cloudidea - cloud intrusion detection, evidence ......cloudidea - cloud intrusion detection,...

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CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence preservation and Analysis Benjamin Taubmann * Hans P. Reiser * Thomas Kittel ** Andreas Fischer * Waseem Mandarawi * Hermann de Meer * Universit¨ at Passau * , Technische Universit¨ at M ¨ unchen ** {firstname.lastname}@uni-passau.de, [email protected] 1. Problem statement Virtual machines (VMs) hosted on Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) clouds are an attractive target for attackers. Cloud providers and cloud customers who want to detect, analyze, and preserve evi- dence about malware attacks in IaaS clouds are faced with multiple problems: Cloud customers cannot use existing intrusion detection tools that require access to physical hardware or make use of vir- tual machine introspection (VMI). Cloud providers lack contextual knowledge about the system executing within the VM and do not know which intrusion detection heuristics fits for it. 2. Goals We want to enhance the security of IaaS clouds by designing an architecture for malware and intrusion detection, analysis and evi- dence collection. Our proposed architecture achieves the following goals: Offer customizable security services to cloud customers, e.g., VMI-as-a-Service. Enhance protection of cloud infrastructure and other VMs against attacks originating from a VM. Be sufficiently lightweight to be usable in production environ- ments with negligible overhead. Provide detailed insight into malware behavior and collect con- clusive evidence about attacks. 3. Architecture and analysis framework The CloudIDEA architecture is designed to be modular, scalable and offers semantic aware introspection. It consists of a decen- tralized analysis framework and a central management component. The analysis framework itself is part of every physical cloud node and contains several introspection and tracing plug-ins. This in- cludes VMI, network traffic, hypercalls to the hypervisor and fur- ther performance statistics. The central management component is composed of the decision engine, behavior database and the virtual network management. [Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.] Whenever a VM behaves abnormal, the decision engine defines actions based on external inputs, such as user configurations or service level agreement (SLA), and internal information, such as available resources, VM interdependencies, and migration cost. Depending on the expected attack and the resource intensity of the analysis modules, it can activate additional analysis modules, replace a malicious VM with a fresh instance, or trigger the virtual network management to migrate and isolate a suspicious VM. We divide between two types of tracing methods. Lightweight plug-ins are used to detect intrusion in a production environment causing only a negligible overhead. Heavyweight plug-ins are used for further investigation on VMs that might be infected and are only enabled if required. As the heavyweight plug-ins are more resource intensive, the system under analysis can be migrated to a dedicated investigation host, based on the expected attack and available cloud resources. The log data that is obtained by the different plug-ins of the analysis framework is stored in a central database, the behavior database. This database is used in order to create behavior models for each VM using machine learning algorithms and also stores and updates these behavior models. The decision engine can then use these models to decide on how to configure the current monitoring behavior. The virtual network management module is used by the decision engine to assign interconnected VMs to physical cloud resources. It has to take into account both, the underlying network, and VM interdependencies. It ensures under these constraints that after mi- gration all VMs still meet their SLAs. 4. Contributions CloudIDEA is a novel architecture for malware detection, analysis and evidence collection in IaaS based cloud data centers. It lever- ages several monitoring techniques in order to learn more about benign behavior and to create behavior models of all VMs at run- time. The overhead of the analysis can be configured at runtime so that it can be minimized on production environments. If anomalies are detected in a VM, the system can be analyzed more intensely in order to detect if the anomaly is caused by malware. Addition- ally, CloudIDEA provides an interface for cloud customers to be informed about intrusions and offers forensics means for evidence collection and malware analysis. Therefore it is able to offer VMI- as-a-Service. Acknowledgments The research leading to these results was supported by the Bavar- ian State Ministry of Education, Science and the Arts as part of the FORSEC research association. 1 2015/4/10 Copyright and Reference Information: This material (preprint, accepted manuscript, or other author-distributable version) is provided to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly work. Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the author(s) and/or other copyright holders. All persons copying this work are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked by these copyrights. This work is for personal use only and may not be redistributed without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. The definite version of this work is published as [·] Benjamin Taubmann, Hans P. Reiser, Thomas Kittel, Andreas Fischer, Waseem Mandarawi and Hermann De Meer. Cloudidea - cloud intrusion detection, evidence preservation and analysis. In Proc. of the 10th European Conf. on Computer Systems (EuroSys 2015), 2015. Poster with abstract. See http://www.net.fim.uni- passau.de/papers/Taubmann2015a for full reference details (BibTeX, XML).

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Page 1: CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence ......CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence preservation and Analysis The research leading to these results was supported

CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection,Evidence preservation and Analysis

Benjamin Taubmann ∗ Hans P. Reiser ∗ Thomas Kittel ∗∗ Andreas Fischer ∗

Waseem Mandarawi ∗ Hermann de Meer ∗

Universitat Passau∗, Technische Universitat Munchen∗∗

{firstname.lastname}@uni-passau.de, [email protected]

1. Problem statementVirtual machines (VMs) hosted on Infrastructure-as-a-Service(IaaS) clouds are an attractive target for attackers. Cloud providersand cloud customers who want to detect, analyze, and preserve evi-dence about malware attacks in IaaS clouds are faced with multipleproblems: Cloud customers cannot use existing intrusion detectiontools that require access to physical hardware or make use of vir-tual machine introspection (VMI). Cloud providers lack contextualknowledge about the system executing within the VM and do notknow which intrusion detection heuristics fits for it.

2. GoalsWe want to enhance the security of IaaS clouds by designing anarchitecture for malware and intrusion detection, analysis and evi-dence collection. Our proposed architecture achieves the followinggoals:

• Offer customizable security services to cloud customers, e.g.,VMI-as-a-Service.

• Enhance protection of cloud infrastructure and other VMsagainst attacks originating from a VM.

• Be sufficiently lightweight to be usable in production environ-ments with negligible overhead.

• Provide detailed insight into malware behavior and collect con-clusive evidence about attacks.

3. Architecture and analysis frameworkThe CloudIDEA architecture is designed to be modular, scalableand offers semantic aware introspection. It consists of a decen-tralized analysis framework and a central management component.The analysis framework itself is part of every physical cloud nodeand contains several introspection and tracing plug-ins. This in-cludes VMI, network traffic, hypercalls to the hypervisor and fur-ther performance statistics. The central management component iscomposed of the decision engine, behavior database and the virtualnetwork management.

[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]

Whenever a VM behaves abnormal, the decision engine definesactions based on external inputs, such as user configurations orservice level agreement (SLA), and internal information, such asavailable resources, VM interdependencies, and migration cost.Depending on the expected attack and the resource intensity ofthe analysis modules, it can activate additional analysis modules,replace a malicious VM with a fresh instance, or trigger the virtualnetwork management to migrate and isolate a suspicious VM.

We divide between two types of tracing methods. Lightweightplug-ins are used to detect intrusion in a production environmentcausing only a negligible overhead. Heavyweight plug-ins are usedfor further investigation on VMs that might be infected and are onlyenabled if required. As the heavyweight plug-ins are more resourceintensive, the system under analysis can be migrated to a dedicatedinvestigation host, based on the expected attack and available cloudresources.

The log data that is obtained by the different plug-ins of theanalysis framework is stored in a central database, the behaviordatabase. This database is used in order to create behavior modelsfor each VM using machine learning algorithms and also stores andupdates these behavior models. The decision engine can then usethese models to decide on how to configure the current monitoringbehavior.

The virtual network management module is used by the decisionengine to assign interconnected VMs to physical cloud resources.It has to take into account both, the underlying network, and VMinterdependencies. It ensures under these constraints that after mi-gration all VMs still meet their SLAs.

4. ContributionsCloudIDEA is a novel architecture for malware detection, analysisand evidence collection in IaaS based cloud data centers. It lever-ages several monitoring techniques in order to learn more aboutbenign behavior and to create behavior models of all VMs at run-time. The overhead of the analysis can be configured at runtime sothat it can be minimized on production environments. If anomaliesare detected in a VM, the system can be analyzed more intenselyin order to detect if the anomaly is caused by malware. Addition-ally, CloudIDEA provides an interface for cloud customers to beinformed about intrusions and offers forensics means for evidencecollection and malware analysis. Therefore it is able to offer VMI-as-a-Service.

AcknowledgmentsThe research leading to these results was supported by the Bavar-ian State Ministry of Education, Science and the Arts as part of theFORSEC research association.

1 2015/4/10

Copyright and Reference Information: This material (preprint, accepted manuscript, or other author-distributable version) is provided to ensure timely dissemination of scholarly work.Copyright and all rights therein are retained by the author(s) and/or other copyright holders. All persons copying this work are expected to adhere to the terms and constraints invoked bythese copyrights. This work is for personal use only and may not be redistributed without the explicit permission of the copyright holder. The definite version of this work is published as

[·] Benjamin Taubmann, Hans P. Reiser, Thomas Kittel, Andreas Fischer, Waseem Mandarawi and Hermann De Meer. Cloudidea - cloud intrusion detection, evidence preservation andanalysis. In Proc. of the 10th European Conf. on Computer Systems (EuroSys 2015), 2015. Poster with abstract.

See http://www.net.fim.uni-passau.de/papers/Taubmann2015a for full reference details (BibTeX, XML).

Page 2: CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence ......CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence preservation and Analysis The research leading to these results was supported

Benjamin Taubmann*, Hans P. Reiser*, Thomas Kittel**, Andreas Fischer*, Waseem Mandarawi*, Hermann de Meer**University of Passau

**Technische Universität München{firstname.lastname}@uni-passau.de, [email protected]

CloudIDEA - Cloud Intrusion Detection, Evidence preservation and Analysis

The research leading to these results was supported by the “Bavarian State Ministry of Education, Science and the Arts” as part of the FORSEC research association.

Problem

Cloud infrastructures are an attractive malware target, as many security-sensitive services are provided

Common IDS solutions are impractical for cloud environments because the provider lacks detailed contextual knowledge about the system running in the virtual machine

Customers have detailed information about their virtual machine but can not use tools that require physical hardware access or make use of virtual machine introspection

CloudIDEA Architecture

Analysis Framework

Virtual Network

Virtual Machines

Cloud Management

Production Network Analysis Network

CloudIDEA managementCloud Nodes Analysis Cloud Nodes

Decision Engine

Virtual Network Management

...

Analysis Framework

Virtual Network

Virtual Machines

Cloud Management

...

Logging & AnalysisvCPU vMem vNet vCPU vMem vNet

resourceusage info

VM inter-dependencies

Forensics Interface

Analysis Framework

Plug-in based monitoring- virtual machine introspection- network traffic- virtual machine hypercalls- performance statistics

Logging- central storage - standardized storage format- provide data for malware analysis- preservation of evidence

Analysis- combine the output of several plug-ins- use machine learning to create behavior models of virtual machines - anomaly based intrusion detection

Tracing Interpretation Logging Analysis

Virtual Machine Analysis Framework

vMem

vCPU

vNet

libVMI

pcap

guestmodules

protocolparser http

analysis

TCP stats

volatility

rekall

...

database

simplelogging

extendedlogging

intrusiondetection

behaviordatabase

evidencecollection

OS

application

Hypervisor

Hardware

...

Logging & Analysis

Cloud Management

machinelearning

malware analysis

provide customizable security services to cloud customers, e.g., VMI-as-a-Servicedefend large scale cloud environments with a combination of monitoring and attack detection techniquesmaintain scalability by the application of analysis plug-ins with different resource requirementsselect tracing plug-in automatically based on the current threat level and available cloud resources

support attack knowledge exchange with central data collection and analysisenhance security by on demand virtual machine migration and isolation when intrusions are detectedenable live malware forensics by leveraging a dedicated analysis environmentprovide customers an interface for preservation of evidence

Goals

Benjamin TaubmannUniversity of Passau

Contact