collective bargaining

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Ikramul Hasan This study is prepared for academic exercise. This is study which cover different aspects of collective bargaining issue in different industrial arena which also gives us an opportunity to understand different activities regarding issue and their gapes based on four articles. “Different aspects of Collective Bargaining in Industrial Arena”

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This study is prepared for academic exercise. This is study which cover different aspects of collective bargaining issue in different industrial arena which also gives us an opportunity to understand different activities regarding issue and their gapes based on four articles.

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Page 1: Collective Bargaining

Ikramul Hasan This study is prepared for academic exercise. This is study which cover different aspects of collective bargaining issue in different industrial arena which also gives us an opportunity to understand different activities regarding issue and their gapes based on four articles.

“Different aspects of Collective Bargaining in Industrial Arena”

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Table of contents

Page 1.0 Introduction 04 2.0 Literature Review Model 1 06

2.1 Methodology 09

2.2 Results & Findings 09

3.0 Literature Review for Model 2 11 3.1 The co-ordination policy 11 3.1.1 Development 11 3.1.2 The institutions: 11 3.1.3 The content 12 3.2 Assessing meeting the guidelines for bargaining claims 13 3.2.1 Inflation 13 3.2.3 National productivity 13 3.2.4 Wages 13 3.2.5 Non-wage aspects 14 3.2.6 Quantitative aspects 2000-2002 14

3.2.7 Qualitative aspects 15 3.2.8 Reductions in working time 15 4.0 Literature Model 3 15 4.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations 16 4.2 Style/level of expertise of the negotiators 16 4.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues 16 4.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques 17 4.5 Methodology 17 4.6 Findings 17 4.6.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations 17 4.6.2 Style/level of expertise demonstrated by negotiators 18 4.6.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues 19 4.6.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques 19 5.0 Literature Review Model 4 19 5.1 Methodology 21 5.2 Findings 21 6.0 Gaps in literature 22 7.0 Recommendation 23 8.0 Conclusion

23

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9.0 References 23

List of Tables and Figures

Table1: Results of the study 09 Table 2. Literature Gaps 22

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1.0 Introduction: Numerous organizations particularly in manufacturing side have transformed their work systems

in to team-based work system to gain better economic performance with organizational

flexibility and effectiveness (McHugh, 2007; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Batt 1999). Understanding

employee attitudes, socio-technical and job design theories support a positive relationship

between team systems and work-related attitudes (McHugh, 2007; Hackman and Oldham, 1980;

Cumming 1978) though some studies have not found a consistent relationship (McHugh, 2007;

Appelbaum et al. 2000). To understand how alternative work systems affect work-related

attitudes, there is a need to examine the interface between team systems and union-related

institutional arrangements as “positional characteristics” that are attained by having

organizational membership and may act as cognitive filters for individual perceptions and

attitudinal responses. Employee seniority is relevant to a study of work restructuring because

team systems are often associated with changes to the tenure based privileges of seniority

systems (McHugh, 2007; Hunter et al. 2002). In a joint labor-management initiatives, such as

off-line problem solving, are frequently viewed as a precursor to the adoption of team systems

(McHugh, 2007; CutcherGershenfeld et al. 1987). Employee participation is one potential

avenue for increasing organizational flexibility for more dramatic workplace innovations such as

teams (McHugh, 2007; Katz and Kochan, 2004). Job satisfaction focuses on day-to-day work

experience and is relevant to the debates surrounding the negative repercussions of team systems

on employees (Babson, 1993).

The social partners have also concluded voluntary agreements to be implemented by collective

bargaining in the member states covering telework (2002), work-related stress (2004),

harassment and violence at work (2007), a framework of actions for the lifelong development of

competencies and qualifications (2002) and a framework of actions on gender equality. The

primary focus in the Directive to negotiated arrangements in establishing a European Works

Council prompted European-level bargaining between management and employee

representatives on an unprecedented scale. EWCs, however, are consultation, not negotiating

bodies, and cover the rights of all employees, not just those of trade union employees. At the

European level of analysis, there are three levels at which social dialogue takes place and three

Framework Agreements have been negotiated by the cross-sectoral social partners covering

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parental leave (1996), part-time work (1997) and fixed-term employment contracts (1999)

(Gennard, 2009). In the year1999, the European Graphical Federation passed a resolution

entitled “Developing a European Industrial Relations System in the Graphical Sector” which

contained an agreed for national level collective bargaining within a European context in Annual

General Meeting (AGM) for different European countries. UEG has been influenced by that of

the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) which has been a leader in developing a European

co-ordination of collective bargaining strategy in developing this policy (Gennard, 2004;

Schulten, 2000, 2001a, b). The UEG co-ordinated collective bargaining approach is multifaceted

that it aims to prevent graphical employers from gaining a competitive advantage by applying

downward pressure on employment conditions. The policy also seeks to stimulate economic

growth in the European graphical industry by maintaining and increasing the real purchasing

power of graphical workers, and/or their employment security by negotiating the implementation

of employment creation measures such as reductions in working time (Gennard, J. 2004).

Many conflicts in labour relations and community settings illustrate a range of difficulties, many

of which involve people taking positions that evoke resistance from others (Caverley,

Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005, Susskind and Cruikshank, 1987). Whether it is a conflict over

pay and benefits or the scheduling of work, people often engage in positional-based bargaining

(Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005, Fisherand Ury, 1991) where parties take a position,

argue for it, and then agree to make concessions in reaching an agreement. Alternative dispute

resolution strategies are often based on the assumption that it is possible to be more integrative,

win-win, and cooperative (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Kochan and Osterman,

1995; Fisher and Ury, 1991; Walton and McKersie, 1965). They are based on the belief that both

parties can be winners with complementary and non-competing interests. Such strategies

encourage people to go beyond their positions, focus on the problem rather than the personalities,

and seek to satisfy each party’s interests or real needs (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell,

2005; Wisher and Ury, 1991). This usage appears to stem from the inherent perception of power

that people associate with this style of conflict resolution. Even though 70 percent utilized a

positional-based negotiation style, 60 percent of the litigators surveyed thought that problem-

solving negotiation is a preferred method that needs to be more readily used within conflict

resolution processes (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005). In this literature study we try

find gaps between articles to draw a conclusion for a perfect combination collective bargaining

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process in the company operation for effective performance and article are consider 4 model to

define the fact base on industrial system, European collective bargaining process, case study and

also view point.

2.0 Literature Review Model 1: In traditional work systems are based on hierarchical control focuses on management desires to

“establish order, exercise control, and achieve efficiency” by: (a) limiting worker attention to a

single job; (b) deskilling jobs with accountability focused on individuals; (c) layering the

organizational structure with an emphasis on positional authority, managerial prerogatives, and

hierarchical status symbols; and (d) restricting employee voice and limiting sharing of business

information. This mass production approach is associated with individualized, repetitive, and

scripted work (McHugh, 2007; Batt 1999). Seniority is an enduring principle in employment

relations arising out of the desire to curb managerial favoritism because seniority gives

employees preferential treatment based on either job or organizational tenure (McHugh, 2007;

Rees 1962). Gordon and Johnson (1982) distinguish to pattern between noncompetitive and

competitive status seniority. Noncompetitive status seniority includes benefits that accrue with

seniority without depriving fellow workers of benefits (e.g., insurance coverage, sick days, and

pensions). These benefits are more distal-based and more clearly linked to continuance

organizational commitment through side-bet theory (McHugh, 2007; Allen and Meyer 1990).

Where competitive status seniority determines work preferences that accrue with seniority that

may deny fellow workers’ preferences, for example, job assignments, shift preferences, overtime

options, vacation scheduling, and job security. These preferences are more proximal to the

employee’s work experience and have a closer connection to job satisfaction and affective

organizational commitment. Traditional work systems emphasize using seniority principles to

allocate competitive status seniority opportunities. In particular, under traditional systems,

seniority creates vested rights in jobs that are reinforced by the formal and informal adoption of

various work rules (McHugh, 2007; Rees 1962). Thus, the following hypotheses are suggested:

Hypothesis 1a Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and job

satisfaction such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work in a traditional system

and have high seniority

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Hypothesis 1b Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and organizational

commitment such that organizational commitment wills him higher when employees work in a

traditional system and have high seniority.

Off-line problem-solving is a form of employee involvement in which a groups of employees

who may or may not be from the same work unit work voluntarily meet to engage in problem-

solving activities called parallel teams because they have a structure that “is parallel to the

organization of work, they tend to complement rather than substitute for existing structures”

(Batt 2004: 188)by assuring that off-line problem-solving groups do not challenge the extant

organizational hierarchy with limited discretion and recommend to management (McHugh,

2007; Batt 1999; Cohen and Bailey 1997; Lawler et al. 1995). Empirical research has not found a

consistent, long-term, positive relationship between employee involvement in off-line problem-

solving and work-related attitudes (McHugh, 2007; Cohen and Bailey 1997). Batt (2004: 189)

asserts that “the most plausible interpretation of these results is that parallel structures do not

sufficiently influence the organization of work and daily routines of employees to dramatically

affect their attitudes and self-interests.” The work-related attitudes of team members with

experience in off-line problem- solving groups are likely to differ from other employees. Team-

based work systems require substantive employee participation because teams are charged with

responsibility for determining how to achieve team objectives. However, with continued

participation (i.e., exposure to off-line groups and teams) an employee has a broader exposure to

various decision-making activities and, therefore, a greater likelihood of a positive relationship

between participation activities and general work-related attitudes. In short, a stronger

relationship between team membership and work-related attitudes would be expected for

employees who had off- line problem-solving experience because those employees would have a

more exposure to participation systems (McHugh, 2007). Therefore, the following hypotheses

are proposed:

Hypothesis 2a Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between

work system and job satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work

in teams and have experience in the off line problem—solving process.

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Hypothesis 2b Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between

work system and organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he

higher when employees work in teams and have experience in the off line problem-solving

process.

Several empirical studies showed that no significant relationship between union participation and

organizational commitment while others have suggested that these results may be partly due to

an inappropriate specification of the union participation construct (McHugh, 2007; Kelloway and

Barling 1993; Leicht 1989; Martin et al. 1986). Using a conceptualization of union participation

that accounts for the cumulative and nonindependent aspects of union participation, Fullager and

Barling (1991) found a positive relationship between union participation and organizational

commitment. This suggests that individuals who participate in union activities have higher

commitment because they have greater interest in the long-term nature of their employment

relationship. According to the voice hypothesis workers become primed to detect dissatisfying

conditions in the workplace as members participate in union activities, such as attending union

meetings and reading union literature become more aware of the dissatisfying aspects of their

jobs (McHugh, 2007; Freeman and Medoff 1984). However, Pfeffer and Davis-Blake (1990:

261) contend that drawing attention to the negative aspects of work may actually diminish

employee perceptions of the union since “calling attention to negative aspects of the work

reminds workers not only of problems created by the employer but of the failure of the union to

remedy these problems.” The interaction between teams and union participation is best

understood after considering issues of worker influence. Team systems require a higher level of

employee involvement than more traditional work arrangements ((McHugh, 2007; Cohen and

Bailey 1997). Workers reporting higher job satisfaction and affective commitment also report

greater influence in their work situation (Campion et a!. 1996). Worker desire for influence

pervades multiple spheres of the employment relationship. Thus, one could argue that greater

employee influence arising from both team membership and union participation will be

positively related to work-related attitudes. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:

Hypothesis 3a Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and job

satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees both work in teams and are

more active in their union.

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Hypothesis 3b Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and

organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he higher when

employees both work in teams and are more active in their union.

2.1 Methodology: A field study was conducted at a unionized manufacturing facility that employed 1,676 hourly

employees. Interviews with labor and management officials, as well as information garnered

from focus groups. A voluntary survey, endorsed by labor and management, was administered at

the plant. A total of 743 individuals provided completed surveys (44% response rate). The

demographic composition of the respondents closely matched the composition of the entire

hourly workforce. The respondents were 86% male, 76% white, average age 47 years (s.d. 9.7),

and average seniority 20 years (s.d. 11.4); while the entire hourly workforce was 87% male, 79%

white, average age 48 years (s.d. 10), and average seniority 21 years (s.d.= 11.3).

2.2 Results & Findings:

Table1: Results of the study

Hypothesis Findings

Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and job satisfaction

such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees work in a traditional

system and have high seniority

Significant

Seniority will moderate the relationship between work system and organizational

commitment such that organizational commitment wills him higher when

employees work in a traditional system and have high seniority

Significant

Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between work

system and job satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when

employees work in teams and have experience in the off line problem—solving

process

Insignificant

Off- line problem-solving experience will moderate the relationship between work

system and organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will

he higher when employees work in teams and have experience in the off line

Significant

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problem-solving process.

Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and job

satisfaction, such that job satisfaction will he higher when employees both work in

teams and are more active in their union.

Significant

Union participation will moderate the relationship between work system and

organizational commitment, such that organizational commitment will he higher

when employees both work in teams and are more active in their union

Significant

The significant interaction found between union participation and teams. Alternatively, the

union’s stance toward a work restructuring initiative may be an important influence on the

impact of union participation on work-related attitudes. If the union opposes a team-based work

system, then union participation could be a school for individual opposition. Alternatively, where

a union is supportive, union participation provides a means for communicating the desirability of

the new work system to employees, as well as a vehicle for employee voice in the design of the

work system. Moreover, under the team-based system, union representatives and management

counterparts co-facilitated team meetings, jointly provided process assistance to teams, and

delivered team-related training. For non-team employees, union-management interactions tend to

focus on grievance handling and contract administration. In short, union participation differed

under each work system. However, the difference is likely linked to differences in employee

influence. The results associated with off-line employee involvement are informative. Off-line

problem- solving experience moderated the relationship between work system and organizational

commitment, but not job satisfaction. Individuals who work in teams and have participated in the

off-line program report higher organizational commitment than those who have participated in

the employee involvement program and are working under a traditional system. Perhaps, worker

commitment increases as employee expectations arising from off-line program participation are

met under the auspices of a team-based work. The results also reaffirm the observation that first

generation work organization innovations, such as off-line employee involvement programs, are

a useful starting point for participation in higher-level innovations, such as teams (Lawler et al.

1995). The inability to find a significant interaction between work system and off-line employee

involvement experience for job satisfaction, yet finding a significant interaction for

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organizational commitment may be attributed to differences in these two constructs, as well as

the characteristics of the off-line employee involvement process.

3.0 Literature Review for Model 2: Excessive wage increases can result in the European Central Bank (ECB) raising the interest

rates. This macroeconomic environment also increases the probability of employers and national

government favoring what Schulten (2000, 2001a) N calls “competition oriented collective

bargaining policies”. These seek to achieve, in one country, at the expense of competitor

countries, collective bargaining outcomes compatible with improved national, sector and

corporate competitiveness. The productivity oriented collective bargaining thesis. Wage

bargaining centers on the distribution of productivity gains between the interests of workers and

employers. Increases in wages resulting from enhancements in productivity plus inflation are

known as the quantitative aspects of the collective agreement. The productivity oriented

approach to the co-ordination of collective bargaining aims to achieve for any collective

agreement a total value equal to the sum of the annual average increase in inflation plus the

annual average increase in national productivity. Under this approach, however, the bargained

nominal wage increase can be lower than this sum (Gennard, 2004).

3.1 The co-ordination policy

3.1.1 Development

It also agreed to continue to encourage bi-lateral and multi-lateral transnational collective

bargaining co-operation initiatives between its affiliates (European Graphical Federation, 1994).

The major step forward, however, in the development of a productivity oriented collective

bargaining policy occurred when the 1999 EGF Annual General Meeting (European Graphical

Federation, 1999a) adopted a “Declaration on the Co-ordination of Collective Bargaining”

(European Graphical Federation, 1999a).

3.1.2 The institutions:

The major institutions developed by UEG to develop, and monitor, transnational co-operation

amongst affiliates are its Collective Bargaining Committee and its Annual Collective Bargaining

Conference of the chief negotiators of affiliated unions. This conference is attended by the chief

negotiators of affiliates and they debate, and approve or reject, the guidelines suggested for the

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co-ordination of collective bargaining for the following year’s annual collective bargaining

round (UNI Europa Graphical 2000a).

3.1.3 The content

The content of the UEG Guidelines on the European co-ordination of collective bargaining with

national graphical employers’ organizations rests on seven pillars the provision of information,

online network, social dialogue, and regional collective bargaining, guidelines for bargaining

claims, transnational companies and transnational solidarity. It provides information on a regular

basis on the duration and termination dates of agreements, the bargained changes to the

quantitative and qualitative aspects of agreements and on progress to meet, at a point in time and

over time, the common collective bargaining objectives and trends on meeting these objectives.

The survey is the basis upon which the Collective Bargaining Committee and the Collective

Bargaining Conference establish the key priorities for the next collective bargaining round with

the national graphical employers’ organizations. In 2002, UEG entered the results of its

Collective Bargaining Survey for the years 2000, Future collective bargaining survey reports will

be added to this database thus providing affiliates with a quick access to up-to-date information.

In the same year, UEG established an online network providing affiliates with a forum for quick

and easy exchange of information on collective bargaining activities including industrial

disputes, in affiliates’ countries. Its animators collate the data and produce general or specific,

analysis of trends in collective bargaining issues. This component of the guidelines encourages

affiliates on a regional basis to exchange information on their collective bargaining agendas and

outcomes, on the industrial relations policies and practices of particular graphical and packaging

multinational companies and to provide solidarity action in industrial dispute situations

(European Graphical Federatio 1999, UNI Europa Graphical 2001, 2002, 2003). The rationale

behind such moves is that linguistic and cultural similarities in some regions, such as the Nordic

countries or the German speaking countries, might make co-ordination easier. The central pillar

of the guidelines is that bargained wage increases plus bargained increases in the qualitative

aspects of employment conditions be at least equal to the annual increase in inflation plus the

average annual increase in national productivity. The guidelines for bargaining claims link wage

negotiations with other elements of collective bargaining. As well as the different collective

priorities of each national graphical trade union, the UEG co-ordinate collective bargaining

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policy takes account of the different levels (e.g. confederal, sector, etc.) and stages of

development of collective bargaining in each country and the macroeconomic priorities of

European governments. The onus falls on UEG affiliates to ensure that the national agreements

they negotiate meet (or move towards) the minimum standards and wage goals outlined in the

guidelines. If in attempting to do this an affiliate finds itself in industrial dispute with employers

then affiliates in other countries are committed to provide solidarity action, which includes

refusing to handle work transferred from the country in which the dispute is taking place. This

clause can also be invoked when a dispute occurs in the country of an UEG affiliated union. For

example, in 2003 notice of its dispute with the German national graphical employers’

organization went out from the German affiliate Verdi (Medien). In the previous year, the

Norwegian affiliate had issued a similar notice with respect to its dispute with its national

graphical employers’ organizations (Gennard, 2004).

3.2 Assessing meeting the guidelines for bargaining claims

In assessing the extent to which affiliates have met the UEG guidelines for bargaining claims

there are measurement problems with regard to inflation, productivity and wages.

3.2.1 Inflation

The EU Commission, on the other hand, publishes a harmonised index of consumer prices which

is a pure price index which excludes rents, mortgage and interest payments [6]. This statistic

often varies from that of national based inflation indices. UEG affiliates in completing the

collective bargaining survey questionnaire invariably quoted nationally compiled inflation

statistics, which invariably presents some difficulties concerning comparability.

3.2.3 National productivity

The EU Commission issues productivity per worker statistics. The UEG Annual Collective

Bargaining Survey collects wage information per worker and therefore, the productivity per

worker figure is the most appropriate measure to use. The problem is that many European

countries do not publish productivity per worker data on a sector basis (Gennard, 2004).

3.2.4 Wages

In the UEG guidelines, the wages figure relates to the annual percentage bargained increase at

the sectoral level with national graphical employers’ organizations (Column (4) of Table I). The

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figure for Belgium and Cyprus also includes wage increases resulting automatically from a link

to increases in inflation as well as those resulting from bargaining. Measuring only the bargained

wage understates the actual wage increases (earnings) received by the graphical workers in any

one year. The bargained wage increase shown in Table I is an understatement of the actual

annual wage increases for some countries. This is because in multi-level bargaining systems in,

for example, the UK and the Nordic countries, the actual wage increase received is the sum of

those bargained at the sector and the company/enterprise level. The figure in Column (1) refers

only to the bargained sectoral wage increase. The UEG Collective Bargaining Survey, while

recognizing these important data limitations, confines itself to collecting information on the

percentage wage increase bargained at the sectoral level, on wage increases automatically linked

to inflation increases and on wages bargained for all workers at the multi-sector level (Gennard,

2004; O’Donnell and O’Reardon, 2000).

3.2.5 Non-wage aspects

In calculating, over time or at a point in time, the change in the total value of a collective

agreement, a central problem is assigning a financial cost to the employer of the bargained

increases to the agreement’s qualitative aspects. This is especially difficult in cases where the

actual cost to the employer of increases in non-wage benefits depends upon the extent of take-up

of the benefit. Examples of this problem are where graphical unions negotiate improved training,

retraining and lifelong learning opportunities and where they negotiate early retirement schemes

designed to increase employment opportunities for other composition such as younger workers

(Gennard, 2004).

3.2.6 Quantitative aspects 2000-2002

Table I provides data for 14 European countries for the collective bargaining rounds of 2000-

2003 inclusive (UNI Europa Graphical, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003). Over the period 2000-2002

inclusive, graphical unions across Europe have experienced difficulties in achieving bargained

wage settlements that equal the sum of increases in the annual average rate of inflation plus the

average annual increase in national productivity. Over the three-year period only in Sweden in

2000, in The Netherlands in 2001, in Germany and Norway in 2002 and in Belgium, Norway and

Sweden in 2003 did graphical unions exceed this target? In every bargaining round, graphical

workers in general received a bargained wage increase in excess of the average annual increase

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in inflation. The real purchasing power of graphical workers has, on average, been maintained

over the period 2000-2003 inclusive. The obtaining of bargained wage increases at least equal to

the increase in the rate of inflation is a key of “absolute” floor below which the wage evolution

should not fall.

3.2.7 Qualitative aspects

The four collective bargaining rounds overall, in 12 of the 14 countries; graphical workers

gained some improvements to qualitative aspects of their employment conditions. The

exceptions were Austria and Luxembourg (Gennard, 2004).

3.2.8 Reductions in working time

It understates the actual position as it excludes overtime working. In eight of the countries, the

annual amount of working time, excluding overtime, is below the UEG guideline of 1,750 hours

per year. The guideline is exceeded in Ireland, Portugal, Latvia, Spain (where there was in 2000,

a reduction in annual working time of eight hours) and the Czech Republic. Although not

included in the table, the working hours guideline is also exceeded in Iceland and Croatia.

Overtime working in the graphical industry varies considerably from country to country

(European Graphical Federation, 1998b, 1999b) and from company to company. In some

European countries, the level of paid overtime working in the graphical industry exceeds 20

hours per week. Averaged out across countries, the “typical” graphical worker is estimated to

work between five and six paid hours of overtime per week [8]. If one assumes that some 50 per

cent of European graphical workers (estimated to be 0.5 million) work five to six paid hours of

overtime per week then a total of 141 million paid overtime hours per year are worked in the

European graphical sector. However, in some European countries, there are restrictions on

overtime working. In Denmark, for example, overtime working is restricted to one hour per day

whilst in Spain the maximum for paid overtime (Gennard, 2004).

4.0 Literature Model 3:

The ability to ensure the clarity of the bargaining issues was an important facilitative condition

which describes the degree to which the negotiators and associated parties at the bargaining table

can utilize tactics, strategies and techniques in clarifying the bargaining issues brought forth in

the negotiation process. This cooperative-based collective bargaining framework suggests that a

thorough understanding of one’s organizational history and a clearly defined bargaining

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approach are pre-conditions for a good dispute resolution process. By understanding the degree

of trust between labor and management and the style of negotiation, parties can clearly establish

and identify the core issues being discussed (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations

We felt that the degree of trust developed from previous negotiations between labor and

management was important in understanding the level of trust, communication, and the nature of

the relationship in the present bargaining process (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005,

Rubin, 1989). Trust is often the process of developing a relationship of trust in collective

bargaining is seen as a legitimate means of endorsing ethically sound values (Caverley,

Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Rubin, 1989). A relationship of trust has a greater chance of

coming to fruition if the parties involved in a collective bargaining process have previous

experiences that illustrated honest intentions. By building on the organizational history and its

link to trust between inter-organizational parties (i.e. labor and management), negotiators can

begin the process of mapping out the style of dispute/conflict resolution to utilize within the

bargaining process.

4.2 Style/level of expertise of the negotiators

labor-management cooperation be best achieved within an integrative collective bargaining

process by the style/level of expertise of the negotiators might impact and influence the process

and associated outcomes within collective bargaining. In terms of the style of the negotiators, the

most commonly known cooperative-based negotiating style is illustrated in interest-based

bargaining (in other words, win-win bargaining, problem-solving negotiation and collaborative

bargaining). Mayer (2000) suggested that trustworthiness is primarily rooted in an individual’s

competencies, skills, and characteristics such as: problem solving; clarity of language; and

understanding of power imbalances, interests, positions and values which in turn enables

negotiators to influence the other party.

4.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues

Examples of distributive issues include hourly rate of wages, job security agreements, and re-

training costs. Integrative issues, on the other hand, have mutual benefit interests and

opportunities for joint gain for all parties. Achieving greater understanding of the nature of the

basic issues and the strength of each principal’s interests in these issues is more important for

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integrative issues. Effective negotiators may choose to utilize problem-solving tactics on the

issues with integrative potential at the same time that they use either competitive or cooperative

tactics on distributive issues (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005; Chicanot and Sloan,

2003).

4.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques

The facilitator can increase the likelihood of constructive outcomes in conflict situations by:

• creating equality in situational powers; synchronizing positive and negative overtures;

• providing social support and process expertise to enhance constructive dialogue; and

• performing translation functions and adjusting situational tension to optimum levels.

Structured workshops and training programs can help forge more favorable inter-group attitudes

and, as a result, more constructive inter-group behavior. Overall, the conditions within a

cooperative-based integrative collective bargaining process are like dominoes and arranged in a

manner where the major conditions such as the degree of trust developed from previous

negotiations and style/level of expertise of the negotiators commence a chain reaction of events

where the clarity of the bargaining issue and use of third party facilitators/inter-group training are

aspects of bargaining that impact and influence whether the dominoes will move forward to

reach its ultimate goal of cooperative-based integrative collective bargaining (Caverley,

Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.5 Methodology To conduct paper researcher use case study method to understand the situation of collective

bargaining and the two companies are BC Cool-Aid Society and British Columbia Systems

Corporation.

4.6 Findings:

4.6.1 Degree of trust developed from previous negotiations

Within both cases, there was evidence of fractious historical relationships between labor and

management. In beginning both collective bargaining experiences, parties felt that the previous

negotiation was fractious, harmful, and unproductive. Parties expressed some interest in

investigating the use of any alternative that might avoid the fractiousness of their previous

experiences. As a result, there was openness to learning about a more integrative process. At

BCSC, labor and management entered the bargaining session under a number of constraints,

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including the previous history and damaged relationships that resulted from the previous

bargaining contract, where many members of the Board intervened in the dispute. Like the BC

Cool-Aid Society, representatives of BCSC recognized that there was a need to address the issue

of improving long-term working relationships.Lead facilitators and representatives from the

various labor and management groups in each case study responded by focusing on the

establishment of a better working relationship. At BCSC and the BC Cool-Aid Society,

debriefings were held prior to the collective agreement process. These helped surface

dissatisfactions with the previous negotiation process and clarify perceptions about other’s

motives and to indicate a willingness to talk about issues. Although a high level of rapport and

trust may not have fully developed, the relationship was much better than in previous

negotiations. The chief spokespersons from management and labor, although they were mindful

of previous years of hard bargaining, were able to sit together and discuss the issues at hand and

propose solutions. There were many false starts in the collective bargaining process that

occurred. In one case, the BCGEU union representatives at Streetlink walked out because of lack

of progress (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.6.2 Style/level of expertise demonstrated by negotiators

The majority of the people at the negotiation table did try to modify their styles and work within

the principles of problem solving. In one case. at Streetlink, a union member, who tried to offer

ideas in a problem-solving style, was ostracized by his colleagues. In the bargaining sessinns,

parties snught to implement a problem-solving approach in defining and understanding the

identified issues after determining each party’s needs and interests. Furthermore, the residual

good feelings positively affected the post bargaining relationship as several settlement

implementation issues were resolved easily between union and management. In terms of

applying interest-based negotiation principles from Fisher and Ury’s (1991) Getting to Yes,

parties within both cases agreed that any of the bargaining committee teams could speak on an

issue, foster candor about issues, and brainstorm for solutions. For BCSC and the BC Cool-Aid

Society, the mutual gains approach had a significant effect on the bargaining process. The lead

negotiators within the BCSC and BC Cool-Aid Society cases utilized their problem-solving skills

and abilities to establish a number of principles for labor and management to work together.

Overall, the negotiation teams were mindful of the previous acrimonious bargaining experiences.

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This general discussion may have helped parties better understand the issues from both sides

(Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.6.3 Clarity of the bargaining issues

In both case studies, some issues were easier to deal with than others. The employees at the BC

Cool-Aid Society commenced bargaining by examining an integrative-based issue pertaining to

occupational health and safety as several concerns related to the safety of the building were

raised by both labor and management at the Society. As part of a mutual gains/interest-based

negotiating process, a joint employer/employee safety committee was formed. The workplace

health and safety philosophy outlined a general procedure to resolve safety problems, including

updating the safety manual, carrying out safety tests, developing relationships with the local fire

department. testing the basic security system. The union brought 42 issues to the bargaining table

from a list of over 300 bargaining demands from its membership, down from over 60 issues

brought forward in the previous negotiations. Management representatives tabled less than a

dozen issues (Caverley, Cunningham and Mitchell, 2005).

4.6.4 Ability of facilitators to use problem solving-based techniques

In both cases, third party facilitators were additional members of the bargaining process, serving

as trainers and troubleshooters in the management/administration ofthe collective bargaining

process. The third party facilitator encouraged the parties for agreement on issues put forth on

the bargaining table. At BCSC, the Fisher and Ury principles were part of a training exercise for

both labour and management representatives prior to commencing the bargaining process. The

opening session featured a mock exercise in which two mixed teams comprised jointly of union

and management representatives bargained over finite natural resources. Successful bargaining

seemed attainable. Within the training session, the third party facilitator structured the workshop

in a manner that participants were able to assess their style in resolving conflict and participate in

role-plays that demonstrated positional and integrative bargaining (Caverley, Cunningham and

Mitchell, 2005).

5.0 Literature Review Model 4: In the Social Agenda 2006-2010, the European Commission proposed to develop an optional

European Union framework for transnational bargaining. Such a framework, the Commission

argued, would provide for the possibility to conclude transnational collective agreements at

either company level, namely multinational companies with production capacity or service

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provision in more than one EU country or at the sector level covering a certain sector such as

shipbuilding, engineering, etc. The European Commission regarded the conclusion of

transnational company agreements as a key factor in the development of the European social

partners’ future capacity to conduct a dialogue in keeping with the increasingly transnational

nature of company organization and the need to anticipate change and have strategies to deal

with it. The Commission pointed out that the social partners wishing to conclude transnational

agreements at present encountered uncertainties and difficulties that could prevent, or at least

reduce, the impact of such agreements. EU-wide employers’ organizations remain firmly against

collective bargaining taking place above the national level and have adopted a policy of

opposition to an EU framework for transnational bargaining at the company level. EWCs have

no collective bargaining role. The Modine EWC, for example, has negotiated a pan-European

bonus system for the company, whilst the Novartis EWC has undertaken a survey of pay and

conditions across the company’s European plants. They cover the conditions under which

transnational company-wide bargaining can begin, the mandate (claim) and negotiating team, the

approval of the agreement, the implementation of the agreement and the relationship between

transnational agreement and the national agreements. An important factor in this last named

principle is the inclusion of a non-regression clause whereby if the terms of the national

agreement are superior to the transnational agreement, the better conditions in the national

agreement cannot be lowered to the level of the transnational agreement. There are, however,

problems and disagreement that can arise between the affiliates of European industry federations

in the negotiation of transnational company agreements. Multinational companies were unlikely

to be attracted to a transnational collective agreement that is not legally binding/enforceable.

Finally, there is issue of the role of EWC members in transnational negotiations. Since devising

its procedure for the negotiation of company-wide transnational agreements, the EMF has

utilised this in bargaining at this level with at least five multinational companies Areva,

Schneider, Daimler-Chrysler, John Deere and Ancelor Miltal. The company approached the

EMF to see how a transnational agreement on equal opportunities could be achieved. The

agreement was signed in November 2006 and was implemented nationally. The Areva EWC did

influence the employees’ claim to management, the negotiation of the transnational agreement

and its implementation but above all the conclusion of the Areva transnational agreement

demonstrated clearly that the E1VIF procedure worked. The Schneider-EMF transnational

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company agreement was signed in June 2007 covering plants in 27 countries. It was a relatively

precise agreement but, again, demonstrated that the E1VIF procedure for negotiating

transnational company agreements was credible. The EMF-Daimler Chrysler transnational

agreement guaranteed for employees in future in Chrysler garages employment. It was

negotiated by the company’s EWC and the EWC co-ordinator. Fewer European countries were

involved than in the agreements outlined above. Negotiations involved the company’s EWC and

EWC Co-ordinator. The transnational Arcelor-Mitta)IEMF agreement covered common health

and safety standards to apply in the company’s plants throughout the world and not just Europe.

The origin of the agreement was at a global council meeting. There was an extra round of

negotiations and the agreement was approved and signed (Gennard, 2009).

5.1 Methodology: This is a paper of viewing some point which bargaining takes place in the European Union, the

EU Commission make proposal for a procedure for transnational collective bargaining, the

procedures agreed by the EMF and UNI-Europa Graphical for the negotiation of company-wide

transnational agreements, and the content of some existing transnational company-wide

agreements.

5.2 Findings: The continuation of company wide transnational agreements demonstrates that European

industry federations can provide added value to multinational companies by providing effective

procedures within which transnational company agreements can be concluded. They also

demonstrate that the negotiation of such agreements requires substantial resources and cannot be

done without the assistance of the EWC. The existing transnational collective agreements in the

metal trades show that European trade union organizations have to be determined to follow

procedure, provide a trade union answer to EWC bargaining and that national based unions are

unlikely to be able to negotiate with European level corporate management. Lastly existing

transnational company collective agreements certifying that EMF procedure for the negotiation

of such agreements is effective, credible and workable (Gennard, 2004).

6.0 Gaps in literature:

After discussing above literature on collective bargaining some gaps identified which are

discussed in table 2.

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Table 2. Literature Gaps

Models Gaps did not address

Model 1

This study shows us something very important in our company environment that role of the management that which is perfect for a company either traditional management or team base system or union participation in the activity because all of these system ensure workers attitude, work system and organizational commitment to work, any of the system can be play effective role but the things is where there a dispute in working collective bargaining activity as well as negotiation process is not clearly define rather than about the system.

Model 2

This is paper which give s the idea all about the countries have in Europe and their industrial practice as well as the macroeconomic environment where if the wage rate increase with qualitative work on the back ground of increase in productivity and inflation towards agreement country can ensure the nation level collective bargaining but the information gap start when we see many country deny this fact and are not interested to do that no even published its productivity per worker and also there is dispute that though the inflation increase simultaneously wage is not increase in this process who is the legitimate authority which ensure the binding agreement in graphical industry worker a negotiator is not clear.

Model 3

This is a article all about the negotiation process to ensure collective bargaining in organizational level. In the negotiation they argued the level of trust required for certain negotiation because it is the ultimate thing which center in the conflict and negotiator performance depend on this so the gape how the trust can be build up and up what level it ensure its benchmarks not clear rather than negotiator role.

Model 4

This is a view point paper which proposes some ways for the industrial collective agreement where the two parties have conflict and nothing has indicated to clear the thing. Another gap in this proposal that who is the legitimate body that take the ultimate decision for both party because company and union did not want transnational agreement in different location rather than they want make it with the consultation with union but there is also dispute that who play the role of negotiator the EWC is neutral party considered by the employer where the EMF does not right to bind any thing can only give consultation. So if this comes clearly that we can go for any decision.

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7.0 Recommendation:

To have better environment in working place we have satisfy both party on the basis of their job

security, safety, welfare etc. for worker as well as profit for the owner to ensure that we need

perfect team who can run independently to sole their problem means there is some sort of

autonomy their as well we need some traditional approach to in some concern binding. On the

other hand we need union for our collective bargaining process to make our agreement

transparent as well as effective than there is no confusion in our rights. In working environment

we negotiator because everybody think different their must be a conflict so that they have role.

So in final words if we want to have better company environment than we need all of the above

process toward our goal any one system described by the articles can be solution we need all of

the approach combination to supplement each other on to management to have good collective

bargaining process in our working arena.

8.0 Conclusion: In the end it is clear that how collective bargaining process work in different aspect with dispute

and representing these concepts may be sufficient to understand collective bargaining. So if we

want to comply these concepts in our country we must go through with proper process according

to our working system.

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