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C H A P T E R 19

Meditation and the Neuroscience ofConsciousness: An Introduction

Antoine Lutz, John D. Dunne, and Richard J. Davidson

Abstract

The overall goal of this chapter is to explorethe initial findings of neuroscientific researchon meditation; in doing so, the chapteralso suggests potential avenues of furtherinquiry. It has three sections that, althoughintegral to the chapter as a whole, mayalso be read independently. The first sec-tion, “Defining Meditation,” notes the needfor a more precise understanding of med-itation as a scientific explanandum. Argu-ing for the importance of distinguishing theparticularities of various traditions, the sec-tion presents the theory of meditation fromthe paradigmatic perspective of Buddhism,and it discusses the difficulties encounteredwhen working with such theories. The sec-tion includes an overview of three prac-tices that have been the subject of research,and it ends with a strategy for developinga questionnaire to define more precisely apractice under examination. The second sec-tion, “The Intersection of Neuroscience andMeditation,” explores some scientific moti-vations for the neuroscientific examinationof meditation in terms of its potential impact

on the brain and body of long-term prac-titioners. After an overview of the mecha-nisms of mind-body interaction, this sectionaddresses the use of first-person expertise,especially in relation to the potential forresearch on the neural counterpart of sub-jective experience. In general terms, the sec-tion thus points to the possible contributionsof research on meditation to the neuro-science of consciousness. The final section,“Neuroelectric and Neuroimaging Correla-tes of Meditation,” reviews the most relevantneuroelectric and neuroimaging findings ofresearch conducted to date, including somepreliminary correlates of the previously dis-cussed Buddhist practices.

Introduction

This chapter discusses possible contributionsof meditation to the neurobiological study ofconsciousness and to cognitive and affectiveneurosciences in general. Empirical researchon meditation started in the 1950s, and asmuch as 1,000 publications on meditationalready exist.1 Despite such a high number

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of scientific reports and inspiring theoreticalproposals (Austin, 1998; Shapiro & Walsh,1984 ; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991;Wallace, 2003 ; West, 1987), one still needsto admit that little is known about the neu-rophysiological processes involved in med-itation and about its possible long-termimpact on the brain. The lack of statisti-cal evidence, control populations and rigorof many of the early studies; the hetero-geneity of the studied meditative states;and the difficulty in controlling the degreeof expertise of practitioners can in partaccount for the limited contributions madeby neuroscience-oriented research on medi-tation. Thus, instead of providing a completereview of this empirical literature (Austin,1998; Cahn & Polich, 2006; Delmonte, 1984 ,1985 ; Fenwick, 1987; Holmes, 1984 ; Pagano& Warrenburg, 1983) we choose to addressour central question from three directions.

The purpose of this first section is to clar-ify conceptually what the term “meditation”means and to propose an operational def-inition. We focus on Buddhist meditativepractices as a canonical example. We pro-vide a short presentation of the main tenetsof Buddhist psychology and epistemology, aswell as a description of the standard tech-niques used in many Buddhist practices.From these standard claims, we then derivethe possible contributions of meditation toneurosciences and develop tentative propos-als for a neuroscientific understanding ofthe cognitive and affective processes thatare altered by training in meditation. In thelast section, we review existing neuroelectricand neuroimaging findings on meditation, aswell as some preliminary correlates of theseBuddhist practices.

1. Defining Meditation

Although widely used, the term “medita-tion” is often employed in a highly impre-cise sense such that its descriptive power isgreatly decreased. One underlying reason forthe term’s inadequacy is that, in its typicalusage, it refers generically to an extremely

wide range of practices. Thus, in a typicaldiscussion of this kind, West (1987) arguesthat practices as diverse as the ritual dancesof some African tribes, the spiritual exer-cises of the desert fathers, and the tantricpractices of a Tibetan adept are all formsof meditation. Historically, this attempt tocategorize diverse practices under the samerubric reflects some intellectual trends in theearly 20th century, most especially “perenni-alism,” that argue unequivocally for a cer-tain genre of mystical experience as theessence of religion (Proudfoot, 1985 ; Sharf,1998). From the standpoint of the neuro-sciences, the problem with such a positionis that it begins from a set of hypothesesthat are difficult to test because they assumethat the common element in mystical expe-rience necessarily transcends thought, lan-guage, reason, and ordinary perception –most of which are required for any reli-able neuroscientific procedure to test thehypotheses.

In addition to the problem of unverifiablehypotheses, the generic use of meditationas applying to such a wide range of diversepractices inevitably trivializes the practicesthemselves. For example, the unique tech-niques and context of Sufi zikr must beignored if they are to be considered thesame as the Taoist practice of T’ai Chi. Inshort, to make zikr and T’ai Chi describ-able with the same term, one must ignorea good deal of what makes them radicallydifferent from each other. This would beakin to the use of the word “sport” to referto all sports as if they were essentially thesame. A typical result of such an approachis the extremely general model proposed byFischer (1971) in which all forms of med-itation – exemplified by Zazen and someunspecified “Yoga” practice – fall along thesame trophotropic scale of hypoaraousal,even though attention to the details ofmany Buddhist practices, including Zazen(Austin, 1998), makes a description in termsof hypoarousal extremely problematic.

An alternative approach to research onmeditation is to attend more closely to theparticularity of the individual practices in


meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness 499

question. An apt metaphor in this casemight be the interaction between tradi-tional medical systems and researchers seek-ing to develop new pharmaceuticals. Intheir search for plants whose active ingre-dients might yield effective new medica-tions, some researchers have begun exam-ining traditional medical systems in variouscultures in order to narrow their searchbased on traditional claims about the medic-inal properties of local plants (Jayaraman,2003 ; Schuster, 2001). In that collaboration,attention to the particularity of the heal-ing tradition is crucial, for it is the localknowledge about specific, local plants thatwill aid the search for new medications.Clearly, such a project would be gravely hin-dered if researchers were to assume that, forexample, an Amazonian healer’s traditionalherbal lore would somehow amount to thesame traditional knowledge about medicinalherbs that one would hear from a Himalayanhealer. The value of consulting a specific tra-dition is precisely that – through accident orexpertise – the tradition may have gleanedsome valuable knowledge or developedsome practice that is not found elsewhere.This importance of particularity supportsthe need to preserve local traditions, but italso speaks to the need to heed their bound-aries. A common problem with the literatureon meditation is a tendency to ignore thoseboundaries in order to emphasize somevague universality in human experience.

This attention to the particularity of con-templative traditions is related to anotheraspect of the approach we adopt; namely,that it is also strongly consistent with ourknowledge of the neurosciences. Specifi-cally, cognitive and affective neurosciencehas matured over the past decade, and wenow understand something about the brainmechanisms that subserve different atten-tional and affective processes. Meditationtechniques that target specific underlyingprocesses are thus likely to engage differentneural circuitry. If, however, the particular-ity of a tradition’s claims and practices arenot examined, the possibility that a practicetargets a specific process will not be noted.

Sorting Claims and Descriptions

In emphasizing the particularity of each tra-dition’s approach to meditation, one neednot discount the possibility that highly dis-parate traditions may have independentlydeveloped techniques that lead to similarand measurable outcomes.2 Nevertheless, itseems best not to begin with an assump-tion about any such innate similarity indisparate meditative traditions. One reasonfor avoiding such assumptions is the issueof particularity above, but another reasonis that similarities among traditions tendto appear primarily in claims about theultimate meaning or nature of the stateattained (e.g., “pure consciousness”) or inmetaphysically charged phenomenologicaldescriptions (e.g., ineffability) that do notlend themselves to easy measurement orinterpretation.

Because similarities among traditionsoften rest on such issues, an emphasis onthose similarities tends to exaggerate a prob-lem that all researchers on meditation mustface; namely, the need to discern whichparts of a traditional account of meditationare useful in formulating a neuroscientificresearch strategy, as opposed to parts of anaccount that are not suitable for that pur-pose. The problem here is the need to inter-pret traditional discourse about meditation,especially in terms of meditative techniquesand resultant states. In short, traditional acc-ounts often describe techniques and resul-tant states that are measurable and repeat-able; nevertheless, parts of the same accountmay also focus on issues that can neither bemeasured nor repeated. In many traditions,the distinction between these parts of anaccount reflects a tension between (1) closedescriptions of meditative techniques andstates and (2) the metaphysical or soteriolog-ical requirements that must be met by thosestates, often expressed in textual sources thatthe tradition considers inviolable.

Let us take as an example the Tibetanpractice of “Open Presence,” which we dis-cuss further below. In describing Open Pres-ence, traditional authors, such as Wangchug



Dorje (1989) and Thrangu (Thrangu & John-son, 2004), offer typically detailed descrip-tions both of the techniques that induce thatstate and also of the experiences that shouldoccur when the techniques are appliedproperly.3 For example, discursive tech-niques for de-emphasizing the objectifica-tion of sensory content are described indetail, and in terms of resultant states, theconsequent loss of a sense of subject-objectduality is also articulated clearly. These partsof the traditional account lend themselvesto investigation, inasmuch as they describetechniques and results for which neuralcorrelates may be plausibly postulated andtested. At the same time, however, Buddhistphilosophical concerns also demand that thestate of open presence reflects the onto-logical foundation of all reality, and Bud-dhist notions of nirvan. a also require that therealization of that state will lead the adeptto attain inconceivable physical and mentalpowers. Such claims often occur in texts thattraditional scholars are obliged to defendunder all circumstances. From a neuroscien-tific perspective, however, these claims donot lend themselves readily to analysis ordescription. Thus, from the vantage point ofthe researcher who stands outside the tra-dition, it is crucial to separate the highlydetailed and verifiable aspects of traditionalknowledge about meditation from the tran-scendental claims that form the metaphysi-cal or theological context of that knowledge.

Meditation as Explanandum

Attention to the particularity of each tra-dition and the careful examination of tra-ditional knowledge about meditation bothcontribute to a main concern of this chapter:the notion of meditation as an explanan-dum. Or, to put the issue another way,how does one define “meditation” in thecontext of neuroscientific study? This ques-tion is not answered easily in part becauseof the extremely wide variety of humanactivities to which the term “meditation”might be applied. And the situation maynot be much improved even if one focuseson just one tradition. In the case of Bud-

dhism, most traditions use a term for med-itation that correlates with the Sanskritterm bhavana, literally, “causing to become.”In Tibetan traditions, the usual translationfor bhavana is gom (sgom), which roughlymeans “to become habituated to” or “tobecome familiar with.” The meditative tra-ditions of Tibetan Buddhism often employthe term in a generic fashion, and as aresult, it is often translated into English withthe equally generic term “meditation.” Thegeneric usage of gom or “meditation” reflectsits application to a remarkably wide rangeof contemplative practices: For example, thevisualization of a deity, the recitation of amantra, the visualization of “energy” flowingin the body, the focusing of attention on thebreath, the analytical review of argumentsor narratives, and various forms of object-less meditations would all be counted as“meditation.”

Nevertheless, despite this variety, it ispossible to identify some relevant featurescommon to the traditional descriptions ofthese Buddhist practices, especially whenone separates those descriptions from meta-physical arguments or exigencies that stemfrom defending a textual tradition. First, itis assumed that each such practice inducesa predictable and distinctive state (or setof states) whose occurrence is clearly indi-cated by certain cognitive or physical fea-tures or events phenomenally observable tothe practitioner. Second, the state inducedis said to have a predictable effect on bothmind and body in such a way that, byinducing that state repeatedly, a practitionercan allegedly use it to enhance desirabletraits and inhibit undesirable ones. Third, thepractices are gradual in the sense that theability to induce the intended state is sup-posed to improve over time, such that anexperienced practitioner should meditate ina manner that is superior to a novice. Fromthe traditional standpoint, this improvementis marked especially by two phenomenallyreportable features: the acquisition of cer-tain traits (cognitive, emotional, or physical)and/or the occurrence of certain events (cog-nitive, emotional, or physical). Finally, thepractice used to induce the state must be



learned, usually from a meditation teacherwho is said to be a virtuoso in the practice.That teacher will also serve as a guide tothe practice so as to assist the practitionerin improving his or her ability to producethe state.

Based on these features, these diverseforms of Buddhist meditation may be takenas explananda in regard to three generalissues: (1) the claimed production of a distin-ctive and reproducible state that is phenom-enally reportable, (2) the claimed relation-ship between that state and the developmentof specific traits, and (3) the claimed pro-gression in the practice from the novice tothe virtuoso. Although initially formulatedin terms of Tibetan practices, these featuresseem to be a useful way of understandinghow meditative practices in most contem-plative traditions may be construed as neuro-scientific explananda.

A Paradigmatic Framework: BuddhistMeditative Techniques

Our use of Buddhist contemplative tradi-tions to develop a theoretical frameworkfor understanding meditation is not merelya product of historical accident; rather,Buddhist contemplative traditions are par-ticularly well suited to the development ofthis kind of theoretical model. The rea-son, in brief, is that unlike many contem-plative traditions, Buddhist traditions tendto offer extensive, precisely descriptive, andhighly detailed theories about their prac-tices in a manner that lends itself readilyto appropriation into a neuroscientific con-text. This emphasis on descriptive preci-sion stems from the central role that variousforms of meditation play in Buddhist prac-tice. That is, from the standpoint of nearlyevery Buddhist tradition, some type of med-itative technique must be employed if oneis to advance significantly on the Buddhistspiritual path, and because Buddhism ini-tially developed in a cultural context wherea wide range of such techniques were avail-able, Buddhist theoreticians recognized theneed to specify exactly the preferred tech-niques. Their analyses eventually develop

into a highly detailed scholastic traditionknown in Sanskrit as the Abhidharma –a type of Buddhist “psychology” that alsoincludes discussions of epistemology, philos-ophy of language, the composition of thematerial world, and cosmology.4

Despite the variety of Buddhist traditions,they share two axioms articulated in Abhid-harma texts: A central goal of Buddhist prac-tice is the elimination of suffering, and anyeffective method to eliminate suffering mustinvolve changes in one’s cognitive and emo-tional states, because the root cause of suffer-ing is a set of correctable defects that affectall the mental states of an untrained person(Gethin, 1998). Thus, any practice that isconsidered by the tradition to be an effec-tive method must involve the features notedabove, including some set of reliable tech-niques that induce mental states that willinduce the desired changes in behavioral andpsychological traits. In this regard, the Bud-dhist contemplative traditions exhibit con-siderable diversity, because they hold diver-gent opinions about the precise nature ofthe defects to be eliminated, the traits to beinduced, and the best methods for accom-plishing all this. At the same time, both thediversity and the continuity of Buddhist con-templative practices also stem from the richcultural context in which Buddhism initiallyflourished.

early history and basic forms

When the historical Buddha Sakyamuni firstset out on the religious life (ca. 500 bce),he apparently encountered a large numberof meditative techniques that were alreadybeing practiced by various contemplativetraditions in South Asia. Although histor-ical sources from this period are generallyvague in their descriptions of contempla-tive practices, one can identify some com-mon trends. Broadly speaking, these tra-ditions maintained that the contemplativelife should be focused on the search forone’s true self (often called the atman), andbecause this true self was generally assumedto be somehow obscured by one’s involve-ment in the world of the senses, many con-templative techniques involved an inward



focus whereby one’s mind was retractedfrom the senses. In addition to this inwardfocus, most techniques from this periodprobably sought to reduce the occurrenceof other types of mental content – generi-cally called “conceptuality” (kalpana) – thatwere also thought to obscure one’s visionof the true self. Distractions caused by thefluctuation of the mind were commonlythought to be linked to the fluctuation ofthe breath, and meditative techniques there-fore often involved either breath control(pran. ayama) or at least some attention tothe disposition of the breath. And becausethe mind was thought to be strongly influ-enced by the body, contemplative practicesinvolved specific postures or corporeal exer-cises (Bronkhorst, 1986; Gethin, 1998).

When these practices were appropriatedby the historical Buddha Sakyamuni, theiroverall context was altered, inasmuch asthe Buddha maintained that the belief ina “true self” (atman) was completely mis-taken. Indeed, from the earliest days a cen-tral goal of Buddhist contemplative practiceis precisely to demonstrate to the practi-tioner that no such fixed or absolute iden-tity could ever be possible (Gethin, 1998).Nevertheless, although the Buddha alteredthe context of the contemplative practicesthat he encountered, the Buddhist medi-tative techniques that he and his followersdeveloped retained some of the same basicprinciples of inward focus, reduction of con-ceptuality, the importance of the breath, andthe relevance of the body.

Perhaps the most ubiquitous style of Bud-dhist meditation that exhibits these featuresis meditation aimed at improving concentra-tion – a style of meditation that is rooted inpractices aimed at obtaining samatha. Trans-latable literally as “quiescence,” samatha isa state in which the practitioner is ableto maintain focus on an object for a the-oretically unlimited period of time. As aterm, samatha therefore can also describeone of the historically earliest and most basicstyles of Buddhist meditation that aims atattaining that state. In such a practice, thepractitioner augments especially a mentalfaculty known as smr.ti, confusingly trans-

lated as both “mindfulness” and “awareness”;in simple terms, it is the mental function(caittasika) that focuses the mind on anobject. At the same time, the meditationinvolves a faculty that checks to see whetherthe smr.ti is focused on the intended objector whether it has lost the object. Thus,this other faculty, often called samprajanya,involves a type of meta-awareness that isnot focused on an object per se, but ratheris an awareness of that intentional rela-tion itself (Gethin, 1998; Silananda, 1990;Wallace, 1999).

Both as a state and as a style of prac-tice, samatha provides the practical andtheoretical underpinnings of many otherBuddhist practices, especially because it con-stitutes the basic paradigm for any prac-tice that involves one-pointed concentra-tion (ekagrata) on a specific object. At thesame time, however, Buddhist theorists whodiscuss samatha generally do not considerit to be in and of itself Buddhist. That is,practices oriented toward attaining samathamust create a highly developed ability to sus-tain intense focus on an object, and whereasthe development of that ability does lead tosome trait changes, it does not lead to all ofthe changes that Buddhists seek, most espe-cially in regard to the regulation of emotions.Hence, although a samatha-oriented prac-tice may be a necessary ingredient of mostBuddhist contemplative traditions, it mustbe accompanied by another fundamentalstyle of Buddhist practice; namely vipasyanaor “insight.” (Gethin, 1998; Silananda, 1990;Wallace, 1999).

As with the samatha style of practice,vipasyana is also one of the earliest andmost fundamental forms of meditation. ForBuddhist theorists, vipasyana is a style ofmeditation that, in combination with thefocus or stability provided by cultivatingsamatha, enables the practitioner to gaininsight into one’s habits and assumptionsabout identity and emotions. In general,this insight includes especially the real-ization of “selflessness” (nairatmya) – thatis, realizing that one’s belief in a fixed,essential identity is mistaken and hencethat the emotional habits that reflect that



belief are baseless (Dalai Lama XIV, 1995 ;Gethin, 1998; Silananda, 1990). Neverthe-less, although every Buddhist contemplativetradition would agree that such a realiza-tion must be part of vipasyana, one againencounters considerable diversity in the pre-cise way in which vipasyana is defined andthe way it is developed in practice. For exam-ple, in some traditions reasoning and a typeof internal conceptual discourse are criticalto the practice, but other traditions maintainthat reason and concepts are of only limiteduse in obtaining vipasyana. Likewise, sometraditions maintain that a vipasyana medi-tation must have an object toward whichsome type of analysis is brought to bear(Dalai Lama XIV, 1995 ; Silananda, 1990),whereas others maintain that the meditationmust eventually become completely object-less (Wangchug Dorje, 1989). Perhaps thesole theme that runs throughout all Buddhisttraditions is that, in vipasyana meditation,the type of meta-awareness mentioned ear-lier plays an especially important role – anissue that we examine in the section on thetheory of meditation.

further historical developments

Although the basic combination of samathaand vipasyana provides both a theoreticaland historical touchstone for the develop-ment of Buddhist contemplative practices,a number of other forms of meditationwere developed in the various Buddhistcommunities of Asia. Three practices ini-tially developed in India are especiallyemblematic of the range of developments:“Recollection of the Buddha” meditations(buddhanusmr.ti), Lovingkindness medita-tion (maitrıbhavana), and tantric “Wind”(vayu) meditations.

The practice of Recollection of the Bud-dha is probably, along with Lovingkindnessmeditation, one of the oldest Buddhist prac-tices. Recollection involves the recitation ofthe Buddha’s attributes, and in its earliestform it may have involved nothing morethan that. At some point, however, therecitation of the Buddha’s physical attributeswas linked with the visualization of theBuddha in the space in front of the prac-

titioner. This basic technique of recitationand visualization is representative of a widerange of similar Buddhist practices thatevolved during the first millennium. Chiefamong these is the practice of visualiz-ing deities and paradisiacal environments,a technique especially important in mostforms of Buddhist tantra (Beyer, 1977).

Alongside Recollection (and later, visu-alization) practices, Lovingkindness medita-tion was also a widespread practice in bothearly and later Buddhism, where it is thema-tized as the cultivation of “great compassion”(mahakarun. a). The practice aims to culti-vate an emotional state; namely, a sense oflove and compassion toward all living things.Representative of a wide range of practicesthat promote or inhibit traits by repeatedlyinducing a particular emotional state, someforms of the practice involve the recita-tion/visualization techniques employed inRecollection meditation. Some discursivestrategies, such as thinking through the stepsof an argument for compassion, may alsobe employed (Dalai Lama XIV, 1991; P.Williams, 1989).

Last to develop (toward the end of thefirst millennium in India) are a variety ofpractices that may be called tantric Windmeditations. These practices aim to manip-ulate the various forms of energy, metaphor-ically called Wind (vayu), that are allegedto flow in channels throughout the body.This model is roughly analogous to the con-temporary understanding of the nervous sys-tem, where the notion of Wind is analo-gous to the propagation of neural impulses.In the Buddhist model, the mind itself isthought to consist of such Wind energy,and practices that manipulated that energywere therefore intended to induce or inhibitmental states or traits. The many techniquesemployed include the visualization of vari-ous syllables or other items at specific pointsin the body as a means to alter the flow ofmental energy; physical exercises, includingbreathing exercises; and an array of othertechniques, including manipulation of thediet. An example of this style of practicethat later becomes important in Tibet is the“Tummo” (gtum mo) practice – a method



that, in manipulating the Wind, is also said togenerate considerable body heat as a byprod-uct (Cozort, 1986; Dalai Lama XIV, 1995 ;English, 2002 ; Snellgrove, 2002).

As Buddhism spread from its initial loca-tion in the Gangetic plain, Buddhist practi-tioners developed and enhanced the abovepractices, along with many other relatedforms of meditation. Eventually, Buddhismspread to other regions of Asia, and vari-ous traditions arose that persist to this day.Each tradition elaborated its own particularinterpretation of techniques that, althoughlikely inherited from Indian Buddhist tradi-tions, always acquired a local flavor. Never-theless, most extant practices reflect the var-ious styles of meditation noted above.

analysis of meditation: samatha and

vipasyana as paradigm

To aid in the mastery of meditative tech-niques – and also to respond to critics out-side their traditions – Buddhist theoreticiansin India and elsewhere developed detailedaccounts of their contemplative practices.These accounts are often extremely com-plex, and as noted above, they sometimesraise metaphysical issues that are not eas-ily addressed in neuroscience. Likewise, tosome degree the accounts are shaped by theneed to defend a particular textual traditionor line of argumentation, and as a result,some statements that seem to be descrip-tive are not known to be exemplified by anyactual Buddhist practice. Nevertheless, otheraspects of the accounts seem more empiri-cal in their approach, and attention to thoseaspects may prove useful when examiningmeditation in a laboratory context. Withthis in mind, we have sketched the follow-ing practical and simplified account of Bud-dhist meditation theory, aimed especially atresearchers interested in studying contem-plative practices in Buddhism and other tra-ditions. As one might expect, the numerousforms of Buddhist meditation are accompa-nied by an equally wide range of theoreti-cal accounts. Nevertheless, the central issuescan be addressed in terms of the theories thatundergird samatha and vipasyana, especiallywhen these styles of meditation are under-

stood to describe two aspects of the same med-itative state. In the interest of both applica-bility and simplicity, we derive our accountprimarily from a specific and living contem-plative tradition: Tibetan Buddhism.

Drawing on a maxim developed bytheir Indian predecessors, Tibetan theoristsmaintain that the highest forms of Bud-dhist meditation must integrate the quali-ties of samatha and vipasyana into a sin-gle practice. As described by the mostcommon traditional metaphor, the prac-titioner cannot make significant spiritualadvancement without the combination ofsamatha and vipasyana, just as a cart cannotmove without two wheels. Another tradi-tional metaphor is perhaps more descriptive:When attempting to see the murals onthe wall of a dark cave, one must use alamp that is both well shielded and bright.If the lamp is not well shielded, then itsflame will flicker or even become extin-guished, and if its flame is not sufficientlyintense, the lamp’s light will be insufficientfor the task at hand (Tsongkhapa, 2002).This very basic metaphor describes the qual-ities that are indicated by the terms samathaand vipasyana: The former primarily con-cerns the stability (gnas cha) of the medita-tive state, whereas the latter concerns thatstate’s phenomenal or subjective intensity(gsal cha) (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004).

To state these features more precisely, inmeditations that involve an object, stabilityrefers to the degree to which the practitioneris able to retain focus on the object with-out interruption. In such meditations, clar-ity refers to the sharpness or vividness of theappearance of the object in awareness. Forexample, in the visualization of a coloreddisc, a completely stable meditation wouldbe one in which the meditator’s focus on theobject is not perturbed at all by other phe-nomenal events, such as emotions, thoughts,or sensory perceptions. In such a meditation,the clarity would be constituted by the disc’svividness of color and sharpness of shape.

Generally, these two aspects of a medi-tative state are understood to work some-what at odds with each other in the caseof novice meditators. That is, in the case



of a novice, the greater the stability of themeditative state, the more likely is it to lackintensity. And the greater its intensity, themore likely is its lack of stability. This tensionbetween stability and clarity is expressed inthe two main flaws that hinder a meditation:“dullness” (Tib., bying ba) and “excitement”(Tib., rgod pa). When dullness first arises, thefocus on the object will be retained, but asdullness progresses, the clarity of the objectbecomes progressively hindered, and a sen-sation of drowsiness overtakes the medita-tor. If dullness continues, the dimness of theobject will cause the meditator to lose focuson it, or in the case of gross dullness, themeditator will simply fall asleep. In contrast,when excitement occurs, the clarity of theobject will often increase, but the intensityof the mental state perturbs the meditationsuch that distractions easily arise and focuson the object is lost (Thrangu & Johnson,2004 ; Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje,1989).

In most practices, the ideal meditativestate – one beyond the novice stage – is astate in which neither dullness nor excite-ment occurs; in short, stability and clarity arebalanced perfectly. Hence, for the Tibetancontemplative traditions (and indeed, fornearly every other Buddhist tradition), itwould be incorrect to interpret Buddhistmeditation as “relaxation.” This is not todeny the importance of mental and phys-ical techniques that help the practitionerrelax. Without such techniques, an excessof physical or mental tension may develop,and when such tension occurs, excitementwill almost certainly arise. If, however, suchrelaxation techniques are overused, theyare likely to propel the practitioner intodullness and hence hinder the meditation.Indeed, from a Buddhist perspective a prac-tice that only relaxes the mind might even-tually prove harmful. That is, such a practicewould develop a great deal of dullness, andas a result the practitioner might becomewithdrawn, physically inactive, and mentallydepressed. Overall, then, Buddhist medi-tations avoid an excess of relaxation, andit is for this reason that very few prac-tices are done while lying down. It is also

worth noting that, just as the tradition con-tains techniques to ease mental or physicaltension, it also espouses methods to coun-teract an excess of relaxation or dullness(Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 ; Tsongkhapa,2002 ; Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

Although the balance of clarity and sta-bility as described above forms an overallparadigm for Tibetan Buddhist practices, itis important to recognize the ways in whichthat paradigm is modified for each practice.For example, novices hoping to develop themeditative state of Rigpa Chogzhag or “OpenPresence” may be taught to emphasize oneor another feature in order to make ini-tial headway in the practice. In short, theyare encouraged to err on the side of clar-ity, because it is more important to avoiddullness than excitement in the early stagesof that practice (Thrangu & Johnson, 1984 ;Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

The practice of Open Presence raisesanother issue: the applicability of this modelto meditations that do not focus on anobject. In objectless practice, the loss offocus on the object or its degree of phenom-enal vividness obviously cannot be taken ascriteria for the degree of stability or clarity.Instead, stability becomes a marker for theease and frequency with which the medita-tor is perturbed out of the state the medita-tion is intended to induce, and clarity refersto the subjective intensity of that inducedstate. Thus, after a session of Open Presence,a meditator who reports that the medita-tion was unstable but very clear would meanthat, although the intended state was inter-rupted repeatedly, the subjective experienceof the state was especially intense when itoccurred.

A final aspect of the basic theory of med-itation concerns the distinction between theactual meditative state (Tib., dngos gzhi) andthe post-meditative state (Tib., rjes thob).In brief, the states developed in medita-tion are usually thought to create a post-meditative effect. In some cases, some phe-nomenal aspect of the meditation persistsin the post-meditative state. For example,after a meditation in which one cultivatesthe experience of phenomenal content as



seeming dreamlike, one’s perceptions in thepost-meditative state are also said to havea dreamlike quality for at least some periodafter arising out of meditation. In other cases,the post-meditative state involves a traitchange. Meditation on love and compassion,for example, is alleged to inhibit the occur-rence of anger between meditative sessions.From the Buddhist theoretical perspective,such post-meditative changes are often atleast as important as the states induced dur-ing the meditation itself, and success in apractice is often measured by the strength ofthe effects that occur after meditation (DalaiLama XIV, 1995 ; Thrangu & Johnson, 1984 ;Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

contemporary practice and

problems of terminology

In the laboratory setting neuroscientificresearchers are likely to encounter Bud-dhists who engage in contemplative prac-tices located in three overall traditions: theVipassana or Insight Meditation movementlocated within Theravada Buddhism, theZen tradition of Japan, and the Tibetan tra-dition. One might encounter practices fromother Buddhist traditions, but the medi-tations of the aforementioned three tradi-tions are by far the most widespread. Theyare also the most likely to be practicedby persons, such as Europeans and NorthAmericans, who are not native to the cul-tures in which the practices have devel-oped (Coleman, 2002). Of these three tra-ditions, the style of meditation taught in theVipassana traditions is especially emblem-atic, because the basic meditative style ofVipassana closely resembles some founda-tional practices in the Zen and Tibetantraditions.

The Vipassana or Insight Meditationmovement consists of several loosely alliedinstitutions and individuals that teach astyle of meditation rooted in the oldercontemplative traditions of Theravada Bud-dhism in Myanmar, Thailand, and Srı Lanka.Although it draws on older traditions, theVipassana movement is “modern” in thatit makes a somewhat simplified and regu-

larized set of meditation instructions avail-able to a wide population that is not lim-ited to celibate monastics (Coleman, 2002).In its most typical form, the early stage ofVipassana practice consists largely of a basicsamatha style of meditation focused on thesensation made by the breath as it flows inand out of the nostrils, although sometimesanother aspect of the breath may be takenas the object of meditation (Gunaratana,2002). In the early stages, the aim of themeditation is to keep the attention focusedon the breath without distraction – that is,without the attention wandering to someother object, such as a sensation or a mem-ory. For beginners (and even for advancedpractitioners), the attention inevitably wan-ders, and the usual instruction is to recog-nize that the mind has wandered – for exam-ple, to see that it is now focused on the painin one’s knee, rather than on one’s breath –and then to “drop” or “release” the distrac-tion (the knee pain) and return to the breath.Part of the aim is not only to develop focusedattention on the breath but also to developtwo other faculties: a meta-awareness thatrecognizes when one’s attention is no longeron the breath and an ability to redirectthe attention without allowing the meta-awareness to become a new source of distrac-tion, as when one berates oneself for allow-ing the mind to wander (Gunaratana, 2002 ;Kabat-Zinn, 2005).

Given the description thus far, practicesvery similar to Vipassana meditation are alsofound among contemporary practitioners ofZen and Tibetan Buddhism. Indeed, it is pos-sible that the Vipassana approach to medi-tation on the breath has led Zen and Tibetanpractitioners to employ a similar style ofbreath-meditation to a much greater extentthan they have in the past. Certainly, it isclear that in contemporary Zen and Tibetanpractice, focusing the attention on the breath(or sometimes another static object) is oftenused as a means to develop the basiclevel of concentration required for moreadvanced forms of meditation. In manycases, these more advanced meditations aimto enhance the type of meta-awareness that



is cultivated during the Vipassana style ofpractice, and because the traditions havedifferent ways of understanding and enhanc-ing that meta-awareness, all three kinds oftraditions – Vipassana, Zen, and TibetanBuddhism – diverge in their practices fromthis point forward.

Although Vipassana meditation may beespecially representative of a widespreadand foundational style of practice in contem-porary Buddhism, any discussion of Vipas-sana meditation must address a problemof terminology: the often confusing use ofthe terms “mindfulness” and “awareness.”In the Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction(MBSR) designed by Jon Kabat-Zinn (2005),for example, the term “mindfulness” is usedprimarily to refer not to the focusing aspectof mind, but rather to the meta-awarenessthat surveys that focus and its relation tothe intended object. Likewise, in MBSRthe term “awareness” sometimes seems tostand primarily for attention or the focusingaspect of mind. In contrast, popular workson Tibetan Buddhist meditation, such asthe work of Thrangu (Thrangu & Johnson,2004), use these same two terms, but theirmeaning is reversed: “mMindfulness” refersto attention or focus, whereas “awareness”refers to a faculty of mind that surveys themental state at a meta-level.

The confusion in English terminologyis in part due to some confusion in theproper usage of the Buddhist technical termsthemselves. Strictly speaking, smr.ti – liter-ally, “memory” – is the focusing aspect ofmind, and historically it is often translatedas mindfulness when used in the contextof meditation. An obvious case is the com-mon technical term smr.tyupasthana (in Pali,satipat.t.hana), usually rendered as “founda-tion of mindfulness.” The problem, how-ever, is that even though smr.ti should standonly for the focusing aspect of mind, in bothpopular and technical Buddhist literature onmeditation it is not infrequently assimilatedto the meta-awareness mentioned above.One reason for this is that in the Vipassanatradition, meditations that initially empha-size smr.ti as the focusing faculty are them-

selves used as a means to thoroughly developmeta-awareness (samprajanya or prajna) ata later stage in the practice (Gunaratana,2002). It is therefore not surprising thatsmr.ti becomes closely associated with themeta-awareness, but this imprecise use ofsmr.ti has contributed to the confusion con-cerning the English terms “mindfulness” and“awareness.”

To restate the problem using the termsdiscussed earlier, we should note that suchauthors as Thrangu (Thrangu & Johnson,2004) employ the term “mindfulness” torefer to the samatha aspect of a meditativepractice – that is, the stability of the medita-tion. And these authors then use “awareness”for the vipasyana aspect of the practice; thatis, the meta-awareness that is especially asso-ciated with the clarity of the meditation.Turning then to its usage in, for example,MBSR, one finds that mindfulness refers pri-marily to the vipasyana aspect of the prac-tice, not the samatha aspect.

Although this problem is simply one ofterminology, it can prove quite confusing in alaboratory setting. In the case of Open Pres-ence practice, Tibetan meditators will usu-ally deny that their practice is of mindfulness(i.e., dran pa’i nyer gzhag), whereas in fact,they mean to say that they are emphasizingthe development of some meta-awareness ina way that has many parallels with the mind-fulness practice of Vipassana meditators orpersons trained in MBSR. For the researcher,one solution to this problem is again to beattentive to the particularities of the practicein question while keeping track of the factthat we have yet to standardize the Englishlexicon of technical terms for the analysis ofmeditation.

Another problem of terminology comeswith the use of the term samatha itself, espe-cially in its Tibetan context. Our discus-sion thus far has used the term samatha inthree basic meanings: (1) a particular state inwhich one can allegedly focus on an objectfor an unlimited period of time, (2) a styleof practice aimed at attaining that state, and(3) the aspect of any meditative state thatconstitutes its maximal stability. Already,



these three meanings can lead to consid-erable ambiguity, but the second meaningis particularly troublesome. One problem issimply that the expression “samatha medi-tation” is not sufficiently clear. That is, whenBuddhist theorists are being precise, theyrecognize that samatha meditation shouldbe rendered more properly as “meditationaimed at obtaining samatha.”

But even after this clarification, a problemremains: When one practices samatha med-itation, which kind of samatha is one tryingto obtain? In other words, is one attempt-ing to cultivate the ability to concentrate onan object for an unlimited period? Or is onetrying to cultivate some other kind of maxi-mal stability? The main problem here is that,in the Tibetan context, the term samatha isused to refer to stability in meditations thatdo not even have an object; hence, in thosecases samatha cannot relate to concentra-tion on an object. To make the matter evenmore complicated, there are Tibetan prac-tices in which samatha is used in connectionwith both kinds of meditations (i.e., withan object and without an object). Finally,even when samatha is related to practiceswith an object, the object in question maydiffer considerably; an example with neuro-scientific import is the difference betweenfocus on the breath and focus on a visualizedobject. Indeed, traditional scholars, such asThrangu (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 , p. 21),with all these issues in mind, caution theirstudents about the potential for confusioncaused by the ambiguity of technical termssuch as samatha.

As with the case of mindfulness andawareness, the problems with the term“samatha” should remind researchers thatthe particularities of a practice maybe obscured by ambiguous terminology,whether in the source language or in Englishtranslation. As a practical matter, one mayeven wish to avoid the term samatha as adescription of a practice. This is not to saythat the term should be abandoned: Clearly,for both historical and theoretical reasons,samatha must remain in the lexicon on Bud-dhist meditation. But when seeking to spec-ify exactly what a practitioner is doing dur-

ing meditation, it may be more useful to useother Buddhist terms as labels for a partic-ular practice – or perhaps researchers willdevelop new terms in dialogue with practi-tioners. Otherwise, if one is not careful, onemay be misled into believing that a wide setof disparate practices are the same because,for one reason or another, they may all becalled “samatha meditation.”

Three Meditative States inTibetan Buddhism

We have mentioned repeatedly the impor-tance of attending to the particularity ofthe contemplative tradition whose practicesmight become part of a research agenda, andwith this in mind, we now discuss brieflythree specific forms of meditation found inTibetan Buddhism. Part of our aim is to setthe ground for a discussion of these prac-tices, because they have already been thesubjects of some preliminary neuroscientificresearch, as is presented below.

All three styles of meditation come froma particular strand of contemplative prac-tice in contemporary Tibetan Buddhism.In Tibetan, a term for this style of prac-tice is Chag-zog (phyag rdzogs), a compoundthat refers to two traditions of meditation:the “Great Seal” or Chag-chen (phyag chen;Skt. Mahamudra) of the Kargyu (bka’brgyud) school and the “Great Perfection”or Dzog-chen (Karma Chagme, 2000) of theNying-ma (Rnying ma) or “Ancient” school.Although historically and institutionally dis-tinct, for the last 200 years the Great Sealand Great Perfection traditions have becomeallied so closely that it is now exceedinglyrare to find a practitioner who employs thetechniques of only one style in completeisolation from the techniques of the otherstyle. This is not to say, however, that thereare no important differences between thesetwo traditions. They differ especially in thedetails of their most advanced practices, andthey also propose slightly different tech-niques for the three meditations discussedbelow. Nevertheless, for the purposes of thebrief descriptions below, they may be treated



as constituting a single overall style of con-templative practice.

The three practices in question are Tse-cig Ting-nge-dzin (rtse gcig ting nges ‘dzin)or Focused Attention, Rig-pa Chog-zhag (rigpa cog bzhag) or Open Presence, and Mıg-me Nying-je (dmigs med snying rje) or Non-Referential Compassion. All meditators inthe Chag-zog style receive at least someinstruction in all three of these practices, andall advanced meditators will be thoroughlyfamiliar with them.

focused attention (tse-cig

ting-nge-dzin)

The Tibetan term Tse-cig Ting-nge-dzin or“Focused Attention” refers to a mental statein which the mind is focused unwaveringlyand clearly on a single object. This state,which literally translates as “one-pointedconcentration,” occurs in many practices,and it is a typical goal for novices in theChag-zog traditions. The relevant Buddhisttheories and techniques are usually drawnfrom a generic account of practices thatseek to develop samatha in the sense ofthe ability to focus on an object for anunlimited time. This generic account, some-times called “common samatha” (thun monggi zhi gnas), differs from the present con-text. That is, in actual practice, Chag-zogpractitioners of Focused Attention usuallydevelop a lesser (and often unspecified) stateof concentration before being instructed bytheir teachers to move on to other prac-tices, which no longer involve focusing onan object (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004). Nev-ertheless, the practice of cultivating FocusedAttention draws heavily on the theories andtechniques of common samatha. Perhapsthe most important principles drawn fromthat generic account can be summarizedunder six overall issues: the setting, the bodyposture, the object, the flaws that hinderprogress, the “antidotes” to the flaws, andthe stages of development in meditation(Tsongkhapa, 2002).

Although sometimes neglected in schol-arly work on Buddhist meditation, the set-ting for meditation is clearly considered bytraditional authors to be an important ele-

ment in developing the ability to concentrateon an object (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 ;Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje, 1989).One aspect of setting is the context formedby the other practices in which a medita-tor is engaged. These practices include espe-cially formal guidance received from one’spreceptor, the study of Buddhist thought,a wide range of devotional practices, andthe observance of a basic moral code basedupon non-harm (ahim. sa) and compassion.Another aspect of setting concerns the sitewhere one is to meditate. In this regard, tra-ditional accounts speak at length about theneed for a quiet place with few distractionsand adequate access to food and water. Sotoo, the spot to be used for meditation isprepared by the meditator on a daily basisby cleaning it and preparing it through vari-ous ritual activities.

Once preparations for the session arecomplete, the meditator adopts the posturefor meditation. Various styles of Tibetanmeditation involve different postures, but inthe context of developing Focused Atten-tion, the general rule is that the spinemust be kept straight and that the restof the body must be neither too tensenor too lax (Thrangu & Johnson, 1984 ;Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje, 1989).At this point, another element of thesetting – the use of memorized formulasto induce the proper conceptual attitude –is invoked, and depending on the practicein question, a number of other practices orritual activities may precede the portion ofthe practice in which one seeks to developFocused Attention.

When actually engaged in the practiceof Focused Attention, the meditator focusesthe mind on the object to be meditatedupon. This object may be a sensory object,such as a visible object in front of the med-itator, or it might be mental, such as a visu-alized image (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 ;Wangchug Dorje, 1989). In general, Tibetanpractitioners do not use the breath as anobject of meditation, except perhaps for rel-atively brief periods as a means to settle themind (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004). This trendmay be changing, however, in part because



of the modern encounter with other Bud-dhist traditions. To a great extent, the par-ticular object chosen depends largely on theparticular practice (such as tantric visual-ization or Open Presence) that forms theoverall context for the development of Focu-sed Attention.

Having placed the attention on the object,the meditator then seeks to avoid two over-all flaws: dullness and excitement. As men-tioned above, in the early stages, these flawsmanifest in a straightforward fashion. Dull-ness is detected by, for example, a dim-ming or blurring of the object and, in itsmost gross form, a sensation of drowsi-ness. The main symptom of excitement isdistraction (i.e., the intensity of the focuscauses one to be hyperaroused, and as aresult, attention wanders to other mentalcontent or phenomena; Thrangu & Johnson,1984 ; Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje,1989).

In practice, the usual technique to coun-teract excitement is to become aware of theoccurrence of the distracting content or phe-nomenon – that is, one notes the fact that themind is now attending to another object, andthen one returns the mind to the intendedobject without allowing the original distrac-tion to produce more mental distractions,such as the thought, “It is not good to be dis-tracted” (Thrangu & Johnson, 2004). Some-times excitement is also caused by physicalor environmental factors – too much ten-sion in the body or too much bright light inthe meditation area, for example. Or, excite-ment may be caused by applying too mucheffort to the meditation (i.e., being too rigidin one’s focus). Similarly, in the case of visu-alized objects, excitement might be causedby too much intensity or brightness in thevisualized object. Sometimes an affectiveremedy is used; for example, the meditatormight temporarily switch to a contempla-tion of suffering, and the affective impactof that contemplation will reduce excite-ment enough that one can return to the orig-inal object of meditation. Various visualiza-tions – such as visualizing a small black dropbehind the navel – may also be employed to

counteract excitement and allow the medi-tator to return to the original object of med-itation (Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

In terms of dullness, methods to counter-act it are often related to those that coun-teract excitement. For example, just as onemight counteract excitement by meditatingin a dimly lit room, one can counteract dull-ness by meditating in a brightly lit setting.So too, adding tension to the body or inten-sity to a visualized object can also coun-teract dullness. And in terms of affectivemethods, the meditator might temporarilycontemplate joy or compassion (and some-times even fear) so as to energize the mindenough to return to the original object. Aswith excitement, visualizations may also beemployed; for example, one may visualizea white dot on one’s forehead at the pointbetween the eyes (Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

For advanced meditators, many of the“antidotes” mentioned here are too coarse,and they would lead to an overcorrection inthe meditation. For these practitioners, thesubtle degree of dullness or excitement thatthey encounter is corrected by equally sub-tle adjustments to the clarity (for dullness)or the stability (for excitement) of the med-itation state until both stability and clarityreach their maximal, balanced state.

The notion that advanced meditatorsemploy different responses to flaws in med-itation raises the final relevant issue intraditional accounts; namely, the theoriesabout the progression of stages in medita-tion. Many contemplative traditions speakof ascending stages through which the prac-titioner passes; a typical account speaks ofnine levels of progressively higher degreesof concentration along with correspondingchanges in the meditator’s response to dull-ness and excitement (Thrangu & Johnson,1984 ; Tsongkhapa, 2002 ; Wangchug Dorje,1989). This schema, however, is far morecomplicated than it seems, and as Apple(2003) demonstrates, the Buddhist pen-chant for scholasticism makes this topic anextremely complicated one when it is con-sidered in its fullest form. Without goinginto great detail, it is important to note that,



according to these schemas, a single prac-tice may progress gradually through a num-ber of meditative states, but some of thosestates might differ significantly from eachother both phenomenally and in terms of theappropriate technique to be applied. Like-wise, the mental and physical effects of apractice may build gradually; for example,as one’s level of concentration improves,mental and physical well-being is also saidto increase But some effects occur only atsome stages and do not progress further(Tsongkhapa, 2002).

In terms of the most relevant effects thatare traditionally expected to arise from thispractice, the main result of Focused Atten-tion is a greater ability to concentrate anda concomitant decrease in susceptibility tobeing perturbed out of a concentrated state.The practice is also thought to increase notonly the stability of one’s concentration butalso its intensity. At the higher levels of prac-tice, this type of meditation is also said toreduce the need for sleep, and during themeditation it is thought to induce pleasur-able sensations, including a lightness or pli-ancy of mind and body.

open presence (rig-pa chog-zhag)

Open presence or Rig-pa Chog-zhag is oneof the main meditative states that practition-ers following the Chag-zog style of practiceattempt to cultivate. The basic motivationfor the practice is rooted in a Buddhist axiommentioned earlier: Namely, that one’s neg-ative emotional habits and behaviors arisefrom a set of mental flaws that cause oneto consistently misconstrue both one’s iden-tity and also the objects toward which thoseemotions and behaviors are directed. Asnoted above, those flaws are meant to becorrected by vipasyana meditation throughwhich one cultivates an accurate under-standing of the nature of one’s identity andthe nature of objects in the world. In thissense, Open Presence may be considereda particular version of vipasyana. Chag-zogtheorists, however, have a unique under-standing of what it means to gain the under-standing or “wisdom” (Tib. ye shes) that

counteracts flaws by seeing the true nature ofidentity and objects. And because the prac-tice involves many discursive strategies thatare based upon an underlying theory, onemust have some sense of those theoreticalunderpinnings. Hence, even though our pre-sentation aims to focus on empirical descrip-tions of what practitioners actually do, a briefforay into more abstract theory is neces-sary. Our theoretical discussion is based onthree authors who are typical of the Chag-zogtraditions: Karma Chagme (2000), Thrangu(Thrangu & Johnson, 2004), and WangchugDorje (1989). Our concise and thematic pre-sentation, however, might not be satisfac-tory to a strict traditionalist, in part becausethe issues involved are notoriously difficultto explain. Nevertheless, from an academicand anthropological standpoint, this presen-tation should suffice to convey the main the-oretical issues relevant to this style of con-templation as it is practiced currently.

Theoretical Background. When justifyingand explaining the types of practices thatinduce Open Presence, Chag-zog theorists,such as Karma Chagme (2000), Thrangu(Thrangu & Johnson, 2004), and WangchugDorje (1989), argue that, properly speaking,objects are only known through experience;it is nonsensical to speak of objects sepa-rate from experience. Likewise, experienceof an object necessarily involves a subjectthat experiences the object, and it is there-fore nonsensical to speak of objects withoutspeaking of a subject. The theoretical linch-pin is that the nature of both objects andsubjects is that which characterizes themunder any circumstances – it must be essen-tial to them, rather than accidental. Andwhat is essential to them is that they alwaysoccur within experience. Hence, to know thenature of objects and subjects is to know thenature of experience (Thrangu & Johnson,2004).

Whatever may be the philosophical mer-its of such an analysis, Chag-zog practi-tioners are thus aiming to understand thenature of experience – that which is essen-tial to any instance of experience, regard-less of the accidental and changing features



of the objects or subjectivities involved. Todo so, they employ a set of techniquesthat are intended to make the practitioneraware of the invariable feature of all expe-riences. They speak of this invariable fea-ture using various descriptions, includingRigpa, “Awareness,” or, using the metaphorof light, Selwa (gsal ba), “Luminosity” or“Clarity.” But whether called Awareness,Clarity, or some other synonym, the pointis that the invariant element in experience isthat which, from a phenomenal standpoint,makes it possible for the subject-object rela-tion to be presented in experience.

As the alleged invariant in all states ofknowing, Awareness contrasts with featuresthat are accidental (i.e., not essential) toany given cognition; namely, the particu-lar features of the object and subject occur-ring within the cognition. What is accidentalabout the object are its characteristics, suchas color or shape. And what is accidentalabout a subject is, for example, its temporallocation in the narrative of personal iden-tity or the particular emotional state thatis occurring with the subjectivity. Hence, ameditative technique that enables the prac-titioner to know Awareness or Clarity mustsomehow avoid attending to the particular-ities of object and subject and grant accessinstead to the fact of knowing itself. Theproblem, according to Chag-zog theorists, isthat untrained persons are deeply entangledin the accidental features of experience; gen-erally, they focus especially on the features ofthe object, and occasionally they are explic-itly aware of themselves as subjects. But ineither case, untrained persons are not awareof what is invariant in those experiences.

To overcome this problem, the variouslineages of contemplative practice that fallunder the rubric of Chag-zog propose dis-tinct techniques, but one common approachis based upon a move toward subjectivityin meditation. The notion here is that theinvariant aspect of experience is closely tiedto the reflexive awareness (Tib. rang rig) thatenables one to have memories of oneself asan experiencing subject. On this theory, asan object is being presented to an experienc-ing subject, reflexive awareness also presents

the process or occurrence of that experi-ence either passively or involuntarily. ForChag-zog theorists, this faculty of appercep-tive presentation is a derivative form of themore fundamental Awareness that is thebasic nature or structure of consciousnessitself. Hence, a meditative technique thatremoves the cognitive features that usuallyobscure the implicit reflexivity of experienceis one that moves that practitioner closerto an understanding of that fundamentalAwareness.

Above we noted that even the earli-est forms of vipasyana meditation seem toinvolve some form of meta-awareness thatsurveys the meditative state in such a waythat it enables one to know whether onehas lost the focus on the object. Likewise,that same type of meta-awareness servesto determine whether or not dullness andexcitement are occurring. Thus, even inthese other forms of vipasyana practice, oneencounters a type of reflexivity, inasmuchas the meditative state is meant to involvean awareness of the state itself. With this inmind, one can think of the Chag-zog prac-tice of cultivating Open Presence as empha-sizing this aspect of vipasyana practice toits furthest possible point. This practice dif-fers from other meditations, however, in thattheoretically it is taking an implicit aspect ofall cognitions – a fundamental form of reflex-ivity – and making it phenomenally accessi-ble to the practitioner.

On this theoretical understanding ofOpen Presence, two features of the practiceare especially salient. First, in other medi-tations that fall under the general rubric ofvipasyana, one cultivates a faculty of mindthat is best described as a meta-awareness;it is “meta” in that it is dependent upon themindfulness (smr.ti) that is focusing the mindon the object at hand. As noted above, thismeta-awareness surveys the mind itself so asto determine, for example, whether it is dullor excited. Thus, inasmuch as it focuses oncognition itself, the meta-awareness is reflex-ive, and to this degree it resembles the typeof state cultivated in the practice of OpenPresence. The difference, however, is thatin Open Presence the prefix “meta” would



be inappropriate; instead, it is assumed that,rather then being attendant upon the basicfaculty of mindfulness – i.e., the faculty thatfocuses on an object – the reflexive aspectof mind is actually more fundamental thanmindfulness. In other words, mindfulnessmust occur with an object, but the possi-bility of objects being presented in experi-ence is itself rooted in a more fundamentalreflexivity.

The second distinctive aspect of OpenPresence is that, unlike other meditations,at advanced stages of the practice there is noattempt either to suppress or to cultivate anyparticular mental content. One does not fo-cus, for example, on a visualized image or ona sensory object, such as a sensation made bythe breath. In this sense the state of OpenPresence is objectless. Nevertheless, eventhough higher levels of the practice do notinvolve any particular content or object, italso is important for content to be occurringin the mind because to cultivate an aware-ness of the invariant nature of experience,one must be having experiences. Indeed, forbeginners it is preferable that the experi-ences be especially striking or clear. Thus,even though the meditation is objectless, itis not a state of blankness or withdrawal. Sen-sory events are still experienced, sometimeseven more vividly. In terms of technique, thisfacet of the meditation is indicated by thefact that one meditates with the eyes openand directed somewhat upward.

Basic Practice. The actual state of OpenPresence is one in which the meditatoris aware of the Clarity or Awareness thatmakes all cognitions possible. This state isa relatively advanced one, and even experi-enced practitioners may not be able to sus-tain it for more than a short period of time.There are, however, a series of practices thattrain inexperienced meditators to cultivateOpen Presence, and even experienced prac-titioners sometimes modulate their practiceso as to move up or down the scale of prac-tices, depending on how well the particularsession is proceeding.

Schematically, we use the diagram in Fig-ure 19.1 to summarize the stages of the styleof practice that leads to Open Presence:

Figure 19.1.

This diagram is based especially on thestyles of Chag-zog practice exemplified byKarma Chagme (2000), Thrangu (Thrangu& Johnson, 2004), and Wangchug Dorje(1989),and their works are the main tex-tual sources for the presentation below.It is important to note, however, thatthe diagram suggests a trajectory of actualpractice that, although clearly implicit inthese authors’ writings, is not explicit.Nevertheless, this way of presenting theflow of the practice has the advantage ofbeing far less complicated than traditionalpresentations.

As Figure 19.1 illustrates, in this style ofpractice the overall trajectory begins with ameditation that develops concentration onan object. One then employs techniquesthat cultivate an awareness of subjectivityin a manner that de-emphasizes the object.In doing so, one gains phenomenal accessto the reflexive awareness that is thoughtto be invariant in cognition. One then de-emphasizes subjectivity as well so as to fur-ther enhance that access to reflexivity, andfinally one practices so as to move to thepoint where the invariant aspect of aware-ness is realized fully in meditation. Through-out this entire process the close guidance ofan instructor is considered essential.

This style of practice generally beginswith the development of Focused Attention(i.e., concentration on a particular objectas described previously). Initially retainingsome focus on the object, one then cultivates



attention to the state of the subjectivityobserving the object. This is in part accom-plished by discursive strategies that areimplemented after a certain level of concen-tration and mental calm has been reached.In one such strategy, one is instructed to askquestions about the object, such as, “Is itinside the mind or outside the mind?” Or,when an appearance arises, one observes itand asks, “Where did it arise from?” Or asit abides in the mind, one asks, “Where isit abiding?” Or as it disappears, one asks,“Where did it go?” These questions and sim-ilar discursive strategies are used to trainone to see the object as just a phenom-enal appearance and to create the subjec-tive impression that the appearance is notsomething separate from one’s mind. As ameans to heighten one’s awareness of subjec-tivity, the same types of questions are thenapplied to the phenomenal appearance asmind (with questions such as, “What coloris the mind?” “What shape is the mind?”),which has the effect of pointing out the man-ner in which the phenomenal content is acci-dental to the experience. Along with or inlieu of such strategies, a deliberate perturba-tion – such as a sudden shout – may be intro-duced into the meditation so that the effectson subjectivity will be especially salient.

The move to an emphasis on subjectivityis further encouraged by dropping any delib-erate focus on an object. As a sensory con-tent or mental event occurs, one observesit (sometimes along with the momentaryuse of a discursive strategy), and then onereleases any focus on it. This is similar to theVipassana practice discussed above, exceptthat after releasing the content or event onedoes not return to any object. Instead, onereleases the mind into its “natural state” (rangbabs), which one understands to be the statereflecting only the invariant nature of con-sciousness and not the accidental propertiesof subject and object.

One is also repeatedly reminded by one’sinstructor that “grasping” (’dzin pa) – takingthe mental content as an object – is to beavoided. Here, the gross symptoms of grasp-ing include indications that one has begunto focus on or examine the content or eventand then elaborate upon it – in a phrasing

often employed in oral instructions, one isnot to “follow along” (rjes su ’brang ba) achain of thoughts. A much subtler indica-tion of grasping, however, is simply the factthat, in phenomenal terms, the appearanceor event seems separate from the subjectivityin the experience. Thus, when one “releases”objects, one must do so with the understand-ing that the objects actually are not sepa-rate from awareness itself, of which the sub-jectivity is also just a facet. This attitude isinitially developed through discursive strate-gies, which seem to play a crucial role indeveloping Open Presence.

Having become adept at emphasizingsubjectivity –attending to the state of one’sawareness without construing its contentsas separate from the subjectivity – the nextstage of the practice involves techniquesthat de-emphasize subjectivity itself. The-oretically, this is accomplished in part byone’s facility at releasing objects. That is,because awareness is construed as subjec-tivity in relation to objects, the practice ofreleasing objects will also erode subjectivity.But another important aspect of this stageof practice is not to grasp onto subjectivityitself as an object. That is, as one is attempt-ing to abide in a state that is aware and yetnot focused on an object, one may still havea sense of subjectivity that is caught up in anidentity that extends beyond the particularmoment – as such, that sense of an identity isconsidered an accidental feature of the statebecause it changes over time.

One of the many remedies employed hereis the repeated (and somewhat paradoxical)instruction not to make an effort to meditate.In other words, for the meditator a persistentway that the sense of “I” manifests wouldbe in the form of a thought, such as, “I ammeditating.” Such a thought involves con-ceptual and linguistic structures that con-nect to a sense of “I” located in the past andthe future. And because that way of locat-ing subjectivity – essentially as a narrativeagent – changes from one cognitive contextto the next, it is a type of subjectivity thatis thought to obscure the invariant featureof consciousness. According to most tradi-tional accounts, it is extremely difficult tode-emphasize subjectivity to this degree. As



a result, most beginner and mid-range med-itators engaged in the cultivation of openpresence are likely to be actually meditatingat the level below this stage; that is, the stageat which subjectivity is still emphasized.

Through the above techniques – alongwith other methods that involve visualiza-tions and breathing exercises – advancedmeditators are thought to eventually inducea particular phenomenal experience: Theexperience’s content does not appear as anobject over against a subject, and the expe-rience also does not involve a sense of sub-jectivity that is articulated by conceptualor linguistic structures, even if those struc-tures are only implicit. It is worth reiterat-ing, however, that in de-emphasizing bothobject and subject, the aim of the practice isnot to become withdrawn from experiences,whether perceptual or mental. Instead, theaim is for experiences to continue to occureven though the state de-emphasizes theparticularity of the object and subject. It isin this way that, according to Chag-zog theo-rists, one will become aware of the invariantfeature of all states of consciousness.

Finally, at the highest level of practice,what we have described as a de-emphasisof both object and subject moves, at leasttheoretically, to a point where no elementsof objectivity or subjectivity – whether inthe form of conceptual structures, categoriesof time and space, or some other feature –remain in the experience. At this point, theinvariant feature of cognition is said to berealized fully by the meditator, and this is thefull-blown state of Open Presence. It seemsthat because this state is extremely advancedin each generation of practitioners the Chag-zog traditions recognize only a small numberof practitioners as having truly reached thislevel of practice.

In terms of the effects of the practice,one ability developed through cultivatingOpen Presence is the stability of the state –that is, one is not easily perturbed out of thestate. The difference, however, is that unlikein Focused Attention, in Open Presencethe stability is not constituted by the factthat other phenomena do not pull oneaway from the object on which one focuses.Instead, stability consists of one’s ability to

continue to experience phenomena with-out objectifying them and, ideally, with-out having a sense of an agentive or nar-rative subjectivity. The state thus seems tocultivate a type of ipseity or bare aware-ness. After a session, for advanced medi-tators the objects of perception will phe-nomenally appear to be less fixed and morelike appearances in a dream or a miragefor at least some period afterward. And asone advances further, the state between ses-sions begins to seem more like Open Pres-ence itself. The relevant longer-term traitsthat are expected to arise from cultivatingOpen Presence include most prominentlya facility to regulate one’s emotions, suchthat one is disturbed less easily by emotionalstates. The mind is also said to be moresensitive and flexible, and the cultivationof other positive states and traits is there-fore greatly facilitated. All three of our maintraditional sources (Karma Chagme, 2000;Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 ; Wangchug Dorje,1989) make it clear that these and otherindications are thought to be observable inbehavior, because it is through observing andinterviewing students that the meditationmaster is able to guide them in this difficultpractice.

non-referential compassion

(mıg-me nying-je)

Unlike practices oriented toward gener-ating Focused Awareness or Open Pres-ence, the practice of Non-ReferentialCompassion aims to produce a specificemotional state; namely, an intense feelingof lovingkindness.5 The state is necessar-ily other-centered, but it is non-referential(dmigs med) in that it does not have any spe-cific object or focus (dmigs pa), such as aspecific person or group of persons. Thus,in effect this meditation has two aspects:the cultivation of compassion and the cul-tivation of objectless awareness (i.e., OpenPresence). Hence, this practice may be con-sidered a kind of variation on Open Pres-ence, but it also differs somewhat from OpenPresence. That is, except for the earlieststages of the practice, in Open Presencethe meditator does not usually require anyparticular mental content or event as the



context for the cultivation of Open Presence.But in the cultivation of Non-ReferentialCompassion, one does require a particularmental event – the emotion of compassion –that forms the context for the cultivationof the objectless awareness that is OpenPresence.

The two aspects of Non-ReferentialCompassion – compassion and Open Pres-ence – must occur together for the med-itation to be successful (Wangchug Dorje,1989), but although precise descriptions ofthis practice are not readily available, itappears that for many practitioners this prac-tice requires a sequence within the session.In some cases, a meditator may first cultivateOpen Presence and then cultivate compas-sion while retaining the state of Open Pres-ence to the greatest degree possible. Aftercompassion has been evoked, the meditatormay then emphasize Open Presence onceagain, because the techniques for cultivat-ing compassion may have led the medita-tor to stray from an objectless state. In othercases, a meditator may begin by first evok-ing compassion, and then, while the mindis suffused with compassion, the meditatorwill cultivate Open Presence.

The sequentiality of the practice, whichdoes not apply to the most advanced prac-titioners, stems largely from the methodsthat are initially used to evoke a compas-sionate mental state. These methods oftencombine multiple techniques, most espe-cially a discursive strategy (usually the stepsof a memorized argument), a set of visu-alizations, and sometimes a litany or otherrecitation. In all the Tibetan traditions, threesuch meditations are widely practiced: the“Sevenfold Causal Instructions” (sems bskyedrgyu ’bras man ngag bdun), the “EquanimousExchange of Self and Other” (bdag bzhanmnyam brjes), and the practice of “Givingand Taking” (gtong len) (Dalai Lama XIV,1991, 1995).

All three of these practices, which them-selves may be combined in various ways, typ-ically begin with an evocation of equanimity(btang snyoms, Skt, upeks. a). Often a visu-alization of three persons is used: a belovedperson (most especially one’s mother), a per-son for whom one has some enmity, and

a person toward whom one feels indiffer-ence. With a visualization of these personsin place, one then employs discursive strate-gies – such as the argument that all beings areequal in wanting to be happy and wishing toavoid suffering – that are designed to elimi-nate one’s biases toward these persons. In theSevenfold Causal Instructions, one is thenencouraged not only to see all beings as equalbut also to take one’s mother as paradig-matic of all beings. Another set of discur-sive contemplations – sometimes includingspecific visualizations – are then used to dis-place one’s preferential treatment of oneselfover others. One contemplates, for example,how despicable one would be to prefer one’sown happiness over the well-being of one’smother; here, the practitioner might recalla memorized aphorism or the admonitionsof his or her teacher. Finally, by recallingor visualizing the intense suffering experi-enced by others – i.e., “all sentient beingswho are as if one’s mother” (ma sems canthams cad) – one becomes motivated empa-thetically to eliminate that suffering. Towardthe endpoint of this process one experiencesa visceral, emotional reaction that is saidto involve especially a feeling of opening atthe center of the chest, sometimes accom-panied by horripilation and the welling oftears in the eyes. This state involves both love(matrı) – the aspiration that other beings behappy – and compassion (karun. a) – the aspi-ration that other beings be free of suffer-ing. At this point the state might involve adegree of sentimentality, and the final phaseof developing compassion is meant to gobeyond that state to one that is both morestable and also more engaged with aidingothers (Dalai Lama XIV, 1991).

Most Tibetan practitioners are trainedintensively in this type of contemplationfor generating compassion. It is evident,however, that these techniques for induc-ing compassion are not objectless, inas-much as they involve visualizations, argu-ments, aphorisms, litanies, and so on that arefocused on objects of one kind or another.Nevertheless, having generated compassion,the practitioner can then cultivate OpenPresence from within that state. Indeed, asa phenomenally intense state, compassion



is well suited to the early stages of cul-tivating Open Presence, because compas-sion’s intensity lends itself well to an aware-ness of subjectivity and, hence, reflexivity.And if the emotional state of compassioncan be sustained even while one is cultivat-ing Open Presence, the meditator is in thestate of Non-Referential Compassion. As ameditator becomes more adept at cultivat-ing compassion through the various tech-niques mentioned above, the mind becomesmore habituated to the state such that anadvanced practitioner can induce the stateof compassion almost effortlessly. At thisstage the practice would no longer requirea sequence; that is, compassion can be cul-tivated directly within a state of Open Pres-ence itself (Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

In general the cultivation of compassionis thought to grant the meditator numerousbeneficial effects between sessions, such ascreating a general sense of well-being andaiding in counteracting anger or irritation.Long-term practitioners of this practice arealso said to have an effect on others aroundthem, in that other persons nearby may alsofeel a greater sense of well-being and happi-ness. Compassion is also thought to providebenefits when one is in a meditative sessioninvolving other practices. It is especially use-ful for counteracting torpor in meditation;that is, it is a considered a strong antidotefor dullness, as mentioned earlier. Likewise,because compassion is other-centered, it isconsidered to develop traits that are essentialfor the successful cultivation of Open Pres-ence. That is, in developing Open Presenceone must eliminate the mind’s “grasping”directed toward objects and also toward sub-jectivity itself. Grasping, moreover, is rootedin a persistent trait within the mind thatabsolutizes the standpoint of the subject. Bypersistently orienting the meditator towardothers, compassion lessens this fixation onself and makes it possible for grasping tobe eliminated through the practice of OpenPresence. In this way, the cultivation of com-passion is thought to train the mind in a waythat is essential to the success of some prac-tices (Dalai Lama XIV, 1991, 1995 ; KarmaChagme, 2000; Thrangu & Johnson, 2004 ;Wangchug Dorje, 1989).

Generating a Description

As the discussion above indicates, evenwithin Buddhism a large number of distinctcontemplative practices continue to be prac-ticed in living traditions. For this reason,significant changes in meditative style arefound even for a basic samatha style of med-itation focused on the sensation made bythe breath. For instance, practitioners fromthe Vipassana or Insight Meditation move-ment may practice this meditation with theeyes closed so as to de-emphasize the impor-tance of the visual modality. In contrast, clos-ing the eyes is rarely encouraged in the Zenand Tibetan traditions, in part because it isassumed to induce dullness or drowsiness.

The difference of opinion concerning theclosing of the eyes is illustrative of the dif-ficulties that researchers face when speci-fying the exact nature of a meditation tobe studied. One main problem is that thetraditional accounts of these practices movefar beyond the sketches given here; instead,those accounts are usually highly detailedand extremely complex. Likewise, the ter-minology used to describe the practicesis sometimes unreliable, either because ofambiguities in the traditions themselves orproblems in translation. Practices from dif-ferent traditions may in fact overlap signifi-cantly – the overlap between contemporaryMindfulness practice and Open Presencemeditation is one case in point. Finally, sub-jects from traditionally Buddhist culturessometimes are reluctant to depart from tex-tual descriptions of meditative practices. Todo so would require a practitioner to assertsome authoritative experience as a medita-tor, and it is usually thought to be inappro-priate to claim that degree of accomplish-ment in meditation.

Researchers may also encounter problemswhen attempting to assess the degree oftraining and practice over the life of a par-ticular practitioner. One of the main diffi-culties is that, traditionally, contemplativepractice involves many varieties of medita-tion, each of which mutually influence eachother and differentially affect the mind. Thequantification of the total hours of medita-tion throughout a practitioner’s life is thus



not straightforward and will require furthermethodological development.

In any case, before tackling the prob-lem of quantification, an important task forany researcher is generating a precise andconcrete account of the practices in whichmeditating subjects claim to be engaged. Thebest way to proceed is probably to developa list of questions that can be used tohelp prompt descriptions from practitionerswithout getting caught either in traditionalcategories or issues of cultural translation. Toassist researchers in this task, we close thissection on Buddhist meditation with a prac-tical series of sample questions that wouldaid both the meditator and researcher indefining more clearly the relevant facets ofthe practice to be studied. The questionsaddress five overall issues: (1) the relativedegree of stability and clarity appropriate tothe practice; (2) the “intentional modality”(i.e., whether the meditation has an object);(3) the techniques, such as breath manipu-lation, that are employed; (4) the expectedeffects of the practice during meditation;and (5) the expected effects after a session.Although based especially on the practiceand theory of meditation found in TibetanBuddhism, questions of this type are likelyto be useful when examining other contem-plative traditions.

1. Concerning stability and clarity, one mayask the following:� In view of the practitioner’s level,

should the meditation favor stability,clarity, or a balance?� What are the indications that stability

needs adjustment?� What are the indications that clarity

needs adjustment?2 . Concerning intentional modality, one may

ask the following:� If the meditation includes an object,

then,� Is there one object or many objects in

the meditation?� For each object, is the object dynamic

or static?� If the object includes or consists of

a visual form, a sound, or a sen-sation, then is the object perceived

through the senses, or is it imaginedin the mind through visualization oranother technique?

� If the meditation does not include anobject, then does one direct one’s atten-tion to something else?

3 . Concerning meditative techniques, one mayask the following:� Is the practice done with the eyes

opened or closed?� Does the practice employ any discur-

sive strategies, such as recitations, mem-orized descriptions, or arguments thatone reviews?

� Does the practice use breath mani-pulation?

� Does the meditation involve focus-ing on different parts of the body bymeans of a visualization or some othertechnique?

� Does the practice require a specific pos-ture or set of physical exercises?

4 . Concerning expected effects during medita-tion, one may ask the following:� Is the meditation expected to pro-

duce any physical sensations ormental events, either constantly orintermittently?

� Does one expect the meditation toproduce subjectively noticeable alter-ations in cognition, either constantly orintermittently? One example would bethe impression that one’s perceptionsseem to be like the appearances in adream.

� Is the meditation expected to causeany emotions, either constantly orintermittently?

5 . Concerning expected effects after medita-tion, one may ask the following:� Does one expect the meditation to alter

one’s cognitions? One example wouldbe the impression that one’s percep-tions are more vivid.

� Does one expect the meditation to alterone’s behavior? One example would bea tendency to sleep less.

� Does one expect the meditation to alterone’s emotions? One example would bethe tendency to recover more quicklyfrom emotional disturbances.



By adapting or adding to this list of ques-tions for the particular practice in question,meditators and researchers may be able tocollaborate more readily so as to describe ina straightforward way the major features ofa practice that are relevant to a particularneuroscientific research agenda. With suchdescriptions in place, the dialogue betweenmeditators and researchers can be far moreprecise, and the interaction between neuro-science and meditation is therefore likely tobe more fruitful.

The Intersection of Neuroscienceand Meditation

This section briefly explores some possi-ble scientific motivations for the neuroscien-tific examination of meditative practices andtheir possible impact on the brain and bodyin advanced practitioners. The aim here is toclarify further the distinguishing features ofthis approach compared to other empiricalstrategies described in this handbook. Beforewe move forward with this discussion, how-ever, two points of clarification need to bemade. First, because of the relative paucityof currently available empirical data in thisfield, this section remains largely program-matic. Second, we discuss some studies thatinvolve novice meditators, but the set ofissues examined here are most relevant toadvanced practitioners of meditation. Nev-ertheless, emphasis on advanced practition-ers should not minimize the importance ofstudying meditation in less practiced individ-uals. Indeed, some of us have already done so(see, e.g. Davidson et al., 2003). For progressin this general area to advance, we believethat research on practitioners at all levelsshould be encouraged, but one must also rec-ognize that the goals of studying individualsat different levels of accomplishment differsomewhat.

Turning now to the question of advancedpractitioners, we begin by noting three fre-quently advanced hypotheses:

1. Advanced practitioners can generate newdata that would not exist without susta-ined mental training. These data encom-

pass either meditative states or traits indu-ced by meditation. Meditative states referto the transient alterations of experiencevoluntarily cultivated by a given medita-tion practice (i.e., bodily awareness, relax-ation, emotions, and so on). Traits referto the lasting changes in these dimen-sions that persist in the practitioner’s dailyexperience irrespective of being activelyengaged in meditation.

2 . Advanced practitioners can robustlyreproduce specific features in experienceas cultivated in given meditative practice.This reproducibility makes those featuresscientifically tractable.

3 . Advanced practitioners provide morerefined first-person descriptions of theirexperiences than naıve subjects. Thus, theneurophysiological counterpart of thesefirst-person accounts can be defined,identified, and interpreted more easily bythe experimentalist.

We now discuss these claims in relation tothree neuroscientific agendas: neuroplastic-ity, the interaction of mind and body, and thepossibility of neural counterparts to subjec-tive experience. In the course of this discus-sion, specific techniques from the Buddhisttradition serve as illustrations.

Transforming the Mind andBrain Neuroplasticity

From a neuroscientific perspective, the firstpromising claim made by Buddhist con-templative traditions is that experience isnot a rigid, predetermined, and circum-scribed entity, but rather a flexible and trans-formable process. On this view, emotions,attention, and introspection are ongoing andlabile processes that need to be understoodand studied as skills that can be trained, sim-ilar to other human skills like music, math-ematics, or sports. This principle is founda-tional for Buddhist contemplative practice,because such practices are based upon thenotion that the mind is malleable in this way.As a result, the methods employed by Bud-dhist contemplative practices resonate withwidely accepted developmental models ofbasic cognitive processes; according to these


52 0 the cambridge handbook of consciousness

models, cognitive functions are skills thatcritically depend upon learning from envi-ronmental input (e.g., McClelland & Rogers,2003 ; Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Thisbasic stance reflects another well-acceptedand well-documented theory; namely, thatexperience changes the brain. Interest inthis feature, known as neuroplasticity, hasprompted an explosion of research over thepast decade.

As a result of ongoing research on neu-roplasticity, we now have a detailed under-standing of many of the molecular andsystem-level changes that are produced byspecific types of experiential input. Forexample, neonatal rodents exposed to vary-ing levels of maternal licking and groom-ing develop very different behavioral pheno-types. Those animals that receive high levelsof licking and grooming (the rodent equiva-lent of highly nurturing parenting) developinto more adaptable and relaxed adults. Ofgreat interest is the fact that the brains of theanimals are critically affected by this differ-ential rearing. Indeed, gene expression forthe gene that codes for the glucocorticoidreceptor is actually changed by this experi-ence, and the detailed molecular pathwaysby which experience can alter gene expres-sion have now been worked out in this model(Meaney, 2001). This program of researchillustrates the profound ways in which neu-roplasticity can unfold, and it demonstratesthat experience-induced alterations in thebrain can occur all the way down to the levelof gene expression.

Meaney’s work on alterations in braingene expression implies that similarexperience-induced alterations might occurin humans. Currently, however, there areno direct measures of localized neuronalgene expression that can be non-invasivelyobtained in humans. Nevertheless, otherresearch suggests that such changes doindeed occur. For instance, the brain ofan expert, such as a chess player, a taxidriver, or a musician, is functionally andstructurally different from that of a non-expert. London taxi cab drivers have largerhippocampi than matched controls, and theamount of time the individual has worked

as a cab driver predicted the size of theposterior hippocampus (Maguire et al.,2000). Further work by this group suggeststhat these differences in hippocampal sizeare the results of experience and trainingas a cab driver and not a consequence ofpre-existing differences in hippocampalstructure (Maguire et al., 2003).

Whether similar structural alterations indifferent regions of the brain occur also as aconsequence of affective – rather than sen-sorimotor – experience is not definitivelyknown, but all of the extant work at boththe animal and human levels indicates thatit does. Certainly there are good animaldata to suggest that such changes occur, asindicated by the study on neonatal rodents.In humans, a variety of research indicatesthat deleterious conditions, such as chronicstress, neglect, and abuse, produce func-tional changes in the brain that are likelysubserved by structural alterations (Glaser,2000). Likewise, research on depressionindicates that patients with mood disordersexhibit structural differences in several brainregions, including the hippocampus and ter-ritories with the prefrontal cortex; signif-icantly, at least some of these differencesare associated strongly with the cumulativenumber of days of depression in the patients’lifetimes (Sheline, 2003).

These findings raise the possibility thattraining and practices that are specificallydesigned to cultivate positive qualities, suchas equanimity and lovingkindness, will pro-duce beneficial alterations in brain functionand structure. Presumably, these alterationswould be most prominent in long-term,advanced practioners, but we have alreadyshown that even very brief short-term train-ing (30 minutes) in emotion regulation canproduce reliable alterations in brain function(Urry et al., 2003). So too, we have observedthat a 2-month course in Mindfulness-BasedStress Reduction (MBSR) can produce alter-ations in patterns of prefrontal brain activ-ity that we have previously found toaccompany positive affect (Davidson et al.,2003).

The findings concerning MBSR may beespecially relevant, because MBSR is likely


meditation and the neuroscience of consciousness 52 1

to provide a large pool of persons for thestudy of neuroplasticity and meditation. An8-week program that was originally devel-oped in a hospital setting for patients withchronic illnesses, MBSR is now appliedacross an extremely wide range of popu-lations (Kabat-Zinn & Chapman-Waldrop,1988; Kabat-Zinn, Lipworth, & Burney,1985). The method, based primarily onBuddhist practices, seems to be effectivefor chronic pain, anxiety disorders, gen-eral psychological well-being, psoriasis, andrecurrent depression (Grossman, Niemann,Schmidt, & Walach, 2004). The programseems to work by helping the patient dis-tinguish primary sensory experience (e.g.,chronic pain, physical symptoms of anxiety)from the secondary emotional or cognitiveprocesses created in reaction to the primaryexperience. Individuals are trained to use themindfulness practice to elicit the details oftheir experience and to directly perceive theunstable and contingent nature of the feel-ings and sensations that are associated withaversion and withdrawal; as a result, indvid-uals are better able to counter any propensitytoward withdrawal and aversion in responseto physical or psychological pain.

From a neuroscientific perspective, theapparent effectiveness of MBSR practiceraises the question of neuroplasticity – that,is, does it produce alterations in brain func-tion and structure? Recent data indicatea possible relationship between medita-tion training and changes in brain structure(Lazar et al., 2005). In this study, corti-cal thickness was assessed using magneticresonance imaging. Increased cortical thick-ness could be caused by greater arboriza-tion per neuron, increased glial volume, orincreased regional vasculature, all of whichare important for neural function. Corti-cal brain regions associated with attention,interoceptive, and sensory processing werefound to be thicker for a group of mid-rangepractitioners than for matched controls (themeditator participants had, on average, 40

minutes of daily practice of Insight medita-tion for an average of 9 years). We antici-pate that research conducted over the next2 years by several groups will further exam-

ine possible anatomical changes induced bymeditation.

Mechanisms of Mind-Body Interaction

In addition to the study of neuroplasticity,one of the most potentially fruitful ques-tions in the study of meditation is the impactof training the mind on peripheral biolog-ical processes that are important for phys-ical health and illness. Quite literally, thequestion here is whether mental training canaffect the body in a way that will have a sig-nificant impact on physical health. Althoughthere are many popular claims about thehealth benefits of meditation and contem-plative practice, there is relatively little thatis solidly known about this potentially cru-cial issue. Even more importantly, there arepreciously few attempts to mechanisticallylink the changes that are occurring in thebrain with alterations that may be producedin peripheral biology. It is beyond the scopeof this chapter to review the basic researchrelevant to these questions, but it providessome general guidelines and examples.

It is established that there is bidirectionalcommunication between the brain and theperiphery and that this communication pro-ceeds along three basic routes: the auto-nomic nervous system, the endocrine sys-tem, and the immune system. In each ofthese systems, specific pathways and sig-naling molecules enable this bidirectionalcommunication to occur. These structuralcharacteristics are highly relevant to thepossibility that meditation may influencephysical health. That is, some conditionsof peripheral biology may be potentiallyaffected by meditative practices becausethose conditions – such as an illness –are susceptible to modulation by the auto-nomic, endocrine, and/or immune pathwaysinvolved in brain-periphery communication.Thus, because there is bidirectional com-munication between the brain and periph-ery, it is theoretically possible to affect thosetypes of conditions by inducing changesin the brain through meditation. At thesame time, however, other conditions or ill-nesses may not be influenced in this way by



Control Meditation

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Figure 19.2 . Effect of meditation training on the immune system during aMindfulness-Based Stress Reduction program (8-week program) with novicepractitioners. Means ± SE antibody increase from the 3 - to 5 -week to the 8- to9-week blood draw in the Meditation and Control groups. The ordinate displaysthe difference in the log-transformed antibody rise between the 3 - to 5 -week andthe 8- to 9-week blood draws derived from the hemagglutination inhibitionarray. (From Davidson et al., 2003 .)

meditation because the peripheral biologicalprocesses in question cannot be affected byany pathway involved with brain-peripherycommunication.

With this in mind, the strategy that wehave adopted in some of our work is toexamine a proxy measure that we know canbe modulated by central nervous changesand that is health-relevant. In a seminalstudy, Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, Gravenstein,Malarkey, and Sheridan (1996) reportedthat caregivers of dementia patients had animpaired response to influenza vaccine com-pared with a matched control group. Severalgroups have now independently replicatedthis basic finding and have examined someof the details regarding the mechanism bywhich stress might impair humoral immu-nity (e.g., Miller et al., 2004).

In our group, we have investigatedwhether individual differences in patterns ofprefrontal brain activity that we have pre-viously found to be associated with affec-tive style (i.e., individual differences in pro-files of affective reactivity and regulation)are also associated with differences in anti-

body response to the influenza vaccine. Wefound that individuals with high levels ofleft prefrontal activation, a pattern that wehave previously found to predict more pos-itive dispositional mood, had higher levelsof antibody titers in response to the vac-cine (Rosenkranz et al., 2003). The spe-cific question of whether mental trainingcould improve the immune response wasaddressed in our study of MBSR (David-son et al., 2003 ; Figure 19.2). In this study,individuals who had been randomly assignedto an MBSR group were compared to await-list control group. Subjects were testedjust after the MBSR group had completedtheir 8-week training. We found that themeditators exhibited a significantly greaterantibody response to the influenza vaccine.Of most importance in this study was ananalysis we conducted that examined rela-tions between brain and immune functionchanges with meditation. We found that forthe individuals assigned to the meditationgroup, those who showed the greatest shifttoward left-sided activation also exhibitedthe largest increase in antibody titers to the



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Figure 19.3 . Effect of Tummo meditation of the regulationof body temperature. Skin and air temperature and heart ratechanges before, during, and after the meditation of long-termpractitioner L.T. (adapted from Benson et al., 1982).

vaccine. These findings suggest some associ-ation between the magnitude of neural andimmune changes.

A variety of other findings in the litera-ture suggest that autonomic changes occurduring specific types of meditation. Asnoted in the first part of this chapter, theTibetan Tummo practice has as its byprod-uct the production of heat. Benson and hiscolleagues reported on three practitionersand found that, by using this practice, theywere indeed able to voluntarily increase tem-perature in their toes and fingers by as muchas 8

◦C (Figure 19.3 ; Benson et al., 1982).Takahashi et al. in a study of Zen medita-tion in a fairly large sample (N = 20) foundchanges in heart rate variability (reflect-ing parasympathetic nervous system activ-ity) that were associated with changes inspecific EEG frequencies (Takahashi et al.,2005). In future studies, the combination ofboth brain and peripheral measures will beimportant in helping understand the mecha-nisms by which such peripheral changes maybe occurring. This type of data will be espe-cially useful as research moves forward onthe practical question of whether meditative

practices can affect the body in a way thatimproves health.

Using First-Person Expertise to Identifythe Neural Counterpart ofSubjective Experience

As discussed in the first section of this chap-ter, various meditative practices induce awide variety of altered states of conscious-ness. It is thus frequently claimed that thestudy of meditation will contribute to ourgeneral understanding of the neural basis ofconsciousness. Here we aim to move beyondthis general claim and illustrate how specificBuddhist practices might provide researchopportunities to glean new insights aboutsome of the brain mechanisms contributingto consciousness. More precisely, we discusshow the collaboration with long-term Bud-dhist practitioners is of great interest in thestudy of (1) the physical substrate of sub-jectivity or the self, (2) the physical prin-ciples underlying the emergence of coher-ent conscious states from unconscious brainprocesses, and (3) the functional role of thespontaneous brain baseline.



studying the substrate

of subjectivity

One of the useful points of intersectionbetween Buddhist contemplative practiceand the neuroscience of consciousness is theemphasis on understanding the nature of theself. A comparison between Buddhist andneuroscientific models of the self is beyondthe scope of this chapter, but it is impor-tant to note that both traditions distinguishbetween a minimal subjective sense of “I-ness” in experience, or ipseity, and a narrativeor autobiographical self. Ipseity is the mini-mal subjective sense of I-ness in experience,and as such, it is constitutive of a minimal orcore self. By contrast, a narrative or autobio-graphical self (Legrand, 2005) encompassescategorical or moral judgment, emotions,anticipation of the future, and recollectionsof the past. This explicit sense of narra-tive or autobiographical self is often char-acterized as occurring in correlation with anexplicit content, or object, of experience. Italso appears to be dependent in some fash-ion on ipseity, inasmuch as the narrative selfis in part based upon that minimal subjectivesense of I-ness.

The notion of ipseity is further explainedthrough Western phenomenological theory,according to which one can speak of experi-ence in terms of both transitive and intran-sitive modes of consciousness. Any experi-ence “intends” (i.e., refers to) its intentionalobject; this is its transitive aspect. At thesame time, the experience is also reflexive-ly manifest to itself, and this is its intransi-tive aspect. On this theory, the intransitiveaspect of experience is a form of self-consciousness that is primitive inasmuch asit (1) does not require any subsequent actof reflection or introspection, but occurssimultaneously with awareness of the object;(2) does not consist of forming a belief ormaking a judgment; and (3) is passive inthe sense of being spontaneous and involun-tary (Zahavi & Parnas, 1998). For instance,when one consciously sees an object, oneis also at the same time aware of one’sseeing; similarly, when one visualizes a men-tal image, one is also aware of one’s visualiz-ing. This tacit self-awareness has often been

explained as involving a reflexive awarenessof one’s lived body or embodied subjectiv-ity correlative to the experience of the object(Mearleau-Ponty, 1962 ; Wider, 1997). It is, inshort, another way of speaking about ipseity.

If the above model is correct, then ingiving an account of consciousness, neuro-science needs to explain both “how the brainengenders the mental patterns we experi-ence as the images of an object” and “how,in parallel . . . the brain also creates a senseof self in the act of knowing . . . ” In otherwords, to give an account of consciousness,neuroscience must show how it is that onehas a “sense of me” by demonstrating “howwe sense that the images in our minds areshaped in our particular perspective andbelong to our individual organism” (Dama-sio, 1999, pp. 136–137). As a number ofcognitive scientists have emphasized, thisprimitive self-consciousness might be fun-damentally linked to bodily processes of liferegulation (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1988).

This approach to the question of con-sciousness suggests a research strategy thatmight be aided by the use of experiencedmeditators. That is, to understand conscious-ness, it is presumably best to begin by exam-ining it in its simplest form. And on this the-ory, the simplest form of a conscious state isreducible to ipseity, which is required for oris prior to the narrative self. One experimen-tal strategy would be to involve long-termpractitioners of a practice such as Open Pres-ence that allegedly induces a state in whichipseity is emphasized and the narrative selfis lessened or eliminated. By examining suchpractices, one may be able to find neural cor-relates of a bare subjectivity, which in turnmay yield some insight into the neural cor-relates of the most basic type of coherentstates that we call consciousness.

studying the substrate

of consciousness

Empirical evidence clearly indicates thatonly a selective set of neurons in the brainparticipates in any given moment of con-sciousness. In fact many emotional, motor,perceptual, and semantic processes occurunconsciously. These unconscious processes



are usually circumscribed brain activities inlocal and specialized brain areas (Dehaene& Naccache, 2001). This result suggests that,when a stimulus is phenomenally reportablefrom the standpoint of experience, it isthe result of translocal, large-scale mecha-nisms that somehow integrate local func-tions and processes. In other words, it hasbeen hypothesized that the neural activ-ity crucial for consciousness most probablyinvolves the transient and continual orches-tration of scattered mosaics of functionallyspecialized brain regions, rather than any sin-gle, highly localized brain process or struc-ture (Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Llinas,Ribary, Contreras, & Pedroarena, 1998; W.Singer, 2001; Tononi & Edelman, 1998).

The issue at stake here can be illus-trated by the example of binocular rivalry.When the right eye and the left eye are pre-sented with competing, dissimilar images,the observer does not experience a stablesuperimposed percept of the images pre-sented to the two eyes, but instead per-ceives an ongoing alternation between theimages seen by each eye every couple of sec-onds. When one percept is consciously per-ceived, the other remains unconscious. Yet,even if a stimulus is not reportable, thereis evidence it is still processed by the brainin various ways. Activity in the amygdala,which is known to increase during the pre-sentation of facial expressions of fear andanger, is still detectable even when the emo-tional face is suppressed because of binoc-ular rivalry (Williams, Morris, McGlone,Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004).

Binocular rivalry suggests that local neu-ral processes – such as those involved in theprocessing of visual stimuli – are not in them-selves sufficient to account for conscious-ness. In other words, the neural processoccurs, but may or may not be consciouslyexperienced. Some other process or mech-anism must be involved. It is in responseto this type of issue that contemporaryresearchers (Llinas et al., 1998; Singer, 2001;Tononi & Edelman, 1998) have hypothe-sized some kind of integrative mechanismsor processes that, although transient, areable to orchestrate or coordinate function-

ally specialized brain regions. A commontheoretical proposal is that each moment ofconscious awareness involves the transientselection of a distributed neural popula-tion that is both integrated or coherent,and differentiated or flexible, and whosemembers are connected by reciprocal andtransient dynamic links. As we show inthe next section, neural synchronizationand de-synchronization between oscillatingneural populations at multiple frequencybands are popular indicators of this large-scale integration (Engel, Fries, & Singer,2001; Varela, et al. 2001). For instance, dur-ing the binocular rivalry discussed abovethe alternation of perceptual dominancecorrelates with different ongoing patternsof distributed synchronous brain patterns(Cosmelli et al., 2004 ; Srinivasan, Russell,Edelman, & Tononi, 1999).

Thus it is hypothesized that large-scaleintegrative mechanisms play a role in con-scious processes. However, these large-scalebrain processes typically display endoge-nous, self-organizing behaviors that cannotbe controlled fully by the experimenter andare highly variable both from trial to trial andacross subjects. Linking these brain patternsto the experiential domain is notoriously dif-ficult in part because the first-person reportsare readily inaccurate or biased (Nisbett &Wilson, 1977). The problem, in a nutshell,is that the experimenter is led to treat asnoise the vast majority of the large-scalebrain activity, as he or she can neither inter-pret it nor control it.

It is in this context that meditationbecomes relevant. We hypothesize thatlong-term practitioners of meditation cangenerate more stable and reproducible men-tal states than untrained subjects and thatthey can also describe these states moreaccurately than naıve subjects. The prac-titioners’ introspective skills could providea way for experimenters to better control,identify, and interpret the large-scale inte-grative processes in relation to the subjectiveexperience.

This “neurophenomenology” approach(Varela, 1996) was tested in the context ofa visual protocol with naıve subjects. On



the day of the experiment, participants werefirst trained during a practice session to beaware of subtle fluctuations from trial totrial in their cognitive context as defined bytheir attentive state, spontaneous state pro-cesses, and the strategy used to carry out thetask. During the visual task, their electricalbrain activity and their own report abouttheir cognitive context were recorded. Tri-als were clustered according to the acquiredfirst-person data, and separate, dynamicalanalyses were conducted for each cluster.Characteristic patterns of synchrony in thefrontal electrodes were found for each clus-ter, depending in particular on the sta-bility of attention and the preparation todo the task (Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie, &Varela, 2002).

As discussed in the report by Lutz andThompson (2003), the collaboration withlong-term practitioners will be particularlyrelevant to the further extension of thisresearch strategy. Let us return again to thebinocular rivalry paradigm. The perceptualselection in rivalry is not completely underthe control of attention, but can be mod-ulated by selective attention (Ooi & He,1999). Evidence suggests in particular thatthe frequencies of the perceptual switchcan be controlled voluntarily (Lack, 1978).It is possible that long-term practitionersof Focused Attention meditation can gaina more thorough control of the dynamicof perceptual switch than naıve subjectsand that they can also refine their descrip-tions of the spontaneous flow of perceptualdominance beyond the mere categories ofbeing conscious of one or another percept,thereby leading possibly to new brain cor-relates. Carter et al. (2005) recently pro-vided behavioral evidence that long-termpractitioners can indeed change the rivalryrate during meditation. They reported differ-ential effects on visual switching accompa-nying rivalry during Non-Referential Com-passion meditation and Focused Attentionmeditation (see the earlier discussion onmeditative states in Tibetan Buddhism)among 23 Tibetan Buddhist monks vary-ing in experience from 5 to 54 years oftraining. Compassion meditation led to no

modification in rivalry rate, in contrast withFocused Attention meditation, which led toextreme increases in perceptual dominancedurations that were reported by 50% ofmonks after a period of single-pointed med-itation. The monks reported additional sta-bilization of the visual switching when theydid the visual task during Focused Attentionmeditation.

In sum, the capacity of long-term prac-titioners to examine, modulate, and reporttheir experience might provide a valuableheuristic to study large-scale synchronousbrain activity underlying conscious activityin the brain.

meditation and physiological

baselines

A central goal of the practice of meditation isto transform the baseline state of experienceand to obliterate the distinction betweenthe meditative state and the post-meditativestate. The practice of Open Presence, forinstance, cultivates increased awareness ofa more subtle baseline (i.e., ipseity) duringwhich the sense of an autobiographical ornarrative self is de-emphasized. Long-termtraining in Compassion meditation is saidto weaken egocentric traits and change theemotional baseline. Practitioners of Mind-fulness/Awareness meditation aim to expe-rience the present nowness, and this typeof meditation affects the “attentional base-line” by lessening distractions or daydream-like thoughts. In this way, meditative prac-tices are generally designed to cultivatespecific qualities or features of experiencethat endure through time relatively indepen-dent of ongoing changes in somatosensory orexternal events. These qualities are thoughtto gradually evolve into lasting traits.

From an empirical standpoint, one way toconceptualize these various meditative traitsis to view them as developmental changesin physiological baselines in the organism.Finding ways of systematically characteriz-ing these baselines before, during, and aftermental training is thus crucial for the empir-ical examination of the long-term impact ofmeditation. A systematic characterization ofbaselines in the context of meditation is also



an important methodological issue becausean essential aspect of experimental researchis the identification and control of a base-line against which the condition of inter-est can be contrasted. Underestimating thisissue is a potential source of confusion whenstudying meditation practitioners, particu-larly long-term practitioners, because thecontrast between the initial baseline and themeditative state might be biased by a base-line difference between groups (i.e., novicesversus adepts).

When conceptualizing the notion of abaseline, perhaps the most useful approachis to consider a baseline in terms of thecapacity for living systems to maintain theiridentity despite the fluctuations that affectthem. Indeed, for many theorists this abil-ity is one of the most fundamental biologi-cal roots of individuality, if not subjectivityitself (Maturana & Varela, 1980). This basicnotion of homeostatic identity is the intu-ition that underlies the concept of a baselinein various domains. In the context of medita-tion, the notion of a baseline is clearly mean-ingful in relation to “raising the baseline” bydeveloping traits that persist outside of anymeditative state. In the scientific context,the concept of a baseline plays an impor-tant role in characterizing a broad variety ofbiological phenomena. Similarly, in psychol-ogy a baseline state is defined as a restingstate by comparison to a task-specific state(say the task of remembering a successionof numbers). In an even broader, ecologicalcontext, psychologists attempt also to iden-tify regularities or traits in the average ongo-ing states of an individual (e.g., mood andpersonality). Areas of biology that study liv-ing processes at a systemic level – such asthe level of the cell, the organism, or theimmune system – also use the notion of thebaseline to convey the idea that somethingremains constant in the system through time.Such features would include, for example,the electrical charges of the neuron, the glu-cose level in the blood system, and bodytemperature. It is important to note that,in all these contexts, the functional invari-ance of a given baseline provides informationabout the homeostatic mechanisms that reg-

ulate and maintain the organization of thesystem even amid environmental perturba-tions. It is in this sense that the notion of abaseline is related to the ongoing identity ofan organism. And given the sensitivity thatmost contemplative traditions show to thistype of issue, the search for baseline changesthroughout the continuum of mental train-ing is a general strategy that can potentiallybe applied to clarify mind-brain-body inter-actions at many explanatory levels, includ-ing brain chemical, metabolic, or electricalactivity; the immune system; the cardiovas-cular system; and the hormonal system.

This idea can be illustrated with the caseof metabolic and electrical brain baselines.Investigation of the metabolic brain baselinebegan following the finding that in an awakeresting state, the brain consumes about 20%of the total oxygen used by the body, despitethe fact that it represents only 2% of thetotal body weight (Clark & Sokoloff, 1999).This finding raises the question of the func-tional significance of this ongoing consump-tion of energy by the brain. Interestingly,brain imaging techniques that permit anexamination of baseline levels of brain activ-ity have suggested that this global activa-tion at rest is not homogeneously localizedin the brain. There are a consistent set ofbrain areas active at rest with eyes closed, aswell as during visual fixation and the passiveviewing of simple visual stimuli. The roleof these activated areas is revealed from theattenuation of their activity during the per-formance of various goal-directed actions.Because the activity in these areas is asso-ciated with the baseline activity of the brainin these passive conditions, Raichle and col-league have suggested that they are function-ally active, although they are not “activated”(Gusnard & Raichle, 2001). In contrast tothe transient nature of typical activations,the presence of this functional activity in thebaseline implies the presence of sustainedinformation processing.

Our current understanding of the func-tional role of these tonically active networksis still limited. Evidence from brain imagingindicates that the posterior part of this toni-cally activated network (posterior cingulate



cortex, precuneus, and some lateral poste-rior cortices) is important for the continuousgathering of information about the worldaround and possibly within us, whereas theanterior part (ventro- and dorsoventral pre-frontal cortices) is important for the ongo-ing association among sensory, emotional,and cognitive processes that participate inspontaneous self-referential or introspec-tively oriented mental activity (Gusnard &Raichle, 2001). One can speculate that, giventhe nature of many meditations, these brainareas activated in the resting brain will befunctionally affected by long-term medita-tive practices.

Similarly, the awake, resting brain isassociated with a well-defined neuroelec-tric oscillatory baseline different from theone during sleep, anesthesia, or activemental activity. Changes in this baselineindex are implicated in developmental pro-cesses in children, aging, cognitive IQ, andmental disorders (Klimesch, 1999). Alongthese same lines, we found a group differ-ence in the initial premeditation baselinebetween long-term Buddhist practitionersand novices, suggesting some impact of long-term mental training (Lutz, Greischar, Rawl-ings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004). The num-ber of hours of formal meditation during thelifetime of long-term Buddhist practition-ers correlates with some oscillatory proper-ties of the brain electrical baselines. Further-more, we showed that the post-meditationbaseline was affected by the meditation ses-sion, and this suggests a short-term effectof meditation on the EEG baseline (Figure19.4). In any case, this question of a neuro-electric baseline and its relation to mentaltraining is a fruitful one, and it is currentlybeing investigated, as is discussed in moredetail in the next section.

To summarize, our functional under-standing of the brain and body baselinesremains largely incomplete, and given theimportance played by some notion of a base-line in most meditative traditions, it is likelythat our understanding will be significantlyadvanced by understanding those meditativepractices that, above all else, aim to trans-form the “baseline of the mind.”

Neuroelectric and NeuroimagingCorrelates of Meditation

The search for the physiological correlatesof meditation has been centered essentiallyon three groups: Yogis and students of Yogain India, adherents of Transcendental Med-itation (TM; Becker & Shapiro, 1981) inthe United States, and practitioners of Zenand Tibetan Buddhism in Japan, the UnitedStates, and South Asia (India, Nepal). His-torically, the first studies took place in Asiain the 1950s with advanced yogic practi-tioners in India (Das & Gastaut, 1955) andwith long-term Zen practitioners in Japan(Kasamatsu & Hirai, 1966). Since the 1970s,meditation research has been done almostexclusively in the United States on prac-titioners of TM (Becker & Shapiro, 1981);over 500 studies have been conducted todate. Compared to the degree and sophis-tication of the training of practitioners inthe early studies conducted in Asia, TMresearch relied mainly on the experienceof relatively novice Western practitionersusing mostly a single standard relaxationtechnique.

Since the late 1990s, we have witnessed arenewed interest in research on meditation.Various researchers have begun the explo-ration of a broad range of meditative prac-tices inspired by various traditions – suchas Zen, Tibetan Buddhism, Yoga, and Qi-gong – involving novices, patients, or long-term practitioners. Academic research insti-tutions are starting to express an interestin this area as epitomized by the Mindand Life meetings at MIT in 2003 and ameeting co-sponsored by the John Hop-kins School of Medicine and the George-town School of Medicine in November 2005

between the Dalai Lama, along with otherBuddhist scholars, and neuroscientists (Bari-naga, 2003).

This new, broad interest has been fosteredby several factors. First, the neurobiology ofconsciousness and cognitive, affective, andsocial neuroscience have become central andaccepted areas of research in neurosciencesover the last two decades, which lendslegitimacy to the research on meditation.



Controls

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Figure 19.4. Relative EEG gamma power during non-referential compassionmeditation in a group of novices and a group of long-term Buddhistpractitioners. a–b. Intra-individual analysis on the ratio of gamma (25–42 Hz) toslow oscillations (4–13 Hz) averaged through all electrodes. a. The abscissarepresents the subject numbers, the ordinate represents the difference in themean ratio between the initial state and meditative state, and the black and redstars indicate that this increase is greater than two and three times, respectively,the baseline standard deviation. b. Interaction between the subject and the statefactors for this ratio (ANOVA, F(2 ,48) = 3 .5 , p < .05). IB (initial baseline), OB(ongoing baseline) and MS (Fischer, 1971 #68). The relative gamma increaseduring meditation is higher in the post-meditation session. In the initial baseline,the relative gamma is already higher for the practitioners (p < .02) than thecontrols and correlates with the length of the long-term practitioners’meditation training through life (adapted from Lutz et al. 2004).

Second, because meditative practices, suchas Yoga or Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduc-tion (MBSR), are now used routinely in themedical environment, clinicians recognizethe need to validate its impact on the brainand the body.

Neuroelectric Correlates ofMeditative States

Since 1950s, the electrophysiological mea-sure of brain or autonomic system has beenthe most popular imaging tool with whichto study meditation.

Electroencephalography (EEG: Cooperet al., 2003) is a non-invasive techniquethat measures the electrical potentials on thescalp. EEG has an excellent temporal reso-lution in the millisecond range that allowsthe exploration of the fine temporal dynamicof neural processes. Below we discuss somebasic findings about the nature and functionof brain oscillatory processes as measuredby electrophysiology, present some commontheoretical assumptions about the neurody-namic basis of consciousness, and review theneuroelectric correlates of various medita-tive styles.

oscillatory neural synchrony and

consciousness

In 1929, Hans Berger recorded for the firsttime a human brain’s EEG and reportedthe presence of several brain rhythms inthese signals (Berger, 1929). Since Berger’sfirst observation, the various ongoing brainoscillations have been used successfully tocharacterize mental states, such as sleep, thewaking state, or vigilance, and mentalpathologies, such as epilepsy. Sensory evo-ked potentials (EEG signals triggered by anexternal stimulation) or the Bereitschaftpo-tential (a “readiness EEG potential” that canbe recorded over motor areas up to 1 s beforethe execution of a movement) have demon-strated that such mental factors as sensation,attention, intellectual activity, and the plan-ning of movement all have distinctive elec-trical correlates at the surface of the skull(Zeman, 2001).

Even though EEG results may be alsocontaminated by muscle activity, EEG oscil-lations are believed to reflect mostly thepost-synaptic activity of neurons, in partic-ular from the neocortex. More precisely,when a large population of neurons recordedby a single electrode transiently oscillates atthe same frequency with a common phase,



their local electric fields add up to produce aburst of oscillatory power in the signal reach-ing the electrode (Nunez, Wingeier, & Sil-berstein, 2001). The amplitude, or power,of these EEG oscillations thus provides acoarse way to quantify the synchronizationof a large population of oscillating neuronsbelow an electrode.

Oscillatory neural synchrony is a funda-mental mechanism for implementing coor-dinated communication among spatially dis-tributed neurons. Synchrony occurs in thebrain at multiple spatial and temporal scalesin local, regional, and long-range neuralnetworks. At the cellular level, oscillatorysynchrony, or phase synchrony, refers to themechanism by which a population of oscil-lating neurons fires their action potentialsin temporal synchrony with a precision inthe millisecond range. At the populationlevel, neuronal synchrony is best analyzedby looking at the common average oscil-latory neural activity among the popula-tion. This oscillatory activity can be mea-sured either from the local field potentials(the summated dendritic current of localneural groups) or from the macroscale ofscalp recordings in EEG (Becker & Shapiro,1981) and magnetoencephalography (MEG);Srinivasan et al., 1999). The emergence ofsynchrony in a neural population dependson the intrinsic rhythmic properties of indi-vidual neurons, on the properties of the net-work (Llinas et al., 1998), and on the inputsdelivered to the network. As a general princi-ple, synchrony has been proposed as a mech-anism to “tag” the spatially distributed neu-rons that participate in the same processand, consequently, to enhance the salienceof their activity compared to other neurons(Singer, 1999).

The functional and causal roles of syn-chrony are still an active area of researchand depend on the spatial scale at whichthese phenomena are analyzed. In particular,it is useful to distinguish between two mainscales, short range and long range. Short-range integration occurs over a local net-work (e.g., columns in the primary visualcortex), distributed over an area of approx-imately 1 cm, through monosynaptic con-

nections with conduction delays of 4 to 6

ms. Most electrophysiological studies in ani-mals have dealt with short-range synchroniesor synchronies between adjacent areas cor-responding to a single sensory modality.These local synchronies have usually beeninterpreted as a mechanism of perceptualbinding – the selection and integration ofperceptual features in a given sensory modal-ity (e.g., visual Gestalt features).

Large-scale integration concerns neuralassemblies that are farther apart in thebrain and are connected through polysy-naptic pathways with transmission delayslonger than 8 to 10 ms (Schnitzler & Gross,2005 ; Varela et al., 2001). In this case, syn-chrony cannot be based on the local cellulararchitecture, but must instead reside in dis-tant connections (cortico-cortical fibers orthalamocortical reciprocal pathways). Thesepathways correspond to the large-scale con-nections that link different levels of thenetwork in different brain regions to thesame assembly. The underlying mechanismof long-range synchrony is still poorly under-stood (for a model see Bibbig, Traub, & Whit-tington, 2002). Long-range synchronizationis hypothesized to be a mechanism for thetransient formation of a coherent macro-assembly that selects and binds multimodalnetworks, such as assemblies between occip-ital and frontal lobes, or across hemispheres,which are separated by dozens of millisec-onds in transmission time. The phenomenonof large-range synchrony has received con-siderable attention in neuroscience becauseit could provide new insights about theemergent principles that link the neuronaland the mental levels of description. Sev-eral authors have proposed that these mech-anisms mediate several generic featuresof consciousness, such as unity (Varela &Thompson, 2001), integration and differen-tiation (Tononi & Edelman, 1998), transi-toriness and temporal flow (Varela, 1999),and awareness of intentional action (Free-man, 1999). In this view, the emergence of aspecific coherent global assembly underlinesthe operation of any moment of experience.The transition from one moment to the nextwould be subserved by desynchronization



of some coherent assemblies and the syn-chronization of new ones. It has also beenhypothesized that whether a local processparticipates directly in a given consciousstate depends on whether it participatesin a coherent, synchronous global assembly(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Engel et al.,2001).

Neural synchronies occur in a broad rangeof frequencies. Fast rhythms (above 15 Hz)in gamma and beta frequencies meet therequirement for fast neural integration andthus are thought to play a role in consciousprocesses on the time scale of fractions ofa second (Tononi & Edelman, 1998; Varela,1995). Fast-frequency synchronies have beenfound during such processes as attention,sensory segmentation, sensory perception,memory, and arousal.

Yet neural synchrony must also be under-stood in the context of the slower alpha andtheta bands (4–13 Hz), which play an impor-tant role in attention, working memory(Fries, Reynolds, Rorie, & Desimone, 2001;von Stein, Chiang, & Konig, 2000), and sen-sorimotor integration (Burgess & O’Keefe,2003 ; Rizzuto et al., 2003). This evidencesupports the general notion that neural syn-chronization subserves not simply the bind-ing of sensory attributes, but the overallintegration of all dimensions of a cognitiveact, including associative memory, affectivetone and emotional appraisal, and motorplanning.

So far, oscillatory synchrony has beeninvestigated mostly on oscillatory signalshaving the same rhythms. More complexnon-linear forms of cross-band synchroniza-tion, so-called generalized synchrony (Schiff,So, Chang, Burke, & Sauer, 1996), are alsoexpected and may indeed prove more rele-vant in the long run to understanding large-scale integration than strict phase synchro-nization (Le Van Quyen, Chavez, Rudrauf,& Martinerie, 2003).

Considering the general importance ofneural synchrony in brain processing, it is notsurprising that scientists interested in medi-tation have tried to study its electrical braincorrelates as early as the 1950s (Das & Gas-taut, 1955 ; Wenger & Bagchi, 1961). Since

then, more than 100 studies have investi-gated the tonic changes in the ongoing EEGfrom a restful state to a meditative state orthe modulatory, or phasic, effect of medi-tation on the electrical brain responses toexternal sensory stimuli (for reviews, seeAndresen, 2000; Davidson, 1976; Delmonte,1984 ; Fenwick, 1987; Pagano & Warrenburg,1983 ; Schuman, 1980; Shapiro & Walsh,1984 ; West, 1980, 1987; Woolfolk, 1975).

The majority of these EEG studiesfocused on the change in the brain’s oscil-latory rhythms, particularly in the slow fre-quencies (alpha and theta rhythms). It isimportant to keep in mind that such mea-sures reflect extremely blurred and crudeestimates of the synchronous processes ofthe ∼10

11 neurons in a human brain. Becauseslow oscillations have high electrical voltagesthat make them visually detectable, earlystudies only reported coarse visual descrip-tions of EEGs. Changes in fast-frequencyoscillations during meditation have beenrarely reported (with the notable exceptionof Das & Gastaut, 1955 , and more recentlyLutz et al., 2004) possibly because the lowervoltage of these oscillations requires spec-tral analysis instead of simple visual inspec-tion. The investigation of fast-frequency syn-chrony during meditation has become morecommon since the 1990s following a devel-oping understanding of its functional role inthe “binding problem.”

In addition to spectral analysis, medita-tion has also been characterized with mea-sures of coherence or long-distance phasesynchrony (LDS) (Fries et al., 2001). Thesemeasures quantify the dynamic couplingbetween EEG channels over distant brainregions. Coherence is the frequency correla-tion coefficient, and it represents the degreeto which the frequency profiles of two dis-tant areas of the head, as reflected in theelectrical signals detected by scalp elec-trodes, are similar. LDS measures the instan-taneous phase relationship between signalsat a given frequency (Lachaux, Rodriguez,Martinerie, & Varela, 1999). LDS provides amore direct measure of phase-locking thancoherence because it can separate the effectsof amplitude and phase in the interrelations



between signals. Thus, LDS can test moreprecisely the assumption that phase syn-chrony is involved in long-distance neu-ronal integration. Because of the non-linearnature of brain processes, these linear anal-ysis approaches are likely to characterizeonly partially the functional properties ofsynchronous activity. Yet, complementarynon-linear analysis of brain dynamics dur-ing meditation has only just started to beexplored (Aftanas & Golocheikine, 2002).

In the selective summary of the liter-ature below, we review only those EEGstudies published in top-tier journals and/orthose that focused on the study of long-termpractitioners.

transcendental meditation

TM is a passive meditation adapted for West-erners from the Vedic or Brahmanical tradi-tions of India. The subject sits quietly, withthe eyes closed, repeating a Sanskrit sound(mantra), while concentrating on nothingand letting the mind “drift” (Morse, Martin,Furst, & Dubin, 1977). The continued prac-tice of TM supposedly is said to lead to anexpansion of consciousness or the attain-ment of “cosmic” or “pure, self-referral con-sciousness” (Maharishi, 1969). The techni-que is described as “easy, enjoyable and doesnot involve concentration, contemplation orany type of control” (R. K. Wallace, 1970).

The standard EEG correlate of TM isan increase in alpha rhythm amplitude, fre-quently followed by a slowing in frequencyby 1–3 Hz and a spreading of this pattern intothe frontal channels (R. K. Wallace, 1970).An increase in bursts of theta oscillations (4–7 Hz) has also been reported. Global fronto-central increases in coherence in alpha (6–12 Hz), as well as in theta frequency rangesbetween baseline and TM practice, havebeen found frequently (for reviews and for amodel of TM practice see Travis, Arenander,& DuBois, 2004)).

The dominant frequency in the scalp EEGof human adults is the alpha rhythm. Itis manifest by a peak in spectral analysisaround 10 Hz and reflects rhythmic alphawaves (Klimesch, 1999; Nunez et al., 2001).Alpha oscillations are found primarily over

occipital-parietal channels particularly whenthe eyes are closed, yet alpha activity canbe recorded from nearly the entire uppercortical surface. During wakefulness, it is abasic EEG phenomenon that the alpha peakreflects a tonic large-scale synchronization ofa very large population of neurons. This low-frequency global neural activity is thought tobe elicited by reciprocal interactions amongthe cortex, the reticular nucleus, and the tha-lamocortical (Delmonte, 1985) cells in otherthalamic nuclei (Klimesch, 1999; Nunez etal., 2001; Slotnick, Moo, Kraut, Lesser, &Hart, 2002) even if cortico-cortical mech-anisms also play a possible role (Lopes daSilva, Vos, Mooibroek, & Van Rotterdam,1980).

Because an overall decrease in alphapower has been related to increasing deman-ds of attention, alertness, and task load, alphaactivity is classically viewed as an “idlingrhythm” reflecting a relaxed, unoccupiedbrain (Klimesch, 1999). Large-scale alphasynchronization blocks information process-ing because very large populations of neu-rons oscillate with the same phase andfrequency; thus, it is a state of high integra-tion but low differentiation. Within a band-width of perhaps 2 Hz near this spectralpeak, alpha frequencies frequently producespontaneously moderate to large coherence(0.3–0.8 over large interelectrode distance(Nunez et al., 1997). The alpha coher-ence values reported in TM studies, as a traitin the baseline or during meditation, belongto this same range. Thus a global increaseof alpha power and alpha coherence mightnot reflect a more “ordered” or “integrated”experience, as frequently claimed in TM lit-erature, but rather a relaxed, inactive mentalstate (Fenwick, 1987).

In contrast, alpha desynchronizationreflects actual cognitive processes in whichdifferent neuronal networks start to oscillatelocally at different frequencies – typicallyin higher frequencies (>15 Hz), as well asslower rhythms (4–15 Hz) – and with differ-ent phases, reflecting local processing of spe-cialized neuronal circuitries, such as thosefor attention, vision, memory, emotion,and so on. Large-scale synchrony between



distant neuronal assemblies oscillating at var-ious frequencies reflects an active coordina-tion of functionally independent networks;in short, it reflects a state of high inte-gration and high differentiation. Thus, theslow frequency activity (<13 Hz) found dur-ing TM meditation, combined with the fre-quent finding of decreased autonomic activ-ity, has been interpreted by many authorsas reflecting hypoarousal or a relaxed state(Delmonte, 1984 ; Holmes, 1984 ; Pagano &Warrenburg, 1983).

Yet, the “idling” model of alpha activityhas been extended recently to account fornew findings. Alpha oscillation can, paradox-ically, increase locally over specific regionsor also across specific areas while the subjectis actively focusing his or her attention onan object or while holding in mind infor-mation (memory load during retention, forinstance). Slow rhythms (4–12 Hz) can thusalso be involved in active mental statesrequiring attention, working memory, orsemantic encoding (Ward, 2003). This alphamodel still remains compatible with theidling model because on this view, alpharhythms during mental activity reflect activeinhibition of non-task-relevant cortical areas(Klimesch, 1999).

Because TM is described as a passive med-itation without active control or concentra-tive effort, the EEG picture found duringTM meditation can still be interpreted asreflecting mainly hypoarousal or a relaxedstate. Yet, it is also possible that the ongoingrepetition of the mantra, which involves, forinstance, some form of attention and work-ing memory, can lead to an active exclusionof some brain processes compatible with anincrease in alpha activity in non-task-relatedcortical territories.

TM researchers further view this EEGpicture as reflecting a single and originalstate of “Transcendental pure consciousness”(Maharishi, 1969; Travis et al., 2004). Thetranscendental state is conceptualized as a“fourth state of consciousness,” a “wake-ful hypometabolic state” that differs fromhypnosis and ordinary or sleep states (R.K. Wallace, 1970). Although these descrip-tions might best be interpreted as meta-

physical assertions rather than first-persondescriptions, they do suggest that this stateof absorption could also involve some formof meta-awareness. Nevertheless, despite thepossibility of a more sophisticated phe-nomenological interpretation and the needto relate physiological data to subjectivedata, it is still unclear whether and howTM meditation practices produce increasedalpha activity beyond a general arousal effector an inhibition of task-irrelevant corticalzones. Other relaxation techniques have ledto the same EEG profile, and studies thatemployed counter-balanced control relax-ation conditions consistently found a lackof alpha power increases or even decreaseswhen comparing relaxation or hypnosis toTM meditation (Morse et al., 1977; Tebe-cis, 1975 ; Warrenburg, Pagano, Woods, &Hlastala, 1980). Similarly, the initial claimthat TM produces a unique state of con-sciousness different from sleep has beenrefuted by several EEG meditation studiesthat reported sleep-like stages during thistechnique with increased alpha and thentheta power (Pagano, Rose, Stivers, & War-renburg, 1976; Younger, Adriance, & Berger,1975).

To summarize, alpha global increases andalpha coherence mostly over frontal electro-des are associated with TM practice whenmeditating compared to baseline (Morse,Martin, Furst, & Dubin, 1977). This globalalpha increase is similar to that producedby other relaxation techniques. The pass-ive absorption during the recitation of themantra, as practiced in this technique, pro-duces a brain pattern that suggests a decreaseof processing of sensory or motor informa-tion and of mental activity in general. Be-cause alpha rhythms are ubiquitous and fun-ctionally non-specific, the claim that alphaoscillations and alpha coherence are desir-able or are linked to an original and higherstate of consciousness seem quite premature.

attention meditation

with an object

This section regroups EEG studies on med-itative practices having a component ofattention regulation. In all these practices,



the intentional structure of a subject/objectremains. As mentioned earlier these tech-niques lie somewhere on a continuumbetween two poles of practices: On the onehand, one-pointed attention techniques cul-tivate a form of voluntary, effortful, and sus-tained attention on an object, and on theother hand, vipasyana meditation cultivatesa more broadly focused, non-judgmentalmode of bare attention. These medita-tions differ from relaxation techniquesbecause they cultivate a balance betweenhypoarousal (Becker & Shapiro, 1981) andexcitation. This balance is required, inparticular, to maintain a sufficient clarityor meta-awareness throughout the medi-tative session. These practices encompass,for instance, Zazen meditation, Indian yogicconcentration, meditation in MBSR, andone-pointed focused attention. The empha-sis on stabilizing the mind on an object oron the awareness of the intentional rela-tion itself depends not only on the giventechnique but also likely on the degree ofthe practitioner’s accomplishment in a givenpractice.

With some important exceptions, moststudies on Zazen or India yogic concentra-tion practices have revealed an EEG signa-ture similar to TM as characterized by low-ered autonomic arousal and slow-frequencyEEG patterns (either an increase in alpha oran increase in theta activity; Austin, 1998;Delmonte, 1984 ; Fenwick, 1987; Shapiro &Walsh, 1984). This pattern was reported as astate and sometimes also a trait. For instance,Kasamatsu and Hirai measured the EEGsignals of 48 priests and disciples duringZazen practices (Kasamatsu & Hirai, 1966).All subjects exhibited visually an increasein alpha activity mostly over central andfrontal electrodes immediately after begin-ning meditation. Less experienced subjectstended to maintain high-amplitude alphaactivity throughout the meditative session,whereas the EEGs of those with more yearsof Zazen practice showed a rhythmical thetawave pattern during the later stage of ZazenAnand, Chhina, and Singh (1961) comparedvisually the EEG activity of four advancedyogis during rest and during meditation. All

subjects displayed large alpha activity duringperiods of rest and increases during medita-tion (Anand et al., 1961).

Yet, several exceptions deserve scrutiny.Two early field studies of Yoga in India byDas and Gastaut (1955) and Wenger andBagchi (1961), reported a clear sign of auto-nomic arousal with increased heart rate andskin conductance while advanced yogis med-itate. High-amplitude high-frequency EEGoscillations (beta and gamma) were foundand were more pronounced during deepmeditation (Das & Gastaut, 1955). In awell-controlled study, Corby et al. (1978)studied a form of Tantric Yoga meditationwhere the practitioners and controls focusedon their breath and on the mantra. Unlikepreviously reported studies, proficient med-itators demonstrated increased autonomicactivation during meditation, whereas unex-perienced meditators demonstrated auto-nomic relaxation. During meditation, profi-cient meditators showed an increase in alphaand theta power, minimal evidence of EEG-defined sleep, and a decrease in autonomicorienting to external stimulation.

These findings are consistent with theview described above that alpha and thetaactivation can also index attentional pro-cesses. Becauseee one major feature of atten-tion is selection, it is likely that the local-ized increases in slow frequencies reflectcortical tuning such that those cortical zonesthat are not required for task engagementare selectively inhibited to facilitate task per-formance (see e.g., Cooper et al., 2003).Also consistent with this formulation aredata on attentional anticipation. Foxe, Simp-son, and Ahlfors (1998) demonstrated that acue indicating an upcoming auditory stim-ulus induced increased alpha power overparieto-occipital (Blake & Logothetis, 2002)cortex, compared when the cue indicatedan upcoming visual stimulus. These findingsare all consistent with the idea that alphasynchronization during attentional processesreflects inhibition of non-relevant areas orprocess (Klimesch, 1999).

It would be misguided to identify alpha ortheta activity as the sole index of mindful-ness/awareness meditation. Numerous data



suggest that synchronized gamma activity isalso specifically involved in selective atten-tion. In the literature on meditation, oneearly study on advanced yogic practition-ers reported spectacular generalized high-amplitude beta/gamma oscillations duringintense internal concentration of attention(Das & Gastaut, 1955). We also found anincrease in fast-frequency oscillations dur-ing samatha practice (unpublished data).Numerous studies of humans, as well as ani-mals, have demonstrated an enhancementof the gamma activity when subjects wereactively attending to a certain stimulus orsimply perceived an object (Tallon-Baudry &Bertrand, 1999). Such synchronized gammaactivity during attention participates notonly in bottom-up processes (e.g., sensorysegmentation, feature extraction) but also intop-down processes (Engel et al., 2001).

Slow and fast-frequency rhythms inter-act in the brain. For instance, in intracra-nial recordings from area V4 in monkeys,increased gamma range synchronization, butreduced low-frequency synchronization, isobserved among neurons activated by theattended stimulus as compared to neuronsactivated by an identical but non-attendedstimulus (Fries et al., 2001). These impor-tant results, as well as event-related data,lead to the notion of a surround inhibi-tion wherein active cortical areas, indexedby alpha desynchronization and/or fast-frequency synchronies, are surrounded by a“doughnut” of alpha synchronization or inhi-bition (Suffczynski, Kalitzin, Pfurtscheller,& Lopes da Silva, 2001). This balancebetween slow and fast frequencies can bedetected under specific experimental condi-tions, such as intracranial recording or sim-ple event-related tasks, over motor or sen-sory areas. Yet, this distinction is likely to beblurred in general while recording ongoingEEG signals because of volume conduction(i.e., a single neural source is likely to influ-ence the signal in many recording channels).Despite this limitation, the combined char-acterization of fast-frequency synchronies,in addition to the slow frequencies, over var-ious topographical regions of the scalp islikely to provide increased understanding of

the specific neural processes that are alteredby these practices.

Finally there is some evidence thatalpha/theta oscillations during Zazen orSamadhi practices differ functionally fromthe alpha/theta activity during a relaxednon-meditative state. An early model ofmeditation proposed that “de-automization”was induced, such that each stimulus trialwas perceived as “fresh” during medita-tive states cultivating a receptive and openawareness (Deikman, 1966; Kasamatsu &Hirai, 1966). A possible indication of thisprocess is EEG alpha blocking, which isdefined as a decrease in ongoing alpha (8–12 Hz) power when comparing prestimu-lus to post-stimulus activity. Typically alphaactivity is reduced from closed eyes to openeyes or when discrete stimuli are presentedand is thought to reflect cortical process-ing. This response habituates after repeti-tive stimulus presentations (Morrell, 1966).Early field studies on yogis reported no alphablocking in response to auditory, thermal,and visual stimuli (Anand et al., 1961; Das& Gastaut, 1955 ; Wenger & Bagchi, 1961).Subsequent Zen studies found alpha block-ing to auditory sounds but without habitua-tion (Kasamatsu & Hirai, 1966). Early TMstudies produced conflicting results, withone finding an absence of alpha blocking,whereas the other reported habituation ofalpha blocking to auditory stimuli (Banquet,1973 ; R. K. Wallace, 1970).

A replication and extension of these find-ings were attempted (Becker & Shapiro,1981). Experienced Zen, Yoga, and TM med-itators, and “attend” and “ignore” groups ofcontrols were presented with auditory clicksduring mediation. The attend group wasasked to “pay strong attention” to each click,notice all of its sound qualities and subtleties,and count the number of clicks; the ignoregroup was told “try not to let the clicks dis-turb your relaxed state.” EEG alpha sup-pression and skin conductance response bothshowed clear habituation, which did not dif-fer among groups, thus failing to replicatethe earlier studies.

As a summary, these meditation prac-tices that feature focused attention on



objects most frequently are accompanied byincreases in alpha and theta power, but alsoby fast frequencies (beta and gamma) duringdeep meditation. The slow-frequency activ-ity overlaps notably with early drowsinessand sleep stages even if these oscillationspotentially differ functionally. The neuro-electric signatures of these various medi-tative techniques (Focus Attention, Zazen,Vipasyana meditation) have not yet beenfirmly established. Our current understand-ing of attention suggests that the selectionor the exclusion from attention of particu-lar contents (sensory, motor, internal tasks)is correlated with the activation or inhibi-tion of specific brain areas, as indexed byspecific changes in selective brain oscillatorypatterns. The combination of topographicalinformation with spectral information seemsa promising method by which to delineatefurther these various meditative techniques.

objectless meditation

During objectless meditation, such as OpenPresence or Non-Referential Compassionmeditation, it is said that the practitionerdoes not focus on a particular object butrather cultivates a state of being. Object-less meditation does so in such a way that,according to reports given after meditation,the intentional or object-oriented aspect ofexperience appears to dissipate in medita-tion along with the explicit sense of being aperceiver or an agent (autobiographical self).One working hypothesis is that some form ofmeta-awareness or, more precisely, of somemere ipseity still remains or is enhanced dur-ing these states.

These types of meditation have beenpoorly investigated so far. We studied agroup of long-term practitioners who under-went mental training in the same TibetanNyingmapa and Kargyupa traditions for10,000 to 50,000 hours over time periodsranging from 15 to 40 years. We foundthat these long-term Buddhist practitionersself-induced sustained EEG high-amplitudegamma-band oscillations and phase syn-chrony during Non-Referential Compassionmeditation (Lutz et al., 2004 , Figure 19.5).These fast-frequency oscillations (>20 Hz)

had a peak-to-peak amplitude of the orderof dozens of microvolts for several prac-titioners. High-amplitude oscillations werecontinuous during the meditation over sev-eral dozens of seconds and gradually increaseduring the practices. These EEG patternsdiffer from those of controls, in particularover lateral fronto-parietal electrodes. Somepreliminary data further suggest that theseongoing high-amplitude gamma oscillationsare correlated with self-reports of the clarity(see the section on samatha and vipasyanaas paradigms of meditation; Lutz et al.,2005).

These new findings are similar to the earlyreport of Das and Gastaut (1955) during theSamadhi of advanced Indian Yogis. Samadhiwas defined as a state during which “theperfectly motionless subject is insensible toall that surrounds him and is conscious ofnothing but the subject of his meditation.”Das and Gastaut (1955) reported an accel-eration of the cardiac rhythm during med-itation almost perfectly parallel to that ofthe EEG. The EEG showed progressive andspectacular modifications during the deep-est meditations in those subjects who hadthe longest training: acceleration of the alpharhythm and decrease in the amplitude andappearance of faster oscillations (>20 Hz).These fast frequencies (beta (25–30 Hz)and sometimes even gamma activity (40–45

Hz) became generalized during the Samadhimeditation, with high amplitude reachingbetween 30–50 mV.

In our study (Lutz et al., 2004), we fur-ther showed that during this objectless med-itation the ratio of fast-frequency activity(25–42 Hz) to slow oscillatory activity (4–13

Hz) over medial fronto-parietal electrodes isinitially higher in the resting baseline beforemeditation for the practitioners than thecontrols (Figure 19.4). During meditation,this difference increases sharply over most ofthe scalp electrodes and remains higher thanthe initial baseline in the post-meditativebaseline. The functional and behavioral con-sequences of sustained gamma activity dur-ing objectless meditation are not currentlyknown, and such effects clearly need furtherstudy.



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Meditative state(1) (2) (3) (4)

Figure 19.5 . Example of high-amplitude gamma activity during thenon-referential compassion meditation of long-term Buddhist practitioners. a.Raw electroencephalographic signals. At t = 45 s, practitioner S4 startedgenerating a state of non-referential compassion, block 1. b. Time course ofgamma activity power over the electrodes displayed in “a” during four blockscomputed in a 20-s sliding window every 2 s and then averaged over electrodes.c. Time course of their cross-hemisphere synchrony between 25–42 Hz. Thedensity of long-distance synchrony above a surrogate threshold was calculatedin a 20-ssliding window every 2 s and for each cross-hemisphere electrode pairsand, then, was averaged across electrode pairs (adapted from Lutz et al. 2004).

Neuroimaging Correlates of Meditation

At this stage neuroimaging studies onmeditation are typically more exploratorythan hypothesis driven. Nevertheless, someprogress has been made in the identifica-tion of structural-functional brain relation-ships of meditative states and traits using avariety of neuroimaging modalities. In par-ticular, some theoretical efforts have beenmade to localize the neural circuitry selec-tively engaged during a meditative state.Austin (1998), for instance, elegantly com-bined his insight as a Zen practitioner withhis neuroanatomical knowledge of the brainas a medical doctor to speculate about the

neural basis of the peak experience of ameditative state termed “kensho” or “satori”in Japanese Zen Buddhism. In this state,the sense of selfhood is allegedly dissolvedand an “unattached, self-less, impersonal”awareness remains (this state shares a strong,descriptive similarity with the Open Pres-ence state discussed above). After examin-ing the precise experiential changes inducedby this state, he reviewed the various phys-iological subsystems that might participatein this state. Austin specifically introducesthe distinction between “egocentric” neu-ral networks involved in the generation of amultifaceted self situated in time and spaceand “allocentric” neural networks involved



in the mere processing of the external envi-ronment. For Austin, neural networks par-ticipating in the construction of the narra-tive self could be shut down during Kensho,specifically through thalamic gating origi-nating from the reticular formation. At thesame time, he proposes that the state ofhyperawareness during this practice is medi-ated by intralaminar nuclei of the thala-mus that can increase the fast-frequency syn-chrony in other cortical regions. These nucleicould shape the resonance of the cortico-thalamo-cortical loops and functionally alterthe neural processing in these egocen-tric/allocentric networks. These proposals(Austin, 1998, 2006) are clearly specula-tive, and further discussion is beyond thescope of this review. Nevertheless, Austin’swork amply illustrates the potential bene-fits that may come when the neuroscience ofmeditation and first-person descriptions arebrought into a dynamic dialogue that com-bines their findings in a manner that placesfruitful constraints on each.

Although there is considerable potentialfor advancement in neuroscience throughneuroimaging studies of meditation, thenumber of published studies remains sparse.To illustrate the range of methods and ques-tions utilized thus far, we now review brieflythe published research in this area.

brain imaging techniques used

in meditation research

Positron emission tomography (PET; Blake& Logothetis, 2002) and functional magneticresonance imaging (fMRI) are two func-tional brain imaging methods that have beenused to study meditation. PET measuresemissions from radioactively labeled chemi-cals that have been injected into the blood-stream and uses the data to produce two- orthree-dimensional images of the distributionof the chemicals throughout the brain andbody. Using different tracers, PET can revealblood flow, oxygen and glucose metabolism,and neurotransmitter concentrations in thetissues of the working brain. Blood flow andoxygen and glucose metabolism reflect theamount of brain activity in different regions,and this type of data enables scientists to

characterize the physiology and neurochem-istry of the working brain. SPECT (singlephoton emission computed tomography) isanother neuroimaging method that is similarto, though less sophisticated than PET, andit produces images of neurochemical func-tion that have less spatial resolution thanPET. MRI uses magnetic fields and radiowaves to produce high-quality two- or threedimensional images of brain structures with-out injecting radioactive tracers. Using MRI,scientists can see both surface and deep brainstructures with a high degree of anatomi-cal detail (millimeter resolution). MRI tech-niques can also be used to image the brain asit functions.

Functional MRI (fMRI) relies on the mag-netic properties of blood to enable theresearcher to measure the blood flow in thebrain as it changes dynamically in real time.Thus researchers can make maps of changesin brain activity as participants perform var-ious tasks or are exposed to various stim-uli. An fMRI scan can produce images ofbrain activity as fast as every second or two,whereas PET usually takes several dozensof seconds to image brain function. Thus,with fMRI, scientists can determine pre-cisely when brain regions become active andhow long they remain active. As a result,they can see whether brain activity occurssimultaneously or sequentially in differentbrain regions as a participant thinks, feels, orreacts to external stimuli. An fMRI scan canalso produce high-quality images that canidentify more accurately than PET whichareas of the brain are being activated. In sum-mary, fMRI offers better image clarity alongwith the ability to assess blood flow and brainfunction in seconds. So far, however, PETretains the advantage of being able to pin-point which neurochemicals are involved infunctional brain alterations.

early neuroimaging studies on

relaxation practice and meditation

The studies from Lou et al. (1999) andNewberg et al. (2001) provide the first evi-dence of functional brain changes using PETor SPECT during a relaxation practice anda meditative practice, respectively. Even if



these studies offer new insights about thesestates, they speak also for the need to moreprecisely develop descriptions of the prac-tices to better understand just what the func-tional neural changes are reflecting.

Yoga Nidra, literally “Yoga-Sleep,” is astate in the Yoga tradition in which con-sciousness of the world and consciousnessof action are meant to be dissociated: Themind “withdraws” from wishing to act and isnot associated with emotions or the powerof will. The practitioner allegedly becomesa neutral observer who experiences the lossof conscious control, concentration, or judg-ment, yet maintains an equal and impar-tial attention to sensory awareness, whichis said to be enhanced. A PET (15 O-H2 O)study of blood flow changes during YogaNidra practice was carried out while subjectslistened to a tape recording, with guidedinstructions on the different phases of thepractice (Lou et al., 1999). The relaxationtape contained focusing exercises on bodysensation, abstract joy, visual imagery of asummer landscape, and symbolic represen-tation of the self. Participants listened tothe tape and followed the instructions ofthe guided meditation. The baseline con-dition was obtained by replaying the tapewhile participants remained neutral (i.e.,they did not follow the instructions). Eachof the guided meditation phases was associ-ated with different regional activations dur-ing meditation relative to the control con-ditions. Yet, during all meditative phases,overall increases in bilateral hippocampus,parietal, and occipital sensory and associa-tion regions were found compared to controlconditions. This pattern suggests an increaseof activity in areas involved in imagery.

Deactivation was found during medita-tion in orbitofrontal, dorsolateral prefrontal,anterior cingulate cortices, temporal andinferior parietal lobes, caudate, thalamus,pons, and cerebellum. This differential activ-ity was interpreted as reflecting a “tonic”activity during normal consciousness in thebaseline condition. The areas decreasing dur-ing the meditation state are known to par-ticipate in executive function or controlof attention. More particularly, dorsolateral

prefrontal cortex participates in workingmemory and the preparation for voluntarymovement, the anterior cingulate plays arole not only in motivation and resolutionof conflict but also skeleto-motor controland executive attention, and the cerebellumis implicated in cognitive functions such asattention.

Lou et al. (1999) interpreted these resultsas reflecting dissociation between two com-plementary aspects of consciousness: theconscious experience of the sensory worldand the “fact or illusion of voluntary control,with self regulation.” Unfortunately, the lackof a control population makes it difficult tointerpret whether the brain patterns reflectspecific meditative qualities or the cognitiveprocesses induced by the instructions.

Using SPECT Newberg et al. (2001)measured changes in regional blow flow(rCBF) while eight relatively experiencedTibetan Buddhist practitioners meditated.The practitioners practiced daily for at least15 years and underwent several 3 -monthretreats. In the scanner, the practitionerswere instructed to “focus their attention on avisualized image and maintained that focuswith increasing intensity.” In constrast to Louet al. (1999), Newberg and colleagues (2001)reported an increase in activity in orbitalfrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex(DLPFC), and thalamus. They also founda negative correlation between the DLPFCand the superior parietal lobe, which wasinterpreted as reflecting an altered sense ofspace experienced during meditation. Thedifference in the frontal areas between theirfinding and that of Lou et al. (1999) wasviewed as reflecting a difference between anactive and a passive form of meditation.

In addition to the fact that no con-trol participants were involved in the New-berg study, there is regrettably a lack ofdescriptive precision of the meditative statethat was studied. This limitation will ham-per the future comparison of this studywith others. More precisely, a broad vari-ety of Tibetan meditative techniques couldencompass the provided meditative descrip-tions. These practices include, for instance,Focused Attention on a mental object, or any



meditation on the visualization of a deity,or indeed the visualization of one’s guru.Unfortunately, these practices can differ oreven be opposite in terms of their motiva-tions or emotional qualities. For instance, thevisualization of deities could involve someinvocation of anger or lust, whereas the visu-alization of the guru is meant to inducea strong devotional affect in the medita-tor. Because the independent variable (i.e.,the specific meditative practice) was onlyvaguely described in this study, its impactis limited.

focused attention/minfulness-

awareness meditation

A form of Kundalini Yoga using mantra rep-etition combined with breath awareness wasassessed with fMRI (Lazar et al., 2000). Thecontrol state entailed the mental enuncia-tion of animal names. Five Yoga adepts whohad practiced Kundalini Yoga for at least4 years served as subjects. An increase inthe Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent(BOLD) signal was found from baseline tomeditation in the putamen, midbrain, ante-rior cingulate cortex, and the hippocam-pal/parahippocampal formation, as well asin regions in the frontal and parietal cor-tices. The comparison of early versus latemeditation states showed activity increasein these regions, but within a greater areaand with larger signal changes later in thepractice. Because the pattern of brain activ-ity increased with meditation time, it mayindex the gradual changes induced by medi-tation. This pattern of activity encompassedareas subserving attention (fronto-parietalcortices) and areas subserving arousal andautonomic control (limbic regions, mid-brain, and anterior cingulate cortex).

In another attention-related study, werecently studied experienced Buddhist med-itators (>10,000 hours of cumulative med-itation practice) and newly trained controlsubjects while they performed a FocusedAttention meditation (Tse-cig Ting-nge-dzin;see the section on Focused Attention), alter-nating with a passive state, while undergo-ing block-design fMRI (Brefczynski-Lewis,Lutz, & Davidson, 2004). During this stan-

dard meditation, the participants concen-trated their attention on an external visualobject (a white dot on the screen), gentlybringing attention back to the object if theybecame distracted or sleepy. Control sub-jects with no prior meditative training weregiven instruction in concentration medita-tion with daily practice a week before thefMRI scan. fMRI of concentration medita-tion in both the experienced meditators andthe controls showed common areas of acti-vation in the traditional attention network,including such areas as the intraparietal sulci,frontal eye fields (FEF), thalamus, insula,lateral occipital, and basal ganglia. How-ever, experienced meditators showed moreactivation, especially in the frontal-parietalnetwork. The increased activation in theseregions for experienced practitioners mayrepresent a neural correlate for these sub-jects’ expertise in sustained attention. Thefact that controls show greater activation inthe anterior cingulate compared with theadepts may reflect greater error proneness(i.e., distraction) and conflict monitoring inthe controls than the adepts; the conflictwould be between the instructions to focusand the difficulty of complying with suchinstructions.

Taken together these two brain imagingstudies show that concentration meditationenhances processing in regions similar tothose found in other attentional paradigms.The group differences between long-termpractitioners and novices support the viewthat attention processing could be affectedby mental training.

pure compassion and

lovingkindness meditation

Using functional imaging, we assessedbrain activity while novice and long-termpractitioners generated a Lovingkindness-Compassion meditation, alternating witha resting state (Brefczynski-Lewiset et al.,2004). As described in the section on Non-Referential Compassion meditation, thisstandard Buddhist meditation involves thegeneration of a state in which an uncon-ditional feeling of lovingkindness and com-passion pervades the whole mind as a



way of being, with no other considera-tion, reasoning, or discursive thoughts. Thisstate is called in Tibetan “pure” or “non-referential” compassion, as the practitioneris not focused upon particular objects dur-ing this state. In the resting state the subjectswere asked to be in the most ordinary statewithout being engaged in an active mentalstate or being in a pleasant or unpleasantemotional state. Subjects were eight long-term Buddhist practitioners and eight age-matched healthy control volunteers whowere interested in learning to meditate.Buddhist practitioners underwent mentaltraining in the Tibetan Nyingmapa and Kar-gyupa traditions for 10,000 to 50,000 hoursover time periods ranging from 15 to 40

years. During the meditative state, we founda common activation in the striatum, ante-rior insula, somatosensory cortex, anteriorcingulate cortex, and left-prefontal cortexand a deactivation in the right interior pari-etal. This pattern was robustly modulatedby the degree of expertise, with the adeptsshowing considerably more enhanced acti-vation in this network compared with thenovices.

These data provide evidence that thisaltruistic state involved a specific matrix ofbrain regions that are commonly linked tofeeling states, planning of movements, andpositive emotions. Maternal and romanticlove have been linked in humans to the acti-vation of the reward and attachment cir-cuitries, such as the substantia nigra andthe striatum (caudate nucleus, putamen,globus pallidus; Bartels & Zeki, 2004). Pos-itive and negative emotions are expected todifferentially activate the left and right pre-frontal cortices, respectively, as suggested bylesion and electrophysiological data (David-son, 2000). More generally, feeling statesare thought to be mediated by structuresthat receive inputs regarding the internalmilieu and musculoskeletal structures andinclude the brainstem tegmentum, hypotha-lamus, insula, and somatosensory and cin-gulate cortices (Damasio, 1999). This viewhas received some neuroimaging support ina task where subjects self-generate emo-tional states and more recently in studies

using pain experience or interoceptive tasks(Craig, 2002).

Finally, love and compassion require anunderstanding of the feelings of others;hence, a common view is that the veryregions subserving one’s own feeling statesalso instantiate one’s empathic experienceof other’s feelings. This framework derivesfrom perception-action models of motorbehavior and imitation. The key proposalis that the observation and imagination ofanother person in a particular emotionalstate automatically activate a similar affec-tive state in the observer, with its associatedautonomic and somatic responses. Thus,experienced and empathic pain commonlyactivated the anterior insula and rostral ante-rior cingulate cortex (Singer et al., 2004).The activation in the anterior insula wasstronger for the practitioners, an area thatsome scientists have found to be involved infeelings. These data are consistent with theview that our experience of another’s suf-fering is mediated by the same brain regionsinvolved in the experience of our own pain.

We further found that brain activity forthe long-term practitioners was greater thanthe novices in several of the commonly acti-vated regions. These analyses indicate thatthe degree of training, as reflected in thehours of cumulative meditation experience,modulates the amplitude of activation in thebrain areas commonly involved in this state.

To summarize, our study of Compas-sion meditation found activation in brainregions thought to be responsible for moni-toring one’s feeling state, planning of move-ments, and positive emotions. This patternwas robustly modulated by the degree ofexpertise. These data suggest that emotionaland empathic processes are flexible skillsthat can be enhanced by training and thatsuch training is accompanied by demonstra-ble neural changes.

General Conclusion

Overall, this chapter aimed to summa-rize the state of knowledge in neuro-scientific research on meditation and to



suggest potential avenues of inquiry illu-minated by these initial findings. Thefirst section discussed the need for moreprecise descriptions of meditative prac-tices so as to define properly the prac-tices that are the objects of scientificstudy. Following this recommendation, theBuddhist contemplative tradition was pre-sented in detail as a canonical example. Themain Buddhist theories of meditation werereviewed as well as the basic parametersthat define most forms of Buddhist con-templative practice. In addition to suggest-ing an approach to defining and categoriz-ing meditation, this section also aimed tounderscore the difficulty of separating well-defined first-person descriptions of medita-tive states from other claims that, althoughapparently descriptive, are best understoodas reflecting particular cultural or religiousexigencies that are not strictly rooted in sci-entifically tractable observations. The choiceto view a Buddhist claim as a first-persondescription of an actual state or as primar-ily a product of some religious and culturalrhetoric is certainly subject to debate andinterpretation. Further developments willdefinitely be needed to delineate these dis-tinctions. With these difficulties in mind,three standard Buddhist meditative stateswere described in detail, as well as therationale for the cultivation of these statesand the expected post-meditative effects.Some general guidelines were then pro-posed for developing a questionnaire todefine more precisely a practice under exam-ination. It is our hope that this first sec-tion will provide researchers with sometheoretical and methodological principlesto clarify and enhance future research onmeditation.

The second section explored some sci-entific motivations for the neuroscientificexamination of meditation in terms of itspotential impact on the brain and body oflong-term practitioners or its possible role inthe neuroscientific study of subjective expe-rience. After an overview of the mechanismsof neuroplasticity and mind-body interac-tion, we argued that mental training mighthave a long-term impact on the brain andbody in a way that is beneficial for physical

health, illness, and possibly well-being. Wethen suggested how the use of first-personexpertise might foster our understanding ofthe neural counterpart of subjective expe-rience. These intersections between neuro-science and meditation were separated heremainly for analytical purposes, but theseheuristic distinctions implicitly suggest animportant area of further research; namely,the interactions among the various themes ofresearch. For instance, one question of inter-est will be to explore whether it is mean-ingful to study the alleged therapeutic orhealing virtues of meditation as a variable ofresearch in isolation from other issues. Theinterest in this question stems from the pos-sibility that the beneficial changes found inpractitioners of meditation are intrinsicallydependent on other practices or virtues cul-tivated in their tradition, such as compas-sion, ethical behavior, or a first-person explo-ration of the nature of the self and externalperception. Having suggested, in any case,the potentially fruitful exploration of medi-tation from a neuroscientific perspective, inthe final section, we reviewed the most rel-evant neuroelectric and neuroimaging find-ings of research conducted to date. We antic-ipate that the renewed interest in researchon meditation will probably extend and pos-sibly modify this section within the nearfuture.

As noted earlier, we chose to emphasizethe practice of long-term Buddhist practi-tioners, in part because of the potential thata study of such practitioners might haveto enhance our understanding of conscious-ness. Already we have some indication thatexperienced practitioners are able to pro-vide repeatable subjective reports that aremore reliable than those from untrained per-sons, and this opens the door to wide-rangingresearch into the neural correlates of thosereportable states. More particularly, the pos-sibility that some meditators may be ableto induce a state approaching some form ofbare consciousness or ipseity raises the tan-talizing (if contentious) hypothesis that theneural correlates of such a state would bringus closer to understanding what we meanby consciousness from a neuroscientific per-spective.



Our decision to focus on long-term Bud-dhist practitioners, however, should notdiminish the importance of future researchon novices, of longitudinal studies of changesover time in novice or mid-range practi-tioners, or of research involving other con-templative traditions. This point is crucialif one believes that some of these medita-tive practices have the potential to evolveinto a more secular form of mental train-ing, with alleged therapeutic, pedagogical,and/or health value. Most importantly, thecollective evidence showcased in this reviewunderscores the fact that many of our coremental processes, such as awareness andattention and emotion regulation, includingour very capacity for happiness and com-passion, should best be conceptualized astrainable skills. The meditative traditionsprovide a compelling example of strategiesand techniques that have evolved over timeto enhance and optimize human potentialand well-being. The neuroscientific study ofthese traditions is still in its infancy, butthe early findings promise both to revealthe mechanisms by which such training mayexert its effects and underscore the plastic-ity of the brain circuits that underlie com-plex mental functions. It is our fervent hopethat this review will stimulate additionalresearch and will lead to the increased use ofthese practices in a wide range of everydaycontexts.

Authors Note

Support for writing this chapter and theresearch from the authors’ lab that isreported herein was provided by NIMHP50-MH069315 to RJD, gifts from Adrianneand Edwin Cook-Ryder and from BryantWangard, NCCAM U01AT002114-01A1 andthe Fyssen Foundation. Address correspon-dence to Antoine Lutz or Richard J. David-son, W. M. Keck Laboratory for FunctionalBrain Imaging and Behavior, Waisman Cen-ter, 1500 Highland Avenue, Madison, WI53705 -2280. Email: [email protected] [email protected]. Address correspon-dence to John D. Dunne, Department of

Religion, Emory University, 537 Kilgo Cir-cle, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322 .Email: [email protected].

Notes

1. Number of articles indexing the term “medi-tation” in Medline in 2005 .

2 . For a fruitful and pragmatic development ofthis hypothesis see Depraz, Varela, & Vermer-sch (2003).

3 . To facilitate further inquiry by readers unfa-miliar with the relevant Asian languages, onlysources available in English have been used topresent the pertinent Buddhist theories andpractices. It is important to note, however, thatmany of the most relevant Tibetan texts in par-ticular have yet to be translated reliably intoany European language.

4 . Gethin (1998) provides an excellent overviewof the Abhidharma and its context. It is impor-tant to note that the two classical South Asianlanguages most relevant to the history of liv-ing Buddhist traditions are Sanskrit and Pali.Sanskrit is relevant especially to Tibetan, Chi-nese, Japanese, and Korean Buddhism. Pali isstill a scholarly language of the Theravada Bud-dhist traditions that are active especially inSrı Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar. For con-sistency, we have used Sanskrit for technicalterms that apply generally to Buddhist tradi-tions, but some academic sources will favor thePali equivalents. In such sources, Abhidharmawould be rendered as Abhidhamma.

5 . In English, the term “lovingkindness” is oftenused in lieu of “compassion” because it moreaccurately translates the Sanskrit compund,maitrıkarun. a. This compound consists of twoterms: maitrı, translated as “loving,” is definedas the aspiration for another to be happy, andkarun. a, translated as “kindness,” is defined asthe aspiration that another be free of suf-fering. The term karun. a is also translated as“compassion,” and in Tibetan it is renderedas snying rje, the term that occurs in “non-referential compassion” (dmigs med snyingrje; Skt., niralambanakarun. a). Nevertheless,even though the most accurate translation ofthis compound should include only the word“compassion,” the actual practice of generatingthis state involves both love and compassion;that is, both maitrı and karun. a.



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