cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse gabriel vacariu (bucharest univ.)

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Cognitive neuroscience and the “hyperverse” Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

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Page 1: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Cognitive neuroscience and the “hyperverse”

Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Page 2: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Introduction: • The main problem: the mind-body (brain) problem• Philosophy of mind: Descartes’ dualism, identity

theory (Place and Smart), eliminativism (Churchlands), non-reductive physicalism, property dualism, brain produces mind (Searle ‘92, Frith ‘07), supervenience, etc. + notions: mind-brain, qualia, mental causation…

• Cognitive science in ’50s • Usually, identity theory or property dualism or brain

produces mind (Searle ‘92, Frith ‘07, Libet ‘80s) • Approaches: Computationalism, connectionism,

dynamical system (embodied/situated cognition)

Page 3: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• Main problems: Representation (existence, content, format), levels, emergence, etc.

CNS: Neuroscience + Psychology • Gazzaniga + Miller (cognitive psychologist) coined

CNS in taxi (New York, late ‘70s) : “How the brain enables the mind.” [allow, permit, assist]

• CNS: “Correlations” mental and neuronal states = = Mind-brain (body) problem• Difference neuronal patterns-mental states:

ontological, epistemological (depend on observer??), linguistic?

Page 4: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

PROBLEMS of CNSI. The binding problem• Binding: widely distributed neural areas correlated

with features of representation of object (color, size, motion, orientation) – perceptual image of object

• Forms of binding: spatial or temporal, conscious or unconscious, visual, auditory, cognitive, cross-modal binding, sensory-motor binding, memory binding

• Binding - “almost everywhere in the brain and in all processing levels”. (Velik 2010)

Page 5: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Approaches for the binding problem(1) Treisman’s feature-integration theory • Old-fashion approach• Attention (difficult for CNS)• Many critics → Treisman “improved” FIT

(Ptolemaic epicycles)

(2) Synchronized oscillations (EEG)• Von der Malsburg, Engel, Gray, Singer, Fries, Tallon-

Baudry, etc.• Synchronized oscillations: binding, unity of

consciousness

Page 6: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• Frequency bands → Cognitive functions • Delta - sleep, theta - memory, alpha - vigilance

fluctuations, beta and gamma ranges - awake stages + feature binding, attention, and memory. (Tallon-Baudry 2010)

• From 0.1 to 120-200 Hz then 0.01-1000 Hz!• Multiplex between fast and slow waves

No strict correspondence between a frequency band and a cognitive process! (Tallon-Baudry ‘10, ‘09)

Page 7: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

II. Localization and fMRI• fMRI and localization• 2 extreme theories (grand cell vs. holistic theories)• Today, in the middle: A mental state correlated with

widely distributed neuronal areas. • “Widely”? How much? It depends on our tools of

observation (their structure + performance).• Localization (neuronal) of features (color, size, space,

edges, motion, direction) → Unification of perceptual features = Binding problem

• Banich & Compton (‘10)- Expression: about the area V4 “has been posited to play a special role in color perception, although that claim has been controversial” (or V5 for motion) (Many such expressions in CNS!)

Page 8: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

III. “Perceptual filling” • Relationship between sensorial inputs and

perceptual states like “constructive perception” or “perceptual filling in” view: brain “fills in perception of blind spot”

• Brain fills color, patterns and motion• Fovea “subtends about 4 degree of visual arc”

regarding color.

“Outside of the fovea, which covers only 2 to 4 degrees of arc, the retina loses resolution and is sensitive only to light and dark edges. (It follows that our normal sense of a rich and colorful visual world is a construction of the visual brain, not a literal record of the input into the retina.)” (Baars and Gage 2010, p. 272)

Page 9: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

IV. Cross modal interactions/multimodal integration• Someone perceives an object that has a color +

shape + in motion within spatiotemporal frame. • If these properties - processed independently (not

completely) what mechanism furnishes unity of a coherent conscious experience of a visual + auditory + motion scene?

• Traditional: modular system (Fodor)• Sensory modalities --- different pathways in brain,

but how they communicate → A unified mental representation?

Page 10: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

V. Raichle’s default network (2006, 2011)• The brain apparently uses most of its energy for

functions unaccounted for – dark energy…• Brain: demands of environment - less than 1%;

energy consumption necessary for changes in brain activity is less than 5%!

• Cost of intrinsic functional activity which far exceeds that of evoked activity and dominates the overall cost of brain function. (Raichle 2009)

Page 11: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• Task-specific decreases from a resting state occur in many areas of the brain

• “Intrinsic activity”: spontaneous cognition, intrinsic functional activity facilitates responses to stimuli, interpreting, responding to and predicting environmental demands

• fMRI and PET do not furnish information about this intrinsic energy of the brain

Page 12: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

VI. Types of knowledge • Conscious-unconscious• Implicit-explicit• Procedural-declarative• Automatic-controlled• Accessible-inaccessible

These kinds of knowledge overlap, but they are not identical!

Page 13: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Conscious and unconscious states• Vimal (2009): “a list of 40 different meanings of

consciousness, not exhaustive.” (in Uttal 2011)• Baars (1988, 2006): Consciousness = Results of

unconsciousness processes (accepted by many)= “Global workspace theory” (Baars 1988, 2002)• Edelman (1989), Damasio (1989), Freeman (1991),

Llinás et al. (1998), Edelman, Tononi (2000), Kanwisher (2001), Dehaene, Naccache (2001), Rees (2001), John (2001), Varela et al. (2001), etc.

• Relations between conscious-unconscious states? Relations between correlated brain states?

Page 14: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Other problems• All other problems (notions) from CS/CNS: levels,

emergence, whole-parts, holism vs. atomism, self-organization, threshold, variability-stability, etc.

• 2D to 3D-space, mental imagery (Kosslyn-Pylyshyn eternal debate), “endurance” problem (continuity) of mental representation of an object, role of neurotransmitters or glia, self and meaning, etc.

• Spatial cognition

Page 15: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

VII. Van Wedeen (2012): new image for anatomical structure of brain

[Movie 1: Van Wedeen (2012), 3 min]• Diffusion spectrum imaging (DSI)• Brain = Geometric structure of cerebral fiber

pathways• Rhesus monkey superior longitudinal fasciculus-3

(SLF3): “entirely consists of a single curved two-dimensional (2D) sheet of paths, all mutually parallel, transversely oriented, and all crossing SLF3 at nearly right angles” (p. 1630)

Page 16: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• This grid structure: continuous with those of limbic system and basal ganglia + at all scales (“single voxel, to the lobe, to the hemisphere”) + all species!

• Completely new image for anatomical structure of the brain:

“Far from being just a tangle of wires, the brain’s white-matter connections turn out to be more like ribbon cables — folding 2D sheets of parallel neuronal fibers that cross paths at right angles, like the warp and weft of a fabric”.

Page 17: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

VIII. Optimism vs. skepticism in CNSOptimism: Many researchers working in CNS

Gallant’s laboratory and “mind-reading “

(1) Nishimoto et al. (2011)[Movie 2: Gallant + Nishimoto (2011), 3 min]• Mind-reading: brain activity measurements -

Reconstruct natural movies (V1, V2, V3) • “Dictionaries” for shape, edge and motion • Each voxel has a dictionary• Against Gallant, Uttal (‘11): “Not ‘reconstruction’

per se; selecting from a predetermined “deck of cards” (Uttal 2011)

Page 18: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

(2) Huth et al. (2012) [Movie 3: Huth et al. (2012), 5 min]• Identify semantic space of 1705 categories (objects/

categories) onto cortical surface using voxelwise model

• Categories - located in brain in a continuous space: semantically similar categories - located nearby points (voxels 30,000) in cortex

• A color is assigned to each category• Using principal component analysis (PCA): 4

dimensions (semantic space in brain, many dimens.) • 4 dims: animacy, social interactions-nature,

civilization, biological-nonbiological/animal-nonanimal

Page 19: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• Semantic space - represented in large parts of brain and “mapped smoothly onto the cortical sheet”

• Category representation - “broadly distributed across the cortex”

• The model does not clearly reflect visual and conceptual features

• Voxels from occipital and temporal lobes - visual features of categories, voxels from medial parietal + frontal cortex - conceptual features

Page 20: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Skepticism • Bechtel (philosopher, San Diego) optimism but2 years ago moved to skepticism!

Uttal (CNS, not philosopher) (’01, ‘11)• fMRI and PET “localize” mental functions at

“macro-level” (large neural patterns) = Wrong• Mind – at “micro-level”• “Neural network approach is computationally

intractable” → Mind-body problem - not solved• Each mental state associated widely distributed

neuronal areas (whole brain)

Page 21: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

IX. Correlations + status of CNS• Today: Some people use both fMRI + EEG• However, mental states have to be correlated with

firing neurons/oscillations + neuromodulators and neurotransmitters, white and grey matter, glia cells, etc. = Whole brain

• But, due to evolution, we cannot isolate brain from body! Sporns (2006)

• “Correlations?” → Can we construct a science?• Any mental state correlated with whole brain!• Different apparatus (EEG, fMRI, MEG, DTI, etc.)→

Different “aspects” of brain’s activity?

Page 22: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

• Mind and brain are complementary aspects of thing-in-itself (Spinoza)?

• Waves and particles are complementary aspects of noumena (Bohr) (ontological status? “aspects”)

• “Correlations” - no ontological status = No entities → No relationships = No laws →

CNS is not science, but new engineering or pseudo-science!• Mind-brain problem (+ all sub-problems) – no

acceptable solution after more than 300 years! • Maybe mind-brain problem is a pseudo-problem? If

yes, framework has to be wrong! Which one?

Page 23: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Epistemologically Different Worlds (EDWs)

Within world/universe: 4 scientific 4 problems = Dualities:

1. Mind-body (brain) (Cognitive Science)

2. Cell/organism-life (Biology)

3. Particle-wave (quantum mech.) (Physics)

4. Micro-macro (Einstein-quantum mec.) (Physics)

→ All great problems in foundations of “special sciences” ● My goal: The world/universe does not exist! But

something else exist. What?

Page 24: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Notions(a) “Non-living” entities that exist will be called it².

(Singular -“it”) (Ex: it = a stone or a planet)(b) “Living” entities that exist = It². (It = organism of

a bee or human) (c) The entity that corresponds to an It will be

called “being”. Correct: “Being is.”; Incorrect: “Being exists.”. (“Being” = the “I”, mind, life, human subjectivity)

(d) “Correspondence” refers to the conceptual /abstract (not real) relationships between entities that belong to EDWs.

Page 25: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

(e) “Interaction” (for all entities) equivalents with human “observation/perception”

( f) “Determinate” refers to certain determinations/characteristics/traits;

“Indeterminate” - determinations in possible states; “Non-determinate” - no determinations

(g) “Human being” = the “I” or the self = Being

“Human organism” = brain + body = It

(h) What really exist 5 billions years ago in universe/world? (No human being/living entity)

Propositions for it:

Page 26: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

(1) Epistemologically different interactions constitute

epistemologically different it², and epistemologically different it² determine epistemologically different interactions.

(2) Any it exists only at "the surface" because of the

interactions that constitute it.

(3) Any it exists in a single EW and interacts only with the it² from the same EW.

(4) Any EW (a set of it² – and eventually It² – and their interactions) appears from and disappears in the hyper-nothing. (Hume’s skepticism: “No causality” vs. Kant’s optimism: a priori pure intuitions + categories)

(5) Any EW is, therefore all EDWs have the same

objective reality.

Page 27: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● World/universe = “Unicorn-world” = All entities/object that exist are placed within the same spatio-temporal framework.

● EDWs: Unicorn-world does not exist ↔ Not all objects/entities exist in the same “world”.

● EDWs ≠ Parallel worlds/universes● Strong distinction epistemology–ontology (Plato)

is wrong.● (P1) - “To interact = to exist”● Bohr’s complementarity (an epistemological, not

ontological, notion) is a wrong notion.

Page 28: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● “Exist ” used for entity with determinations

→ In general, spatio-temporal framework● “Existence” and “interaction” interrelated● Interactions constitute “surface” of an it →

→ Ontological reality in one EW = An it exist only in one EW● Constitutions ↔ Determinations● Parts-whole → Organizational + epistemological-

ontological thresholds● Mind-brain problem, “quantum gravity” = illicit

extensions: Impossible to use → Impossible to exist!

Page 29: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Propositions for being and It:

(6) Being corresponds to an It.

(7) Being is an EW. Therefore, being is.

(8) Having certain determinations, from our

viewpoint an It is composed of an amalgam of It and their relationships.

(9) Certain states and processes form knowledge (that is being).

(10) As an entity, being has unity as indeterminate individuality.

Page 30: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● It: Without any correspondence → It does not survive in any environment.

● Coordination of biological functions needs an unity impossible to be used/exist within mechanisms of an It → Such unity = the “I”!

● This unity corresponds to development of an It and evolution of species.

● Any mental state/process is the “I”.● CNS: “Correlations”? = No ontological status! ● Unity of consciousness/self within brain = Error

(Analogy: Unity of table among microparticles)

Page 31: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● Each mental function = the “I”● The unity of the “I” represents indeterminate

individuality of being.● Indeterminate individuality = Entity with potential

determinations● The notion of “being” has no plural.● “Knowledge (perceptions, thoughts, actions) is

being”. ● Representations of space or color is mind.● However, no color in mind/brain→ No space!

Page 32: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● Without space, being is an indeterminate individuality with its (implicit) unity.

● This unity cannot be identified using external tools of observation (fMRI, EEG). (Bohr: Definition of any entity includes tools of measurement!)

● Any knowledge is being (subjectivity).● Different modalities (vision, auditory, etc.) →

Different kinds of mental perception = the “I”!● “Internal feeling”/“external space”/“internal

eyes” (regression ad infinitum) = Wrong notions!

Page 33: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

Hyperverse● Hyperverse = ∑ EDWs → Abstract notion● For ontological status, hyperverse needs

interaction/ observation with/of an hyperentity (God).

● Hyperentity that interacts with all ED entities cannot exist! (Hyperontological contradiction)

● From a human’s viewpoint - not too many EDWs● Extending conditions of (observation) interaction

to all entities, number of EDWs increases a lot.

Page 34: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

→ Rejection of: “levels”, “emergence”, “super-venience”, “composition”, “entanglement”, “ non-locality”, “complexity”, some “causalities”

(11) Being is, therefore EDWs are.● If being isn't, any It would not survive in its

environment.● Another 2 propositions = 13 propositions (about

our knowledge: Bohr’s definition of entity + serial attention)

Page 35: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● Mind and body (brain), waves and particles, micro-macro, etc. are or belong to EDWs.

● Within the unicorn-world, pseudo-causalities dominated “our world” (vs. Hume’s against causality + Kant: “Hume awaked me up from my dogmatic sleep!”)

● After Copernicus (Earth), Darwin (living species), Freud (reason) = Revolutions against myths in human thinking, I reject yet another myth: “world”, “Universe”

● From man: “Center of Universe” →“Alone in world” → Not even “alone”, but EDWs + the “I” = EW and an entity (unity)

Page 36: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● Once again to mount a Copernican revolution for discarding our “special” status (observers of “universe”):

World/Universe does not exist!

Science - dualities:● Those 4 problems are pseudo-relationships in

unicorn-world = Pseudo-problems!● Other sub-problems = Pseudo-problems also

Page 37: Cognitive neuroscience and the hyperverse Gabriel Vacariu (Bucharest Univ.)

● EDWs perspective changes the largest “Weltanschauung” trashing the most “tangible” (but the most dangerous) notion, the “world”/universe

● EDWs (what really exist), a very strange image of reality!

● However, Boltzmann: “Matters of elegance ought to be left to the tailor [clothes] and to the cobbler [shoes].” (Einstein 1916)