climate change, north–south co-operation and collective decision-making post-rio

CLIMATE CHANGE, NORTH±SOUTHCO-OPERATION AND COLLECTIVE

DECISION-MAKING POST-RIO

JYOTI PARIKH,� P. G. BABU and K. S. KAVI KUMAR

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This article reviews the progress made since the signing of the Framework

Convention on Climate Change. We argue for increasing the e�orts to introduce a

collective decision making process. Developing arguments mainly from a Southern

perspective, the article discusses the risk factors that need to be assessed for collective

decision making, the implications of such processes and policy instruments such as Joint

Implementation to implement the decision making framework. The criteria for inter-

regional allocation of emission abatement and the potential cooperation between North

and South in the context of climate change are also discussed. The article highlights the

need to reduce the risk of climate change by early action. # 1997 by John Wiley &

Sons, Ltd.

J. Int. Dev. 9: 403±413, 1997

No. of Figures: 0. No. of Tables: 0. No. of Refs: 13.

INTRODUCTION

The growing realization that anthropogenic activities could potentially change theEarth's climate led to the signing of the Framework Convention on Climate Change(FCCC) by the heads of 166 nations at The Earth Summit in 1992. Subsequently ithas been rati®ed by more than 60 nations. On 21 March 1994, FCCC became aninternational law. The Conference of the Parties (COP), which has already taken placetwice, in March 1995 at Berlin and in July 1996 at Geneva, is expected to takedecisions in such a way that FCCC's procedures see prompt and e�ective action.Climate change due to accumulation of greenhouse gases (GHG) in the atmosphereposes many economic, political and scienti®c challenges which have to be dealt within a collective decision making framework by national and international decisionmaking bodies. Policy decisions to address climate change have to be taken in acomplex setting characterized by uncertainty. In addition, these decisions often

� Correspondence to: Jyoti Parikh, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Gen. A. K. VaidyaMarg, Goregaon (E), Mumbai-400 065, India.

CCC 0954±1748/97/030403±11$17.50# 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Journal of International Development: Vol. 9, No. 3, 403±413 (1997)

involve use of con¯icting criteria such as equity, e�ciency, sovereignty and ecologicalconcerns. Decisions are usually based on beliefs about the likely occurrence or not ofuncertain events which are relevant to the decisions at hand. Decisions regardingclimate change have to be made not only in the near future, but have to be reviewedon a continuous basis, or at least periodically. The major decisions concerning climatechange that need to be faced by all countries and their citizens are:

. What should be the level of concentration of GHG gases that can be tolerated atdi�erent times?

. By how much should GHG emissions be reduced to achieve these chosen levels oftolerable concentrations?

. How should these abatement levels be distributed among countries taking intoaccount the responsibilities for current concentrations and development needs? Inother words, who should bear the burden of emissions abatement at di�erentphases?

. What kind of policies will achieve the desired reductions of concentrations of GHGgases and in turn, their emissions?

. Considering that uncertainties will always remain, is it sensible to postpone radicalpolicies until the uncertainty over impacts is reduced?

A BRIEF APPRAISAL OF THE FCCC POST-RIO

When the UN General Assembly called for the establishment of an Inter-governmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for a FCCC in 1991 before the EarthSummit, the aim was to negotiate a convention for signature at the summit. Thoughthe European Union (EU) and the small island nations favoured the establishment oftargets and a timetable for limiting the emissions of GHGs, the US and the oilproducing countries were against such move. In an attempt to push the Convention,the US and the UK suggested a compromise formulation in the last INC meetingbefore the Earth Summit. According to this, which is now stated as Article 4 in theFCCC, a non-binding call for an attempt by the developed countries and those witheconomies in transition1 to return to 1990 emission levels of CO2 and other GHGsnot controlled by the Montreal Protocol was made. Despite such non-committalobjectives, UN FCCC includes positive measures such as setting-up of a number ofnew UN institutions like Conference of Parties (COP), and providing ®nancialassistance and technology transfer for the developing countries. The Convention isunequivocal in its overall response to climate change through its statement, `theparties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimise thecauses of climate change and mitigate its adverse e�ects' (FCCC, 1992). TheConvention has set out a substantial part of the agenda, which included thediscussion of the adequacy of the commitments made in the FCCC and the criteriafor activities implemented jointly (AIJ), for the ®rst COP.

At the ®rst COP in Berlin, though renewed commitments were made with a promiseof further reductions of GHGs beyond 2000, the key issues like targets and timetables

1 In this article, we shall refer to Annex I countries as `North' and the rest of the countries as `South',recognizing that neither the Annexes nor the North±South dichotomy capture the full complexity ofgovernment positions on climate change.

J. INT. DEV. VOL. 9: 403±413 (1997) # 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

404 J. Parikh et al.

were not discussed in detail. The `Berlin Mandate' in itself involved a sophisticatedapparatus of monitoring and reporting, as well as substantive new measures. How-ever, these new measures are no more certain than they were before COP-1. Theevolution of post-2000 commitments are important since the 1990±2000 stabilizationprograms have virtually avoided any serious restrictions on the business-as-usualscenario in the North. Developing countries, along with the EU, stress that theanalysis and assessment phase should be concluded in parallel with negotiations on aProtocol or other legally binding agreement to strengthen the FCCC. On the otherhand, the developed nations, including the US, argued that the analysis andassessment phase should occur before Protocol negotiations begin.

Again at Geneva, though the agenda was straightforward, namely to evaluate theprogress made since COP-1 on the Berlin Mandate, and to achieve an overall con-sensus on speci®c emission reductions of all GHGs, the meeting revealed that thedeveloped countries (with the exception of Germany and UK) had failed to stick evento their ®rst phase targets, namely to reduce emissions to the 1990 levels.

The basic dilemma behind such an ambivalent approach to tackle the climatechange problem seems to stem from the debate over the cost of mitigating climatechange against the potential risks of irreversible changes. Given the potentially highamounts of investments needed to reduce GHG emissions, most of the developedcountries are adopting a `wait-and-see' approach instead of accepting the moralresponsibility due to their past emissions. On the other hand, based on scienti®c®ndings that climate change could have particularly adverse implications for poornations, developing countries are pressing for action to be taken by the developedcountries to control GHG emissions. More objectively, prudence demands thathumankind should not be playing a `game' which leads to irreversible change.

Achievement of climate protection goals appears more likely if policies are formu-lated within the ambit of other larger policy agendas with respect to issues such aseconomic restructuring, ®scal reforms and local sustainability. However, there is alsothe need for global commitment for retaining the habitability of this planet. The UNFCCC does provide that vital link, and without it there would be no collectivecommitment to respond to climate change, its causes, and its consequences. But, likemost other international conventions, FCCC sets only a very limited target for initialaction, as can be seen from the progress made since Rio in terms of GHG emissionabatement. Hence there is an urgent need to give a new thrust to FCCC. In thefollowing sections we develop arguments for further building on the base provided bythe FCCC and suggest ways in which collective action can be initiated and discuss theopportunities for the development of policy instruments on a global scale. First somecharacteristics of the climate change problem which underscore policy decisions areoutlined.

DIFFERENTIATED IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate Change Risk and Uncertainty

Climate change risk is associated with uncertainty, but it is characterized as a trendrather than a sudden risk or a random event such as nuclear accidents, earthquakes or¯oods. That is, if there is a risk at the present time then, there will be a similar risk in

# 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. INT. DEV. VOL. 9: 403±413 (1997)

Climate Change 405

the following year. However, correspondingly there would be a stream of bene®ts ofabatement, which accrue over time and are additive. These pro®les of risk over timehave two implications. First, climate change impacts will be cumulative and areinevitable given the present concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere. This alsomeans that if global abatement is undertaken, then the climate impacts are deceleratedrather than avoided. Second, higher abatement costs are justi®ed in case of trend risk,as it has a stream of bene®ts for all years in the distant future. That is, abatementavoids adaptation costs not in say, 2025, but for many years subsequently. Therefore,small but regular reductions may be more desirable than hoping to reduce suddenlyand a lot later, which can be traumatic, if not impossible. It is better to initiate e�ortsto be on a gradual learning curve; if new information suggests that scaling up is notrequired, then one could relax. However, in the meantime, an understanding of howto deal with change develops. As pointed out by Chichilnisky (1994), climate risk isendogenous, collective and correlated. Delay in response is associated with two risks:the need to adapt to the changes; and the risks of irreversible damages. Both of thesea�ect the South adversely.

Poverty and Climate Change

Another important issue while making climate change decisions is that of poverty andthe linkages between poverty and climate change impacts. Suppose there is increasedoccurrence of extreme events such as ¯oods, cyclones, typhoons, hurricanes and so ondue to climate change. In such a situation, it is the poor who are more vulnerablecompared to the well o�. In the case of the recent cyclone in Andhra Pradesh in Indiain 1996, more than 1,000 people died and there was huge property loss. Cyclones ofsimilar intensity in advanced countries like the US may not lead to such widespreaddamages. In essence, the threshold level to withstand the impacts of climate changewould be less for developing countries when compared with the developed ones. Insuch a case, given that the present accumulation of GHG in atmosphere is due toadvanced countries, will they be forthcoming to insure the poor against suchcalamities?

Large-scale out-migration from coastal zones is expected due to sea level rise.Intrusion of sea water in the ground water and changes in temperature can causewidespread reduction in agricultural incomes. This will create a large number ofenvironmental refugees especially from low-lying delta regions in poor countries.Countries dependent on agricultural production are likely to be adversely a�ected.The share of GDP from agriculture in total GDP ranges from 16 to 64 per cent in lowincome developing countries and 12 to 37 per cent in middle income developingcountries compared to only 3 per cent of USA (World Bank, 1994). Also, the share ofpopulation depending on agriculture are of similar proportions in the South. In short,the impact of climate change will di�er from region to region and sector to sector.

While the rich can argue about whether to enjoy more welfare now or pay later inthe future and if so what discount rate to use, this is unlikely to be a major issue forthe poor who are on the margin of subsistence. If a poor country is forced to reducetheir GHG emissions or pushed to adapt to climate change without aid or e�cienttechnology, they would have no option but to reduce their current consumptionbelow subsistence level. Rising concentrations of GHG in atmosphere will bring more



constraints on their future development. To conclude, since the poor, wherever theyare, have a very high marginal utility of income, if required to curtail their GHGemissions in a comparable way to the rich, the poor will bear a disproportionateburden of global warming caused mainly by the lifestyles and consumption patternsof the rich. Any reasonable decision-making framework needs to address this primaryconcern. Such a concern automatically raises the issue of equitable distribution whichwe discuss later.

Vulnerability of Food Production Systems

The FCCC suggests that `. . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in theatmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference withthe climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame su�cient toallow ecosystem to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food productionis not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainablemanner'. Rosenzweig and Parry's study (1994) provides an idea of what is in store forthe future due to climate change in terms of food vulnerability.

The study concludes that the world cereal production is estimated to decreasebetween 1 and 7 per cent, depending on the climate change scenario used, by 2060 AD.The study also indicates that the impacts would be more severe on developingcountries, in comparison with developed countries. Thus, CO2 concentration levels ofdouble the value of preindustrial values in 2060 may not be acceptable to the South. If550 ppm is reached in 2060 AD, it is likely that given the long lead times required,stabilization reached by say, 2100 AD, would be much higher and the outcome may besevere.

Accepting Adaptation

There is increasing reference to the need for adaptation to climate change. Adaptationranges from switching to di�erent crops to migrating or giving up land rights if theyare in the coastal area. Rosenzweig and Parry (1994) have indicated increased hungerin developing countries which is also one way they adapt. That is, due to delay inabatement, global risks are externalized for which there will be no compensation. Inany case, adaptation will be too all-pervasive and costs too di�cult to isolate forcompensation. Will the North pay for dikes in Bangladesh or give migrationrights and compensate for shifting and rehabilitation to people from the Maldives?US estimates for costs to build walls along the vulnerable zones to sea level rise is£107 (1989) billion (Yohe, 1990). That may be a small share of US GDP, but suchmeasures, even scaling for their coast lines, for say, India, could require very largeshares of their GDP. Who shall pay India for such a wall?

It is said that there may be a rise of mean temperature of 0.25 8C per decade. Thisis sometimes multiplied to get 2.5 8C for a century but there could be non-linearityand temperature rise could be more with more GHG accumulations. Moreover, 2.5 8Cmean temperature rise could mean a 5.5 8C rise in the Northern hemispheredue to extensive land areas compared with oceans. Indeed, if this happens, it wouldbe di�cult to live in many parts of the Indian subcontinent and other populated


Climate Change 407

countries in the mid-east and South Asia, and large-scale migration may take place.The marginal damage of one extra degree of temperature is far more serious in theSouth than in the North, where they may even bene®t from that extra degree. Mostmodels developed in the North do not e�ectively build in the perspectives of theSouth in adapting to climate change. In addition, the resources to adapt often do notexist in poor countries and adaptation may involve increased human su�ering.Finally, adaptation does not solve the problem; it only postpones what more is tocome. All this implies that North±South transfers of resources are necessary tomitigate the climate change problem and facilitate action.

NORTH±SOUTH TRANSFERS OF RESOURCES

There are several di�erent ways of looking at North±South transfers; these are notnecessarily mutually exclusive, and one may overlap with another.

Rent for Environmental Space

Currently there are many countries whose use of environmental space far exceedstheir justi®able share of that space. Parikh et al. (1992) has indicated that theseprivileges are worth US $70 billion per year. Also, the North's use of environmentalspace has a temporal characteristic; that is, these emissions will occupy the environ-mental space for hundreds of years in the future (Smith, 1991). According to the`polluter pays' principle, those who have occupied this environmental space shouldpay rent for it for their excess use of the global environment to those whose use isbelow their entitlements. In addition, when the latter need that space, that should bemade available to them.

Compensation for Adaptation Burden Imposed

The consumption patterns of the rich countries have put constraints on the develop-ment alternatives of the poor countries. Due to the climate change possibility, thepoor will be forced to spend more resources to adapt to the climate change problems;this will constrain the resources available for their immediate development priorities.

Liability Payments for Damages and Excess Past Concentrations

Those who have emitted more than their share of the absorption capacity of theatmosphere (on a per capita basis) and bene®tted, are liable to others for the possibledamages arising from global climate change.

Lost Opportunities due to Concentrations after 1990

The cost of delay in emission reduction (by the North) in terms of the South'sforegone opportunities to development is substantial. This will impose manyconstraints on the way the South decides on policy options regarding issues such ashow to generate power, how to use land, and what crops to grow and so on. Hence,



North±South transfers of large amounts are needed to compensate the South for thedevelopment opportunities foregone.

As against all these, Global Environment Facility (GEF) gets replenishment ofUS$2 billion for three years to address four di�erent global environmental concerns;climate change, biodiversity, international water and CFC reduction. There is plainlya need to investigate other opportunities for North±South transfers through globalpolicy instruments such as tradable emission permit regime, or joint implementationas discussed below.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR GLOBAL CO-OPERATIONAND COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING

In this section we brie¯y described the steps involved in collective decision-makingprocess and then highlight the criteria for allocation of emission reduction burdenamong various. The opportunities for North±South co-operation in the context ofclimate change are also discussed.

Necessary elements of collective decision-making are linked and brought togetherwith national decision making either directly or preferably through global policyinstruments. The ®rst step in a long-term decision-making process is to select aconcentration level which accounts for equity considering those stakeholders whoseemissions so far have not contributed signi®cantly to the current atmosphericconcentration levels. Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of the main GHG, CO2 ,at any level between 350 and 750 ppmv calls for signi®cant reductions in the emissiontrends in the near future. If a very low level is chosen, considerable sacri®ce is expectedfrom the present generation. If a high level of concentration is chosen, there would bedanger of irreversible damages and high adaptive costs. Remember that, if 550 ppm ischosen, it is di�cult to go back to 440 ppm, but vice versa is possible.

The second step is to determine global emission scenarios corresponding to theconcentration levels decided in the ®rst step. There could be a number of ways to reacha particular target. Scenarios are developed and the task in step 2 is to select fromamongst such alternative scenarios. For example, if a low target of 350 ppm is chosen,Annex I countries may need to curtail severely their emissions, and non-Annex Icountries can grow only to the extent that Annex I countries reduce emissions. Parikhand Painuly (1994) calculate that this calls for a reduction by the North of morethan 30 per cent of emissions by 2025. This way, the North will have a stake in thedevelopment of the South so as to see that the South has access to the best oftechnologies and incentives to use them so the emissions of the South rise as little aspossible, without compromising their development. In case of a higher concentrationtarget of 450 ppm, some development for non-Annex I countries is possible over andabove the space given by reduction by the North. On the other hand, if a target of550 ppm is selected, large adaptation costs may occur.

Criteria for Inter-regional Allocations

Having determined concentration levels for stabilization and emission paths, the nextstep is to broadly allocate goals. Requirement for minimum standard of living should


Climate Change 409

be also used as criteria. It is also suggested that some deterrent should be there toencourage action and stop free riding while these goals are being negotiated, such asliability for concentrations after a speci®c year.

The distribution of per capita carbon emissions between regions is highly skewed.The North has a per capita emission which is approximately four times that of theSouth. Within the North, USA's per capita emission is 5.03 tons per year which istwice as much as that of many countries in western Europe. The same is true of theSouth too; Brazil has a higher per capita emission (0.38 tons per year) than the rest ofthe South. If one compares emissions per unit of GDP, then, the South and easternEurope would have higher emissions per unit of GDP than the North. Emissions perGDP are sometimes taken as an indication of ine�ciency. However, high emissionsper GDP can be attributed only partially to ine�ciencies in the South. High emissionsare mainly due to a low level of economic development (World Bank, 1994). A greaterneed for new infrastructure building explains high emission per GDP and also callsfor higher growth in future. Apart from investment in infrastructure, pricing andvaluation of non-tradables also matter in these calculations. This can be captured byan adjustment factor for purchasing power parity.

The discussions regarding future entitlements for GHG emission so far haveexcluded the historical record of past emissions. Such an omission might be wrong forthe following reason. Increases in the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere havetaken place over a prolonged period of time. The contribution of North America andwestern Europe to the concentration is much greater than their share of currentemissions. On the other hand, the historical emissions from developing countries havebeen low and hence their share of the overall concentration is also low. The currentgeneration of developed countries are the bene®ciaries of resource transfers frompast generations. These resource transfers have been possible only due to theexploitation of global environmental resources by their past generations. As a result,the current generation living in the developing countries have the right to claim a partof these resource transfers, or transfer of emission free technologies, or right topollute (for development needs), as environmental resources are common property.

North±South Co-operation

Once inter-regional obligations are decided, one could discuss global policy instru-ments, which make it possible to reduce the cost burden by either trading emissions orby meeting the obligations jointly or by contributing to carbon tax, which can be usedto reduce emissions in non-Annex I countries. Global policy is also needed to discussways of North±South transfer, either through the above mentioned or other means.These are referred as global policy instruments. They can be selected based on utility(global or national) criteria. Institutional failures, such as lack of well de®nedproperty rights, and distortionary subsidies, lead to market failures such as gapsbetween private and social costs of production and consumption activities. As a resultof this, producers and consumers do not appreciate the true scarcity value of theresources they use up, such as environmental resources. The emerging pattern ofeconomic growth from such production and consumption plans is usually unsustain-able. Economic instruments which are aimed to correct such unsustainable resourceuse bridge the gap between social costs and private costs by internalizing all the



external costs and risks. The use of economic instruments at the global level to dealwith climate change requires special considerations. We emphasize these here, as theyrelate to some suggested policy instruments.

To elaborate, economic instruments such as property rights, pollution taxes andtradable emission permits bring about a realignment of resource allocation with socialobjectives. Such economic instruments achieve the objective of sustainable growththrough providing a corrective to the functioning of the market; by encouraging costminimization; permitting ¯exibility of use; and adjusting to changing environment.The key to the promise of economic instruments is their ability to harness the powerof the market. Economic instruments can be broadly classi®ed into the followingcategories: allocation of property rights (ownership rights, use rights and develop-ment rights); creating markets (tradeable emission permits, tradeable o�sets);economic incentives (emission taxes, subsidies); ®nancial instruments (such asGEF, green fund, location incentives); and liability instruments (liability standards,damage liability, liability insurance).

Activities implemented jointly (AIJ), tradeable permits and carbon taxes are someof the global policy instruments that lead to economic e�ciency but require inter-national negotiations. Among these options, AIJ is already referred to in the FCCCand the pilot phase is already accepted by the COP. AIJ gives an opportunity forco-operation between the North and South, where the North can invest in the Southto reduce GHG emissions, if it is cheaper to do so. The South gains in terms of energye�ciency if better technologies are provided. It is suggested by Parikh (1995) that inthe absence of agreement on international credits, perhaps domestic credits or taxincentives can be given by the Annex I countries. A related question is, should GHGemissions reduced through AIJ accrue to the investing country, giving them anopportunity to increase their emissions to that extent? If yes, then further negotiationsare needed on how much emission reductions through AIJ can be credited, and themode of monitoring and veri®cation.

There are concerns that perhaps AIJ will delay new technology development orconsumption patterns of the North will not change. Accountability of global GHGemissions when the South does not have limits on the emissions is another concern.Therefore, there is no agreement on the credit issue so far. Even if this is undecided,credits or incentives for AIJ in the form of a carbon tax rebate can be giveninternally by the North. If a carbon tax is not imposed by that country government,then it could permit rebate under some other category such as that of treating AIJ asa category of R&D expense or charity or other tax deductible expenses. Thus,internal incentives can be given to private entrepreneurs by the Governments in theNorth. Why should the governments in the North do so without internationalcredit? AIJ can have an immense value in terms of capacity building in the South, sothat when they will have to reduce emissions, they will be ready for it. They maychoose to go for an energy e�cient mode of development. Parikh (1994) shows thatif the South makes some e�ort to reduce emissions now, it will reduce pressure onthe North in future as well. Thus, it could have long-term bene®ts in terms ofpreparedness of the South and reduced global emissions. AIJ will require monitoringof the projects by certi®ed auditors to account for carbon reduction, especially ifinternational credits are given.

Tradeable emission quotas (or permits) are one way of creating a market for GHGemissions. A global level of tolerable emissions is set for greenhouse gases and


Climate Change 411

allocated among the nations by some criteria. Tradeable permit schemes, on the otherhand, give some developing countries the possibility to earn additional foreignexchange for their development till such time that they have surplus permits. Thesooner this is done, the earlier the bene®ts. It will also indirectly encourage them toreduce GHG emissions early, unlike AIJ, which induces them to reduce directly butsporadically. However, on what basis emission permits should be distributed is athorny issue about which much is written. Though the desirability of distributingpermits (quotas) on per capita basis is recognized at least in the long run (Manne andRichels, 1993), population growth in developing countries is an issue of concern.A compromise could be to have the quotas on the basis of the population ®xed in theyear in which the agreement is reached. This will encourage the North to reachagreement sooner and at the same time the South does not pro®t from populationgrowth.

In addition to these options, other forms of co-operation exist. These includeregional approaches, technology transfer, a technology fund or joint technologydevelopment. Apart from the North±South co-operation, regional approachescan also be developed keeping in view the common features shared by the regionswhich may include socio-economic, ecological or meteorological characteristics.Once the goals and policy instruments are agreed upon, then national leveldecision-making begins.

CONCLUSIONS

The global climate change debate at present is between those who want to initiateaction to control GHG emissions, and those who want to wait and watch till furtherevidence is made available about the occurrence or not of climate change and itspotential impacts. Though the lack of su�cient scienti®c information to support theclimate change hypothesis is often cited as reason for not making commitments bydeveloped countries, as Adam Rose (Rose, 1997) points out it may be less aboutevidence and more about stakeholders' world-view and their perceptions of fairness.The `free-ride' that the North is enjoying even after signing FCCC will be eventuallycostly. In a matter of 10 years more GHGs would be added by the North to theexisting concentrations, which could represent more than 40 years of `carbonrequirements' of the South. In the overall interest of humankind and the relativelymore vulnerable developing countries, there is a need for e�ective mechanisms at theglobal level to have a check on such behavior. The South would like to:

. See the developed countries taking their responsibility seriously early on, so thatthe burden that falls on them later to reduce emissions is much smaller and that itdoes not a�ect their economies and their future generations.

. Avoid the climate risk and the associated adaptation burden that they can illa�ord.

. Have new technology transfers early on, so that they are available to them whentheir emissions rise.

This paper has addressed these aspects while emphasizing the need for North±South transfers through global policy instruments.



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors are grateful to many persons who contributed to the review processwhich has enriched this paper with more points of view, particularly Professors KiritParikh, Kenneth Arrow and G. Pillet.

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