centro de estudios puertorriqueiios -...

15
Ce ntro de Es tudi os Pue rtor riqu eii os CENTRO JOURNAL VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I •SPRING 2013

Upload: others

Post on 16-Oct-2019

1 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios

CENTRO JOURNAL VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I •SPRING 2013

Page 2: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

EDITOR

Xavier F. Torti, City University of New York-Lehman College

P U BLICATIONS COORDINATOR

Noraliz Ruiz Caraballo

ADVISORY BOARD

Frances Aparicio, Northwestern University Luis Aponte Pares, University of Massachusetts-Boston

Cesar J. Ayala, University of California-Los Angeles Efrain Barradas, University of Florida-Gainesville

Deborah Berman Santana, Mills College Arnaldo Cruz-Malave, Fordham University

Jorge Duany, Florida International University Juan Flores, New York University

Nilda Flores Gonzalez, University of Illinois-Chicago H umberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

Edwin Melendez, City University of New York-Hunter College Sonia Nieto, University of Massachusetts-Amherst

Francisco Scarano, University of Wisconsin-Madison Anthony Stevens-Arroyo, City University of New York-Brooklyn College

Carmen T. Whalen, Williams College Ana Celia Zen tell a, University of California-San Diego

BOOK REVIEW EDITORS

Elizabeth Garcia, Connecticut College Felipe Pimentel, City University of New York- H ostos Community College

EDITORIAL ASSISTANCE

J onathan Goodman-Copy Editor

Elizabeth K. Allen-Copy Editor

ART DIRECTION

Kenneth Kaiser

ISSN: 1538-6279 (Print); ISSN: 2163-2960 (Online) ISBN-13: 978-1-878483-71-3; ISBN-IO: 1-878483-71-4 t 20l3 Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios H unter College / City University of New York 695 Park Avenue, E-1429, New York, NY 10065 212.772.5690 • Fax 212.650.3673 • http://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu

CENTRO Journal is indexed or abstracted in: Abstracts in Anthropology; Academic Search Complete; Alternative Press Index; America: H istory and Life; Caribbean Abstracts; CONUCO-Consorcio Universitario de Indizaci6n; Current Contents/ Social & Behavioral Sciences (CC/ S&BS); Gale; HAPl- H ispanic American Periodical Index; Historical Abstracts; Internacional Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS); ISI Alerting Services; Lacindex; Left I ndex; Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts; M LA Internacional Index; OCLC PAIS; P ro Quest; Red de revisras cientificas de America Larina, el Caribe, Espaiia y Portugal (RedALyC); Scopus; Social Science Citation Index (SSCI); Social Services Abstracts; Social Scisearch; Sociological Abstracts; Ulrich's Periodicals Service; H.W. Wilson H umanities Abstracts; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts.

CENTRO Journal of the Center fo r Puerto Rican Studies

VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • SPR ING 2013

Special Section: Puerto Rico, the United States and the Making of a Bounded Citizenship

GUEST EDITOR: Pedro Caban

-PAGE 4-

The Puerto Rican Colonial Matrix: The Etiology of Citizenship-An Introduction

P EDRO CABAN

-PAGE 22-

Confronting a Colonial Legacy: Asserting Puerto Rican Identity by Legally Renouncing U.S. Citizenship

JACQUELINE N. FONT-GUZMAN

-PAGE 50-

Extending Cit izenship to Puerto Rico: Three Tradit ions of Inclusive Exclusion

CHARLES R. VENATOR-SANTIAGO

-PAGE 76-

The Bordering of America: Colonialism and Citizenship in the Philippines and Puerto Rico

RICK BALDOZ AND CESAR AYALA

-PAGE 106-

Citizenship and the Alien Excl usion in the Insular Cases: Puerto Ricans in the Periphery of American Empire

EDGARDO MELENDEZ

-PAGE 146-

From Freedom Fighters to Pat riots: The Successful Campaign to Release the FALN Political Prisoners, 1980-1999

MARGARET POWER

- PAGE 180 -

eoJiberal ism and Oriental ism in Puerto Rico: Walter Mercado's Queer Spiritual Capital

TACE HEDRICK

-PAGE2 10 -

Me)ancholic Readings, Precarious Authority: The Work of Mourning in Edgardo Rodriguez Julia's Funereal Chronicles

JASON CORTES

-PAGE 232-

Book Reviews

- PAGE 256-Acknow)edgementS

Page 3: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

50 CENTRO JOURNAL

VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • SPRING 2013

Extend ing Citizenship to Puerto Rico: Three Traditions of Inclusive Exclusion CHARLES R. VENATOR·SANTIAGO

ABSTRACT

This article examines the legal history of the extension of United States citizenship to Puerto Rico between 1898 and 1940. During this period, Congress enacted a series of laws that extended three different types of citizenship to Puerto Rico, namely a Puerto Rican citizenship, a derivative form of parental or jus sanguinis citizenship, and a statu­tory form ofjus soli or birthright citizenship. This article argues that law and policymak­ers developed the latter citizenship laws and policies in order to affirm the inclusive exclusion of Puerto Ricans within the nascent U.S. global empire. [Key Words: Puerto Rico, citizenship,jus soli, empire, imperialism, colonialism, Nationality Act of 1940]

The author([email protected]), is an assistant professor with a joint appoinrment in

the Department of Political Science and El Institum: Institute for Latino/ a, Caribbean and Latin American Studies, University of Connecticut. He is current President-Elect of the Puerto Rican Studies Association and a Board Member of LatCrit. He is the author of Puerto Rico and the Origins of U.S. Global Empire: The Disembodied Shade (Routledge, forthcoming) and edits the publications of the LatCrit South-North Exchange on Theory, Culture and the Law.

Extending Clbzensh1p lo Puerto RICO: Three Tradrtions of lnclUSNe ExclUSIOf'I • Charles R. Venator-Santiago 51

THE UNITED STATES DEVELOPED NEW TERRITORIAL AND CITIZENSHIP POLICIES TO

GOVERN PUERTO RICO AND THE OTHER TERRITORIES ANNEXED FOLLOWING THE

SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898. The new territorial policy ascribed an unincorpo­

rated territorial status on Puerto Rico enabling the U.S. administrative state apparatus

to selectively determine when to treat the island as a foreign country for constitutional

purposes. For more than a century, the U.S. has treated Puerto Rico as a foreign loca­

tion for the purposes of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.

Constitution, 14th Amend., cl. I). Accordingly, some U.S. law and policymakers argue,

birth in Puerto Rico is tantamount to birth outside of the U.S. But this view is contra­

dicted by a series oflaws enacted by Congress since 1898 which confer three different

types of citizenships on the island-born residents of Puerto Rico, namely: 1) a Puerto

Rican citizenship conferring a non-alien nationality (1900-present); 2) a natural­

ized citizenship conferring a parental or derivative form of jus sanguinis citizenship

(1906-1940) ; 3) and a statutory form of jus soli or birthright citizenship (1941-present).

However, while these citizenship laws have affirmed the inclusion of Puerto Ricans

within the U.S. global empire, U.S. legal actors have consistently excluded Puerto

Rican-born citizens from the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship

Clause, a precondition for constitutional equality.

Drawing on Ophir, Givoni, and Hanafi's (2009) concept of inclusive exclusion, I argue

that the laws extending U.S. citizenship to Puerto Rico have consistently affirmed the

inclusion of island-born Puerto Ricans within the U.S. global empire, while simultane­

ously excluding these citizens from the possibility of acquiring equal constitutional

membership within the polity. This article explains the latter argument through an

examination of the key legal debates shaping the extension of U.S. citizenship laws to

Puerto Rico between 1898 and 1900. Part 1 begins by providing an overview of the prec­

edents shaping the acquisition of U.S. territorial citizenship in 1898. The main objective

of this part is to provide the reader with a short outline of the core precedents that served

as a backdrop to the debates over the status of Puerto Rico and its inhabitants in 1898.

Part 2 examines the key legal debates that shaped the contours of the extension of three

types of citizenship to Puerto Rico. More specifically, the article discusses the enactment

of citizenship laws and the ensuing legal debates framing the membership status of

Puerto Rican-born citizens. This article concludes with a brief outline of the prevailing

Page 4: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

52 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

legal debates over the current status of Puerto Rican-born citizens. My overall goal is to

provide a map of the legal history of the extension of citizenship to Puerto Rico in order

to open new and more critical avenues for future research on questions that require a

clear understanding of the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans.

Part 1: U.S. Territorial Citizenship In 1898

Since its inception, the U.S. simultaneously developed both a colonialist and an

imperialist expansionist tradition with corresponding territorial and citizenship

policies that incorporated national citizenship laws. The colonialist tradition was

premised on the annexation territories that could be settled by white citizens and

subsequently admitted as new states of the Union. Territories subject to colonization

were governed as a part of the U.S. for constitutional and citizenship purposes. In

contrast, the imperialist tradition was premised on the mere occupation of territories.

Territories subject to imperialist occupation were selectively treated as locations

situated outside of the U.S. for constitutional and citizenship purposes. In 1898, U.S.

law and policymakers drew upon both traditions in order to establish constitutional

baselines that could inform the development of a new territorial policy to govern

Puerto Rico and the other territories acquired during the Spanish-American War.

Specifically, law and policymakers were interested in developing a new expansionist

policy that would enable the U.S. to permanently annex territories without being

bound to create new states or incorporate the non-Anglo-Saxon inhabitants of these

territories into the U.S.

What is important to note is that by 1898 it was well established that persons born in

the U.S. acquired a right to a constitutional form ofjus soli or birthright citizenship.

In 1898, eligible persons born in the U.S. could acquire a national citizenship in at

least two ways. Most persons born in the U.S. acquired a jus soli or birthright citizen­

ship under the terms of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (U.S.

Constitution, 14th Amend., cl. 1). Prevailing interpretations of the Citizenship Clause,

however, excluded Native Americans and the children of ambassadors and foreign

sovereigns from the possibility of acquiring a U.S. citizenship at birth (United States

v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)). However, as I w ill discuss in detail below,

Congress possessed the power to enact special legislation enabling the individual or

collective naturalization of Native Americans (Getches, Wilkinson, and Williams 1998)

Extending C1bzensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three TradrtlOllS of lnclUSM! Exch.Jslon •Charles R. Venator-Sanhago 53

and the children of foreign officials. What is important to note is that by 1898 it was

well established that persons born in the U.S. acquired a right to a constitutional form

of jus soli or birthright citizenship.

Alternatively, racially eligible persons born outside of the U.S. could acquire citizen­

ship through a process of naturalization in at least four ways. Between 1789 and 1952, U.S.

immigration laws limited the naturalization of "aliens" to persons deemed to be either

white or of African heritage (Gettys 1934: 36-7; Haney Lopez 1996). Drawing on its con­

stitutional power to develop uniform rules of naturalization, Congress enacted legislation

providing for at least four types of naturalization processes (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, §8, cl. 4 or 14th Amend., cl. 1). For example, immigrants could undergo an individual process of

naturalization or in some instance lawmakers could enact a personal naturalization stat­

ute. Congress could also enact legislation that collectively naturalized a group of people.

In addition, the U.S. embraced the doctrine of coverture and established that marriage

was tantamount to a form of naturalization (Revised Statutes, §1994). This meant that

eligible aliens who married U.S. citizens would acquire their spouses' citizenship.

Congress also recognized the right to a derivative or parental form of jus sanguinis

citizenship. While legal actors and scholars alike disagree on the constitutional source

of this type of citizenship, since 1790 Congress has enacted legislation enabling a child

of a citizen born outside of the U.S. to acquire citizenship at birth so long as his or her

father had previously resided in the country (Weisenfeld 1975). Beginning in 1898,

citizens residing outside of the U.S. were able to transmit a parental form of jus san­

guinis (blood right) citizenship to their children born outside of the country (Revised

Statutes, §1993). For the purposes of this article, however, I will treat this form of citi­

zenship as a type of naturalization.

In 1898, U.S. colonialism could be differentiated from imperialism in five impor­

tant ways. First, whereas the colonialist tradition was premised on the annexation of

territories, the imperialist tradition sought to acquire new territories through mere

occupation. Second, whereas the colonialist tradition governed annexed territories as

a constitutional part of the definition of the U.S., the imperialist tradition selectively

treated occupied territories as locations situated outside of the jurisdiction of the

U.S. Third, while U.S. colonialism was anchored on interpretations of the Territories

(U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §3, cl. 2) and Admissions (U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §3, cl.

1) Clauses of the Constitution, U.S. imperialism was grounded on other constitutional

provisions that granted Congress and the President more expansive powers. Fourth,

while the bill of rights extended to territories subject to colonial annexation, the impe­

rialist tradition recognized the power of the administrative state apparatus to deter­

mine which rights could be withheld or extended to an occupied territory. Finally,

Page 5: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

54' CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

whereas the colonialist tradition recognized that birth in a colonial territory was

tantamount to birth in the U.S., the imperialist tradition equated birth in an occupied

territory to birth outside of the country. Stated differently, in 1898, whereas eligible

persons born in a colonial territory acquired a Fourteenth Amendment or constitu­

tional citizenship at birth, persons born in an occupied territory could only acquire a

U.S. citizenship through naturalization. To be sure, by 1898, both traditions counted

with a clear body of constitutional precedents. U.S. colonialism was premised upon the annexation of new territories that could

be settled by white citizens and subsequently organized for the purposes of admitting

new states (U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, §3, cl. l; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, at

447-448 [1856); Willoughby 1995) . Since its inception, the U.S. conquered, purchased,

or simply annexed new territories that could be settled by white citizens and orga­

nized into colonies. During the colonial stage, the President would administer the

territory on behalf of Congress and enable its inhabitants to organize a local govern­

ment that could subsequently develop into a state government (Grupo 1984; Sheridan

1985). Between 1789 and 1898, the U.S. annexed sufficient territory to create and sub­

sequently admit thirty-seven new states into the Union. While all territories annexed

after founding of the U.S. and before 1898 have since been organized and admitted

into states of the Union, no territory annexed after 1898 has been granted statehood.1

Colonial territories were governed as parts of the U.S. for constitutional purposes.

To be sure, by 1820 in Loughborough v. Blake the Supreme Court established that:

Does this term [colonial territories] designate the whole, or any particular portion of

the American empire? Certainly this question can admit but one answer. It Is the name

given to our great republic, which Is compoHd of States and territories. The District

of Columbia, or the territory west of the Missouri, Is not less within the United States,

than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and It Is not less necessary, on the principles of our

constitution, that uniformity In the Imposition of Imposts, duties, and excises, should be

observe In the one, than In the other. (18 U.S. 317, at 319-emphasls added)

Stated differently, in 1898 colonial territories were governed as part of the definition

of the U.S. and all constitutional provisions that were not locally inapplicable extended

to these localities in the same way that they would extend to a state of the Union. In

1898, the prevailing constitutional definition of the U.S. included states and territories

subject to colonization. U.S. colonialism recognized that Congress wielded a constitutional power to govern ter­

ritories during the colonial stage and subsequently admit these territories as states of the

Extending Clt1zensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t10ns of lnclUSlve Exclusion • Charles R. Venator·Sant1aoo 55

Union on an equal footing with the original thirteen. As noted above, the power to govern

colonies was grounded in the Territories Clause, which empowered Congress to make all

needful rules and regulations for these types of territories, and the Admissions Clause,

which authorized Congress to admit new states. However, while the Supreme Court had

repeatedly recognized the enhanced power of Congress to rule the "states-in-the-making,"

the Court had also established that congressional power over the territories was limited

by the Bill of Rights. Thus, while citizen settlers lost their national political power (i.e., the

right to participate in Federal elections and to elect national representatives) while they

resided in a colonial territory, citizens were still entitled to all of the protections afforded

by the Bill of Rights. This meant that Congress could not pass legislation for a colonial ter­

ritory that violated a citizen's individual liberties and civil rights (American Insurance Co.

v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511 (1828); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 [1856D. To this extent, even

though citizens acquired a subordinated status, they possessed a constitutional power to

invoke the Bill of Rights in order to curtail some dimensions of Congress' power.

Inhabitants of colonial territories could acquire U.S. citizenship in at least four

ways. Prior to 1898, all treaties of territorial annexation contained an article providing

for the collective naturalization or promising to do so at some future time (Gettys 1934:

144-5). Congress could also enact a special statute providing for the collective natural­

ization of the eligible residents of a territory (Revised Statutes, §1995). In addition, by

1874 Congress had extended the Constitution and all laws that were not locally inap­

plicable to the colonial territories, including the Fourteenth Amendment and the right

to jus soli or birthright citizenship (Revised Statutes, §1891) . Stated differently, by 1898,

birth in a colonial territory was tantamount to birth in the U.S. (Bickel 1973) . Finally,

in 1892, the Supreme Court established in Boyd v. Thayer that eligible "alien" residents

of a colonial territory were collectively naturalized when a territory was admitted into

the Union as a new state (143 U.S. 135, at 170). Accordingly, the process of admission of

a new state was equal to the admission of a people.

Unlike the colonialist tradition, U.S. imperialism was premised upon the occupa­

tion of territories for a wide range of purposes other than to admit new states. By 1898,

the U.S. had occupied territories for military, strategic, and commercial purposes both

inside (intraterritorial) and outside (extraterritorial) its boundaries (Raustiala 2009).

Although examples abound, the experiences of Native Americans (intraterritorial) and

Mexicans (extraterritorial) provided key imperialist legal precedents. Notwithstanding

the complexities of the experiences of Native Americans, in 1898, the U.S. occupied

Domestic Dependent Nations, reservations, and other enclaves inhabited by Native

Americans without seeking to create new states. To this extent, my contention is that

the legal precedents established by the occupation of Native American territories are

Page 6: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

56 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

more consistent with an imperialist tradition than with a colonialist tradition. In the

case of Mexicans, the precedents established by the occupation of the Port of Tampico

during the War of 1846-48 would subsequently shape a more malleable understand­

ing of U.S. extraterritoriality, enabling law and policymakers to selectively treat occu­

pied territories as foreign localities in a domestic or constitutional sense.

It is also important to note that in some instances the U.S. used both an imperi­

alist and a colonialist tradition to govern acquired territories. For example, in the

case of Mexico, the U.S. used an imperialist logic to legitimize the occupation of the

Port of Tampico during the War of 1846-48, while subsequently annexing (and later

purchasing) the northern part of Mexico. In the latter case, the U.S. colonized and

subsequently admitted the territories that formed New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada,

Colorado, and California. Likewise, the U.S. first occupied the Republic of Hawaii in

1893 and governed it as an occupied territory until 1898. However, in 1898, Congress

enacted legislation that formally annexed Hawaii and governed the island as a colonial

territory until 1959, the year that the former republic was admitted as a state of the

Union. Notwithstanding the complex history of territorial acquisition, it is important

to recognize that in each instance Congress enacted legislation that explicitly defined

the territory's status as either a colony or a mere occupied territory.

The imperialist tradition established that occupied territories could be selectively

treated as locations situated outside of the U.S. for constitutional purposes. In the case

of Native American territories, the Supreme Court established that while tribal lands

were located within the geography of the U.S., they could be governed as "wards"

situated outside of the jurisdiction of the U.S. (United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,

at 380 [1886]; Norgren 1996). In contrast, by 1850, the Supreme Court had established

that externally occupied territories could be governed as both foreign locations for

constitutional purposes and domestic possessions for international interests. More

precisely, in Fleming v. Page, a case arising from the occupation of the Port of Tampico,

Mexico, Chief Justice Taney wrote:

As regarded by all other nations, It [the port of Tampico, Mexico] was a part of the

United States, and belonged to them exclusively as th• territory Included In our

established boundaries .... But yet It was not a part of this Union. For every nation

which acquires territory by treaty or conquest holds It according to Its own Institutions

and laws. (50 U.S. 603, at 615)

U.S. imperialism anchored its authority on different constitutional provisions other

than the Territories and Admissions Clauses. For example, imperialism legitimized the

Extending C1t1zensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Traditions of Inclusive ExcluSIOO • Charles R. Venator·Sanbago 57

military occupation of territories on the Commander-in-Chief Clause (U.S. Constitution,

Article 2, §2, cl. 1) or the constitutional provision authorizing the President to command

the armed forces to occupy internal (e.g., the Civil War South) or external (e.g., Mexico)

territories. In the case of territories occupied for commercial interests (e.g., the Guano

Islands), imperialists have looked to the Commerce Clause as a source of authority (U.S.

Constitution, Article l, §8, cl. 3). In contrast, imperialists have justified the occupation

of Native American territories by invoking constitutional provisions that contain exclu­

sions targeting "Indians.'' For example, the Commerce Clause contains language that

excludes "Indians not taxed" and opens the door for the legal actors to pass discrimina­

tory legislation against Native American territories. Historically, both the President and

Congress invoked the limited scope of these provisions in order to justify their plenary

power over occupied territories and to curtail the extension of constitutional rights to

the inhabitants of these territories (Deloria and Wilkins 1999).

Finally, the imperialist tradition treated both internally and externally occupied

territories as locations situated outside of the U.S. for citizenship purposes. In 1886,

the Supreme Court established in Elk v. Wilkins that Native Americans born in the

U.S. could not acquire a U.S. citizenship at birth under the terms of the Fourteenth

Amendment (112 U.S. 94). Native Americans, the Court reasoned, owed their alle­

giance to a tribe situated outside of the jurisdiction of the U.S. and could only acquire

U.S. citizenship through a special congressional statute. In contrast, by 1898, the

Supreme Court had established that birth in an occupied territory was tantamount to

birth outside of the U.S. (Inglis v. Sailor's Snug Harbor, 3 Peters 99 [1830]; Wong Kim

Ark v. United States, 169 U.S. 649, at 655 [1898]; and Gettys 1934: 21).

In sum, by 1898, the U.S. had developed two clear territorial citizenship policies.

Colonial territories were governed as constitutional parts of the U.S. and persons born

in these territories were entitled to acquire the same birthright citizenship available to

eligible persons born in any state of the Union. Alternatively, occupied territories were

treated as locations situated outside U.S. jurisdiction and birth in these territories was

tantamount to birth outside of the country. Persons born in occupied territories could

only acquire U.S. citizenship through naturalization. Following the Spanish-American

War of 1898, both anti-imperialists and imperialist legal actors and scholars used the

latter interpretations to establish competing baselines to debate the future status of

Puerto Rico and its inhabitants.

Part 2: Puerto Rico, Citizenship, and the U.S. Global Empire

U.S. law and policymakers began to conceptualize a new type of global expansionism

during the 1880s (LaFeber 1986; Shulman 1995). The new form of global expansionism

Page 7: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

58 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

was premised upon the permanent annexation of land that could house strategically

situated military bases and naval coaling stations throughout the world without binding

Congress to admit new states (Mahan 1898; Rodriguez Beruff 2007). However, while

advocates of global expansionism were keen on annexing new territories, they were

not interested in naturalizing the non-white inhabitants of these territories. In order

to reconcile these competing interests, global expansionists invented a new territorial

status with corresponding citizenship policies that combined interpretations of

colonialist and imperialist precedents. The earliest articulations of the new territorial policy were introduced during

the peace negotiations and the ensuing Treaty of Paris of 1898 (S. Doc. 61-357, 1910).

More precisely, Article IX of the Treaty ascribed a plenary power to Congress to

determine the future status of the island and its inhabitants. This provision marked a

radical departure from prior treaties of territorial annexation, which treated acquired

territories as a part of the U.S. upon their annexation. In contrast with other like

provisions included in prior annexation treaties, Article IX placed Puerto Rico in a

legal limbo until Congress enacted legislation to govern the island. During the Senate

ratification debates of the Treaty of Paris, Senator Orville H. Platt (R-CT) explained

that the second clause of Article IX enabled Congress to govern Puerto Rico without

"incorporating" the island's inhabitants into the Union (32 Cong. Rec. 296). Following

the cessation of hostilities on August 1898, President McKinley authorized the use of a

military dictatorship to rule Puerto Rico until Congress enacted an organic or territo­

rial act providing a civil government for the island (Rossiter 2004; H. Doc. 56-2, 1902).

The Foraker Act created a new territorial status affirming the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico while simultaneously enabling law and policymakers to selectively govern the

island as a foreign country for constitutional purposes.

In 1900, Congress enacted the Foraker Act, an organic or territorial act replacing

the military regime with a civilian government and institutionalizing the new territo­

rial status (31 Stat. 77; Gould 1969). The Foraker Act created a new territorial status

affirming the U.S. annexation of Puerto Rico while simultaneously enabling law and

policymakers to selectively govern the island as a foreign country for constitutional

purposes. To be sure, as Senator John C. Spooner (R-WI) explained during the rel­

evant congressional debates, the Foraker Act would establish that "(t)erritory belong­

ing to the United States, as I think Puerto Rico and the Philippine Archipelago do,

Extend1no Citizenship to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t10ns of lnclUSlve ExcluS1on • Charles R. Venator-Sant1aoo 59

become a part of the United States in the international sense, while not being a part of

the United States in the constitutional sense" (36 Cong. Rec. 3629-emphasis added).

The Foraker Act institutionalized this ideology in Section 3, which authorized the

imposition of fifteen percent Dingley Act of 1897 (30 Stat 151) tariff on all merchandise

trafficked between Puerto Rico and the U.S. and violating prevailing interpretations of

the Uniformity Clause (U.S. Constitution, Art. 1, §8, cl. 1). To be sure, the Uniformity

Clause barred the imposition of tariffs, duties, and other taxes on merchandise that

was bought and sold within the U.S. in order to preserve a more stable financial envi­

ronment among states and territories.

The Supreme Court developed a new territorial doctrine that provided constitu­

tional cover for a tempered interpretation of the nascent ideology of global expansion­

ism in a series of rulings generally known as the Insular Cases (1901-1922) (Burnett

and Marshall 2001; Torruella 1988; Rivera Ramos 2007). However, the core premises of

the new territorial doctrine were first articulated in the concurring opinion of Justice

Edward D. White in Downes v. Bidwell (182 U.S. 244 [1901D. In Downes, a plural major­

ity of justices (5-4) affirmed the constitutionality of the Foraker Act's taxes on mer­

chandise trafficked between Puerto Rico and the U.S. Writing for the majority, Justice

Henry B. Brown invoked the imperialist precedent established in Fleming to interpret

Congress' power under the Territories Clause to treat Puerto Rico as a foreign country

for the purposes of the Uniformity Clause. Justice Brown's opinion sought to establish

that the Constitution did not limit Congress' (imperialist) power to govern annexed

territories such as Puerto Rico as foreign countries. Alternatively, while Justice White

concurred that Congress possessed a power to govern Puerto Rico as a foreign terri­

tory in a domestic of constitutional sense, this power was contingent on whether a ter­

ritory was incorporated or unincorporated (Downes, at 341-42). Accordingly, Congress

was bound by colonialist precedents to govern incorporated territories as states-in­

the-making. However, Justice White reasoned, Congress possessed a power to select

which constitutional provisions could be withheld or extended to unincorporated

territories such as Puerto Rico so long as the "fundamental" or personal rights of the

island's inhabitants were protected (Downes, at 298- 99). In other words, while Justice

White's rationale accepted the imperialist notion that Congress could treat annexed unincorporated territories as foreign locations for constitutional purposes, the power

of Congress over unincorporated territories was tempered by the "fundamental" rights

of its inhabitants.

In sum, and for the purposes of my argument, the resulting doctrine of territorial

"incorporation," combined features from both the colonial ist and imperialist traditions

giving rise to a new type of territorial policy. First, the U.S. could now hold annexed

Page 8: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

60 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

territories for an indefinite period of time without being bound to grant statehood to

the territory in question. Second, the U.S. was now able to selectively govern annexed

territories as foreign locations for constitutional purposes rather than being bound to

treating them as a part of the U.S. Third, whereas the colonialist interpretation of the

Territories Clause established that the inhabitants of the territories were entitled to

the protections of the Bill of Rights, thus curtailing the power of Congress, the new

interpretation gave Congress the power to determine which rights could be with­

held or extended to an unincorporated territory. In a sense, the new doctrine used an

imperialist rather than a colonialist interpretation of the Territories Clause to enable

the U.S. to develop policies that could be adjusted to the local realities of an unincorpo­

rated territory. The doctrine of territorial incorporation enabled the U.S. to selectively

affirm the political inclusion of Puerto Rico within the nascent global empire, while

simultaneously excluding the island from an equal status within the polity.

In addition, the U.S. has since adopted two citizenship policies to govern the inhab­

itants of unincorporated territories. In 1927, Congress enacted legislation conferring

a Fourteenth Amendment right to jus soli or birthright citizenship to all persons

born in the Virgin Islands (S. Rep. No. 69-650, 1926, 2). Since then, all persons born

in the Virgin Islands have acquired a constitutional right to U.S. citizenship at birth.

Alternatively, lawmakers developed a different citizenship policy for Puerto Rico and

the other unincorporated territories annexed since 1898 premised on the conferral of

statutory rather than constitutional citizenship. In the case of Puerto Rico, Congress

has since enacted legislation conferring three different types of statutory citizenship

on persons born in the island: 1) a Puerto Rican citizenship tantamount to non-alien

nationality; 2) a naturalized citizenship conferring a derivative form of parental or jus

sanguinis citizenship (1906- 1940); and 3) a statutory form of jus soli citizenship con­

ferring a form of birthright citizenship (1941-present). However, whereas Congress

was willing to extend a statutory form of birthright citizenship to Puerto Rico, law­

makers have consistently refused to extend the Citizenship Clause to the island and in

large measure limiting the ability of Puerto Rican-born citizens to acquire a statutory

citizenship. Stated differently, while Congress' extension of citizenship to Puerto Rico

affirmed the inclusion of Puerto Ricans within the U.S. global empire, lawmakers'

refusal to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to the island has affirmed the constitu­

tional exclusion of island-born Puerto Ricans.

Puerto Rican Citizenship The notion of a Puerto Rican citizenship was first introduced in Article IX of the

Treaty of Paris as a measure to annex Puerto Rico without annexing either an island

Extending C1t1zensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t10ns of lnclUS1ve Exclusion • Charles R. Venator·Santiaoo 61

primari ly inhabited by Spanish subjects or naturalizing its non-Anglo-Saxon residents. The first clause of Article IX reads as follows:

Spanish subjects, native to the [lberlan] Penlnsula, residing In the territory over which

Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain In such

territory or may remove therefrom ... beln11 subject In respect thereof to such laws ., arw

applicable to forel11nen. In case they remain In the territory they may preserve their

allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from

the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaratlon of their decision

to preserve such allegiance; In default of which de<laratlon they shall be held to have

renounce It and to have adopted the natlonallty of the territory In which they may

reside. (S. Doc. 61·357, 1910, 2: 1693-emphasls added)

To be sure, the language of Article IX established an artificial difference between

Spanish-born and island or Puerto Rican-born Spanish subjects. Whereas Spanish­

born subjects were allowed to retain their Spanish citizenship, while maintaining all

property rights while residing in Puerto Rico, island-born Spaniards were ascribed

a Puerto Rican nationality to nowhere. More importantly, as I will discuss below,

Spanish-born Spaniards were afforded the rights of aliens in Puerto Rico, rights that

were not available to Puerto Ricans. Read in a historical context, the language of

Article IX represented a departure from all prior treaties of territorial annexation.

Whereas Spanish-born subjects were allowed to retain their Spanish citizenship, while maintaining all property rights while residing in Puerto Rico, island-born Spaniards were ascribed a Puerto Rican nationality to nowhere.

The citizenship provision of Article IX also created two problems of legal con­

struction. First, Article IX unilaterally denaturalized island-born subjects and barred

them from the possibility of acquiring a more egalitarian citizenship. Not only were

Puerto Rican-born subjects barred from retaining their Spanish citizenship, but they

were also ascribed a nationality that precluded the bearers from complying with the

requirements of prevailing U.S. immigration and naturalization laws. At the time

"aliens" seeking to acquire U.S. citizenship through naturalization were required t~ renounce their allegiance to a sovereign before they were able to begin the U.S. natu­

ralization process. The Puerto Rican nationality confined its bearer to an anomalous

Page 9: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

62 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

citizenship status preventing him or her from acquiring a U.S. citizenship through nat­

uralization. In addition, the language of Article IX did not clarify whether spouses and

children acquired the citizenship status of Spanish citizens or Puerto Ricans. In other

words, Article IX did not clarify whether Spanish wives and their children acquired

the citizenship of their Puerto Rican-born husbands, or whether the opposite was true

(Re Bonnet y Jaspard, 2 PR Fed. 70 [1906D. Suffice it to say that Article IX introduced

a new artificial membership/citizenship hierarchy among the residents of Puerto Rico

and within the nascent U.S. global empire.

1\vo years later, Congress enacted the Foraker Act and institutionalized the mem­

bership provision of Article IX. Section 7 of the Foraker Act invented a Puerto Rican

citizenship that reproduced the same logic articulated in Article IX. Congress also

neglected to reconcile the Puerto Rican citizenship with prevailing immigration laws

and continued to reproduce the same exclusions created by Article IX. Like Article IX,

Section 7 confined Puerto Ricans to a separate and unequal citizenship status. More

importantly, this was the first time in U.S. history that Congress refused to naturalize

the inhabitants of an annexed territory.

Problems arising from the legal construction of Article IX and Section 7 were rou­

tinely debated in the Federal district court for Puerto Rico. For example, district court

judges often found themselves having to determine the impact of these provisions

on the status of women married to Puerto Ricans and other aliens (e.g., Martinez de Hernandez v. Casanas, 2 PR Fed. 519 [1907)). In some instances, the court was tasked

with determining the status of the children of mixed marriages (e.g., Rodriguez y Pujals

v. Argueso y Flores, 2 PR Fed 517 [1907))). Other cases that routinely reached the court

addressed the right of children of mixed marriages, who were born and permanently

residing in Puerto Rico, to acquire U.S. citizenship through naturalization (e.g., Re

Bonnet y Jaspard). In most instances, however, the key legal question addressed by the

district court entailed ascertaining the citizenship status of a person or a corporation

in order to determine whether the court possessed the jurisdiction to hear relevant

cases. To be sure, the Federal district court in Puerto Rico was limited to hearing cases

between citizens from different or diverse jurisdictions (e.g., a Puerto Rican v. a U.S.

citizen, or a Spanish citizen, etc.). 1\vo Puerto Rican citizens, individual or corporate,

seeking to resolve a conflict were required to use local or Puerto Rican courts rather

than the Federal forum.

Federal agencies also found themselves grappling with problems arising from the

anomalous status of Puerto Ricans. For example, Puerto Rican merchants seeking

to travel and engage in international commerce found themselves unable to acquire

U.S. citizenship and by extension, a passport. In response, the Department of State

Extend1no Ot1zensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t10ns of lnclUS1ve Exclusion • Charles R. Venator·Sanbago 63

petitioned Congress to enact legislation that would provide the residents of Puerto

Rico and other insular or unincorporated territories with a special passport (H. Rep.

No. 57-559, 1902). In 1902, Congress enacted the Insular Passports Act granting the

residents of Puerto Rico and other unincorporated territories access to special insular

passports (32 Stat. 386). While not every controversy resulted in the creation of cor­

rective or remedial legislation, several cases resulted in administrative opinions that

generally equated Puerto Rican citizenship to U.S. nationality (Van Dyne 1904: 229) .

The Supreme Court also grappled with the question of the status of Puerto Rican

citizens on several occasions. As Efren Rivera Ramos notes, the Court first addressed

the status of Puerto Rican citizens in Downes, where Justice White established that

the residents of Puerto Rico could be governed as alien races until Congress enacted

legislation that incorporated the island. More specifically, Justice White argued that

Congress could either enact legislation that expressly incorporated Puerto Rico, or

implicitly by collectively naturalizing the residents of the island (Downes 182 U.S.

244, at 332- 33; Rivera Ramos 2007: 82). Rivera Ramos further argues that the Court

subsequently affirmed this interpretation in Rasmussen v. U.S., a Supreme Court ruling

establishing that the collective naturalization of the residents of Alaska had incorpo­

rated this territory (197 U.S. 516 [1905]). In other words, while the Court linked Puerto

Rico's unincorporated status to the c itizenship status of Puerto Ricans, the Court also

established that the collective naturalization of the residents of an unincorporated ter­

ritory was tantamount to the incorporation of the territory in question.

In the Gonzales ruling, the Supreme Court established that the Puerto Rican citizenship

conferred a non-alien national status on its bearer and ordered the release of Gonzalez.

Several years later, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Wi//iams took up the question

of the legal status of the Puerto Rican citizenship (192 U.S. 1 [1904D. The case arose

from a habeas corpus proceeding arising from the detention of Isabella Gonza!ez.2

Gonzalez, an "unmarried" woman was detained in New York by immigration officials

upon arrival on suspicion that she was an alien immigrant and would become a charge

for the state. Immigration officials ascribed an "alien" or immigrant status to Gonzalez,

detained her, and sought to deport her to Puerto Rico. In the Gonzales ruling, the

Supreme Court established that the Puerto Rican citizenship conferred a non-alien

national status on its bearer and ordered the release of Gonzalez. However, as several

scholars have noted, while the Court established that the Puerto Rican citizenship was

Page 10: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

64 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

tantamount to a non-alien nationality, the justices refused to explain the nature of this

status (Duffy Burnett 2008; Erman 2008). The Gonzales ruling placed Puerto Rican

citizens in a status situated somewhere between aliens and U.S. citizens.

In sum, the Puerto Rican citizenship affirmed a form of inclusive exclusion that

confined its bearer to a separate and unequal status. Indeed, the Puerto Rican citizen­

ship affirmed the inclusion of Puerto Ricans within the U.S. polity as non-alien nation­

als entitled to unequal rights. Simultaneously, the Puerto Rican citizenship excluded

the residents of the island from equal membership in the U.S. polity or more spe­

cifically from the ability to acquire U.S. citizenship. The language of Article IX of the

Treaty of Paris and Section 7 of the Foraker Act barred Puerto Ricans from acquiring

either U.S. or Spanish citizenship, ultimately confining this population to a member­

ship status located in a legal limbo between aliens and citizens.

Naturalized Citizenship, 1898- 1940

Earlier scholarship suggests that the language of Article IX and Section 7 barred Puerto

Ricans from acquiring U.S. citizenship prior to 1906 (Bothwell 1971: 55; McGovney 1934:

603). Yet, available records from the National Archives and Records Administration

(NARA) suggest that between 1900 and 1906, Federal district court judges in ew

York were accepting petitions for naturalization by Puerto Ricans. In general, prior

to 1906, Federal district court judges handled naturalization petitions and possessed

wide latitude or discretion to determine who could acquire U.S. citizenship through

naturalization. It may be the case that some judges were willing to ignore the language

of Section 7 of the Foraker Act and simply allow some Puerto Ricans to undergo the

naturalization process as aliens. However, more research is needed to establish whether

persons born in Puerto Rico to Puerto Rican parents were able to successfully undergo

the naturalization process and acquire U.S. citizenship before 1906.

In 1906, Congress enacted the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Act

(BINA) enabling island-born Puerto Ricans to formally acquire U.S. citizenship

through naturalization (34 Stat. 596). BINA established that Puerto Ricans were

"racially qualified" to acquire U.S. citizenship and contained a residential exception

enabling Puerto Ricans to migrate to a state or incorporated territory in order to

undergo a process of individual naturalization (In re Gira/de, 226 F. 826, at 3 [1915]).

More specifically, Section 30 of the act provided:

That all the applicable provisions of the naturallzatlon laws of the United States shall

apply to and be held to authorize the admission of all persons not citizens who owe

permanent allegiance to the United States, and who may become residents of any

Extending Cit1zensh1p to Puerto RJCo: Three Traditions of Inclusive Exclusion • Charles R. Venator-Santiago 65

State or organized Territory of the United States, with the following modifications: The

applicant shall not be required to renounce alleglance to any foreign sovereignty; he

shall make his declaration of Intention to become a citizen of the United States at least

two years prior to his admission; and residence within the Jurisdiction of the United

States, owing such permanent allegiance, shall be regarded as residence within the

United States within the meaning of the five year's residency clause of the existing law.

(34 Stat. 607)

More importantly, BINA enabled island-born Puerto Ricans to acquire a constitutional

citizenship as a direct result of undergoing a naturalization process in the U.S. (states and/ or incorporated territory).

BINA, however, fostered at least two socio-legal forms of inclusive exclusion. On

the one hand, island-born Puerto Ricans were now able to acquire U.S. citizenship

through an individual process of naturalization, albeit in a world where Jim Crow laws

relegated Latinos to a separate and unequal social status. Simultaneously, in order to

acquire U.S. citizenship, island-born Puerto Ricans were required to migrate to a state

or incorporated territory and establish a two-year residency, a requirement that was

beyond the reach of the masses of working-class Puerto Ricans who wished to live on

the island. This of course is not to say that working-class Puerto Ricans who perma­

nently migrated to the U.S. would not be able to acquire U.S. citizenship. In addition,

shortly after the enactment of BINA, the U.S. Department of Labor eliminated the

power of the Federal district court in Puerto Rico to grant naturalizations requiring

divorced or widowed Puerto Rican-born women who were previously married to an

alien and/ or the children of mixed marriages permanently residing in Puerto Rico to

migrate to the mainland in order to acquire U.S. citizenship through the naturalization

process (Re Hastrup, 11 PR Fed. 183, at 184 [1919]).

Almost a decade later, Congress enacted the Naval Services Appropriations Act of

1914 and included a special exception enabling eligible aliens who had served in any of

the naval branches of the armed forces to acquire a citizenship through naturalization

(38 Stat. 392). More specifically, the act provided that any "alien of the age of twenty­

one years and upward who may under existing law, become a citizen of the United

States, who has served or may hereafter serve for one enlistment of not less than four

years in the United States Navy, Marine Corps, or Revenue-Cutter Service (Coast

Guard), and received an honorable discharge, could undergo the process of naturaliza­

tion without having to previously declare an intention to acquire U.S. citizenship" (38

Stat at 395). This law effectively treated service on a naval ship as a sort of residency

in a state or incorporated territory. Soon after the law was enacted, Puerto Rican ser-

Page 11: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

66 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME X:XV • NUMBER I • 2013

vicemen began to invoke this provision in order to acquire U.S. citizenship. In 1915, a

Federal district court for the District of Maryland ruled in In re Gira/de that Puerto

Rican servicemen could use this provision to acquire U.S. citizenship and promptly

naturalized Mr. Socorro Giralde, a native of San Juan, Puerto Rico (226 F. 826, at 3).

While Judge Carter recognized that the Gonzales established that "for many pur­

poses the inhabitants of Puerto Rico" were "not aliens," he argued that the word alien

could be "employed in different senses," enabling eligible Puerto Rican servicemen to

acquire U.S. citizenship (226 F. 826, at 1).

The Jones Act provided for the collective naturalization of the permanent residents of

Puerto Rico under the terms of Section 5.

Between 1900 and 1916, Congress debated twenty-one additional citizenship bills

for Puerto Rico culminating with the enactment of the Jones Act of 1917 (39 Stat.

951; Cabranes 1979). The Jones Act provided for the collective naturalization of the

permanent residents of Puerto Rico under the terms of Section 5. However, the first

clause of Section 5 also permitted Puerto Ricans to retain their Puerto Rican citizen­

ship by making a declaration under oath of their intent before a district court. Only 288

Puerto Ricans rejected the U.S. citizenship and chose to remain Puerto Rican citizens

(Ex Parte Morales, 10 PR Fed. 395, at 397 [1918]; Bothwell Gonzalez 1979, 2: 310-3).

Moreover, Section 5 stipulated several deadlines during which time Puerto Ricans

residing outside of the island as well as alien residents (including the children of mixed

marriages) were required to declare their intention to avail themselves of the Jones Act

citizenship. In addition, Section 41 of the Jones Act reinstated the power of the Federal

district court in Puerto Rico to grant naturalizations to aliens residing in the island and

established that residency in Puerto Rico was tantamount to residence in the U.S. for

the purposes of naturalization laws (Re Semidey, 9 PR Fed. 535 [1917]).

Like prior citizenship laws, the Jones Act citizenship established a new form of

inclusive exclusion. Congress collectively naturalized the residents of Puerto Rico

without changing the territorial status of Puerto Rico. It followed that only the chil­

dren of citizens could subsequently acquire U.S. citizenship at birth. Stated differ­

ently, the Jones Act created a derivative or parental form of jus sanguinis citizenship

for Puerto Rico limiting the transmittal of U.S. citizenship to the children of citizens

(Botl1well Gonzalez 1980: 52). Additionally, Puerto Rican citizens residing abroad,

aliens, and the children of aliens permanently residing in Puerto Rico who failed to

Extending C1hzensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t10ns of lnclUSll'e ExcluSIOll • Charles R. Venator-Sanbago 67

declare their intention to acquire U.S. citizenship within the allotted time frame found

themselves unable to acquire U.S. citizenship. In some instances, as the Federal district

court in Puerto Rico noted in 1917 in Re Bauring, working-class aliens or the children

of an alien father permanently residing in Puerto Rico were simply unable to afford

the costs entailed in traveling to San Juan to declare their intention to become U.S.

citizens (10 PR Fed. 107). In other instances, women who married aliens (which most

likely entailed marrying a next-door neighbor) after the enactment of the Jones Act

lost their citizenship as a result of the prevailing doctrine of coverture. Suffice it to

say that both the nature of the Jones Act citizenship and the time restrictions placed

on the ability of non-Puerto Rican citizens to declare their intention to acquire a U.S.

citizenship fostered a new set of exclusions that would haunt the courts and Congress for the better part of a quarter of a century.

Almost immediately after the passage of the Jones Act, judges in the local courts

began to assert that the citizenship and naturalization provisions of the new organic

act had incorporated or changed the territorial status of Puerto Rico. For example, on

April 5, 1917, the Federal district court in Puerto Rico ruled in In the Matter of Garffer

that the Jones Act declared "that residents in Puerto Rico shall, for naturalization pur­

poses, be considered the same as residents elsewhere in the United States, which for

naturalization purposes, therefore, amounts to an incorporation of Porto Rico [sic] in

the United States" (9 PR Fed. 544, at 546). In addition, citing the precedents established

by the Supreme Court in Downes and Rassmussen, both the Federal district court and a

local municipal court respectively ruled in both In the Matter of Tapia (9 P.R. Fed. Rep.

452 [1917)) and Muratti v. Foote (25 D.P.R 568 [1917)) that the collective naturalization

provision of the Jones Act had implicitly incorporated Puerto Rico. However, within six

months, the Supreme Court reversed these findings in the People of Porto Rico v. Tapia (245 U.S. 639 [1918)) without providing an explanation for its reasoning and leaving

Pueno Ricans confused about their legal status within the U.S. global empire.

Several years later, Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Taft, one of the original

members of the cabal advocating for a global expansionist foreign policy, seized the

opportunity to affirm the doctrine of territorial incorporation and the ensuing inclu­

sive exclusion of naturalized Puerto Ricans residing in the island. In Balzac v. People of Porto Rico the Court addressed the question of whether a U.S. citizen charged with

libel could invoke a right to a trial by jury (258 U.S. 298 [1922]). Even though the local

Federal district court had consistently affirmed the extension of this right, and the Bill

of Rights more generally, to the island since 1898, Chief Justice Taft held that Congress

had not extended the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury to Puerto Rico. Writing

for the Court, Chief Justice Taft invoked a narrative of Anglo-American exceptional-

Page 12: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

68 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

ism to argue that the status of Puerto Rico, rather than the status of those residing in

the island, was determinative of the "application of the Constitution" (258 U.S. 298,

at 309). Congress, the Chief Justice further reasoned, held a plenary power to select

which constitutional provisions could be withheld or extended to Puerto Rico (258

U.S. 298, at 312). However, Taft continued, "should Puerto Ricans desire to move into

the United States proper" they would acquire "all political and other rights" upon

arrival (258 U.S. 298, at 311). Stated differently, even though the Congress had affirmed

the inclusion of naturalized Puerto Ricans within the U.S. polity, their citizenship sta­

tus was contingent on the status of their residence.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taft invoked a narrative of Anglo-American exceptional ism to argue that the status of Puerto Rico, rather than the status of those

residing in the island, was determinative of the "application of the Constitution."

Simultaneously, between 1914 and 1940, Congress debated and/or enacted two

strands of legislation addressing the citizenship status of Puerto Ricans. Between 1914

and 1940, lawmakers debated upwards of sixteen status and plebiscitary bills seek­

ing to change the territorial status of Puerto Rico (Trias Monge 1981). Although most

of these bills affirmed the Jones Act citizenship provision, six of the bills contained

special citizenship provisions linked to different status options. With the exception

of Representative Vito C. Marcantonio's (D-NY) H.R. 12611, a 1936 bill introduced in

Congress calling for the independence of Puerto Rico, all status and plebiscitary bills

introduced prior to 1940 affirmed the ability of Puerto Ricans to retain a U.S. citizen­

ship even if Puerto Rico became a sovereign or independent country. In the case of

Representative Marcantonio's bill, Section l provided for the creation of a special

immigration status for Puerto Ricans enabling the residents of an independent Puerto

Rico to travel back forth between the mainland and the island. In addition, during this period Congress also passed upwards of five amendments

to various immigration laws and the Jones Act seeking to correct the exclusionary

effects on Puerto Ricans who were permanently residing in the island. For example, in

1918 Congress passed an amendment to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization

Act of 1906 enabling "any Porto Rican [sic] not a citizen of the United States" who had

served in the U.S. naval forces to acquire a citizenship through naturalization regard­

less of whether he had complied with the typical residency requirements or declared

his intention to become a citizen (40 Stat. 542; Re Daniel, 10 PR Fed. 506 [1918); Ex

Extending C1t1zensh1p to Puerto R1eo: Three Traditions of Inclusive ExcluSIOll • Charles R. Venator-Sallbago 6SI

Parte Ramirez, 10 PR Fed. 549 [1918]). Moreover, between 1927 and 1940, Congress

enacted three amendments to Section 5 of the Jones Act enabling the collective

naturalization of Puerto Ricans who had acquired an anomalous citizenship status as a

result of the citizenship provision's exclusions. For example, in 1927 Congress enacted

an amendment, Section 5(a), enabling Puerto Ricans who had previously chosen to

retain a Puerto Rican citizenship to "become citizens of the United States upon the

same terms and in the same manner as is provided for the naturalization of native

Porto Ricans born of foreign parents" (44 Stat. 1418, at 1419). In 1934, Congress passed

a second amendment, Section 5(b), permitting the naturalization of Puerto Rican

women who had previously lost their U.S. citizenship as a result of marriage to an

alien (48 Stat. 1245). Finally, in 1938, Congress passed a third amendment, Section 5(c),

providing for the retroactive naturalization of the children of aliens who failed to avail

themselves of the opportunity to acquire U.S. citizenship under the terms of either

Section 5 or Section 5(a) (52 Stat. 377). In the laner case, lawmakers estimated that

upwards of 6,000 children of aliens had established permanent residency in Puerto

Rico since April 11, 1899, and had become stateless inhabitants of the island (S. Rep.

No. 75-1679, 1938, at 3). What is especially important to note about these amendments

is that lawmakers found themselves consistently having to enact corrective legislation

to naturalize permanent residents of Puerto Rico who acquired anomalous citizenship

statuses as a result of the exclusions created by the Jones Act citizenship provision and

its relationship to the island's unincorporated territorial status.

What is especially important to note about these amendments is that lawmakers found

themselves consistently having to enact corrective legislation to naturalize permanent residents of Puerto Rico who acquired anomalous citizenship statuses as a result of

the exclusions created by the Jones Act citizenship provision and its relationship to the island's unincorporated territorial status.

Extending Birthright Citizenship

In 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt charged a special interdepartmental

committee comprised of representatives from the Departments of State, Justice,

and Labor, with the revision of existing nationality, immigration, and citizenship

laws in order to compile a unified or comprehensive national ity law (President 1939:

v). The scope of the special committee included the codification of citizenship and

nationality acts for both incorporated and unincorporated territories. The report

Page 13: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

70 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

was completed in 1935 and subsequently submitted to Congress resulting in the

enactment of the ationality Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 1137). The new law established

that persons eligible to acquire U.S. citizenship and born in Puerto Rico after January

13, 1941, would acquire a jus soli or statutory form of birthright citizenship (Alvarez

Gonzalez 2009; Gonzalez Lamas 1946). The ationality Act of 1940 contained two core provisions defining the status of

Puerto Rico and its inhabitants. The Nationality Act began by establishing a distinc­

tion between the U.S. and its outlying possessions or unincorporated territories.

Section lOl(d) defined the U.S. as a geographical term that included the forty-eight

states, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (54 Stat. 1137). In con­

trast, Section lOl(e) defined the remaining territorial possessions, including Guam

and the Panama Canal Zone, as outlying possessions or unincorporated territories.

Accordingly, President Roosevelt's special committee, the original authors of the

Nationality Act, Section lOl(d), established that "bringing" Puerto Rico within the

definition of the "United States" was tantamount to the incorporation of the island

within the U.S. for the for the purpose of conferring a jus soli citizenship on persons

born in Puerto Rico after 1941; it followed that birth in Puerto Rico would now have

"the same effect as birth in the continental United States" (President 1939: 1: 4).

The Nationality Act also replaced the jus sanguinis citizenship provision of the

Jones Act with a jus soli or birthright citizenship provision establishing that all racially

eligible persons born in Puerto Rico after 1941 would acquire citizenship at birth

regardless of the citizenship status of their parents. Section 202 began by retroactively

naturalizing all persons born in Puerto Rico on or after April 11, 1899 (54 Stat. 1137, at

1139). More importantly, according to the President's special committee, Section 202

applied "the rule of jus soli to Puerto Rico as of the date of its annexation to the United

States, treating Puerto Rico for such purpose as an incorporated territory of the United

States" (President 1939: 14). Together with Section lOl(d), these provisions established

that Congress had selectively incorporated Puerto Rico for the sole purpose of extend­

ing a statutory form of jus soli citizenship. In 1948, at the behest of the Resident Commissioner Antonio Fern6s Isern (PPD/D­

PR), Congress amended Section 5(b) of the Jones Act in order to exempt Puerto Ricans

who had been naturalized prior to 1940 from expatriation under the terms of Section

404(c) of the Nationality Act of 1940 (62 Stat. 1015). Section 404(c) provided for the

expatriation of naturalized citizens who continuously resided outside of the U.S. for

five years or more. Resident Commissioner Fern6s Isern, like prior Puerto Rican

Resident Commissioners, sought to amend Section 5(b) as a cautionary measure. What

is important to note, however, is that U.S. lawmakers agreed that whereas the Jones

Extending C1t1zensh1p to Puerto Rico: Three Trad1t1011S of lnclUSlve ExcluS1on • Charles R. Venator-Sanbago 71

Act conferred a naturalized citizenship on Puerto Ricans, the Nationality Act of 1940

conferred a native or natural-born citizenship status on persons born on the island

after 1941 (H. Rep. o. 80-2210, 1948, at 2; Fern6s 1996).

Notwithstanding these changes, the Nationality Act of 1940 introduced another form

of inclusive exclusion. Whereas Congress had previously enacted legislation extending

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Virgin Islands, in the case of Puerto Rico lawmak­

ers chose to invent a statutory form of birthright citizenship to govern the residents of

the island. Although the Nationality Act of 1940 extended to Puerto Rico an inclusive

form of jus soli or birthright citizenship that conferred a native or natural-born citi­

zenship status, lawmakers refused to extend the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to Puerto Rico, a precondition for constitutional or equal citizenship.

Concluslon: Citizenship Today

Even though Congress has previously enacted legislation that selectively incorporated

Puerto Rico for the purposes of extending the right to a jus soli citizenship to the

island, lawmakers have refused to change the territorial status of the island for more

than a century. Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated territory that can be selectively

governed as a foreign locality for constitutional purposes. otwithstanding the fact

that Congress has enacted legislation conferring a jus soli or birthright citizenship on

Puerto Ricans that is tantamount to a native or natural-born citizenship status, the U.S.

global empire continues to govern Puerto Rico as a separate and unequal territorial

possession. The multiple citizenship Jaws developed to govern the island have only

reinforced the inclusive exclusion of Puerto Ricans within the U.S. global empire.

Puerto Rico remains an unincorporated territory that can be selectively governed as a

foreign locality for constitutional purposes.

Prevailing citizenship debates continue to affirm this legal history. For example, in

1989, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) introduced a Memorandum estab­

lishing that Puerto Rico was located outside of the U.S. for citizenship purposes and

Puerto Rican-born citizens had since acquired a statutory citizenship under the terms

of the Jones Act of 1917. It followed that Puerto Rican-born citizens were mere statu­

tory citizens who could not claim a Fourteenth Amendment or constitutional citizen­

ship. Thus, the CRS Memorandum concluded, Congress possessed a plenary power to

enact legislation that could unilaterally expatriate Puerto Rican-born citizens (PRF AA

..

Page 14: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

72 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

1992: 8l-6; de Passalaqua 1990). Since then, most legal and political debates over the

status of Puerto Rican-born citizens have centered on the fragility of the statutory

nature of the citizenship extended to the island (Roman 2006; Perez 2008).

In the ensuing years, Puerto Ricans have mounted at least two major legal and

political challenges to the CRS interpretation. During the early 1990s, leftist Puerto

Ricans began to travel outside of Puerto Rico and renounced their U.S. citizenship

in order claim a Puerto Rican citizenship. With the exception of the case of the late

Juan Mari Bras, the U.S. has rejected all efforts by Puerto Ricans to renounce their

U.S. citizenship in favor of acquiring a Puerto Rican citizenship (Lozada Colon v. U.S. Dept. of State, 2 F. Supp. 2d 43 [1998)). Alternatively, in 1998, Jennifer Efron, a Puerto

Rican-born citizen residing in the state of Florida, sought to acquire a constitutional

citizenship by undergoing the U.S. naturalization process (Efron ex rel. Efron v. U.S.,

1 F. 2d 1468 [1998]). Efron argued that she feared that a future Congress might enact

plebiscitary legislation that collectively denaturalized persons born in Puerto Rico and

she sought to acquire a constitutional citizenship through naturalization. She reasoned

that a naturalized citizenship would protect her from unilateral expatriation. A year

later, affirming a lower court ruling, without providing an explanation, the Supreme

court rejected Efron's effort to undergo a naturalization process and denied her the

ability to acquire a constitutional citizenship [Efron ex rel. Efron v. U.S., 528 U.S. 987

[1999)). In sum, the U.S. global empire presently confines Puerto Rican-born citizens to

a separate and unequal citizenship status and rejects efforts by Puerto Ricans to either

renounce this status or acquire a constitutional status.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS r am indebted to the staffs of the Library of the United States Department of the Interior and

the Law Library of Congress for their assistance and consistent support in this project. Several

research grants from the University of Connecticut's Research Foundation and the Center for

Latin American and Caribbean Studies provided me with the necessary resources to conduct

this research. I am also grateful for the insightful critiques provided by the blind reviewers and

Xavier F. Totti's patience with my delays.

NOTES 1 In 1898 the U.S. possessed 5 territories which were subsequently admitted into the Union

(New Mexico, Arizona, Oklahoma, Hawaii and Alaska). All were acquited/ annexed before 1898,

but granted statehood/admission into the union after 1898. 2 In court documents Gonza.Iez's appears as Gonzales. For the purpose of this paper, Gonza.Iez

refers to the person and Gonzales to the legal case.

Extending Citizenship to Puerto Rico: Three Traditions of lnclUS1ve Exclusion • Charles R. Venator-Santiago 73

REFERENCES

LAWS AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Amendment to Organic Act of Puerto Rico of 1948, Public Law 776, chapter 649, 80th Cong., 2nd

sess., U.S. Statutes at Large 62 (1948), 1015.

Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1906, Public Law 338, 59th Cong., 1st sess., U.S.

Statutes at Large 34 (1906): 596.

Dingley Act of 1897, chapter 11, U.S. Statutes at Large 30 (1897): lSl.

Foraker Act of 1900, chapter 191, S6th Cong., 1st sess., U.S. Statutes at Large 31 (1900), 77.

Jones Act ofl917, Public Law 368, chapter 368, 64th Cong., 2nd sess, U.S. Statutes at Large 39 (1917), 9Sl.

Insular Passports Act ofl902, Public Law 1S8, chapter 1088, 57th Cong., 1st sess., U.S. Statutes at

Large 32 (June 14, 1902), 386.

Nationality Act of 1940, Public Law 8S3, chapter 876, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., US. Statutes at Large

54 (October 14, 1940), 1137.

Naturalization of Aliens Act of 1918, Public Law 144, chapter 69, 6Sth Cong., 2nd sess., U.S.

Statutes at Large 40 (1918), S42.

Naval Service Appropriations Act of 1914, Public Law 121, chapter 130, 63rd Cong., 2nd sess., U.S.

Statutes at Large 38 (1914), 392.

Porto Rico Civil Government Revenues Act of 1927, Public Law 797, chapter 503, §Sa, 69th Cong.,

2nd sess., U.S. Statutes at Large 44 (1927), 1418.

Puerto Rico Civil Government Act of 1934, Public Law 477, chapter 845, §Sb, 73rd Cong., 2nd

sess., U.S. Statutes at Large 48 (1934), 1245.

Puerto Rico Civil Government Act of 1938, Public Law S21, chapter 225, §Sc, 7Sth Cong., 3rd sess.,

U.S. Statutes at Large 52 (1938), 377.

Senator Platt of Connecticut, speaking during ratification of Treaty of Paris of 1898, on

December 19, 1899, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record 32, part l: 296.

Senator Spooner of Wisconsin, speaking for the Foraker Act of 1900, on April 2, 1900, H.R. 8245,

56th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record 33, part 4: 3629.

United States Congress. House of Representatives. Annual Reports of the War Department for

the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900, Part 13: Report of the Military Governor of Porto

Rico on Civil Affairs, 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 1902, H. Doc. 2, Part 13.

____ Revised Statutes of the United States, 1873-1874, 43rd Cong., 1st sess. Washingron:

Government Printing Office, 1878.

----·· House of Representatives. Amendment to the Revised Statutes Relating to Passports,

S7th Cong., 1st sess., 1902, H. Rept. SS9.

---- ·House of Representatives. Message From the President of the United States on the

Nationality Laws of the United States, 3 Parts, 76th Cong., 1st sess., 1939, House

Committee Print.

---·House of Representatives. Amending the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, 80th Cong., 2nd

sess., 1948, H. Rept. 2210.

--- ·Senate. Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between

the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, Volume 2, 6lst Cong., 2nd

sess., 1910, S. Doc. 357.

Page 15: Centro de Estudios Puertorriqueiios - smjegupr.netsmjegupr.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Extending-Citizenship-to...Humberto Garcia Muiiiz, Universidad de Puerto Rico-Rio Piedras

74 CENTRO JOURNAL • VOLUME XXV • NUMBER I • 2013

_ ___ Senate. Citizenship for the Inhabitants of the Virgin Islands, 69th Cong., 1st sess., 1926,

S. Rept. 650.

_ ___ Senate. Correcting United States Citizenship Status of Certain Persons Born in Puerto

Rico, 75th Cong., 3rd sess., 1938, S. Rept. 1679.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Alvarez GonzaJez, Jose Julian. 2009. Derecho constitucional de Puerto Rico y relaciones constituciona/es con los Estados Unidos, casos y materiales. Bogota: Editorial Temis, SA.

Bickel, Alexander M. 1973. Citizenship in the American Constitution. Arizona Law Review 15: 369-89.

Bothwell GonzaJez, Reece B. 1971. Trasfondo constitucional de Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras, PR:

Editorial Universitaria.

____ 1979. Puerto Rico: cien alias de /ucha politico. 5 Vols. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial Universitaria

____ 1980. La ciudadania en Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial Universitaria.

Cabranes, Jose A. 1979. Citizenship and the American Empire, Notes on the Legislative History of

the United States Citizenship of Puerto Ricans. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Deloria Jr., Vine, and David E. Wilkins. 1999. Tribes, Treaties Et Constitutional Tribulations.

Austin: University of Texas Press.

de Passalacqua, John L.A. 1990. The Involuntary Loss of United States Citizenship of Puerto

Ricans Upon Accession to Independence by Puerto Rico. Denver Journal of

International Law and Policy 19: 139-60.

Duffy Bumen, Christina, and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution. Durham, N.C.: Duke IJniversity Press.

____ 2008. "They say I am not American ... ": The Noncitizen National and the Law of

American Empire. Virginia Journal of International Law 48: 659-718.

Erman, Sam. 2008. Meanings of Citizenship in the U.S. Empire: Puerto Rico, Isabel Gonzalez,

and the Supreme Court, 1898-1905. Journal of American Ethnic History 27(4): 5-33.

Fem6s, Antonio. 1996. La ciudadania nacional de los puertorriqueiios. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Situm.

Getches, David H., Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. Williams, Jr. 1998. Cases and Materials

on Federal Indian Law. 4th Edition. St. Paul, MN: West Group.

Gettys, Luella. 1934. The Law of Citizenship in the United States. Chicago: The University of

Chicago Press.

GonzaJez Lamas, Antonio. 1946. Adquisici6n y perdida de la ciudadania de Estados Unidos por los

natural es de Puerto Rico. Revista de derecho, legislaci6n y jurisprudencia 9( 4): 209-29.

Gould, Lyman J. 1969. La /ey Foraker, raices de las poUtica colonial de /os Escados Unidos. Rio

Piedras, PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.

Grupo de Investigadores Puertorriquenos. 1984. Breakthrough From Colonialism: An Interdisciplinary Study of Statehood. 2 vols. Rlo Piedras, PR: Editorial de la

Universidad de Puerto Rico.

Haney Lopez, Ian F. 1996. White by Law, The Legal Construction of Race. New York: New York

University Press.

LaFeber, Walter. 1986. The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World Power. Political Science Quarterly 101(5): 705-18.

Extending C1bzensh1p to Puerto R!Co: Ttvee Trad1t1011S of lncluswe Exclusion • Charles R. Venator·Sanbago 75

Mahan, Alfred T. 1898. The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. Boston: Little,

Brown and Company.

McGovney, Dudley 0. 1934. Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They? California Law Review 22: 593-635.

Norgren, Jill.1996. The Cherokee Cases, The Confrontation of Law and Politics. New York:

McGraw-Hill, Inc.

Ophir, Adi, Michael Givoni, and Sari Hanafi, eds. 2009. The Power of Inclusive Ex-c/usion,

Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. New York: Zone Books.

Perez, Lisa Maria. 2008. Note: Citizenship Denied: The Insular Cases and the Fourteenth

Amendment. Virginia Law Review 94: 1029-81.

Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration. 1992. Puerto Rico: Political Status Referendum, 1989-1991. Vol. II. Washington, D.C.

Raustiala, Kai. 2009. Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? The Evolution of Territoriality in American Law. New York: Oxford University Press.

Rivera Ramos, Efren. 2007. American Colonialism in Puerto Rico: The Judicial and Social Legacy. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers.

Rodriguez Beruff, Jorge. 2007. Strategy as Politics: Puerto Rico on the Eve of the Second World War. Rio Piedras, PR: La Editorial.

Roman, Ediberto. 2006. The Other American Colonies, An International and Constitutional Law

Examination of the United States' Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Island Conquests. Durham, C: Carolina Academic Press.

Rossiter, Clinton. 2004. Constitutional Dictatorship, Crisis Government in the Modern

Democracies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Shulman, Mark Russell. 1995. Nava/ism and the Emergence of American Sea Power, 1882-1893. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.

Torruella, Juan R.1988. The Supreme Court and Puerto Rico, The Doctrine of Separate and

Unequal. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.

Trias Monge, Jose. 1981. Historia Constitucional de Puerto Rico. Vol. II. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial

Universitaria.

United States. Congressional Research Service.1985.Admission of States Into the Union After the Original Thirteen: A Brief History and Analysis of the Statehood Process. Prepared

by Peter B. Sheridan, Government Division, Congressional Research Service, 85-765

GOV. Washington, DC.

United Scates General Accounting Office. 1997. U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S.

Constitution, GAO/OGC 98-5. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Van Dyne, Frederick. 1904. Citizenship of the United States. New York: The Lawyer's

Cooperative Publishing Co.

Willoughby, William F. 1905. Territories and Dependencies of the United States, Their Government and Administration. New York: The Century Co.

Weisenfeld, Joy P. 1975. The Conditional Nature of Derivative Citizenship. University of California-Davis Law Review 8: 345-75.