classical antiquity -'agesilaos' boiotian campaigns and the theban stockade of 378-377 b. c.' 1987

7/27/2019 Classical Antiquity -'Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378-377 B. C.' 1987

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Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns and the Theban Stockade of 378-377 B. C.Author(s): Mark H. MunnSource: Classical Antiquity, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Apr., 1987), pp. 106-138Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/25010860 .

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MARK H. MUNN

Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaignsand the Theban Stockade of 378- 377 B. C

BETWEEN THEconclusion of the Corinthian War in387/6 and the outbreakof the Boiotian war in 379/8 the Spartan hegemony reached the height of itsstrength inGreece, andKing Agesilaos was the chief architect of that strength.The tensions that erupted in the coup at Thebes in thewinter of 379/8 werelargely a product of Agesilaos' policy of supporting, with force, oligarchiessympathetic to Sparta. The war against Thebes which followed this coup wasbegun in accordance with Agesilaos' designs (though it soon became fraughtwith unforeseen complications), and for a time itwas carried out under his ownleadership in the field. Though strategic initiative at the outset of the BoiotianWar laywith the Spartans, thewar itself failed to advance Spartan objectives.But with the settlement eventually reached at Sparta in 371 came the opportunity for Sparta to reduce Thebes to the dependent ally she had been before379/8. This was Agesilaos' design, and the catastrophic failure of thisdesign atthe battle of Leuktra is generally adduced as proof thatAgesilaos' policiescontained the seeds of their own destruction.1 Before judgment is passed on

Iwish to thankmy wife, Mary Lou ZimmermanMunn, andDarice Birge, who accompaniedand aided me inmy fieldwork around Thebes in 1983 and 1984, and to thank J. K. Anderson,Lionel Pearson, W. K. Pritchett, andMichael H. Jameson, along with two anonymous reviewers,all of whom read drafts of thispaper andmade comments thathave contributedmuch to improvingthe finished product.1. R. E. Smith, "The Opposition toAgesilaus's Foreign Policy, 394-371 B.C.,"Historia 2(1953-54) 274-88; J. G. DeVoto, "Agesilaos II and the Politics of Sparta, 404-377 B.C.," Diss.

Loyola University, Chicago, 1982, 211-52; C. D. Hamilton, "Agesilaus and theFailure of Spartan

? 1987 BY THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

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MUNN:Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 107

Agesilaos for the outcome of Leuktra, where he was not in command, attention must be given toAgesilaos' attempts to break Thebes by force of arms inperson, in the campaigns of 378 and 377.While the circumstances of the engagements of 378 and 377 were determined by the diplomatic activities that preceded them,Agesilaos was the firstto recognize that success inwar provided the best opportunities for successfuldiplomacy.2The present study is a detailed examination of Agesilaos' ability toadvance his aims in the opening campaigns of theBoiotian War through hisefforts on the field of battle. These campaigns have not yet been the object ofthe sort of close study that has been accorded to themore decisive battles ofantiquity. As a consequence, we are largely dependent upon the overt judgments of our sources for our assessment of these events, and those judgments(chiefly of Xenophon, Diodoros, and Plutarch) are by no means in agreementwith each other.3 One of the objectives of this study is tomediate the conflicting impressions left by our sources on these events. The chief means to thatend is to set forth a clear account of the events themselves, which requiresfundamentalwork on the topography and tactics of these campaigns.Not thatthese have gone without notice in recent scholarship, for several places andevents belonging to these campaigns, such as Chabrias' celebrated standagainst Agesilaos, and the locations of Skolos and Graos Stethos, have beentreated elsewhere. But our knowledge of all such places and episodes gainsclaritywhen they are studied indetail and in context.This study is asmuch an analysis of the strategies and tacticsof Agesilaos'opponents as it is of Agesilaos, for it is against the reactions of his opponentsthat Agesilaos' abilities and shortcomings must be measured. The rivals ofSparta in the first half of the fourth century were keen to devise means ofcountering Spartan superiority on the battlefield, and this ambition isperhapsmost dramatically reflected in the remarkable cross-country stockade and ditchprepared by the Thebans andAthenians to guard Theban territory in anticipation of Agesilaos' first campaign against Thebes in 378.4Although passes hadlong been defended and blocked bywalls, an extensive cross-country fieldworkof this sort was a novelty.5 It may be argued that the Theban stockade was an

Hegemony," Ancient World 5 (1982) 67-78; Hamilton, "The Generalship of King Agesilaus ofSparta,"Ancient World 8 (1983) 119-27.

2. See, in addition to theworks in n.l supra,G. L. Cawkwell, "Agesilaus and Sparta,"CQ26 (1976) 62-84, and Cawkwell, "TheDecline of Sparta," CQ 33 (1983) 385-400.3. DeVoto (supra n.l, 237-52) has given a chapter of his dissertation to a discussion of thesecampaigns and has examined the relationship between Xenophon's and Diodoros' accounts. Hiseffort to reconcile these two accounts isonly partially successful, however, while his understandingof the events themselves isundermined by the fact that he has made no advance inunderstandingthe topography of the campaigns.4. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.38-41, 48-49.5. On the novelty of this fieldwork, see J. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice in the

Age of Xenophon (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 132-36, and V. D. Hanson, Warfare andAgriculture in Classical Greece (Pisa 1983) 67-74. A. W. Lawrence, Greek Aims in Fortification



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108 CLASSICALNTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 1/April 1987

experiment that failed, since Agesilaos was able to cross it in both of hiscampaigns.Nevertheless, the Theban fieldwork had its influenceon the courseof these opening campaigns of the Boiotian War, and even if itwas not anunqualified success, its construction was a significant indication of the resolveof theThebans and theirAthenian allies to resist Spartanmight by land.6

SOURCESIt is remarkable that although no surviving ancient source describes all

noteworthy episodes of these campaigns ina connected narrative,we do have avariety of sources that comment on the campaigns from several different viewpoints. This fact gives rise to a number of difficulties in reconstructinga unifiedaccount of events, but it is an advantage in that we are not dependent upononly one point of view. The principal reason for thismultiplicity of viewpoints,certainly, is that no decisive battles took place in these campaigns.Victorieswere claimed by both sides, often for the same encounters, so that accountsvary according to the interests of the several authors who mention theseevents.

Xenophon, whose partiality for Agesilaos is well-known, is our chiefsource of information on these campaigns, and on the Theban stockade inparticular.7 Since the stockade was a defensive work overcome by Agesilaos,mention of it serves to highlight that commander's tactical skills. Indeed, theopportunity to praise the generalship of Agesilaos in these campaigns seems tohave been the sole criterion used byXenophon in selecting episodes for narrationwhenever the king himself was in the field. Polyainos alsomentions thestockade in his catalog of the stratagems ofAgesilaos. Inpart Polyainos' references derive fromXenophon, but Polyainos alsomentions details and episodesthat come from at least one other major source.8(Oxford 1979) 167-72, lists numerous Greek barrierwalls known either archaeologically or fromancient descriptions; none is quite as ambitious in its length as the Theban stockade.6. The Theban stockade was not the only such fieldwork employed by Greek armies of thefourth century. A similar barricade was erected to close the Isthmus of Corinth againstEpameinondas in 369: see Diodoros 15.68.3; cf. Xenophon Hell. 7.1.15, 2.5. The Dema wall inAttica hasoften been compared to the Theban stockade: see J. E. Jones, L. H. Sackett, and C. W. J. Eliot,"TOAEMA: A Survey of theAigaleos-Parnes Wall," BSA 52 (1957) 176, 180-81, 183n.106; J.R.McCredie, Fortified Military Camps inAttica, Hesperia Supplement XI (Princeton 1966) 96;Anderson (supra n.5) 134-35; Y. Garlan, Recherches de poliorcetique grecque, Bibliotheque desEcoles Frangaises d'Athenes et de Rome 223 (Paris 1974) 80-81. I have argued that the resemblances between the description of the Theban stockade and the remains of the Dema wall aremore than fortuitous and that the two fieldworkswere in fact built at the same time: seeMunn,"TheFourth-Century Defenses ofAttica: The Dema Wall," abstract,AJA 85 (1981)208-9; Munn,"Studies on theTerritorial Defenses of Fourth-CenturyAthens," Diss. University of Pennsylvania1983, 178-313.7. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.35-55; Ages. 2.22.8. Polyainos 2.1.11 and 25 (stockade); 2.1.2, 7, 12, 21, 24 (other references to these campaigns). J.Melber, "Uber die Quellen und den Wert der Strategemensammlung Polyans," NJbb



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Diodoros describes successes on both sides, but on balance his accountprefers the accomplishments of theAthenians. Chabrias' generalshipwins thegreatest praise, while the defensive stockade is never explicitly mentioned.9Diodoros derived his account of this period from the history of Ephoros, whoseems to have devoted an entire book to the Boiotian War of 378-371.1? SinceEphoros' history of this period is known to have included full descriptions ofbattles, it isnot surprising, in view of the popularity of Ephoros' work, to findevidence that later authors extracted episodes from these campaigns fromEphoros' history.11Ephoros was perhaps the primary source of the informationgiven by Polyainos where he diverges fromXenophon, and Nepos certainlyused Ephoros for his account of Chabrias' stand.12A Theban viewpoint on these affairs ispresented by Plutarch in his life ofPelopidas, and this is also reflected in his life of Agesilaos.13Here again thestockade is not mentioned, while the emphasis isplaced on the skill and discipline of the Thebans who defend their own land. In this regard, though thesecampaigns are said to have been relatively undistinguished in termsof immediate results, they are credited with engendering in the Thebans the skills thatthey would later use decisively at Leuktra. Kallisthenes' Hellenika has beenrecognized as the chief source for Plutarch's life of Pelopidas.14Like Ephoros,fur Philologie und Padagogik Supp. 14 (1885) 526-54, has concluded thatPolyainos did not consultXenophon, but if he did not, Polyainos must certainly have been relying on an intermediarywhodid. See, e.g., the close verbal parallels between Polyainos 2.1.11 andXenophon Hell. 5.4.49. It isgenerally recognized that Polyainos did make use of other collections of stratagems: seeMelber,541-45; F. Lammert, "Polyainos (8)" in RE 21, part 2 (1952) 1433;R. J. Phillips, "The SourcesandMethods of Polyaenus," HSCP 76 (1972) 297-98.9. Diodoros 15.32.1-34.2. Cf. Demosthenes 20.76 andAristides Panath. 284d.

10. On the dependence of this part of Diodoros' history on thework of Ephoros see C. A.Volquardsen, Untersuchungen uiber die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten beiDiodor, Buch XI bisXVI (Kiel 1868) 51-71, esp. 58, 66, 71;G. L. Barber, The Historian Ephorus(Cambridge 1935) 24, 35-38. On the title and content of Ephoros' Book XXI, see Barber, pp. 24and 36.

11. Polybios 12.25f remarks thatEphoros had a certain aptitude for describing naval battles(Konon's battles off of Cyprus and Knidos are cited), though he feels that Ephoros was lesssucessful in his comprehension and description of the complicatedmaneuvers involved in landengagements (Leuktra andMantineia are the examples cited). In the absence of Ephoros' text weare unfortunately unable to make our own judgment on Polybios' point (Polybioswas inclined tobe harsh in his criticism on thispoint; cf. 12.25g), but from itwe may at least be sure thatEphorosoffered detailed descriptions of military affairs on land.12. On Polyainos' use of Ephoros see Phillips (supra n.8). Melber, followed by Lammert(supra n.8), emphasizes the dependence of Polyainos' first two books on Ephoros. Because ofPolyainos' reliance on the works of other compilations, identifying the source of many of hisstratagems ofAgesilaos (2.1.1-33) is less straightforwardthanMelber has suggested (540-41, 545).On Nepos' use of Ephoros, see J. R. Bradley, "The Sources of Cornelius Nepos: Selected Lives,"HSCP 73 (1969) 308-9.13. Plutarch Pel. 15;Ages. 26.14. J. Buckler, "Plutarch on Leuktra," SymbOslo 55 (1980) 75-93, esp. 75-76; S. Fuscagni,"Callistene di Olinto e la vita di Pelopida di Plutarco," Contributi dell'Istituto di storia antica 3(1975) 31-55; H. D. Westlake, "The Sources of Plutarch's Pelopidas," CQ 33 (1939) 11-22, esp.18-22; F. Jacoby, "Kallisthenes (2)," inRE 10, part 2 (1919) 1707.



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Kallisthenes provided considerable detail in his accounts ofmilitary events.15 Itis likely that Kallisthenes' work was the source of some portions of Ephoros'history of these affairs, and this probabilitymakes it impossible inmany casesto determine which of these two authors was the source of episodes found inthe compilations of Polyainos and Frontinus.16There is no reason to believe that any of the contemporary historiansnamed above were eyewitnesses of Agesilaos' Boiotian campaigns. There issome probability, however, that each of them, writing some twenty to fiftyyears after these events, did consult informantswho had been present. Xenophon in particular, since he was a mature contemporary of the Boiotian Warand a former companion-in-arms of Agesilaos', very likely derived his circumstantially detailed information from fellow-officers who had served withAgesilaos.17 For military matters Xenophon's narrative, thoughhighly selectiveand for that reason at times tendentious, should be considered authoritative.18Ephoros and Kallisthenes, both coming of age in the generation after theseevents and not known to have hadmilitary experience themselves, neverthelessmoved in intellectual circles that includedmen of action.19Details survivingfrom their accounts may be presumed to have been recorded at no more thansecond or third hand from men who had participated in those events, at a timewhen many eyewitnesses still lived and, moreover, at a time when many otherhistorians had recorded or were recording the same period inhistory.20

15. Kallisthenes gave a detailed description of the battle of Issos, though he draws criticismfrom Polybios, 12.17-22, for inconsistencies and omissions. On the relationshipof thispassage toPolybios' criticism of Ephoros (supra n.11), see K. Sacks, Polybios on theWriting of History,University of California Publications in Classical Studies 24 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1981) 195202. In defense of Kallisthenes' account of the battle of Leuktra, see Buckler (supra n.14).16. Ephoros is said by Porphyry to have copied extensively fromKallisthenes, FGrH 70T17,124T33; see Barber (supran.10) 131-33, and Jacoby (supran.14) 1706, and FGrH IIc, p. 31. Forsimilar but not identical passages thatmight have come from either Ephoros or Kallisthenes, seePolyainos 2.1.12 and 24 and Frontinus 1.4.3 (cf. infrann.62, 74).17. On the composition of thisportion of Xenophon's Hellenica, begun during his sojourn inthe Peloponnese among the allies of Sparta and revised after 358, see E. Delebecque, Essai sur lavie deXenophon (Paris 1957) chaps. 6-8, and J. K. Anderson, Xenophon (NewYork 1974) 16571.

18. On the values and limitations of Xenophon's writings, especially with regard tomilitaryaffairs, seeAnderson (supra n.5) 9-12.19. As a student of Isokrates, Ephoros must have had contactwith men likeTimotheos (alsoa student of Isokrates: see [Plutarch]Mor. 837c) and perhaps Timotheos' sometime colleague ingeneralship, Chabrias (Diodoros 15.29.7). On what little is known of Ephoros' life, see Barber(supran.10) 1-16. Kallisthenes, raisedby his uncle Aristotle (PlutarchAlex. 55.4), must have beenfamiliar with the circle of theAcademy, and probably encountered Chabrias and Phokion, Chabrias' prot6g6 from the time of the Boiotian War; see PlutarchMor. 1126c, Phok. 4.2, 6.1-7.4; cf.

Diogenes Laertius 3.24. On Kallisthenes' upbringing, see Jacoby (supra n.14) 1675-76, 1685-86,andT. S. Brown, "Callisthenes andAlexander," AJP 70 (1949) 226-32.20. Daimachos of Plataia and Anaximenes of Lampsakos are cited as sources used by Ephoros (FGrH 65 T1 and 72 T28), and both may have covered theBoiotian campaigns of 378-77. TheBoiotians Dionysodoros andAnaxis are known to have written histories ending in 361/60, therefore probably covering theBoiotian War (FGrH 67, 68T1). Androtion (like Ephoros, said to have



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We have, therefore, fromXenophon and through intermediate sources, agood deal of information that was first committed to writing within living

memory of these campaigns.Although much of what is reported inDiodoros,Plutarch, and Polyainos is greatly compressed or fragmentary in nature, theobscurities and apparent contradictions among their accounts can be clarifiedto a great extent and can yield a coherent account of these events. If we takeup, then, the diverse strands of information that have come down to us andcombine them, as Polybios advises, with firsthandobservations from the site ofthe events,21we can move beyond the narratives and judgmentsof our sourcesin reconstructing and assessing Agesilaos' campaigns againstThebes.

KYNOS KEPHALAIIn the campaign of 378, Agesilaos began by following the same itinerarytraced by the army under Kleombrotos the previous winter.2 After arriving at

Thespiai byway of Plataia, he proceeded towardTheban territory, intending toenter it in the vicinity of Kynos Kephalai. There he found, according toXenophon, that "the plain and the most valuable part of the [Theban] landwasprotected round about by an entrenchment and a stockade" (Hell. 5.4.38).Unable to proceed, he devastated the property of theThebans that layoutsidethe stockade, moving his camp frequently over a period of days while hedevised a stratagem for outmaneuvering the defenders of the stockade. Eventually, by marching out at daybreak before the defenders could anticipate hismovements, he managed to cross the stockade and went on to destroyThebanpropertywithin itsperimeter, "up to the city" (Hell. 5.4.41).The point where Agesilaos crossed the wall in 378 is described by Xenophon as i n6os 0eowulv elflokX, "the entrance [toTheban territory] towardThespiai" (Hell. 5.4.48), and the place is namedKynos Kephalai (Ages. 2.22).Kynos Kephalai iswhere Kleombrotos encamped inTheban territory theprevious winter, withdrawing after sixteen days without having effected any actionagainst the Thebans (Hell. 5.4.14, 6.4.5). This was also the place where theThebans encamped in the spring of 377, in anticipation of Agesilaos' secondcampaign (Hell. 5.4.48-49). Kynos Kephalai was, evidently, themost suitableplace for the passage of an army from the territoryof Thespiai eastward intoTheban land. Can this place be located?been a student of Isokrates: FGrH 324 T2) devoted considerable attention in his Atthis to theforeign affairs of Athens, particularlymilitary affairs (see FGrH 324 F8-53), and likely gave dueattention to the famous successes of Chabrias inhis Theban campaigns (cf.Demosthenes' rhetorical praise of Chabrias soon after the latter's death, 20.76, and note thatAndrotion made mentionof Chabrias' early career: FGrH 324 F48).21. Polybios 12.27.1-6, 28.6.22. Xenophon, Hell. 5.4.38-41 and Ages. 2.22, describes Agesilaos' progress in 378 (cf.Diodoros 15.32.1-6). On Kleombrotos' campaign, seeHell. 5.4.14-16, 6.4.5. Peloponnesian control of theKithairon passes is discussed infra,pp. 00-00, 00.



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ONCHESTOS /A N I N PLAIN,TENERIC MS

'~ ~ ," TANAGRATHESPIAI I----SK * NEOKHORAKTHESPIAI '.LOUTOUFI SKOLOSLEUKTRA

soO'" Q--i :DAFNOULA6 *PYRGOS ERYTHRAI

KREUSIS

AIGO TH

rates two distinct regions in this part of Boiotia (see Figure 1). Below thisescarpment to the north lie the broadAonian plain and itswestward continuation, the Teneric plain. South of the escarpment is a plateau of gently rollinghill country, drained in its eastern portion by theAsopos River. The escarpment itself ismore rugged ground than the area to either the north or south,being punctuated by hills and numerous deep-cut ravines, which drainwaterstoward the lower ground to the north. The deepest of these ravines between

Thespiai and Thebes is that which leads the Kanavari stream, the ancientThespios, through the escarpment and into theAonian plain.23The direct line between Thespiai andThebes runs through this rugged zoneof the escarpment, and through this zone there lay no good route between thetwo-at least not for an army moving in hostile territory.24 Much easier

23. On the geography of thispart of Boiotia seeA. Philippson, Die griechischen Landschaften (Frankfurt 1951-52) vol. 1:2, 500-512, and P. W. Wallace, Strabo'sDescription of Boiotia, aCommentary (Heidelberg 1979) 5-6, 67.24. The easiest way from Thebes to Thespiai is to follow the edge of the Aonian plain to theKanavari ravine and follow this up into the Thespiai valley. This is the route followed by Pausanias

(9.25.5-26.6, with a short detour to the sanctuary of the Kabeiroi, near the mouth of theKanavari, and with comments on the way toward Onchestos); see the commentary by Frazer,Pausanias's Description of Greece (London 1898) vol. 5, 136, 140. The difficulty of thisway formilitary forces, especially in traversing the narrow Kanavari ravine, isexemplified in the account ofthe death of Phoibidas given in Xenophon Hell. 5.4.42-45 (cf. Polyainos 2.5.2); the vadtrl



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ground layboth north and south of the straight line.To thenorth, through theTeneric plain, the way into Theban territorynarrows down to a pass barely akilometer wide at the beginning of theAonian plain, near where theKanavariravine emerges.25This way is passable, but also easily defensible, since thesteep slopes on either side of the pass would prevent a larger invading armyfrom outflanking a defending force drawn up in the pass. To the south of theescarpment lies a much more open countryside, where a way some four kilometers wide (between the bed of theAsopos to the south and the drop into theKanavari ravine to the north) leads from the area of Leuktra in the territoryofThespiai into Theban lands.This latterway, entering the countryside inwhichMardonios had once arrayed his army for battle, is certainly themore suitableway for a large army to proceed fromThespiai towardThebes. This must havebeen the route of Kleombrotos, and later of Agesilaos with his army of someeighteen thousand foot and fifteen hundred cavalry.

Kynos Kephalai, "Dog Heads," is a name appropriate for an eminence,most likely a group of summits or a ridge.26 lthough this region of theAsoposbasin has no especially prominent summits, the land does rise to its highestelevation locally at a point almost precisely equidistant fromThebes and Thespiai. A summit at 388meters is reached along the Rakhi Kendani, a ridge ofrounded hills which overlooks the Asopos basin to the south and east, thesteep-sided Kanavari ravine to the north, and the territoryand town of Thespiai to the west-northwest (see Figure 2 and Plate 1). This eminence (perhapsnot the summit at 388meters specifically, but the group of hills known today asthe Rakhi Kendani) is the most suitable candidate for the ancient toponymKynos Kephalai.27 Command of this height would have ensured passage eastand west for an army (or, alternatively, would have blocked it for an oppo

&a6dpaTxoSncountered by theTheban cavalrymay have been the narrows of theKanavari ravineitselfor some side ravine on the southeastern side of Kanavari.25. This is theway from Thebes to Onchestos mentioned by Pausanias 9.26.1, 5, and itwasthis route fromOnchestos through the Teneric plain thatAlexander took inhismarch on Thebesin 335: Arrian Anab. 1.7.7.26. Cf. themore famous Kynos Kephalai inThessaly, the scene of Flamininus' victory over

PhilipV, described by Polybios 18.22.9: 6(polxakXoOvtalav Kuvog KEqpaXai,TxaXeig6'E/io xait?pzeQLxxxaoevoLali aqg CoOg ixavov avaxzevovxeg. Close at hand inBoiotia, Dryos Kephalai,or Treis Kephalai, was the name of theKithairon pass leading to Plataia: see Herodotos 9.39 and

Thucydides 3.24.1. The kephalai here most likely refer to summits above the pass.27. The modern village Loutoufi is not far from the summitof theRakhi Kendani. Loutoufiis perhaps the successor of the ancient XowQovof Kynos Kephalai, to be located somewherehereabouts, which was the birthplace of Pindar, according to Stephanos of Byzantion s.v. KuvvoKeWpcta(a.here are no grounds for identifying the site of Pindar's house at Thebes (Pausanias9.25.3; Arrian Anab. 1.9.10) as Kynos Kephalai, as does S. Symeonoglou, The Topography ofThebes from the Bronze Age toModern Times (Princeton 1985) 140, 198, and plate 2.When thisarticle was already inmanuscript I was informedbyDr. A. Andriomenou, Ephor ofAntiquities atThebes, that plowing near Loutoufi has recently turnedup artifacts fromMycenaean, Archaic, andClassical graves, confirming the above hypothesis, at least to the extent of demonstrating that therewas an ancient settlement in the vicinity of Loutoufi.



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114 CLASSICALANTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 1/April 1987

1vK 1

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Figure 2. Campaign of 378: probable course of the Theban stockade and location of

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abrias'tand. Contournterl 50 m......... ......= !:"C ....... .....:

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i eteen te te e ampaign ofobable orse o te eban stoade and loaton o

nt) arrival of Agesilaos in late spring the Thebans, probablyithvellowedbservationf movements in thenian assis-ngcuntryside. Itoulprepared he fieldwork which they hoped wouldrevenprovidedecurencampment just withinether

bouwisenevitable devastationdsfhebtheiran territory.28e knowfortheautious Kleombrotos in this fieldworkrfTHE COURSE OF THE THEBAN STOCKADEBetween the time of the midwinter campaign of Kleombrotos and the

arrival of Agesilaos in late spring the Thebans, probably with Athenian assistance, had prepared the fieldwork which they hoped would prevent the otherwise inevitable devastation of their territory. iWe know that this fieldwork

'.rva...:::::::laespig h Tebn, rba..... At:...: :~:~o.-:tance,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,. !::-::..,r......kwhc hy oe wudpevn heohrwisenvitabledevastaionftheir erritory e now hathiseldwo_

28. No surviving source specificallymentions that theAthenians had a hand in the construction of the Theban stockade, but this is widely assumed to be the case, even to the point ofassuming thatChabrias himself directed the work: seeM. Cary inCAH VI 68; Jones, Sackett, andEliot (supra n.6) 176;McCredie (supra n.6) 96. Indeed, theAthenians must have been involved inevery stage of the planning and construction of the wall, since the defense of such a fieldworkwould not have been conceivable if the Thebans did not have the substantial support of the

Athenians. This, in large part, must have been the assistance that the Athenians gave the Thebans



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MUNN:Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 115consisted of a ditch and stockade,29 the latter probably of brushwood andstakes embedded in the mound thrown up behind the ditch,30and that it waspunctuated at intervals by sallyports which allowed horsemen to charge outfrom behind the wall.31 Of its course we are told in general terms that it"encircled the plain and themost valuable parts of the land" of theThebans.32The line of the stockade is associated with specific places: Kynos Kephalai,Skolos, and, less directly, Graos Stethos. No trace of this earth-and-woodbarricade survives (or, at least, none has been recognized),33and commentators so far have had little to add toXenophon's account of it. It should bepossible, however, by reference to the natural topography of the Thebaid andto the places noted above, beginning with Kynos Kephalai, to fix the approximate course of the stockade with reasonable certainty.The reasons for identifying the Rakhi Kendani asKynos Kephalai are alsoreasons for placing the beginning of the stockade on these same heights. Northof these heights the escarpment of the Kanavari ravine-a steep climb of two

so enthusiastically after the trial and acquittal of Sphodrias: Xenophon Hell. 5.4.34; cf. Polybios2.62.6, Diodoros 15.29.7, PlutarchAges. 26.1, Pel. 15.1. Inspiration to build the stockademay wellhave come from Chabrias. His role in its defense was a prominent one (he is the only alliedcommandermentioned by Xenophon). Chabrias had recently returned from a successful campaignagainst Persian forces on the frontiers of Egypt: Diodoros 15.29.2-4; Nepos 12.3.1; see H. W.Parke, GreekMercenary Soldiers (Oxford 1933) 59-62. That campaignmay have involved the useof entrenchments like theTheban stockade. This may be adduced from references to a place calledXacptiov Xdcat (Strabo 16.2.33; Pliny NH 5.68) which probably originated in this campaign ofChabrias inEgypt: see Parke, 60, andCary, 68. Chabrias is later associatedwith another fieldworkevidently resembling that around Thebes, the stockade and ditch at theCorinthian Isthmos in 369:Diodoros 15.68.1-3.

29. Though Xenophon varied his vocabulary in referring to the fieldwork, it is clear that itwas a uniform and continuous work (d&joTExacQpgeuov Texal ateoaetragcotvov xVxXW6 jtebiovxai ta Aksioov&OLa TtS X5oQag,Hell. 5.4.38), consisting of a stockade and ditch, variouslyreferred to as xa oavQ'xa'ca xai Y TldqpQogHell. 5.4.38), Ta oTCautbQaTaai tdqpQovuAges.2.22), Trtdqpog xai ti6 oTauQgo)a (Hell. 5.4.50), T6 oTaug5woa (Hell. 5.4.49), T XaQaxdcaTa(Hell. 5.4.41), and T6 xaQaxwoua (Hell. 5.4.38 and 39). Cf. Polyainos 2.1.25: Or3lctotozT e6iov6lexTapgevoav xai anexagdxcooav. Polyainos then refers to the stockade as TO XaQaxwo)a.30. The deep soils on hills of theAsopos basin are well suited to this sort of excavation andearthwork, with brushwood available in gullies and on hills round about. Stakes would requirescavenging from among vine props, timbers from abandoned buildings (e.g., from the hamlets ofKynos Kephalai, Potniai, and Skolos, which must have been evacuated; cf. Hell. Oxy. 12. 3 [London]), and the cutting of trees; all of these resources were immediately at hand (cf.Herodotos9.15.2 on Mardonios' fortified camp along theAsopos, in the same area covered by the Thebanstockade). On the typical construction of Greek stockades see Polybios 18.18; Xenophon Hell.6.5.30;McCredie (supran.6) 97-98; W. K. Pritchett, The Greek State atWar, vol. 2 (Berkeley andLos Angeles 1974) 133-46, Lawrence (supran.5) 162.31. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.39; cf. Polyainos 2.1.25.32. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.38 (quoted supran.29).33. Aerial photographs taken under the right conditions might reveal evidence of the ancientditch. Unfortunately, theRAF aerial photographs of the area of Thebes, which I have been able toexamine at the British School inAthens (through the kindness of H. W. Catling), were taken attoo high an altitude and at thewrong season (August) to reveal the sort of vegetation marks thatmight indicate the line of the buried ditch.



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hundred meters over ground deeply cut by numerouswatercourses-providedan obstacle that needed no fortification.34The Theban and Athenian camp onKynos Kephalai (the Rakhi Kendani) was certainly protected by the stockade,which must have begun near the edge of the drop into theKanavari ravine.From the height of the Rakhi Kendani the Souleza crest runs east-southeast forabout five kilometers, standing some sixtymeters above theAsopos plain at itsbeginning, dropping to ten meters or so over its last kilometer, where it iswithin a few hundred meters of the bed of theAsopos (today the village ofLoutoufi stands near the center of the Souleza crest; see Figure 2 and Plate 1).This crest would have provided the Theban and Athenian forces the sort ofdefensive line-along higher ground-which we know theypreferred. The Souleza crestwas probably the line followed by the Theban stockade to the southwest of Thebes. It was in front of this line thatAgesilaos moved, shifting hiscamp several times a day while attempting to find a weak point atwhich tocross the stockade.35

In addition to giving the defenders of the stockade the advantage of higherground, the Souleza ridge also gave them added cover to hide themovement oftheir forces behind the stockade. This was probably a factor in a surpriseattackof the Theban cavalry, the one engagement along this line thatXenophondescribes. On one occasion when Agesilaos was withdrawing towardcamp, theTheban cavalry, "until then hidden from view," charged through the sallyportsand succeeded in cutting down a number of Agesilaos' own cavalrymen andpeltasts before being driven off (Hell. 5.4.39-40). It is difficult to believe thatthis stockade was everywhere sufficiently tall to have masked movements ofcavalry behind it.More likely, the unexpected appearance of the Theban cavalrywas made possible by the fact that theywere able to move frompoint topoint behind the Souleza ridge, below the line of the stockade.

From the end of the Souleza crest eastward there is no obvious line of highground for the stockade to follow. It is conceivable that the stockade anglednortheastward to reach the gentle heights of theGolemi crest,which runsmoreor less parallel to the Asopos at a distance of two to three kilometers from theriver.More probable is that the fieldwork, having approached theAsopos byfollowing the Souleza crest, followed a line along its north bank. The Asoposhere defined the border of Theban territory,36 and since the bed of the Asoposis themost substantial natural barrier in thispart of theplain the stockademaywell have taken advantage of it and followed the river for most, if not all, of itseastward course from this point. This supposition is supported by the likeli

34. It is possible, given the amibitious nature of the Theban fieldwork, that a stretch ofstockade was also built furthernorth, beyond the end of theKanavari ravine, toblock the kilometer-wide gap at the junction of theAonian and Teneric plains. Through thisgapAlexander's armypassed in 335 (supra n.25). It is a more defensible gap than theway into the Theban Parasopia byKynos Kephalai. Whether fortified or not, thisway was never tried by the Peloponnesian army.35. Polyainos 2.1.21; cf. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.38.36. Pausanias 9.4.4 specifies that theAsopos was xcai vv eTl the border between Plataianand Theban territory, and thismust have been the case in 378 aswell.



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hood that Skolos, the easternmost known location for the stockade,37 lay onthe north bank of theAsopos. The placement of Skolos and the evidence forthe eastern extent of the stockade will be discussed below in connection withthe campaign of 377. Before that, events connected with Agesilaos' successfulcrossing of the stockade in 378 deserve discussion.

CHABRIAS' STANDXenophon's account in theHellenika of Agesilaos' first campaign againstThebes omits any mention of Chabrias and makes no reference to the encounter with Agesilaos which, according toDiodoros 15.32.3-33.4, won praise

for Chabrias from Thebans and Athenians alike. It is likely, however, thatXenophon does refer to the encounterwith Chabrias in hisAgesilaos, althoughseeing it in a different light than Diodoros. This becomes clear when thesequence of events of the campaign of 378 is untangled from the selectivenarratives our sources provide.Diodoros says thatwhen the Theban and Athenian forces had assembled,they "occupied a certain elongated hill, twenty stades from the city, and having

made a bulwark of the difficult terrain, they awaited the attack of theenemy."38This cp6(3Xqta (here translated "bulwark")might be interpreted asa rather imprecise description of the stockade and ditch, behindwhich, as weknow fromXenophon, the Thebans andAthenians did await the firstapproachof Agesilaos. This is probably not the case, however, for in the ensuing encounter none of our sources makes reference to the stockade.

After dispersing the Theban and Athenian light-armed troops and harassing their hoplites with his own skirmishers,Agesilaos advanced his phalanxtoward their line, evidently expecting them to give way in the face of thegreater size of his army. Chabrias, followed by the Theban Gorgidas, commanded his troops to stand at ease with their spears upright and their shieldsoff, resting against their knees. The precision with which this commandwasexecuted and the confidence the stance implied convinced Agesilaos that theenemy were going to hold their ground.With enemy forces standingon higherground and evidently more prepared and eager for battle in this advantageousposition than his own allied army,Agesilaos judged itwiser not to engage theenemy at this point. Instead he withdrew his phalanx to the plain, offering theThebans and Athenians the opportunity of engaging him on level ground ifthey chose. They did not choose to do so, andAgesilaos sent his light troopsand cavalry out to plunder the countryside.39

37. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.49.38. Diodoros 15.32.3: oi [ eV Or)3aLot X6cpov tlva xaxeX6povTo jraQa4jxri, oTa6ioLvjtiXeovta 5ri t6iX5c;g lxool, xaicgptOXrLa JTOLrc.L'EVOlag bvoaXw(Oag&vRLCevov v TOdV

7io.epiov Eqpo6ov.39. This is the account of Diodoros 15.32.4-6 augmented by the very similar accounts, allprobably derived from Ephoros, given by Polyainos 2.1.2 (whomentions Gorgidas as theThebancommander) andNepos 12.1 (whomentions the flight of the Theban and Athenian mercenaries,



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Chabrias won praise, according to Diodoros (15.33.4), from the Thebansfor saving them in this encounter by the skill of his generalship. Nepos (12.1)reports this as the most memorable of Chabrias' deeds, and Demosthenes,some twenty years after the event and soon after Chabrias' death, remindedtheAthenians of Chabrias' accomplishments on the battlefield, beginningwiththis encounter: "How skillfully, as your commander, he drew up your ranksatThebes to face the whole power of the Peloponnese" (20.76).The noteworthiness of this encounter derives from the fact that Chabriasfaced the stronger force of Agesilaos without any fortificationsprotecting himand, presumably, without any fortifications just to his rear towhich he couldretreat shouldAgesilaos have pressed the attack. Indeed, it is clear from whatfollowed this standoff that Agesilaos already had his army well within theterritory of Thebes, that is, inside the perimeter of the stockade.4 For Diodoros reports thatAgesilaos now took possession of "agreat quantity of plunder"(15.32.6) from the countryside, which must correspond toXenophon's reportthat after successfully crossing the line of the stockade he "devastated andburned the region within up to the city" (Hell. 5.4.41). Even clearer is thereport inXenophon's life of Agesilaos that, after crossing the stockade by

Kynos Kephalai, Agesilaos "devastated the countryside up to the city, offeringto do battle with the Thebans both in the plain and in the hills, if they chose tofight" (22.2). Here is a reference to the encounter with Chabrias and theBoiotians-battle was offered to them, but they refused to fight in defense ofTheban land.

This, then, will have been the first time that the Theban andAthenianallies confronted Agesilaos face to face-hence the particular thrill of dangerassociated with the event. The Peloponnesian army had already been con

i.e., peltasts); on the less thanwholehearted enthusiasm of Agesilaos' Peloponnesian troops at thistime, see in general Isokrates 14.15, and in particularPolyainos 2.1.7 (=Plutarch Ages. 26) and2.1.21, which most likely belong to the campaign of 378, and 2.1.20, which may be 378 or 377. Ifollow Anderson (supra n.5, 89-90, and "The Statue of Chabrias," AJA 67 [1963] 411-13), inunderstanding Chabrias' stand to be the drill of a hoplite phalanx (reliquamphalangem, saysNepos12.1.2, referring to the formation of the hoplites that remained inplace after the dispersal of theirlight-armed support troops; see the note ad loc. by J. C. Rolfe in theLoeb); see also J. Buckler,"A Second Look at theChabriasMonument," Hesperia 41 (1972)466-74. Demosthenes 20.76 andthe statue of Chabrias, which is specifically associated byDiodoros andNepos with this encounter,should be enough to demonstrate thatChabrias was the principal commander of Athenian citizensoldiers-hoplites and otherwise-on this occasion (cf. Diodoros 15.29.7). The reference byDiodoros on this occasion to Chabrias as amercenary commander (Diodoros 15.32.5:Xaciactg 6' 6'A0rivaiog TCv ito0oqxSoQv&qpqryouFevog)ndXenophon's association of Chabrias with peltastmercenaries in 377 (Hell. 5.4.54) should be taken to show that Chabrias also had mercenariesunder his command, which may have been both hoplites and light-armedpeltasts. These mercenariesmust have included troopswho had served under Chabrias inEgypt (supran.28), andChabriasnow probably used thesemercenary hoplites as drilled cadres in the front ranks of his phalanx, justasGorgidas used the Sacred Band (see Plutarch Pel. 19.3).40. It has sometimes been assumed that Chabrias' stand took place at or before the line ofthe stockade, e.g., Anderson (supran.5) 134, and DeVoto (supran.1) 241, 245.



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MUNN:Agesilaos' Boiotian Campaigns 119fronted along the line of the stockade, but this fieldwork hadmade it impossible for Agesilaos, even with his overwhelming numbers, to contemplate adirect assault on his enemies. Now, having passed through the stockade by aruse,Agesilaos could not be held back atwill, and the possibility of a decisivedefeat for theThebans and Athenians was real. Their responsewas tomake ofthe terrain what they had made of theirwall, and to stand against Agesilaosonly at those points where they had the advantage of position-where theyheld Toz6oL ?E6Q&eLOLDiodoros 15.32.4). In thismanner they had "made abulwark of the difficult terrain."41They could thusdefend themselves whereverthe ground was suitable, but they could not prevent Agesilaos' forces fromplundering the open countryside.Diodoros locates the stand on "a certain elongated hill, twenty stades fromthe city." This hillmost likely lay somewhere to the west of Thebes, for itwasprincipally this area that the Peloponnesians must have plundered in this campaign, since Xenophon specifies that "the parts east of Thebes" (a nQO6goTrigTOyv l3a(cov rto6swg,Hell. 5.4.49), also described as "the remainder" (TxXoLra,Ages. 2.22) of Theban territory,were the objectives of Agesilaos' second campaign. In fact, taking account of the location of Kynos Kephalai asdetermined above, itmay be assumed that this hill lay to the southwest ofThebes. This was the direction from which Agesilaos made his entrance intothe Thebaid, and the plain that his troops devastated after his phalanx withdrew from the Theban and Athenian position on the hill was certainly the openground south and southwest of Thebes. Accepting the distance of twenty stadesfrom Thebes, but allowing some leeway both for the possible imprecision ofthis figure and for the variable length of the stade, we may look for a suitablelocation for the elongated hill between three and four-and-a-half kilometers tothe southwest of Thebes.42

From the ridge that runs above the south bank of the Kanavari ravine,between the Rakhi Kendani (Kynos Kephalai) and Thebes, three elongatedcrests run eastward, out into the open plain southwest of Thebes: Souleza,Skouliki, and Konizos. The greater part of the northernmost of these crests,Konizos, falls within the arc from Thebes prescribed by Diodoros' information.43The location of Chabrias' stand against Agesilaos was probably some

41. It is hard to escape the impression from the passage in Diodoros that the q0o6p5.ljja"bulwark," refers to an artificalbarrier, namely, the stockade. But Ibelieve this is shown not to bethe case. The explanation may well lie in the fact thathereDiodoros has excerpted thedescriptionof Chabrias' stand, retaining some of the original wording, from the fuller account of Ephoros,who had previously made mention of the stockade, which was an artificial cjto63rklca. phoros'account thenwent on to suggest justwhat I have pointed out here, namely, that the Thebans andAthenians, stripped of the protection of their stockade, nonetheless couldmake a "bulwarkof thedifficult terrain."42. On the basis of the length of Greek feet cited by F. N. Pryce andM. Lang, "Measures"in the OCD (Oxford 1970) 659, twenty stades comes to between 3,528 and 3,996meters.43. The arc ismeasured from the center of Thebes' southern flank,where themain entranceto the city and to the Kadmeia on the south side lay.Note thatPausanias 9.8.1 says that Potniai is



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where along this crest (see Figure 2 and Plate 2), facing southeastward towardthemore open plain.This position in fact makes very good sense of the sequence of events ofAgesilaos' first campaign, as they can now be reconstructed (see Figure 2).

Agesilaos' observation that the enemy only appearedwithin the stockade afterbreakfast (xewT'QLcQov, ell. 5.4.41) suggests that the defenders normally retired to the same campsite each evening, that is, to theiroriginal encampmentsomewhere on the heights of Kynos Kephalai.44Agesilaos' passage through thestockade was therefore achieved by beginning to move at dawn, deceivingenemy sentries as to his intentions, andmoving quickly to the east of KynosKephalai, crossing the stockade toward the lower end of the Souleza crest. Assoon as thismovement of the Peloponnesian army became known to the Theban andAthenian allies, there would have been concern for the safety of thecity, and even more concern that theirown lineof retreat towardThebes mightbe cut off. The obvious and necessary decision was to withdraw at once,directly toward Thebes, a decision which would have recommended itself tothe allies all themore because it enabled them to keep to the high ground.Atthe same time their peltasts were probably sent against the Peloponnesians toharass and slow their march. These were the forces thatAgesilaos effectivelyscattered before sending his own peltasts against the allies. A march from theRakhi Kendani directly towardThebes would have taken the allies across thecrest of Konizos. Here, toward the northern end of the plain south of Thebes,with a way into the western side of Thebes still open at their back,45 theabout ten stades fromThebes; Potniai is located at modern Takhi (infra n.67), which stands abouthalfway between Thebes and Konizos.44. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.41 says that it was on account of the speed of Agesilaos' marchbefore breakfast, by which time his opponents customarily appeared in force, that he passed thebarrier unhindered. Polyainos 2.1.25 creditsAgesilaos' passage through one of theopenings in thestockade to a deceptive maneuver in the face of the enemy.While threateningan entrance towardthe left of his front,Agesilaos sent a column from the rearof his formation towardanundefendedopening in the opposite direction, by which he eventually passed through (for related formationsand maneuvers executed by Agesilaos, see Hell. 4.3.4, 6.5.18-19). The circumstantial detail inPolyainos' account probably comes from a good fourth-century source (Kallisthenesor Ephoros?),probably the same source that provided details aboutAgesilaos' formations inhis campaign of 377found in Polyainos 2.1.24 (infra n.62). In the present instance the accounts of Xenophon andPolyainos make good sense as complementary partial descriptions of the same event, which can beunderstood as follows. Though the main force of Agesilaos' opponents never assembled untilsometime after dawn, as Xenophon notes, theymust have maintained a sizable picket force onwatch throughout the night to guard against any surprise attack. Agesilaos began moving wellbefore the customary hour of themarshalling of his opponents, but, inorder to cross the stockade,Agesilaos still needed to catch the picket force off guard. Hence Agesilaos effected a ruse throughthemaneuver Polyainos describes, and his eventual movement across the linewas, as Polyainossays, toward the right (i.e., toward the east), as is suggested above. Xenophon's description sumsup the action without providing details, and, incidentally, implies that the Thebans (he nevermentions theAthenians in this campaign) were more culpably negligent than they actuallywere.

45. There was probably a gate in the southwest corner of the walls of Thebes on the line ofmarch of the allies (amodern track still approaches Thebes from this direction, from the backsideof Konizos): see Symeonoglou (supran.27) 115, fig. 3.6, site 257.



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Theban andAthenian allies drew up their ranks to face the forces ofAgesilaos,which probably approached from the southeast. After Agesilaos decided not toattack, the two armies no doubt continued to confront each other in a standoffwhile Agesilaos' light troops and cavalrywere engaged inplundering the plainsouth of Thebes.

Xenophon's report that Agesilaos "devastated and burned the regionwithin the enclosure up to the city" (Hell. 5.4.41) isprobably true as far as itgoes, but is perhaps misleading for what it omits. By the actions of ChabriasandGorgidas the Peloponnesian phalanx was unable to engage itsnumericallyinferior enemy in decisive combat, and, being confronted by the enemy, thephalanx must have been unable to participate effectively

in the devastation offields within the stockade.46The destruction wrought by Agesilaos on thisoccasion was essentially limited to what could be plundered or burned by hislight troops and cavalry, and this, despiteXenophon's and Diodoros' accounts,was probably not extensive. Because of the strength of the enemy cavalry, thePeloponnesian light troops could not disperse widely, and the Peloponnesiancavalrymust have been chiefly occupied with keeping the enemy cavalry incheck. Most of the devastation wrought by the Peloponnesians was accomplished by setting fire to the ripe grain,47and this damage was probably confined for the most part to the level plain south of Thebes, east of the SoulezaKonizos heights and west of Golemi.

Agesilaos contented himself with this distinctly limited success, and uponhis withdrawal to Thespiai his Spartan advisors criticized him, according toDiodoros 15.33.1, for not decisively engaging the enemy. If Agesilaos hadsuccessfully done so, the ensuing devastation of Theban landswould certainlyhave been more thorough, and it would have been possible to blockadeThebes. With that danger averted, the pride of the Thebans and Athenians attheir accomplishment is understandable. The threat, however, was only postponed until the next year.

SKOLOSIn 377, Agesilaos again led the Peloponnesians across the Isthmos to Plataia, intent on devastating more of Theban territory.Knowing the obstacle hehad to surmount before his army could proceed with theirwork, he had con

trived a ruse to enable his force to cross the stockade unopposed. He had sent

46. Devastation was in any event normally carried out by light troops,while hoplites maintained their formations as long as hostile forceswere abroad: see Hanson (supran.5) 21-25. Onthe comparative sizes of the two armies, see infra n.82.47. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.41 specifies that firewas used on Theban land, which incidentallyconfirms thatAgesilaos' invasion followed the traditionalpattern of arrivingwhen the grainwasnearly ripe but not yet harvested, sometime between mid-May and late June: seeHanson (supran.5) 30-35.



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word ahead toThespiai calling for a market to be prepared there for his army,and requesting all embassies to await him there. The Thebans took the baitand, anticipating that this invasionwould begin as the previous two had, coming from Thespiai, they encamped at Kynos Kephalai. Arriving at Plataia,Agesilaos could probably see their camp. Knowing that all was according toplan, he prepared tomove his army at dawn, probably the first dawn after hisarrival at Plataia. He marched along the road toErythrai, directly away fromThespiai, and turned north to cross the stockade at a safe distance fromKynosKephalai, by Skolos (see Figures 1 and 3).48The location of Skolos has been the subject of some debate. The evidenceof this episode supports the view of thosewho have placed Skolos on the northside of theAsopos River, inwhat clearly was Theban territory at this time.Evidence in favor of this location for Skolos has been marshalled most effectively in the several studies by Pritchett on the topography of the Parasopia.Pritchett has placed Skolos in the vicinity of the chapel of Ayios Georgiossouth of the village of Neokhoraki, above the north bank of theAsopos.49 Theopposing view that Skolos is to be identifiedwith remains two-and-a-halfkilometers south of theAsopos, around theMetokhi of Hosios Meletios justwestof Dharimari, is defended by P. Wallace.50 Pritchett regardsWallace's site tobe the ancient Erythrai (a view I accept, and I have so indicated inFigure 1),while Wallace argues that Pritchett's site is to be identified as the obscuresettlement of Therapnai.51Wallace has in fact supplemented Pritchett's observations of the remains in

48. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.47-49, followed closely by Polyainos 2.1.11; cf. Xenophon Ages.2.22. Xenophon reports thatAgesilaos sent his feigned command toThespiai tine 6E... CvrasgnITxzaLgais&yvexo, but in fact he must have set up this ruse well before his arrival inPlataia, forhis movement from Plataia to Skolos was almost immediate,while a period of a few dayswouldhave been needed forAgesilaos' message to have had its desired effect. That Agesilaos didmovequickly from Plataia is the only way of explaining theperplexing statement byXenophon, repeatedby Polyainos, that when he had reached Skolos Agesilaos had "completed in one day a two-daymarch for an army" (Hell. 5.4.49; Polyainos 2.1.11). The march from Plataia along the road toErythrai and on to Skolos is a distance of some fifteen kilometers, which is not even a full day'smarch, let alone a two-daymarch. Yet Xenophon clearly thought that there was something remarkable in the distance covered by Agesilaos' army in the space of a day. To account for this Isuggest that, having made his crossing of Kithairon, Agesilaos arrived at Plataia in the evening ofwhat had been a full day's march. Then, without a full night's rest, he prepared his army tomoveagain at the break of dawn, so that he arrived at Skolos still in the morning, at the hour when anarmywhich had just crossed Kithairon the day before would normally be expected to begin thenext day's march. This he did to ensure that he crossed the stockade at a place and a time that theenemywould not have expected.49. W. K. Pritchett, Studies inAncient Greek Topography (Berkeley 1965-1982) vol. 1, 1079, vol. 2, 178-79, vol. 3, 289-94, vol. 4, 97-101.50. Wallace (supra n.23) 87-90.51. Pritchett (supra n.49) vol. 1, 103-7 on Erythrai;Wallace (supran.23) 94-96 on Therapnai. Strabo 9.2.24 is the only source to report a place named Therapnai inTheban territory,andhis testimony is of uncertain value: see J.M. Fossey, "Therapnai and Skolos inBoiotia," BICS 18(1971) 106-9.



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the vicinity of Ayios Georgios to show that therewas a sizable settlement somefive hundred meters southeast of the chapel of Ayios Georgios, on the northbank of theAsopos where it is crossed by a bridge south of Neokhoraki. Onthis spotWallace has noted "ancient sherds and roof tiles ingreat abundance"over an area of some two hundred by four hundredmeters, includingGeometric, fifth-, and fourth-century sherds.52I have been able to confirmmuch of thisin a brief inspection of the site, where I found Classical, Hellenistic, andRoman sherds as well as a roughly worked limestone column drum and asegment of Roman cemented brickwork.An inspection of the opposite bankfailed to reveal any comparable concentration of sherds on the south side oftheAsopos.These investigations demonstrate that here, on the north bank of theAsopos, there was once a substantial settlement with a long history of occupation.This evidence ismore in keeping with what we know of Skolos, a place thatsaw the arrival of the army of Mardonios into Theban territory (Herodotos9.15) andwhich was still there to be seen in the time of Pausanias (9.4.4), thanit is with what we know of Therapnai, which ispractically nothing.Moreover,the evidence of Mardonios' march in 479 andAgesilaos' encounter with thestockade at Skolos in 377 both favor the conclusion that Skolos lay on thenorth side of theAsopos, Wallace's assertion to the contrarynotwithstanding.53This is not the place to reviewMardonios' movements; we need only note thathismarch fromTanagra to Skolos and his encampment on theAsopos allmakebest sense when they are confined to the north side of the river.54Likewise, thenorth bank of the Asopos would have been themost defensible line for the

Theban stockade as it extended eastward from the end of the Souleza crest (seesupra, pp. 116-17). We shall see shortly that the testimony ofXenophon favorsthe view that the Theban stockade did in fact follow an east/west line until itsend toward the Tanagran frontier.A Skolos on the north bank of theAsoposwould naturally have been incorporated into such a line of the stockade, asweknow it was. A Skolos two-and-a-half kilometers south of the river wouldrequire us to understand a considerable deviation from themost advantageousdefensive line for the stockade, a deviation which would afford no compensating advantages to the defenders, and a deviation which would notmake senseof Xenophon's next reference to the stockade, as is discussed in the nextsection.

Considerations of the terrain around Ayios Georgios, as it would haveaffected themovement of Agesilaos' army, also favor the identificationof thenorth-bank site as Skolos. Here, for up to two kilometers west or east of thebridge below Neokhoraki and theAyios Georgios chapel, the ground north of

52. Wallace (supra n.23) 95.53. Ibid. 96.54. See Pritchett (supra n.49) and Fossey (supra n.51) 107 on Mardonios' movements, asdescribed byHerodotos 9.15, and cf. infra n.71.



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the river ismore nearly level and open than it is to either side. This openingextends northward for some three kilometers, up to the glen inwhich themodern village of Neokhoraki lies. These conditions, combined with the factthat a bridge must have crossed theAsopos at Skolos just as one does today,would have favored themovement of a large army into this quarter of Thebanterritory.From this areaAgesilaos could easily proceed eastward, as we knowhe did, toward the frontierwith Tanagra.

TANAGRA AND TO TEIXO0

After entering Theban territory by Skolos, Agesilaos laidwaste the landeast of Thebes, ICXQTg TavayQaLct , "as far as the [territory]of the Tanagraioi" (Xenophon Hell. 5.4.49). The territoryeast of Thebes referred to heremust all have lain in the Parasopia, strictly speaking all southeast of Thebes.There is no evidence thatAgesilaos attempted to pass north of the heights ofSoros-Moustafades-Petra Stavraetos-Monovigla to enter the Aonian plain, forwhen we can next locate him, on his returnmarch, he iscertainly still southeastof Thebes (see below on Graos Stethos).55After reporting that he reached as far as Tanagran territory,Xenophongoes on to note thatTanagra was at that time still controlled by Spartan allies,presumably to account forwhy Agesilaos did not continue his plundering intothe territory of Tanagra. Agesilaos then turned back, ev aQLateq eXcov6TteiXog, "keeping the wall on his left" (Hell. 5.4.59). If this TeiXog is to beidentifiedwith the orauc6opQa, he stockade by Skolos, mentioned just before,and again just after (Hell. 5.4.50), thenAgesilaos can be understood to haveturned back from a point somewhere east of Skolos, to head west, stayingnorth of-i.e., inside of-the line of the stockade.This point of interpretation, however, is controversial. Most commentators, because of the difference in terminology and the difficulty of understanding the spatial relationships between the pointsmentioned in thispassage, denythat To TeiXog of Hell. 5.4.49 is the same as the Theban stockade. Instead,

55. Fossey (supra n.51, 106) believes that the stockade at Skolos was intended toprevent thepassage of Agesilaos north of Soros, from theParasopia down into theAonian plain.He bases thison the supposition that the settlement of Skolos was located at modern Neokhoraki, below

afortified enclosure on Soros which he considers to have been the acropolis of Skolos. A location forthe stockade as far north as Neokhoraki or Soros isunlikely both because itmeans thatmuch goodland north of theAsopos would have lain outside the protective stockade and, more important,because it does not allow satisfactory sense to bemade of the accounts of the ensuingmovementsof Agesilaos. The remains beside the Asopos belong to a substantial settlement, and no suchremains are known atNeokhoraki. The remains on Soros may still be considered to be those of anoccasional refuge for the inhabitants of Skolos, but they have no bearing on the question of thelocation of Skolos itself (which Hell. Oxy. 12. 3 [London] describes as TeEXog'x eXcovat thebeginning of the Peloponnesian War), and they certainly have no bearing on the topography andstrategy of Agesilaos' campaign.



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because of the proximate mention of Tanagra, TOTeLXog ere is generallyinterpreted as the wall of Tanagra.56To reject the identity of TOteXog with the Theban stockade simply because of the difference in terminology is not compelling, for the stockade cansurely be called a TeXXOg,sXenophon elsewhere calls temporary stockades.57Nor is the sense of this passage improved by assuming that this TeiXog is thewall of Tanagra. After reaching Tanagran territory, Agesilaos a&r'el evLaQLOTeQL Xcv TO tIXog. T6 TrXog is cited here as a point of reference for

Agesilaos' returnmarch, and Xwov mplies that this relationship between Agesilaos and n6 txeiog continued to hold true for the duration of his march back.YetAgesilaos can only have had the

wall of Tanagra on his left for amoment,as he began his returnmarch.58 If, however, TO6TdXog isunderstood to be theTheban stockade, this reference to a lineareast/west fieldworkmakes perfectlygood sense.Another objection to seeing T6 zTiXogas thewall of Tanagra is that thisinterpretationwould require us to understand thatAgesilaos marched as fareast as the city of Tanagra and not just, as Xenophon says, as far as theterritory of the Tanagraioi. It is by no means clear what advantage Agesilaoswould have gained by marching toTanagra itself.His object was to devastateTheban territory, and forcing his troops to forage and to provide for themselves off the enemy's land was the most effective way to do so.59 If he hadentered Tanagran territory and encamped there before returningwestward, hisarmywould probably have brought unwelcome damage to theproperties of hisallies inTanagra.60

Finally, we may wonder, if Tanagra were indeed the point of referenceintended by Xenophon, why would it have been referred to as TO6Teiog rather

56. L. Breitenbach, ed., Xenophontis Hellenica, Libra III-VII (Leipzig 1863) 229 s.v. TOt?iXoS;G. E. Underhill, A Commentary on theHellenica of Xenophon (Oxford 1900) 212 s.v. TotaEXog; . L. Brownson, trans.,Xenophon, vol. 2, Hellenica Books V-VII (LoebClassical Library,London 1921) 101,where T6 xTeXog s simply translatedas "thewall of Tanagra";Anderson (supran.5) 307-8 n.82; D. W. Roller, "The Date of theWalls atTanagra," Hesperia 43 (1974) 260-63,esp. 261 with n.13; Roller, "A New Map of Tanagra,"AJA 78 (1974) 152-56, esp. 155with n.40;Roller, "TheLocation of Xenophon's rFQog orf0og," AJA 82 (1978) 107-9.57. InHell. 7.4.32 a wooden stockade improvisedovernight (Exx6o'rovxTE;a6blaExovrlqpEvaoxTYvdOeva xaL aooxravuQovvTeg) is called TO teiXog. Cf. the VX.Lvov TEiXog of Hell. 1.3.4, and thetaqcpogand reIXogof Hell. 5.2.4.58. Anderson (supra n.5, 307-8, n.82) notes the awkwardness of To6TeXog as the wall ofTanagra in this context, though he prefers to accept this interpretation.Roller ("Location," supran. 56, 107-8) suggests that the sense of continuity implied inXenophon's description can beunderstood ifAgesilaos marched around Tanagra in a counterclockwise direction, thus keeping iton his left, until he moved off toward the northwest. This compromise still leaves us wonderingabout the purpose of the maneuver, and why Xenophon should describe it in such an obliquemanner.

59. Polyainos 2.1.21; cf. Hanson (supran.5) 25-28.60. Note that Agesilaos had made a point of having a market prepared for his army atThespiai (Xenophon Hell. 5.4.48, Polyainos 2.1.11), so it isdoubtful thatanother could have beenprovided impromptuatTanagra.



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126 CLASSICALNTIQUITY Volume 6/No. 1/April 1987than simply as / Tdvayga, or / nroLkgtWVTavayQacoLv?On the other hand, inview of the number of ways inwhich the stockade is described byXenophon(supra n.29), TOrEiXog is readily understandable as a term chosen by Xenophon for the sake of variety, to refer to the same oaxuctQoamentioned onlyshortly before, and soon to be mentioned again.

GRAOS STETHOSAs Agesilaos was making his way westward again, the Thebans (and,we

may presume, the Athenians) had come up and taken a position on the hillcalled Graos Stethos, "oldwoman's breast," where the ditch and stockade laybehind them. They did so, Xenophon says, because they considered this asuitable place to challenge Agesilaos to battle (Hell. 5.4.50). Diodoros, echoing his description of the spot on which Chabrias and the Thebans hadmadetheir stand the previous year, says that the Thebans occupied "certain other

difficult terrain" (6uaoxowiag TLva'g ecTQag) where, not daring to face the enemy on level ground, they sought to prevent the devastation of their countryside (15.34.1). Polyainos gives two accounts of this incident, the firstof which(2.1.12) seems to be a condensed version of Xenophon's account, though itdiffers in certain details.61The second (2.1.24) ismistakenly introduced as anepisode fromAgesilaos' Boiotian campaign of 394, but it clearly describes thisepisode, adding details not found in the firstversion.62Xenophon is the onlysource tomention the stockade in this context, and it does not figure in any ofthe action connected with the stand on Graos Stethos.

According to Xenophon, the Thebans considered this to be an advantageous position because "theway was rather narrow at thispoint, and the areawas difficult to pass through."63Polyainos notes that theTheban position onthe hill overlooking the road made it "difficult [for Agesilaos] to array for

61. A similar and even briefer version is given by Frontinus Strat. 1.4.3 (cf. infran.74). Themost strikingdifference between Polyainos 2.1.12 andXenophon's account is the name of the hill,which Polyainos gives as PaSg Eogs. Most editors assume that'Peas is a textual corruption ofrFa6g or Fraila, and cite Stephanos of Byzantion s.v. TdvayQa: IV &FQotav E'VLOL yovoL TOvOv Tg OrSija'Cig xao5uevov E6og (soWoefflin andMelber in the Teubner edition). This is areasonable assumption, but after this emendation of the text of Polyainos the hill is still called6bog,not o-rnOogas inXenophon, and the evidence of Stephanos confirms that 6bogis an established variant of this toponym. The conclusion to be drawn is thatPolyainos' account in 2.1.12 isderived from some source other than (or in addition to)Xenophon (Kallisthenesor Ephoros?; seeinfran.62).62. Aside from the confusion over the occasion, there is nothing contradictory between thetwo versions, and the tactical information provided in 2.1.24 is so detailed that itmust have comefrom a fairly comprehensive fourth-century history (cf. supra n.44). The presence of two versionsof this incident inPolyainos might indicate two different original sources, but the redundancy andthe blunder over the date in 2.1.24 are probably best accounted for by assuming that Polyainos

excerpted them from two different collections of stratagems.63. Hell. 5.4.50: xc i yaQ orev6v Av cTacvn sc. 66,]c:tleixsg xcai i6ofalov TOxwQCov.



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battle and impossible to proceed [without a battle]."64As in the previoussummer, when he realized the situation Agesilaos did not force the issue.Instead, Xenophon says, "having turned aside he proceeded toward the city,"thereby causing the Thebans to abandon their strong position for fear that

Agesilaos might attack Thebes. Polyainos says the same.5Agesilaos moved away from the Theban position by a routewhich couldhave taken him to Thebes. Consequently the Thebans, fearing for the city,"left the place where theywere arrayed at a run and hastened to the city by theroad to Potniai" (Hell. 5.4.51). Xenophon adds, iv yaQ aixrj a&cpaXesoxTa,which is usually translated "for thiswas the saferway." Safer inwhat sense? It

seems probable that this was the very road thatwas just described as "rathernarrow . . . and difficult to pass through [for an army inbattle formation]." Itseems, rather, that aoqpaXeoeOQcaere must mean "surer," in the sense thatthis was a better or quicker way to reach Thebes than theway Agesilaos wasattempting.Their retreat along this route, the road to Potniai, left the Thebans exposed to attack, for some of the Spartan polemarchs led theirmorai ina chargeupon the Thebans. The Thebans, however, were moving across heights, andone of the Spartan polemarchs was struckdownwhen the Thebans hurled theirspears from above. Continuing their retreat toward the city, the Thebansyielded the heights to the advancing forces of the Peloponnesians. The vanguard of the Peloponnesians, the Skiritai accompanied by some of the cavalry,themselves dealt blows from the heights on the last of the Thebans as they ranpast, toward the city. But soon the retreat ceased. Xenophon states that as theThebans neared the walls of their city they drew up their forces to face theenemy. Diodoros, in an account which is both brief and confusing, reports thatthe tide of the battle turnedwhen the Thebans were reinforced bymen fromthe city. By this point the Skiritai were themost advanced of the Peloponnesian foot, and this company was forced to withdraw before the advancingTheban force. The Thebans reoccupied the lastheight from which the Skiritaihad attacked them, and since they had forced the enemy to retreat from thatpoint, they erected a trophy.Meanwhile Agesilaos withdrew and regrouped,andmade camp, Xenophon notes, on the very spotwhere before he had seenthe enemy drawn up against him (i.e., on Graos Stethos). The next day he ledhis army onward toThespiai.66Two essential circumstances emerge from the accounts of this incident(chiefly that of Xenophon) to indicatewhere Graos Stethos and these eventsare to be located. The first is that, with armies moving at a run from GraosStethos to the vicinity of Thebes, Graos Stethos cannot have been any great

64. Polyainos 2.1.12: iv xa~i TO JtaQaTdoeO0aL 6oauXoaov xai TO nrQoxcoQev &&vaLov.65. Hell. 5.4.50-51, Polyainos 2.1.12.66. Xenophon Hell. 5.4.51-54 is the chief source of information for these events; cf. Diodoros 15.34.2, Polyainos 2.1.12, 24. The episode is discussed byAnderson (supran.5) 136-37.



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distance away from the city. The second is thatGraos Stethos layabove a roadto Potniai, probably the road along which Agesilaos was going to procedewhen he was opposed by the Thebans drawn up on Graos Stethos. The location of Potniai is known; it lay in the area of present-day Takhi, a kilometerand a half south of Thebes, or, as Pausanias (9.8.1) specifies, about ten stadesfrom the city on the road from theAsopos.67 At the time of the encounterAgesilaos was moving generally westward; Potniai still lay ahead of him, so hemust have been somewhere to the south and east of Thebes. A logicalplace tolocate this encounter would be generally east of Takhi, along the line of a roadcoming from the east leading, on the one hand, to Potniai andThebes, and, onthe other hand, towardThespiai (see Figure 3 and Plate 3).The line of the modern road from Neokhoraki to Thebes exactly meetsthese requirements. Today this road is on the main east/west route in thenorthern Parasopia, and such away must have been used in antiquity aswell.68From the open fields north of Skolos and south of Neokhoraki this road runswest-northwest through a valley which gradually grows narrower as it isenclosed by the heights of theMikri Psilorakhi on the north and the Rakhi

Ambelia-Golemi crest on the south. This is the road to Potniai, and this iswhere Graos Stethos is to be sought.Through similar reasoningBolte long ago suggested thatGraos Stethos layin this area, between Neokhoraki and Thebes.69More recently another candidate has been advanced by Roller, who has followed a different line of reasoning.Roller begins from the assumption that TOx6og of Hell. 5.4.49 is thewallof Tanagra, and on that basis he traces a rather different course forAgesilaos'march than that suggested here. Roller suggests thatAgesilaos kept thewall of

Tanagra on his left by marching counterclockwise aroundTanagra beforemoving away to the northwest along the level plain (now occupied by an air base)parallel to the line of the present-day national road. This would lead himtoward theTheban Aonian plain from the east. Roller identifiesGraos Stethoswith the most prominent hill northwest of Tanagra, Monovigla (elevation 466meters; see Figure 1) and places the Theban defensive position on its northeastern slopes.70Besides the slight likelihood that any defensive position on

Monovigla would be opportune for halting Agesilaos' advance into Thebanterritory, the improbabilityof this identificationofMonovigla asGraos Stethoscan be seen by its distance, some sixteen kilometers as the crow flies, fromThebes. It is difficult to envisage the Theban armymoving, as Xenophon

67. On Potniai see Pritchett (supra n.49) vol. 4, 94 and 102, fig. 4;Wallace (supran.23) 9394; and Symeonoglou (supran.27) 174.68. This would have been the main route between Thebes and Skolos, an important localroute and incidentally a continuation of theway fromTanagra traveledbyMardonios (Herodotos9.15.1-2).69. Bolte, "'Tcl6oSgrjosg," inRE 7, part 2 (1912) 1827-28.70. D. Roller, "The Location of Xenophon's rFQog oTrtogs,"AJA 82 (1978) 107-9.



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reports, from here at a run until itwas close to the walls of Thebes, and it isquite unbelievable thatAgesilaos would have brought his own forces back fromthe chase some sixteen kilometers to encamp them on Monovigla beforemarching westward again to Thespiai on the next day. Having assumed (as isargued above, incorrectly so) that TOTCsXogs the wall of Tanagra, Roller hasignored relevant information inmaking his identificationof Graos Stethos.Bolte suggested that Graos Stethos could be identified with Psilorakhi(elevation 406 meters) or Mikri Psilorakhi (elevation 407 meters), both ofwhich lie north of the road from Neokhoraki toward Takhi (Potniai) andThebes, and which are the most prominent heights in this vicinity, west ofSoros (elevation 547 meters; see Figure 3).71There is no reason to assume,however, thatGraos Stethos (which seems also to have been known asGraosor Graias Hedos: see n.61) was themost prominent height in the area. In fact,descriptions of the engagement here, and specificallyXenophon's reference tothe Theban stockade behind the Theban position (which Bolte did not takeinto account), suggest thatGolemi (elevation 340meters), the eminence on theopposite side of the road from the Psilorakhes, was Graos Stethos where theThebans drew up their forces.From their position on Graos Stethos, the Thebans (and theirAthenianallies) had the ditch and stockade behind them (Hell. 5.4.50). The Thebansneed not have been drawn up in the immediate proximity of the stockade. Bythis reference, Xenophon may have intended only to specify that theThebanswere making their stand inside the perimeter of the stockade (the first time inhis narrative that they are said to have done so). Similarly,Xenophon's reference to TO xTEiog on Agesilaos' left does not require us to understand thatAgesilaos was moving immediately alongside it, only thathe was stillwithin itsline. Since the stockade is not againmentioned inXenophon's account, or inany other, it evidently had no part in the action which ranged from the area ofGraos Stethos, along the road to Potniai, and from those places towardThebes. The stockade provided no protection for Thebes and its territoryfacingTanagra.72It has already been suggested that the stockade generally followed thecourse of the Asopos River to the south and southeast of Thebes (supra, p.

71. Supra n.69. Roller (supra n.70, 108) objects to Bolte's placement because "such a location could not be reached fromTanagra except by traversing the rough gorge of theAsopos, anarea which is ... virtually impassable for an army." The gorge of the river itself need not betraversed along such a route, and the countryside north of theAsopos is by no means impassablefor an army.Mardonios brought his army fromTanagra to Skolos by this route in479;Herodotos9.15.2.7

classical antiquity -'agesilaos' boiotian campaigns and the theban stockade of 378-377 b. c.' 1987

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