chapter ill south africa and its neighbouring...
TRANSCRIPT
CHAPTER Ill . -
SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND AFRICAN UNION
L
CHAPTER III
SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES AND AFRICAN UNION
3.1. South Africa's Foreign Policy towards Neighbouring Countries
Foreign policy of South Africa towards neighbouring countries in the post
apartheid period is an important transformation in South Africa's foreign policy.1
Since the end of apartheid, the South African foreign policy has focused·onitsAfrican
partners particularly in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and
the African Union (AU). South Africa has played a key role as a mediator in African
conflicts over the last decade, such as in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
the Comoros, and Zimbabwe. The present chapter examines South Africa's political
relations in Africa, South Africa's economic expansion into Africci, assessment of··~·
South Africa's role in Africa, South Africa's dominant position in Southern African
region, role and position of South Africa in the African Union (AU), the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEP AD) and the Southern African.
Development Community (SADC).
South Africa's political and economic relations with the rest of the Africa grew
dramatically in the first ten years of democracy. The underlying principle in South
Africa's Africa policy is that South Africa cannot develop while the rest of the
continent remains poor.Z Pretoria has been strongly engaged in conflict resolutions. ·
South Africa's activities in promoting NEPAD abroad have reinforced perceptions of
the country is the face of NEP AD, a perception with which South Africa is not always
comfortable. The South Africa's foreign policy has been engaged with various issues
of economic and trade with other African countries. The country's trade surplus with
1 South Africa is a country located at the southern tip of Africa, to the north lie Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe; to the east are Mozambique and Swaziland; while Lesotho is an independent country wholly surrounded by South African territory. 2 Nandile Ngubentombi, "An Overview of Bilateral and Regional Relations", in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994 - 2004, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2004), p. 202.
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Africa illustrates further the concerns about overwhelming economic dominance, an
element of which the government is actually aware.
3.1.1. South Africa's Political Relations in Africa
From the outset of democratic working South Africa was very clear about its
role on the continent. It would be one borne out of building and consolidating
partnership, stitching together alliances with African states, rejecting the go - it -
alone posture of the apartheid government and instead emphasising multiculturalism. 3
As early as the 1990s, the African National Congress (ANC) stated that Africa
represented an important sphere of strategic relationships that needed to be gently
established and maintained with a degree of sensitivity. This was reflected in ANC's
policy documents which spoke of the faith of the democratic South Africa being
inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of the continent. The ANC
believed that foreign policy should reflect the interest of the continent of Africa and
that if we do not devote our energies to this continent, we too could fall victim to the
forces that have brought ruin to its various parts.4
Part of this thinking was guided by apartheid South Africa's incursions into the
continent, specially the front line states, but also the ANC's need to stay loyal to those
African leaders who supported it during liberation struggle. Thus, Mbeki highlighted
that as the ANC approached the eve of 1994 democratic elections it argued that Should
it win the right to govern South Africa, an ANC ruled South Africa would be full
member of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and SADC - participating in
building and peace keeping missions in Africa and other initiatives such as efforts at
stimulating the continent's economic revival. 5
In essence democratic South Africa's relationship with Africa became defined.
by Africa's underdevelopment and the continent's impending economic regeneration,
3 Sanusha Naidu, "South Africa and Africa: Mix Messages" in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos (eds.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994- 2004, (Johannesburg: SAIIA, 2004), p. 207.
4 African National Congress, Foreign Policy in a New Democratic South Africa: A Discussion Paper, (Johannesburg, ANC Department of Internal Affairs, 1993). 5 Makao, F.K, "Making Sense of South Africa's Africa Policy and the South Africa Leadership Thesis", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 23, 1.( Pretoria, University of Pretoria, 2001), p 44.
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which Pretoria explicitly locateP within what it saw as its multilateral role in global
institutions. As Landsberg notes, South Africa has positioned itself as a key player in
resolving issues of interest to the global South. 6
At another level, the unique nature of South Africa's transition has also
become another cornerstone of its relationship with the continent. It would seemed
that while the rhetoric of the relationship thus appeared to be a bit problematic, South
Africa's democratic transition has in some ways, atleast under the Mandela
presidency, canonised the promotion of human rights and democracy in its diplomatic
relations. This idea of resolving conflicts and averting war through the theory of
democratic peace became inextricably tied to the perceived notion by South Africa's
ruling elites that the idea of promoting peace and negotiations through the
dispensation of a liberal democratic tradition could stabilise confliCt ridden societies
like Angola, the DRC, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Sudan.
In reality, the inclinations incurred the displeasure of the Africa leaders who
accused Pretoria of pursuing a western project and in fact, ofbeing little more than the
west lackey on the southern tip of Africa. 7 The impact of the latter has been the
emergence of the alliances and pacts, especially in the southern Africa in order to
isolate South Africa politically and to have a prevailing counter balance to South
Africa's perceived strength.
On the other hand, South Africa's human rights <md democracy trajectory has
not always been a winning formula amongst the international community and the
mainstream media and commentators. The difficulties have been to maintain a posture
between the moral high ground and the difficulty in distancing itself from
undemocratic regimes and those leaders considered to be grossed human rights
violators, specially those who stood by the ANC during its time in liberation
movement. This position of striking a balance between being a sovereign state and
6 Chris Landsberg, Hegemon or Pivot: debating South Africa's Role in Africa, Debate hosted by the Centre for Policy Studies, (August 2003).
7 Chris Landsberg, "Promoting Democracy: The Mandela- Mbeki Doctrine", Journal of Democracy, 11, 13, (2000), p. 107.
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reconciling its own commitment to democratic principles and norms has become a
sore point in South Africa's Africa policy.
Pretoria has rejected any hegemonic ambitions and has pushed on with its
sense of multiculturalism in its deliberations with the continent. This can be found in
more than 40 missions that South Africa has opened in Africa since 1994 as well as
the critical, if not integral, part played in the construction of NEP AD and in the
reconstruction ofthe OAU into AU.8 Some analysts see this process as reintegrating
Africa into the global economy but also redirecting the relationship with the west.
Others see this as South Africa's contribution in reforming the agenda of developed
world to include more discussions on Africa's priorities.9 South Africa has been at the
centre of some intense criticism especially concerning what analysts and African
leaders see as South Africa's promotion of the west's agenda on the continent. These
critiques argue that South Africa is not reshaping the west's attitude to Africa or for
that matter prioritising Africa's needs in these negotiations. It would seem that while
South African political relations with Africa appear to be caught between a rock and a
hard place, its economic relations with the continent looks more concretised.
3.1.2. South Africa's Economic Expansion into Africa
South Africa's gross domestic product (GDP) of US $ 239 billion is 40 times
larger than the average Sub- Saharan Economy. It represents 25 percent of the total
African economy and constitutes one third of the economy of Sub- Saharan Africa and
almost two thirds· of the GDP of Southern African Development Community
(SADC).10
Since returning to the international arena, South Africa has enjoyed a high
profile on the world stage. It has assumed a number of international leadership roles in
Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), the Commonwealth and Organisation of the
8 In some ways NEPAD has sought to reengineer Africa's relationship with its development partners by assuming responsibility and taking ownership for its development trajectory. 9 Naidu, n.3, p. 210. 10 Neuma Grobbelaar, "South African Corporate Engagement with Africa: Experiences, Lessons and Policy Recommendations" in Grobbelaar, N and Besada, H (eds), Unlocking Africa's Potential, the Role of Corporate South Africa in Strenthening Africa's Private Sector, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2008), p. 13.
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African Unity (OAU), forged deep and meaningful ties with many countries on both
diplomatic and economic fronts. Africa in particular has been an important focus of
interest, as South Africa has worked to cultivate and consolidate partnerships on the
continent. This was intended to distance the new government's actions from the past
behaviour of the apartheid states and to express solidarity with, gratitude to, those
African leaders who had been sympathetic to South Africa's liberation struggle. 11
Perhaps the most dramatic illustration of South Africa's metamorphosis from being a
pariah to a continental powerhouse is the mushrooming of South African parastatal
andcorporate presence in Africa.
Whereas in only fifteen years ago the country's economic influence was
limited to the South African Customs Union States and Zimbabwe, South African
corporates now run the national rail road in Cameroon, managed power plans in Mali
and Zambia, dominate the huge telecommunication market in Nigeria, Uganda and
Swaziland and hold a majority share in Ghana's mining house, Ashanti goldfields.
This list details only a selection of larger venture in what has sometimes been referred
to in the popular media as South Africanisation of the African economy.
Two factors have been responsible for South Africa's penetration of the
African market place. One was South Africa's political transition to democracy and its
related return to international respectability. The second, which occurred at the same
time, was the end of the cold war and the concomitant dismantling of the state dir~cted
commandist economic model, which was succeeded by the neo-liberal alternative. The
world had become disillusioned with Africa and donors were not longer interested.
The continents share of FDI flows shrank, while the prospect of rehabilitating its
depleted infrastructure and selling of its meagre state owned assets dwindled. At the
same time Eastern Europe became the preferred destination for major European and
other investors.
In this context, South African capital was well placed to take advantage of the
market opportunities opening up in Africa. Having been frozen out of the global
economy for the better part of the 1980s as a result of the sanctions, South African
11 Naidu, n.3, p. 211.
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corporates had a surplus of capital to invest to Africa's disintegrating transport,
tourism and other infrastructures, or state owned assets . •
3.1.3. Economic and Trade Strategies of South African Companies in Southern Africa
The successful economic and trade strategies of South African companies in
achieving their interests in Southern Africa are the socio-historical product of its
intermediate position in a hierarchy of economic, political, financial, technological,
trade and military international power relations. These extend from the USA at the
centre . of capitalism to the. African. continent and its Southern African region at the
periphery of capitalism. South Africa's position in a hierarchy of international power
relations does not give its national capital accumulation and relative international
strength sufficient relative autonomy from the national capital accumulation and
international strength of developed countries. However, its position in a hierarchy of
Southern African regional and African continental power relations gives its capital
accumulation, relative international strength and considerable regional and continental
strength enormous advantages and privileges in its Africa economic and trade relations
with the rest of Southern Africa and Africa.
The economic and trade strategies of South African companies in Southern
Africa are primarily determined by two interlinked national and international
dynamics. 12 The first is the dependent nature of its national capital accumulation and
its relative international strength. The second is the balance of social forces nationally,
regionally, continentally and internationally.13 For a concrete understanding of the
national and international dynamics characterising economic and trade strategies of
South African companies, we should take into account the following factors. Firstly,
the structural interlocking network of strategic socio-political and economic interests,
interlinkages and ties that countries of developed countries developed and maintain
with So?th Africa. Secondly, the reality that the national economy of South· Africa is
12 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, "South Africa- Southern Africa Relations in the Post- Apartheid Era", Nordic Journal of African Studies, 14 (2), (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Afiica, 2005), p. 236. 13 Its dependent capital accumulation process, relative international strength and considerable regional and continental strength are interlinked with the issue of the balance of social forces nationally, regionally, continentally and internationally.
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dominated by finance capital of developed countries and the reality that the
relationship between the state and capital, because of the past tense of its history of
settler colonialism, is characterised by conflicts and tensions some of which are racial
and racist. 14
Thirdly, the reality that Southern Africa is relatively more developed and
integrated into international capitalism and developed countries than all other sub
Saharan African regions and the reality that South Africa is dominant in this process.
The strength and weakness of the economic and trade strategies of South African
companies in Southern Africa and beyond should be viewed in the context of South
African socio-political and economic development, international capitalist
development, inter-imperialist and capitalist rivalries, African regional powers and
regional powers of other developed countries. 15 The success of economic and trade
strategies of South African companies in Southern Africa is, among others, the
product of South Africa's intermediate position within the international division of
labour.16
South Africa serves as the source of raw materials, the market for
manufactured products, the outlet for export of capital and the reserve for cheap labour
for the developed countries. The other Southern African countries serve as sources of
raw materials, markets for manufactured products, outlets for export of capital and
. reserves for cheap labour for South Africa.
South Africa's position within the international division of labour is
characterised by the fact that it exports raw materials and semi-manufactured products
14 Makgetlaneng, n.l2, p. 236. 15 This global context is the arena of internationalisation of competition which involves not only forms of capitalist integration and patterns of co-operation but also competition among capitalists nationally, regionally, continentally and internationally, supported by their national state. 16 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, "Key Issues in the South African Economic Transformation Process", Politeia, 19(1), (2001).
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and it imports manufactured products, which are essential for the operation of its
economy.17
The economic and trade strategies of South African companies are determined,
to a greater extent, by its assessment of relative power between itself and other
Southern African countries within the context of power relations regionally,
continentally and internationally. Relative power is the issue, which should be viewed
and understood in terms of South African socio-political, economic and trade interests
and its view of those of other African countries. It should be viewed and understood
also in terms of the level of the socio ... political; economic; human resources
development, financial, trade, technological and military capabilities, resources of
South Africa in relation to the level of capabilities and resources of other Southern
African countries and their strategic importance to South Africa. 18
There is unevenness in the level of the socio-political, economtc, human
resources development, financial, trade, technological and military development
between South Africa and other Southern African countries. This helps to explain the
form and content of economic and trade relations between South Africa and other
Southern African countries which are in favour of South Africa. Despite the fact that
the size of the markets of other Southern African countries is limited, these countries
. are of strategic importance to South African companies. South African companies
have· a comparative advantage over the companies of developed countries and other
developing countries in their economic and trade activities in Southern African
countries in terms of proximity to the national markets of these African countries. The
fact that the distance to the markets of other African countries is shorter and that
transportation costs are generally lower means a greater cost advantage to the South
African companies.
Another issue is the fact that South African products are tailored to African
socio-economic conditions. These factors are some of the various crucial weapons
17 Unlike other African countries, South Afiica occupies intermediate position within the international division of labour. While South Africa has not been successful in its struggle to become a significant exporter of manufactured products in the multilateral international markets, other African countries constitute the main markets for its m~ufactured products. 18 Makgetlaneng, n.l2, p. 237.
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used by South African companies in their competition with companies of developed
countries and other developing countries in Southern Africa. This is the case given the
fact that other Southern African countries serve as sources of raw materials, markets
for manufactured products, outlets for export of capital and reserves for cheap labour
for South African companies.19
South African companies formulate and implement their Southern Africa
economic and trade strategies within the limits of their capabilities and resources. It is
also done in the light of the capabilities and resources of companies of other Southern
African, African and non-African countries, particularly those ofdeveloped countries
to frustrate their efforts and their ability to pursue and achieve their interests. Thus, the
economic and trade strategies of South African companies should be examined,
among others, from the point of view of the aspirations and capability of South
African capital in relations with those companies of other countries. Their strategies
should also be viewed and understood beyond their declarations.
The Africa, the continent with the largest concentration of the poorest
countries in the world and with weak and underdeveloped economies. It is behind the
rest of the South in socio-economic development is one of the factors which enables
South African companies to achieve their economic and trade objectives in the rest of
Southern Africa.Z0 Briefly, one of the key factors characterising the success of South
African companies in achieving their economic and trade objectives in Southern
Africa is the reality that South African companies operate regionally and continentally
within the regional and continental balance of social forces, which is increasingly in
its favour.Z 1
19 Iheduru, O.C, "Post-Apartheid South Africa and Its Neighbours: A Maritime Transport Perspective", Journal of Modern African Studies, 34(1), (1996), p. 238.
20 This can best be understood if we take into account that the poverty and weakness of the majority of African countries are negative socio-political and economic factors in terms of the position they occupy not only in the international power relations but also in the regional and continental power relations.
21 Sehlare Makgetlaneng, "The Importance of the Primacy of the Internal Factors over the External Factors", Journal of Development Economics for Southern Africa, Vol. I, Nos. 8 and 9, JanuaryDecember, (2000).
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3.1.4. Assessment of South Africa's Role in Africa
South Africa has been playing an important role in Africa since the post
apartheid period. At least two distinct perspectives emerged about the current role of .
South Africa in the continent. First, it is either seen as an emerging middle power and
a pivotal state or as selfish hegemon. The first position is championed by Maxi
Schoeman, who sees South Africa as playing the role of an emerging middle power- a
synthetic term that draws _on the twin theses of middle power and emerging power. 22
The term middle power is used to denote a position in the universal power hierarchical
order of states, rank in the international division of labour and.. an. interest in the stable .
international order that does not seek to impose an ideological pre-conceived vision of
an ideal world order.
Whereas, the traditio~al middle powers of cold ww chose the global aren~ as
their plan of action and were _not regional powers. The emerging powers are regional
and they shoulder responsibility for stability and order all their member countries.
Such powers are for example, India and Brazil which are a part of the Third World.
Maxi believes that South Africa has discharged its role as a middle power in the
international arena. It has been exemplary in its control of small arms, voluntary
denuclearisation and the ban on the anti-personal land mines and it played a leading
part in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review and extension conference of 1995.
South Africa's regional role, however, is not so prominent, despite the support
and encouragement ofboth the USA and UK. Its advocacy for NEPARD and its place
in AU, its drive bothto host the Pan African parliament and to bid for a permanent
seat in UN Security Council all indicate a willingness to play a positive role. South
Africa's acceptability as a regional leader has, however, not always been
acknowledged. Some countries like Zimbabwe anxious not to be eclipsed while others
are reluctant to open their flawed democracies to scrutiny. The best way out for South
Africa is to place an even greater emphasis on multiculturalism in its continental role.
22 Schoeman, M. (2003), "South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power", in Daniel, J. Habib and R. Southal (eds.), State of Nations: South Africa 2003-2004, (Cape town, HSRC Press, 2003), p. 3.
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A similar position is also propounded by Daniel, Naidoo and Naidu23 who
argued that South Africa has shown willingness to play a regional role, it has not been
keen to lead. The following position has been reached with review of South African
activities in Africa after apartheid: a South Africa first approach, with capital and state
pursuing parochial economic goals without regard for the well being for the region, an
integration under South African hegemony approach and a non- hegemonic regional
corporation and integration. The post apartheid state is seen as pursuing a policy of
non- hegemonic corporation through multilateral organisations like SADC, AU, NAM
and the Commonwealth. Multilatenilism did not prevent South Africa frolll
intervening in a hegemonic manner in the political crisis of Lesotho between 1994 and
1998.
Thus, supporting South Africa's multilateralist approach to foreign policy, the
authors would like it to take into account a human rights dimension. This
interpretation also finds expression and support in the work of scholars like Le Pere24
and Landsberg, both of whom approvingly stressed the pivotal rather than the
hegemonic role of South African state. The term pivotal gives a character of
importance to South Africa's foreign policy that implicitly stresses partnerships,
multilateralism and non-assertive behaviour.
A number of shortcomings, some of which are common to all the perspectives,
emerged from the literature discussed above. Firstly, all the articles and chapters
assumed that partnerships and hegemony are mutually exclusive options. Secondly,
South Africa's foreign policy should be that of a hegemon. Simply being a pivotal
state, an important one, means a rejection of the role of leadership. Finally, all of the
perspectives reviewed also suffered the . weakness of assuming and imputing
consistency and homogeneity to South Africa's foreign policy.
23 Daniel, J and Naidu, S, "The South Africans have arrived: Post-apartheid Corporate Expansionint Africa", in Daniel J. Habib, A and R. Southal (eds.) State of Nations: South Africa 2003-2004, (Cape Town, HSRC Press, 2003) p. 5.
24 LePere, "South Africa- An Emerging Power", Global Dialogue, 3, 1, (1998).
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3.2. South Africa's Dominant Position in Southern African Region
South Africa has a dominant position in the African continent because of
economic power, political institutions, regional power and active role in international
affairs.25 South Africa's dominant position in the region arises from: (1) the size,
experience and operational capability of its security forces. Following the absorption
of recruits from the private armies of the liberation movements, the size of South
African defence force is expected to rise from 87000 to 120000 coupled with size and
self sufficiency of South Africa's arms industry and the absence of any obvious
military trades from abroad, this is a source of concern of neighbouring governments.
(2) Economic superiority. South Africa's GDP is four times that·of its neighbours to
the north. A quarter of the regions total trade is with South Africa, with an
overwhelming balance (5.5 to 1) in South Africa's favour. Some 40% of Malawi
import emanates from South Africa while two - third of Zairean imports and one third
of its export are rooted through South Africa.
The persistence of civil war in Angola and Mozambique and the disruption to
east west communication system have only enhanced the regions reliance on South
Africa's network of road and rail communications for shipment of foreign trade.26 In
1981, the Southern African Development and Co-ordination Conference (SADCC),
which was renamed as SADC in 1992 was established to reouce the dependence and
promote regional integration. It is widely acknowledged that the economic future of
the region will hinge on South Africa's economic performance.
The following are the points on which whether South Africa can perform a
credible regional role or not. Given a stable polity and economic revival, South Africa
could become an engine for growth for the region, coordinating investment and
technical assistance. The new government in Pretoria would be so absorbed by social
and economic reconstruction and lastly, that regardless South Africa prospers or not,
Pretoria would be sensitive and restrained in its dealing with its neighbours. The
25 Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Personal Interview, N. Smjitkumar, Johannesburg, South Africa, (29
February, 2008). 26 Jack Spence, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: Current Realities, Future Options", in Paul, R (eds.),
Reaction and Renewal in South Africa, (London, Macmillan Press, 1996), p. 233.
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outcome will be determined by the policies adopted by South Africa following its
accession to power.27 South Africa might play an important role in international
politics of African Continent as a whole. South Africa might use its dominant role in
the region as a gateway to the raise of the continent. President Mandela has indicated
as much as on the grounds that his government's first priority is to concentrate on his
country's domestic problems. South African diplomacy in Africa will be driven by
economic imperatives. The temptation to be a major player in each and everyone of
the continents conflict will probably be resisted. There will be attempts to involve a
newly constituted South African National Defence Force in peace keeping . 28 operatiOns.
3.2.1. South Africa and Africa: within or apart?
Let's examine how South Africa has become a leading power in Africa. Given
its history since 191 0 when the Republic of South Africa was established -particularly
since 1948 when apartheid became institutionalised - the country was not only apart
from itself but also from the rest of Africa. The illegitimate, racist government in
Pretoria saw Africa, and particularly its immediate neighbourhood in Southern Africa
as areas for penetration, exploitation and destabilisation; This was the Africa of
'labour reserves' from which- from the nineteenth century- hundreds of thousands of
Southern African migrants ventured to South Africa to work in mines, farms and
industry for a pittance. This was also the Africa of 'broken-backed' states as
apartheid's marauding military bombed Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho, Botswana,
Zambia and Zimbabwe in a campaign of awesome destructiveness that eventually
resulted in a million deaths and an estimated $60 billion in damages between 1980 and
1988?9
The collective memory of these actions is still fresh in the minds of regional
states. South Africa' s apartheid governments saw themselves culturally and politically
27 All the members of the SADC including South Africa acknowledged that trading blocks are becoming a more important part of the world trading system. Hence, regional integration of Southern Africa, buiH:ling on the foundation of SADC, is deemed to be essential to avoid marginalisation. 28 Spence, n.26, p. 236. 29 Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Lansberg, (eds.), South Africa in Africa: the Post
Apartheid Era, (Scottsville, University ofKwaZulu, Natal Press, 2007), p.18.
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as very much part of the West, with the country having been part of the 'white
dominions', with Australia, Canada and New Zealand. As Hendrik Verwoerd, one of
the key architects of apartheid put it: 'we look upon ourselves as indispensable to the
White World . . . We are the link. We are white, but we are in Africa. We link them
both, and that lays on us a special duty.' 30 Verwoerd claimed that whites had brought
civilisation, economic development, order and education to Africa and that South
Africa would determine the continent's destiny. In a similar vein, an earlier South
African premier, D.F. Malan, talked of 'preserving Africa for white Christian
civilisation.'
Long before Thabo Mbeki began promoting a more egalitarian vision for a
renewed Africa, these leaders considered themselves 'Renaissance' men, seeking to
spread 'enlightenment' to 'ignorant savages' on a 'dark continent' .31 South Africa's
biggest trading partners were, and remain largely today, Britain, the United States
(US), Germany, France and Japan. But South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa has
increased dramatically since the end of apartheid.
In some eyes, this has revived fears of the visions of South African leaders like
Hendrik Verwoerd and John Vorster who often invoked dreams of a South African-led
Southern African common market and a political Commonwealth. In a perverse
appropriation of the term, both leaders actually claimed to be pursuing 'Pan
Africanist' policies. South African premier, Jan Smuts, captured this mercantilist,
imperialist spirit well. in 1940: 'All Africa may be our proper market if we will but
have the vision and far-sighted policy will be necessary if it is to be realised.'32 The
end of the first decade of apartheid was deemed the most appropriate time to
undertake a frank assessment of what has been accomplished in South Africa's
relations with Africa.
30 Ibid, p.l8. 31 Such patronising thinking was very much a feature of South African political thought from Cecil Rhodes- the diamond tycoon, imperialist, and premier of Cape colony- to F.W. de Klerk, leaving the black-led governments ofNelson Mandela and Mbeki little choice after 1994 but to engage the region with great humility. 32 Adebayo Adedeji, "South Africa and Africa's Political Economy: Looking Inside from Outside" in Adebajo, Adedeji and Landsberg (eds.) South Africa in Africa: the Post-Apartheid Era, (Scottsville, University ofKwaZulu, Natal Press, 2007), p. 19.
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South Africa has during the past thirteen years, established solid credentials to
become Africa's leading power. Its role in the establishment of the New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Union and its commitment to
promoting peace in Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) cmd Cote
d'Ivoire are clear evidence that, since 1994, South Africa is not only within but also
for Africa. 33
3.2.2. South Africa's African renaissance agenda
South Africa's foreign policy can also be examined in the context of African
renaissance agenda and its role in various fields. A key aspect of South Africa's
foreign policy over the past thirteen years has been its role of peacemaker in Africa,
promoter of democratisation on the continent, and a champion of Africa's interests
abroad: all part of an African Renaissance agenda. The government of Thabo Mbeki
has pursued a largely pragmatic foreign policy with a core concern: the articulation of
an ambitious African posture, officially dubbed 'The new African agenda' in search of
development, peace, security, governance and economic growth.34
Many foreign governments and investors seeking opportunities in Africa
regard South Africa as a gateway to the rest of the continent. In the aftermath of its .
own negotiated settlement in 1994, the new post-apartheid government quickly moved
to make the promotion of democratisation in Africa as the central tenet of its foreign
policy. Under the banner of an 'African Renaissance,' this policy stated that durable
solutions to problems in the world 'can only come through the promotion of
democracy throughout the world.' Former president Nelson Mandela, in an address to
the US Congress in Washington D.C. on 6 October 1994, advocated that ' ... we
should cease to treat tyranny, instability and poverty anywhere on our globe as
peripheral to our interests and to our future.' Mandela declared in Washington in
October 1994 that 'it is perhaps a common cause among us that everywhere on our
globe there is an unmistakable process leading to the entrenchment of democratic
systems of goveinment'.
33 Adebajo, Adedeji and Lansberg, n.29, p. 21. 34 Ibid, p.25.
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A major theme running through South Africa's foreign policy became the
promotion of 'democratic peace'. Under Mandela, South Africa openly subscribed to
the idea that democracies do not go to war with each other, and that democracy is
fundamentally more peaceful than other forms of government. Mbeki too, even before
he became president, was committed to the 'building of stable democratic systems ...
and [making] a contribution to the challenge of peace, democracy, development and
stability in the rest of our continent'. 35 Mbeki strongly criticised one-party rule and
personal dictatorships in Africa. He has cautioned that 'the one party system and
Illilitary governments will not work' and suggested that Africans must 'rebel' and
'resist all tyranny'. South Africa in Africa has often advocated for governments in
Africa to 'derive their authority and legitimacy from the will of the people,' as well as
become fully representative of women.
Given its commitment to ending Africa's international marginalisation, South
Africa, over the past thirteen years, has actively promoted regional integration and
development. In the 1996 Draft Discussion Document on a Framework for
Cooperation with the Countries of the Southern African Region, South Africa's
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stated: 'South Africa should strive to achieve
regional economic development by utilising the instrument that is ready at hand, in the
form of the Southern African Development Community.' The document further noted
that South Africa's vision for the SADC region is one 'of the highest possible degree
of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where necessary, and joint planning of
regional development initiatives, leading to integration consistent with socio
economic, environmental and political realities.' 36
South Mrica's stance on regional integration favours a 'cautious and step-by
step' approach towards regional development in Southern Mrica. The emphasis was
thus initially on cooperation rather than full-fledged integration. Policy was based on
'the principles of equity and mutual benefit'; a denunciation of domineering
35 For Mbeki, 'the dream of peace and stability, of democracy and human rights' are all intertwined. South Africa's president has repeatedly noted that Southern Africa must transform into a 'zone of peace' by means of 'building stable democracies. 36 Adebajo, Adedeji and Lansberg; n.29, p.26.
79
hegemony towards the region; and the belief that an emphasis on partnership and
fairness would more effectively achieve the country's foreign policy goals. South
Africa put much effort and energy into restructuring SADC, stressing the
implementation and operationalisation of protocols on free trade, politics, defence, and
security cooperation. Emphasis was also placed on boosting international investor
confidence and attracting foreign direct investment to Southern Africa.
Thabo Mbeki played a key role in negotiating the New Partnership for Africa's
Development in 2001. NEPAD was an initiative to spur Africa's development after
decades of failures as a result of the legacies of colonialism and the Cold War, bad
governance, unsound economic policies and management, and destructive conflicts.37
South Africa adopted a strong policy in favour of continental integration and
was a key actor in establishing the AU in 2002, with the death of the OAU and the
birth of the AU taking place in South Africa' s port city of Durban. With South
Africa's influence, the AU stressed the need to strengthen its capacities and actions in
conflict prevention, management and resolution. Special emphasis was placed on AU
missions in Burundi and Sudan's Darfur region and on strengthening the 15-member
au Peace and Security Council (PSC) that was established in July 2004, on which
South Africa won one of only five three-year renewable seats.38 Under Mandela and
Mbeki, South Africa' s foreign policy has promoted adherence to ·democratic
benchmarks and governance indicators in order to benefit from a renewed focus on
African 'ownership' .39
37 The NEPAD plan of action identified five critical issues as being essential to bolstering Africa's development efforts: Democracy, governance and peace and security; economic and corporate governance; infrastructure and information technology; human resource development (notably health and education) and agriculture and market access. 38 Adebajo, Adedeji and Lansberg, n.29, p.27. 39 South Africa was instrumental in setting up an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003 to promote democratic governance in Africa. About 28 countries have signed up to be reviewed in this voluntary, self-monitored system involving governments, the private sector, and civil society actors.
80
3.2.3. South Mrica's advantages in economic and trade in Africa
South Africa enjoys enormous privileges and advantages in its economic and
trade relations with the rest of Southern Africa and Africa for various reasons.40
Firstly, South Africa is relatively more developed socio-politically, economically,
financially, technologically and in terms of human resources development and trade
than all of the other sub-Saharan African countries. Secondly, South Africa's
geographical proximity to the internal markets of the other Southern African countries
provide the South African suppliers with advantages through lower transportation
costs and the relatively shorter delivery distances. The cost of supplying Southern
African countries with goods is less than from other countries outside Southern Africa.
The fact that the distance is shorter and freight costs are generally lower is such that
the South African suppliers enjoy a greater cost advantage.
Thirdly, South Africa's socio-economic development is linked with the socio
economic development of Southern Africa. It is in the long-term interest of South
Africa to contribute towards the development of the industrial capacity of its
neighbours. The Southern African countries increase their importance to South Africa
to the extent that their industrial development increases. The more their industrial
development increases, the greater their share of manufactured imports from South
Africa.
Fourthly, smce 1994 political transformation in the country, a number of
transnational cotporations of developed countries continued using the country as their
regional relay station, staging-post and nerve centre. Their regional offices being in
South Africa, they have been making economic, trade and investment relations in the
country on the basis that the country is a reliable springboard for operations
throughout the region and the continent. South African companies have also been
making and increasing economic, trade and investment relations throughout the region
and the continent.
Fifthly, successful trade and economic relations depend on the mobility of
people, capital, goods and information. There are effective, reliable road transportation
40 Makgetlaneng, n. 12, p.252.
81
networks linking South Africa with the rest of Southern Africa.41 Sixthly, South
Africa's exports to the continent have become increasing significantly since 1994. In
1998, total trade was valued at some ZAR 25 billion (USD 4 billion) with African
countries accounting for some 14% of total exports. The significance of South Africa's
trade with the rest of Africa is that it is mainly in manufactured products with over
60% of exports to the rest of Africa in categories of prepared foods, chemicals, base
metals and articles, machinery and motor vehicles and parts. A further characteristic
feature of South Africa's trade with the rest of Africa is that 75 per cent of its trade is
. with the ~outhen1 African pevelop!llentGolllll1\lllity countries.42
3.3. Role and Position of South Africa in the African Union (AU)
South Africa has been a key player in the formation of African Union. South
Africa was instrumental in establishing the AU and its organs, namely the: Assembly,
Executive Council, Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), Peace and Security
Council (PSC) etc.
It has supported the AU financially and militarily and sent peace keeping forces to
other countries of Africa. South Africa was also the first African state to choose its
delegation of representatives to Pan African Parliament (PAP). Under the protocols
article on elections, each member states may send five representatives to the PAP,
atleast one of whom must be a woman. Adopting an electoral method that can be used
as a model by other parliaments, South African party whips drew up a list of potential .
representatives before tabling it before the entire parliament, having agreed that atleast
three of South Africa's five representatives would be women.
However, in a continent where there may be an abundance of parliament either
as scrutinisers of legislation or as overseers of the executive, one may well ask
41 This gives South African companies a competitive advantage in the region, since road transport is quicker and cheaper. South Africa has various transportation networks which link the country with the rest of Africa. · 42 Makgetlaneng, n.l2, p. 252.
82
whether the efforts made by South Africa to establish the PAP will be of any real
value in furthering the principles ofNEPAD and AU.43
The South African government is playing an increasingly important role in the
political and economic affairs of the African continent. South Africa's increasing
political role is directly linked to its economic might. Its economy accounts for about
45 per cent of Africa's GDP, equivalent of three times the size of the second biggest
economy in Africa (Egypt). South Africa's economic interest and importance are the
driving forces behind its political stands on some of the crucial situations facing Africa
today, including Darfur. Within the African Union (AU); South Africa is a member of
the influential Peace and Security Council, where vital measures affecting peace and
security in Africa are discussed and acted on. At the international level, South Africa
is currently a member of the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council.
Statement and Plan of Action of the South Africa - Africa Union, Caribbean -
Diaspora Conference44: Africans from the Continent and representatives of the
Diaspora from the Caribbean gathered at the Jamaica International Conference Center,
Kingston, Jamaica on 16-18 March 2005, for a Conference jointly organised by the
African Union and the governments of South Africa and Jamaica. The theme was
''Towards Unity and United Action by Africans and the African Diaspora in the
Caribbean for a Better World: The Case of South Africa".
The Conference recalled that the gathering was the result of the initiative by
the government of South Africa to acknowledge the contribution ofthe Diaspora in the
Caribbean (including the labour movement) in the struggle against Apartheid. The
Conference was also an opportunity to celebrate the ten years of democracy in South
Africa. Therefore, from the above discussion, it is clear that South Africa has been
playing an important role in Africa and in the AU. South Africa has not only played an
43 Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, and Tim Hughes, "Between Democratic Governance and Sovereignty: The Challenge of South Africa's Africa Policy", in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, (eds.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2004), p. 76. 44 Report of South Africa, African Union, Caribbean Diaspora Conference, Kingston, Jamaica, (16-18 March 2005).
83
important role in the formation of the AU, it has also been supporting AU financially.
South Africa has been sending peace-keeping forces in African Countries.45
3.3.1. South Africa and NEP AD
The NEPAD was formally adopted at the Lusaka AU Summit in 2001. It is a
crucial element of Pretoria's foreign policy vision and engagement with Africa and the
world.46 At the beginning of the 21st century relevant stakeholders on the African
continent initiated a new offensive towards advertising Africa's preparedness to seek
closer cooperation with the dominant global actors and integration into the currently
existing world market. The initiative;s subsequent blue pnnt ha5 adopted the
programmatic title The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). This
paper reflects on certain issues particularly linked to the proactive part played by
South Africa and the likely implications the NEP AD initiative might suggest in terms
of future perspectives.47 In the first place, it has a far-reaching inter-continental
impact. It is to some extent a product of different and competing interests for
hegemonic control over Africa's policy orientations both in terms of international
political relations as well as in terms of socio-economic paradigms.
To this extent NEP AD can be qualified as a 'pact among elites', which seeks to
gain the power of deciding over Africa's future development discourse. It aims at
greater integration into the dominant global forces and hence a higher degree of
participation in international political and economic affairs, which have so far
increasingly marginalised if not ignored the continent.48 To reconcile expectations and
demands towards such an initiative requires an effort formulated on two fronts. Firstly
it seeks international recognition and support beyond the continental level from the
powerful state actors of the industrialised world as represented in both the countries of
45 Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, Personal Interview, N. Surjitkumar, Johannesburg (South Africa), (29 February, 2008). 46 Kuseni Dlamini, "South Africa's Foreign Policy since 1994" in South Africa Year Book of International Affairs, (SAIIA, 2003), p.lO. 47 Whatever reservations critics may formulate, one has to concede that NEPAD can currently claim a multi-dimensional relevance within an international relations perspective. 48 Henning Melber, "South Africa and NEPAD- quo vadis", Centre for Policy Study, (2002), p. 2.
84
the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and in
particular the G 7/8.
At the same time it has to secure a maximum degree of acceptance 'at home',
as a truly collaborative African effort being part and parcel of the transformation of
the previous Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU). To
that extent one might argue that the emerging policies trying to firmly place NEP AD
on the map of both the industrialised countries and the African continent have to
manoeuvre between a rock and a hard place.
NEP AD has despite all problems and suspicions, managed within are markeclly ..
short period of time 'to bring Africa back in', at least with regard to an international
debate of what is considered to be an African initiative towards establishing new
partnerships and links with the outside industrialised world49• NEP AD is discussed,
questioned and defended both in Africa and abroad and has thereby achieved more
acknowledgement and recognition than any other initiative recently coming from the
continent. Based on this phenomenon alone, it can rightly claim to be of relevance to
Africa.
3.3.2. South Africa and Origin of NEP AD
With its successful democratic transition, South Africa emerged during the
second half of the 1990s as a new political factor on the continent. In the late 1990s,
the South African President Thabo Mbeki coined and popularised the term 'African
Renaissance; .50 While the notion never materialised as a fully-fledged, concise new
paradigm, it managed to rally policy-makers, bureaucrats and intellectuals alike
behind an idea still highly relevant as a concept of African self-respect, dignity and
pride. Inspired by earlier notions of self-reliance (in the sense of African· ownership
over African affairs), the 'African Renaissance' provided a philosophical basis for
new policy formulation. Parallel to this philosophical dimension, are efforts aimed to
49 Henning Melber, The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Old Wine in New Bottles?' Forum for Development Studies, 29 (1); (2002), p.l86. 50 Melber, n. 48, p. 3.
85
position South Africa in terms of its foreign and economic policy in a leadership role
within the African continent.
Within this process, Mbeki's foreign policy approach could be characterised as
"a complicated and sometimes contradictory mixture of ideology, idealism and
pragmatism."51 This blend competed with ambitions for a leading role displayed by
other countries, in particular the agenda by Libya's Col. Gaddafi in the transformation
of the OAU into the AU.52 South Africa's Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, in a
keynote address to the German Foundation for International Development
characterised the emerging South African strategy, as early as December 1998, in a
revealing way by asserting "there is a new resilience and a new will to succeed in the
African continent. We in South Africa have called it a renaissance, a new vision of
political and economic renewal. It takes the global competitive marketplace as point of
departure."53
Since October 2001, the NEP AD secretariat is based at the Development Bank
of Southern Africa in Midrand, South Africa, with President Mbeki's economic
adviser Wiseman Nkhulu acting as chief operating officer. NEP AD has sought
increasingly close co-operation with existing institutions such as the African
Development Bank (ADB), the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the AU
Secretariat to counteract suspicions of running its own show. Its advocates confirmed
the aim is to ultimately incorporate NEP AD offices into the AU headquarters. The
composition of NEPAD's Steering Committee confirms the current power-sharing
arrangement by uniting Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa: the five
states involved in the initiative since its early stages.
Another ten African states have been appointed to an Implementation
Committee and selected on a regional ~epresentation basis. More recently, as part of
the integration ofNEPAD into the newly consolidated AU structures and with the aim
51 Gerrit Olivier, "Is Thabo Mbeki Africa's Saviour", International Affairs 19 (4), (2003), p 817. 52 Kurt Morais, and Sanusha Naidu, "Libya' Africa Policy: What does it mean for South Afiica and
NEPAD?" South African Journal of International Affairs, 9 (2), (2002), p 109. 53 Ian Taylor, "Globalisation and Regionalisation in Afiica: Reaction to Attempts at Neo-liberal
Regionalism", Review of International political Economy, 10 (2), (2003), p. 312.
86
of reflecting ownership over the initiative by all African states, more countries and
their political leadership which is critical of NEP AD such as Libya, Namibia and
Zimbabwe, originally dismissed the initiative as an outward oriented sell-out strategy.
Notwithstanding these permissive structures and pragmatic efforts to compromise,
NEP AD remains controversial among leaders of African states. It has also utterly
failed to gain approval from many stakeholders in African societies such as trade
unions, grassroots organisations and parts of the academia and churches, who consider
the initiative as an ideological blunder of a neo-liberal capitulation towards the
powerful in this world. 54
President Mbeki has played a significant part in the conceptualisation of
NEP AD, which as a document of macro-political economy, may be regarded as the
defining achievement of his presidency so far. The immediate springboard for the
emergence of NEP AD was the 1999 Sirte Declaration, following an OAU
extraordinary submit which apart from approving in principle the establishment of the
AU. At the OAU submit at Togo in 2001, Presidents Mbeki, Bouteflika and Obasanjo
were charged with taking forward the African recovery agenda with the G-8.
Millennium Partnerships for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) was adopted by
the AU summit in July 2001 as the new African initiative. Believing that Africa would
more benefit from a joint approach, the AU leaders amalgamated both into the New
Partnerships for Africa's Development, which was adopted at Ahuja in Octol:>er 2001.
President Mbeki presented NEP AD to the South African parliament a few
days latter. After having played a central role in the development of this policy and its
acceptance by the. African political leaders, South Africa's role in the conversion of
NEP AD from document to policy was further enhanced by its election as the first
chair of the newly constituted AU summit in Durban in 2002.55
54 NEPAD emerged out of the debates on the subject of African renaissance. The notion of renaissance suggests not just a rebirth, but a rediscovery, promotion of African pre-colonial values, culture, identity and pride. 55 Sidiropoulos and Hughes, n.43, p. 68.
87
The key conditions enunciated in the NEP AD document for sustainable growth
were encapsulated in a number of undertakings. 56 These include the peace and security
initiative consisted of promoting long term conditions for development and security;
and democracy and political governance initiative comprised a series of commitments
by participating states to create and consolidate basic governance and practices. The
economic and corporate governance initiative entailed the promotion of a set of
concrete and time bound programmes aimed at enhancing the quality of economic and
public financial management as well as corporate governance. The human resources
initiative included reversing the brain drain, bridging the education gap, reducing
poverty and mobilising the resources required to build secured the health system and
control diseases effectively. The market access initiative aimed to diversify African
production through intersectoral linkages, to promote access to international markets
for African goods.
NEP AD was taken on a road- show to northern capitals to gamer support for
initiative, with the South African President, in particular, taking part. South Africa can
claim a number of incremental and progressively reinforcing successes in promoting
the acceptance of NEP AD. This includes its success in securing the adoption of
programme as the received blue print for African renewal by Mrican leaders across
the continent. President Mb~ki has bemoaned the low number twelve of African
leaders that had ratified the establishment of peace and Security Council by the tiine of -. .
the holding of AU summit in Maputo in July 2003. In South Africa, though, NEP AD
has a high recognisability factor. Mbeki can be seen as central promoter of NEP AD,
his key partners in this exercise hav~ been Presidents Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade,
a reflection of how South Africa has preferred to conduct its policy in Africa through
consensus. 57
As part of AU's adoption, it weakens the perception that NEPAD is a South
African initiative established as a counter weight to the AU, especially since the
secretariat was based in South Africa and its staff consisted largely of Mbeki
56 OAU/AU, The New Partnership for Africa's Development, Ahuja, Nigeria, (October, 2001). 57 Sidiropoulos and Hughes, n.43, p. 71.
88
proteges. 58 On the other hand, South African officials have always been at pains to
emphasise that this is a continental programme rather than one led by South Africa. It
is also true, however, that much of the administrative structure and material presented
by the NEPAD reflects the concern of South Africa's foreign policy.59 Another
element of South Africa's contribution to changing the debate in Africa has been in
the transformation of the OAU into the AU.
3.3.3. South Africa and SADC60
Since 1994 the South African government has regarded the Southern African
region as the most important priority of its foreign relations. To illustrate the
importance attached to this region, the first foreign policy document adopted by this
government was in fact a "Framework for Co-operation in Southern Africa" approved
by Cabinet in August 1996.
In terms of this "Framework", our vision for the Southern African region is
one of the highest possible degrees of economic cooperation, mutual assistance where
necessary and joint planning of regional development initiatives, leading to integration
consistent with socio-economic, environmental and political realities. In order to carry
out South Africa's foreign policy objectives in Southern Africa, South Africa joined
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in August 1994.
South Africa has taken a leading role in the region to address such issues· as
closer collaboration and economic integration. These include the establishment of a
58 Alden, C and Pere, L, South Africa 's Post Apartheid F ;reign Polley-from Reconciliation to Revival, · (London: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 62.
59 Ibid, p.63. 60 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been in existence since 1980, when it was formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled States in Southern Africa known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The transformation of the organisation from a Coordinating Conference into a Development Community (SADC) took place on August 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia. Current Member States are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
89
free trade area in the region, the development of basic infrastructure, the development
of human resources and the creation of the necessary capacity to drive this
complicated process forw~d, as well as the urgent need for peace, democracy and
good governance to be established throughout the region.61
Since joining SADC, South Africa has become very involved in the activities
of the community. South Africa has been co-coordinating the Finance and Investment
and Health sectors. Regarding the many activities of SADC, such as Transportation
and Communications, Agriculture, Trade, Energy and Mining, etc., these are actively
pursued by the relevant South African line function departments. The signature of the
SADC Protocol on Trade in August 1996 confirmed the commitment of Southern
Africa to establish a Free Trade Area in the region. Negotiations to determine Member
States tariff structure are at an advanced stage. 62
South Africa has also played a leading role in the development of the Berlin
Initiative, which strives to foster closer co-operation between the European Union and
SADC. Priority issues that are included under this Initiative are the consolidation of
democracy in the Southern African region, combating illicit drug trafficking, clearance
of landmines, regional integration, promotion of Trade and Investment and combating
HIV I AIDS. South Africa together with the other member states of SADC is also co
operating with the USA under SADCIUS Forum Initiative.
South Africa played an important role in having Gender issues placed on the .
SADC Agenda and is a signatory to the Declaration on Gender and Development and
the Addendum on the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and
Children. As a follow-up to the Declaration on Gender and Development South Africa
hosted a SADC Conference on Violence against Women and Children in March 1998
in Durban. 63
61 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Pretoria, (2004). 62 The Trade Protocol was ratified by more than two thirds SADC Member States and it was implemented on the I st of September 2000. Presently, more than half of the SADC Member States has already deposited their Instruments oflmplementation of the SADC Protocol on Trade. 63 Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, Southern African Development Community (SADC), Pretoria, (2004).
90
In 1999 the SADC Council focused on Special Programmes. This entailed
setting up working groups to deal with the issues of Mine Action, Combating the
Proliferation of Small Arms and Disaster management in the region. At the SADC
Council Meeting in Windhoek during August 2000 a Secretariat Officer was appointed
to monitor progress with the Working Groups dealing with these issues. Both the
small arms and landmine issues are also discussed with the European Union under the
Berlin Initiative. South Africa continues to play a significant part in these deliberations
and together with the other member states ensures that the interests of the region are
communicated to the wider international arena.
South Africa, together with the other member states of SADC established the
Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in June 1996 as a forum in which political
issues in the region could be discussed and resolved. Due to differences m
interpretation of the functions and structures of the Organ it did not become an
operational and functional instrument of SADC. At the extraordinary SADC Summit
held in Windhoek, Namibia on 9-10 March 2001, Heads of State and Government
finally reached agreement on the role, functions and structure of the Organ. A Draft
Protocol was drawn up and adopted at the SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi on 14
August 2002. At the 1996 SADC Heads of State Summit in Maseru, South Africa was
elected as Chair of SADC for a period of 3 years. During its chairmanship fiv_~ SADC
protocols reached the implementation stage and the organisation adopted some
recommendations regarding the rationalisation of its structures and programme of
action.64
The ultimate objective of SADC is to build a region in which there will be a·
high degree of harmonisation and rationalisation to enable the pooling of resources to
achieve collective self reliance in order to improve the living standards of the people
of the region. 65 The major preoccupation of SADC member countries has been with
issues of preferential trade and economic development and in particular South Africa's
perceived protectionism in relation to trade exports from the region. South Africa, on
64 Department ofForeign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, (2003). 65 Available at www.sadc.org
91
the other hand has reportedly felt frustrated by the failure of many member countries
to implement SADC agreements.
Some of the protocols and declarations that South Africa .and some other
countries have adopted are: the SADC multilateral agreements of corporation and
mutual assistance in the field of crime combating; the SADC regional drug control
programme 1998 to 2002; the OAU declaration and plan of action on drug abuse and
illicit trafficking control in Africa; the Southern African Regional Action Plan on light
arms and illicit trafficking and the United Nations Convention on Transnational
Organised Crimes and related protocols on human trafficking. 66 In addition, South
Africa began actively promote the adoption and implementation of various UN led
security initiatives. South African institutions have also created opportunities for anti -
narcotic NGOs, health professionals and police experts to collaborate on forensic
testing and prevention campaigns in the region. On the other positive side, South
Africa contributed by lobbying for the creation of a SADC early warning system and
national centres that could play an important diplomatic role in times of crisis.67
South Africa has long recognised that our economic success is integrally linked
to the economic success and growth of our neighbouring countries and to the
prosperity of the African continent. This view has placed a large emphasis on growing
regional trade and economic cooperation between countries in the SADC Region. It ....
has also seen us being an active participant in the African Union and the NEP AD
programme. The importance of regional trade as a contributor to higher levels of
economic growth can be seen across the world, for example in Asia, Europe and both
North and South America. It is therefore necessary to fmd ways to increasingly grow
the regional trade and the economies in the region.
South Africa as the strongest economy in the region must take responsibility in
ensuring that there are greater levels of imports from the SADC Region to match the
increase in our exports to the region. We should also be ensuring that levels of private
sector investment are increased. The legislative framework to facilitate trade and
66 Sidiropoulos and Hughes, n. 43, p. 71. 67 SADC, Draft Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ, (Unpublished), (2003).
92
investment in the region is in place and governments in the region are increasingly
working more and more closely. This must now be matched with greater levels of
private sector interaction. To boost this interaction, there is a need to have improved
physical infrastructure linking the countries, more competitive logistics chains and
greater number of business forums, trade missions and joint business projects. Both
the public and private sector need to work more actively in ensuring that greater levels
of regional integration become a reality.
With the global economy picking, it is seen that there are new opportunities in
world markets, and as a region, it should be finding ways to increase the cooperation
in order to boost the collective exports to the rest of the world. Taking on global
markets however requires high levels of competitiveness and compliance with
international standards. This recognition has seen South African increasingly placing
more and more emphasis on improving the competitiveness of South Africa's
industry, participating in international standards bodies, and promoting greater levels
of compliance by the industry. It is necessary that all countries in the region and in
Africa look at these issues very seriously, as falling behind would result in an increase
in the divide between developed and developing countries.
The issues of standards and compliance are being tackled in the WTO. No
country wants to see them being used as a means to limit market access for developing
countries. There is need to recognise that the long-term trends in the direction of
higher standards. It is therefore necessary that to start moving in this direction,
regardless of the outcomes in the WTO to be successful in the export promotion and
export orientation.68
3.4. Challenges of South Mrica, SADC and AU
There are various challenges of South Africa's policy and its relations with
SADC and the AU. Countries and regional and multilateral organisations in Africa
continue to face numerous obstacles in their efforts to build a security community and
68 Speech by Mpahlawa, Minister of Trade and Industries, SADC Review lOth Anniversary, (1997 -2006).
93
develop the continent. One of the most difficult tasks in security sector will be to plan
for the consequences of regional economic integration and phasing out of the borders.
Most of the members of the SADC and AU currently face the challenges even
at national level. 69 These include: weak institutional capacity in the criminal justice
system, weak financial and banking sectors, weak NGOs and civil societies and
inadequate strategies, infrastructUre and personal at ports of entry. At a regional and
multilateral level, the following are the· challenges of South Africa, SADC, and AU
members. These include: lack of legislation or clarity on criteria for cross border
jurisdiction, cultural and language differences and environmental degradation,
declining standards of living and rising level of poverty and disease.
SADC, the AU and international community along with civil society will need
to face these challenges head on during the next decade if the vision of NEP AD is to
be achieved. Finally, South Africa has played a pioneering role in the security arena in
the region and on the continent particularly by brokering peace agreements in different
countries particularly in Burundi and the DRC. Finally, there is a need to integrate the
security plans of SADC and the AU in the broader development plans being developed
for the region and the continent. 70
South Africa's foreign policy in the post-apartheid period towards
neighbouring countries is an important transformation in its policy. From the above
discussions, we can fmd out that South Africa plays a dominant role in the formation
of African Union, SADC and NEP AD Initiative. South Africa has also dominant
position in Southern African countries because of its economic superiority, operational
capability of its security forces and South Africa's active role in international affairs.
There are challenges of South Africa's foreign policy towards its neighbouring
countries and its relation with SADC and African Union. South Africa has to play a
pioneering role in security arena and other issues to overcome all these challenges.
69 Gail Wannenburg, "From Pariah to Pioneer: the Foreign Policy of South Africa Police Service", in Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, ( eds.), Apartheid Past, Renaissance Future, South Africa's Foreign Policy: 1994-2004, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2004) p. 166. 70 Ibid, p.l67.
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The next chapter examines South Africa's Foreign Policy towards maJor
powers. It includes South Africa and USA, South Africa and EU, South Africa and
Russia, South Africa and China and South Africa and Japan relations in the post
apartheid period.
95