described structuralprevention as a reform program for states at risk ofarmed conflict. It encompasses a wide range ofpolicies addressing the various risk factors outlinedabove. Building Legitimate National Institutions

In line with the observation that effective and legiti-mate institutions make a society more resilient toconflict risks, institution building is often animportant component of structural prevention. Bybuilding democratic, inclusive processes a politycan ensure that disagreements do not escalate intopolitical violence and conflict.49 Strengthening therule of law, improving security and justice-sectorgovernance, and promoting participatory andinclusive decision making through electoralassistance are now among the core goals of multilat-eral conflict-prevention efforts before and afterconflict. In postconflict countries, rebuilding afunctioning and equitable state is often a genera-tional task that requires long-term engagement bydonors. Holding elections should not be seen as anexit strategy for international supporters of institu-tion-building processes.

The population will only regard their governmentinstitutions as legitimate if they have some capacityto deliver basic public services. The absence offunctioning education, health, security, and justicesectors, or grossly inequitable access to their

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43 World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (Washington, DC, 2011), pp. 78-79. 44 United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 124.45 Frances Stewart, ed., Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict. Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).46 Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, Food Insecurity and Conflict: Applying the WDR Framework (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010).47 World Bank, World Development Report 2011, pp. 84-89.48 United Nations Secretary-General, Report on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1625 (2005), para. 37.49 United Nations Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 26; see also UN General Assembly Resolution 57/337.

services, can create insecurity and inequity, whichare among the root causes of armed conflict.Fulfillment of the Millennium Development Goalshas been identified as the “indispensible foundationof prevention.”49 International donors play a criticalrole in supporting the provision of basic publicservices in low-income countries. Whether theyprovide aid through national institutions or outsideof them will impact on public perceptions of thequality of national public bureaucracies. Observershave noted that in Afghanistan, for instance, thedisbursement of aid through nongovernmentalorganizations has weakened the legitimacy of thegovernment. When aid finances public-servicedelivery through community-driven development,it can secure political benefits in addition to thesocial or economic benefit offered. Community-driven development is an “approach that empowerslocal communities, including local governments, bygiving direct control to the community overplanning decisions and investment resourcesthrough a process that emphasizes participatoryplanning and accountability.”50 It can help generategood governance from the grassroots andstrengthen bonds between the government and itscitizens. In divided societies, community-drivendevelopment can strengthen social cohesionbetween identity groups.

The pursuit of equalizing policies addressinghorizontal inequality in the economic, social, andpolitical sphere can contribute to the goal of root-cause prevention. In Liberia, for instance, a batteryof tools has been used to this effect. A lack of dataon disparities often hampers the effectiveness ofsuch preventive efforts. Seminar participantssuggested that this gap in in-country analyticcapabilities should be addressed through dedicatedefforts by international donors.

The regulation and enforcement of bans on illegalexploitation and trafficking of natural resources atthe national, regional, and international levels canmitigate the conflict risks associated with thepresence of exploitable natural resources in low-

income countries. The Governance and EconomicAssistance Management Program (GEMAP)developed by the Government of Liberia and theInternational Contact Group on Liberia constituteexamples of programs that seek to improve goodgovernance in the management of natural resourceexploitation and thus mitigate destructiveincentives to prey on the country’s resourcewealth.51

Delivering Conflict-Sensitive Aid

Development aid can lead to sustainable prosperity,but at times it also generates or fuels politicaltensions in the recipient state. Therefore, donorsand recipients should monitor how developmentpolicies, programs, and projects in low-incomecountries at risk of armed conflict impact onequality, justice, and security. Development aid cannever be assumed to be neutral vis-à-vis conflictrisks, particularly in low-income countries where itmay dwarf other sources of government revenue.Through its impact on national economic andsocial policies, such as the allocation of budgets andpublic-sector employment, aid can mitigate oraugment conflict risks. However, adverse sideeffects on political tensions were too oftenoverlooked in development planning in the past.For instance, the irrigation of Sri Lanka’s largestriver flowing north-east through a sparselypopulated dry zone in the east and the resettlementof 30,000 families from the country’s denselypopulated south and west to the east increased thesense of Tamil marginalization in their own“homeland” and contributed to the deterioration ofthe civil conflict.52 Many aid groups that were activein Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s had veryfavorable views of the country’s economic perform-ance since they used development indicators thatdid not capture the way it exacerbated the dividealong ethnic lines.53

Today, the UN, international financial institu-tions, bilateral donors, and nongovernmental aidproviders are becoming increasingly sensitive to theimpact of development aid on conflict risks.


50 World Bank, Community-Driven Development in the Context of Conflict-Affected Countries: Challenges and Opportunities (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), p. 6.51 Renata Dwan and Laura Bailey, “Liberia’s Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme (GEMAP): A Joint Review by the Department of

Peacekeeping Operations’ Peacekeeping Best Practices Section and the World Bank’s Fragile States Group,” New York: United Nations Department of PeacekeepingOperations, May 2006.

52 Vincent Fruchart, Per Egil Wam, and William Webster, “Effective Poverty-Reduction Strategies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Lessons andSuggestions,” Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2009, p. 5.

53 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda (West Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998).

However, a recent survey of Poverty ReductionStrategy Papers (PRSPs) for thirty-two Africancountries affected by conflict found that no system-atic attention was given to analyses of economic andsocial causes or consequences of armed conflict.54 Inpart, this may be due to the fact that other objectivesof national development policy and developmentaid often trump considerations related to conflictprevention. This problem is epitomized by a lack ofcoherence within the governments of many donorcountries and aid recipients. In Afghanistan, forinstance, members of the security community inKabul took important security decisions with majorlong-term ramifications for conflict prevention andeconomic development without sufficient consulta-tion with agencies and programs focusing onpoverty reduction and structural prevention. At theUN, the Interagency Framework for Coordinationon Preventive Action strives to mainstreamsensitivity to conflict risks across the organizationby generating awareness of the short- and long-termramifications of developmental, political, andhumanitarian efforts on conflict risks. It bringstogether officials from twenty-two agencies anddepartments to pool information and analysis anddevelop multidisciplinary strategies for conflictprevention. Root-Cause Prevention in the Aftermathof Armed Conflict

In about half of all countries emerging from civilwar renewed hostilities break out within ten yearsof the termination of the previous conflict.55 Thus,postconflict countries tend to be particularly inneed of preventive action by national, regional, andinternational actors. Political settlements are oftenconcluded by a small elite, and they may not last ifthey are not transformed into broader societalcompacts that can be adjusted when new grievancesarise. Postconflict root-cause prevention needs torestore confidence in security- and justice-sectorinstitutions, which is likely to have been severelyundermined during the conflict.

States emerging from armed conflict tend toattract more generous assistance from regional andinternational actors in their efforts to attaineconomic development and sustainable peace thancountries that have not experienced massivepolitical violence. Postconflict assistance includesmultilateral peace operations, which deployedmore than 250,000 peacekeepers around the worldlast year.56 The United Nations PeacebuildingCommission, which was established in 2005, istasked with bringing together all relevant actors forpostconflict peacebuilding to marshal resources,provide strategic advice, and develop bestpractices.57

Systemic Prevention: Addressing theRoot Causes of Conflict at the GlobalLevel

Some of the most salient conflict risk factors canmost effectively be addressed through globalregulation and capacity building. Illegal exploita-tion of and trafficking in natural resources, flows ofillegal narcotics, money laundering, the prolifera-tion of small arms and light weapons, and environ-mental degradation and climate change are cross-regional phenomena with a negative impact onconflict risks. Their destabilizing effects can bemitigated by setting and implementing globalstandards and by building capacity at the local,national, regional, and international levels.58

Illegal drug cultivation and trafficking andassociated criminal violence challenge the rule oflaw and generate instability in Central America,Central Asia, and other regions. Since drugtrafficking constitutes a mainly demand-drivenprocess, stemming the flow of illegal narcoticsrequires action by producer and transit states aswell as consumer countries. Measures to stemillegal narcotics flows and associated conflict risksinclude both reducing poverty that drives cultiva-tion in exporting states and concerted efforts tocombat addiction in importing countries.59

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54 Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and Robert Picciotto, “Integrating Conflict Prevention in Development Policy and Aid Agendas,” Tokyo: Japan International CooperationAgency and UNDP, March 2008, p. 11.

55 Ibrahim Elbadawi, Håvard Hegre, and Gary Milante, “The Aftermath of Civil War,” Journal of Peace Research 45, No. 4 (2008): 455; Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, andMåns Söderbom, “Post-Conflict Risks,” Journal of Peace Research 45, No. 4 (2008).

56 Jake Sherman, ed., Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011 (New York: Center on International Cooperation, 2011), p. 4.57 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/180 (December 20, 2005), UN Doc. A/RES/180; UN Security Council Resolution 1645 (December 20, 2005), UN Doc.

S/RES/1645.58 James Cockayne and Christoph Mikulaschek, “Transnational Security Challenges and the United Nations: Overcoming Sovereign Walls and Institutional Silos,” New

York: International Peace Academy, 2008.59 The Hemispheric Drug Strategy adopted by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States in 2010 is but

one recent example of efforts at systemic prevention of drug-related violence and instability.

Illicit exploitation and trafficking of naturalresources, such as diamonds, timber, and coltan,have been addressed by country-specific measures,which include export sanctions imposed by the UNSecurity Council on postconflict countries that risksliding back into conflict. In addition, theKimberley Process has established a certificationscheme for rough diamonds, which covers morethan 99 percent of global production.60 It consti-tutes a joint effort by governments, the diamondindustry, and civil society. More internationalassistance for low-income participating countrieswould be necessary to enable all of them to meetthe extensive requirements of the certificationscheme. The Extractive Industries TransparencyInitiative is another initiative aimed at mitigatingthe adverse side effects that natural resource wealthcan have on stability and peace. It commits oil, gas,and mining companies in participating states todisclose payments to governments and obliges thelatter to divulge information on these payments aswell.

The abundance of small arms and light weaponsin low- and medium-income countries makesrecourse to violent strategies in political disputesseem more attractive and therefore increases thelikelihood of armed conflict. Proliferation in smallarms and light weapons can most effectively bestemmed through coordinated action by stateswhere small arms are produced, stockpiled, andtraded through arms brokers, as well as countries atthe receiving end of the proliferation chain. The2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat andEradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and LightWeapons in All Its Aspects constitutes an effort toprevent the further spread of these weapons. So far,implementation of the program of action has beenuneven and slow.61 The 2012 Review Conferencemay provide a forum for improving the effective-ness of this tool for systemic prevention.

Coherence andCoordination in ConflictPrevention

Over the past twenty years the number anddiversity of actors engaged in conflict preventionhas significantly increased. Today, more interna-tional and regional organizations, individual states,and nonstate organizations conduct structural andoperational prevention than ever before. In mostsituations of escalating crisis, multiple third partiessimultaneously undertake preventive action. Inmultiparty conflict-prevention initiatives, coordi-nation and leadership among third parties are oftenmissing. In the absence of agreement among thirdparties on their respective roles, the messagedelivered to the parties engaged in an escalatingdispute is often incoherent, synergies are notexploited, leverage cannot be applied effectively,and thus the prospects of success at prevention arerelatively dim.OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVECOORDINATION

The reasons for a lack of coherence and coordina-tion in conflict prevention are numerous. Whenstates and international organizations engage inpreventive action, they typically do not merely seekto prevent a conflict but also have distinct—andsometimes conflicting—national and institutionalinterests related to the outcome of the dispute andthe political landscape in the country after thecrisis. The objective of some actors may be to attaina comprehensive solution to the crisis. Others maypursue the narrower goal of containing a crisis inorder to maintain regional stability, or of freezing along-standing, simmering dispute. Divergence inthe interests and objectives of third parties caneasily translate into disputes over leadership and alack of coordination among them. Competition


60 United Nations Secretary-General, Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 16.61 See the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security (London: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 2;

Sarah Parker, “Improving the Effectiveness of the Programme of Action on Small Arms Implementation Challenges and Opportunities,” Geneva: United NationsInstitute for Disarmament Research, April 2011.

among international and nongovernmental organi-zations over resources and intergovernmentalmandates constitutes another disincentive forcooperation.

Spoilers among the disputing parties oftenaugment rivalry between third parties in order toscuttle crisis-management efforts that threatentheir interests. The practice of “forum shopping,”which involves playing different actors engaged incrisis diplomacy off each other, is a way to concealbelligerent intentions while buying time to rearmand pursue a military victory. One speaker at theseminar suggested that the outcome of mediationefforts in Madagascar in the aftermath of the March2009 coup d’état were adversely affected by forumshopping as some local actors exploited the differ-ences in approach of the various envoys from theUN, African Union, the South AfricanDevelopment Community, and the InternationalOrganization of the Francophonie.

In the area of structural prevention, “donorhedging” presents another obstacle. Donor govern-ments sometimes hedge their bets with respect tothe agencies, funds, and programs whose conflict-prevention work they support in a specific at-riskcountry. Uncertain of the technical competence ofany one of these international organizations todeliver results, donors may fund several of themsimultaneously to do similar work. This practicecan lead to a proliferation of project-implementingorganizations doing overlapping and duplicativework. INSTRUMENTS FOR COORDINATIONBETWEEN THIRD PARTIES

Ideally, actors undertaking preventive diplomacy inthe same crisis cooperate and even partition theirlabor on the basis of their comparative advantages.Some actors with high visibility and prestige canfulfill formal, public tasks while others act asinformal facilitators behind the scenes. Envoys ofstates with good relations with one party to thedispute can leverage their special relationship toconvince this party to join negotiations and accepthard compromises instead of escalating the dispute.Nonstate experts in preventive diplomacy are often

most capable of pursuing a track II process thataccompanies track I negotiations facilitated by adifferent actor. In situations where third-states’governments may not want to directly facilitate adialogue with proscribed nonstate armed groups orterrorist organizations, nongovernmentalmediation institutes can facilitate negotiations atthe informal request of these governments and inclose cooperation with them. Sometimesnongovernmental organizations, such as the Centrefor Humanitarian Dialogue or the CrisisManagement Initiative, offer technical support andexpert advice to government officials duringpreventive diplomacy processes.

The outcome of the matching process betweenparties and those offering preventive diplomacydepends primarily on the conflict parties’ prefer-ences for specific third-party facilitators and thewillingness of international stakeholders to backthese actors. There is no natural gatekeeper whoassigns leadership to any one third party, unless allmajor interested parties agree on who should leadthe process. Third-party actors engaging insimultaneous preventive diplomacy have deviseddifferent fora and tools that help them achievecoordination, coherence, and synergies in theirconcurrent efforts. In different contexts, they haveused these instruments with varying success.Groups of Friends and Contact Groups

“Groups of friends” and “contact groups” arefrequently-used mechanisms that can facilitatecoordination and enhance the unity of purpose ofinterested third parties.62 These groups consist ofstates informally coalescing around specificthematic, country-specific, or regional issues. Theyvary by their functions and by their degree ofeffectiveness. What all of these groups have incommon is that they are formed in response tocrises, rather than as an attempt to prevent theirinitial outbreak. Their main objective is to facilitatecoordination among the group’s members on howto prevent the escalation of a crisis or its relapseinto armed conflict. For a variety of reasons itwould be difficult for interested third states to formcountry-specific groups of friends solely for the

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62 Teresa Whitfield, Friends Indeed? The United Nations, Groups of Friends, and the Resolution of Conflict (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2007);Jochen Prantl, “Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council,” International Organization 59, No. 3 (2005); Jean Krasno, “The Group of Friends of theSecretary-General: A Useful Leveraging Tool,” in Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations, edited by Jean Krasno, Bradd Hayes, and Donald Daniel(Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003).

63 This observation was attributed to Alvaro de Soto by one of the seminar’s participants.

64 See Whitfield, Friends Indeed?, pp. 249-250.65 Ibid.66 OECD Development Assistance Committee, "Scaling Up: Aid Fragmentation, Aid Allocation, and Aid Predictability: Report of 2008 Survey of Aid Allocation

Policies and Indicative Forward Spending Plans," Paris: OECD, 2008, p. 17.67 Youssef Mahmoud, “National Forum on Conflict Prevention, Agadez, Niger 23-27 July 2001,” unpublished paper dated August 28, 2001.

pursuit of preventive diplomacy in the absence of amanifest crisis. These include concerns over non-intervention in internal affairs, the reluctance ofstates to share intelligence with others to alert themof a simmering crisis, and the scarcity of entrypoints for third-party crisis diplomacy in theearliest stages of a dispute. Thus, groups of friendsand contact groups rarely serve as instruments forpreventing the initial outbreak of conflict.

Several factors account for whether a group offriends or contact group will be effective atpreventing an escalation of, or relapse into, massviolence. It is important that the “friends” thatconstitute the group have the political clout andinterest to influence events on the ground in the at-risk country; in the words of a well-known UNenvoy it is “the friends that matter, not the group offriends.”63 If the perspectives of the states partici-pating in a group on the issue at hand are irreconcil-able, the formation of the group is unlikely to lead tothe development of coherent and effective policies.Grossly divergent viewpoints among the statesrepresented in the Group of Friends of Myanmar,for example, have made it difficult for this instru-ment to serve as a forum for the formulation ofstrategies to provide incentives for the governmentto alter its domestic policies. The quality of thegroup’s leadership can contribute to the group’ssuccess or failure. At the seminar, one participantcited the example of the effective leadership byAmbassador Hans Dahlgren as co-chair of theInternational Contact Group on Liberia. Accordingto this speaker, he was instrumental in bringingCharles Taylor, the then president of Liberia, andother parties to the negotiating table in 2003 andinto a peace process that culminated in the conclu-sion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement andTaylor’s departure from Liberia.64 Prior to assumingthe role as co-chair of the Contact Group,Ambassador Hans Dahlgren had gained extensiveexperience on conflict management and crisisprevention in West Africa as special representativeof the presidency of the European Union to theMano River Union countries and as Sweden’spermanent representative to the UN in New York.65

Pooling Resources and “Double-Hatting” Envoys

In the area of structural prevention, theDevelopment Assistance Committee of theOrganization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) provides a valuable forumfor achieving policy coherence among donorcountries. While pooling resources is not always aguarantee for success, it often holds the promise ofenhancing aid effectiveness. Multidonor trust fundscan help reduce transaction costs for donorcountries and host countries, whose governmentbureaucracies may have limited absorptive capacityand can be overwhelmed by a plethora of separateaid projects. The United Nations PeacebuildingFund provides a vehicle for pooling resources.During the first five years of its existence, itsupported more than one-hundred projects infifteen conflict-affected and fragile states.

There is a need for donor governments to shareinformation on parallel prevention efforts moreeffectively with one another, so as not to duplicateefforts and unnecessarily tax local capacities. If theyfail to coordinate their efforts, they risk placingconsiderable stress on national capacities that arealready dealing with a crisis. In Zambia, forexample, ten different international processesassessing national governance were conductedconcurrently in 2008, in addition to the govern-ment’s own annual report, which also analyzed thestate of governance in the country.66

Increasingly, international organizations respondto the fragmentation of resources and mandates byconducting joint programs. In the field of conflictprevention, the UN Department of Political Affairsand the UN Development Programme havelaunched a series of joint programs combiningelements of structural and operational prevention.The first such joint effort was the process started byNiger’s National Forum on Conflict Prevention inAgadez, Niger, in July 2001.67 Peace and develop-ment advisers, who seek to support the UN’sresident coordinator by integrating conflict-prevention into the programming of the entire UN


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68 Zenko and Friedman, “UN Early Warning,” pp. 23-24.69 See, for example, Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, Greater Than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing “Whole of Government” Approaches to Fragile States (New York:

International Peace Academy, 2007).70 United Nations Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict, para. 67.

country office, are presently deployed in twenty-one countries.68 Short of conducting jointprograms, an increasing number of internationalorganizations and agencies conduct desk-to-deskdialogue and joint strategic exercises and collabo-rate on training and conflict risk assessments.

Over the past decade there has been a markedincrease in the frequency of hybrid preventioninitiatives, which are jointly conducted by twointernational or regional organizations under theleadership of a single representative who reports toboth organizations. For instance, former NigerianPresident Olusegun Obasanjo served as specialenvoy of the UN Secretary-General to the GreatLakes region and as representative of both theAfrican Union and the International Conference onthe Great Lakes Region. One seminar participantexplained that Obasanjo undertook sixty flights infourty-five days to conduct three rounds of shuttlediplomacy with the eight subregional heads of statein order to achieve the eventual rapprochementbetween them. Another speaker cautioned that thehybrid peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts ofthe UN and the African Union in Darfur have onlyshown mixed results to date. The variation in theeffectiveness of hybrid initiatives points to the factthat institutional arrangements cannot overcomefundamental substantive differences between theinterests of third-party actors.INSTRUMENTS FOR COORDINATIONWITHIN STATES AND INTERNATIONALORGANIZATIONS

Most states and international organizations thatengage in conflict prevention in at-risk countries doso through multifaceted initiatives that involvepreventive tools at the disposal of a variety of theirown departments and agencies. The differentbureaucratic units within governments andmultilateral institutions often struggle to develop aunified understanding of conflict risks and todevise and implement coherent preventive strate-gies. It is difficult for developmental, diplomatic,defense, financial, and other agencies or depart-ments within a single government or internationalorganization to coalesce around a shared strategic

vision because they may not share the same bureau-cratic interests and cultures. Sometimes intrade-partmental and interdepartmental turf wars consti-tute an additional obstacle to policy coherence andcoordination.

In recent years, enhancing internal coordinationand coherence has become a major focus ofmultilateral and bilateral actors working on conflictprevention in fragile and postconflict states.69Starting in the early 2000s, several national govern-ments, including Canada, the Netherlands, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States, establishedunits designed to foster interdepartmental integra-tion in an effort to enhance the effectiveness oftheir aid to fragile and postconflict states. So far,such integration units generally have had limitedsuccess and are still works in progress. Part of theproblem is that, by and large, they were notmandated to devise policy, and their heads were notaccorded cabinet positions. Without this authority,the impact of these units on interdepartmentalcoordination and coherence is likely to remainlimited, except in times when they are championedby a powerful government official.

In the context of the UN Secretariat and thevarious agencies, funds, and programs within theUN system, four different bodies at the headquar-ters seek to promote coordination and coherence atvarious decision-making levels and amongdifferent groups of stakeholders. The UNSecretary-General’s Policy Committee is a cabinet-style decision-making mechanism that providesguidance to the entire UN Secretariat. It provides aforum for the principals, mainly Under-Secretaries-General, to share early warning analyses anddiscuss potential courses of action for theSecretary-General. The Executive Committee onPeace and Security, which is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, meets twicea month to discuss pressing national and regionalissues.70 The Interdepartmental Framework forCoordination on Early Warning and PreventiveAction is mandated to develop strategies to beimplemented in a coordinated manner by the UNas a whole. It encompasses twenty-two agencies and

departments, which meet three to four times a yearand twice a month at expert reference groupmeetings.71 Finally, the Inter-Agency StandingCommittee, which coordinates the humanitarianefforts of seventeen UN and non-UN entities,maintains an early-warning working group andprepares consensual findings presented in thequarterly Early Warning–Early Action Report. Asin many bureaucracies, the process of buildingconsensus among the numerous actors in the UNSecretariat and its agencies, funds, and programscan be time consuming and cumbersome. However,coherence can be brought about relatively swiftly inthe face of imminent crisis and in the presence ofdecisive leadership by the Secretary-General.

A range of mechanisms for cooperation amongthe field presences of UN agencies, funds, andprograms, as well as political and peacekeepingmissions, exist at the regional and country levels.The challenges of coordination and coherence havebeen the impetus behind the development andrefinement of the Integrated Mission PlanningProcess and the UN Development AssistanceFramework. These are planning tools that seek tointegrate and harmonize the efforts of all UN actorsconducting political, developmental, humanitarian,or other work in a specific country.

ConclusionOver the past few years international and regionalorganizations and their member states have showna resurgent interest in multilateral conflict preven-tion as a tool for avoiding the escalation of politicaldisputes into armed conflict. The increasingpreparedness of regional and international actors toaddress conflict risks before they materialize andthe greater willingness of many at-risk states toaccept third-party preventive action translated intonormative evolutions and growing capabilities for

multilateral conflict prevention. Even while thepractice of multilateral conflict prevention greatlyvaries between different world regions, there is agrowing expectation for regional organizations toprovide good offices and preventive diplomacyduring crises in the region. At the United Nations, arange of capabilities for conducting early warningand preventive diplomacy were created both atheadquarters and in regions at risk of conflict. ThePeacebuilding Commission recently expanded thescope of its preventive efforts beyond postconflictstabilization, and the United Nations SecurityCouncil changed its prevention-related workingmethods by introducing “horizon scanning”briefings and informal interactive dialogues withgovernments embroiled in escalating crises.

The growing interest in multilateral conflictprevention was accompanied by a proliferation ofactors engaged in this field of work. Too often,coherence and coordination are missing bothbetween different third-party actors undertakingpreventive action and internally within their ranks.An increasing number of coordination fora haveonly achieved limited success to date, and the risksof sending mixed messages and duplicating effortsremain whenever multiple third parties simultane-ously address a deteriorating crisis.

One way to deal with the challenge of coordi-nating risk-mitigating efforts by multiple thirdparties is to combine their political facilitation withaid addressing the root causes of grievances. Thirdparties could collaborate on programs that integrateaspects of preventive diplomacy and structuralprevention. In this way, they could capitalize onconflict parties' greater willingness to accommo-date development assistance and use this as anentry point for successfully pursuing politicalengagement, which can help resolve political crisesbefore they escalate into conflict.


71 Zenko and Friedman, “UN Early Warning,” p. 24; see also Rubin and Jones, “Prevention of Violent Conflict,” p. 402.

Annex: Case Studies in Conflict Prevention

The seminar featured three case studies of states—Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Kyrgyzstan—that have recentlyexperienced armed conflict and represent a wide range of geographical areas. In all three countries, preventionfailed, although conflict-mitigation strategies were effective in Kenya. Each country had previously experiencedconflict in its recent past, and is still at risk of relapsing into political violence, especially if effective conflict-prevention measures are not taken. Violence in all three cases exposed many of the deep-rooted political andsocioeconomic structural challenges that these countries face, ranging from youth unemployment and ethnicdiscrimination to weak governing capacity and corruption. While some background to the crises in thesecountries was provided at the seminar, much of the discussion focused on future steps that can be taken toprevent a relapse into violent conflict.

CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Côte d’Ivoire has experienced great political turmoil since the death of Félix Houphouet-Boigny, its long-serving first president, in 1993. The civil war between 2002 and 2004 led to the division of the country: thegovernment maintained control of the south, and anti-government forces held the north. In March 2007 a newpeace agreement was signed by the warring parties, the government and the rebel Forces Nouvelles, inOuagadougou, Burkina-Faso. Presidential elections were postponed on several occasions before being held inlate 2010.

The proximate cause of the fighting in 2010 and 2011 was a crisis triggered by the refusal of Laurent Gbagbo,the incumbent president, to cede power after losing to Alassane Ouattara, the challenger, in the second roundof the elections held on November 28, 2010. The election results were certified by the UN. Repeated high-levelmediation efforts by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) failedto resolve the stalemate. On April 11, 2011, Laurent Gbagbo was taken into custody, ending a standoff thatlasted more than four months. Laurent Gbagbo finally surrendered to troops loyal to Alassane Ouattara afterthe Forces Nouvelles advanced to the southern part of the country and the UN and French forces attackedLaurent Gbagbo’s heavy weapons and military facilities in response to mortar and artillery fire against the UNheadquarters and the Golf Hôtel in Abidjan, where Alassane Ouattara had resided for several months. Duringthe conflict, approximately 3,000 people were killed and more than 500,000 displaced.

Many obstacles lie in the path to sustainable peace in Côte d’Ivoire. Interethnic tensions, which have longdestabilized the country, were heightened by the postelection violence. The country must develop an inclusive,national civic identity based on fairness and equality to mitigate the chances of a relapse into conflict. Alongthese lines, one speaker noted that creating a national army that represents the country’s diversity will be “thefirst brick of national rebuilding.” Such a measure would represent a clear break from the past, when ethnicfavoritism determined the composition of the armed forces.

Inclusive politics should also form the cornerstone of reconciliation. When President Alassane Ouattaraformed his cabinet in late May, he did not include any members of Laurent Gbagbo’s party, the Ivoirian PopularFront (FPI). This step could prove an obstacle to progress toward a more peaceful future. An alternativeinterpretation of this event is that it could generate an opportunity for the FPI to become a genuine oppositionparty.72 However, the government must create a political environment in which different parties can compete ona level playing field. It is particularly important for all political forces, including supporters of FPI ideology whorenounce violence and hate rhetoric, to be able to organize for the legislative elections scheduled to be held byyear’s end.73

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72 Eric Agnero, “Ouattara Names Cabinet in Ivory Coast,” CNN, June 1, 2011, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-01/world/ivory.coast.government_1_laurent-gbagbo-ivory-coast-unity-government?_s=PM:WORLD .

73 International Crisis Group, “A Critical Period for Ensuring Stability in Côte d’Ivoire,” Africa Report No. 176, August 1, 2011.

http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-01/world/ivory.coast.government_1_laurent-gbagbo-ivory-coast-unity-government?_s=PM:WORLD

Transitional justice is an important element of peacebuilding, and much work remains to be done in thisrespect in Côte d’Ivoire, after a decade marred by impunity for politically-motivated abuses. Reports of massivehuman rights violations have been made against forces loyal to both President Alassane Ouattara and formerPresident Laurent Gbagbo. Unfortunately, recent efforts at ensuring accountability have not been encouraging.In particular, it has been reported that justice has not been meted out impartially, focusing primarily on holdingLaurent Gbagbo’s supporters accountable.74 A Dialogue, Reconciliation and Truth Commission has beenestablished, but there are concerns that it has yet to be perceived as a neutral body.75

Another major component in a strategy for preventing relapse into political violence is an effective and timelydisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. The abundance of small arms and light weapons inCôte d’Ivoire constitutes an urgent concern considering the high youth unemployment rate and the fact thatstrong tensions from the election-related violence are still smoldering. International actors should play animportant role in supporting and encouraging disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. One encour-aging sign is that in renewing the mandate of the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the UN SecurityCouncil emphasized the role of UNOCI in assisting the government in this process. Effective disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration and security-sector reform in Côte d’Ivoire could help to lower crime ratesand restore the rule of law, which would encourage more foreign investment, thus facilitating the country’srecovery.76

KENYA

Violence erupted in Kenya in the aftermath of the December 2007 presidential election. Over the followingmonths, the conflict claimed roughly 1,300 lives and displaced several hundred thousand people. Armedconfrontations started after the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared the incumbent president, Mwai Kibakiof the Party of National Unity (PNU), the victor. The latter quickly took the oath of office, amid allegations ofvote rigging by supporters of his opponent, Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Party (ODM). The fact thatthe ODM had garnered a significant percentage of parliamentary seats increased concerns that vote tamperinghad occurred in the presidential election. The fighting occurred mainly along tribal lines, largely pitting Kikuyu(the ethnic group Mwai Kibaki’s belongs to) against Luo (Odinga’s ethnic group) and Kalenjin.

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spearheaded a mediation process on behalf of the African Unionthat led to a political agreement between the parties on February 28, 2008. The agreement included a power-sharing arrangement that provided for Mwai Kibaki to remain in power as president and Raila Odinga toassume the newly-created post of prime minister. The cabinet was composed of members of both parties. A newconstitution was drafted and approved by referendum in 2010. The next presidential elections are scheduled tobe held in 2012.

The mediation effort by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was successful in finding an early end topolitical violence.77 Kofi Annan is an experienced mediator, and was well-respected by the parties. As chair ofthe African Union’s Panel of Eminent African Personalities he assumed strong leadership of the mediationprocess,78 while the UN and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), a Geneva-based nonstatemediation institute, played a well-coordinated supporting role. Thus, the challenges typically associated withmultiparty mediation, such as personality conflicts and diverging perspectives on the causes of the violence andthe objectives of the mediation, could not be exploited by spoilers in this case.

74 Ibid.75 Ibid.76 For more on security-sector reform, see Arthur Boutellis, “The Security Sector in Côte d’Ivoire: A Source of Conflict and a Key to Peace,” New York: International

Peace Institute, May 2011.77 On the mediation by Kofi Annan, see Elisabeth Lindenmayer and Josie Lianna Kaye, “A Choice for Peace? The Story of Forty-One Days of Mediation in Kenya,”

New York: International Peace Institute, August 2009.78 Other panelists included Benjamin Mkapa, former president of Tanzania, and Graça Machel-Mandela, former Mozambican Minister of Education and Culture. 79 For a detailed description of the work of Concerned Citizens for Peace during the crisis, see George Wachira with Thomas Arendshorst and Simon M. Charles,

“Citizens in Action: Making Peace in the Post-Election Crisis in Kenya – 2008,” Nairobi: Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa, January 2010.80 Ibid., p. 5.

20 CASE STUDIES

While much media attention focused on the mediation process led by Kofi Annan, the important role thatKenyan civil society played in mitigating conflict during the crisis was less recognized. The efforts of the civilsociety network Concerned Citizens for Peace (CPP) were particularly notable.79 CPP was led by an informalgoverning board, which was composed of a Kenyan diplomat, two professional peacebuilders, and two formergenerals—all with various ethnic backgrounds and skills sets.80 Its diverse composition helped to enhance thepopular perception of its objectivity. The core team convened daily public meetings, called the “Open Forum,”at a hotel in Nairobi. At these gatherings participants shared information, developed conflict-mitigation strate-gies, and identified ways to implement them.81 The core team also enlisted the support of the independentmedia, artists, religious leaders, business associations, and others. Through this vast network of supporters, CPPplayed a key role in facilitating the implementation of conflict-mitigation measures. It convinced telecommuni-cations executives to send mass text messages promoting peace, which countered incitements of violence bysimilar means. It also injected peaceful messages into newspapers, organized theatrical performances andmusical concerts, and created burial committees in areas of heightened violence, providing coffins and lendingmoney for burials, in order to ease the hardship of the bereft and dampen some of their anger toward theperpetrators of violence.82

The election to be held in 2012 will be an important test for Kenya’s ability to prevent conflict. Pending legisla-tion would require the winner of the presidential election to receive more than 50 percent of votes cast, as wellas more than 25 percent of the vote in twenty-four counties. The passage of this provision would make ethnicchauvinism a less attractive strategy for any candidate. It is likewise important that measures are taken to ensurethat the Electoral Management Body exhibit impartiality and competence. Ensuring accountability for pastpolitical violence would serve as a deterrent to those actors who consider committing atrocity crimes similar tothose perpetrated in the aftermath of the 2007 elections. The conclusion of a code of conduct by political parties,which commits them to responsible conduct prior to the election, might also contribute to the goal ofpreventing political violence if compliance is monitored. Seminar participants suggested that civil societyshould press for impartial and professional conduct by the Electoral Management Body, adherence to the codeof conduct by political parties before, during, and after the election, and peaceful dialogue in the the press andthe public sphere.

In 2003 Kenya operationalized the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and ConflictManagement as a body that is coordinated by the Office of the President and liaises with government agenciesand civil society. The committee and the district peace committees under its umbrella were clearly incapable ofpreventing and de-escalating mass violence in late 2007 and early 2008. The UN and other international actorsshould continue their ongoing efforts to work with the Kenyan government and local civil society actors tostrengthen the district peace committees in the lead up to the 2012 elections.

It was also suggested at the seminar that Kenya will have to work hard to address the structural issues that stillput the country at risk of another outbreak of violence. The adoption of the new constitution in 2010 was animportant step toward reforming the country’s political system. Much progress has also been made in reformingthe police since the last election. Nonetheless, youth unemployment, horizontal inequality along ethnic lines,and land ownership disputes are ongoing challenges that have not been adequately addressed.

KYRGYZSTAN

In 2010, Kyrgyzstan suffered from two periods of political violence. The first wave of violence occurred in April;the second and more devastating episode unfolded in June. The immediate triggers of the violence in April 2010were steep increases in the price of electricity and heating. Protests in Talas, Bishkek, and in other cities betweenApril 5th and April 8th resulted in the deaths of approximately ninety people at the hands of security forces.

81 Ibid., pp. 12-25.82 Lecture by member of Concerned Citizens for Peace, New York, NY, February 20, 2009.

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During the uprising in Talas, protestors seized government offices, which were later taken back by the securityforces. In Bishek, protesters took over the offices of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who fled with his family toJalalabad, later resigning and going into exile. In the aftermath of the ousting of President Bakiyev, a provisionalgovernment was formed under the leadership of Roza Otunbaeva, a former foreign minister. The transitionalleadership included politicians representing a wide range of political parties opposed to the former president. Aconstitutional referendum and parliamentary elections were planned.

Ahead of the constitutional referendum on June 27, 2010, tensions flared between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in thesouth, which were stoked by political elites and finally erupted into large-scale violence between June 9th andJune 16th. Several hundred people were killed, 100,000 to 200,000 people were displaced, and acts of arsonclaimed hundreds of businesses and homes. In spite of this violence, the government went ahead with thereferendum on June 27th, which approved a new constitution. The constitution expanded the size of the parlia-ment and introduced a limit to the number of seats any one party can hold, thus improving the chances forcoalition rule. Parliamentary elections were held in October 2010. Five parties hold eighteen to twenty-eightseats in the new parliament, and the new government includes parties that opposed Kurmanbek Bakiyev,including acting President Roza Otunbaeva’s Social Democratic Party, as well as the pro-Bakiyev Ata-Zhurtparty. Roza Otunbaeva has pledged not to run in the presidential elections scheduled for late 2011.

Several key factors contributed to the 2010 violence in Kyrgyzstan. Frustration with the corrupt and ineptregime of Kurmanbek Bakyiev and a weak economy contributed to the fatal incidents in April.83 The causes ofthe June violence were more complex. Economic malaise stoked ethnic tensions at the community level.Through appeals to ethnic nationalism, political leaders channeled discontent in destructive ways.84 The weakcapacity and perception of legitimacy of security-sector institutions also contributed to the escalation of theviolence.

At the seminar, several suggestions for conflict-prevention strategies in Kyrgyzstan were made. Well-respected elders and religious figures at the community level could defuse interethnic tensions throughmediation.85 If violence begins to spread, new media and mass text messaging constitute powerful tools forsquashing rumors, countering propaganda, and defusing tensions. What was clear from the June 2010 violenceis that technology was primarily used for nefarious purposes. Cell phones were used to spread false rumors andrecruit rioters during the June turmoil. There is no reason why technology cannot also be employed for positivepurposes, especially if it is used within the framework of a well-conceived national conflict-preventionstrategy.86

State institutions in Kyrgyzstan need to be reformed and strengthened to prevent a future outbreak and escala-tion of violence. Evidence indicates that politicians and security services were complicit in the June 2010violence.87 This suggests the need to develop a more professionalized, impartial security apparatus. Likewise,instruction in human rights and international humanitarian law should be embedded into police and militarytraining courses, as well as in the curriculum of academic institutions. The International Committee of the RedCross is helping Kyrgyzstan to take a small step in this direction, although much work remains to be done.88

22 CASE STUDIES

83 See International Crisis Group, “Kyrgyzstan: A Hollow Regime Collapses,” Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 102, April 27, 2010. 84 Indeed, the seeds of the June violence were planted in May. When ethnic Uzbek politician Kadyrjan Batyrov allegedly led a mob that burned down the Batryrov

family home in Teyit, ethnic Kyrgyz looted a university in Jalalabad run by Kadyrjan Batyrov. See International Crisis Group, “The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan,” CrisisGroup Asia Report No. 193, August 23, 2010.

85 Rafis Abazov, “Kyrgyz Conflict Mediation Infrastructure Must Be Rebuilt,” Central Asia Newswire, August 9, 2011. 86 Ibid.87 International Crisis Group, “The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan.” 88 The International Committee of the Red Cross conducted a seminar with high-level military officials on international humanitarian law, advocated for the incorpo-

ration of international humanitarian law in the curricula at universities, and helped to train high school instructors to teach human rights. International Committeeof the Red Cross, “Newsletter from the Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the Kyrgyz Republic,” February 2011, p. 7.

Agenda

Conflict Prevention:Toward More Effective Multilateral Strategies

Wednesday, May 4, 2011

16:30 – 16:45 Opening Statement

Welcoming remarksDr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, IPI

16:45 – 18:15 Session 1: From Timely Analysis to Preventive Action

Which tools and institutions for conflict prevention currently exist, and how can they befurther improved? To what extent can failures of conflict prevention be ascribed to capacitygaps, and when do they result from a lack of political will to use existing conflict-preventioncapabilities? Which strategies can be employed to overcome a lack of will to engage in timelyand effective preventive action?

ChairH.E. Mr. Jarmo Viinanen, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Finland to theUnited Nations

SpeakersAmbassador Levent Bilman, Director of Policy and Mediation Division, United NationsDepartment of Political Affairs Dr. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Director of the Guyana Institute of Public Policy, and Fellow,Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies Dr. James O. Jonah, former UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs

18:30 – 20:30 Featured Address and Dinner

Introduction of the SpeakerDr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, IPI

Featured SpeakerAmbassador Vijay Nambiar, Chef de Cabinet of the United Nations Secretary-General

Thursday, May 5, 2011

09:00 – 10:30 Session 2: Preventive Diplomacy: Which Strategy in the Face of Crisis?

Which strategies are particularly useful for which crisis and how can instruments becombined and sequenced most effectively, such as the good offices of the Secretary-Generaland his representatives and envoys, formal pronouncements of intergovernmental organs,bilateral engagements, and efforts by groups of friends? How has the practice of the UnitedNations in preventive diplomacy evolved in recent years? What are the comparative

23

advantages and disadvantages of regional and subregional organizations, which havebecome increasingly active in the conduct of preventive diplomacy in many parts of theworld?

ChairH.E. Ms. Signe Burgstaller, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission ofSweden to the United Nations

SpeakersAmbassador Abdullah Alsaidi, Senior Fellow, IPI Dr. Stephen Jackson, Team Leader, Policy Planning Unit, United Nations Department ofPolitical Affairs Dr. Abiodun Williams, Vice President, Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention, UnitedStates Institute of Peace

10:30 – 11:00 Coffee break

11:00 – 12:30 Session 3: Structural Prevention: Addressing the Root Causes of Conflict

In its 1997 report, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict stated thatstructural prevention deals “with long-term, underlying factors conducive to peace andequitable development (linking security, well-being and justice).” How do the UnitedNations, regional organizations, and their partners, understand structural prevention inpractice? How can we ensure that strategies for the promotion of structural prevention arecontext-specific and duly focus on the most critical priorities? How do we know whetherconcrete elements of structural prevention have a positive impact?

ChairMr. Peter Gastrow, Senior Fellow and Director of Programs, IPI

SpeakerMr. Alastair J. McKechnie, Consultant and Former Director, Fragile & Conflict AffectedCountries Group, World Bank Ms. Gay Rosenblum-Kumar, Senior Secretary, UN Interagency Framework Team forPreventive ActionMs. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Professor of International Affairs, The New School

12:30 – 13:45 Lunch

13:45 – 15:15 Tour of United States Military Academy, West Point, and Group Photo

15:15 – 16:45 Session 4: Preventing Mass Atrocities

What are the commonalities and differences in the root causes and triggers of genocide, warcrimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity? What are the unique challenges tothe prevention of mass atrocities, and what strategies can be devised to address them? Whatinternational, regional, and national governmental and civil-society capabilities exist for theprevention of mass atrocities? How can multilateral instruments for conflict prevention andthose designed to prevent mass atrocities be utilized in a mutually reinforcing manner?What lessons can be derived from recent experience in that regard?

24 AGENDA

ChairDr. Edward C. Luck, Senior Vice President for Research and Programs, IPI

SpeakersH.E. Mr. Saúl Weisleder, Deputy Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UnitedNations Dr. Francis M. Deng, Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General for the Prevention ofGenocide Mr. Udo Janz, Director, New York Office, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees


17:15 – 18:45 Session 5: Coherence and Coordination in Conflict Prevention

What are the challenges associated with a multiplicity of multilateral and bilateral actorsdeveloping and implementing preventive action? How do country-specific conflict-preventionefforts of the United Nations, member states, regional organizations, and civil society relateto one another? What are positive examples of how multilateral, bilateral, national, andlocal actors have worked together effectively to prevent conflict? What lessons can we learnfrom these examples? How can challenges to coherence and coordination be addressed moreeffectively in future conflict-prevention efforts?

ChairH.E. Ms. Tine Mørch Smith, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission ofNorway to the United Nations

SpeakersMs. Teresa Whitfield, Senior Adviser, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and SeniorAdvisor and Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, NYU Mr. Stan Nkwain, Deputy Director, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UnitedNations Development Programme

19:00 – 20:30 Dinner

Friday, May 6, 2011

09:00 – 11:00 Breakout Groups: Conflict-Prevention Case Studies

Three breakout groups will consider conflict prevention in different situations where risks offuture political violence may be present. Which conflict-prevention strategies have theUnited Nations, member states, regional organizations, and other external and nationalactors pursued in each case? Which strategies have been most and least successful, and why?What form could future strategies for preventing conflict take? Discussions in the breakoutgroups should focus on identifying opportunities and obstacles for multilateral conflictprevention pursued by the United Nations and regional organizations in each situation, butthey should also consider potential linkages between multilateral conflict-prevention effortsand activities by national actors, including governments and civil society. They should alsoconsider ways to overcome challenges for effective conflict prevention.

25

Group 1: Côte d’Ivoire

Group 2: Kenya

Group 3: Kyrgyzstan


11:30 – 13:00 Session 6: Plenary Report from Breakout Group Rapporteurs and Discussion

Speakers and participants will respond to the reports of the breakout group rapporteurs.This will be followed by broader dialogue on the lessons learned from each case study.

ChairDr. Walter Kemp, Director for Europe and Central Asia, IPI

SpeakersMr. Peter Gastrow, Senior Fellow and Director of Programs, IPI (Kenya)Dr. Rafis Abazov, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Harriman Institute, Columbia University(Kyrgyzstan) Mr. Rinaldo Depagne, Senior Analyst for West Africa, International Crisis Group (Côted’Ivoire)

13:00 – 14:00 Lunch

Introduction of the SpeakerMr. Warren Hoge, Vice President for External Relations, IPI

Featured SpeakerDr. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Director of the Guyana Institute of Public Policy, and Fellow,Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies

14:15 Departure for New York City

26 AGENDA

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more

than twenty nationalities, with offices in New York, facing United

Nations headquarters, and in Vienna. IPI is dedicated to promoting the

prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by

strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve

its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening,

publishing, and outreach.

777 United Nations Plaza New York, NY 10017-3521 USA

TEL +1-212-687-4300 FAX +1-212-983-8246

Freyung 3, 1010 Vienna, Austria

TEL +43-1-533-8881 FAX +43-1-533-8881-11

www.ipinst.org

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