collision avoidance and colregs-lbs

Hindustan Institute of Maritime Training

Chennai

COLLISION REGULATIONS

Need to revise Colregs knowledge

A navigator is well versed in international Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (Colregs)

prior to his MOT examinations but thereafter in time is most likely to forget many important

provisions of the Rules. Some of course are confused about certain parts of Colregs from the

beginning others understanding of certain implications of the Rules may become clouded slowly due

to non-use.

Collision Regulations 1972 were the result of comprehensive research and discussions between

members countries of IMO at that time. These rules re-structured the order of importance of the 1960

rules, reduced the number of words to almost 75% and re-defined some of the most important

international marine practices pertaining to sea passages of ships in light of modern day conditions.

The 1972 rules are presently under considerations of IMO for a further revision. Even so their

essential content may not undergo a sea change.

Facts indicate we do not know enough

A survey was conducted by the Australian Maritime College to test mariners clear understanding of

Colregs. The questionnaire comprised of six clear visibility and six restricted visibility collision

situations. The analysis of answers was very revealing. About 85% replies to restricted visibility

questions were wrong but in clear visibility situations the score was better with only 25% answers

being wrong. What’s more 40% of these 25% wrong replies were in case of overtaking situations.

Most of the total 85% wrong replies were from foreign going masters and senior watchkeepers.

While the usefulness of the Colregs to avoid collisions because of certain inherent ambiguities of the

Rules themselves can be a subject of heated discussion, I would like to dwell only on the Colregs as

they stand today and their implications

Colregs reference books

Clear understanding the Rules can be improved by referring to books and documents listed in the end.

Of these I recommend reference one as it also includes all the Rules ‘M’ notices listed are the best to

start with due to their immediate availability on board.

Study of near miss collisions is also an extremely useful tool to iron out faults in the understanding of

the Rules. But nobody documents collision near misses. An excellent effort however is being done by

Nautical Institute’s “Seaways” magazine which publishes ‘Mars’ reports covering navigational near

misses and these are sincerely recommended for discussion among bridge watchkeepers.


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Rule 5 Lookout: Of all the 38 Colregs and 4 annexes I shall refer to only 2 or 3 and I have no

hesitation in taking you first to a Rule, conscious compliance of which would have saved many

collisions, i.e. Lookout

“At all times” includes at anchor. A vessel ‘Gerda Toft’ was blamed by the Cburt when she dragged

her anchor and collided with ‘Elizabeth Mary’ the watchkeepers were doing some paperwork in the

chartroom and the AB was on gangway duty below.

“By Sight”. Guidance on maintaining a proper lookout is given in the STCW’95. These important

guidelines can enlighten navigators and shore mangers about how may lookouts duties of a lookouts.

Duties of a lookout, and matters such as, can a watchkeeping officer be the sole lookout.

1. The lookout must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper lookout and no other

duties shall be undertaken or assigned to him which could interfere with that task.

2. The duties of lookout man and helmsperson are separate. The helmsperson shall not be

considered to be the lookout while steering. (Only exception being bridge with all-round view on

small ships)

3. The O.O.W may be the sole lookout provided on each occasion

- situation is carefully assessed to establish without doubt that it is safe to do so

- account is taken of weather, visibility, traffic density, proximity to danger to navigation, TSS

etc, and

- assistance is immediately available if any change in situation occurs.

4. In determining composition of bridge watch to ensure proper lookout, master shall consider

- Visibility and weather

- Traffic density

- Presence of TSS etc

- Workload of other functions of the ship on watchkeepers

- Knowledge and confidence in competence of officers and crew

- Experience of officers and degree of their familiarization

- Radiocommunication taking place during the watch

“By hearing” implication is to keep bridge doors open or and post the lookout outside the wheelhouse

from where he can hear. In fog it may also be necessary to stop all noisy work on the vessel to

improve audibility so that watch officer will be able to hear other vessel’s whistle signals.

“By all available means” includes Radar, VHF, binoculars etc. yes binoculars Master and Pilot of

vessel ‘Santa Alicia’ were found at fault for not using the binoculars to look for the vessel ‘Germ’

before the vessels collided.

“Every vessel snail at all times maintain a proper lookout by sight and hearing as well as by all

available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full

appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”


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A listening watch on VHF is implied for lookout purposes and warnings or intentions heard must be

given due consideration to make a full apprasal of the situation. Use of VHF for collision avoidance

of course can be dangerous if identification of vessels is not positive, if too much time is spent in

communicating instead if taking action and if action agreed between vessels is contrary to Colregs.

Advantages of VHF and above points should be appreciated before taking an extreme view of

altogether disallowing the use of VHF and above points should be appreciated before taking an

extreme view of altogether disallowing the use of VHF.

“Full appraisal of the situation” keeping a listening watch on agencies like VTMS (Vessel Traffic

Management System) has been held as part of making a full appraise by all available means. For

example a vessel on her maiden voyage collided off Bremen with a Ro-Ro vessel. The VTMS

repeatedly warned her of impending collision with the crossing “Ro- Ro star”. But the master

misinterpreted his correctly occurred. This human error was due to over-reliance on one means of

lookout to the exclusion of all other means.

In another case keeping a lookout and making full appraisal has been deemed to include watching

navigational instruments like autopilot. Poor lookout at a crucial time and not watching own compass

resulted in a collision between ‘Trentbank’ and ‘Fogo’. The trentbank had just overtaken the tanker

Fogo when the formers autopilot failed and the Fogo was so close (that even the deviation within the

possible 10 deg. Limit set for the alarm). Caused the trentbank to steer towards Fogo and collision

occurred. The chief officer on watch on trentbank was busy with some paperwork in the wheelhouse

at the type. Here is what the judge said in his verdict

“The attitude of the master of the trentbank and her chief officer was most lamentable towards

automatic steering. The master had given no orders to ensure that somebody was on lookout all the

time. The chief officer, according to his own story saw nothing wrong in undertaking a clerical task

and giving only an he was the only man on this ship who was keeping any semblance of a lookout at

all. The automatic pilot can lead to disaster if left to look after itself while vigilance is relaxed it is on

men that safety at sea depends and they cannot make a greater mistake than to suppose that machines

can do all their work for them.”

Lookout by radar of course is practiced and requires little elaboration. Some checks of the equipment

preferably every watch are recommended in ‘M notices referred to even today, believe it or not, some

masters are skeptical about the use of radar and some still hope to prolong the life of the equipment

through discouraging use. Here are few observations, on the use of radar, taken form court

judgements.

a. If radar is not functioning properly so as to be unreliable then it may be hazardous to use it.

b. Radar may be temporarily disregarded due to excessive interference etc. (which means lake all

precautions during the interim period as if there in no radar)

c. This does not however mean that if there is a properly functioning radar set, the master has any

discretion to disallow its use or turn off the radar. If a vessel carries a properly functioning radar

set, then its use must be made especially in restricted visibility.

d. Whether keeping a lookout by radar or not visual lookout must be maintained.


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How to improve lookout? As one solution to the problem of poor lookout I think experienced Masters

will agree that frequent visits to the bridge by the master, especially at change of watch time and

when officers are new to the vessel will tremendously improve collision avoidance capability as well

as navigational safety of their vessels. Secondly, not allowing non-navigational paperwork or chart

correction on the bridge without additional lookout will help.

When are casualties more likely? U.K. P&I Club studied 236 collisions from 1987 to 1995 and found

that 55% of collisions occurred in good visibility and only 33% in poor visibility local time of

maximum number of collisions was 0500 to 0800 during which 25% of collisions took place further

remember the proven truth about change of watch 50% of all navigation related casualties occurred

within 15 minutes before or 15 minutes after change of watch also 90% of all major accident take

place in or close proximity of harbours and ports. Such statistical inputs form accident studies can be

useful in determining when to monitor bridge operations to ensure proper lookout and safe

navigation.

Next, consider the rule on safe speed

Rule 6:Safe speed

“Every vessel shall at all times proceed at a safe speed so that she can take proper and effective action

to avoid collision and be stopped within distance appropriate to the prevailin circumstances and

conditions and then the Rule describes 6 criteria by all ships and 6 more when having an operational

radar. All 1 must be considered carefully in determining safe speed in a given set of conditions.

It may be noted that safe speed can be a speed higher than present speed in certain cases. This was

evident in the collision case of ‘Ring’ and ‘Orlik’. The ring waiting ahead of Orlik was to pick up her

pilot after the Orlik. The Ring was faulted for losing her steerage way and fall of her course into the

path of the Orlik as the Orlik picked up her pilot.

Safe speed is usually full speed in clear open waters but must be less than full in case of restricted

visibility or in increased traffic conditions etc. if no radar is operational on board and in traffic and or

in fog, perhaps the safe speed should be deemed to be zero requiring possible anchorage till visibility

improved.

Further full speed in fog for commercial expediency is never likely to be accepted as an excuse in

case of a collision. For compelling commercial reasons or otherwise it is not rare that ships proceed at

speeds much greater than what can be considered safe speed especially in fog.

Against this scenario, two Colregs requirements need to be emphasized. Firstly, Rule 19 dealing with

conduct in restricted visibility requires all vessels to have engines ready for immediate manoeuvring

and reminds once again in this Rule to adapt to safe speed as per conditions of restricted visibility.

Secondly vessels constrained by draught (showing 3 red lights) by Rule 18 are told to navigate with


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particular caution having full regard to their special condition. An IMO clarification to deep drafted

vessels states that such vessels should have their engines ready for manoeuvring.

A deep drafted VLCC proceeding at 14 knots in a TSS in good visibility spotted a tug and tow

crossing the traffic lanes ahead from port to stud at 8 knots. The VLCC gave 5 short blasts etc., then

reduced speed then went astern but could not avoid colliding with the tug and tow which was

crossing at right angles to the lanes as required. The tug was blamed 70% for impeding deep drafted

VLCC’s navigation for not giving way as per crossing situation when the ROC (risk of collision)

existed and also for going at an excessive speed in the circumstances. The VLCC had done

everything right except that its initial speed of 14 knots when there was traffic about was considered

in excess of safe speed for her existing condition and was blamed 30%.

The Master’s speed problem may be realistically solved in future when

1. The traffic management system attains a high level of sophistication (like that of the 3-D systems

presently controlling aircraft

2. Ship auto identification systems become mandatory for all vessels and

3. Policing and punishing of the traffic lawbreakers is undertaken diligently by coastal stares. These

measures may contribute to acceptance of higher speeds as safe speeds in fog. But until that

happens a mariner is bound by the present Colregs for determining and following safe speed in

fog.

Next consider Rule 10: Traffic Separation Schemes. The TSS set up in many parts of the world is

perhaps the single most dramatic occurrence responsible for reducing the number of collisions by

drastically reducing end-on situations. However when passage planning through TSS some facts need

to be kept in mind.

1. Rule 10 is only applicable to IMO approved schemes although charts may show both approved

and non-approved schemes. How to decide? The booklet “Ships Routeing” and also B.A. Annual

notice no.17 give the details. Approved or not approved should be entered on the passage plans. A

US court held that a vessel which had collided and was not complying with charted TSS off the

coast of Japan was not at fault as the TSS was not IMO approved and so Rule 10 did not apply.

Hence additional caution is necessary near non-approved schemes because vessels may be

proceeding in the wrong lane. Good seamanship as recommended in Rule 2, however demands

that charted TSS, whether approved or not, should be complied with.

2. Using the scheme does not mean priority over vessels not using the scheme. Normal Colregs

always apply.

3. Finishing is not prohibited by Rule 10 in the TSS as long as fishing vessels keep clear of vessels

using the scheme. They thus might get out of the way only at the last minute, causing concern to

large vessels.

4. Avoiding heavy weather or avoiding traffic are not considered sufficient reasons for using the

Inshore Traffic Zone and any power driven vessel longer than 20 m must use the lanes of the

main TSS and not use the Inshore Traffic Zones unless she is proceeding to or from a port within

the ITZ.


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Amendments to Colregs in force 4th

November 1995

I sincerely hope the above refresher discussion generates interest in understanding and compliance of

these and other Colregs to effectively prevent collisions the most dreaded “Big bangs” of marine

casualties.

Rule No Subject Old implication New Implication

26 Fishing vessels Fishing vessels carried two cones

with bases together. Those less

than 20 m, long could carry a

basket instead.

Fishing vessels less than

20 m, in length also have

to carry the cones with

bases together. (Basket

done away with)

26 and Annex 2 Fishing vessels Fishing vessels in close proximity

to each other could (word was

‘may’) carry additional lights e.g.

for trawlers white over white to

denote shooting nets or

searchlights for pair trawlers etc.

Fishing vessels, of 20 m or

more in length in close

proximity to each other

have to carry the additional

lights. Those less than

20m, in length may carry.

Annex 1

(Add new 3 d)

Horizontal

Positioning of Lights

No horizontal position stated for a

single masthead light of a power

driven vessel.

Power driven vessels (of

less than 50 m in length

when carrying the single

masthead light shall

display it forward of

midships for vessels less

than 20m in length as far

forward as possible

Annex 1

(Add new 9 b)

Horizontal sectors of

lights

All round lights (like N.U.C

lights) to be located so that they

are not obscured for more than a

sector of 6 degrees by masts etc

If impracticable to comply

with old requirement then

can exhibit two all round

lights so that they should

appear as one light at a

distance of one mile (Some

ships already do this by

positioning pairs of N.U.C

lights on either side of

Christmas tree mast)

Annex 1

(Add new 13 and

present 13

becomes 14)

High speed craft

lights

Forward masthead light of all

ships has to be carried not less

than 6m and need not be more

than 12 m above deck and in

between related to breadth of the

vessel

Forward masthead light of

High Speed Craft with a

length to breadth ratio of

less than 3 may be placed

lower than stated in rules.

So however base angles at

line joining sidelights with

mastlight not to be less

than 27 degrees

Annex 4 Distress signal Existing distress signals listed in

this annex

Survival craft Radar

transponder (SART) now

added to 14 existing

distress signals.


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