competitive equality of opportunity

Competitive Equality of Opportunity

D. A. LLOYD THOMAS

The first purpose of this discussion is to distinguish betweena number of distinct ideas which can be conveyed by the expression'equality of opportunity'. Detailed attention will be given to onlyone of them: 'competitive' equality of opportunity. Other con-ceptions of equality of opportunity will be mentioned as part of aprocess of clarification, but then put aside. After an account ofcompetitive equality of opportunity, and a discussion of itsrelationships to determinism and manipulability, two principalobjections will be urged against it: that (given certain empiricalbeliefs) it leads to an incoherent account of what is a just dis-tribution, and that the greater the extent to which competitiveequality of opportunity is realized, the less (in one respect) arethe opportunities available to persons to make autonomouschoices.

Opportunities

First let us consider briefly what is an opportunity, with examplesin mind such as 'She had an opportunity to take a job in California','He had many opportunities to get married', and 'There was noopportunity to escape'. One has an opportunity to do somethingor to have something provided that one can do it or have it ifone chooses. One has no opportunity to do something or to havesomething if one cannot do it or have it even if one wishes to.But not everything one can do or have if one chooses is anopportunity. For something to be regarded as an opportunity itmust, in addition, be seen as to some extent good. It is bittersarcasm to say that someone had the opportunity to lose his lifepointlessly in the Battle of the Somme. Opportunities may begood, wonderful, or not very good, but they cannot be regardedas in no respect good. Often opportunities are regarded as goodboth by the person who has them and by others. But it can bethat A does not see a certain option as in any sense good, andhence does not regard it as an opportunity, while B does regardA's option as good, and thinks of A as having an opportunity.

388

at Aston U

niversity on January 29, 2014http://m

ind.oxfordjournals.org/D

ownloaded from

http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/


COMPETITIVE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 389

What could people have in mind when they favour equalopportunity? Obviously it cannot be that everyone has the sameopportunity (as when, for example, two people both have theopportunity to teach at Berkeley for a year). It is necessarily truethat it cannot be a matter of the same opportunity, for in manycases A having a certain opportunity at a certain time to dosomething (for example, to marry B) precludes others from havingthe same opportunity.

'Ideal' Equality of Opportunity

Perhaps, then, for all to have equal opportunity would be for allto have an equally good (though different) set of opportunities.For example, A has the opportunity to join the Foreign Office,but not to be a Fellow of New College; B has the opportunity tobe a Fellow of New College, but not to join the Foreign Office.A and B have different opportunities, but some would say thatthey were equally good opportunities. This view of equality ofopportunity would hold in the following situation. Over Pi's lifethere have been certain opportunities Oi, O2 etc.; over P2's lifethere have been certain opportunities Oa, Ob etc., and so on forall persons. There is equality of opportunity if, by reference tosome scale for evaluating opportunities, the score for Pi's packageis much the same as that for P2's package, and so on for everybody.For convenience this idea will be called 'ideal' equality of oppor-tunity, but the label is not intended to suggest that there is any-thing ideal about it other than in the sense that it is a limit case.

For such a conception of equality of opportunity to be applicable(much less desirable), there would have to be an agreed inter-personal standard of comparison for the goodness of opportunities.Sometimes defenders of equality of opportunity appear to supposethat there is such a scale: for example, that opportunities can becompared by reducing them in some way to a common denomi-nator of power, wealth and status. But it may be doubted whetherthere really is such a scale. For a certain option may appear goodto one person and not to another, and it is not obvious that wecan say, in all cases, that one of these judgements of goodness issimply mistaken. Some accept a conception of the goodness ofopportunities related to power, wealth and status, while othersreject this. Arguments can be given for both views, and it isdoubtful whether either is simply mistaken. As Professor Nozicksays '. . . life is not a race in which we all compete for a prize

at Aston U



ownloaded from



390 D. A. LLOYD THOMAS:

which someone has established; there is no unified race, withsome person judging swiftness'.1

Non-competitive Equality of Opportunity

Let us make another attempt to get closer to a plausible accountof equality of opportunity. The idea need not be that everyoneshould end up with an equally valuable cluster of opportunities.It could be that there shall be some opportunities that are presentin everybody's cluster (at the appropriate stage of life). For ex-ample, there is the 'commitment to full employment': the attemptto make available to everyone the opportunity to do some kindof work, or again, the idea that everyone ought to have theopportunity to receive some kind of tertiary education. Theseideas can be represented as follows. For every person Pi, P2 etc.there ought to appear amongst his or her cluster of opportunitiescertain 'standard' opportunities, such as the opportunity to work(Ow), or the opportunity to receive some form of tertiary education(Ot). Thus:

For P i : Oi O2 Ow Ot O3 . . . etc.For P2: Oa Ob Ow Ot Oc . . . etc.

This conception of equality of opportunity does not suffer fromthe difficulty with 'ideal' equality of opportunity. As it is notrequired that everyone shall have an equally valuable cluster ofopportunities, the question of a common set of criteria for assessingclusters of opportunities does not arise. However, it is assumed thateveryone has reason to want the opportunities to be made availablein his or her cluster. Perhaps the justification would be (afterRawls) that they are opportunities everyone has reason to wantwhatever other opportunities they might want, i.e. whatever theirrational plan of life might be. On this conception of equality ofopportunity it is also supposed that there is some authority (nearlyalways assumed to be the state) which can so manipulate thingsas to make such opportunities available in everyone's cluster. Itmust be further supposed that it is legitimate for that authorityto create such opportunities by, if need be, compulsorily reduc-ing the opportunities others already have. It is commonlyassumed that the state has the right to do this, and it is interestingto raise the question of where this right might come from. It does

1 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974,P- 235.

at Aston U



ownloaded from



COMPETITIVE EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 39I

not come from it merely being morally desirable that there shouldbe such opportunities, even given that it can be shown that it ismorally desirable. It may be morally desirable that my friendshould make available equal opportunities to all of his children,in so far as he can, and not give them all to his favourite child.But that does not give me any right to interfere, if he does not.

The mere existence of a morally unacceptable situation doesnot, as such, give anyone the right to interfere. Hence argumentswhich move directly from premises about some state of affairsbeing morally unacceptable to a conclusion that the state has theright to put that state of affairs in order are incomplete. This isnot to deny (to return to the case of the children) that certainforms of mistreatment provide grounds for a right to interfere.Though now the point turns on the ill-treated child having aclaim against others, if those immediately responsible fail todischarge their obligations, rather than on the child beingunequally treated. One might cite the case of parents who equallyneglect all of their children.

My own view concerning this type of equality of opportunityis that such claims are justified (i) when they reasonably can berepresented as moral claims which hold against the communitygenerally, and (ii), when they are moral claims of such a kindthat the state can legitimately compel their satisfaction. Perhaps,therefore, a claim for equal opportunity to receive medicalattention is justified, while a claim for equal opportunity to receivesome kind of tertiary education is not. The issues involved hereare complex, and warrant separate discussion. It must be empha-sized that in now setting aside non-competitive equality of oppor-tunity, I intend only to set it aside. It is not supposed that it hasbeen shown to lack justification.

The label 'non-competitive' has been used for this conceptionof equality of opportunity because the opportunities are seen asones that ought to be available to anybody if they wish to takethem up, not as ones that have to be striven for in competitionwith others. So we now have, on the one hand, 'ideal' equalityof opportunity, which is an implausibly strong demand, and onthe other, 'non-competitive' equality of opportunity, which manywould regard as acceptable for certain types of opportunity, butnot as the whole story. So we come to 'competitive' equality ofopportunity.

at Aston U



ownloaded from




Competitive Equality of Opportunity

The example to be taken is the English 'UCCA' selection processfor filling student places at universities. We have persons (uni-versity departments) who have authority to distribute certainopportunities. They are to be distributed by reference to generalcriteria, those best satisfying the criteria, in competition withothers, getting the opportunity. It will be supposed that there arenot as many opportunities available as there are persons whodesire them. Thus the position is clearly different from non-competitive equality of opportunity. Under that conception anyonewho wished could take up the opportunity, whereas under thecompetitive conception not everyone who likes can have theopportunity. Indeed there could not be both non-competitiveand competitive equality of opportunity in exactly the samerespect, as the former presupposes that the opportunity is availableto anyone who wants it, while the latter presupposes that noteveryone who wants it can have it. It would seem, then, thatcompetitive equality of opportunity has to do with the way inwhich these competitions are conducted. Perhaps, consideringthat opportunities are not going to be equal in the end, it wouldbe better to call it 'fair competition for scarce opportunities'. Forstrictly speaking (as has already been suggested), if a person hasan opportunity to do something, then he can do it if he chooses,but in the situation we are now considering it will not be the casethat all of those who can be said to enjoy 'equal' opportunity willin fact get the opportunity. There is an interesting contrastbetween having an opportunity and some instances of having aright. One may have a right to vote (in law), but not be in aposition to exercise that right (because one has been kidnapped).In the case of opportunities the connection between having theopportunity and the 'material' possibility of exercising it is closer.If being kidnapped prevents one from voting, then one does nothave the opportunity to vote on that occasion. Thus linguisticpropriety could lead one to say that what has been called 'non-competitive equality of opportunity' is the only form of equalityof opportunity, properly speaking. Alternatively, the opportunityin question here could be thought of as the opportunity to compete,which each can have if he chooses, and not the opportunity toenjoy that which is competed for (i.e. the student places).

We now need to lay down the criteria for this kind of equality

at Aston U



ownloaded from




of opportunity. What would it be for there not to be equality ofopportunity in this sense? There would not be equality of oppor-tunity if A were selected and B were not because B was a Jew(or female, or of a certain nationality, or not rich, or not a relativeof a member of the department etc.). What is the principleoperative here?

First Principle:

The criteria of selection employed must include only character-istics relevant to the utilization of the opportunity to be madeavailable.

Thus, with regard to the example in hand, being a Catholic isnot a relevant characteristic, while being clever is. Clearly therecan be disputes about what are the relevant characteristics, andalso, if these are agreed, about what are reliable indications of theirpresence. But there is no need to go into details on these questions.

It would be widely allowed that this is a necessary conditionfor competitive equality of opportunity, but is it sufficient? Letus consider the following case. A and B are applicants for the lastremaining place in a university department. A has impressive'A level' results, performs well at interview, and has an enthusiasticreference. B has mediocre 'A level' results, is not forthcomingat interview, and has an indifferent reference. On this basis A isgiven the place. The first principle would appear to be satisfied,anyway, so long as any doubts about the connection betweenfacts of this sort concerning A and B and their likely capacity tomake good use of the opportunity are ignored. Has B enjoyedequal opportunity? Suppose that A has come from a rich, well-educated family, and has been to one of the academically bestpublic schools in the country. B has come from a poor, ill-educatedfamily, and has been to a comprehensive school with a not verywell taught sixth form. Has B enjoyed equal opportunity with A?Some would say 'No', and justify their view in the following way.'Compare A's past opportunities with B's. At various crucialpoints in his career A has had amongst his total set of opportunitiesbetter ones than those available to B. For example, at the time ofstarting secondary education A may have had the opportunity togo to several excellent public schools as well as to the localcomprehensive. B only had the opportunity to go to the localcomprehensive. These past opportunities have considerably

at Aston U



ownloaded from



394 D - A- LLOYD THOMAS:

influenced their respective chances of getting the new opportunity—the place in the department. Only if those past opportunitieshad been equally good (with regard to the effects that they haveon factors relevant to the present competition) would there be"true" or "real" equality of opportunity.'

The chances of a person securing a new opportunity is seen asresting upon a pyramid of past opportunities which have alreadybeen enjoyed. But it is not only past opportunities which willaffect a person's present chances of securing new opportunities:inherited potentialities and talents, early environment and so on,will also have this kind of effect. Having made the point moregeneral, we can now state a second principle for competitiveequality of opportunity.

Second Principle:

Equality of opportunity in a certain competition C exists onlyif the possession of all the factors (Fi, Fz . . . etc.) which affectsuccess at C, and the possession of which is open to humanmanipulation, are so manipulated as to ensure that all com-petitors in C possess those factors to an equal extent.

Here is an example of the operation of the second principle.The quality of secondary education a person receives affects hischances of success at the university entrance competition. It isalso open to human manipulation. Therefore, if there is to beequality of opportunity in this competition, the quality of second-ary education received will have to be manipulated so that allcompetitors have the benefit of an education of the same quality.From the second principle we can also see what factors mightbecome relevant to equality of opportunity, though they are notnow. Let us suppose that intelligence is at least partly dependenton genetic factors, and let us suppose further that we come toknow how to manipulate these factors. Then, by the secondprinciple, lack of equal possession of these factors would establishthat there was not full equality of opportunity for those com-petitions in which intelligence is relevant.

Competitive Equality of Opportunity and Determinism

The second principle has an interesting consequence if it isconjoined with a belief in determinism. (Determinism is taken tobe the doctrine that for any event, including any human act or

at Aston U



ownloaded from




performance, there is some set of antecedent events, and someset of covering general laws, such that the occurrence of the eventin question is fully explicable by reference to these.) Let ussuppose that determinism is true, and that it covers 'moral'factors relevant to doing well at competitions, such as trying hardand persevering against difficulties; that is, such 'moral' factors,as much as any other, are held to be determined by antecedentcircumstances. Let us further suppose that our 'technology' hasreached the point where any factor of relevance to success in acertain competition can be manipulated, and has been, so as toensure equality of opportunity by satisfaction of the second prin-ciple.

If these conditions were satisfied the outcome of every com-petition would be a tie between all the contestants. For supposethat in some competition one contestant does better than theothers. Then, according to determinism, there must be someantecedent event or events which account for this difference. Thusthere is a factor relevant to success at the competition whichcould (by hypothesis) have been manipulated but was not.Therefore the second principle was not satisfied. Therefore inany competition in which the principle is satisfied the result mustbe a tie.1 In these circumstances the demand for equality ofopportunity becomes absurd. For the point of the competitionwas to decide on the allocation of scarce benefits by a contestin which some were more successful than others. But if the resultof every competition is a tie, it is useless for making this allocation.Hence in the circumstances supposed there is an inconsistencybetween the demand for competitive equality of opportunity andthe very presumption necessary to make that demand pointful,namely that the competition will resolve the allocation of scarcebenefits.

The consequences of assuming complete manipulability are

1 It is not true that in every particular 'contest' or 'game' it follows fromequal possession of the factors relevant to success that the outcome willbe a tie. But such particular 'contests' or 'games' would be constituents ofa 'competition' as that term is being understood here. If there were agenera! tendency for Pi to do better than P2 over a series of particularcontests making up a competition, then it could not be said that the secondprinciple had been satisfied in the circumstances supposed. For eitherthere is some relevant factor which has not been equalized and whichaccounts for the general tendency, or else we can 'decide' who will win(for example, by deciding who goes first), in which case the truth ofdeterminism is called into question. (I am grateful to John Baker fordrawing my attention to this point.)

at Aston U



ownloaded from




discussed by Bernard Williams, who says 'In these circumstances,where everything about a person is controllable, equality ofopportunity and absolute equality seem to coincide . . Z.1 It istrue that in these circumstances there would be no reason forgiving any one competitor a greater benefit at the end of thecompetition than any other. But this does not amount to a co-incidence of competitive equality of opportunity and absoluteequality. It is the end of equality of opportunity, for that notionhad its point in the context of a competition where scarce benefitsare to be distributed.

It is true that the distribution of benefits could be madearbitrarily, say, by drawing lots. And if in the odd particularcontest chance is used as a tie-breaker, it is not unreasonable tothink that the letter rather than the spirit of the first principlehas been broken. But what is at issue here is a situation in whichall of the factors relevant to success have been manipulated so asto ensure that all have equal chance of success, and thereforewhere all competitions (that is, series of 'contests' or 'games')ought to end in a tie between all competitors. In that case com-petitive equality of opportunity becomes absurd, for the com-petitions are now essentially lotteries, and more than the letter ofthe first principle has been violated.

Let us consider some of the alternatives open to those whohold the second principle, but who want to get themselves offthis hook.

1. While allowing that determinism is true, it could be pointedout that manipulation is far from possible in respect of all factorsrelevant to success at competitions. Therefore unmanipulabledifferences will remain, such as (at present) differences in 'natural'intelligence and talent. These differences will result in somecompetitors doing better than others, and hence the competitionswill not be pointless.2. While it is doubtful whether determinism could be whollyrejected (for then, how could the factors which affect success atcompetitions be ascertained?), it could be rejected in part. Onepossibility here is that determinism holds of the possession ofnatural abilities, and of some acquired characteristics relevant to

1 'The Idea of Equality' in Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds.),Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,1962, pp. 128-129.

at Aston U



ownloaded from




success at competitions, but not in general to the moral qualitiesrelevant to success, or to the acquired abilities which have inpart been acquired in virtue of the presence of certain moralqualities.

Now let us consider the position if it is accepted (a) thatcomplete manipulability is not in fact possible, and (b), thatdeterminism does not hold for all moral qualities. Then if therewere complete equality of opportunity by reference to the secondprinciple, the outcomes of competitions would depend upondifferences in natural abilities, and differences in the applicationof moral qualities to the development of such natural abilities.We have arrived at the formula used by Michael Young's merito-crats : 'Intelligence and effort together make up merit ( I+E = M)'.1

Some will be unhappy that this should be the outcome ofcompetitive equality of opportunity. For the conception we havearrived at will amount to a state of affairs in which those who winhave greater natural aptitudes and more sterling moral qualities.Now if one is (as we are now supposing) non-deterministic aboutat least some moral qualities, one might be prepared to allow thatdifferential rewards on this basis are deserved by the person whogains them. But surely one's natural abilities are not due to anycredit on one's own part: they are not deserved, so why shouldpeople receive different rewards on that basis?

The tracks that lead away from the contention that in a justsociety only deserved differences (at most) ought to be differentiallyrewarded will be ignored. Let us merely note where we get toif we suppose that any difference in rewards on grounds of naturalability is not justified, and that greater natural abilities ought tobe suppressed in some way, or counteracted, for example, bydeliberately worsening the opportunities of those with superiornatural abilities. This would make the outcome of competitionswholly dependent on moral qualities. In a society with completeequality of opportunity as now understood, we would have themorally superior receiving the greater benefits. In so far as thesebenefits included power and status, it would be an elite of themorally virtuous, of the 'elect'. It scarcely needs emphasizing thatthis is a secular version of some forms of seventeenth-centuryProtestantism.

1 Michael Young, The Rise of Meritocracy 1870-2033, Thames and Hudson,London, 1958, p. 74.

at Aston U



ownloaded from



30.8 D. A. LLOYD THOMAS:

Competitive Equality of Opportunity and Justice

The discussion of competitive equality of opportunity inrelation to the assumptions of determinism and completemanipulability has not given rise to any conclusive objection tothat conception of equal opportunity. For complete determinismmay be denied, and complete manipulability does not, in any case,hold. An advocate of competitive equality of opportunity mightbe worried by future prospects, but there would appear to be nodifficulty in his at present advocating this conception. However,when we come to consider the view of justice to which he iscommitted, there would appear to be an incoherence in his ideaof equality of opportunity.

While complete manipulability may be science fiction, theimplicit assumption that what is manipulable legitimately may bemanipulated in order to satisfy the second principle, has beenleft unquestioned. But on reflection we may wish to constrain thewhole-hearted pursuit of the requirements of the second principleup to the limits of our 'technological' capabilities. An example ofsuch a constraint is one we may wish to impose to protect thefamily. For example, let us take two persons who start from anapproximately equal position in circumstances of equality ofopportunity. One succeeds in acquiring a position needingconsiderable education and skill, while the other has a routinejob requiring little education. Now consider their children. Sofar as factors relevant to success in their competitions are con-cerned, they will not be equal. Thus we have a problem for thosewho advocate competitive equality of opportunity: the prizeswon in the competitions of the first generation will tend to defeatthe requirements of equality of opportunity for the next. Nowsomeone sufficiently fanatical about equality of opportunity maysay that such inequalities as arise from the competitions of onegeneration should be corrected before the competitions of thenext begin. 'The virtues of the fathers shall not be visited uponthe sons.' And it is possible to suggest how this might be attempted:children could be removed from their parents at an early age andput into state nurseries intended to provide a similar earlyenvironment for all children.

It is now possible to formulate an incoherence in the notion ofdistributive justice contained within the idea of competitiveequality of opportunity. On the basis of the second principle,

at Aston U



ownloaded from




equality of opportunity requires equalization of the factors((Fi . . . Fn) relevant to success. Unless at ti all competitorspossess Fi . . . Fn equally (where this is manipulatively possible)equality of opportunity has not been achieved. Thus, in accordancewith the second principle, the following situation must hold, sofar as manipulable factors are concerned:

Atti: A B CFi . . . Fn = Fi . . . Fn = Fi . . . Fn

The competition between A, B and C now proceeds, and wesuppose that they have differing degrees of success, due, let ussuppose, to differential possession of unmanipulable naturalabilities. Let us suppose that later the distribution of benefits bythe competition is as follows:

Att2: A B C3b 2b b

By reference to the idea of competitive equality of opportunitythe distribution at t2 is just, given that the first principle alsohas been observed during the competition.

Now let us suppose that these differences in benefits receivedhave an effect on the extent to which Fi. . . Fn are possessedby members of the next generation (Ai, Bi, and Ci) when theirtime comes to engage in a similar competition. This effect maybe through the passing on of wealth, or of especially favourableenvironments, and so on. It is assumed, for the purpose of thisargument, that the benefits received by the first generation doaffect, and affect favourably the possession of factors relevant tosuccess in the next generation. This is, of course, a contingentassumption, and it may not hold invariably. The position at t3will then be as follows:

Atty. Ai Bi CiFi . . . Fn > Fi . . . Fn > Fi . . . Fn

Thus there emerges the following incoherence in the conceptionof justice contained within the idea of competitive equality ofopportunity. At t2 the distribution of benefits is just because it isbased on competitive performance under the two principles ofequality of opportunity. At t2 the distribution of benefits is notjust because it causes a distribution of the factors Fi . . . Fn att3 contrary to that required by the second principle of equality

at Aston U



ownloaded from




of opportunity. Such an incoherence must remain so long as thedistribution of benefits at t2 has a certain kind of causal influenceon the possession of factors Fi . . . Fn in the competition followingupon t3. This amounts to saying that the incoherence will remainso long as there are social relations between members of onegeneration and the next. The considerations are wider than thecontinued existence of inheritance and the family. For as JohnCharvet has pointed out,1 even state nurseries could notguarantee equal treatment, and hence the doctrine must end upby not permitting persons to be dependent for their self-development on others at all; in other words, the doctrine isincompatible with the existence of any society at all.

This argument against competitive equality of opportunitydoes not bring up the problems which arise with the ideas of'compensatory justice' or 'positive discrimination'. For thoseideas have application in a context in which competitive equalityof opportunity is assumed not to have existed, and the questionthen arises 'What is to be done about those for whom the chanceof equal opportunity has now been lost for good, and who are at adisadvantage as a result?'. But as the difficulty just raised forcompetitive equality of opportunity assumes that its requirementsare being universally adhered to (so far as this is possible), theproblems of compensatory justice are beside the point.

Competitive Equality of Opportunity and Liberty

The idea of state nurseries and so on would generally be regardedas taking the demands of equality of opportunity too far, if onlybecause of the gross infringement of the liberty of parents. (Wewill pass over the risk of no more Mozarts because not all canbenefit equally from having Leopold for a father.) Those whoare just concerned about liberty may come to see the situationlike this. The pursuit of equality of opportunity is justified withinthe bounds of certain constraints; constraints imposed not onlyby the limits of our manipulative capacities, but also by respectfor certain liberties, which will not always allow us to manipulateeverything that we could. But it might be thought that if thismuch is granted, pursuit of equality of opportunity can be con-ducted within a framework of respect for liberty. I will conclude

i 'The Idea of Equality as a Substantive Principle in Society', in A. deCrespigny and A. Wertheimer (eds.), Contemporary Political Theory,Nelson's University Paperbacks, London, 1971, pp. 157-158.

at Aston U



ownloaded from




by trying to show that the conflict between equality of opportunityand liberty is more serious than this. It is not that the pursuitof such equality only sometimes may impinge on liberty: itspursuit will inevitably conflict with liberty.

It is not possible to lessen any inequality of opportunitywithout to some degree compromising autonomous choice. Theopportunities that any particular person enjoys do not grow ontrees: they depend upon the choices made by others. (It is notclaimed, of course, that this is true of all opportunities. Some areprovided by nature, for example, the opportunity to sow early,but it is true of the opportunities relevant to competitive equalityof opportunity.) Consider the case of employment opportunities.One person's opportunity to do a certain job is a matter of someother person or persons choosing to offer him that opportunity.Now given the differences between persons so far as desirablecharacteristics for doing a certain job are concerned, if the choiceof those to whom jobs are to be offered is made autonomously,some will have many opportunities and others few. Thus if onewere to demand that people should have nearer to equal oppor-tunities, the only way in which this could be done would be toplace restrictions on the autonomy of choice of those who haveopportunities at their disposal. Thus movement in the directionof equality of opportunity will inevitably be a constraint on liberty.To this a qualification may be allowed. If those who have oppor-tunities at their disposal themselves choose to distribute thoseopportunities more equally (rather than being constrained bysome authority to do so), the autonomy of choice need not becompromised. But in general, greater equality of opportunitymust bring into existence an elaborate, coercive administrativeapparatus constantly attempting to re-impose equal opportunityon (what will appear to the bureaucrats as) the anarchy of in-dividual choice, and the unequal opportunities that arise from it.

Now it may be that one is quite happy to see some libertysacrificed for the sake of equality of opportunity in a field suchas employment. But the same point, that the opportunities ofsome are the choices of others, applies (one might say, appliesparadigmatically) in the case of personal relationships. Theopportunities for friendship or for marriage of one person arethe choices others make to be willing to be friends or to entermarriage. Here too the only way in which greater equality ofopportunity could be brought about would be by restricting the

at Aston U



ownloaded from




autonomy of individual choices. Now it may be that one is notso happy about accepting the constraints necessary for greaterequality of opportunity in this area. If one is not so happy aboutit, what is the difference between it and the economic cases?

But the argument just given is open to objection.

'Often the person entitled to transfer a holding has no specialdesire to transfer it to a particular person; this contrasts witha bequest to a child or a gift to a particular person. Hechooses to transfer to someone who satisfies a certain con-dition (for example, who can provide him with a certaingood or service in exchange, who can do a certain job, whocan pay a certain salary), and he would be equally willingto transfer to anyone else who satisfied that condition. Isn'tit unfair for one party to receive the transfer, rather thananother who had less opportunity to satisfy the condition thetransferrer used? Since the giver doesn't care to whom hetransfers, provided the recipient satisfies a certain generalcondition, equality of opportunity to be a recipient in suchcircumstances would violate no entitlement of the giver.'1

So the persons awarding the prizes will not be concerned to bestowopportunities on particular persons, but on anyone who happensto satisfy best certain general characteristics deemed to be relevantin this competition. Indeed, if the persons awarding prizes donot do this, they will be violating the first principle for equalityof opportunity. Then how could equality of opportunity amongstthe competitors conflict with the autonomy of choice of thoseawarding the prizes? For example, it does not infringe upon theautonomy of choice of university selectors, who are looking forcertain general characteristics, if those amongst whom they arechoosing have enjoyed equality of opportunity.

To consider this objection, let us think in terms of a sequenceof competitions, those who do best at Ci go on to C2, and so on.Then the autonomy of the choice made between the contestantsin the last competition of the series is not compromised by thecontestants in that competition having enjoyed equality of oppor-tunity. But in order for them to have equality of opportunity atthat point, it is required that the earlier relevant opportunitiesof the contestants should have been equalized (in virtue of the

1 Robert Nozick, op. cit. p. 236. The argument in this section is indebtedto ideas developed by Professor Nozick in chapters 7 and 8 of that work.

at Aston U



ownloaded from




second principle). Therefore the choices of those who made theearlier decisions must have been constrained if equality of oppor-tunity is to be maintained. For example, those selecting pupilsfor good schools could not be allowed to make their choiceswithout constraint, for if they did, then by the time these pupilsgot to the university selection stage, those who had been selectedwould have enjoyed better opportunities than those who wererejected. Therefore there would not be equality of opportunityin the subsequent competitions, such as university selection. Itmay be replied that this still allows for autonomous choice in thelast competition of any series. But this will not allow so muchautonomy of choice as might at first appear. If we are only con-cerned with equality of opportunity up until the choice is made,then the choice may be made autonomously. But if we are alsoconcerned with equality of opportunity after the choice has beenmade, then the choice will have to be constrained so as to ensurethat.

As an example of this last point, consider a company officialtrying to choose the best person for an executive training scheme.Having a university education makes an applicant more desirablefor the job. Therefore those who have not had a university edu-cation do not enjoy equal opportunity with those who have. Ifthey were to enjoy equal opportunity, they, too, ought to havehad a university education. Therefore, those who choose who isto receive a university education cannot be allowed an autonomouschoice, for if they are, equality of opportunity at a later stagemay be affected. But similarly, the company official's choice maybe regarded as affecting equality of opportunity at a later stage.For if those who have been selected for the executive trainingscheme have a much better opportunity of reaching top positionsthan those who came into the company in some other way, thenthe company official's decision will affect equality of opportunityat that later stage. Thus equality of opportunity is compatiblewith making autonomous choices only if either (a) there is to beno further concern about equality of opportunity beyond thepoint at which the choice is made, or (b), those making the choicethemselves decide to allocate opportunities with an eye to ensuringequality of opportunity in later competitions.

The argument has attempted to show that there is in onerespect an inevitable conflict between the pursuit of competitiveequality of opportunity and the exercise of autonomous choice.

at Aston U



ownloaded from



404 D. A. LLOYD THOMAS: EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

Of course it can also be claimed that the existence of equality ofopportunity in any sphere increases the options actually availableto many, and hence that it furthers the ideal of liberty (or, if notof liberty, then, at any rate, of something valuable). The problemsof evaluating the resultant of these conflicting tendencies will notbe entered into here.1

BEDFORD COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

1 My thanks are due to Wes Cooper, Trudy Govier and Anne Lloyd Thomas,who commented in detail on an earlier draft of this paper. They are alsodue to members of the audiences when this paper was read in 1975 atthe University of Calgary and at the University of Alberta, for theirilluminating remarks in discussion.

at Aston U



ownloaded from



competitive equality of opportunity

Documents