THE DIASPORA AS AN ECONOMIC ASSET

How China and India use their diaspora to support their

economic development

Candidate number: 72190

Word count: 9998

Submission: 1st September 2009

Dissertation submitted for the obtention of the degree

MSc China in Comparative Perspective

London School of Economics and Political Science

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Abstract

In the wake of their economic reforms, both China and India have actively engaged their

diaspora to support their economic development. This paper aims at analysing and comparing

China and India’s strategies of using their diaspora for economic purposes. At the end of the

Cultural Revolution, China has created an institutional and legal apparatus to court its citizens

overseas. However, in order to utilize more efficiently its diaspora, it has widened the scope of its

policies at the beginning of the 1990’s by including all ethnic Chinese abroad, by engaging

overseas students and by trying to directly influence overseas communities. To use its diaspora,

India has also set up dedicated institutions and created incentives for overseas Indians to invest in

India. It has moreover resorted to a rhetoric strategy to appeal to the wealthiest overseas Indians

and bind them emotionally to the motherland.

The similarities in China and India diaspora policies can be explained by the peculiar

constraints a state faces when engaging a diasporic population. As the diaspora escape the direct

control of its state of origin, it is rational for the state to pursue policies that aim at rendering the

diaspora governable mainly by producing a self-disciplined diaspora that can act in accordance

with its interests. This accounts for China and India common policies because they both aim at

creating what Gamlen (2006) has called a “transnational governmentality”: through institutions,

privileges and discursive strategies, both states are seeking to render the diasporic population

governable and favourable to their interests.

However, divergences in their efforts are also conspicuous. Whereas China’s diaspora

policies are consistent and broad, encompassing all ethnic Chinese abroad, India’s scope of

diaspora engagement is much narrower in its target and in its means. For instance, India has

constructed a diasporic population centred on wealthy post-independence migrants and has not

sought, unlike China, to directly influence Indian overseas communities

We contend that China and India respective conception of nationalism are central to shed a

light on these divergences. The Chinese ethnic nationalism is conducive to the use by China of its

diaspora because it regards the link to the homeland as depending not on territory but on common

blood. On the other hand, the traditional Nehruvian conception, by its original distrust on

capitalism and by its linking of Indianess to the Indian territory, has hampered the use of the

Indian diaspora. The rise of the Hindu Right is the opportunity to test the assertion that

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nationalism is central in explaining diaspora policies. Compared to the Nehruvian nationalism,

the Hindu ethnic conception of nationalism has been able to foster the engagement with the

Indian diaspora by first switching Indian identity from the territory to the ethnicity and secondly

by adapting its discourse to overseas Indians’ aspirations. In India, the diaspora is not only

addressed differently according to the conception of nationalism but is even turned into a field of

competition between these nationalist conceptions, thus further highlighting the relationship

between nationalism and diaspora engagement.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...........................................................................................................................................2

Introduction ....................................................................................................................................5

CHAPTER I: CHINA AND INDIA ’S STRATEGY TO ENGAGE THEIR DIASPORA ...................................7

China’s strategy to use its diaspora................................................................................................... 7

Creating an institutional apparatus targeting the diaspora................................................................. 7

Creating and extending the official diaspora .................................................................................... 8

Courting ethnic Chinese overseas to extract benefits ........................................................................ 9

Tackling the brain drain: from returning to the nation to serving the nation from abroad ................ 10

Creating the appropriate diaspora abroad ....................................................................................... 17

India’s strategy to use its diaspora.................................................................................................. 19

A new institutional and legal framework to court the diaspora ....................................................... 20

Construction of an official diaspora ............................................................................................... 20

The absence of efforts to engage overseas students and influence overseas communities................ 22

Quantitative comparison of India and China’s success in attracting diasporic financial resources ... 22

Convergences and divergences of China and India’s diaspora policies ......................................... 24

The common nature of the engagement: a trans-national governmentality...................................... 24

Variation in China and India engagement of their diaspora ............................................................ 26

CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM AS AN EXPLANATION OF CHINA AND INDIA ’S DIASPORA POLICIES 27

China: an ethnic nationalism conducive to the engagement of the diaspora ................................. 27

The importance of ethnicity ........................................................................................................... 27

A nationalism conducive to the diaspora engagement..................................................................... 28

India: different nationalisms for different diaspora engagements................................................. 30

The Nehruvian nationalist conception: a hindrance to the diaspora engagement ?........................... 30

The Hindu nationalism: an alternative nationalism committed to courting the diaspora ..................33

The diaspora as a site of competition between nationalisms ........................................................... 36

Conclusion: ...................................................................................................................................37

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................39

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Introduction

After a period of economic autarky, China and India have embraced a modernization project

that relies on economic liberalization and connection to the global economy. To support this

endeavour, both countries have sought to engage their diaspora, as it indeed constitutes an

extraordinary pool of financial and human capital. For instance, the Chinese diaspora (excluding

Taiwan) represents less than 4% of the PRC’s population but has an income of $700 billions,

which equals to two thirds of the Chinese GDP. Indian expatriates have an estimated income of

$160 billions, which is equivalent to 35% of the Indian GNP, whereas they only represent 2% of

the Indian population (Devan et Tewari 2001, 55). In Western countries, both diasporas tend to

be more educated and wealthier than average (Zhu 2006, 3). If there exists a literature dealing

separately with China and India’s strategy of using their diaspora, there is not however a

comprehensive comparison between this two cases.

This paper aims at addressing this very aspect by comparing the strategy of the Chinese and

Indian state in engaging their diaspora to support their economic development. This implies that

the analysis will be conducted from the states’ standpoint, i.e. will be mainly interested by the

official discourses and policies and not by the diaspora point of view or the non-official

initiatives. The period from the beginning of the Chinese and Indian economic reforms onwards,

i.e. respectively from 1978 and 1991, will be considered, as it is when China and India began to

resolutely court their diaspora.

China and India share similarities that render the comparison relevant: China and India have

both engaged in a vigorous strategy to utilize their diaspora. In addition, they are the two

countries with the largest diaspora, with respectively 50 and 20 millions (Devan et Tewari 2001,

55). Both diasporas can be found on the five continents. We will use the terms diaspora and

overseas Chinese/Indians in a generic manner to refer to all the individuals of Chinese and Indian

origin or descent abroad. In the case of China, the term will include Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The first chapter will compare India and China’s strategy to deal with their diaspora. After

examining their policies, we will offer a theoretical framework to this analysis to highlight their

convergence and divergence.

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The second chapter is interested in explaining the differences in China and India’s ways to

use their diaspora. We will suggest that the nature of their nationalism is central in explaining

their dissimilarities. Of course, nationalism might not be the only explanatory factors of China

and India’s diaspora policies, but we deliberately made the choice of focussing only on this

aspect, as we believe that it plays a significant role in their respective strategy. An ethnic

conception of nationalism in China has allowed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to adopt

all-inclusive and consistent policies toward overseas Chinese. On the contrary, the Nehruvian

nationalism based on the Indian territory and culture is less conducive to an engagement of the

diaspora. Such relationship between nationalism and diaspora engagement seems confirmed by

the rise in India of the Hindu Right that, relying on an ethnic nationalism, is actively involved in

courting Indians overseas.

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CHAPTER I: CHINA AND INDIA ’S STRATEGY TO ENGAGE THEIR

DIASPORA

This section aims at analysing and comparing how China and India have engaged their

diaspora since 1978 and 1991 respectively in order to support their economic development.

China’s strategy to use its diaspora

Whereas during the Cultural Revolution the overseas Chinese were depicted as “bourgeois

capitalists” (Pina-Guerassimof et Guerassimof 2007, 255) and their relatives in China persecuted

(Thunø 2001, 911), they became a central preoccupation for the PRC as it realised the diaspora’s

potential in supporting its modernization project. Therefore, China has first created an

institutional and legal apparatus to court its citizens abroad. However, in order to utilize more

efficiently its diaspora, it has widened the scope of its policies by including all ethnic Chinese

abroad, by engaging overseas students and by trying to directly influence overseas communities.

Creating an institutional apparatus targeting the diaspora

As early as 1977, the CCP organized an “all nation overseas Chinese conference” that called

for the strengthening of the links with the overseas Chinese (which officially refers only to PRC’s

citizens abroad until the 1990’s as discussed below). One year later, the Overseas Chinese Affairs

Office (OCAO), dependent of the State Council, was instituted, what demonstrates that overseas

Chinese were now a national matter (Barabantseva 2005, 9). Except Tibet, every province and

municipality has set up their own OCAO. In 1978, the All China’s Federation of Returned

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Overseas Chinese (ACFROC) was restored after its suspension during the Cultural Revolution.

Its official role is to provide a link between the mainland and the overseas Chinese, in other

words to channel financial and human capital for the sake of the PRC (ibid, 10-11). It has more

than 2,000 organs at the province, city and autonomous district level and 8,000 affiliated

organizations at the village and county level (Thunø 2001, 916).

Alongside with these organizations that directly deal with the overseas Chinese, the PRC has

equipped itself with institutions in charge of supplying expertise on the diaspora. For instance,

the Chinese People’s Congress has an Overseas Chinese Commission whose mission is to

conduct research and provide recommendations for guiding policy-making concerning overseas

Chinese. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference aims at studying and consulting

about the conception of overseas Chinese policies. Altogether, these institutions have contributed

to the issue of more than 11 000 laws and regulations concerning overseas Chinese.

(Barabantseva 2005, 11)

Creating and extending the official diaspora

The scope of the diaspora policy of the PRC has remarkably evolved since 1978 to adapt to

the necessity of its modernization project.

At the beginning of the economic reforms, the policies toward the diaspora were theoretically

directed only to the PRC’s citizens abroad. To court them, China sought to reincorporate them

into the national community.

This strategy has first been supported by a rhetoric tactic celebrating the patriotism of the

overseas Chinese and their indefectible link with the mainland. For instance, the editorial of the

People’s Daily of 4th January 1978 is emblematic when it proclaimed that Chinese citizens abroad

are “part of the Chinese people” and have to be involved in the “Four Modernizations” (Thunø

2001, 912). The rupture with the Cultural Revolution discourse that depicted them as traitors is

remarkable. Simultaneously, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engaged in a strategy of “re-

attachment with Chinese overseas by means of relatives” (ibid., 915) by courting the relatives

through political rehabilitation and endowment of special privileges. In 1982, the constitution

recognized Chinese overseas and returnees as a special group. The Protection Law of 1990

guarantees the protection of overseas Chinese’ family and economic interests and encouraged

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them to come back through granting them special legal and economic privileges (Thunø 2001,

917-20). As stated by an official of Fujian quoted by Thunø, protecting the overseas Chinese was

“a question of protecting the overseas Chinese feeling of nationality (ming’an) and the concept of

fatherland” (ibid., 917).

A major shift occurred in the 1990’s: the policies toward the diaspora have gradually

embraced not only the PRC’s citizens abroad but rather all the ethnic Chinese regardless of their

nationality (ibid., 921). The official conception of the diaspora consequently underwent a

profound change as it would from now on encompass all people of Chinese origin living abroad

regardless of their citizenship. The diaspora the government could now tap in was therefore

considerably extended. How such change can be explained?

First of all, the past reluctance of the PRC to deal with ethnic Chinese bearing a foreign

nationality stemmed from the fear of alienating their host states, especially the states in Southeast

Asia. They indeed often depicted ethnic Chinese as a fifth column of the Chinese communism.

As China was committed to anti-colonialism and championed the third-world cause, it accepted

the demands of the newly independent Southeast Asian states of forbidding dual citizenship for

the overseas Chinese (Fitzgerald 1972, 102-115). However, the rise of China, its abandonment of

Maoism and its commitment to “peaceful rise” has allowed the PRC to be more self-confident in

dealing with all ethnic Chinese abroad.

Secondly, courting ethnic Chinese became a necessity for the PRC in order to respond to the

significant Taiwanese efforts in this area (Barabantseva 2005, 25).

Finally, the support of PRC’s citizens overseas took mainly the form of remittances and

donations, which were increasingly inadequate for China’s economic development. Constructing

an official diaspora that would embrace all ethnic Chinese would allow the PRC to attract the

FDI, entrepreneurial skills and networks of the wealthy ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia and

elsewhere.

Courting ethnic Chinese overseas to extract benefits

The most conspicuous way the diaspora was induced to invest in China was first through the

creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZ). If the creation of SEZs is not strictly speaking

directed toward the overseas Chinese, the fact that they encompass many qiaoxiang (i.e. areas of

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important emigration) clearly indicates that they are a call for overseas Chinese’s financial

resources. This is confirmed by a law of 1983 that accords overseas ethnic Chinese special

privileges if they decide to invest in SEZs. (Barabantseva 2005, 12-3). More generally, the

network of agencies in charge of dealing with overseas Chinese became increasingly committed

to deal with all the ethnic Chinese abroad.

Besides these administrative initiatives, the PRC officials have engaged in a discursive

strategy to promote a strong attachment to the homeland among ethnic Chinese worldwide. The

overseas Chinese are first depicted as a full-fledged part of the Chinese family and as indefectibly

linked to the Chinese soil, regardless of their current location of residence or the date of their

emigration. Kuah notices that the term zuguo, which can be translated by ancestral land or

motherland, is regularly used by officials when talking with overseas Chinese about the PRC

(Kuah-Pierce 2006, 250-1).

To support such rhetoric, the authorities have sough to foster emotional links to the

motherland. For instance, they have instituted root-seeking programs and language summer

schools for overseas Chinese (Cheng, Kinglun et Cheng 2005, 8-9). They even do not hesitate to

allow the revival of religious practices or the rebuilding of lineage ancestral houses provided that

they strengthen links with overseas Chinese (Kuah-Pierce 2006). In addition, overseas Chinese’s

success and generosity are systematically celebrated. For instance, donors and investors are

praised through certificates, plaques or public spaces named after them. On a trip to PRC, they

will be welcomed with pomp by officials (Kuah-Pierce 2006, 250).

It thus appears that the government seeks to obligate the overseas Chinese to be involved in

the welfare of the motherland by “giving them face” and binding them emotionally to China. The

state is consequently able to extract financial resources form overseas Chinese for entrepreneurial

work or philanthropy activities. Such strategy is not new as shown by the study of Madeline Hsu

about migrant’s donation in Taishan County from 1893 to 1993 (Hsu 2000). But it is dramatically

revived in the context of opening and reforms.

Tackling the brain drain: from returning to the nation to serving the nation from abroad

Besides money, human capital is the other main resource that can be extracted from a

diaspora. To tap into such asset, China has increasingly relied on its overseas students whose

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number has dramatically increased following the opening of the PRC. They form the bulk of a

category called the new migrants (xin yimin), i.e. the people who have emigrated after 1978.

Their value for the PRC is not their wealth but rather their human capital they developed abroad.

Moreover, as they often hold a PRC passport and emigrated recently after having grown up in

China, they can be easily encouraged to support the motherland.

In the 1980’s, China’s stance toward overseas students was rather guarded, as they were

often involved in protests at home (Zweig 2006, 67). However, the continuation of the reforms

after Deng’s southern trip induced China to allow student mobility while encouraging returns.

This stance is epitomized by the “twelve-character approach” of 1993 that urges to “support

study overseas, promote return home, maintain freedom of movement” (zhichi liuxue, guli

huiguo, laiqu ziyou) (Barabantseva 2005, 16). Such strategy has been incontestably fruitful.

Zweig et al. show for instance that it has allowed China to transfer the bulk of cost of the training

of its international students and scholars on the western countries. Now, foreign organizations

mainly pay for the training of Chinese overseas students. In 2004, the Chinese government and

the danwei accounted for only 38% of the funding of overseas scholars and students whereas

foreign agencies (universities, World Bank etc.) participated to 57.8% of the funding (Zweig,

Chen et Rosen 2004, 745) Therefore, from the PRC point of view, the situation is less a brain

drain than an outsourced training.

Besides sending students training abroad, PRC’s objective was also to encourage returns to

avoid brain drain. This was translated by the slogan “improving services for returned students”.

For instance, in 1992, the Ministry of Personnel created job introduction centres and adopted

preferential policies regarding jobs and housing for returnees (Zweig 2006, 68). Today, an

important set of institutions aims at supporting overseas students and returnees:

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Source: Zweig 2006, 71

Since beginning of the 2000’s, the objective of PRC’s policy towards students has been

extended: return is always sought but China has resolved to engage the students staying abroad.

The PRC acknowledges that Chinese students or ex-students residing overseas are crucial to

transfer new technologies and skills to China. Therefore, China’s current strategy is less fighting

brain drain than encouraging emigrants to contribute to the strengthening of the homeland from

abroad. The slogan of “returning to serve the country” - hui guo fuwu – has been replaced by

“serving the country” - wei guo fuwu (Nyìri 2001, 637). As other countries facing an important

brain drain, China is thus embracing what Meyer et al. have called the “Diaspora option” (1997,

quoted in Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 2), i.e. the transformation of the loss of the brain drain into

an asset to support the development of the motherland.

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This strategy can be deemed as quite successful. Even while staying abroad, the new

migrants do participate in serving the country efficiently. First, it appears that Chinese scholars

abroad significantly support China by teaching, organising networks and joint research, as

demonstrated by Zweig, Fung and Han’s study concerning the interactions of overseas Chinese

academics in the US and Canada with China:

Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 23

And indeed, the slogan “serving the country” seems to be heard and adopted, judging by their

declared motivations for cooperating with China:

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Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 26

PRC’s government and universities are constantly supporting such exchanges by organizing

numerous cooperation programs (Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 15-6).

Secondly, students who stay overseas after their studies can engage in business with the

mainland in different manners. In working in multinational corporations, they often play the role

of mediator between the company and the Chinese market, thus inducing firms to operate in

China. For instance, about half of the managers of foreign companies in Beijing are returnees

from abroad (Nyìri 2001, 636). New migrants can also invest in China but, contrary to the

traditional migrants who invest in low-tech labour intensive industries, they are likely to set-up

high-tech industries by transferring new technologies they know from abroad. In her study of the

Chinese diaspora in the Silicon Valley, Annalee Saxenian (2002) finds that they are importantly

involved in exchanging information and technology with the Mainland:

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Source: Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 20

If we analyse the quality of the technology effectively transferred in mainland, it appears that

returnees are more likely to import more-advanced technologies in China than Chinese that did

not migrated abroad as shown by Zweig, Chen and Rosen’s study of technologies imported by

researchers in development zones:

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Source: Zweig, Chen et Rosen 2004, 751

It consequently appears that China has quite successfully managed to utilize its new

migrants. Of course, the emigration of students can be assimilated to a brain drain, since it is

often the best students who go abroad. However, although the majority of overseas students

chose to remain overseas, an increasing reverse brain drain is observable (Yang et Tan 2006, 2).

Moreover, China has fruitfully embraced the “diaspora option” by obtaining from its diaspora to

“serve the country” from abroad. It seems to be the most efficient tactic given the constraints

China is facing. As stated by an official discussing the role of overseas Chinese from Osaka that

established three manufacturing companies in Changsu City, Jiangsu province:

if we had brought these people back, it is not certain we could have used them,

because currently we cannot pay them the same salaries and benefits they get in

Japan. If we could use them [that is, pay their salaries], we still could not develop

[yang] them, because the equipment they need is too expensive for us to buy now.

But if we let them stay overseas, and invite them back to serve the country, we

can use them. This is a terrific choice and model (Chen et al. 2003, 73 in Zweig,

Fung et Han 2008, 18).

Therefore, China’s use of its overseas students can be deemed as successful since it seems

that “the economic returns of their contribution to China greatly surpasses the state’s level of

investment over the past twenty years in sending them overseas to study” (Chen and Liu 2003,

172, quoted in Zweig, Fung et Han 2008, 15).

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Creating the appropriate diaspora abroad

We have described how China has adopted policies at home in order to utilize the diaspora.

But quite remarkably, China also attempts to directly fashion abroad its diaspora to make it

sympathetic to PRC’s objectives but also capable of defending China’s interests overseas.

Such strategy relies on two pillars: influencing overseas Chinese organizations and creating a

homogeneous diasporic identity. To begin with, the PRC is now involved in the supervision of

Chinese overseas associations. Interestingly, these associations turn out to be very standardized

worldwide. Nyìri notices that their activities and discourses tend to be uniform. They are

decorated with the same banners and mementos provided by PRC’s organizations. Even if such

associations claim to be tonxianghui (native-place organizations) as the traditional overseas

organizations, their leaders are from diverse provinces (Nyìri 2001, 645). Mandarin, instead of

regional dialect, is used in these associations (ibid.), thus fostering their standardization.

As well as supervising overseas associations, the PRC uses them as a bridge to reach and use

the local overseas communities. For instance, Nyìri reports that the PRC embassy in Bucarest

was consulted by the Fujianenes tonxianghui regarding the demonstration to protest against the

bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade in 1999 (ibid.). It indeed appears that complex and

numerous links exist between China’s governmental bodies and overseas Chinese organizations:

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Source: Nyìri 2001, 647

China also aims at fostering a uniform overseas Chinese identity. As a result, it first seeks to

promote interactions between different migrants’ communities through the organization of

business fairs around the world or the pairing of different overseas associations (Biao 2003, 28).

China also creates dedicated organizations such as the China Overseas Friendship Association

whose goal is officially to “promote the unity of the sons and daughters of China and for the

unification of the motherland” (Thunø 2001, 923). Such initiatives are especially important to fill

the gap that might exist between the old overseas communities and the new migrants.

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Moreover, an important propaganda apparatus such as TV channels, websites and

newspapers are involved in influencing overseas Chinese. These media are used to create a

correct and uniform overseas identity. Their discourse is standardized worldwide: the opinions

displayed are aligned on the People’s daily, the wealth and dynamism of overseas Chinese and

their support to the motherland are acclaimed (Nyìri 2001, 640). Concerning the newspapers,

Nìyri remarks that not only the message but also the layout is the same worldwide. References to

the country where they are edited are very rare, what allows to put at a distance the host society.

Conversely, what is happening in other overseas Chinese communities is widely explored. The

media indeed “portray the experiences of Chinese in their countries of residence in a humorous

way, or report on atrocities committed against Chinese” (Nyìri 2001, 640). By doing so, they

create a dichotomy Chinese/foreigners and thus “‘re-other’ the foreign” (ibid.).

By emphasizing a common Chineseness and putting at a distance the host society, the media

consequently participate to form a homogeneous overseas Chinese identity globally that is in line

with PRC’s aspirations. To draw on Benedict Anderson work (Anderson 2006), they shape an

imagined overseas Chinese community and foster a long-distance nationalism, i.e. “a nationalism

that no longer depends as it once did on territorial location in a home country” (Anderson 2001,

42). The usefulness for PRC is obvious in the economic realm: it allows the PRC to attract

investments and to encourage the migrants to support the motherland from abroad.

India’s strategy to use its diaspora

Before the reforms in 1991, India did not seek to exploit the potential of its diaspora. The

Nehruvian autarkic model of development coupled with a focus on the nation-building of the

young Indian state diverted the attention from the diaspora (Lall 2001). However, progressively

in the 1980’s and especially after 1991, India began to engage its diaspora in order to support its

development. India’s strategy is quite similar to China’s. It has set up an institutional apparatus to

cope with overseas Indians, created incentives for them to invest and conducted a rhetoric

strategy to bind them emotionally to India.

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A new institutional and legal framework to court the diaspora

Officially, the India diaspora encompasses the NRIs and the PIOs. The NRIs, or Non

Resident Indians, are Indian citizens who are residing abroad. The PIOs or Persons of Indian

Origin, are individuals with no Indian passport but of Indian origin or descent (HLC 2001, viii).

India’s first means to engage the diaspora was to introduce legal and tax incentives to attract

NRIs’ financial resources in the wake of the economic liberalization (Lall 2001, 178-190;

Walton-Roberts 2004, 58). In 1999 a PIO’s card is created. It is a long-term visa (20 years) that

allows PIOs to have property or access to the education system in India.

The victory of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998 gave an impetus to

the diaspora policy. Besides the PIO card, the government created in 2000 a High Level

Committee (HLC) on the Indian Diaspora charged by the Ministry of External Affairs to issue a

report on the role NRIs and PIOs can play in India’s development. Its recommendations led to the

possibility of a dual-citizenship to some PIOs in 2003.

In addition to these national measures, different states in India are also committed to engage

their emigrants. For instance, the states of Punjab, Kerala and Gujarat have created numerous

institutions to deal with overseas Indians, such as an NRI professional assembly democratically

elected in Punjab, a Ministry for NRI Division in Gujarat or the Non Resident Keralites Affairs

Department in Kerala (HLC 2001, 540-4).

If such initiatives are remarkable, they are nonetheless hindered by the legacy of pre-1991

autarkic model of development (e.g. Roy et Banerjee 2007). For instance, in small and medium

enterprises (SME), FDI are limited to 24%. This is likely to discourage diasporic FDI in India as

we observe that in China, diasporic FDI are predominantly small (US$ 2-3 million) and directed

to export oriented SME (ibid. 18).

Besides these policies to court the NRIs and PIOs, India has resorted to a rhetoric tactic to

construct a diaspora committed to the development of the motherland.

Construction of an official diaspora

India has engaged in a discursive strategy to court its diaspora. As in China, this is done first

by stressing the indefectible link to the motherland. For instance, Walton-Roberts underlined that

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government and banking officials constantly “utilizes deeply cultural discourses of belonging to

wrest investment from [the] Diaspora.” (2004, 59). The overseas Indians are moreover

remembered their link to the motherland through root-seeking programs as In China. For the

youngest, the Know India Program aims, by welcoming young overseas Indian in India, “to

create awareness about the phenomenal transformation taking place in India […] and to prepare a

blueprint for creating a sustained mechanism for engaging the Diaspora youth with India”

(Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, 69).

As in the Chinese case, another tool to engage the diaspora is to celebrate its success and

contribution to India. This is translated by a membership to the state-constructed Indian diaspora

largely underpinned by professional success. “Success is equated to becoming a globally

recognisable Indian ‘hero’” (Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 765). This can be easily understood as the

wealthiest overseas Indians have the best potential to invest money and transfer skills in India. A

special day to celebrate the outstanding expatriates - the Pravasi Bharatya Divas (Overseas

Indians Day)– has been decided by the government. It has gathered eminent NRIs personality

such as the Nobel price winners Amartya Sen or V.S. Naipaul. Moreover, a special decoration,

the Pravasi Bharatya Samman Awards, has been created to distinguish the most successful

emigrants. As in China, the Indian local governments also celebrate their emigrants through

conferring them taur or izzat (honour) when they pay their native region a visit (ibid., 62).

This strategy of celebrating successful overseas Indians is supported by the legal arrangement

concerning dual citizenship. Following a recommendation the HLC report, it was decided that a

dual citizenship would be possible to some PIOs in the 2003 Dual Citizenship (Amendment) Bill.

The beneficiaries of this dual citizenship can invest in industry and agriculture, acquire property,

send their children in Indian schools and universities but they don’t have the right to vote or run

for political office. Interestingly, only PIOs from Europe, North America and Australasia could

apply for it. This means that only the wealthiest and most educated communities, part of the post-

independence migration, are concerned (Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 764). As a consequence,

phrase such as “apartheid of dollars” flourished in the media to characterize this political choice

(Leclerc 2004, 11).

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The absence of efforts to engage overseas students and influence overseas communities

If there are important convergences in the Indian and Chinese strategies to court their

diaspora, two main differences between their approaches can be identified. The first lies in the

absence of official mechanisms in India to influence the overseas communities like China does as

described by Nyìri. Similarly, whereas China has adopted specific measures concerning its new

migrants, India does not seem to engage in a precise policy targeting overseas students and recent

educated emigrants. The generic policy toward the diaspora discussed above is the only policy

framework to engage them.

Quantitative comparison of India and China’s success in attracting diasporic financial

resources

We want now to assess India performance in attracting financial resources from its diaspora

in comparison to China by relying on quantitative data. Such data cannot be taken as the definite

proof of the success of one state’s diaspora policies. Other factors such as the timing of the

reforms as well as the structure, repartition and business culture of each diaspora has to be taken

into account to properly explain these figures (Lall 2001, 199-203). This is beyond the scope of

the present paper. Nonetheless, these data are useful as states policies undoubtedly play a central

role in the attraction of diasporic resources.

FDI:

It appears that India has been less successful than China in attracting diasporic FDI. Zhu

estimates that 60-70 % of the FDI in China come from the diaspora (2006, 7), close to Roy et

Banerjee’s estimation of 50-60% (2007, 4). On the other hand, diasporic FDI in India amount for

4.18% of the total FDI between 1991 and 2003 (Roy et Banerjee 2007, 4). In a chronological

perspective, China’s success in attracting diasporic FDI compare to India is confirmed:

23

Total FDI (TOFDI) compared to overseas Chinese FDI (NRC). Source: Guha et Ray 2000, 21.

Unfortunately, no more recent data could be found.

Total FDI compare to NRIs’FDI in India. Source: (ibid., 32)

Remittances:

India is far ahead of China concerning remittances: between 1991 and 2001, China received

around $1billion annually whereas India $7.7 billion (Kapur 2004, 6). However, this is not really

24

the demonstration of India’s success in dealing with the diaspora. Indeed, remittances are less

efficient than FDI in supporting development because only a fraction of remittances is actually

invested (ibid., 10-14). Moreover, the difference between China and India in attracting

remittances can be explained by a relative substitution of remittances for FDI in the Chinese case,

as a result of different policy incentives (ibid., 6). This is confirmed by the fact that Indian

overseas financial contributions take mainly the form of remittances (Walton-Roberts 2004, 57):

source: Walton-Roberts, 2004, 57.

Convergences and divergences of China and India’s diaspora policies

The common nature of the engagement: a trans-national governmentality

As a conclusion of this first chapter, we wants to offer a theoretical framework to China and

India’s diaspora policies in order to better understand their common political choices and

highlight their differences. Drawing on Gamlen work (2006), we argue that their strategy can be

best characterized as “transnational governmentality”, i.e. a strategy “by which a [transnational]

25

population is rendered governable, through the construction, machination, and normalization of a

set of governmental apparatuses and knowledges (Foucault 1978: 102-103)” (Gamlen 2006, 5).

First of all, in accordance with Foucault’s definition of governmentality, it appears that China

and India’s governments do not aim at exerting power on emigrants as a person but on the

diaspora as a whole. The diaspora is taken as a population (in the Foucaldian sense) and

constitutes the very target of China and India’s power. We have shown that this state-constructed

diasporic population has undergone changes. In China it has been constantly extended to now

encompass all ethnic Chinese abroad. In India, this diasporic population is more restrictively

tailored as it is centred on the successful post-independence emigrants. But in any case, “the

discourse of belonging to a diaspora is crucial in attempts to produce this governable mentality,

or governmentality” (Gamlen 2006, 7-8).

Secondly, it is clear that to cope with their diasporic population, both China and India’s

strategy relies increasingly on a set of specific institutions and knowledge. We have shown that

such apparatus of institutions goes from the central government down to the local authorities in

China or in India. Institutions are not only governmental organizations but can also include

economic agencies to promote FDI or universities for instance.

Lastly, China and India’s mode of engagement of their diaspora implies a technology of the

self. Both countries, by developing a correct diasporic identity that implies a long-distance

nationalism and the support to the motherland, aims at creating self-regulated emigrants that

would act in accordance to India and China objectives by investing in the motherland for

instance. This is especially visible in China through its policy of shaping a correct Chinese

diasporic identity by influencing tongxianghui and overseas Chinese media.

Such common political initiatives between China and India can be explained by the peculiar

constraints a state faces when engaging a diasporic population. A diasporic population indeed

largely escapes the direct control of its state of origin since it lives in a foreign territory on which

its homeland does not have the monopoly of violence (Gamlen 2006, 12). Consequently,

emigrants cannot be easily reached by their state of origin and might even have developed strong

emotional ties with their host country. Moreover, engaging directly the diaspora bear the risk for

their state of origin of alienating their host country. To cope with such issues, it is rational for

states to pursue policies that aim at rendering the diaspora governable mainly by producing a self-

disciplined diaspora that can act in accordance with their interests. This accounts for China and

26

India convergence in their strategy to engage their diaspora. Celebrating emigrants, binding them

emotionally to the “homeland”, attracting their resources through special privileges and

investment friendly environments appears to be very efficient strategies to create a diaspora self-

regulated in the sense that it is spontaneously inclined to support India and China’s economic

development.

Variation in China and India engagement of their diaspora

On the other hand, we have shown that important differences exist between China and India’s

way of engaging their emigrants. It appears that China has followed a much more consistent

policies to tap into its diaspora.

First, China has extended the scope of its diaspora policies from the PRC’s citizens abroad in

the 1980’s to all ethnic Chinese today. To do so, the PRC has promoted an all-inclusive diasporic

identity to be applied to its diaspora, regardless of migrants’ wealth or date of migration. In

contrast, India has constructed a diasporic population centred on wealthy post-independence

migrants as shown by the modalities of the dual citizenship law for instance.

Secondly, China has liberalized its economy in a way that has promoted overseas Chinese

investments whereas India still have some restrictive policies, especially toward the SME, that

hamper investments.

Thirdly, China is actively committed to directly influencing overseas community abroad by

being involved into their organizations’ activities and by trying to foster a unifrom overseas

Chinese identity. In addition, it has actively embraced a policy to engage its students abroad.

Such strategies could not be identified in the Indian case.

The next chapter aims at explaining this divergence between China and India’s diaspora

policies. We argue that differences in the nature of nationalism in China and India can provide a

good explanation to this divergence.

27

CHAPTER II: NATIONALISM AS AN EXPLANATION OF CHINA AND

INDIA ’S DIASPORA POLICIES

The first chapter has analysed and compared the strategy of the Chinese and Indian states to

use their diaspora for economic purposes. If these policies are converging, important differences

exist nonetheless. We argue that the difference between China and India’s conception of

nationalism is a crucial factor to explain the variation in their diaspora policies.

China: an ethnic nationalism conducive to the engagement of the diaspora

If China has been able to engage so consistently its diaspora, it is notably because the

features of its nationalism are conducive to such approach.

The importance of ethnicity

China’s nationalism is based on ethnic grounds. Several reasons explain this nationalist

conception. First, the construction of a racial nationalism in China draws on the traditional

Confucian emphasis on lineage: it has allowed the Han to be depicted as the descendants of the

mythical Yellow Emperor (Harrison 2002, 105; Dikötter 1997, 14), i.e. as a well defined race

unified by blood. Secondly, China has embraced a racial discourse as a result of the influence of

Western social Darwinist theories at the beginning of the 20th century that is still vibrant today. It

continues to profoundly shape the Chinese identity. For instance, Dikötter underlines how these

racial conceptions are still vivid among prominent scientists, cultural circles and students (1997).

28

It consequently follows that the Chinese nationalism is underpinned by a racial conception:

the Chinese nation is the Han nation. Already, Sun Yatsen rejoiced because to him China

embodied the perfect nation as it shares the five criteria constitutive of a nation: language,

custom, livelihood, religion and race (Duara 1995, 32). More recently, to legitimize the Han-

based conception of the nation, attempts were made to trace minorities’ origin back to the Han

race. For instance, the eminent professor Zhao Tongmao underlined that

the Han are the main branch of all the different population groups in China and

that all “minority” groups ultimately belong to the ‘yellow race’: the political

boundaries of the People’s Republic of China, in other words, are claimed to be

founded on clear biological markers of genetic distance (Dikötter 1997, 30).

In this nationalist framework, the minorities are not overlooked. But they are subject to a

paternalistic supervision. For the sake of the unity of the Chinese state, their autonomy is strictly

limited to the symbolic, cultural and even commercial fields (He 2005) and the alternative

nationalism they might defend is certainly not the nationalist conception of the Chinese state.

A nationalism conducive to the diaspora engagement

It is now possible to understand some characteristics of the Chinese strategy toward its

diaspora. We argue that if the PRC’s diaspora policy is so dynamic and all-inclusive, it is notably

because the Chinese ethnic nationalism is likely to consider overseas Chinese as part of the

Chinese nation, even the most ancient or the less successful overseas communities. If every Han

is to be seen as sharing the same blood and ancestors, then, from the state point of view, overseas

Chinese are still linked to the Chinese nation whatever their geographical or even emotional

distance to China are.

It could be argued that such argument is flawed since China has demonstrated hostility

toward its diaspora during the Cultural Revolution for instance. However, this stance is the

exception and not the rule. The continuous engagement of the Chinese overseas from the end of

the 19th century onwards rather tends to support a relationship between the Chinese conception of

nationalism and diaspora engagement. At the very beginning of the 20th century, the Qing

Dynasty was already committed to engage overseas Chinese for supporting China modernization

(Wang 2000, 65-8). This was much more striking under the Kuomintang: for instance the

29

government created an Overseas Chinese Affairs Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The nationalists even sent teachers abroad to teach the Chinese culture and language to overseas

communities (Wang 2000, 70-1). The relationship between the Chinese nationalism and diaspora

engagement of the late Qing dynasty and of the nationalist government is definitely proved by the

Nationality Law of 1929 that endorses the principle of jus sanguinis from the law of 1909. This

law is even still in operation in Taiwan (Fitzgerald 1972, 7). Except during the Cultural

Revolution, the CCP has also constantly engaged the overseas Chinese even if its policies were

constrained by the desire to accommodate the Southeast Asian states that saw the overseas

Chinese as a fifth column (Fitzgerald 1972). It consequently appears that from the end of the 19th

century onwards, China has been willing to link the overseas Chinese to the motherland despite a

few exceptions.

Bearing in mind the Chinese ethnic conception of nationalism, it is now possible to better

appreciate China’s diaspora policies since 1978. First we understand why China has quickly

extended the scope of its diaspora policies from the PRC citizens to all ethnic Chinese living

broad regardless of migrants’ wealth or date of migration. It could be objected that business

success is important in the PRC’s diaspora discourse and thus would exclude the less successful

overseas Chinese. However, this discourse it is not as central as it is in India for instance. All the

overseas Chinese communities, including the poorest, received the attention of the PRC, even if

they are for instance in Peru, Ecuador or Chile (Cheng, Kinglun et Cheng 2005, 10).

Secondly, the nature of the Chinese nationalism helps us to understand the centrality of the

discourse on common roots and values in PRC strategy to engage its diaspora. It sheds a light on

the confidence with which China is influencing overseas communities and fostering a

homogeneous diasporic identity as described by Pàl Nyìri. Race is used to speak to the overseas

communities, as exemplified by the slogan of an overseas Chinese magazine in Budapest:

“Saluting the Descendants of the Dragon, saluting the Chinese race” (Nyìri 2001, 641). In

addition, the fact that to engage the diaspora China has not

officially produced discourse of ‘Fujianeseness’ or ‘Cantoneseness’ of the kind

that has traditionally been produced among overseas Chinese, especially in South-

East Asia (Nyìri 2001, 16)

30

proves the importance of the PRC’s conception of nationalism in underpinning its diaspora

policies. If the attachment to one’s native place is often recalled to engage migrants, nevertheless,

“provincial identities are derived from a single national discourse” (ibid., 16).

In a word, the racial nationalism in China casts a light on the consistence and the all-inclusive

character of the Chinese diaspora policies. We even could imagine that such relationship between

nationalism and diaspora is not meant to be one-way as Franck Dikötter observes that

the desire to consolidate and expand a biologised notion of Chinese identity in

mainland China and elsewhere may further be reinforced by the resurgence of

overseas networks (Dikötter 1997, 32).

India: different nationalisms for different diaspora engagements

As in China, the features of nationalism in India can explain India’s strategy to engage its

diaspora. India official nationalist discourse is not as definite as in China. In fact two main

nationalisms are competing in today’s India as explained by Meghnad Desai (2000). The

nationalism promoted by Nehru still constitutes the core of Indian official nationalism but the

Hindu right nationalism is increasingly challenging it. And both produce different ways of coping

with the Indian diaspora.

The Nehruvian nationalist conception: a hindrance to the diaspora engagement ?

According to the Nehruvian vision, India is a secular nation that treats its citizen regardless

of their language, religion, and custom. Notably, minorities’ rights are protected by a state that

has no official religion and might even grant minorities special rights. If the Nehruvian

nationalism is not religious or ethnic, it is on the other hand cultural and geographic (Adeney et

Lall 2005, 263). For Nehru, India’s identity is the result of numerous historical contributions such

as Buddhist, Hindu or Muslim influences (Duara 1995, 77). As written by Nehru, “[t]hose who

professed a religion of non-Indian origin or, coming to India, settled down there, became

31

distinctively Indian in the course of a few generations.” (Nehru, 1946, 41, in Adeney et Lall

2005, 263). For this reason Nehru considered that

the high points of Indian history were the reigns of Asoka, the Guptas, Akbar, and

the great Mughals, all of whom attempted to develop a political framework to

unite the cultural diversity of the subcontinent (Duara 1995, 77).

Therefore, India’s identity is “unity among diversity” (ibid.). Rather than the blood, it is the

allegiance to a secular nation and to the post-colonial nation-building project that is constitutive

of the Nehruvian nationalism. The fact that a person not of Indian origin can obtain the India

citizenship, such as the current Chairperson of the Congress Sonia Gandhi, confirms the

territorial and non-ethnic dimension of the Nehruvian nationalism. This is a strong contrast with

the Chinese conception whereby “one does not become Chinese like one becomes Swiss or

Dutch” (Dikötter 1997, 32), or Indian could we add.

This conception allows us to appreciate some features of India’s strategy to engage its

diaspora. First of all, we can understand the relative failure of India to attract diasporic FDI

compare to China. Historically, because of the territorial character of Nehruvian nationalism and

its focus on state building, India has largely overlooked its diaspora until the end of the 1980’s.

M. C. Lall indeed argues that India regarded its emigrants as people that had abandoned India for

selfish reasons, notably for economic gain. “By abandoning their mother country they have in

fact lost their Indianess.” (Lall 2001, 207). Consequently, Nehru’s policies spurred them to

integrate in their host country society. The difference is obvious with China were the ethnic

nationalism has allowed the engagement of the Diaspora from the end of the 19th century

onwards.

The situation has undoubtedly changed today as India is resolutely embracing economic

liberalism, but some obstacles to the engagement of overseas Indians still exist because of the

effects of the Nehruvian nationalism. For instance, M. Walton-Roberts underlines that, at the

popular level, NRI are not always celebrated today and have been called Non Reliable Indians

(2004, 60).

In addition, the Nehruvian legacy participates to explain the extraordinary low Indian

diasporic investments, especially compared to China. The traditional Nehruvian reluctance

toward FDI has induced an economic environment that is not conducive to diasporic FDI. The

importance of bureaucracy and the lack of economic liberalization are regularly highlighted as a

32

reason for the weak NRI investments (e.g. Roy et Banerjee 2007). Besides the quantitative

difference, this might also explain the qualitative difference between China and India diaspora’s

financial contribution. The less investment friendly environment in India might be a reason why

overseas Indians’ contributions are made predominantly through remittances and not through FDI

like in China, as shown above.

Secondly, the Nehruvian focus on territory and state building as constitutive of Indianess can

elucidate why India, unlike China, has not engaged in a strategy to directly influence the Indian

overseas communities. In the Chinese case, the emphasis on a common blood, the efforts to

create a long-distance nationalism and the attempts to put at a distance the host society are central

to China’s strategy to gain influence over overseas communities. All these three means are not

available to an Indian state committed to a Nehruvian nationalism that historically hold Indianess

as territorially based and encouraged the assimilation of overseas Indian in their host society.

Thirdly, the Nehruvian nationalism sheds a light on why the state-constructed diaspora

mainly focus on recent emigrants who settled in western countries, as shown by the scope of the

dual-citizenship law. This cannot be explained only by the importance of their wealth. For

instance, though wealthy and numerous the Indians from South Africa are excluded of the dual-

citizenship law of 2003. This is better elucidated by the fact that the officially constructed

diaspora is determined not only by its Indian origins but also by a strong cultural dimension, in

accordance with the Nehruvian conception of nationalism. For instance, the HLC report defined

the diaspora as “Indians who migrated to different parts of the world and have generally

maintained their Indian identity” (HLC 2001, viii, our emphasis). Therefore, the PIOs of South

Africa are excluded from the dual-nationality law because, as stated in the HLC Report, “a

century and a half of existence in an alien land, and four or five generations of acculturation in a

white dominant society has diluted their Indianness” (HLC 2001, 84 in Dickinson et Bailey 2007,

767).

The Nehruvian vision of nationalism is thus central to understand the lesser consistency of

Indian diaspora policies compared to China. Naturally, the Nehruvian nationalism is not an

inescapable framework, especially as India is increasingly committed to liberalism and that the

Hindu nationalism is developing. However, its effects are relevant to understand the India’s

strategy to engage the diaspora.

33

The Hindu nationalism: an alternative nationalism committed to courting the diaspora

If we assume that nationalism is an important factor in explaining China and India strategy to

engage their diaspora, a change in their nationalist conception should consequently alter these

strategies. The rise of Hindu nationalism in India offers an occasion to test such assertion.

Seeking to challenge the Nehruvian conception of the Indian nation, the Hindu nationalism

has developed quickly since the 1980’s, leading to the victory of the BJP in 1998. According to

this view, the Indian nation is based on the Hindu religion. Hindus are a nation, a civilisation but

also a race since they are the common descendants of the ancient Vedic fathers (Bhatt et Mukta

2000, 413-4). In this conception of the nation, minorities have to show deference to the Hindu

majority (ibid, 418). It thus appears that whereas Nehruvian nationalism is territorial and cultural,

Hindu nationalism recognizes the ethnicity as a central criterion of nationality. The Hindu

nationalism is thus a more conducive ideology to engage the diaspora as it has the merit, compare

to the Nehruvian conception, to detach Indianess from the Indian territory. And indeed, although

the Hindu nationalism claims to resist globalization and westernization as they are a threat to

“Hindutva” (Hinduness), it is in fact using the globalization to pursue its goals (van der Veer

2004, 9). For instance the VHP (or World Council of Hindus, i.e. the umbrella structure of the

Hindu Right organizations abroad) is “a movement that is very active globally and one of the

prime agents of the globalization of Hinduism” (ibid.). Indeed, one of the VHP’s goals is

officially to reach all the Hindus in the world. (van der Veer 1994, 130).

As a consequence, we observe that the rise of the Hindu Right has meant a further

engagement of the Indian diaspora. The BJP has long presented itself as the champion of the

NRIs and PIOs’ causes. It is therefore not surprising that the major progress of India in engaging

with its diaspora happened under the rule of the BJP from 1999 to 2004 and not under the

Congress Party. It is the BJP that first proposed a PIOs card that would grant PIOs numerous

benefits. It is under the BJP rule that the Indian Government commanded the HLC report,

appointed a NRI ambassador in Washington and introduced the Overseas Indian Day. The

highlight is the adoption of the 2003 Dual Nationality Law that is a clear rupture with the

Nehruvian nationalism. Naturally, such measures were interpreted as a gift to the NRIs for their

generous support to the BJP (Leclerc 2004, 2).

34

The commitment of the BJP to court the diaspora thus supports the hypothesis that

nationalism is an important explanatory factor of the diaspora engagement strategies: a change in

the ruling party’s nationalist conception has lead to changes in the diaspora policies.

Apart from the policy-making area, the Hindu Right’s conception of nationalism has allowed

it to engage the diaspora in the area of religion, education or philanthropy to attract financial

resources and promote its ideas. As such, these efforts are not part of the Indian state policies and

thus seem to go beyond our topic. However, Hindu Right’s engagement of the diaspora is worth

analysing because it illustrates the link that exists between nationalism and diaspora engagement.

Moreover, this Hindu nationalist conception cannot be ignored in India, as it is the main

nationalist discourse along with the Nehruvian nationalism and might even become dominant.

In its effort to use the diaspora, the Hindu Right puts forward it nationalist conception first to

promote a uniform diasporic identity among overseas Hindus. To do so, it employs a strategy that

echoes the Chinese case: it fosters an all-inclusive Hindu identity and uses an important network

of institutions to extract some benefits from the Hindu diaspora.

The force of the Hindu Right to use the diaspora has been its capacity to propose an inclusive

conception of its nationalism that fits well the overseas Hindus’ expectations. First, it presents

Hinduism not only as a religion but also as a culture and a spiritual philosophy to respond to

migrants’ apprehension to loose their identity. Hinduism becomes sanitized and all-inclusive,

overlooking the divisive matters such as the castes issues for instance. Mathew and Prashad

(2000) have shown how the Hindu Right in the US advocates this kind of Hinduism as a response

to the anxiety of the Hindus of loosing their identity because of the American way of life.

Moreover, this strategy is efficient as religion is the best way to assert one’s identity in a

multicultural society like the US:

Given this space [provided to religion in the US], the leaders of the Indian-

American community, many of whom are technical-professionals with no training

in theology, make the passage to the religious as the necessary cultural content of

Indian-American life, as opposed to ‘American’ life. With the growth of the

Hindu Right in India during the 1980s, many Indian Americans opportunistically

made alliances with that nationalist project and detached themselves from the

Nehruvian nationalism of the Congress (ibid., 524).

35

In addition, Hindu nationalism is tailored to fit the NRIs’ wealthy and modern life. It is

compatible with capitalism and business success. Chris Fuller and John Harris (2005) have

shown how a Hindu gurus have adopted a religious monist discourse to address to the trans-

national Indian businessmen. Two successful businessmen declare that they find the guru’s

teaching appealing as they find it “scientific” (ibid., 220). In the kind of Hinduism promoted,

business success is freed of guilt and even legitimate. It is even the sign that Hinduism is

compatible with modernity, or better, is the way to modernity (ibid., 221).

These kinds of discourses are complemented by the support of the Hindu Right to economic

liberalization. It has made Hindu nationalism appealing to the wealthy NRIs. Meanwhile, it

induces them to abandon the Nehruvian ideals as

many of the technical-professional migrants blamed the soft socialism of the

Congress for India’s problems and urged the new Brahmins of Indian politics to

galvanize the population towards a ‘Hindu free market’ (Pandya 1998). The

business-friendly project of Hindutva drew the support of many of the merchants

and technical-professional migrants who found this added incentive to their

‘cultural’ connections to the Hindu project (Mathew et Prashad 2000, 224).

To promote this conception of nationalism and extract benefits from the diaspora, the Hindu

Right can in addition rely on an important apparatus to reach the overseas Hindu communities.

For instance, the VHP has branches in all the major countries hosting an overseas Hindu

community (Mukta 2000, 444). Its primary objective is “ to forge a sense of Hinduness world-

wide” (ibid., 446). To reach this goal, the VHP is using varied means such as the vernacular press

(ibid., 447) student organizations on campus, internet (Mathew et Prashad 2000, 526), and

organizes summer camp for the youngest (ibid., 521). The pervasiveness of the Hindu Right in

the Hindu overseas communities must not be underestimated. For instance, in the UK, the vast

majority of Hindu organizations have identified themselves with the VHP and the few who did

not have not however publicly opposed the VHP political agenda (Bhatt 2000, 560).

To what extent is the Hindu Right successful overseas? At the ideology level, we have shown

the Hindu Right’s ideology is quite popular thanks to a discourse that fits overseas Hindus needs.

At the financial level, it is difficult to answer precisely as no comprehensive statistics exist on the

funds raised by Hindu Right organizations. But, as philanthropic organizations are predominantly

organized along religious membership (at least in the US) (Sidel 2004, 224) and that the Hindu

36

Right organizations are likely to constitute the bulk of the Hindu religious organizations, we can

assume that Hindu Right organizations channel a lot of money. Such reasoning could be made for

the Sikh or Muslim overseas organizations as well.

The diaspora as a site of competition between nationalisms

If nationalism impacts on diaspora engagement, diaspora engagement is also a tool in the

competition of nationalisms in India. The construction and engagement by the Hindu Right with

the Indian diaspora must be understood as a part of its broader political agenda to impose its

conception of nationalism.

Engaging the diaspora is first a way for the Hindu right to attract financial support. Certainly,

a large part of overseas Indian contributions is devoted to poverty relief, education or

infrastructure investments. But they are also used to support the Hindutva movement in India. For

instance, the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992 was the occasion of campaigns against

the financing of extremist Hindu movements, including diaspora donations (Leclerc 2004, 12).

Mathew and Prashad assert that a large proportion of the money given to charities by the Hindu

community in the US is in fact used by Hindu Right organizations without the knowledge of the

donors (2000, 520).

In addition, the diaspora is a fertile ground to disseminate the Hindu nationalism and fight the

Nehruvian conception of the Indian nation. In the US, the VHP resorts to an impressive apparatus

that allows it to spread and defend the correct Hindu identity: it encompasses media such as the

newspaper Hinduism Today, religious organizations like the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh that

aims at monitoring religious activities and organizing events, or the American Hindu Anti-

Defamation Coalition to fight any prejudicial discourses against Hindu (Mathew et Prashad 2000,

527). This is not unique to the US: for instance the Hindu Right apparatus is equally imposing in

the UK (see Bhatt et Mukta 2000) where it has been quite successful. For instance, the VHP

sends delegates to the local organization that supervises religious education in state school. It has

even published the book Explaining Hindu Dharma: A Guide for Teachers in 1996 (ibid., 444).

Finally, the Hindu Rights is of course committed to be involved to the official initiative to

engaging the diaspora. E. Leclerc reports that the RSS (the main Hindu Right mobilization

organization) is probably infiltrating the Overseas Indian Day manifestations (2004, 12).

37

Conclusion

It appears that both China and India have actively engaged their diaspora to support their

economic development. We have shown that in many ways, they have used quite similar

strategies to create what Gamlen (2006) has called a “transnational governmentality”. By binding

the migrants emotionally to the homeland, granting them privileges and making them the target

of a dedicated apparatus of institutions, China and India are seeking to render this transnational

population governable and favourable to their interests. However, divergences in their efforts are

also conspicuous. Whereas China’s diaspora policies are consistent and broad, India’s scope of

diaspora engagement is much narrower in its target and in its means. We contend that their

conceptions of nationalism are central to shed a light on these divergences. The ethnicity-based

Chinese nationalism is conducive to the use by China of its diaspora because it regards the link to

the homeland as depending not on territory but on common blood. On the other hand, the

traditional Nehruvian conception, by its original distrust on capitalism and its linking of Indianess

to the Indian territory, has hampered the use of the Indian diaspora. The rising Hindu ethnic

conception of nationalism has been able to foster the engagement with the Indian diaspora by first

switching Indian identity from the territory to ethnicity and secondly by adapting its discourse to

overseas Indians’ aspirations. As these two nationalism are in competition in India, we have

showed that the diaspora is not only addressed differently by them but is even turned into a field

of battle between them, thus further highlighting the relationship between nationalism and

diaspora engagement.

Ultimately, we believe that this comparative analysis is not only relevant to the Chinese and

Indian case but offers a much more universal insight in the relationship between the state and

globalization. It indeed challenges the common acceptation that globalization undermines the

state power and agency. The analysis of China and India’s use of their diaspora to support their

economic development exemplifies how states, even the less wealthy, can utilize globalization

and especially migrations to strengthen themselves (Shain 1995 quoted in Nyìri 2001, 648).

States have not to be necessarily viewed as passive when confronted to increasing flows of

people but also as able to make use of these flows to reassert their power. Of course, such logic

38

can also work against or rework the states’ discourse. In this respect, the undermining of the

Nehruvian nationalism by the Hindu Right’s engagement with the Indian diaspora is a good

example. But the existence of concepts once bounded to the territory such as citizenship (Beck

2000, 23 quoted in Dickinson et Bailey 2007, 759) or nationalism (Anderson 2001, 42) that can

now be detached from the territory to become “distance nationalism” (ibid.), dual citizenship or

even of “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999) allows the state to reassert itself as an inescapable

framework. Similarly we believe that the Chinese and Indian case also demonstrate that

nationalism is not meant to be a relic of the golden age of the Westphalian sovereignty but is

rather a central variable in the states’ way to tackle globalization. Ultimately, the comparison of

China and India have illustrated that nationalism may influence greatly the state response to

globalization and, in the meantime, be influenced by it.

39

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